THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100240009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 26, 1976
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 100310a101 ? c:IA-RnPRSTnn-35 JR600100240009-1
January 26, 1976
SUBJECT: The Present Military Situation in Angola.
2.. MPLA and Cuban forces have already destroyed the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in the north; the Front is not likely
to pose a significant conventional military threat to the MPLA in the
near future, though it may fight on as a guerrilla movement.
perhaps within the next several weeks. We believe that this outcome is
likely, although it will fall short of a total victory in that at least
small-scale guerrilla and insurgent activity will probably continue.
conventional: military victory -over their opponents in the very near"f.uture,
1. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA),
reinforced by about 11,000 Cuban troops and a continuing flow of Soviet
military equipment; now holds a clear superiority of military power in
Angola. The MPLA's military leaders are convinced that they can win a
3 The MPLA side is confident that it can win a similar victory
central and southern Angola, and the MPLA and Cubans are. now regrouping
their forces for a concerted offensive against UNITA. This judgment
of the MPLA is almost certainly correct. Although UNITA can be expected 25X1
to put up stiff resistance, it does not have --- without the combat par- 2 5X1
ticipation and heavy weapons of South African forces -- the ability to,
withstand the combined Cuban and MPLA forces. UNITA's military position
has been seriously undermined by the withdrawal of more than 1,000 South
African troops and advisors. Even a continuation of covert South African
material assistance is not likely to shore up UNITA significantly as a
conventional military force.
over the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in
4. Given the present situation, the remaining forces in Angola
opposing the ULA cannot expect to receive any significant increase of
aid -- either materiel. or manpower --- from Zaire, Zambia, South Africa
or other nations. These nations are all in the process of rethinking
their policies toward Angola and related questions. They are in every
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case more likely to make an accommodation to what they see as an
emerging new situation in southern Africa, than they are to expand
their support to the UNITA and FNLA in an effort to preserve what they
now think is unpreservable.
5. In sum, as the situation now stands, there is little to prevent
the MPLA side from winning a conventional military victory, and in farily
short order. There=is,every indication that Soviet and Cuban aid will
continue to arrive in Angola in amounts regarded by Moscow and Havana
as necessary to finish the job quickly. While the MPLA over the short
term probably cannot totally eliminate guerrilla activity by its rivals,
the MPLA and Cubans will be able to consolidate their military position
throughout Angola. They will also succeed in tightening their adminis-
trative grip on Angola's major urban and economic centers and gaining
control over the Benguela railroad. They will, at least initially, leave
the rural population to fend for itself as the Portuguese did before.
Finally, they will probably avoid a direct military confrontation with
South Africa by not challenging, with conventional forces, the South
African forces in the far south of Angola around the Cunene hydroelectric
project.
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