NATO'S DECEMBER MINISTERIAL: MANY PROBLEMS, FEW SOLUTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100120003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 9, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
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Intelligence Memorandum
NATO's December Ministerial: Many Problems, Few Solutions
Secret
`34
December 9, 1974
No. 1153/74
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Classified by 005827
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December 9, 1974
NATO's December Ministerial: Many Problems, Few Solutions
Summary
NATO's foreign and defense ministers, when they meet in Brussels this week,
will be taking a hard look at the viability of the alliance. That the members will
confront such a difficult topic directly indicates that NATO as a mechanism for
political consultation is functioning well. That this topic needs to be dealt with at all
is an index of the gravity of the alliance's overall condition.
The period from the ministerial last June to the December gathering has been
one of unusual turbulence. In the summer, NATO was confronted with the very real
possibility that two of its members, Greece and Turkey, might be opposing each
other in a war. The alliance's handling of that difficult situation in part provoked
Greece's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command.
This fall, the presence of Communists in the government of Portugal caused
NATO to cut off the flow of nuclear information to Lisbon and to ease the
Portuguese out of the alliance's nuclear planning machinery. Further decisions about
how to handle the Portuguese will be influenced by an awareness that a similar
situation could conceivably arise in the case of other members.
As a backdrop to these events, the economic situation in many NATO coun-
tries has deteriorated steadily. Already, the defense efforts of some have been
affected, and many observers fear that far more serious consequences are still to
come.
The conclusions the ministers draw about the state of the alliance will have a
bearing on their evaluation of detente. Although all NATO members espouse the
goals of detente, there have been few concrete accomplishments to point to
recently, other than the US-Soviet agreement on SALT principles at Vladivostok.
The ministers will be assessing the prospects for concluding the slow-moving Euro-
pean security conference and for making progress at the stalled force reduction
talks.
Hanging over the conference will be the threat of renewed conflict in the
Middle East. The West European ministers will be interested in the US assessment of
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Current Intelligence,
i
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the situation, and may seek guarantees that they will be consulted about US
activities in the event of a new Middle East crisis.
The defense ministers will meet on December 10 and 11 as the Defense
Planning Committee. On the evening of December 10, some of them will convene as
the Nuclear Planning Group. The foreign ministers will meet as the North Atlantic
Council on December 12 and 13. The results of the meetings are not likely to be
dramatic. Bold initiatives would require a degree of political will that is not much in
evidence in most NATO governments this December.
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The Greek Withdrawal
In August, when Athens announced that it was pull-
ing out of NATO's integrated military command, the al-
liance's integrity was threatened as it had not been
since the French military withdrawal in 1966. It is
still difficult to gauge the impact of Greece's deci-
sion because the withdrawal itself has been only par-
tially implemented. Nevertheless, the foreign minis-
ters will be trying to assess the damage and seeking
ways to repair it. They will no doubt conclude that
the Greek withdrawal has had serious but not disastrous
consequences for NATO's southern defenses, and they
will probably opt for caution in dealing with the
Karamanlis regime, in the hope of wooing Greece back
into the NATO fold.
To date, there have been two important consequences
of Greece's withdrawal. First, Greek armed forces are
no longer under NATO command. At worst, this means that
they cannot be counted on in the event of an attack on
the alliance that does not involve a threat to Greece
itself. Secondly, Greek and Turkish bilateral coopera-
tion in the areas of communications and planning has
ended. This cooperation was a basic element in NATO's
defense concept for its southern flank.
Apart from these facts, Greece's intentions re-
garding the implementation of the military withdrawal
are unclear. Two developments in recent weeks have
added to the mystery. Greece announced its intention
to cease sending representatives to the Defense Planning
Committee, the Defense Review Committee, the Executive
Working Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group. Subsequently,
however, Greek representatives in Brussels participated
in the activities of some of these bodies. In another
strange move, the Greeks indicated that they still wish
to occupy the honorary presidency of the North Atlantic
Council at the December ministerial sessions and at the
sessions scheduled for next June.
One interpretation of the ambiguous Greek behavior
is that Karamanlis wished to wait until after the mid-
November election before deciding how to proceed. Having
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achieved a clear victory, he could now decide to re-
verse the earlier decision to withdraw-a development
the other NATO members would welcome but do not ex-
pect. More likely, Athens will enter into a lengthy
series of negotiations with the alliance to decide the
precise terms of Greece's future relationship.
As they have since the Greek with-.drawal announce-
ment, the other NATO members will want to proceed very
carefully. They will be inclined to aet Athens initiate
action to resolve the myriad of questions about the
relationship. The precise connection between Greek
forces and NATO, including Greek participation in NATO
military planning, will need to be determined. The
members will have to decide whether allied forces and
facilities can continue on Greek soil and whether Greek
airspace can still be used. The future of US facilities
L.n Greece will need to be discussed both bilaterally and
in a NATO context. Greek participation in NATO's early
warning air defense system and in various NATO communica-
tions systems are other unresolved questions.
The ministers next week may also give some thought
to whether the attenuated Greek relationship with NATO
presages similar moves toward partial participation by
other alliance members. The difficulties with Portugal
in the nuclear information area and the pressures on the
Dutch to reduce defense spending, and consequently their
NATO role, are giving the alliance particular concern in
this regard.
Portugal
The current political situation in Portugal, which
could also lead ultimately to a withdrawal, represents
another threat to the integrity of NATO. Even if Lisbon
remains in the alliance, as most of the provisional gov-
ernment's leaders claim to want to do, its continued mem-
bership has serious long-term implications.
The alliance has recently decided to cut off the
flow of nuclear information to Lisbon and has eased the
-ortuguese out of the Nuclear Planning Group. The
ostensible reason is the lax security situation in
Lisbon, but the real concern of many N. TO members centers
on the presence of Communists in the Portuguese govern-
ment.
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At their meetings, the ministers will be weighing
this concern against the danger that NATO actions might
stir up anti-NATO sentiment in Lisbon. By and large,
the restrictions placed on the Portuguese have not pro-
voked such a response so far, largely because the gov-
ernment has handled the situation in a low-key manner.
Nevertheless, Portuguese leaders clearly are not happy
with the situation,
The problem of Portuguese access to nuclear infor-
mation seems to have been solved for the time being:
no such information is being sent to Lisbon. Persua-
sion and postponement of the scheduled October meeting
finally convinced the Portuguese that they should withdraw
gracefully from the Nuclear Planning Group. Yet it is
not clear how long Lisbon will agree to its exclusion
from this important area of alliance activity. The
Portuguese may, for example, claim at some point that
the security situation in Lisbon has improved and that
they therefore should again begin receiving nuclear in-
formation. This might force other NATO countries to
make clear that the real problem is the presence of
Communists in the Lisbon government.
The alliance will have to consider seriously the
implications of setting predecents on such an issue.
Some ministers are already wondering what NATO would
do if confronted with Communists in the governments of
other member states. While there is a legitimate con-
cern about NATO security, there is equally the danger
that NATO, in trying to protect its interests, may add
to those pressures already pushing some members toward
a curtailed role in the alliance.
The Economic Pinch
The deteriorating economic situation in the member
countries will be a key topic of discussion. The min-
isters will discuss, in closed session, the likelihood
that economic difficulties will have an adverse impact
on the maintenance of NATO defenses, and they may con-
sider possible remedies. They will have read a report
from NATO's economic committee which concludes that,
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while the military potential of the Warsaw Pact; is
..likely to increase rapidly, the resources available
for defense in most NATO countries can. only be ex-
pected to increase slowly.
The annual review of national de"ense efforts
in NATO's Defense Review Committee has already re-
vealed a number of disturbing developments:
--The Dutch are trying to reduce their nu-
clear responsibilities to NATO, as was shown
by their recent decision to purchase only
the non-nuclear version of the Lance tacti-
cal missile system. Last May, the Dutch
also revealed plans to make substantial
reductions in their active duty -forces.
--Italy has announced its intention to re-
duce the number of conscripts drafted an-
nually and to reduce their period of serv-
ice from 15 to 12 months.
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ome NATO observers are afraid that such develop-
ments, which individually might not be cataclysmic,
represent a pattern that will eventually sap the
alliance's military strength. Rampant inflation
and other economic difficulties, when combined with
a domestic political atmosphere that makes cuts in
defense spending more popular than reductions in. social
programs, may lead NATO countries to make decisions
that could lower the effectiveness of their military
forces and the contribution they are willing to make
to the alliance.
in addition to the direct impact e economic
problems on defense, the ministers plan to discuss
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such related matters as the implications of economic
deterioration for the political and social stability
of member countries and possible effects on allied
solidarity. They will also consider implications for
the East-West balance of power, particularly the pos-
sibility that the West's bargaining position could be
eroded.
NATO Secretary General Luns, for one, believes
that many of the allies are exaggerating their eco-
nomic difficulties and are unnecessarily curtailing
their defense efforts. In a recent discussion with
NATO ambassadors, he acknowledged that the economic
ills of the UK, Italy, and Greece would probably
force them to cut back on their defense efforts. But
he maintained that Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium,
West Germany, the US, and Norway had all become
economically stronger during the last year and that
they should be willing to do more for NATO. He pro-
fessed an inability to understand why the allies could
not achieve a real increase in defense spending every
year when the Soviets were able to do so consistently.
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Specialization and Rationalization: A Way Out?
The Dutch suggested more than a year ago that a
possible way out of the economic bind is to concen-
trate on "specializing" defense tasks (assigning
responsibilities for certain tasks entirely to one
or two countries). Dutch Defense Minister Vredeling
has made the point that, if NATO does not make pro-
gress along these lines, the smaller members of the
alliance will soon be unable to fulfill their defense
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responsibilities. He has even talked of his country
being forced to eliminate one branch of its armed
forces. Another Dutch official has said, in what
other NATO members are treating as hyperbole, that
the smaller countries might eventually decide that
they can no longer afford the price of NATO member-
ship and pull out.
The allies greeted the Netherlands' specializa-
tion initiative with some interest, and NATO has been
working to determine which tasks can be accomplished
in this manner. Several members, however, think that
specialization does not really answer NATO's problems.
The Danish ambassador to NATO, for example, has
hypothesized that if NATO attempts to standardize its
weapons, the major allies will get all the contracts.
With regard to specialization of defense tasks, he has
:aid that the flank countries would feel uneasy about
relying on foreigners for crucial portions of their
defense. The Dutch ambassador himself has admitted that
specialization would not immediately result in savings,
since many of the steps that might be taken would re-
quire fairly substantial initial outla=:rs.
At the Brussels meeting, the defense ministers
will weigh the meager efforts the alliance has already
taken in the area of specialization. They will also be
looking at progress in "rationalization," the attempt
to increase efficiency by specializing defense tasks
and standardizing weapons. NATO has begun studies in
three areas--consolidation of training, consolidation
of communications, and support of wartime lines of com-
munication--but the ministers are not expected to ap-
prove any new efforts.
Detente
The highlight of the discussions will no doubt be
the US report on the Vladivostok summit, particularly
Washington's assessment of the agreement reached on
SALT principles. The West European allies will be
doing some hard thinking about how the SALT developments
might affect the European security conference and the
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force reduction talks. The possibility of including
US foward-based nuclear systems in the force reduction
negotiations will be a subject of particular concern
to the West Europeans.
The basic principles of detente will not be
questioned at the ministerial because, in the words
of a Danish representative in Brussels, detente is as
non-controversial as motherhood. The West Europeans
have no fundamental differences with the US on that
issue and in recent committee papers have acknowledged
the overwhelming importance to detente in general of
US-Soviet bilateral dealings. Some of the allies,
nevertheless, stress that the US and the West Europeans
perceive detente in quite different ways, and this
theme is likely to be heard again at the ministerial.
The French have been the most vocal on this point,
using arguments that can be traced back at least to
De Gaulle. At a recent meeting, a French representative
maintained that Western Europe's geographical situation
leads to a natural tendency on the part of some Euro-
peans to stress defense rather than detente. To the
West Europeans, the threat of Soviet control of Europe
is a matter of survival, while the US merely "senses"
the danger. He was afraid, therefore, that superpower
detente might eventually go so far as to produce an
agreement that would not take West European interests
sufficiently into account.
Despite this fear, the French have joined the allied
consensus concerning the importance of US-Soviet detente.
One Frenchman has remarked that "without it, we would all
be destroyed." The French have nevertheless made clear
that their national detente policies are in no way
dependent on relations between the US and the Soviet
Union.
The Italians seem to share the French concerns.
Drawing on remarks of Secretary Kissinger to the ef-
fect that the results of detente should be judged on
a global basis, an Italian representative asked re-
cently whether this approach posed possible dangers
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t:.'Jr the West Europeans. He suggested that the US
,.in accept negative results in some negotiations in
-Oder to obtain positi~-e results in others. The West
Europeans, on the other hand, tend to seek a balance
f)etween the positive and negative in each negotiation
in which they are involved. He pointed in particular
1_:= the European security conference, where the West
i~auropeans have long felt that the US has not taken a
sufficiently hard line,
The West Europeans will probably be revealing more
than a little bit of impatience and frustration during
the detente discussion. They have long attached great
importance to reaching meaningful agreements at the
European security conference, and in recent months many
of them have developed a new interest in progress at
+tthe force reduction negotiations. Both sets of talks,
A.r which the allies have so much at stake, are progressing
lowly .
Within the last three weeks, the European security
conference in Geneva has registered progress for the
first time in several months. The US thinks that if
:he Soviets continue to show signs of flexibility, it
may be possible to conclude the substantive work of
he conference by next spring. The French also seem
3.K1 believe that further modifications in Soviet policy
toward conference issues can be expected.
The rest of the NATO allies dismiss recent signs
of Soviet flexibility as no more than the usual tactic
of trying to induce forward movement just before a
recess. They are not convinced the Soviets will. con-
tinue to be accommodating when the talks resume in
January. At a recent NATO meeting, many of the allies
agreed that they should continue to negotiate with
":tenacity and patience" since progress at the confer-
ence has been achieved through Western "firmness,
determination, and cohesion."
While it may be possible to hold out at the se-
curity conference on the basis of principle, hard
realities are coming to bear on the Vienna force
ioduction talks. in Vienna, it is the West Europeans
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who may soon be arguing for changes in the Western
position. Several West European governments, faced
with deteriorating economic situations and little
public support for a high level of defense spending,
have come to perceive the force reduction talks as a
useful vehicle for making troop cuts in a multilateral
setting. This new interest on the part of the West
Europeans increasingly overshadows their earlier basic
concern that the negotiations not restrict the pos-
sibilities for future European defense cooperation.
At this point, the potential of the negotiations to
produce defense savings makes the allies restless
about the stalemate in Vienna and anxious to consider
changes in the Western negotiating position that might
produce progress.
The possibility of linking the force reduction
negotiations with the European security conference,
which has already had considerable discussion within
the alliance at US initiative, may come up at the
ministerial. The idea would be to turn around the
Soviet suggestion that the force reduction talks can
go nowhere until the security conference has concluded
and to threaten, instead, to hold back the security
conference until the Soviets are forthcoming at the
force reduction talks. The allies have tentatively
concluded that linkage of this sort would not be ef-
fective now, although it might be considered again at
some future point. They are afraid that such a move
might result in deadlocks at both conferences, adverse
public and parliamentary reactions, and a negative im-
pact on detente in general. At the security conference
itself, the allies are afraid that the Soviets would be
given an opportunity to drive a wedge into NATO unity
and possibly to pick up support from some neutral and
nonaligned countries, which would be alienated by any
allied tactic that slowed down the security conference.
Planning for NATO Forces
One of the main items on the agenda of the defense
ministers this December will be "key elements of minis-
terial guidance." It is NATO practice for the defense
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ministers to provide the alliance's defense planners
wit.n "guidance" to assist them in setting NATO force
goals for a five-year period. The process of agreeing
uon such guidance has normally been routine, sparking
',Jt_t.ie controversy, For the planning period 1977-1982,
however, the US has recommended that NATO adopt a long-
term defense concept in place of the usual guidance,
and some fairly heated discussions of strategy have
resulted. The concept as a whole does not need to be
approved until the ministerials next spring, but cer-
tain "key elements" will be taken up it the December
meetings.
The controversy so far has centered on the emphasis
the US gave to NATO's conventional forces in a preliminary
draft. Despite protestations of US representatives that
the draft concentrated on conventional forces because
they are the ones that need the most work, some allies
thought that the US had basic strategic changes in mind
and was attempting to effect them outside the normal
NATO machinery. The West Germans, Belgians, and British
a.LI stressed that NATO's strategy was based on a triad
of conventional forces and strategic and tactical-nu-
clear elements, and that to stress conventional forces
was to place the other elements of the triad into ques-
tt on. They were particularly concerned that the cred-
ibility of the nuclear deterrent might decline. They
a i maintained that they recognized the need for im-
proving conventional forces, but they wished to be sure
that this was done without putting the triad out of
balance.
Behind the criticism of the US paper is a con-
ci_nuing concern on the part of the West Europeans that
the US might limit its response in the event of a con-
ventional Soviet attack on Europe. A number of recent
events, beginning with the 1973 US-Soviet agreement on
the prevention of nuclear war, have generated this sort
of anxiety. In the present instance, wording changes
a.ri the US draft and assurances that Washington is still
a firm believer in the triad concept have somewhat as-
suaged the fears. Nevertheless, some defense ministers
at the December meeting are likely to stress once again
t,_he importance of maintaining the current NATO strategy.
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Suspicion that the US might be prepared to have its
forward-based nuclear-capable systems in Europe covered
in a force reduction agreement resulting from the Vienna
talks could add to the nuclear anxiety of the West
Europeans.
As the December ministerial approaches, NATO is
plagued by increasing pressures. There are problems
of the sort presented by Greece and Portugal, in which
the integrity of the alliance is directly threatened.
And there are pressures such as those created by the
economic difficulties that member states are experi-
encing, in which the threat to the alliance is every
bit as direct, and even more serious. NATO members
are increasingly realizing that the press of economic
circumstances could so reduce their defense efforts
that the strength of the alliance could be dangerously
sapped.
Neither sort of pressure seems likely to go away,
and both show every sign of intensifying. NATO can
probably do little about situations of the Portuguese
and Greek type, except to handle them as flexibly and
deftly as possible. Steps could be taken, however, to
head off the effects on NATO defenses of the economic
pinch. Yet the members seem unprepared to move. A
recent report of the Defense Planning Committee called
the problems grave but the opportunities great, and
stated that what is required is a firm commitment on
the part of each NATO member, enforced from the high-
est levels. But it is precisely that kind of com-
mitment and enforcement that is presently lacking
in the governments of many of the allies. There is
a paucity of political will, a reluctance to move
forward with solutions that are both logical and bold.
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