QUITO: NOT JUST ANOTHER CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00353R000100110002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 4, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
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C0
Intelligence Memorandum
Quito: Not Just Another Conference
Secret
November 4, 1974
No. 1143/74
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Quito: Not Just Another Conference
Summary
November 4, 1974
The OAS foreign ministers meeting at Quito on November 8-11 will probably
run according to the plan of its sponsors and result in the end of the ten-year-old
sanctions against Cuba. There is, however, a significant risk that the conference may
be contentious and inconclusive. If the minority wishing to maintain the sanctions
presses too hard on its case that Havana is still a subversive threat, Castro's advocates
will be tempted to counter with charges of US intervention in the hemisphere.
Another problem lies in confusion among the countries that normally follow the US
lead on such issues. Unsure of the "correct" course, many are inclined to abstain,
leaving the sponsors of the resolution up for vote increasingly uncertain that they
have the two-thirds majority to win.
Eleven governments are sure affirmatives in favor of lifting the sanctions; three
are certain nays. Most others are inclined to join the majority, but all are wobbling
to some degree.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
f the Office of Current Intelligence,
i
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The OAS foreign ministers meeting at Quito will
be a watershed in inter-American affairs. If the
conference plays out according to its authors' design,
the 1964 resolutions censuring Cuba will be rescinded
and the anomaly of the widely flouted sanctions against
Havana will be removed. The resulting juridical free-
dom of OAS members to decide freely and without stigma
whether or not to associate with the Castro regime
will give extra force to the broadly held view that
the entire system of inter-Americanism needs overhaul.
The revised status of Cuba vis-a-vis the OAS will in-
crease the sense of urgency among many Latin Ameri-
cans to develop a more effective regional vehicle
through which to influence US policy toward the rest
of the hemisphere.
The conference comes at a time of uneasiness in
US - Latin American relations and presents a signifi-
cant risk of retrogression to the adversary spirit on
the part of Latin America toward the US that charac-
terized hemispheric assemblies before the opening of
a new dialogue last year. While most of the partici-
pants seem determined or at least willing to stick to
the issue at hand, a small provocation--whether unin-
tended or planned--might break this discipline. Re-
cent differences between the US and Latin governments
over resource policy, the elusiveness of substantive
progress to fit the rhetoric of the new dialogue, and
publicity over clandestine activities by US agencies
in Latin America have together served to renew the old
fears and skepticisms about US intentions toward the
region. With the problem of the US a more serious
matter for examination than the problem of Cuba to the
minds of some of the foreign ministers in attendance,
the conference has considerable potential for contention.
The OAS and the Sanctions Issue
The OAS is held in low esteem by many, probably
most, of its own members because of the plodding,
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over-formalized procedures that hamper so much of its
work. Yet many of its humanitarian functions, and
particularly the security protection of the Rio Treaty,
are valued highly. For example, the small republic of
Costa Rica, which supports no army, has more than once
invoked treaty protection when its borders were
threatened. More lately, the OAS played a modest role
in ending hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras.
The sanctions against Cuba, imposed in 1964, also were
adopted under the rubric of the Rio Treaty.
The growing ineffectiveness of these sanctions,
as country after country found the censure of Cuba no
longer in its interest, triggered alarm over the
wasting integrity of the Rio Treaty. When Colombia
and Venezuela (the latter the complainant in the 1964
action against Cuba) appeared on the 'verge of becoming
the eighth and ninth OAS members to have diplomatic
connections with Cuba, Costa Rica induced them to de-
lay pending a review of the sanctions issue.
These three countries--Costa Rica=, Colombia, and
Venezuela--having agreed to co-sponsor the initiative
to rescind the 1964 resolutions, carefully picked their
way through the minefield of differing views toward
Cuba. They contrived a bland resolution that invoked
various regional "motherhood" issues such as peace,
ideological pluralism, and non-intervention--and em-
phasized that a vote to rescind merely frees members
to associate with Cuba or not, as they choose. Even
governments still hostile to the Castro regime have
been ill at ease with their obstruction of sister re-
publics that want to open the door to Cuba. This dis-
comfort, along with preoccupation that the Rio Treaty
was faced with irreparable damage, created an accom-
modating atmosphere; in September, all OAS members
concurred in the motion that the foreign ministers meet
to resolve the Cuba issue. Most expected consensus to
reign at Quito as well.
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The effort to handle the sanctions issue as a
procedural matter to tidy up both OAS and Rio Treaty
irregularities has run into some rough weather. For
a few of the countries, the question of Cuban subver-
sion* remains a substantive issue. A larger problem
is the current international atmosphere. Inter-Amer-
ican meetings and even bilateral dealings are no
longer single, independent events, but are evaluated
by many of the governments against a backdrop of
shifting alliances, of political affinities outweighed
by economic practicalities, and of new opportunities
for small or poor countries to wield influence through
bloc politics. The narrowest context in which the
Quito conference will occur, for most governments, is
the new inter-American dialogue.
Counting the Votes
Interpretation and anticipation of the US posi-
tion at Quito have been painful exercises for most of
the countries. The absence of US advocacy or opposition
on the sanctions issue and the apparent US disinterest
in trying to influence the position of other governments
have made the Latins suspect some gamesmanship to which
they are not privy. The governments that have followed
the US lead on Cuba in the past began to hedge against
the possibility that the US might suddenly switch its
stand. A long series of events, beginning with the
signing of an anti-hijacking agreement in February
1973, has fed Latin fears that the US is dealing with
the Castro regime in secret. As the Latinos believe
occurred in the case of China, they feel the US in-
tends to restore ties, leaving many countries in the
*The current state of Cuban subversion is discussed
in the Interagency Memorandum, "The Status of Cuban
Subversion in Latin America," November 1, 1974.
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position of being more papist than the pope. To allow
themselves flexibility, some of these remain officially
"undecided" about how they will vote.
Only Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay are clearly
opposed to lifting the sanctions. Chile and Uruguay
have been particularly determined that the record will
not show a clean slate for Cuba. They want a serious
analysis of whether Castro has turned away from "ex-
porting revolution" and are presenting their separate
cases to plead that he has not. This insistence that
Cuba remains a threat, even though it is a position
pressed by such a small minority, provides a rationale
for the undecided governments to move to the Chile-
Uruguay side if they sense it to be the correct polit-
ical move to make, especially if they believe the US
will do so.
Despite Costa Rica's continued assertion that
it has fourteen* votes wrapped up, none of the other
governments is any longer reading the line-up as cer.-
tain. Most find the counting difficult past the
eleven "sure" affirmatives on lifting sanctions:
Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela (the sponsors); Ecua-
dor (the host); Peru, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago,
Mexico, and Panama (which have diplomatic relations
with Havana); and Honduras and El Salvador (which
have announced their positions). The sponsors appear
fairly confident of winning the votes of Guatemala,
the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, and remain hopeful
about Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Brazil. Speculation
about the US vote has ranged wildly. The growing
uncertainty about how the vote will go has created
"Fourteen constitutes a two thirds majority, eight a
blocking minority. Two GAS members, Barbados and
Jamaica, are not signatories to the Rio Treaty and
are non-voting on the resolution on the agenda.
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two anxieties: the undecideds fear being isolated
with a tiny minority, and all are concerned that
failure to get the Cuba issue settled will damage not
only the Rio Treaty but the entire inter-American
system.
In the end, it seems highly probable that the
vote will go the way the sponsors intend. The over-
riding interest will be to establish a near consensus
and to free inter-American matters of this nagging
issue.
Will Cuba Be the Only Subject?
The risk that the conference will be a blow to
inter-Americanism comes less from differences over
Cuba than from the renewed fractious attitude among
Latins toward the US. After a period of relative
harmony, highlighted by meetings between Secretary
Kissinger and the foreign ministers of Latin America
and the Caribbean early this year, the Latin Americans'
doubts about US willingness to play a more positive
role in Latin America are again on the rise. Skepti-
cism flowered first over numerous commercial issues--
trade restrictions, the sugar quota, and the official
US role in problems between Latin governments and
private US companies. Some Latins have been impatient
also with what they view as a lack of US generosity
in ceding points to them on questions of controlling
trans-national corporations, the transfer of science
and technology, maritime regulations, and a host of
problems relating to economic development now under
study in OAS working groups, the UN, and other inter-
national forums.
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Recently, the US has been blamed by
various groups for the downfall of various governments,
for the assassination of Chilean General Prats in
Argentina, and for subversion of numerous institutions.
President Velasco made a hard hitting speech warning
the Peruvians of the ubiquity of provocateurs.
The Panamanians have laid the groundwork for
raising the question of US subversion at the Quito
meeting. The government has denied that it will in-
troduce the matter,
Even without a premeditated effort to turn the con-
ference against the US, there is some danger that the
Cuba debate might provoke some strong advocate of
Castro--the Peruvian foreign minister, perhaps--to
counter charges against Cuba with charges against the
US. The absence of Secretary Kissinger---which is
considered an affront by the Latins--might create a
testy atmosphere conducive to this kind of argument.
The temptation to bring the US to public account-
ing on the subversion issue would not arise from mere
caprice. Most of the governments seriously fear un-
detected intrusions by the powerful US. Some regimes
will be vulnerable to strong criticism by "anti-
imperialist" groups at home if they let the opportunity
to speak out pass them by. For the Third Worlders,
particularly, their revolutionary credentials are on
the line at home and abroad. Even for moderate gov-
ernments, the Kissinger absence will be a serious, if
temporary, embarrassment. The respected press in
Colombia, for example, interprets the second-level
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US delegation as the latest in a series of proofs that
Latin America is of no real interest or concern to the
US. Colombia's pre-eminent statesman, Alberto Lleras
Camargo, also editorialized with a sharp criticism of
secret US political activity in the hemisphere. Both
themes have been common throughout Latin America.
Each foreign minister will be working from his
own set of needs and desires at the conference. Some
have ticklish situations at home and might try to gain
some particular political victory at Quito with which
to refurbish their government's image. For example,
the Torrijos regime in Panama is under some fire for
conceding too much to the US in the Panama Canal treaty
negotiations and may feel obliged to raise Panama's
plight at Quito.
Beyond Quito
The Latin Americans' comportment at Quito will
reveal to some extent their judgment of what is to
be gained or lost in pursuing the new dialogue. De-
spite their grave reservations, they continue to con-
tribute to various efforts in progress to come to grips
with difficult inter-American problems. And the more
assertively "independent" countries have become suf-
ficiently confident about their own diplomatic prowess
to count more on bilateral exchanges with the US than
on multilateral assemblies to press for what they want.
The majority of the countries, though, sense
that the increasing unity they have achieved has begun
to serve them well in dealing with the US. Their ex-
periences at the UN, where large blocs of small nations
working together have been able to shape international
policies more and more to their liking, have encour-
aged them to use similar tactics in regional affairs.
The clout that the Arab nations--united--have achieved
has further convinced them that a new era has dawned
for the underdeveloped nations and that the Latins,
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too, must seize the moment. They have become more
willing to bury their own differences to present a
united front to the US on regional issues. They prob-
ably will therefore make the assessment that to pro-
ceed as planned will be their best course. They are
scheduled to meet with the US Secretary of State in
March to continue constructing a working partnership,
and they most likely will see this continuity in their
best interests.
Meanwhile, they are seriously considering a
separate regional organization without the US. The
problem of Cuba's isolation reinforces their thinking
along this line. Castro will not join the OAS, which
he has consistently maligned and worked to destroy.
He probably would be attracted to the sort of regional
economic forum proposed by Mexican President Echever-
ria and endorsed by Venezuela's Perez. Most of the
Latin governments actively want to include Cuba in the
range of inter-American affairs. Cuba will probably
be invited to attend the foreign ministers meeting in
March at Buenos Aires and has already indicated it
would accept. Only Chile has indicated unwillingness
to associate with Cuba at such assemblies.
The OAS itself is in a precarious state. Efforts
to restructure it and make it more responsive and re-
sponsible have not been very successful, and the senti-
ment to scrap it in favor of the more free-wheeling,
less formal foreign ministers meetings is growing. But
some accommodation must be worked out for the far-flung
suborganizations now working under OAS direction and
budgetary support. The failure of the Quito meeting to
lift the sanctions, which all agree are ineffective and
unrealistic by now, would probably quicken the mood
to dump the OAS. But even a success at Quito might not
be enough to save the organization.
In sum, the longer range problems of the hemi-
sphere and the recognition that Latin America cannot
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begin to address many of them without cooperation from
the US will probably weigh more heavily with most of
the representatives at Quito than either the issue
of Cuban subversion or the current disgruntlement over
US policies. For this reason, the odds favor a rela-
tively smooth passage of the resolution to lift the
sanctions and a consensus to let Quito serve as the
meeting that removes an obstacle to full regional
communication. While the meeting is more likely than
not to follow the agenda, the danger is still real
that the subject of subversion will be a highly pro-
vocative issue at this particular time.
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