THEODOR HANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000300280001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

THEODOR HAMS
In my capacity as a counterintelligence
agent, and having been in charge of counter-espionage
operations (until approximately 1951) in West Berlin,
I had firsthand knowledge of the type of Soviet activ-
ities under discussion, such as abductions and inter-
rogations under duress of psychological pressure or
physical intimidation.
For the unit to which I was assigned in
Berlin, I had to safeguard the security and mission of
the United States Forces stationed in Berlin and Europe.
I was also responsible for aiding or assisting and ad-
vising the German authorities and Allied agencies in their
investigations of abductions or as the German authorities
call them, the violations of the personal security of the
civilian population of Berlin. During the same period as
well as afterwards, I also had the responsibility of pro-
tecting operations and personnel utilized in the collecting
of counterintelligence or positive intelligence information
for the United States Forces. A large number of the victims
of abductions and interrogations under duress were active for
the. Western Allies and German agencies (also private organi-
zations in West Berlin) in gathering data and information
intelligence from East Germany. For this reason, many
sources and investigators for the United States Forces and
United States Information Agency (USIA) were directly sn-
dangered by these Soviet practices. Therefore, any cases
of abductions and interrogations under duress were of direct
interest to me and the unit which I served (Region VIII of
CIC and 1AREUR Liaison Groups).
facts in each case and to learn more about the modus operandi
of the Soviet, East German, and Satellite intelligence and
security organizations perpetrating such crimes.
During the entire period that I wT r engaged
in these investigations, I collected applicable nevapap"sr
clippings and publications concerning these cases and
generally containing accurate information witinut violating
the existing security regulations of the Counter-lntel-
ligence Corps. The material that was published had been
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 Theodor Hans_Pe_R
this
released in the foreign press. hot having . would have
been impossible for me to recollect the laige number of
details and names'of persona involved, especially since
I was consistently required to cover or report on a multi-
tude of persona and events of interest to the United States
Forces.
From January 1 to October 31, 1951, there
occured 14 cases of abduction in which persons and circum-
stances became known to the West Berlin police, and the
MFS (orSFS.) was directly implicated. During the same period,
the police was notified 209 times regarding abductions, in
which the suspects or offenders could not. be identified.
As mentioned in the KGU (Fighting Group Against
Inhumanity) pamphlet, ?The Red Gestapo" by Bernhard.Sagolla,
concerning the MFS, KURT MUELLER, Communist representative
at Federal German Congress (Lover Rouse), was lured to West
Berlin (again no actual abduction) and was reportedly later
beaten (about 1951) by the interrogator LOTZE toadmit having
betrayed the party (according to testimony of a fellow inmate
who was released and fled to West Berlin), The East German'
refugee, RUDOLF J., Landhausstrssse, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, was
assaulted by four men and beaten with a copper cable on the
night of July 28, 1951. Pedestrians came to the victia'a aid
when he called for help. One WERNER HOPPE, East Berlin, was
then caught. An aaenmplioc., 27 year old ERWIN ZILZ, and an
16'S officer, i9 year old ALBERTSALMINKEITT, managed to flee.
HOPPE had a falsified West Berlin identification document under
the name of MEWES, given him by the M. RUPPE was a burglar.who
had been: offered leniency for a burglary if he cooperated and
was also well paid to carry out the operation and rent a car.
The following are cases described in various
German newspaper clippings and of which I also have personal.
knowledge:
1. DR. ALEXANDER TRUCHNOVICH, 60 years old
at the time, head of the Berlin Cowaittee of Anti-Soviet Organi-
zation "NTS" and a leader of Russian emigrants and resistance
groups. On April 13, 1954, after a brutal beating, he was
apparently placed in a car and taken to East Berlin. The sus-
pect was HEINZ GLAESIE, 40 years of age, married, resident of
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Berlin-Halensee (British Sector), Heilbronner Strasse 11,
was visited in the evening by the victim. GLAFSXE was an
-active member of a German private organization, so-called,
"Late Returnees and Expellees from Prisoner of War Camps
and lost Eastern German Territories." The abduction oc--
cured about 800 -- 8s45 pm., The accomplices were most.
likely a male driver and up to two more men r_xd one -iomau.
GLAESKE was an architect and good acquaintance of the victim,
who probably trusted him well. Also, GLAESKE was most
probably an active double-agent between Soviet intelligence
(and/or WS) and the West German United States supported
Gehlan organization (now the BND). Blood was found in the
apartment afterwards. A rug hau been carried downstairs
by GLAESKE. Later, a subsequently defected East Berlin
policeman claimed that a black OPEL KAPITAEN was used to
take TRUCHNOVICH and GLAESKE to East Berlin. The confusing,
yet interesting, element in this case is the lack of Western
knowledge on whether either TRUCHNOVICH or GLAESKE were
abducted and who really abducted whom. Whatever the true
circumstances were, it is evident that both TRUCHNOVICH and
GLAESKE were moved to the East 'and placed under Soviet control;
there was a bloody struggle, end definitely an abduction of one
or both. individuals took place at Soviet or MFS direction.
One KUEHNE,of the SPD--Ostbuero and its newly
appointed head of covert and resistance activities in last
Germany, was abducted February 1949 from West Berlin to the
East. KUEHNE had been in contact with one EHLEFS, who had
a leading position in the "DWK" (German Economic Cosmission)
of the Soviet Occupation Zone. At that time, EBLESS resided
in West Berlin (French Sector, not far from the Soviet Sector)
,and KIIEHNE had been visiting him at home repeatedly. KUEINE
was then staying temporarily in West Berlin to take over and
.organize the,many East German operational contacts and planned
to return.to Hanover, West Germany. The Soviets (MGB) had
arranged for two accomplices to aid EHLERS in drugging KIIZHNE
and then moving KUEBNE to East Berlin. One girl, posing as a
maid,. prepared the drinks with a drug. The male accomplice
was to.put handcuffs on.the victim. When KUEHNE was not easily
doped, the' man left the adjoining room,: turned. the. radio on
full volume, and tried to subdue EUEHNE.in order to give him
an injection (the syringe was later found). The attempt failed
and the.criminal had to hit KUEHNE on the'head with the band-
cuffs. KITHNE obviously put up a terrific-fight leaving blood
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 Theodor !Tans--Page 4
traces and overturned furniture.
RAMR HII.DEBR UT, onetime head of the
!?GU, was the target of several Soviet and ;1E5 abduction
attempts. One of these was organized by the HFDERICH
Group (TD'S directed and paid) in February 1950, in the
British Sector at Berlin-Uruneweld. Two care were to block
the street. A third car was to approach from a side street.
As HILDIBEANDTts car would stop, a man from the approach-
ing vehicle would subdue HILLLBMNDT with an ether sponge
and a pistol butt, so that HIITEBl ;ANDS could be taken by
one of the cars to feat Berlin. The plan failed when
HILDF.HFANDT simply drove around the obstruction without
realizing the true significance of the situation. Two
culprits were later caught in West Berlin and sentenced.
One RUTH PENSA, closely associated with HEDEF.ICH and a
member of HEDFBICH's gang, voluntarily came to West Berlin
to escape further political pressure end the constant surveil-.
lances by informants and collaborators of the. Communists and
Soviets. She had also been ordered to abduct one KARL HEM
HAGF.N, a member of the "UFJ" (Investigating Committee of
Free Jurists).
WOLFGANG HOEHER, LDP (Liberal Democratic
Party) Representative in West Ba erlin and a member of LDP
"Hilfedienst Oat" (Aid Service East), was caused to become
intoxicated and probably also drugged in order to be ab-
ducted to Fast Berlin. This was in February 1953. In early
1950, HOEHER bed become acquainted with one RIRVES, a
director of a Soviet Corporation in Past. Germany and an
alleged member of a resistance group. one evening they not,
as usual, in a restaurant having dimly illuminated separate
booths. At one of these, KIRVES was holding a seat for
HOEHFR and probably drugged the wine he had ordered for
HOEHER. The drug that was used apparently paralyzed the
will and mental processes of.the victim while not impairing
bodily action and motility.. This accounts forHOEHER.having
-left the. meeting place without objection and 'Joining XIRVE.S
in a waiting taxi, that had been sent there by the WS.
HOEHER appeared slightly inebriated,, but in no unusual-con-
dition to arouse suspicion when departing from the restaurant.
The taxi then proceeded to East Berlin without interruption.
Chemistry student, KAISER, who was subsequently
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sentenced to death in an Fast German show trial, was em-
ployed by the 1':GU in a lrtoorr:tory doing experimental
chemists,{ work connected with propaganda: and resistance
operations directed sjeinat thr, Soy-jets and the Feet German
llegime. His oneti.*ne fellow student and friend, BRa 9ACHFR,
from Fact Berlin's cFinbcidt University maintained close
contact with F'AI31'h for years. .ne day, BRAIMBACHLR toad KAISER
that he had been accosted on the street in the Soviet
Sector by NLFS officials while shopping. After an arrest
and a short but intensive interrogation, B?AMBACHFR waa
recruited as an IFS informant. ,3?4MBACHF R openly told
KAISER about the difficult position in which he found
himself when given the mission by the MFS to aid in or ar-
range FAISER's abduction. Through his frank disclosure,
BftA{. ACFL:R fully gained hAI3i'1?'s confidence. Several days
later, the two were together with their fiancees and had a
few drinks. Then BE BACiiCR and 'KAISER decided to go to
another local tavern to have more drinks. From there both
then boarded a taxi and left for East Berlin. RAISER was
apparently unconcerned, although intoxicated, and very likely
also drugged without roalizing it.
The MGB (or KGB directed Soviet Intelligence
and Security Service) used particularly the element of
deception and trapped victims into placing themselves into
Soviet hands without causing the Fbducted persons to realize
with whom they actually dealt until it was too late. A
favorite ruse was to request the wanted person to accompany
the civilian officials of an alleged tiestorn occupation
power to the naxt Headquarters Office (1'^rruuidature) for
a routine interview or supposedly hermleae identity check.
Local residents were generally aware that Western Allied
authorities did not ",violate personal freedoms" (as abductions,
arrests without warrants, holding suspects without defense
or outside contact, and interrogations under duresa are
called inr'Gernamy). Therefore, they willingly accompanied
the civilians claiming to.repreaent thf. Western Allies.
Once- in the vehicle, the victims wer6 subdued immediately
upon any sign of slam or mistrust. An estimated 600 West
Berlin residents at least, became victims of abductions by
the Soviets or their German organizations or helpers-between
the end of World ''air II and Jf 54. ".oat o! three were ab-
ductions through -uses but quite s number of victims were
also overpowered through phyeicel violence or the use of
alcohol and drugs.
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In addition, many more persons yore eppre-
hendcd in soviet controlled territory after heving been
lured or Wretched closely and entering such area. In a
strictly technical interpretation, cases of apprehension
without proper legal grounds (a method typical of Soviet
security actions) cennot be conzidercd as abductions unless
the victim was moved to Soviet control ugainst hie will..
In one such case, in which the victim was trapped into
entering soviet ruled territory, a welt-known and highly
popular ballerina of the tote opera house in the Soviet
t.ecter .,as apparently- used to entice the victim, a German
of r.ussien origin, to go to Test Berlin. A close, female
eequaintence of this dancer wet sent by the Lcviets to the
victim, after arranging a meeting for the victim with the
ballerina, NATASHA TIiCFIMOVA, to take place following a
performance. In this case, no physical violence or drugs
had to be employed, and the person who was to be met in
the East was possibly not even ewere of the true purpose
of the meeting.
According to material collected and carefully
checked by the UFJ end covering the period of the fall of
1949 until early 1956, there occured at least 99 abductions
to Fast Germany through the use of deception and baits
besides an additional ?6 abductions in which the victims
were overpowered. As the British Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, stated on February 22, 1956, in the
British Parliament, 103 persons were abducted or illegally
arrrated between 1945 and that date by the ;nviets or their
German collaborators from the British Sector of Berlin alone.
In only seven of these cases wee it possible for British
authorities to cause the :>ovie+ta to release the victims.
1ffL.:.'T 2NICE L, 43 years old, a high school
teacher, was assaulted May let, 1950, in he French Sector
of Berlin in the late evening by two tmknewn persons, pulled
into a waiting car . and. abducted.
ALF L I"ILANL, Lh, years old, a Journalist, a9
overpowered near s deserted. house in ruins iri .the vicinity of
a British Sector post office (Berlin :foot 3;-) on November 11,
1;5G, and carried Into a waiting car by to unknown assailants
who abducted him to the Soviet Sector. IIANL always visited
the post office regular-'y in the late morning hours to picL
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his irrail up at. his .:n ; ~.: tal deli,*ery box.
; iIT i., 51 .ie r old laborer, was
ep ken to on Aus st l1, 3` 5_, by a group of three unknown
men. Not expecting .;:ny tr,uble r.' &11, YINTR approached
the group, was beaten unconsciou, drsgFed into a waiting
pPssenFg;er.car, and F.bducted. Ti.s took plan.; relatively
early in the evening, about 6:,: per,, near the elevated
train station onnPn'11FC.. in 3e_1in-hankcelln (Rmericen
Sector).
GIT';, . I' I,_ I7 L, another '-'fst Berlin resident,
was eu .ed by a stnringer on I eb,'u ry 21, 1959, to board a
waiting automobile to be taken by the driver to a hospital
into which a 6hort while before MICIWL'a injured girl friend
had allegedly beon delivered from en accident. In actuality,
she had not been placed in any hospital or involved in any
accident.. The ruse su^ce.ede?d, h:a ever, in causing MIChFL
to be abducted to !aat Berlin, where the responsible authori-
ties then found out. that :"ICI-I. wos not the person by that
name they really wanted.
GtJ ._R VAILI , 26 years old, he participated
in a small family celebration of acquaintances on the night
of July 6th to 7t4 1951 in Vest Bor7.in. During the early
morning hours, VALDIX was taken to the Soviet operated
elevated train in .'cat 2rrlin to Bcrlin Vennsee, where he
resided. Upon are'.?el there end before ler.ving the station
premises, he_ i::ac ssisaif ad by thrcc etrvnicrs, wha had been
waiting for him there, pulled into the train sus:, and Ph-
ducted in it to Pctsdnm in Fast Gelma4, the train's final
destination. Tie use zubmcquently tried by an.Feat German
court for political offenses and sentenced.
Preparations for abductions require careful
planning and thorough knowledge regarding.the victims and
their daily'routine activities especially when.drugs and/or
large groups of assailants are utilized. Usually, such
information is collected through--systematic surveillances.
Frequently, and if feasible, informants with personal contact
with the target personalities, are also used and specifically
directed to provide the needed knowledge. For this reason,
it is extremely difficult to determine accurately at which
stage the collection of information (through surveillances,
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informants, double-agents, or by other moans) ends and
at which precise moment the actual abduction operation
begins. The one activity always carries over into the
other and both =at be fully coordinated. Almost all ab-
ductions, except those solely aimed at eliminating politi-
cal opponents, generally lead to the interrogation and
intelligence exploitation of the victim and the possible
infiltration of the organization which the victim had
served, so that one of the major purposes of abductions
is again the gathering and following up of valuable
intelligence date and leads not as easily or quickly
available by other methods. Therefore, the victims of
.abductions generally are persons erge;ged in anti-Soviet
or anti-Communist efforts, oftentimes on behalf of or in
cooperation with agencies or groups operated or supported
by the United States or other Western Allies. In order to
achieve their aims in this respect, the Soviets, their
Satellites, and Communist agents do not hesitate to use
poison and terror through extreme physical violence and
brutal psychological pressure. This is true for the manner
in which persons are kidnapped or arrested illegally as
well as for the way in which suspects or pre-trial prisoners
are interrogated and confessions obtained. The most typical
examples of Soviet (or MI'S) brutality and disregard for
humane conduct in intelligence, as well as counterintel-
ligence, operation3 are the followings
On July 8, 1952, the member of the UFJ and a
West Berlin lawyer, DR. WALTIR LINSE, was brutally assaulted
in the American Sector of Berlin and abducted to East Germany.
Because of the complexity of the large-scale operation con-
ducted to kidnap DR. LINSE, who was actively engaged in
propagandizing the evils of the Soviet system, it was pos-
sible in a relatively short time to gain detailed knowledge
of the individuals, organization, and actions connected with
the LINSE abduction. The overpowering. and moving of the
victim:from. West Berlin was carried out by notorious criminals
under the personal direction of :SFS officers, who did not,
however, leavc+ Fast Berlin. A West Berlin taxi was taken
by the criminals at 5;CC am of the same date from West Berlin
to the Soviet Sector. The driver, WILHEIN WOITZISicE, was
paid the fare in advance to convince-him of the honesty of
the passengers and to melee him lees suspicious about entering
the. East Sector. Just before crossing the.Sector border,
one passenger gave +JITZIS'r.I. a carton of cigarettes as further
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-incentive for the trip. The border guards stopped the
vehicle, asked 1'?GITZIS1 to step out, and upon finding
the cigarettes on him, arrested him at once on a smug-
gling charge. He was placed in pre-trial detention.
His taxi was taken directly to asafe location in the
Soviet Sector, where the license plates were removed and
placed on a previously selected. and prepared MIS pas-
senger car (b.-door Opel sedan). The gang members as-
signed to the automobile left immediately with this car
for the pre-arranged West Berlin meeting place while the
other accomplices proceeded to the site by different
routes. Not all participants in this crime were at the
scene to assist in overpowering DR. LINSE. Some were to
watch for police interference, several had to observe the
victim, and others had the task of checking the operation
for any signs of trouble or possible failures. After all
accomplices had placed themselves at their assigned lo-
cations, DR. LINSF left his home at 7t30 am. Two of the
criminals then walked directly to DR. LINSE and apparently
asked him for a light for a cigarette. DR. LINSE obliged,
put his hand in his pocket, and at the same moment was hit
in the face with a small hard bag filled with sand. He
was pulled into the car, which then drove off at excessive
speed. A driver of a delivery truck, which was in the
same street, immediately gave chase but could not catch
the car, which was noted by other witnesses as it ap-
proached and crossed the border between West Berlin and
the Soviet occupation zone.
Other witnesses in East Germany subsequently
described how the Opel sedan was stopping at an apparently
pre-designated site in the Soviet Zone where an escort of
East German police in a second car and a motorcycle patrol-
man joined the abductors and left for the next destination
of the victim. According to initial and official Soviet
statements, this abduction never occured and the presence
of DR. LINSE in the Soviet occupied or controlled territory
was unknown in spite of an alleged Soviet investigation in
this case as requested- by the Western. authvrities.. Yet, the
Soviets recently disclosed that DR. LINSE had died in late
1953, in a Soviet prison camp.of unknown causes. The Kest
Berlin police-investigation and interviews of witneuses re-
vealed beyond doubt that, the MIS Main Department VIII (In-
vestigationa and Arrests), headed by MORGFNTHAL, had planned
and directed this entire operation, and that the so-called
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r%F I2T'ISTFrz Group (one of Lept . 7I I ' s sub-units) had carried
it out. 1,15 officers who directly supervised this ab-
duction were one "PAM" (covername) from Berlin-Penkow,
soviet Sector, the group leader, and his deputy, FRITZ VAHLF
alias, PAUL SC1i4ILT. One SIEGFRIED BLNTER, 27 years old,
later caught in 'pest Berlin, was an accomplice in the ab-
duction of DR. LIME.
On May 17, 1;'155, the 2;r year old bFF6 informant
and co1J.ei-orstor, G RHAIII) BFC}', from Teltow, Fast Germany,
was tried by a West Berlin court for attempted abduction
and poisoning of the employee LISA STFIN of the USIA operated
West Berlin broadcasting station !UAS (Radio in the American
Sector). .BECK had been active as a Communist in various
Leftist Fast German political and mass organizations from
1946 on. In the fall of 1953, BFCE established contact with
BIAS and offered to provide information for broadcasts on
agricultural and Fast German farmer's situations in the Soviet
Zone. According to BFCK's testimony at the trial, he had
been arrested unexpectedly November 1954 by the MFS. Al-
though he allegedly denied initially having any connection
with BIAS, BECK claimed he was finally forced to confess to
having furnished reports to HIAS. BECK asserted that the MFS
interrogators threatened to take adverse and punitive action
against his wife and five chiiecen. Instead of prosecuting
and trying BECK, the MUS utilized him to continue his contact
with BIAS and, while acting as double agent, to report in
detail on all individuals, offices, and information requests
or interests of BIAS.
In March 1955, B}C1' received the MFS mission to
prepare and carry out the abduction of FRAU STEIN, who was
known to the MIS as being quite effective in interviewing
refugees and confidential sources or visitors from Fast Germany
at RIAS?and apparently well-informed regarding East German
and ' Soviet conditions, leading.parsonalities, and;. specific
organizations in the Soviet Zone and Sector,.including the
MIS itself. Several high ITS officers, believed to have in-
eluded even 1916', '(3LL1.7:BLh (who was then in charge of the
MIS), initially discussed with BFCY. the best plans for ab-
ducting FRAU STFIN. These meetings took place in a covert
East Berlin NF apartme:.t. Firstly, B-10Y war given a box of
brandy filled candy of a Soviet Zone firm and told that
poisoned candy pieces had been arrran?;ed.in the box in e
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cor-tin order to per -.it 3" CF. to share the candy with the
victim without any dFnger to B: Ct:. He was warned by his
176 superiors or handlers to offer the candy sometime
toward the end of the meeting with FPA.U STFFIN, which had
been scheduled by BFCE and ST:'IN in advance to take place
in a West Berlin cafe. Upon leaving the cafe and on her
walk to her nearby residence, FRAU SHIN was expected to
become unconscious and was to be picksd up by a waiting
car which would appear to be passing by chance. All prepa-
rations for the kidnapping had been made well in advance,
when BETE followed his 2- 'S instructions precisely. FRAU
STTIN did not become ill, however, until she was in front
of her apartment, where neighbors came to her aid and she
was immediately moved to a hospital. After 48 hours of
severe illness, during which FIRAU STEIN's revival was un-
certain, the attending physicians managed to find an antidote
and she recovered. The court medical expert found that it
was most probably the highly dangerous poison "SECPOLAMIN.1
It was only through coincidence and BFCX'a
lack of fear, based on his firm belief that his complicity
in this abduction attempt could not be proven, that BECK
was apprehended in West Berlin shortly after the incident.
Since the death penalty is not applicable in West German
(and also West Berlin) jurisdiction, BECK was sentenced to
twelve years in the penitentiary. This was considered a
stiff sentence and riven specifically as a preventive measure
regarding possible future offenses of this type. In any
court in Soviet controlled territory, the same crime would
have definitely'resulted in a death penalty for the defendant,
providing that he would still be in such physival condition
after pre-trial interrogation and detention that he could
face a court.
On July 25, 1955, the former Mn officer,
SYLVESTFR MURAU, who had defected to West Berlin . some. time
earlier,-was kidnapped from the West German town of Heubeck
.near Darmstadt, where MURAU had taken up residence, as a
refugee without official West German aid. MURAU's daughter,
GITTA CULI2-A1 N, 21 years old, was used by the P FS to dispel
MURAU's suspicion against the actual abductors, who posed as
good acquaintances of GITTA. :;no of the accomplices, 24 year
old J3ACHIM TPT.TZF4 was later caught in West German territory
and sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary.
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In this abduction, :.JiiAU eras first induced
to become intoxicated and then drugged to become un-
conscious. He wea taLEn by car from the aforementioned
community to last Germany across the Soviet Zone border,
which is located quite a distance a?.,iay. Both abductors
received a bonus of 5,C~C Deutsche lark West (close to
~1,2C(1) each in addition of reimbursement of all expenses
and other payments for succeeding in this case. A. short
time later, while TIF.T'F was attempting to take a stolen
bleat Berlin automobile to the Soviet Sector, he and his
accomplice in the kidnapping, cne HJtu:IS, were apprehended
by Western authorities.
On February 4, 10-56, the former East German
People's Police Lieutenant Colonel (Inspekteur), ROBERT
BIALFY, was abducted from West Berlin by direction of the
MFS. In this case, too, careful preparation and timing had
been used to succeed. Several months before, the onetime
Fast German police official, PAUL DIIZPWICKI, also residing
at that time as a refugee in West Berlin, had been recruited
as an informant by the MFS. Having lived for years in West
Berlin as former defected police officer, DRZFWICKI managed
to establish contact with BIALEY and gain his confidence.
On the date of the abduction, DRZfl ICKI had invited BIALEK
to a party subsequently celebrating DfZFWICKI's birthday.
The celebration took place in a furnished room, DRZEWICKI
had rented on February 1st. An alleged niece of DRZFWICKI
and an East Berlin acquaintance of DRZFWICKI, later intro-
duced to BIALFY as also opposed to the Soviet regime, happened
to be present at the party. In reality, the girl and the
East. Berlin resident were the abductors sent along by the F S
to carry out the operation with DRZFWICKI's help. The man
was actually a Soviet Sector police official.
After several drinks, B U,LEK was drugged and
became ill. The main tenant of the. apartment in vhieb the
furnished room was located, even assisted the abductors in
carrying the victim out of the building without realizing
the ?rue circumstances. ,ncc on the street, a passing car
was flagged down for the purpose?of moving the sick man to
a hospital. In reality, the car had been waiting for this
moment and BIAALEY. was abducted to Fast Berlin. ..
In this case, 3D-LFY. had also been engaged
after his defection in assisting ',astern authorities and
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 Theoc'or 11An3--~6 'f
intelligence ej7:ncic~; t; grin vi.!uable information regard-
ing Fast Ger en and targeto end had further been
used in attempts ti reuse the defection of other East
Germans and People's Frlice members to G"est Berlin. It
was well-known to '.;astern counterintelligence and intel-
ligence organizations that the Soviets and theirCommuaist
collaborators were extremely interested in having MUfAU,
BI-AUK, and other '::ost German defectors from police and
government or party organizations returned to Soviet control
in order to prevent the increasing and alarming refugee
flow to the West and the gradually greater number of de-
fections from Fast Germany. It also became known that
many of these abduction victims, especially those formerly
serving in the 1,TS, were sentenced to death for desertion.
One of those executed, in my memory is correct,
was a onetime 1-TS official named PAUL rRF'.BENSiTOCK, who had
been arrested near the Soviet Sector border in Fast Berlin
after extensive surveillance and being lured to the border
by an alleged prospective informant or defector.
According to an article in the "Die Weltvoche,"
Zuerich, Switzerland, of November 2E, 1955, and written by
one H.000K.3IDGE, the West Berlin police president, DR. JOHANNES
STUMM, i.niormed the writer during an interview in Berlin of
.1954, that according to official police files, approximately
400.porsons were abducted from West Berlin by Soviet paid
and directed agents and their German collaborators. or criminal
accomplices. Bonus payments of 50 and 1000 Deutsche Mark
West for one abduction successfully carried out were often-
times given. to the abductors by the Soviets or M.
The close relationship between the use of ab-
ductions and the intelligence or infiltration efforts by
Soviet and Fast German (as well as other Satellite) organi-
zations is well demonstrated by the following selected ex-
amples, representing only a very.fck of the large number of
cases which became known:
On April 27, 1~i54, GEC 1 A J RARPAME moved from
the British Sector of Berlin to the Soviet Sector. According
to a release by the Soviet Zone news agency, ADN, KA17AHiKE
made a full confession to Fast German security authorities
regarding his past association with the GFyHI.EN intelligence
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 Theodor Hans--Page 14
organization in Western Germany. KARPAHNKE claimed in
his confession that he had been deputy chief of the
"Filiale K" (branch office or agency K) and had received
orders directly from the chief of the "Generalvertretung
G" (Main Branch or Division G), the former German General
KOERNING. According to KARPAHNXE, the GEHLEN-Organi-
zation was receiving an annual subsidy of 25 million
Deutsche Mark West. Although at first glance, KARPAHNKE
appears to have no importance regarding abduction oper-
ations, a closer check into his background and personal
contacts reveals at once the missing links between the
usual intelligence activities of the Soviets (or MFS) and
the abduction of DR. ALEXANDER TRUCHNOVICH, which occured
exactly two weeks before KARPAHNKE moved to the East.
HEINZ GLAESKE and KARPAHNXE were friends and
had worked together in the same private German organization
for German returnees. and expellees. As claimed by the
Soviets after the TRUCHNOVITCH incident, GLAESKE had made a
full confession that he had worked for the CEHLEN-Organi-
zation. As the Soviets, and an alleged voluntary statement
by TRUCHNOVICH in the Soviet Zone, also claimed, TRUCHNOVICH
had left West Berlin voluntarily because he considered
further opposition to the Soviet Government senseless. GLAESKE
had allegedly also worked for or with the British Intelligence
Service. KARPAHNKE'e voluntary move to the East, his alleged
confession, and his strange background strongly suggest that
he had been a. double spent between the East and West.
In July 1951, KARFAHNKE had moved with his
entire family and all furniture from East Berlin to the
West Sector. For this: move, he had full permission from
the Soviet Sector authorities. At any time, such moves with
all belongings from East to West were hardly. ever authorized
by the East German administration unless severe personal hard-
ship was involved and to grant them would be of political ad-
vantage. For this reason, KARPAHNKE wee.never a refugee. He
never"claimed to have been forced to leave East Berlin.
Shortly after settling in the British Sector, KARPAHN1E
obtained the job of janitor at the West Berlin "Haas der
Zukunft" (House of Future), an anti-Communist youth hostel
and cultural institution where different Western lecturers
gave talks on the Soviets and Communist dangers to students
and refugees. Shortly after World War II, IARPAHNKE.had
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 Theodor Hans--Page 15
joined the Fast Berlin police and served until 1946 in
its Criminal Investigation Department. It became well
known in recent years that the Soviets. recruited many
of the covert investigators and informants in German ad-
ministration offices in the police force and left them in
their regular positions to provide better cover for activi-
ties which in reality were carried out for the Soviets.
-KARPAHNKE had to leave the police when the Fast Berlin
authorities found out that he had falsified his question-
naire. After a short Soviet detention in a Kommandatura
prison, KARPAHNKE was transferred to the Saeheenhausen
Soviet concentration cemp, and if he had not been recruited
ea..lier by the Soviets, it is very likely that he was
coerced to become a collaborator at that time. Already in
September 1951, the West Berlin police department V (In-
vestigation of Political Crimes) received a complaint
against KA RPAHNKE according to which he had denunciated
(or reported) a refugee from East Berlin to the MFS. The
material did not provide sufficient evidence at that time,
however, to justify action against KARPAHNKE. If KARPAHNKE
were a spy and double agent for the MFS or Soviets, he must
have reported to them continuously on GLAESKE and, on the
basis of GLAESKE's information and personal contact, regard-
ing TRUCHNOVICH.
The aforementioned KGU was of serious concern
to the Soviet regime because it maintained constant coverage
and gathered as well as published voluminous information re-
garding all Soviet inhumane conduct and brutalities committed
;against the Germans. Also, the KGU was highly popular with
the majority of the ?;.-?st German population. Through the
KGU files and efforts on locating missing persons, as well
as by charity work, many Fast Germans opposed to the Soviets
and Communiam voluntarily cooperated with the %GU and furnished
valuable information. The security and success of the Con-
munist endeavors in East Germany were therefore continuously
hampered by KGU publications and resistance work. For this
reason, prior to his resignation from the KGU, its founder
and initial head, the aforementioned HILDEBRANDT,was the
target of several unsuccessful abduction attempts. Later,
other members of the KGU, such as HERR ROLLER, HERR MRD
3AITZ, and ERNST TILLIGH, the successor of.HILDEBRANDT, were
also involved in different attempts by the MFS to abduct thes-.
For the same reason, the onetime alleged KGU contact or
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 Theodor IIans--Pe ce it
employee, BAYER, ."ho had roved to :';tat 3crlin and became
an M YS collaborator, ' hrcetened another former !,GU em-
ployee, SCHAItLAU, with when he had been acquainted, to
cooperate with the :tFE or :CIV.r'T~:AU would be exposed with
regard to farmer moral failings end other violations.
When SCILJJM.U refused to accept the offer of 3AYi:R to wor!_
with the , FS, BAYER used SCIHABLA.U's aged mother from Grimmen,
ast Germany, to be a messenger to SO :i:R' "U with more
threatening letters.
The continued effort by the ;Lx'S to infiltrate
and/or discredit the XGU in the eyes of the general public,
es,,ecially the Fast German population, met with unusual
success when a key member of the I:GU and its anti-Soviet
resistance activities-defected to Fast Berlin and decided
to cooperate fully with the t-f'S and Soviet Zone Communist
regime. This move by the onetime YOU functionary, HANFRIED
HIECKP, born June 25, 1929, at Dresden, was almost certainly
the result. of continued pressure on the part, of the MFS to
approach and recruit as an informant 111ECh'E and other KGU
members. This pressure was not only applied in the form
of serious threats to the person being approached and his
relatives, but also consisted of generous offers, ranging
from complete immunity from further Soviet prosecution for
past hostile actions to promises of large scale renumeration
and other economic benefits in the Soviet Zone.
HIECKP, who used the cover name of FiiED WALTER
while working for the KGU, later furnished all information
known to him about the I'. GU, its operations, sources, contacts,
and most of its lead{ng members. Even though some of his
information was distcrted and adapted to Soviet propaganda
interests, the pamphlet published containing his disclasures
and entitled, 'WFCENANEi'E WALTER" did not fail in its aim of
seriously hurting the further effectiveness of the I:GU and
preparing for ,its eventual. breskup.:
1,hen the I: GU, and with it. a major sustained
and usually very valuable effort against Soviet eggreasion
and acts of terror, was finally discontinued in the face of
increasing pressure and mounting public criticime, the Com-
~cunlats. had won a hard and long battle leaving them- the
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 Theodor Hans--Pare 17
desired freedom of political action in East Germany. It
may also be of Western interest to realize the tragic toll
'HIECKF's full disclosures had among numerous resistance
contacts and sources of the I:GU in the Soviet Zone whom
he caused to be arrested and sentenced severely.
In l,49, the Fast Berlin Communist publish-
ing house, DIETZ, brought out c. Soviet licensed (and
probably prepared) pamphlet, entitled ''KURIERE, SPITZEL,
SFICNE" ("Couriers, Denunciators, Spies), written by HEINZ
FUEFThTE, who claimed lie voluntarily defected to the Soviet
Sector February ~, 1949, because he wanted to discontinue
his association with the SPD in West Germany. i:UEHNE in
identical with the aforementioned abducted KUEHNL,. who had
then just taken over the SPD'Ust-Buero'(SPD operated infor-
mation and resistance organization) before being kidnapped.
In hisforevord, dated June 27, 1949, FUEENE explains that
he wrote the booklet because he realized the mistaken of
the SPD leaders and their policies. It does not require
much imagination to reason why KUFHNE cooperated with the
Soviets in preparing this pamphlet.
The SPD 'Gst-Buero' was one of the moat
popular and efficient private and political intelligence
and resistance organizations until the time KUEHNE was
abducted and during a post-war period when neither the F,GU
nor the UFG had become really effective and known. The die-
closures of KUEHNE, the loss of many good sources and contacts
through him, and the drop in prestige were so damkging to
the SPD 'Ost-Buero' that for many years the organization did
not regain its former.significance. This is particularly
important when one considers the fact that the great majority
of the Soviet dominated SED (Social Union Party of Germany)
was taken over from the SPD by a Soviet forced merger of
the SPD and KPD (Communist Farty of Germany) to make it the
leading party in the Soviet Zone. Again, this abduction and
quick turning of a onetime political foe by the Soviets had
a. definite political. importance in the Communist strategy
and tactics regarding Germany.
Another example of how abduction, defection,
counterintelligence, and anti elestern propaganda are utilised
in conjunction with interrogation and exploitation of all
available sources by the Soviets is the handling of the afore-
mentioned LDP representative `; JL:, GANG ii:~Ei R. (The LLP .
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 subsequently changed its party designation to FDP to
distinguish it from the Communist controlled LDP in East
Germany, and for this reason H)EHE?R is mentioned as FDP
member in later press releases.) In late January 1954,
approximately one year after HCEHER was believed to have
been abducted to East Berlin, the FDP representatives and
WILLI KRESSMANN, SPD representative and mayor of the
Berlin city district of Kreuzberg in the American Sector,
had several heated arguments in a debate in the Berlin
city council regarding KRESSMANN's contention that HOEHER
must have been an informant of the Soviets and double agent
against the FDP (LDP) and the GEHLEN-Organisation, in which
he had responsible positions in West Berlin. KRFSSMANN
based his statements on a pamphlet, entitled "Agent 2996
Reveals," published by the Soviet Sector.Kongress Publish-
ing House in late 1953 or January 1954. In this booklet,
the author is identified as "WOLFGANG HOEHER, 40 years old,
jurist by profession, former military officer, and since
1950 a leading member of the counterintelligence agency of
the GEHLEN-Organization in West Berlin."
Although the Berlin FDP Party Chairman, CARL--
HUBERT SCHWENNICKE, declared on January 27, 1954, that the
matter had not been cleared up completely and that it had
not been proven yet that HOEHER had spied for the East,
here again, the Soviet interest in HOEHER and other FD?
members with Western intelligence missions and contacts is
quite obvious. Next to the SPD (West German Socialist
Democratic Party) and the SPD -0st BuezW the PDP, which
had a large following in East Germany, had the largest 'Oat
Buero' and most active information and resistance organisation.
For this reason, many members of the FDP 'OstBuero' were in
close touch with the GEHLEN-Organization and Western intel-
ligence agencies.
Another FDP 'Ost Buero' agent, HANS FUELDNER,
covername LUDWIG,who had.defected'to the Last or.had been
arrested by the MFS, furnished identifying data to the ) S
on 27 FDP sources and contacts in.East Germany.. In spite of
his cooperation and betrayal, FUELDNER and other double
agents or informants of the MFS were subsequently tried in
,East Berlin for espionage and other crimes against the East
German state. It is of further interest to note that other
defendants tried together with FUELDNER had apparently also
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 Theodor Hans-Page 15
cooperated with the 1S without, however, having received
immunity against prosecution, as apparently given HANFRIED
HIECIcE, HEINZ BUFHIIE, and others.
One co-defendant of FUELDNER was a former
leading member of the West Berlin League for Human Rights,
one SILGRADT, also accused of espionage. SILGRADT was the
principal accused.
Another co-defendant was the former East
German People's Police Lieutenant, WERNER MANGELSDORF, who
had taken an active part in the uprising of June 17, 1953,
against the East German-regime when he organized the liber-
ation of the Gommern jail near Magdeburg. MANGEISDORF later
fled to West Berlin and helped establish and operate the
"Committee of the 17th of June," founded by onetime partici-
pants in the uprising who had been forced to flee from Soviet
prosecution. The private organization was organized with
the help of the aforementioned RAINER HILDEBRANDT to develop
clandestine contacts with disaffected East Germans to prepare
for another uprising against the Communist regime in the hope
of gaining success in another attempt by enlisting Western
support and better coordination and planning of the revolu-
tionary effort.
After MANGELSDORF had become active in this
organization, the MFS arrested his brother, HANS :iANGELSDORF,
and forced the fiancee of HANS, one EDELTRAIUT FUSE, to
contact WERNER MANGELSDORF in West Berlin and to offer his
on behalf of the MFS that HANS would be released if WERNER
agreed to contact the MFS and work for it as an informant
and infiltration agent in the Committee of the 17th of June.
Also, the MFS offered to drop the East German death sentence
against WERNER, which had been pronounced by a Soviet Zone
court against WERNER MANGELSDORF, when he was tried in absence.
WERNER than allegedly accepted this offer and
went to the MPS in East Berlin to cooperate. On December 23,
1953 (the year is uncertain), WERNER MANGELSDORF signed the
obligation to become and MFS informant. When the MFS promise
to release HANS by January 1, 1954, was not kept, WERNER
failed to maintain. contact with the MFS and tried to-dis-
continue his informant mission. EDELTRAUT FUSE was sent
again to WERNER on January 16 and pleaded with him to re-
port to the MFS again, which he allegedly refused to do.
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 On the same day, KANGII L: L: J did not return to his
West Berlin residence from an errand to a local post of-
fice. It is very possible that. r HST was closely observed
by accomplices of ITI1SE. or agents of the MFS shadowing her,
and that an alternate plan of the AFS was to abduct WERNFR
afterwards in the event that he refused to reestablish
contact with the MFS. 1hether he was sentenced to loath
and executed I do not recollect, but. WERNER MANGELSDORF
was definitely given at least a very long sentence. WFRNER
is said to have reported his MFS contact to the 17th June
Committee and the West Berlin police prior to his disap-
pearance. The subsequent fate of his brother, BANS, and
EDELTRAIJT FEHSE is unknown.
During the above mentioned show trial of
FUELDNFR and 1MANGELSDOff, it. became evident that the
principal defendant, SILGFADT, who may also have been ab-
ducted or coerced by the 14FS into cooperating with the
MIS, had voluminous records and address files in his pos-
session concerning last German information sources and
resistance contacts of the League for Human Rights and
the-17th June Committee. All of the material and information
collected in West Berlin by WERNER MANGF.LSDOFd: had also been
in SILGRADT's possession and had been secured by the MFS.
Evidently, the show trial was not only intended to props-
gandize Western intelligence and resistance activities
against the East German regime, but also to hide the true
roles played by the different defendants prior to the trial
with regard to their MIS association and missions. It is
highly doubtful that all defendants cooperated fully with
the MFS in all respects, as in such event their continued
intelligence utilization may have been preferred by the
HIS.
Again, in May of 1954 (the year is uncertain),
another member of the 17th June Committee was arrested by the
West Berlin police on charges of having worked_as informant ,
with.the MIS against that organization.. One EGONLUM was
accused by the police of having prepared: the NR+'S abduction
of another West Berlin resident. At approximately the sane
time, the political refugee from last Germany, HARRY SCHLESING,
was reported missing by the police. CCHLLSING also had contact
with the 17th June Committee and was suspected by the police
of having returned to the Fast because of possible I or
Eastern contacts. In view of the serious and continued
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 Theoc'or Hens--YPE-c 21
infiltration by the :r:: end Ccmnunists of the 17th June
Committee, that organization finally decided to turn over
for security reasons all of its files and carded data to
the appropriate W eat Berlin police department. For the
same reason, the 17th June Committee finally ceased to exist.
Cases of Soviet or MFS infiltration into
Western organizations are well illustrated by the follow-
ing examples, which show easily how such intelligence
operations may be utilized to aid in abductions=
WIL}ffU- STELLER, 39' year old police officer
of the Police Inspection Office Berlin-Zehlendorf, American
Sector, was recruited in 1952 as an informant for the MFS
and reported on internal and confidential activities of
the police in West Berlin for several years. Prior to his
assignment to the police inspection, STELLER was the regular
duty officer at the Police Precinct Nr. 161 (Polizeirevier)
on Clayallee, Berlin-Zehlendorf. For his espionage service,
STELLE:Z received Soviet Sector and East German state issued
purchasing slips (HO Einkaufsgutscheine) for which he bought
commodities regularly in East Berlin. The West Berlin Politi-
cal Crimes Investigation Department uncovered.STELLER's intel-
ligence activities and apprehended him for subsequent prose-
cution. It was possible for STELLER, through his official
position, to cover many interesting facets of American intel-
ligence and security operations in the U. S. Sector because
the principal U. S. offices, military and of the State Depart-
ment, as well as most of the covert intelligence facilities
and the majority of the American billets, are located in
Berlin-Zehlendorf, and particularly in the area covered by
Police Precinct 161.
While the courts of the U. S. High Commission
for Germany (HICOG) were still maintained, a HICOG Court in
WestBerlin.sentenced 24 year old WERNE R-HEINZ OKONEK, a
West Berlin resident to-one year in jail because he was found
guilty of having attempted to report to the WWII-in East Berlin
names of fellow agents in the U. S. Intelligence Service.
OKONEK was employed by the U. S. Intelligence. Service. OFONEX's
wife and child resided in the Soviet Zone at the time that he
was in contact with the MFS, and 01:31TF.Y. bad been threatened
by the MFS with reprisals against his family if he did not
cooperate. Although the admission of 3Y.NUNF.1 and the evidence
provided by the investigators led to JEUN:K's sentence, it
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 Theodor Hans--Pare 22
is not at all certain that either OKONEK confessed
everything or that the investigation uncovered the
full extent of his possible espionage.
In 1953 or 1954, the-25 year old intel-
ligence operator and informant, TIEMANN alias REINHARD,
was apparently recruited by the M in East Berlin in
or before 1952, when he established contact with his
former superior of the onetime German Abwehr (Military
Intelligence Service), one VON ZERSEN, who reportedly
became an NFS agent some time after 1948. When TIEMANN
feared he would be arrested in West Berlin for his
double agent activities between the MFS and the Western
intelligence organizations, he fled to East Germany.
TIEMANN had established contact with the LFV (LANDESAMT
FLIER VERr'ASSUNGSSCHUTZ - Office for the Protection of
the Constitution) and had recommended VON ZERSEN as a
valuable and trusted informant able to furnish key infer- 25X1 C 8 a
nation.
VUS s effort to organize an independent Prior to
ounterintel-
ligence group for the LFV, at which time VON ZERSEN was
identified as I &S informant but, managed to avoid arrest,
TIEMANN and VON ZERSEN apparently gained considerable insight
into the LFV organization and activities. They reportedly
also succeeded in furnishing false information, most likely
prepared by the MFS to mislead and confuse Western authori-
ties, to the LFV and possibly other Western agencies.
One of the most serious threats to the security
of American forces and operations in West Berlin was un-
covered and discontinued when the espionage agent and in-
formant of the Soviet Intelligence Service, the 24 year old
IRMGARD SCHMIDT alias STEPHANIE, was arrested by United
States counterintelligence investigators in West Berlin
December },, 1954, just' before going to East Berlin to turn
over intelligence information and material to her Soviet
superiors. IRMGARD SCHMIDT, who was quite pretty, had sue-
`ceeded in establishing firm personal contact on a social
basis with two important officials of the United States
Intelligence Service. One of these was a military officer,
the other a civilian. With the help of one of her American
friends, she even managed to obtain a position within the
United States Intelligence Service, in accordance with specific
25X1 C8a
25X1 C8a
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 hecdor Ions- - ,,
So~1Et. instruct__* _ lied been a uni-
versity studen' in '. =le, ' c s? ^fr an;,, specializing in
languE-,es and studyinr Chincsc. far mother continued to
reside, there after ?'"'::_ I1-:r hrd moved to Berlin.
In February 11;53, L)rI$?:i wps arrested by the Soviets
because she had placcd her he at ,.he disposal of fellow
students, suspected ~)f being in contact with the };:U and
doing resistance work in }ialle. SCIVIID; was offered the
chance to serve as intelligence informant for the Soviets
to avoid being sentenced and deported with her mother to
Siberia. The Soviets gave her ample funds to permit her
to carry out her espionage missions in vest Berlin and to
dress .pall. li~:(lf h7 SC}~IIi:' was sentenced by an American
court to five years in t.he_ penitentiary.
The apparent ease with which Soviet or Satel-
lite (including East German) interrogators, investigators,
and intelligence officers "turn" suspects or defendants
into cooperating informants or espionage agents is quite
plausible when the Soviet or Communist practices and
procedures of arresting, interrogating, and punishing
people is being considered. No other government or politi-
cal regime operates as many detention facilities, labor
camps, and political indoctrination or re-orientation
programs as the Soviets and all of their Communist allies
to achieve maximum possible control over all individuals
within their territories and over all followers elsewhere.
One of the greatest Soviet assets in maintain-
ing absolute political control is the well established
practice of terror through large scale or mass arrests,
complete disregard for individual liberty regarding op-
ponents and followers alike, and severe punishment, in
the form of harsh sentences and inhumane jail conditions,
to all those who oppose the regime or voice even the
slightest criticism. Also, in this respect, the Soviet aim,
or the purpose of investigations or interrogetions,.in not
so much the finding of truth as it is to achieve a specific
political goal, even if the: true circumstances do'not always
warrant prosecution or punishment: of the.accused. Thus, in'
frequent "spy trials," the uncovering of "capitalist agents,"
and the elimination of "foreign aggressors and Trotskyites,"
oftentimes the persona being tried and even confessing their
crimes have been framed and placed under psychological, as
well as physicel pressure, in luding various types of torture,
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 Theodor Hans--Pate 24
in spite of the fact that only a small number of accused
may have actually attempted or committed such acts.
The same principle of the means being used
justifying the end to be attained holds true for Com-
muniat propaganda and alleged factual reports in Soviet
controlled press and radio. For this reason, those indi-
viduals who may not surrender to Soviet or Cc?unist
demands through terror and fear might oftentimes be duped
into supporting Soviet goals because they believe Soviet
propaganda and distorted reports. To any persons residing
in or close to the Soviet sphere of power, Soviet and Com-
munii ruthlessness in dealing with suspects and accused
individuals is well known. Therefore, when such persons
fall into Soviet hands by being abducted or apprehended,
they are generally very frightened and offer usually
.rather slight resistance to Soviet investigators or inter--
rogators,especially when their ordeal during pre-trial
handling threatens to be prolonged indefinitely or beyond
their capacity for endurance in the event of their state-
ments being insufficient to satisfy the prosecutors. Under
these circumstances, confessions can be obtained after ex-
tended periods of pre-trial investigation and suifering,
even if the accused are either innocent or initially de-
termined not to implicate themselves and others beyond
that which can be proven against them in court. For this
reason, too, former conscientious and capable Western
agents and intelligence operators, such as REINZ X ZH&E,
agreed to cooperate with the some elements they had fought
so hard and effectively before. In the case of XUERRE, who
was assumed to have strong anti-Soviet and anti-Communist
convictions, the manner in which he presented his "de-
fection" to the East in his pamphlet, mentioned above,
would easily cause weaker individuals in the Western parties
and organizations to begin to doubt the wisdom of continu-
ing resistance to Communism.
The. following methods and conditions in East
German and Soviet prisons cause arrested persons to confess
their "erimes4' rather than. remain in pre-trial detention
for long periods:
The interrogators and investigators are con-
tinuoualy warned by their superiors to obtain confessions
from the accused if they do not want to arouse suspicion
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 regarding their political loyalty, efficiency in extract-
ing confessions, or attempted collusion with defendants.
Although beatings, physical torture in the
form of forcing the accused to place themselves for pro-
longed periods in positions of increasing hardship to un-
bearable pain, and other forms of physical torment were
frequently used prior to 1953 and particularly in STALIN's
era to extract confessions regardless of guilt or innocence,
an effort was made after STALIN'a death to refrain from
such practices, except when drastic situations demanded
mass convictions and tight security measures as in the
case of the Fast German uprising on June 17, 1953, the
Hungarian revolution, and similar events. During the
periods of tension cited above, the large number of ar-
rested people, the demand for ruthless domination of in-
surgents, and speed needed to re-establish full political
control made it necessary to revert to physical pressure
methods to convict the dissatisfied elements.
Long periods of interrogation by one or
more investigators, frequently carried out in the middle
of the night or toward early morning hours, poor sleep-
ing facilities, such as hard cots, cold cells, inadequate
bedding, and brightly illuminated cells, and other means
of keeping pre-trial prisoners from getting any rest from
repeated violent accusations and detailed questioning are
all utilized to prevent the accused from maintaining his
mental alertness, morale, and will to resist or defend his
rights of innocence. Blinding lights focused on the accused
during interrogation further helps to intimidate and weaken
the defendant and to make him wish to end the ordeal at all
cost.
Ice cold solitary cells with glaring lights
or in complete darkness, oftentimes of extremely small size,
are. used. also . tobreak resistance of obstinate defendants
refusing to : admit. guilt or betray, accomplices or fellow
resistance fighters.
Frequently these or similar cells are con-
structed to permit the so-called water treatment, which
consists either of flooding the cell gradually with cold
water until the prisoner has to stretch to keep his head
above the water level, or dousing the victim alternatingly
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 Theodor Inns--Pane 2C
with ice cold and very hot water for extended periods.
The Soviets very often used the rather simple but just
as brutal method of forcing the accused to stand for days
in knee deep water or submerged up to his hips so that he
could not rest or change his position besides becoming
violently ill from exposure, the highly unsanitary con-
ditions (not being permitted to leave the confinement for
days), and the further lack of proper nourishment. Persons
subjected.to such tortures do not require drugging or
stimulation through drags to induce confessions.
They are usually so soared and exhausted,
as well as oftentimes seriously ill from the physical
hardships, that they confess to anything. Such drugs as
Sodim Pentathol or so-called truth serums are not even
practical in many Soviet interrogations because the prisoners
could not possibly confess under their affect or under
hypnosis to something not actually experienced or carried
out. Therefore, truth serums, drugs to weaken resistance
and the will to withhold information, could even defeat
the interrogator's mission of preparing the accused to play
the role of scapegoat in a staged show trial.
Deceptographe or Polygrepho (lie detectors),
which are.used considerably by Western agencies, are hardly
used by the Soviets for the same reason besides accomplish-
ing under certain conditions much less than physical pres-
sure and terror could achieve. It is known that a stimulant,
such as strong coffee, strong tobacco or cigarettes after
long periods in which their use was denied, rich and enticing
food, especially also alcohol in large quantities, is used
often to trap the accused or cause him to become fully de-
pendant on the kindness of the interrogator for further
benefits.
.Positions into which the prisoner may be forced
for extended periods include sitting for days or long hours
.in erect posture on a small or ho% bench or stool until he
cannot possibly bear the resultant pains and swelling of his
legs and body caused by abnormal blood circulation and muscle
tension. The aim in this form of torture, and similar ex-
cruciating body positions into which the accused is forced,
is to make the accused lose all command over his will because
of the extreme condition of fatigue, realization of utter
defeat, inability .to beer further pain, and consequent loss
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 Theodor Hans-Dare 2?
of strength of character and power of rental concentration.
It has been established that it is almost impossible for
a normal person to beer up under such treatment without
becoming the willing tool of his tormentors.
Another favorite practice to torrent the
accused is to threaten arrest and torture of his closest
relatives and immediate family. In the case of, I believe,
H:)RST LUDWIG, was was convicted of espionage in 1959, it
became quite evident, as borne out in his own testimony and
magazine publications of his background story, that hds
father was beaten in jail in Fast Germany and made to
believe (or actually overheard) that another close relative
was also brutally beaten in an adjoining cell from where
his or her cries could be heard. The result of this treat-
ment was that HO1 T LUDWIGts father and other relatives co-
operated with the Soviets and the M in convincing him
(HORST) to accept the offer to spy against the western
military establishment (Federal German navy and sir force,
as well as the U. S. Air Force in the United States during
hia training in Florida) for the Soviets. In all cases of
this kind, the Soviets assure a certain degree of silence
and success by using close relatives as hostages, who will
be arrested and punished should the agents or informants
being forced to cooperate ever tarn against the So-iota or
betray their missions to the Western authorities. The
tremendous fear of severs reprisals and harsh treatments to
relatives or the immediate family, including children at
times, probably is a very strong influence on the continued
loyalty and silence of Eastern agents, even if they are not
fully convinced of the Co niet regime's alleged advantages.
A strong element in the interrogator's power
over defendants is his oft-repeated contention that resistance
is useless as long as the accused is in the hands of the
Soviets and that he only hurts his own chances for a rele-
tivelylight sentence by refusing to "cooperate." It is
well known through appropriate press and-radio, publicity,
fully. endorsed and even advertised. by the Soviet security
agencies (such as MFS), that those w3io confess or offer
.their statements and cooperate with. the. Soviet authorities
.early enough will be given from complete inanity to very
light punishment while those who insist on hiding their
crimes against the state or the "people" will be sentenced
severely. This practice, of course, and the consistent
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 Theodor Hens-'e r*e 2
publicity and show trials eemonstreting the method
repeatedly, has a ocnsiderable influence on any defendant
and his willingness to.prevent a very long sentence or
even a death penalty. In this c'nnection, the utili-
zation of technical surveillance end recording equipment,
as well as informants posing as follow prisoners or sympa-
thetic inmates or guards, are used to gather as much detri-
mental information about and from the defendant &a can pos-
sibly be gained between interrogations.
Aside from clever politics! arguments, used
by Soviet investigators in convincing prisoners of the
superiority and infallibility of the Co monist cause and
aims, the accused will frequently be led into apparently
casual political discussions when the interrogators try
to make the accused believe that the questioning is being
relaxed for the sake of a respite and to be more fria:,dly
and even considerate toward the defendant. Even a ca`utioua
prisoner,'and being intelligent, may try to justify his at-
titude toward his interrogators and a so-called objective
criticism of the regime's errors. In such mamenta, the
interrogators will find the arguments for coercing the
prisoner into admitting political,oppoaition to the regime.
Finally, all prisoners in pre-trial detention
are treated in such manner as to purposely lower their self-
respect and feeling of human dignity. The way in which a
newly admitted suspect is registered at the pre-trial prison,
searched physically for weapons or possible implements of
escape, caused to turn in their belongings, and placed into
the cell, is well calculated to cause the prisoner to feel
depraved, lost, end without possible help. The simple ex-
pedient of periods of pre-trial investigation and interrogation
lasting for months or even beyond a year is highly effective
in creating strong despair in the prisoner's mind. Without
hope and the possibility of help from the outside., he. weakens
much more easilythan_if he were-permitted to coimaunicete
with relatives and friends on the outside. This.practice,
of course, also affects the prisoner's relatives and contacts
on the outside, especially if they are in any wry guilty but
not apprehended as yet. Their fears nay cause these people
to make errors in judgment, flee, or even contact the very
persons or organizations for advice and help and thus lead
the Soviets to Fscertain mcrc eaaily their actual Astern
connections and missions.
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 Theodcr.lians--tace ?,
The Aforementioned pamphlet by SAGOLLA (DIE
r,)TF OI ;':APO) reflects on pages 4A through 51 the above .
cited interrogation methods and several examples of brutal
treatments of pre-trial prisoners by the MFS. For the
purpose of this testimony it is unfortunate that names of
the victims and interrogators are not given in the pamphlet,
although dates are cited. Exact details may be obtained
from the Central. Intelligence i,gency, whose representatives
in Teat Berlin maintained close contact with the XGU and
may have saved some of the very veiuable records and files
of that organization before it was closed down.
The pamphlet, entitled, "DER STAATSSICHERHEITSDIENST,
(The State Security Service S), prepared by the
UFJ (Free Jurists in 'Vest Berlin) prior to 1960, contains
very interesting information on pages 5~ through 78 regard-
ing HFS interrogation methods and the manner in which
prisoners of the Soviets and ;'7`S are handled from the
moment of their arrest to their final sentencing in typical
show trials. The UFJ has backed up this information with
several actual case histories and mentions precise names,
dates, and places involved to present authentic reports.
The two examples, illustrating well Soviet and Test German
interrogation methods, cited below were extracted from the
UFJ booklet.
ALFPID YUNT"SCH, born October 23, 1922, resided
in East Germany at Lauchhaimrer, where he worked in the local
machine factory. on March 6, 1953, he made critical remarks
about STALIN, who had just died, and mentioned his hope for
a unified Germany. He made these remarks among fellow workers.
Two days later, he was arrested by three WS officers, who
took him to the local 15FS office. After a complete physical
check of his clothes and body, he vas permitted to keep only
his shirt, trousers and jacket, and was then placed in ^ cell.
After several hours, he vas taken to the interrogation. room
and questioned by several HFS officials for four hours. His
Statements a.t the factory and other remarks he had made were
repeoted-to~him and hie- was accused of-having criticized the
regime, which he denied. Two Mao interrogators..repeatedly
hit him in the face with-their fists, causing him to fall
from his chair repeetedl;r and to lose cornciousnesa. Then a
confession was demanded in return for cigarettes and a promise
of release from jail. After continued refusal to confess,
KUNTZSCH was again beaten. He w.an then returned to his cell.
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 Thor firms-- r 3
in the zcccnd 1-nterrogeticn, the report
from his fellow worrier, : 'IvT itTJ SCH!ZRZ.e Ft, rege.rding
the incident end his remrares .,as finally shown the ac-
cused after specific statements, Y Z TZSCII had made only
in the informant's presence, were mentioned to prove the
accuracy of the accusation. :.wen then the prisoner refused
to make a full confession and was again maltreated. His
resistance was finally broken when he was threatened with
the arrest of his wife and children.
Whenr:L'NTZSCIU was moved several days after
his original arrest to the pro-trial judge, he was told to
sign P statement that he confessed voluntarily and without
coercion. KiINTZSCH pointed to his scars and other marks
of violence and refused to sign the statement. He was then
placed in a dark and damp basement cell without windows of
very small size and forced to stand in it up to 14 hot:s,
when he collapsed. He was revived with water, and when
again threatened with further detention in the same cell,
he signed the statement.
In subsequent interrogations and while being
photographed, he was placed in a blinding floodlight although
he was highly sensitive to any light and almost blind. He
was given a defense lawyer the day of and very shortly before
the trial, at which the prosecutor demanded a sentence of
seven and P. half years in the penitentiary. He was given
a two and a half yeer sentenco, which was later curtailed
when KUNTZSCH in view of his increasing blindness, induced
because of the interrogations facing the floodlights, was
unable to leave the prison hospital.
MARTIN F%HL, born March 23, 1930, a journalist,
wor4ed from 1947 to 1950 as editorial trainee for the Fast
Berlin Communist youth organization magazine, (FDJ-Zeitschrift)
"JUNGF tELT." There he becawr acquainted with the editor
LOTHAR ;LINK. After LINY fled to West .Kerlin in the spring
of 1950', LINE telephoned ?Olt and arranged with POHL a meet-
ing in West Berlin. This telephone. call, apparently made to
POIL:'s office, had become known to the main editorial office
of the magazine, causing the responsible staff members to
discuss the proposed meeting with PJI., and threatening him
with immediate dismissal should he keep the appointment. POHL
therefore did not meet LINT" as scheduled and tlso had no
further contact with LIN. at art;, time later.
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 n February 2', 1153, ?CHL was unexpectedly
arrested in his hone in the Soviet sector of Berlin. He
","es taken to the ' ':.' pre -tricl prison and accused of having
committed espionage against Fast C~cr-many on behalf of the
Americone. PhHL was completely amazed at the charges and
could not understand why he would be accused of such activ-
ity. After many long interrogations for one week the
interrogators finally mentioned the name LIN}'. Thereupon
l':)IIL explained that he had never seen LIMY again after his
flight to Feet Berlin in 19'53.
In spite of his repeated denials of guilt
and contact with LINE or the U. S. Intelligence Service,
POHL continued to be interrogated from six to seven hours
each night for approximately three weeks. POHL was not
permitted to sleep in the daytime in his cell and was unable
to rest during the night when his interrogations took place.
While detained in his solitary and illuminated cell, POTIL
would be awakened by the guard at once whenever he fell
asleep on his small stool, on which he was forced to sit.
At those times, the guard would loudly rap on the cell door
and yell and cuss out the prisoner. Because of his extreme
exhaustion, POHL finally gave up further resistance and
decided to make a false confession. He then claimed to have
met LINK twice in West Berlin in May 1950.
Soon after his "confession" was written up
and signed, POHL was placed in another cell, in which a
certain FUCHS, the onetime press secretary of the ousted
East German Foreign Minister, DERTINGER, was also detained.
FUCHS strongly advised POHL to not make further incriminating
and false statements but to renounce his alleged confession.
POHL followed this advice during the. next interrogation and
the investigator finally accepted his denial, making an of-
ficial record thereof. 'specially at this interrogation,
but also in previous ones, POHL was always yelled at, cussed
out, and:treated"-in.a degrading manner to cause him to lose
his self-confidence.
Until mid-June 1953, POHL wad interrogated three
times weekly, and thereafter again at longer intervals. A
final attempt to yet obtain a confession from PCHL was made
when he was threatened with indefinite detention prior to
trial. In another attempt by the MFS, LIMY and POHL were
confronted while LINT: openly accused POHL`of espionage.. Since
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 Theodore Hans-Pepe 32
POHL had actually had nn, contact with LINK or the
Americans, and LINK must have known this also, It.-is
evident that LIN}: must have been forced as well by the
MFS to fabricate a confession and. implicate others for
the sake of terminating the ordeal of interrogation and
pre-trial detention hardships. In spite of his unchanged
statement of innocence, POHL was placed on trial in
Chemnitz, Fast Germany, where he and other defendants
were sentenced on November 5, 1953 to four years in the
penitentiary. The prosecution had demanded a five year
sentence. The principal defendant, LOTHAR LINK was
sentenced in a separate proceeding of the same court to
ten years in the penitentiary on July 7, 1953,
POHL found out that another defendant, also
a former editor of the "JUNGF WELT,' one PETER LEFOLD, had
also made a false confession and had then similarly re-
tracted his confession. As LFFOLD subsequently explained
to POHL, he could not have met LIN}; in West Berlin on the
dates claimed by LINK, because he (LEFOLD) was not even in past
West Berlin during that period. In the main court session
trying POHL and LEFOLD, both were sentenced to four years
in prison, however. The reason why the trial took place in
Chemnitz, an area in which none of the defendants bad resided
previously or had even worked, was unknown to POHL. POHL
later fled to West Berlin after his release in East Germany
and made a sworn statement to the UFJ on April 18, 1955,
regarding this experience.
Before closing any final analysis of Soviet
and Communist interrogation methods, the following cases
should be studied closely inasmuch as they serve well as
typical examples of brutality and ruthless interrogation.
One is the investigation and prosecution in
'Hungary of CARDINAL MINDSENTY, who is currently protected
by the United States Embassy in Hungary against further
persecution by the AVO (Hungarian Communist, Security and
Counterintelligence Organizetion) MINpSE Ty was,errested
and accused of having committed treason and subversion
against the Communist Hungarian People's Republic. After
very long and extremely exhausting interrogations, MflWSENTY
wee tried in a show trial and given a long sentence. During
the trial, he appeared to be a broken man, having the ap-
pearance of a hypnotized or drugged person. As far as I know,
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 the methods of degradation of the spirit, of exhaustion
through lack of rest and physical as well as nervous
tension, and of interminable accusations and threats
finally caused the cardinal to break do-.rn in his re-
sistance. It is unknown to me if any drugs were used
but I believe, having read published articles by knowledgable
writers in which the use of strong coffee was mentioned
as one practice to keep NINDSINTY awake over long periods
and prevent rest for the accused, that the purpose of the
use of drugs had been achieved.
Another case is the prosecution and trial
of RADAR, the current 'head of the Hungarian Comminiat Party
and State regime. KADAR was subjected to even worse treat-
ments and inhumane handling by the AVO, when he was ac-
cused of anti-Stalinist actions and tendencies prior to the
death of STALIN. Although KADAR's suffering may not be
described to any American investigators or writers by any
available witnesses, it was reported, I. believe, by JAMES A.
MICIIENER, in his recent book, 'he Bridge at Ands , published
by Random House., New York, in 1057. MIICHf:NER cites in this
book a large number of sadistic practices of the AVO in their
handling of prisoners and suspects. Being in the United States
Embassy at Budapest, CARDINAL MINDSFIML should also-be availa-
ble for first-hand statements. i?ICKENER mey'wei.l..remember
many of the Hungarian refugees whose information'he-reported
regarding the AVO and Soviet interrogation and detention
methods and may possibly provide addresses of suitable witnes-
ses. The United States Arr General DEAN should also be able
to furnish first-hand testimony regarding the degrading treat-
ment and brainwashing techniqueshe.-was.subjected to by the
North Korean Communists as a Prisoner of Weir prior to his
release.
Murder by Soviet'agents to eliminate political
,foea,-knowledgable defectors,.former Communists who. left the
Party to fight Communism from the West,, and. any other oppo-
aition considered too dangerous to be.permitted to continue
their activities, is known well as one method of 'gaining
political ends at all-cost. A perfect example of this
ruthless course of action by the Soviets was revealed when
thc I1VD Captain XWXHLOV defected to. the feat in early 1954
instaad of carrying out his Soviet mission to assaaainate
leading NTS official OK.CIOVITCH in Frankfurt/Main, Germany.
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 Theodor Hens--Pr,zF 34
t;nothcr agent. sent elong, to assist
r:H:,KIHOV was the German i1M; ?;t1;;'-'ITS! H, an old-time
Communist from Lindau,_.ake Constance, Germany.
I UKC'dITSCH was born 1;::1 in Switzerland. Another agent,
who accompanied KHO)`:HLCv and ITScH.; was the German
W?'BFH, On February 25, l%'54, these agents were placed in
protective. custody by the United States authorities in West
Germany. On April 22, 1''54, the Americans announced
publicly and officially the Soviet attempt to murder
OKOLOVITCH with the help of these agents, who had been
given all necessary papers, funds, and the small hidden
murder weapon.. It may be significant that at about the
same time, DR. ALY'LMID R TRUCIL"ICVITCH was abducted from
West Berlin, namely on April 111, 1954, only nine days before
the American announcement in Bonn.
To my personal knowledge, the following other
instances of Soviet or ;iFS assassination attempts against
anti-Communist politicians occurred between 1955 and 1957
in Vest Berlin. One was directed at the aforementioned
outspoken anti-Soviet and anti-Communist ?arty Chairman
of the FDP, CARL-HUBFl' SCH`,FMZICKE, to whom the MFS through
annonymous persons sent a package containing a strong ex-
plosive, which wounded severely SCHWFNNICKE'a secretary, who
opened the parcel in the ante-room to the Party leader's
office in the SIF1?U:NS CULPORF.TION's Administration Building,
where he had an important director position. This took place
in early 7.955. In the East German press and radio strenuous
efforts were made to place the blame and guilt on Western
agents d a nationalist group.
Another attempt was made, I believe in 1956,
against the aforementioned SPD functionary and mayor of Berlin-
Kreuzberg, WILLI EIlE5Su.ANN. In this case, an informant of
the MFS, who had first been. tested by several trial missions
which he apparently accomplished",. although1iot:'too successful,
was given a parcel of "s specially prepared e?ploa:ive.charge to
,nail in a certain way and with e, false return address"to.the
intended victim. Only because the informant had also es-
tablished contact with an American counts"rintelligence agency.
in best Berlin and was not willing to carry out. this mission,
was it possible to save t'F,? ES._',11K', The charge was exploded
inste'.d by the rest Berlin police detonation and mine clear-
ing specialists. It ?-as found to have a very large detonating
force and would easily have killed the victim. The bomb and
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 poreel consisted crtircl; .,f pr-~daota purchased in '.!est.
Berlin and --vnufFctured in the "cat. The false return
address area apparently picked by the 'CL;" to implicate
another opponent of Cor~atunie n in blest Berlin, should West
Berlin authorities he f,und a trace of the alleged sender.
The entire parcel and contents had been
built and similar models had :cos'., likely been tested
earlier by the, ;TS in ' ast Berlin in a specially es-
tablished research and development center and laboratory,
designated "Abteilung L (Department S), in which specialists
and MFS prisoners !Ith appropriate technical and scientific
background and knr ledge -fork developing and making all types
of technical equipment, used, for instance, in abductions
,Then cars having false license plates can be driven from
the scene of the crine :chile chantrrring the plates without
having to stop, in audio-surveillance (secret listening
devices), and in clandestine communications, as wall as
spacial photographic missions inquiring spy cetserns of
different sizes and eanouflaged in various 'Jaya.
Instances of suicide, which were in reality
assassinations to male the victim appear to have killed
himself, are not reme,abered by inc. There have been severel
cases of suicide by 6o-riot and 1? YS agents or informants,
but whether these were boron fide suicides or not. is extremely
difficult to determine beyond reasonable doubt. Obviously,
any suicide eliminates further police investigation as soon
as the possibility of murder has been fourA highly improbable.
In ,ne instance, P. pre-trial prisoner of the
Fast German nutt:ortties in the Soviet Sector of Berlin prior
to 1953 was accueea of economic as well as political crimes
and/or espionage against the test German regime. He was
brutally beaten and allegedly managed to jump out of a prison
window in an upper floor. It was generally believed to have
been suicide.by. a -viflti;m of torture .rho could not bear further.
n?streatment It could, easily have. been 'a' last
resort by the responsible i vestiraating,agency to cover up
the true condition of the victim who, beceua.? of maltreatment,
could no longar be utilised in a show trial or who had steadfastly
or because of his true innocence failed to confess. Although
tj.e nare of the victim is no'_ rec:llected by me now, I know
that he ' es at one ' i:ae the fiancee of R; -H VON VARADY,
the present. wife of n -sell knrvrn +,. ;uznalist, A .F:PANDr
ER V: ,N
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 Theodor Hans--?n;-c
VLRAEY-S~1B in ''e e'. er In . _ be=icve that close friends,
as well as his for.~~r fiancee, were convinced that the
victim did not really corcnit suici&,.
In another case, en cspionage suspect or
agent of the Soviets, e. rather beautiful naturalized
American of originally :`cst German nationality, who had
married.e United States serviceman and hedfmigrated to
the United States, was found in a West Berlin apartment of
her onetime boy friend, the German dentist, DR. SO12 R, at
Berlin.-iilmersdorf, British Sector, where she had supposedly
committed suicide o-rer her broken love affair and a quarrel
with DR. SOMME R. The victim's name I do not remember, un-
fortunately; but the Vest Berlin police and United States
authorities In Berlin, Including the CIA, I believe, in-
vestigated. this case end found n notebook of the victim.
She had opened the gas valves in the kitchen after closing
all windows, while DR. loft in the evening and -did
not return until early morning, when he found her already
dead. DR. SOMA?R, himself, as well as several of his female
acquaintances, and even his own wife (married. after the
incident), were all tied up In suspicious activities in con-
nection with the Soviet intelligancc service in East Berlin.
The victim had apparently made numerous travels behind the
Iron Curtain and had been in contact with the Soviets re-
peatedly.
It is my firm opinion, based on extended study
of the Soviet practices, that in their efforts to achieve
their goals they could not hesitate to assassinate opponents
in any manner eoncidered especially suitable and would
therefore take any opportunity to have such murder appear
as suicide.
Another good exnmple of,C-imunist assassination
fore political purpose is the:murder"by ERTCH MIELYE, the
current head of the '?'!'S in rest Germany, when he carried out
a Party order and shot and killed the German police officers,
ANLAUF end LENCK, in Berlin on August 9, 1?31, at a time
when the Nazis had not assumed power and P truely democratic
government existed unecr the -le German Weimar Republic's
Cf-nLtitution.
In vies: of the ruthlesznf ss of Soviet activitiev
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 Sheodor Hans-Paf7e 37
in all fields of intFlligence, espionage, subversion, and
count.erintelligcnce, particularly concerning western Vurope,
the problem of taking effective United States counter
measures without reverting to similar tactics or utilizing
such drastic actions as to seriously endanger our democratic
processes has been and may well continue to be a major reason
why Soviet acts of aggression and terror are difficult to
combat. I am convinced, on the basis of 15 years of practical
experience in Berlin and confronting the Soviets and their
Communist collaborators in continuous "front line action;"
that until now the overall efforts and specific activities
by the responsibl.' United States agencies were rather optimisti-
cally vie??-ed as adequate, or even effective, and fully
sufficient for the future without, however, having been
carried out on a scale really needed to achieve complete
Western protection against future Soviet threats.
It is impossible to place the blame on any
particular individual. Such attempts of improving our ef-
ficiency and increasing our effort would, in my opinion, fail
to provide a sound plan for better measures. It would only
result in accusations and excuses by the agencies concerned.
Also, I know that a very large number of highly dedicated and
capable Americans in all branches of the government and abroad
have done all they could to alert the public and obtain decisions
and favorable results in fighting Communist aggression and terror.
But it must be realized that no matter how much any such activitieq
as counterintelligence, security regulations, intelligence and
espionage acts, and influencing politically foreign countries
and their populations, may be distasteful to or considered an
essential evil by many loyal, although poorly informed Americans
(including some responsible government officials) the United
States and its foreign allies will be in a far more perilous
position, unless we become much more active and concerned re-
garding Western security and our true political strength versus
Communism.
I Sensafely State -thatthe personnel strength,
the scope of available funds and operational means, and the degree
of combined or concentrated effort in providing greater security
from Soviet acts of aggression and subversion in Western Europe,
and particularly regarding Yeat Berlin (or Berlin as a whole
before the Soviet Blockade), were definitely inadequate, as it
pertains not only to the United States authorities there, but
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 Theodor Fans--PF ^e 7
also regarding the French and the British endeavors. In
addition, the punishment provided in our laws and West
German jurisdiction, as shown above in a few examples,
is very light compared with Soviet sentences for similar and
even less serious offenses. '?hen it is possible for the
Soviets to concentrate on private and official Western
agencies to such an extent that infiltration and subversion
cause these agencies to become ineffective and even terminate
their operations, then it is apparent that our success in
this field is highly questionable. (The leading West German
SPD functionary and member of the House of Representatives,
HEIBFRT WEIR, for instance, who had been a leading Com-
muniat before World War II and broke with the Party because
of Soviet domination and his recognition of errors in Com-
aaanis:, doctrines, was the target of numerous Soviet ab-
duction attempts in his West German home town of Hamburg.
He knows Communist ruthlessness personally and serves as
an excellent example of Soviet terror practices. Even
though he is a recognized and well known political figure,
the Communists did not hesitate to attempt to eliminate him
through physical violence. Yet, except for a onetime report-
ing of the attempts to abduct or assassinate him, very little
publicity has been given these attempts.)
One weakness in American policy and actions
in Germany woo the reluctance to demand full recognition
of occupation rights and constant respect from all German
officials and politicians, especially those in responsible
positions in the Soviet Zone, when dealing with or referring
to United States authorities, regardless of contrary Soviet
political aims and domination. The Soviets and their German
collaborators regard the unwillingness by leading United
States officials tocpenly exercise their rights as a control-
ling power during conduct toward Germane and handling Cca-
.munists as an obvious political weakness instead of, as
sincerely intended by the Americans, an effort to be con-
siderate and fair toward all Germans. Believing the Americans
weak, and well-meaning, the Soviets were. encouraged to become
increasingly brazen. in their.diaregard- for human values and
freedom in Germany, but particularly concerning residents
of Western occupied territory. They accordingly assumed
that the United States Government was not sufficiently serious
or sincere in their declared occupation policy and plans for
a unified. and independently democratic Germany to be. willing
and prepared to take drastic Action, even military measures,
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 to protect German thtcgri+.y, security, and pro=.'extern
interes+s.
An as yet unwarranted political independence
end full freedom of political action for solely the Western
occupied Germany ici (similar to a rather premature United
States disarmament right after World '.-'Pr II), not being
based on any realistic appraisal of an as yet quite un-
settled political future for the whole of Germany, includ-
ing the ruthlessly suppressed Soviet Zone, allowed the
Soviets to isolate themselves from the Western powers, to
consolidate their domination of East Germany and Poland,
and to establish a deep rift between the two ports of Germany.
W'este.,n actions regarding East Germany, at an early stage
z?alatively justified and plausible in the light of joint
occupation rights, therefore became practically impossible
or even dangerous.
The riduculous situation of alleged spokesmen
of en occupied people, as the Communists in Fast Germany
claimed to be, although supported in their political activ-
ities by the, Soviets, protesting violently in press and
radio so-called intelligence and espionage efforts by an
occupying power, such as the Americans, never apparently
caused the least concern or immediate counter measures by
the responsible United States occupation officials to
clarify once and, for all the correct status of those East
Germans and the Communists in Germany. Aside from oftentimes
effective actions end protests by GENERAL HOWLi;Y, too few
such energetic steps were ever taken by the Americana to
demand satisfaction and corrective actions.
Unfortunately, Soviet actions in organizaing
and strengthening two years after World War II Feet German
armed forces and security organizations (such as the MYS),
while West Germany was neither rearming nor established
similar security agencies, were never officially pblicizec;
nor.strongly protested by the United States Government,
although detailed and timely reports were forrarded regard-
ing these. threats as early as 1';,I.,q by CIC from Berlin.
The fret that certain United States officials
in Germany intentionally or inadvertently defeated the best
American interests in Germany by playing into Soviet hands
further caused the Soviets and Communists to assume that
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 the United Ste te:;; rc.vernr cn t .: oul d not t&ke drastic
action to insist on its announced policies being carried
out in spite of :ioviet ob.iections or lack of caoperntion.
Such Anericen officia_s, as the former head of the 31-1GUS
(t"ffice M11. Gov't. U.s.) Padio Branch and his deputy,
.having been active Communists before, took actions shortly
after the Soviet Blockade of Berlin seriously affecting
the personnel and effectivoness of broadcasts by RIAS
(U.S. sponsored Padic in Berlin). Through their decisions,
p ;~caerful transmitter ias not used in Berlin as originally
p.'..enncd, ardent rind popular supporters of official American
policies end interests in Furope, as the excellent com-
mentators VC`N 'T: P.,". Y end 11'27N HARW.AITN, were not only fired
without notice or due cruse bu* even prevented from regain-
ing other employment, And radio corinentators were selected
who openly as -ell as secretly supported leftist and SPD
interests strongly opposing Western military preparedness,
such as NATO, and efforts to contain Soviet aggression.
Other independent- 'ZUS conoentst.ore, such as F'RNST. TILLICti,
who also staunchly bar..vd United St.etes policy, were dropped
as well at a later date. This lack of understanding by
certain American _Tficiais abroad (in this case, Berlin),
regarding the importance of fostering and constantly helping
the trul local friends of America, was greatly responsible
for resentment, despair, and doubt in the wisdom of openly
endorsing United States interests in the face of constant
Communist intrigues, infiltration, and frequent mete of
violence, against which many once eager friends of the United
States were not even adequately protected. Although the
aforementioned OMGUS officials were finally ousted in 1953
(shortly before OM3S ceased to exist anywey),.the Radio
Branch chief, while still claiming to represent United States
interests at the! Copenhagen International Broadcasting
Conference in 1947, permitted the Soviets to obtain the best
possible radio frequencies for Fast German stations sending
strong Communist propaganda throughout Germany.
Another serious drawback preventing affective
protective action against abductions and similar transgressions
into 'Jest.ern territory was. the inadequate. patrolling by
T4estern police and aecuritY forces etthe Soviet Zone and
Sector borders:. After a particularly alarming series of
abductions in'.`c-st Berlin, 1 rec-,rmendc.c +, the than
responsible Lmericcn Public Safety officer, u.A.73R B:ND, -
that pe.trole end checks of vehicirs at the Lector borders
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 be increased to perm, It close.- cx?;;i!nttion of suspicious
cars end persons r.nd to rcrorc.license plates for reedy
counterintelligence rt fercn^e. Rio crreed that such
necsureo :ould be eXrellen`: bu4 pointed out 'hat top
level political eioo end dip::n is considerations were
strongly opposed is such action, ei the Soviets could
capitalize on such steps to accuse the !americans of
sabotaging lerman iYrnificetion and intensifying the
separation of Germmany." (The latter remarks were more or
less +hose of leedinc ?United States officials who feared
such consequences.} E"reedoc; of interzonal movement was
strongly demanded by the h1r?hes4. American officials end
then Pctue.l?.y estrblishcd in apitr of continued Soviet
travel restr ctions. This policy may have been sincerely
considered as r. vcy by the ,lmericnns to provide the
desired freedom of rzo,rcment. for all Germans, but it
certainly permitted the Soviets to infiltrate the West
with increased ease end effort while still preventing
Vestern powers equal and proper ecco:e to Fast. Germany
in return.
"y urgent recommendations are that the United
States intelligence end security agencies be built up end
expanded to become more effective and constitute a true
deterrent to further Soviet, and Communist aggression and
subversion, that operational needs in this respect are
not disregarded or inadequately met within, for instance,
military intelligence and security organizations for the
sake: of overriding administrative or budgetary policy con-
sideretions, that the intelligence and foreign area
specialists of the United States Government and forces are
not lost to the security effort because of strict adherence
to such "fearful or cautious" regulations as any recent
foreign nationality, foreign spouses, or unwillingness to
grant necessary waivers for their utilization and retention
under unusual circumstances, If it were possible to use tc.
really great national adv*:ntegc such onetime enemies and
currently: truely loyal hnericnns as WFRNHER VON BRAUN, then
:the utilization of valuable and capable individuals in the
fields of intelligence end security at the present state
of "pe