OUR GOOD NEIGHBORS SHOULD COME FIRST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000500120013-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 28, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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June 29, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX
The U.N. is an extremely worthwhile
organization. Its peacekeeping and hu-
manitarian efforts are a blessing to all
mankind. This organization deserves
and, I hope, will continue to receive our
solid and everlasting support.
Tribute to Hon. Douglas Dillon, Former
Secretary of the Treasury
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 29, 1965
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, on June
21 I was privileged to attend a luncheon
honoring former U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillon. It was a small
luncheon attended by the officers and
friends of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank at its offices here in Wash-
ington.
I have long admired the work and ob-
jectives of the IDB and have been privi-
leged to serve as a congressional adviser
to the U.S. delegation at various meetings
of the Board of Governors of the Bank.
The role Dougl'as Dillon has played as
the U.S. representative on this Board of
Governors will long be remembered. He
has been a pillar of strength in this re-
markable undertaking and is largely re-
sponsible for the great success the IDB
has enjoyed. He has not only helped to
set the Bank on a sound foundation, but
has helped to chart its steady course in
the years to come.
A most significant tribute was paid to
Secretary Dillon at this luncheon by Fe-
lipe Herrera, President of the Inter-
American Development Bank-one
which, I feel, has such importance that
it should be brought to the attention of
the Members of this House since we, the
Members of Congress, must make the
ultimate determinations in regard to the
U.S. participation in this endeavor. I
know of no finer justification for our
role than that reflected in the following
remarks of President Herrera concern-
ing our great former Secretary of the
Treasury:
REMARKS OF FELIPE HERRERA, PRESIDENT OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
AT A CEREMONY HONORING FORMER U.S.
TREASURY SECRETARY DOUGLAS DILLON,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 21, 1965
In honoring Douglas Dillon today for his
extraordinary service and devotion to the
cause of inter-American economic coopera-
tion, we must perforce remember the last
8 years-a period marked by the germina-
tion, the establishment and the growth of
the Inter-American Development Bank.
The economic conference of the OAS held
in August 1957, in Buenos Aires, was a sig-
nificant landmark in the interesting and
constructive process of providing the inter-
American system with a structure to foster
Latin America's development, welfare and
stability. At that Conference, Douglas
Dillon, then just recently named to a high
State Department position after having
served as U.S. Ambassador to France, began
his long association with Latin American
affairs.
I might venture to recall, that in those
days when I headed by country's delega-
tion to that meeting, Mr. Dillon whom I
first met on that occasion told me that he was
deeply impressed by the interest shown by
Latin America in the creation of a regional
financial organization and also by the vigor
with which that idea was being put forth.
He added that although the U.S. Govern-
ment was not in a position to adopt a final
decision at that time, it was fully prepared
to explore, along with the other countries,
the feasibility and the perspectives of such
an institution.
Just 1 year later, in August 1958, our
honored guest, then Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs, voiced the historic an-
nouncement, at a meeting of the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council, that
the Eisenhower administration was prepared
to enter into negotiations with the countries
of Latin America for the creation of a re-
gional development bank.
The year 1959 was thus an interesting pe-
riod In which high officials of the United
St,tes and of the Latin American countries,
many of them present at this ceremony, ded-
icated their maximum efforts to the prepara-
tion of a basic charter for an Inter-American
Bank and to the ratification of that char-
ter by the end of the year.
In February 1960, in San Salvador, the
Bank initiated its organizational process.
Little more than 5 years have passed since
that time. But, for those of us connected
with the Bank, those years have been marked
by an intensity that cannot be measured
by the mere passage of time.
In the initial period of our institution,
Mr. Dillon, now not only a high State Depart-
ment official, but also an Alternate Gover-
nor of the Bank, played an active role and
demonstrated particular devotion to the task
of putting into effect the project to which
he had given so much support.
Just as the Bank prepared to open its
doors in mid-1960, the "Declaration of New-
port" was issued, followed by the call for the
Conference of Bogota, the meeting at which
new and dynamic steps were taken to pro-
mote hemispheric cooperation. In the Act
of Bogota, the American republics recognized
for the first time that the peoples' welfare
and not just economic development should
be an object of common concern. For this,
reforms in traditional systems of production
and distribution of wealth were needed; local
resources had to be oriented on more effi-
cient and social terms, and such efforts had
to be complemented with external coopera-
tion. Once more it fell to the lot of Douglas
Dillon to express the support of his Govern-
ment to this new dimension in regional re-
lations and also to champion the plan to
entrust a substantial part of the Inter-
American Social Development Fund, ap-
proved at that meeting, to our new Bank.
This far-reaching decision enabled the
Bank, practically from the start of Its activi-
ties, to finance not only traditional require-
ments but also those connected with the
fields of urban development and sanitation,
of rural reform and of higher education. At
this juncture, the Bank extended its first
loan in February 1961, and symbolically it
was one for potable water for the inhabi-
tants and industries of the city of Arequipa,
in southern Peru.
At that time, Douglas Dillon had just been
named Secretary of the Treasury in the new
Kennedy administration and in that
capacity he became the U.S. Governor
of our Bank. It is unnecessary to describe
the full extent of the close association of
our honored guest with the Bank in that
position. I should like to recall, however,
the inspiration of his presence and his
speeches at the meetings of our Board of
Governors; his lucid statements before the
U.S. Congress every time the Bank's resources
A3425
were being replenished; his daily Intimate
contact with the small and large problems
of our organization. At times of tension, or
of exaggerated concern, in the difficult stage
when this multinational Bank was building
its financial resources and placing its funds
and when it was putting into effect new
financial techniques and procedures, Douglas
Dillon represented ? for us, the presence of
an objective and true friend, of a banker of
great experience, and of a statesman with
a clear vision of international economic and
political relations.
It fell also to Mr. Dillon's lot during this
period to negotiate and sign in the name of
his country the Charter of Punta del Este,
the institutional framework of the policy of
the Alliance for Progress: a document which
despite ups and downs in hemispheric re-
lations must be considered the cornerstone
in the long process in which a modern society
is being created for more than 200 million
Latin Americans.
Not only through his imaginative and
realistic ideas, but also through that ap-
proach which is so typically his, in which
firmness is blended with persuasion, intel-
ligence with humanity, and tact with con-
viction, Douglas Dillon projected and reaf-
firmed certain basic concepts for interna-
tional economic and financial cooperation.
These concepts, I am happy and proud to
recognize, are part of the Inter-American
Development Banks' very own philosophy. ,
He has been a promoter of the multilateral
approach in the field of external financial
assistance at both the international and
regional scale.
He envisaged, as banker and as man of
Government, the possibilities of using sound
and well-conceived financial mechanisms, for
the needs of economic and social progress in
developing countries.
He has been a convinced advocate of the
need for the countries south of the Rio
Grande not only to develop at a viogorous
pace at the national level but also to seek-
to complement and coordinate their develop-
ment so that the western world might be able
to rely on a strong, prosperous, and united
Latin America.
Our bank fully participates in this ap-
proach. We are a multilateral organiza-
tion, and above all we seek to permanently
create a philosophy of respect and solidarity
among nations of differing rates of develop-
ment and with differing sociological and po-
litical structures. We are struggling, jointly
with the governments of Latin America, in
an effort to have our funds act as leaven in
the necessary task of increasing investment
levels in order to create higher standards of
living. We have been demonstrating to the
developed countries which contribute to our
financial resources and to the nations which
use our funds that an approach which is
technically rigorous and financially sound
Is not incompatible with the growing and
flexible needs of new countries.
This philosophy, of which we think the
Bank has been a vivid demonstration, and
of which Mr. Dillon has been one of the
most important champions, has been re-
flected in recent times in other areas of the
underdeveloped world. Thus, it has not
been mere chance that in the creation of the
African Development Bank and in the pro-
posal to create a regional bank for Asia, the
countries of those continents should have
had such a profound Interest in the achieve-
ments of this regional financial agency for
Latin America, which has led us to give
technical cooperation for both initiatives.
Esteemed friend Douglas Dillon, in the
name of the Board of Executive Directors of
the Inter-American Development Bank, its
management and staff and as your friend
and collaborator, it is a particular pleasure
for me to present you with this medal and
diploma.
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swam Will al like many of my constituents-.that re- principles, its premises and assumptions, its
ways serve to remind you that all of us at -
the Bank recognize in your selfless and -peated raises in the debt ceiling avoid the goals and priorities?
dedicated services to the Americas, the brit- question. We are postponing the inevi- Such questions need urgently to be con-
liant reflections of a true statesman. table. A balanced budget is a must, sidered. Our Government's Dominican ac-
sometimes. I am for Making a beginning, pions h cooe concern among resp
In conclusion, it might be considered be fatiazevens throughoutd the hemisphere, many here,
apropos today to repeat the thoughts of tions signs whom think they u see is those ac-rn to apropos today Balanced Budget in a Balanced Thomas Jefferson on this subject: lieved os haof a ve partial
superseded ayearsya o.
I place economy among the most important That policy was characterized by a thinly
Economy . virtues and public debt as the greatest of veiled contempt for the Latin Americans,
dangers to be feared. To preserve our inde- self-arrogation to the United States of re-
EXTENSION OF REMARKS pendence, we must not let our rulers load us sponsibility for determining the hemisphere's
of up with perpetual debt. We must make our destinies, and a too-ready disposition to rely
HON. RODNEY M. LOVE choice between economy and liberty, or pro- an our Armed Forces in defense of our hemis-
fusion and servitude. pheric interests. A cloud of suspicion and
OF 03;110 Although we are living doubt, confusion and bewilderment, now
in an urbanized hangs over the region. Honest dialog be-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES economy, in a period of our country's tweet the two Americas and true inter-
Tuesday, June 29, 1965 growth much more complicated than the American cooperation., never frequent or
al V wul-1,11y oi some =potion, even today. Our ijorninican intervention.
the President signed, into w uohs u The possibility of a tragic miscalculation
setting a new temporary national debt of the Dominican kind-a miscalculation,
limit of $328 billion. This new limit is i ~~C'L42~ evidently traceable to fault reporting
emboss personnel and y porting from
$4 billion above the ceiling that expires Our Good Neigh ors Should Come First Domingo--has been a real and others
resent in nto
tomorrow, June 30, reflecting continu- p
dan
er
g
g
Ing deficit operations by the Govern- for more than a decade, ever since the onset
ment. EXTENSION OF REMARKS of the cold war in Latin America.
I regret that I could not support this or Since the 1950's our Latin American policy
has been marked by an awkward if unavoid-
measure with a clear conscience. I felt HON. F._ BRADFORD MORSE able dualism. One strand of policy has run
the necessity of making a strong protest from the era of the good neighbor and the
and the only way to do so was to vote OF MASSACHUSETTS traditions, myths, customs, and institutions
against the bi way to do was as to the - IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES of the inter-American system. To the ex-
House. Monday, June 28, 1965 tent that this strand has informed policy
decisions,,
I am dedicated to fiscal responsibility Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, one of the been regarded
n tesass standing in a special fah
and to the prospect of a balanced budg- most thoughtful and perceptive articles
et in a balanced economy, as is the ad- on the nature of United States-Latin milial relation to us. They, while weaker
en-
ministration. The fact is that she Dam- titled to our full` respect ucTheir linte rip ,
cootie platform, adapted by the Deem- ilmerican relations appeared in the New independence, and sovereign equality with
cratic National adopted by for Demo- .ork Times magazine on June 6, 1965. us are, at almost all costs, to be safeguarded,
reads as fotiowa,: 1964, Written by Dr. John Plank, a noted Latin not only against threats and incursions from
I anerican specialist who has served in the outside
t:h
It i
h
t
n
,
e
s
he
emisphere but also against un-
ational purpose, and our com- &tate Department and on the faculty of toward manifestations of our own vast power.
mitment, to continue this expansion of the the Fletcher School of Law and Diplo- Every appropriate effort is to be made to
American economy toward its potential, .lacy the article comes to grips with the help our Latin American neighbors translate
without a recession, with continued eta- their biho
, with
t and ece an withon of the bete- c7nflicting strands of U.S. policy in the thejuridical equality with us into effective
fits of this growth and prosperity to those Western Hemisphere. equality in respects--political, economic, and
e o
who have not fully shared in them. ~Dr. Plank, who is now on the senior The other social.
This will require continuation of flexible S ;aff at Brookings Institution, The strand with policy, which is de-
-and innovative fiscal, monetary and debt that there is an inherent dichotomy out
in rivesYfrom ourb conception eofoLatin America
management policies, recognizing the im- v.ewing Latin America as a "good neigh- as an active theater in the cold war, one
portance of low interest rates. blr" and as a battleground in the cold of the battlegrounds on which we engage
Every penny of Federal spending must be ar. Because those whom we have identified as our mortal
accounted for in terms of the strictest econ- w we have notresolved this
only, efficiency and integrity. We pledge to conflict, he argues that we have mis- enemies, the Communists. In Latin America,
continue a frugal government, getting a judged the nature of the social and eco- as in Asia., Africa, and Europe, our national
dollar's value for a dollar spent and agov- ri Imie revolution and su.is seen ultimately to be at stake.
possibly forfeited T Thosehose in our Government who are charged
ernment worthy of the citizen's confidence. tl:e repect of an entire generation of with responsibility for our Latin American
Our goal is a balanced budget in a bat- Latin Americans, policy find themselves In an extraordinarily
steed economy.
Dr. Plank suggests that the United difficult situation. In effect, they are re-
The administration has been showing Si ales must temper a legitimate concern quired to approach Latin America with split
vis
great responsibility in this area. A for- w:.th the development of Communist u
nion, and the Latin America ehav appears
goo t
Secretary of the Treasury stated strength in the Western Hemisphere with the Latin America that appears under the
that the Department's goal of a balanced confidence in the independence and de- cold war perspective.
budget may be reached by fiscal year vction to freedom of our Latin American The consequences of this duality of ap-
1968. However, enough has not been fr. ends.
done and the constant raising of the debt proach are manifested in all aspects of our
Although I do not agree with Dr. Plank official dealings with Latin America: politi-
ceiling is notin line with the philosophy in every particular, I would like to make cal, decision r specti g axial, even cultural taken America expressed in the Democratic Party plat- hi; fine article available to all of my col- without some weighing of good is neighbor
form. letgues in the House by inserting' it in considerations agaist old war ones. Be-
While I was very much aware of the th3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: cause of the different natures of the policy
problems facing the Treasury Depart- OcR Goon NEIGHBORS SHOULD COME FIRST criteria, ambiguity in our Latin American
melt by reason of Government spending (By John Plank) policy decisions Is inevitable.
in fiscal year 1965, I used this occasion (NOTE-John Plank is a former Foreign Is a leading Latin American intellectual to
to 116ist the red flag for the benefit of any Service officer and professor of Latin Ameri- aged to meet the United States and
or is he
of my colleagues or constituents who car. affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and aged to meet with North serf his , failure to
to
were interested In. showing that this con- Di5lomacy. He is now on the senior staff to s denied visa because test his administered
stant spending beyond our estimated re- at he Brookings Institution.) by a cautious consular officer? ceipts must be halted sometime within We cannot yet reckon fully the costs to us assistance itoadespoticto regime e military
cur-
the near future if our party is to fulfill of sudden, unilateral military intervention in tailed because it is known that the regime
its promises of sound fiscal policies in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. We maintains itself in power only through the
the promises of sou d fiscall pol are obliged, however, on the basis of what we use ar threat of force; or is such assistance Governent. do :Mow to look again at the Latin American to be continued because the despot and his
For some time I have felt very much polity, of the United States. What are its armed henchmen have been ferocious, If fre-
..~.? ,x.,:~olvtvr~t, tclCwtC1J - APPENDIX June 29, 1965
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June 29, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
quently overzealous and unsophisticated,
battlers against the Communists? Is eco-
nomic aid to be given to a country because
of the country's desire to develop and our rec-
ognition of the crying needs of its people;
or is it to be withheld because of doubts
about the depths of commitment of the coun-
try's political leaders to our side in the cold
war?
Although both kinds of criteria continue
to be employed, it seems evident that during
recent times cold war considerations have
weighed ever more heavily in the scales of
judgment. That this should be the case is
understandable. The cold war completely
overshadows all other concerns in our global
foreign policy. Moreover, the cold war in
this hemisphere is becoming more intense
and has, since 1959 and Castro's appearance,
taken on increasingly a paramilitary cast.
Also, it is not surprising that our over-
worked officials, burdened with heavy re-
sponsibilities and harried by the press and
Congress, should want to simplify their de-
cision-making process by greater and greater
subordination of good neighbor factors to
cold war ones. They can accomplish this
subordination by assuming that good neigh-
bor policy and cold war policy are strictly
congruent. As time passes they will come to
believe that. Some of them undoubtedly
already do so.
We shall pay much for such subordination,
however; and we should consider carefully
whether it is worth its cost. Our Dominican
disaster, for example, and its unfortunate
hemispheric repercussions, are largely ac-
countable to an overemphasis on cold war
criteria, almost to the exclusion of criteria
of other sorts. If our interest in a given
country is focused heavily on the question
of Communist capabilities and prospects, if a
disproportionate number of questions put by
Washington to our missions in the field,
whether bearing on matters political, eco-
nomic, social, or military, are to be answered
with the Communist/non-Communist di-
chotomy at the forefront of attention, then
our understanding of that country is going
to be seriously biased. The ferment of
change in Latin America today should not
be evaluated in cold war terms.
There is another, more serious consequence
of weighting cold war factors too heavily in
devising Latin American policy. It is that
we shall alienate increasing numbers of Latin
Americans and shall forfeit much of our small
capital of trust and confidence so painfully
and haltingly acquired during the past 30
years.
If, for instance, the Alliance for Progress
comes widely to be believed in Latin America
to be nothing more than a weapon in our
cold war arsenal, the Alliance for Progress
will die. The formal machinery of the Alli-
ance will persist, of course, but the business
transacted under its aegis will be disguised
blackmail operations on the Latin American
side and disguised bribery or payoff on our
own. The spirit, the mystique, the challenge
of the Alliance will disappear-and with
them our best hope for building an effective
inter-American community.
What must be stressed is that the Latin
Americans think of themselves as people, not been in Bogota in 1948; we know where he
as objects at stake in a global conflict. They was in 1958.
societies in search of
i
tates a
k
f th
hi
n
e
r s
s
o
t
Where was the United States? Was it
individual national identities and destinies,
not as pieces of inhabited territory to be energetically, wholeheartedly, and construc-
allocated to one side or the other in the cold tively helping the Latin Americans to solve
war. Under the good neighbor perspective, their economic and social problems? Was it
these aspects of the Latin American reality identified in the minds of Latin America's
are recognized; under the cold war perspec- young people with the forces of responsible
tive they are not, except derivatively and but major change? Did the United States,
expedientially. through its actions in that decade, give those
We must not allow the cold war to elide young people reason automatically to cast
or absorb the good neighbor. The latter their lot with it in the global struggle against
antedates the former and is a more compre- communism? The questions are rhetorical.
hensive and profound expression of our best Young people do- not stay young: a per-
long-range interests. In striking the bal son 20 years old in 1948 was 30 in 1958; he
ance between the demands imposed by the is 87 today. The United States, through
A3427
one and those imposed by the other, knowl- negligence rather than design, nearly for-
edge, counts for more than doctrine, under- feited a generation of Latin Americans.
standing for more than fervor, judgment for That it did not altogether forfeit them is
more than determination, and prudence for due to the tardy recognition by the Eisen-
more than might. hower administration that the "immense
It is tempting to speculate on how different reservoir of goodwill" was rapidly drying up.
might have been the course of our relations More important, it is due to the sensitivity
with Latin America had we chosen in 1945 and vision of President Kennedy, who cap-
to announce our willingness to give positive tured the imagination of Latin Americans
content to the good-neighbor policy through as no other U.S. President, except Lincoln,
a program analogous to the Alliance for has done and who, through his announce-
Progress. Had we done so, and had we moved ment of the Alliance for Progress, put the
with energy and good will to implement the United States squarely on the side of pro-
program, the impact of the cold war upon found reform in Latin America.
the hemisphere and upon our Latin Amer- President Kennedy's Latin American pol-
ican policy would have been very different. icy combined, as deftly as two such incon-
For we should have initiated our program at gruent elements can be combined, the good
a time of exceptional inter-American neighbor and the cold war. Both weighed
harmony and we might well have captured heavily in all his Latin American decisions.
the momentum of inter-American coopera- Some among us criticized him for the incon-
tion acquired during the Second World War. elusiveness of his actions against Castro,
Moreover, we would have had a" crucial but the President was not to be pushed into
margin of time, several years, in which to behavior that would jeopardize, perhaps de-
help Latin America prepare itself for the stroy, the developing climate of inter-
revolution of expectations and to establish American trust and cooperation. When the
firmly our identification with the forces of introduction of missiles directly threatened
constructive, responsible, democratic reform. our vital national interests, he moved force-
This speculation is useful only because it fully, but that threat absent, he acted with
serves to point up how very different was the masterful restraint.
policy we actually followed, which was until Some Latin Americans criticized him for
recently one of comparative neglect of the making assistance under the Alliance for
region. Although alert to the more obvious Progress contingent u n the carrying out
cold war threats in the hemisphere (we
moved expeditiously to prevent a Commu- of difficult reforms, but t the President, re-
in 1954), and dating the Alliance for Progress to the cold
nist takeover of Guatemala
war, not unsympathetic to the restless , judged that only by undergoing pro-
strivings of most people in the area for found and painful change could the socie-
fundamental changes in their own status ties of Latin America acquire the inner co-
herence, the national consensus, that would
and in the traditionally sanctioned order of make possible their withstanding, over the
their societies, we devoted little time and few long term, Communist subversion and
resources to Latin America. a ession.
On the basis of periodic reassurances to !
ourselves that there existed in the region an There was, of course, a personal dimension
immense reservoir of goodwill toward the of President Kennedy's Latin American be-
United States we relegated Latin America to havior that transcended policy matters as
the lowest priority among the major areas such, one that must be taken into account
of the world. Busy confronting the Commu- in assessing his performance. He conveyed
nists elsewhere, busy building new alliances to the Latin Americans, as his predecessors
and bolstering old ones, we regarded Latin had not done, that he understood and sym-
America as something of a nuisance. What pathized with them, that their problems
we wanted in the hemisphere above all else were his problems. Responsible democratic
was quiet. We did not want our attention and reformist Latin Americans felt that in
diverted from our other more important President Kennedy they had a champion.
tasks. President Johnson inherited President
The decade 1948-58 was a crucial one for Kennedy's Latin American problems and pro-
Latin America. The region's great masses, gram. What he did not and could not in-
urban and rural, bestirred themselves and her'it was the special trust and confidence
began to make demands-political, economic, invested in President Kennedy by the Latin
and social-that they had not made earlier Americans. That trust and confidence Presi-
and that the established order simply could dent Johnson will have to earn himself.
not meet. The intellectuals, the profes- it must be said that he has not yet earned
sionals, the students, toyed with alternative it, and that this Government's reaction to
modes of political and social organization. the outbreak of major disorders in the Domi-
Nationalism, often strident and xenophobic, nican Republic has done little to reassure
came increasingly to serve the purposes of those to the south.
Latin American demagogs. Today Latin America is in crisis. Only
Democratic regimes were sorely tried; the in Mexico and Chile, and to a lesser extent
more fragile of them collapsed into dictator- in Costa Rica, is there real institutional
ships. The possibility of mass violence be- stability, and the future of at least two of
came ever more real: It is symbolic that the those countries is perhaps less certain than
decade began in the year of the devastating present appearances would indicate.
Bogota riots and ended in the year that Vice The causes of the crisis are well-known:
President Nixon was attacked in Lima and the revolution of expectations; expanding
immense population shifts from rural squal-
or to urban poverty and congestion; in-
vidious class distinctions; serious unemploy-
ment and worrisome inflation; Inequitable
patterns of tax and income distribution; un-
responsive and Ineffective governments; lack
of skilled and responsible political leader-
ship and of adequate institutions for effec-
tive popular political participation.
This list is far from exhaustive. But are
there not enough items on it to account for
massive unrest in Latin America? The tur-
bulence we have seen in the region in the
past is likely to pale before the turbulence
we shall see during the months and years
ahead.
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. CONGFESSIONAL RECORD-, APPENDIX June 29, 1965
In the absence of out-and-out occupation
by our Armed Forces, we cannot exert other
than marginal and indirect control over de-
velopments in the states of Latin America.
With that In mind, what should our policy
be as weconfront the troubled situation be-
low our borders? In the eyes of the world
we are at a clear policy crossroads today,
and the world is awaiting our next major de-
cision to see which route we have chosen.
The options available to us can be reduced to
two.
First, we can conclude, as evidently we did
in taking our Dominican actions, that the
cold-war risks in this hemisphere have be-
come so great, the capability of Communist
elements to take advantage of 'situations so
advanced, and the inability of other Latin
American elementsto deal with the internal
problems of their societies so manifest, that
the United States must reexamine Its whole
relationship to the Inter-American system
and to the good-neighbor policy that system
reflects.
More specifically, we can conclude that
the United States must take to itself the
right not only unilaterally to determine the
existence and nature of Communist threats
of takeover of Latin American societies, but
also to act unilaterally or preemptively if in
Our judgment such action is called for to
repel those threats. The principles of self-
determination, nonintervention and multi-
lateral decisionmaking regrettably may have
to take second place from time to time to the
exigencies of the cold war. Those principles,
of course, will remain operative, but only
within limits established by ourselves.
The second option depends upon a sharply
different assessment. By this assessment,
the conflict between progressive and tradi-
tional interests is the dominant problem in
Latin America today, and our cold-war en-
gagement with the Communists in the hemi-
sphere is refracted through this prism in
the eyes of most politically engaged Latin
Americans. They do not, and they will not,
see the cold war as we do. Most Latin Amer-
ican societies are in the incipient stages
of profound national transformation with
attendant disorder and the likelihood of
violence (after all, the mold of custom is be-
ing broken). But very few Latin Americans
participating in the social and political proc-
ssesnow underway foresee-or want to fore-
see-at the end of their national revolutions
a substitution of their former relationship
with the United States by a suffocating iden-
tification with the Communist world.
What they want is independence, identity,
integrity, national dignity, things of which
they feel their histories have until now de-
prived them. What they want is to move
into the modern world, but to do so on their
own, not on the leading strings of either the
United States or the Communist powers.
They want to be free to make their own mis-
takes, to decide their own destinies. They do
not want to be Communists nor to see their
societies taken over by the Communists; but
they take it ill that the United States should
presume to tell them what they can and
cannot want.
The policy course that one derives from
this assessment calls for sensitive under-
standing of the aspirations that motivate
most demands for change in today's Latin
America. It calls for a recognition that to
equate anti-Americanism with procommu-
nism is much too simple, and that much
activity that. we regard as being undertaken
against our interest is not sparked by the
Communists nor being carried out for the
purpose of moving the region into the Com-
munist camp.
It also calls for the utmost restraint and
the most scrupulous caution on our part in
the use of our coercive power. It calls for
a show of confidence in the Latin Ameri-
cans, a willingness to stand in the back-
ground and to let them largely on their own
cf~mplete their perilous passage to modernity.
It calls for a substantial elevation In the
status assigned to good-neighbor considera-
tions in the formulation of our decisions, a
ft rther development of the Latin American
policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and.. John
F. Kennedy, and the evaluation of cold-war
threats under the assumptions of good-
nvighbor premises rather than the reverse.
The risks involved In this second policy
are real. We cannot forget our bitter Cuban
experience. But we do the Latin Americans
snail credit by assuming that the lessons
of Cuba have been altogether lost upon them.
M ireover, we must weigh these risks against
the certain consequences of following the
first policy. Those consequences include the
evisceration of the inter-American system,
a iilrarp reversal in our progress toward inter-
American community, the welling up of great
resentment toward the United States on the
part of most Latin Americans, and a cor-
re;ponding increase in the appeal of Commu-
ntit propaganda and agitation.
Further, if we follow this policy, we shall
probably have to set up proxy or client re-
gimes in troubled parts of the hemisphere
more and more frequently, in violation of
legitimate nationalist aspirations, and to
commit our own Arnied Forces, with the
deplorable effects such commitment entails.
Nclther our own long-term interests nor
those of the Latin Americans will be well
served if we follow this course.
n the other hand, if we reassign primacy
to the philosophy of the good neighbor in
our hemispheric dealings, we shall probably
sec intensified and ever more fruitful efforts
by responsible Latin American leaders to
wcrk together and with us, across national
frc ntiers, to resolve pressing Latin American
problems. Knowing that we will protect
thorn against external threats and will help
thlin upon request to cope with domestic
violence and subversion, they will move
wih' greater assurance and Optimism to
m? et the demands of their societies.
Knowing that our attitude toward them
is benign and constructive, they will
aseert their independence from us in var-
to1[s ways, experimenting with their free-
dom. They will increasingly act without us;
th y will not be acting against us. Over the
longer term they will surmount their in-
gri,lned fear of us, their nagging sense of
initriority in dealing with us, and will as-
suue their proper roles as self-confident,
rek ponsible members of a hemispheric com-
munity of which we, too, will be a part.
1i urely that is outcome we want to see.
Su rely the running of some short-term risks
is Sot too high a price to pay for its attain-
m( nt.
SPEECH
OF
HON. HAROLD D. COOLEY
OF NORTH CAROLINA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 22, 1965
Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Speaker, for many
years I enjoyed the friendship of our late
ani beloved colleague, OLIN JOHNSTON,
who by the simplicity of his life and by
hie devotion to duty and by his sterling
character and great ability endeared
himself to his colleagues and to his coun-
trymen. In the golden hours of his
gr( at life, he left the shores of sound and
mcved into the great realm of silence to
rec Live the full reward which his strong
fair had purchased. OLIN JOHNSTON
was a brave and courageous man, yet he
was an humble and devoted public ser-
vant. He was unswerving in his fidelity
to truth. He discharged all of the vital
functions of high office in a manner
which proved him to be worthy of the
confidence of the people he so well and
ably represented. From an humble
beginning through all of the hardships
and vicissitudes of life he moved to places
of prominence and great responsibility
in the public life of his State and Nation.
When he left the shores of sound for the
great realm of silence, I lost a true and
beloved friend, and his State and Nation
lost a great statesman. May the Lord of
Mercy bless and sustain the members of
his family, and may the love and sym-
pathy of his friends soften the sorrow
they are now suffering.
The 20th Anniversary of the United
Nations
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON., HERVEY G. MACHEN
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 29, 1965
Mr. M:ACHEN. Mr. Speaker, on June
26, 1965, the United Nations observed the
20th anniversary of the signing of its
charter in San Francisco. On this occa-
sion, I should like to add my voice to
those of my colleagues in calling for sup-
port of this international Organization.
A recent survey revealed that less than
10 percent of American citizens have any
extensive knowledge of the United Na-
tions and its work. This is, to say the
least, disturbing. The United Nations
needs wide public: understanding of its
activities if it is to have the backing it
requires. As a contribution to a better
public understanding of the United Na-
tions I discussed the work of this world
body in my weekly report to constituents
which is being broadcast this week over
radio stations throughout Maryland's
Fifth District. The following are ex-
cerpts of this report:
EXCERPTS OF REPORT TO CONSTITUENTS BY
REPRESENTATIVE HERVET G. MACHEN FOR
BROADCAST DUaING WEEK OF JUNE 21 TO
JULY 2, 1965
It seems to me that before we can intel-
ligently assess the work of the United Na-
tions during the past 20 years, we must recall
the purposes for which it was formed.
Broadly, these purposes fall into two cate-
gories. First, political and diplomatic work
aimed directly at the maintenance of peace;
and, second, social and economic activities
that indirectly promote stable, lasting peace
by helping to eliminate the underlying causes
of conflict.
The U.N. record of action in both those
categories is Impressive. In carrying out its
peacekeeping function, the United Nations
has scored many notabe successes.
The U.N. has helped to deter or to termi-
nate warfare in Iran and Greece, in Kashmir
and Korea, in the Congo and the Caribbean,
and twice In the Middle East and twice in
the Western Pacific.
It has settled disputes between countries
which could have escalated into world war
III.
Approved For Release: 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000500120013-0