CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300130005-0
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• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 25, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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August 25, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20857
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I shall yield. But
first, Mr. President, I thank my able col-
league, also a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Kansas.
Knowing him, I am not surprised at his
statement. I am grateful for what he
said.
I am glad to yield to the majority
leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
join my distinguished colleagues in the
remarks they have made about the chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. I, too, hope that he does not in-
tend to give serious consideration?or
any consideration?to the possibility of
resigning as chairman of the committee
which he now heads. He is the one Sen-
ator who is present at every meeting.
He must undertake onerous responsibil-
ities, but he faces up to them with in-
dependence, with vigor, and with knowl-
edge.
I came to the Congress 23 years ago
With BILL FULBRIGHT. I have watched
him in those years with admiration and
respect. I have also noted that in the
press on occasion he takes unmerciful
beatings because he has the temerity to
express his independent thoughts on is-
sues of great importance to the country.
I point out that a Senator has a respon-
sibility, and a chairman of a committee
has a little added responsibility.
What Senator FULBRIGHT has done has
always been in the best interests of the
country, and what Senator FULBRIGHT
has done in conducting the affairs of the
committee has been fair and impartial to
all concerned.
I believe he is one of the great chair-
men of that committee in the history of
the Republic.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished majority leader. In that he
Is also a member of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, what he says in this
connection is of special significance.
SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING DURING
SENATE SESSION
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, at the
suggestion of the majority leader, I ask
unanimous consent that the Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Committee on the Judiciary be author-
ized to meet during the session of the
Senate today.
The PRESIDING si CER Without
objection, it is so ord
THE AD a TION CASE FOR
THE VIETNAM COMMITMENT
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
administration has assembled as persua-
sive a document on why we are in Viet-
nam and why we are staying there as I
have seen. It contains concise state-
ments by President Johnson, Secretary
of State Rusk, and Secretary
McNamara.
It also contains the letters from Pres-
ident Eisenhower and President Ken-
nedy, which constitute the basis for our
national promise to Vietnam to assist.
Since these documents are all rela-
tively brief I ask unanimous consent that
the monograph entitled "Why Vietnam?"
be printed in full at this point in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the mono-
graph was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, RS follows:
WHY VIETNAM?
?
FOREWORD
MY FELLOW AMERICANS: Once again in
man's age-old struggle for a better life and
a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and
compassion of the American people are being
put to the test. This is the meaning of the
tragic conflict in Vietnam.
In meeting the present challenge, it is es-
sential that our people seek understanding
and that our leaders speak with candor.
I have therefore directed that this report
to the American people be compiled and
widely distributed. In its pages you will
find statements on Vietnam by three lead-
ers of your Government?by your President,
your Secretary of State, and your Secretary
of Defense.
These statements were prepared for differ-
ent audiences, and they reflect the differing
responsibilities of each speaker. The con-
gressional testimony has been edited to avoid
undue repetition and to incorporate the
sense of the discussions that ensued.
Together, they construct a clear definition
of America's role in the Vietnam conflict:
the dangers and hopes that Vietnam holds
for all free men, the fullness and limits of
our national objectives in a war we did not
seek, the constant effort on our part to bring
this war we do not desire to a quick and
honorable end.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
AUGUST 20; 1965.
THE ROOTS OF COMMITMENT
In the historic documents that follow, two
American Presidents define and affirm the
commitment of the United States to the
people of South Vietnam.
In letters to Prime Minister Churchill in
1954 and to President Diem in 1954 and 1860,
President Eisenhower describes the issues at
stake andpledges United States assistance
to South Vietnam's resistance to subversion
and aggression.
And in December 1961 President Kennedy
reaffirms that pledge.
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISEN-
HOWER TO PR/ME MINISTER CHURCHILL., APRIL
4, 1954
(From Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for
Change, 1953-56," New York, 1963)
DEAR WINSTON: I am sure * * * you are
following with the deepest interest and anx-
iety the daily reports of the gallant fight
being put up by the French at Dien Bien
Phu. Today, the situation there does not
seem hopeless.
But regardless of the outcome of this par-
ticular battle, I fear that the French can-
not alone see the thing through, this despite
the very substantial assistance in money and
materiel that we are giving them. It is no
solution simply to urge the French to in-
tensify their efforts. And if they do not
see it through and Indochina passes into
the hands of the Communists the ultimate
effect on our and your global strategic posi-
tion with the consequent shift in the power
ratios throughout Asia and the Pacific could
be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to
you and me. * ? * This has led us to the
hard conclusion that the situation in south-
east Asia requires us urgently to take serious
and far-reaching decisions.
Geneva is less than 4 weeks away. There
the possibility at the Communists driving a
wedge between us will, given the state of
mind in France, be infinitely greater than
at Berlin. / can understand the very natural
desire of the French to seek an end to this
war which has been bleeding them for 8
years. But our painstaking search for a way
out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us
to the conclusion that there is no negotiated
solution of the Indochina problem which is
its essence would not be either a face-saving
device to cover a French surrender of a face-
saving device to cover a Communist retire-
ment. The first alternative is too serious in
its broad strategic implications for 11.9 and
for you to be acceptable. * * *
Somehow we must contrive to bring about
the second alternative. The preliminary lines
of our thinking were sketched out by
Foster [Dulles] in his speech last Monday
night when he said that under the conditions
of today the imposition on southeast Asia
of the political system of Communist Rus-
sia and its Chinese Communists ally, by what-
ever means, would be a grave threat to the
whole free community, and that in our view
this possibility should now be met by united
action and not passively accepted. * * *
I believe that the best way to put teeth in
this concept and to bring greater moral and
material resources to the support of the
French effort is through the establishment
of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition com-
posed of nations which have a vital concern
in the checking of Communist expansion in
the area. I have in mind, in addition to our
two countries, France, the Associated States,
Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the
Philippines. The U.S. Government would ex-
pect to play its full part in such a coali-
tion. " ?
The important thing is that the coalition
must be strong and it must be willing to
join the fight if necessary. I do not en-
visage the need of any appreciable ground
forces on your or our part. * ? ?
If I may refer again to history; we failed
to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not
acting in unity and in time. That marked
the beginning of many years of stark tragedy
and desperate peril. May it not be that our
nations have learned something from that
lesson? ? ? ?
With. warm regard,
DEE.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO
PRESIDENT DIEM, OCTOBER 1, 1954
DEAR Ma. PRESIDENT: I have been following
with great interest the course of develop-
ments in Vietnam, particularly since the
conclusion of the conference at Geneva. The
implications of the agreement concerning
Vietnam have caused grave concern regard-
ing the future of a country temporarily di-
vided by an artificial military grouping,
weakened by a long and exhausting war and
faced with enemies without and by their
subversive collaborators within.
Your recent requests for aid to assist in
the formidable project of the movement of
several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese
citizens away from areas which are passing
'Under a de facto rule and political ideology
which they abhor, are being fulfilled. I am
glad that the United States is able to assist
in this humanitarian effort.
? We have been exploring ways and means to
permit our aid to Vietnam to be more effec-
tive and to make a greater contribution to
the welfare and stability of the Government
of Vietnam. I am, accordingly, instructing
the American Ambassador to Vietnam to ex-
amine with you in your capacity as Chief of
Government, how an intelligent program of
American aid given directly to your govern-
ment can serve to assist Vietnam in its pres-
ent hour of trial, provided that your govern-
ment is prepared to give assurances as to the
standards of performance it would be able to
maintain in the event such aid were supplied.
The purpose of this offer is to assist the
Government of Vietnam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of
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20858 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE
resisting attempted subversion or aggresiosa
? through military means. The Government
of the United States expects that this aid will
be Met by performance on the part of the
Government of Vietnain In ?. Undertaking
needed ref cams. ft hopes that such aid,
combined with your own continuing efforts,
will contribute effectively toward an inde-
pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong
government. Such a government would, I
hope, be so responsive to the nationalist as-
pirations of its people, se enlightened in pur-
pose and effective in performance, that it
will be respected both at home and abroad
and discourage any who might wish to im-
pose a 'foreign ideology on your free people.
Sincerely,
Dwienn? D. EISENHOWER.
LETTER FROM PUS/DENT EMENHOWER TO PRESS-
=NT nisei, ocerrare 26, ioeo
Dees Ma. Preesreireer: My countrymen and I
are proud to convey our good wishes to you
and to the citizens of Vietnam on the fifth
anniversary of the birth of the Republic of
Vietnam.
We have watched the courage and daring
;with evhich you and the Vietnamese people
attained independence in a situation so peri-
lous that many thought it hopeless. We
have admired the rapidity with which chaos
yielded to order and progress replaced de-
spair.
During the years of your independence it
has been refreshing for us to observe how
clearly the Government and the citizens of
Vietnam have faced the fact that the great-
est danger to their independence was com-
ratudam. You and your countrymen have
nsed your strength well in accepting the dou-
ble challenge of building your- country and
resisting Communist imperialism. In 5
Short years since the founding of the Re-
public, the Vietnamese people have developed
their country in almost every sector. I was
particularly impressed by one example. I
ien1 informed.- that last year over 1,200,000
Vietnamese children were able tor,go to sie-
=mut*, school; three times as many as were
enrolled 5 years earlier. This ?he certainly
a heartening development for Vietnam's fu-
ture. At the same time Vietnam's ability to
defend itself from the Communists has
grown immeasurably since its successful
struggle to become an Independent republic.
Vietnam's very success as well as its poten-
tial wealth and its strategic location have led
the Goramuniats Of Ilanoi, goaded by the
bitterness of their failure to enslave all
Vietnam, to use increasing violence in their
'attempts to destroy your country's freedom.
Thisgravesthreat, added to the strains and
fatigues of the long struggle to achieve and
strengthen Independence, must be a burden
What would cause MOMents of tension and
concern in almoet any human heart. Yet
train long observation I sense how deeply
the Vietnamese value their country's Inde-
pendence arid strength and I know how well
you used your boldness when you led your
countrymen in winning it. I also know that
your determination has been a vital factor
in guiding that independence while stead-
ily advancing the economic development of
your country. I am confident that these
same qualities of determination and boldness
will meet the renewed threat as well as the
,needs and desires of your countrymen for
further progress on all fronts.
Although the main responsibility for
guarding that independence will always, as
it has in the, past, belong to the Vietnamese
people and their government, I want to as-
sure you that for so long as our strength
can be useful, the United States will con-
tinue to assist Vietnam in the difficult yet
hopeful struggle ahead.
Dwroxr D. ELSENHOWER.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRTOIDENT
DIEM, DECEMUR 14, 191
Dees Mit Pazsiterers: I have received your
recent letter hi which you described so
cogently the dangerous condition caused by
North Vietnam's efforts to take over your
country. The situation in your embattled
country is well known to me and to the
American people. We have been deeply dis-
turbed by the assault on your country. Our
indignation has mounted as the deliberate
savagery of the Communist program of as-
sassination, kidnaping, and wanton violence
became clear.
Your letter underlines what our own in-
formation has convincingly shown?that the
campaign of force and terror now being
waged against your people and your Govern-
ment is supported and directed from the
outside by the authorities at Hanoi. They
have thus violated the provisions of the
Geneva accords designed to insure peace in
Vietnam and to which they bound themselves
In 1954.
At that time, the United States, although
not a party to the accords, declared that it
"would view any renewal of the aggression
in violation of the agreements with grave
concern and as seriously threatening inter-
national peace and security." We continue
to maintain that view.
In. accordance with that declaration, and
in response to your request we are prepared
to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect
its people and to preserve Its independence.
We shall promptly increase our assistance to
your defense effort as well as help relieve the
destruction of the floods which you describe.
I have already given the orders to get these
programs underway.
The United States, like the Republic of
Vietnam, remains devoted to the cause of
peace and our primary purpose is to help
your people maintain their independence. If
the Communist authorities in North Vietnam
will stop their campaign to destroy the Re-
public of Vietnam, the measures we are tak-
ing to assist your defense efforts will no
longer be necessary. We shall seek to per-
suade the Communists to give up their at-
tempts of force and subversion. In any case,
we axe confident that the Vietnamese people
will preserve their independence and gain the
peace and prosperity for which they have
sought so hard and so long.
Joss' F. KENNEDY.
TOWARD PEACE WITH HONOR
(Press conference statement by the Presi-
dent, the White House, July 28, 1965)
Not long ago I received a letter from a
woman in the Midwest. She wrote:
"BEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my humble way
I am writing to you about the crisis in Viet-
nam. I have a son who is now in Vietnam.
My husband served in World War II. Our
country was at war, but now, this time, it is
just something I don't understand. Why?"
I have tried to answer that question a
dozen times and more in practically every
State in this 'Union. / discussed it fully in
Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in
San 'Francisco in June. Let me again, now,
discuss it here in the East Room of the
White House.
Why must young Americans, born into a
land exultant with hope and golden with
promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in
euch a remote and distant place?
The answer, like the wax itself, is not an
easy one. But it echoes clearly from the
painful lessons of half a century. Three
times in my lifetime, in two world wars and
In Korea, Americans have gone to far lands
to fight for freedom. We have learned at a
terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not
bring safety, and weakness does not bring
peace.
The nature of the war
It is this lesson that has brought us to
Vietnam. This is a different kind of war.
There are no marching armies or solemn dec-
larations. Some citizens of South Vietnam,
at times with understandable grievances,
have joined in the attack on their own goy-
August 25, 1965
ernment. But we must not let this mask the
central fact that this is really war. It is
guided by- North Vietnam and spurred by
Communist China. Its goal is to conquer
the South, to defeat American power, and
to extend the Asiatic dominion of commu-
nism.
The stakes in Vietnam
And there are great stakes in the balance.
Most Of the non-Communist nations of
Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist
the growing might and grasping ambition
of Asian communism. Our power, therefore,
is a vital shield. If we are driven from the
field in Vietnam. then no nation can ever
again have the same confidence in American
promise, or in American protection. In each
land the forces of independence would be
considerably weakened. And an Asia so
threatened by Communist domination would
imperil the security of the United States
itself.
We did not choose to be the guardians at
the gate, but there is no one else.
Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring
peace. We learned from Hitler at Munich
that success only feeds the appetite of ag-
gression. The battle would be renewed lei
one country and then another, bringing with
It perhaps even larger and crueler conflict.
Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one
of the most solemn pledges of the American
Nation, Three Presidents--?resident Eisen-
hower. President Kennedy, and your present
President?over 11 years, have committed
themselves and have promised to help defend
.the small and valiant nation.
Strengthened by that promise, the people
of South Vietnam have fought for many long
years. Thousands of them have died. Thou-
sands more have been crippled and scarred
by war. We cannot now dishonor our word
or abandon our commitment or leave three
who believed us and who trusted us to the
terror and repression and Murder that would
follow. -
This, then, my fellow Americans, is why
we are in Vietnam.
- Increased effort to halt aggression
What are our goals in that war-stained
land?
first: We intend to convince the Commu-
nists that we cannot be defeated by force
of arms or by -superior power. They are not
-easily convinced. In recent months they
have greatly increased their fighting forces,
their attacks, and the number of incidents.
I have asked the commanding general, Gen-
eral Westmoreland, what more he needs to
meet this mounting aggression. He has told
me. We will meet his needs.
I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air
Mobile Division and certain other forces
-which will raise our righting strength from
75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately.
Additional forces will be needed later, and
they will be sent as requested. This will
make it necessary to increase our active fight-
ing forces by raising the monthly draft call
from 17,000 over a period of time, to 35,000
per month, and stepping up our campaign for
voluntary enlistments.
After this past week of deliberations, I have
concluded that it is not essential to order
Reserve units into service now. If that ne-
cessity should later be indicated, / will give
the matter most careful consideration. And
I will give the country adequate notice before
taking such action, but only after full
preparations.
We have also discussed with the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam lately the steps that
they will take to substantially increase their
own effort?both on the battlefield and to-
ward reform and progress in the villages.
Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new
program to be tested upon his return to
that area.
I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secre-
tary McNamara to he available immediately
to the Congress to review with the appro-
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August 25, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20859
priate congressional committees our-plan in
these areas. I have asked them to be avail-
able to answer the questions of any Member
Of Congress.
Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask
the Senate Appropriations Committee to add
a limited amount to present legislation to
help meet part of his new cost until a sup-
plemental measure is ready and hearings can
be held when the Congress assembles in
January.
In the meantime, we will use the authority
contained in the present Defense appropri-
ations bill now to transfer funds, in addition
to the additional money that we will request.
These steps, like our actions in the past,
are carefully measured to do what must be
done to bring an end to aggression and a
peaceful settlement. We do not want an
expanding struggle with consequences that
no one can foresee. Nor will we bluster or
bully or flaunt our power.
But we will not surrender. And we will not
,retreat.
For behind our American pledge lies the
determination and resources of all of the
American Nation.
Toward a peacepa solution
Second, once the Communists know, as we
know, that a violent solution is impossible,
then a peaceful solution is inevitable. We
are ready now, as we have always been, to
move from the battlefield to the conference
table. I have stated publicly, and many
times, America's willingness to begin un-
conditional discussions with any government
at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts
have been made to start these discussions,
with the help of 40 nations throughout the
world. But there has been no answer.
But we are going to continue to persist,
if persist we must, until death and desola-
tion have led to the same conference table
where others could now join us at a much
smaller cost.
I have spoken many times of our objec-
tives in Vietnam. So has the Government of
South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own
proposal. We are ready to discuss their pro-
posals and our proposals and any proposals
of any government whose people may be
affected. For we fear the meeting room no
more than we fear the battlefield.
The United Nations
In this pursuit we welcome, and we ask
for, the concern and the assistance of any
nation and all nations. If the United Na-
tions and its officials?or any one of its 114
members?can, by deed or word, private ini-
tiative or public action, bring us nearer an
honorable peace, then they will have the
support and the gratitude of the United
States of America.
I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go
to New York today and to present immedi-
ately to Secretary-General U Thant a letter
from me requesting that all of the resources,
energy, and immense prestige of the United
Nations be employed to find ways to halt
aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam.
I made a similar request at San Francisco a
few weeks ago.
Free choice for Vietnam
We do not seek the destruction of any
government, nor do we covet a foot of any
territory. But we insist, and we will always
insist, that the people of South Vietnam
shall have the right of choice, the right to
shape their own destiny in free elections In
the South, or throughout all Vietnam under
international supervision. And they shall
not have any government imposed upon
them by force and terror so long as we can
prevent it.
This vs the purpose of the 1954 agree-
ments which the Ooramunists have now
Cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those
No. 157-3
agreements was tragically weak, its purposes
still guide our action.
As battle rages, we will continue as best
we can to help the good people of South
Vietnam enrich the condition of their life?
to feed the hungry, to tend the sick?teach
the young, shelter the homeless, and help
the farmer to increase his crops, and the
worker to find a job.
Progress in human welfare
It is an ancient, but still terrible, irony
that while many leaders of men create divi-
sion in pursuit of grand ambitions, the chil-
dren of man are united in the simple elusive
desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding
toil.
As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I
hope that one day we can help all the people
of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black
has made great progress since my appearance
in Baltimore in that direction, not as the
price of peace?for we are ready always to
bear a more painful cost?but rather as a
part of our obligations of justice toward our
fellow man.
The difficulty of decision
Let me also add a personal note. I do not
find it easy to send the flower of our youth,
our finest young men, into battle. I have
spoken to you today of the divisions and the
forces and the battalions and the units. But
I know them all, every one. I have seen them
in a thosuand streets, in a hundred towns, in
every State in this Union?working and
laughing, building, and filled with hope and
life. I think that I know, too, how their
mothers weep and how their families sorrow.
This is the most agonizing and the most
painful duty of your President.
A nation which builds
There is something else, too. When I was
young, poverty was so common that we didn't
know it had a name. Education was some-
thing you had to fight for. And water was
life itself. I have now been in public life
35 years, more than three decades, and in
each of those 35 years I have seen good men,
and wise leaders, struggle to bring the
blessings of this land to all of our people.
Now I am the President. It is now my op-
portunity to help every child get an educa-
tion, to help every Negro and every American
citizen have an equal opportunity, to help
every family get a decent home and to help
bring healing to the sick and dignity to the
old.
As I have said before, that is what I have
lived for. That is what I have wanted all
my life. And I do not want to see all those
hopes and all those dreams of so many peo-
ple for so many years now drowned in the
wasteful ravages of war. I am going to do all
I can to see that that never happens.
But I also know, as; a realistic public
servant, that as long as there are men who
hate and destroy we must have the courage
to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have
built, all that we hope to build, all of our
dreams for freedom?all swept away on the
flood of conquest.
So this too shall not happen; we will stand
in Vietnam.
THE TASKS OF DIPLOMACY
(Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
before the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, August 3, 1965)
As the President has said, "there are great
stakes in the balance" in Vietnam today.
Let us be clear about those stakes. With
its archipelagos, southeast Asia contains rich
natural resources and some 200 million peo-
ple. Geographically, it has great strategic
importance?it dominates the gateway be-
tween the Pacific and Indian Oceans and
flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side,
and Australia and New Zealand on the other.
The loss of southeast Asia to the Communists
would constitute a serious shift in the bal-
ance of power against the interests of the
free world. And the loss of South Vietnam
would make the defense of the rest of south-
east Asia much more costly and difficult.
That is why the SEATO Council has said
that the defeat of the aggression against
South Vietnam is "essential" to the security
of southeast Asia.
But much more is at stake than preserving
the independence of the peoples of southeast
Asia and preventing the vast resources of
that area from being swallowed by those hos-
tile to freedom.
The test
The war in Vietnam is a test of a technique
of aggression: what the Communists, in
their upside-down language, call wars of na-
tional liberation. They use the term to de-
scribe any effort by Communists, short of
large-scale war, to destroy by force any non-
Communist government. Thus the leaders
of the Communist terrorists in such an in-
dependent democracy as Venezuela are de-
scribed as leaders of a fight for "national
liberation." And a recent editorial in Pravda
said that "the upsurge of the national libera-
tion movement in Latin American countries
has been to a great extent a result of the
activities of Communist Parties."
Communist leaders know, as the rest of the
world knows, that thermonuclear war would
be ruinous. They know that large-scale in-
vasions, such as that launched in Korea 15
years ago, would bring great risks and heavy
penalties. So, they have resorted to semi-
concealed aggression through the infiltration
of arms and trained military personnel across
national frontiers. And the Asian Commu-
nists themselves regard the war in Vietnam
as a critical test of that technique. Re-
cently General Map, leader of North Viet-
nam's army, said:
"If the special warfare that the U.S. im-
perialists are testing In South Vietnam is
overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere
In the world."
In southeast Asia, the Communists al-
ready have publicly designated Thailand as
the next target. And if the aggression
against South Vietnam were permitted to
succeed, the forces of militant communism
everywhere would be vastly heartened and
we could expect to see a series of so-called
wars of liberation in Asia, Latin America, and
Africa.
International law does not restrict internal
revolution. But it does restrict what third
powers may lawfully do in sending arms and
men to bring about insurrection. What
North Vietnam is doing in South Vietnam
flouts not only the Geneva Accords of 1954
and 1962 but general international law.
The assault on the Republic of Vietnam is,
beyond question, an aggression. It was orga-
nized and has been directed by North Viet-
nam, with the backing of Communist China.
The cadres of guerrilla fighters, saboteurs,
and assassins who form the backbone of the
Vietcong were specially trained in the North.
Initially, many of them were men of South
Vietnamese birth who had fought with the
Viet Minh against the Prench and gone North
in their military units after Vietnam was
divided in 1954. But that reservoir was
gradually exhausted. During 1964 and since,
most of the military men infiltrated from
the North have been natives of North Viet-
nam. And near the end of last year they
began to include complete units of the regu-
lar North Vietnamese army. In addition to
trained men and political and military direc-
tion, the North has supplied arms and am-
munition in increasing quantities?in con-
siderable part of Chinese manufacture.
Between 1959 and the end of 1964, 40,000
trained military personnel came down from
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20860 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 25, 1965
the North into South Vietnam, by conserva-
tive estimate. More have come this year.
Had all these crossed the line at once?as
the North Koreans dicl in invading South
Korea 15 years ago?nobody in the free world
could have doubted that the assault on Viet-
nam was an aggression. That was the divid-
ing line between North and South Vietnam
was intended to be temporary does not make
the attack any less of an aggression. The di-
viding line in Korea also was intended to be
temporary.
If there is ever to be peace in this world,
aggression must cease. We as a Nation are
committed to peace and the rule of law. We
recognize also the harsh reality that our se-
curity is involved.
We are committed to oppose aggression not
only through the United Nations Charter
but through many defensive alliances. We
have 42 allies, not counting the Republic of
Vietnam. And many other nations know
that their security depends upon us. Our
power and our readiness to use it to assist
others to resist aggression, the integrity of
our commitment, these are the bulwarks of
peace in the world.
If we were to fail in Vietnam, serious con-
sequences would ensue. Our adversaries
would be encouraged to take greater risks
elsewhere. At the same time, the confidence
which our allies and other free nations now
have in our commitments would be seriously
Impaired.
The commitment
Let us be clear about our commitment in
Vietnam.
It began with the Southeast Asia Treaty,
which was negotiated and signed after the
Geneva agreements and the cease-lire in
Indochina in 1964 and was approved by the
U.S. Senate by a vote of 82 to 1 in February
1955. That treaty protects against Com-
munist aggression not only its members but
any of the three non-Communist states
growing out of former French Indochina
which asks for protection.
Late in 1954 President Risenhower, with
bipartisan support, decided to extend aid to
South Vietnam, both economic aid and aid
in training its armed forces. His purpose,
as he said, was to "assist the Government
of Vietnam in developing and maintaining
a strong, viable state, capable of resisting
attempted subversion or aggression through
military means."
Vietnam became a republic in 1955, was
recognized as an independent nation by 36
nations initially, and is so recognized by more
than 50 today.
Beginning in 1055, the Congress has each
year approved overall economic and military
assistance programs in which the continua-
tion of major aid to South Vietnam has been
specifically considered.
During the next 5 years, South Vietnam
made remarkable economic and social prog-
ress?what some observers described as a
"miracle."
Nearly a million refugees from the north
were Settled. These were the stouthearted
people of whom the late Dr. Tom Dooley
wrote so eloquently in his first book, "Deliver
V's From Evil," and who led him to devote
the rest of his all-too-brief life to helping
the people of Vietnam and Laos. ,
A land-reform program was launched A
comprehensive system of agricultural credit
was set up. Thousands of new schools and
more than 3,500 village health stations were
built. Rail transportation was restored and
roads were repaired and improved. South
Vietnam not only fed itself but resumed
rice exports. Production of rubber and sugar
rose sharply. New industries were started.
Per capita income rose by 20 percent.
By contrast, North Vietnam suffered a drop
Of 10 percent in food production and dis-
appointments in industrial production.
In 1954, Hanoi almost certainly had ex-
pected to take over South Vietnam within a
few years. But by 1959 its hopes had with-
ered and the south was far outstripping the
heralded "Communist paradise." These al-
most certainly Were the factors which led
Hanoi to organize and launch the assault
on the south.
I beg leave to quote from a statement I
made at a press conference on May 4, 1961:
"Since late in 1959 organized Communist
activity in the form of guerrilla raids against
army and security units of the Government
of Vietnam, terrorist acts against local offi-
cials and civilians, and other subversive ac-
tivities in the Republic of Vietnam have
increased to levels unprecedented since the
Geneva agreements of 1954. During this pe-
riod the organized armed strength of the
Vietcong, the Communist apparatus oper-
ating in the Republic of Vietnam, has grown
from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel.
This armed strength has been supplemented
by an increase in the numbers of political
and propaganda agents in the area.
"During 1960 alone, Communist armed
units and terrorists assassinated or kidnaped
over 3,000 local officials, military personnel,
and civilians. Their activities took the form
of armed attacks against isolated garrisons,
attacks on newly established townships, am-
bushes on roads and canals, destruction of
bridges, and well-planned sabotage against
public works and communication lines. Be-
cause of Communist guerrilla activity 200 ele-
mentary schools had to be closed, at various
times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800
teachers.
"This upsurge of Communist guerrilla ac-
tivity apparently stemmed from a decision
made in May 1959 by the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of North Vietnam
which called for the reunification of Vietnam
by all 'appropriate means.' In July of the
same year the Central Committee was reor-
ganized and charged with intelligence duties
and the liberation of South Vietnam. In
retrospect this decision to step up guerrilla
activity was made to reverse the remarkable
success which the Government of the Repub-
lic of Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh
Diem had achieved in consolidating its politi-
cal position and in attaining significant eco-
nomic recovery in the 5 years between 1954
and 1959.
"Remarkably coincidental with the re-
newed Communist activity in Laos, the Com-
munist Party of North Vietnam at its Third
Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a
resolution which declared that the Vietnam-
ese revolution has as a major strategic task
the liberation of the south from the 'rule of
U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." This
resolution called for the direct overthrow of
the Government of the Republic of Viet-
nam."
Next door to South Vietnam, Laos was
threatened by a similar Communist assault.
The active agent of attack on both was Com-
munist North Vietnam, with the backing of
Peiping and Moscow. In the case of Laos, we
were able to negotiate an agreement in 1962
that it should be neutral and that all foreign
military personnel should be withdrawn.
We complied with that agreement. But
North Vietnam never did. In gross violation
of its pledge, it left armed units in Laos and
continued to use Laos as a corridor to infil-
trate arms and trained men into South
Vietnam.
There was no new agreement, even on
paper, on Vietnam. Late in 1961, President
Kennedy therefore increased our assistance
to the Republic of Vietnam. During that
year, the infiltration of arms and military
personnel from the north continued to
Increase. To cope with that escalation, Pres-
ident Kennedy decided to send more Ameri-
can military personnel?to assist with logis-
tics and transportation and communications
as well as with training and as advisers to
South Vietnamese forces in the field. Like-
wise, we expanded our economic assistance
and technical advice, particularly with a view
to improving living conditions in the villages.
During 1962 and 1a63, Hanoi continued to
increase its assistance to the Vietcong. In
response, President Kennedy and later Pres-
ident Johnson increased our aid.
Hanoi kept on escalating the war through-
out 1964. And the Vietcong intensified its
drafting and training of men in the areas It
controls.
Last August, you will recall, North Viet-
namese forces attacked American destroyers
in international waters. That attack was met
by appropriate air response against North
Vietnamese naval installations. And Con-
gress, by a combined vote of 504 to 2, passed
a resolution expressing its support for actions
by the Executive "including the use. of armed
force" to meet aggression in southeast Asia,
Including specifically aggression against
South Vietnam. The resolution and the con-
gressional debate specifically envisaged that,
subject to continuing congressional consulta-
tion, the Armed Forces of the United States
might be committed in the defense of South
Vietnam in any way that seemed necessary,
Including employmer:t in combat.
In summary, our commitment in Vietnam
has been set forth in the Southeast Asia
Treaty, which was almost unanimously ap-
proved by the U.S. Senate; the pledges made
with bipartisan support by three successive
Presidents of the United States; the assist-
ance programs approved annually, beginning
in 1955, by bipartisan majorities in both
Houses of Congress; the declarations which
we joined our SEATO and ANZUS allies in
making at their Ministerial Council Meetings
In 1904 and 1965; the joint congressional res-
olution of August 1954, which was approved
by,, combined vote of 504 to 2.
Our commitment is to assist the Govern-
ment and people of South Vietnam to repel
this aggression, thus preserving their free-
dom. This commitment is to the South
Vietnamese as a nation and people. It has
continued through various changes of gov-
ernment, just as our commitments to our
NATO allies remain unaltered by changes in
government.
Continued escalation of the aggression by
the other Side has required continued
strengthening of the military defenses of
South Vietnam. Whether still more Ameri-
can military personnel will be needed will
depend on events, ,especially on whether the
other side continues to escalate the aggres-
sion. As the President has made plain, we
will provide the South Vietnamese with
whatever assistance may be necessary to en-
sure that the aggression against them is ef-
fectively repelled?that is, to make good on
our commitment.
The pursuit of a peaceful settlement
As President Johnson and his predecessors
have repeatedly emphasized, our objective
in southeast Asia is peace?a peace in which
the various peoples of the area can manage
their own affairs in their own ways and ad-
dress themselves to economic and social
progress.
We seek no bases or special position for the
United States. We do not seek to destroy or
overturn the Communist regimes in Hanoi
and Peiping. We ask only that they cease
their aggressions, that they leave their neigh-
bors alone.
Repeatedly, we and: others have sought to
achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in
Vietnam.
We have had many talks with the Soviet
authorities over a period of more than 4
years. But their influence in Hanoi appears
to be limited. Recently, when approached,
their response has been, in substance; You
have come to the wro:ag address?nobody has
authorized us to negotiate. Talk to Hanoi.
We have had a long series of talks With the
Chinese Communists in Warsaw. Although
Peiping is more cautious in action than in
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word, it is unbending in its hostility to us
and plainly opposed to any negotiated settle-
ment in Vietnam.
There have been repeated contacts with
Hanoi. Many channels are open. And many
have volunteered to use them. But so far
there has been no indication that Hanoi is
seriously interested in peace on any terms
except those which would assure a Commu-
nist takeover of South Vietnam.
We and others have sought to open the
way for conferences on the neighboring
states of Laos and Cambodia, where progress
toward peace might be reflected in Vietnam.
These approaches have been blocked by
Hanoi and Peiping.
The United Kingdom, as cochairman of the
Geneva conferences, has repeatedly sought a
path to a settlement?first by working to-
ward a new Geneva Conference, then by a
visit by a senior British statesman. Both
efforts were blocked by the Communists?
and neither Hanoi nor Peiping would even
receive the senior British statesman.
In April, President Johnson offered uncon-
ditional discussions with the governments
concerned. Hanoi and Peiping called this
offer a "hoax."
Seventeen nonalined nations appealed for
a peaceful solution, by negotiations with-
out preconditions. We accepted the pro-
posal. Hanoi and Red China rejected it with
scorn calling some of its authors "monsters
and freaks."
The President of India made a construc-
tive proposal for an end to hostilities and
an Afro-Asian patrol force. We welcomed
this proposal with interest and hope. Hanoi
and Peiping rejected it as a betrayal.
In May, the United States and South Viet-
nam suspended air attacks on North Viet-
nam. This action was made known to the
other side to see if there would be a response
in kind. But Hanoi denounced the pause as
"a wornout trick" and Peiping denounced
it as a "swindle." Some say the pause was
not long enough. But we knew the nega-
tive reaction from the other side before we
resumed. And we had paused previously for
more than 4 years while thousands of armed
men invaded the south and killed thousands
of South Vietnamese, including women and
children, and deliberately destroyed school-
houses and playgrounds and hospitals and
health centers and other facilities that the
South Vietnamese had built to improve their
lives and give their children a chance for a
better education and better health.
In late June, the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers established a mission of four of
their members to explore with all parties con-
cerned the possibilities for a conference
leading to a just and lasting peace. Hanoi
and Peiping made it plain that they would
not receive the mission.
Mr. Harold Davies, a member of the British
Parliament, went to Hanoi with the approval
of Prime Minister Wilson. But the high of-
ficials there would not even talk with him.
And the lower-ranking officials who did talk
with him made it clear that Hanoi was not
yet interested in negotiations, that it was
intent on a total victory in South Vietnam.
As Prime Minister Wilson reported to the
House of Commons, Mr. Davies met with a
-conviction among the North Vietnamese that
their prospects of victory were too imminent
for them to forsake the battlefield for the
conference table.
We and others have made repeated efforts
at discussions through the United Nations.
In the Security Council, after the August at-
tacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, we supported a
Soviet proposal that the Government of
North Vietnam be invited to come to the
Seurity Council. But Hanoi refused.
In April, Secretary General U Thant con-
sidered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to ex-
plore the possibilities of peace. But both
those Communist regimes made it plain that
they did not regard the United Nations as
competent to deal with that matter.
The President's San Francisco speech in
June requested help from the United Na-
tions' membership at large in getting peace
talks started.
In late July the President sent our new
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur J.
Goldberg, to New York with a lette-: to
Secretary General U Thant requesting that
all the resources, energy and immense pres-
tige of the United Nations be employed to
find ways to halt aggression and to bring
peace in Vietnam. The Secretary General has
already accepted this assignment.
We sent a letter to the Security Council
calling attention to the special responsibil-
ity in this regard of the Security Council
and of the nations which happen to be mem-
bers of the Council. We have considered
from time to time placing the matter formal-
ly before the Security Council. But we have
been advised by many nations?and by many
Individuals?who are trying to help to
achieve a peaceful settlement that to force
debate and a vote in the Security Council
might tend to harden positions and make
useful explorations and discussions even
more difficult.
President Johnson has publicly invited
any and all members of the United Nations
to do all they can to bring about a peaceful
settlement.
By these moves the United States has in-
tended to engage the serious attention and
efforts of the United Nations as an institu-
tion, and its members as signatories of its
charter, in getting the Communists to talk
rather than fight?while continuing with
determination an increasing effort to demon-
strate that Hanoi and the Vietcong cannot
settle the issue on the battlefield.
We have not only placed the Vietnam issue
before the United Nations, but believe that
we have done so in the most constructive
Ways.
The conditions for peace
What are the essential conditions for peace
in South Vietnam?
In late June, the Foreign Minister of South
Vietnam set forth the fundamental princi-
ples of a "just and enduring peace." In
summary, those principles are:
An end to aggression and subversion.
Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and
shape for itself its own destiny "in con-
formity with democratic principles and with-
out any foreign interference from whatever
sources."
As soon as aggression has ceased, the end-
ing of the military measures now necessary
by the Government of South Vietnam and
the nations that have come to its aid to de-
fend South Vietnam; and the removal of
foreign military forces from South Vietnam.
And effective guarantees for the freedom of
the people of South Vietnam.
We endorse those principles. In essence,
they would constitute a return to the basic
purpose of the Geneva accords of 1954.
Whether they require reaffirmation of those
accords or new agreements embodying these
essential points, but with provision in either
case for more effective international ma-
chinery and guarantees, could be determined
in discussions and negotiations.
Once the basic points set forth by South
Vietnam's Foreign Minister were achieved,
future relations between North Vietnam and
South Vietnam could be worked out by
peaceful means. And this would include the
question of a free decision by the people of
North and South Vietnam on the matter of
-reunification.
When the aggression has ceased and the
freedom of South Vietnam is assured by other
means, we will withdraw OUT forces. Three
Presidents of the United States have said
many times that we want no permanent bases
and no special position there. Our military
forces are there because of the North Viet-
namese aggression against South Vietnam
and for no other reason. When the men and
arms infiltrated by the North are withdrawn
and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance
of the war in the South, whatever remains
in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter
for the South Vietnamese themselves. As for
South Vietnamese fighting in the Vietcong or
under its control or influence, they must in
time be integrated into their national soci-
ety. But that is a process which must be
brought about by the people of South Viet-
nam, not by foreign diplomats.
Apart from the search for a solution in
Vietnam itself, the U.S. Government has
hoped that discussions could be held on the
problems concerning Cambodia and Laos.
We supported the proposal of Prince Siha-
nouk for a conference on Cambodia, to be
attended by the governments that partici-
pated in the 1954 conference, and noted the
joint statement of the Soviet Union and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in April, to
the effect that both favored the convening
of conferences on Cambodia and Laos. Sub-
sequently, however, Hanoi appeared to draw
back and to impose conditions at variance
with the Cambodian proposal.
We look beyond a just and enduring peace
for Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, to the
day when Peiping will be ready to join in a
general settlement in the Far East?a gen-
eral settlement that would remove the threat
of aggression and make it possible for all the
peoples of the area to devote themselves to
economic and social progress.
Several of the nations of Asia are densely
populated. And high rates of population
growth make it difficult for them to increase
per capita incomes. The solution to these
problems cannot be found through external
aggression. They must be achieved inter-
nally within each nation.
As President Johnson has said, the United
States stands ready to assist and support co-
operative programs for economic develop-
ment in Asia. Already we are making avail-
able additional funds for the development of
the Mekong Valley. And we are taking the
lead in organizing an Asian Development
Bank, which we hope will be supported by
all the major industrialized nations, includ-
ing the Soviet Union. We would welcome
membership by North Vietnam, when it has
ceased its aggression.
Those are our objectives?peace and a
better life for all who are willing to live at
peace with their neighbors.
The present path.
I turn now to the specific actions we are
taking to convince Hanoi that it will not suc-
ceed and that it must move toward a peace-
ful solution.
Secretary McNamara is appearing before
the appropriate committees of the Congress
to discuss the military situation within
South Vietnam in detail. In essence, our
present view is that it is crucial to turn the
tide in the south, and that for this purpose
it is necessary to send substantial numbers
of additional American forces.
The primary responsibility for defeating
the Vietcong will remain, however, with the
South Vietnamese. They have some 545,000
men in military and paramilitary forces. De-
spite losses, every branch of the armed forces
of South Vietnam has more men under arms
than it had 6 months ago. And they are
making systematic efforts to increase their
forces still further. The primary missions
of American ground forces are to secure the
airbases used by the South Vietnamese and
ourselves and to provide a strategic reserve.
thus releasing South Vietnamese troops for
offensive actions against the Vietcong. In
securing the airbases and related military
installations, American forces are pushing
out into the countryside to prevent build-
ups for surprise attacks. And they may be
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20862 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 25, 1965
used in emergencies to help the South Viet-
namese in combat. But :the rosan teak of
rooting out the Vietcong will continue to be
the responsibility of the South Vietnamese.
And we have seen no sign that they are
about to try to shift that responsibility to
us. on the contraryt the presence of in-
creasing numbers of Aineriean combat troops
seems to have stimulated greater efforts on
the part of the fighting men of South Viet-
nam.
At the same tithe, on the. military side, we
Shall maintain, with the South Vietnamese,
our program of limited air atacks on mili-
tary targets in North Vietnam. This pro-
gram is a part of the total Strategy. We had
never expected that air attacks on North
Vietnam alone would bring Hanoi to a quick
decision to cease its aggression. Hanoi has
been committed to its aggression too long
and too deeply to turn around overnight.
It must be convinced that it faces not only
continuing, and perhaps increased, pressure
on the north itself, but also that is simply
cannot win in the south.
The air attacks on the North have also had
specific military effects in reducing the scale
of increased infiltration from the North.
?Many, they are important as a warning to
all concerned that there are no longer
Sanctuaries for aggression.
It has been suggested in some quarters
that Hanoi would be more disposed to move
to negotiations and to cease its aggression if
we Stopped bombing the North. We do not
rule out the possibility of another and longer
pause in bombing, but the question re-
mains?and we have repeatedly asked it:
What would happen from the North in re-
spouse? Would Hanoi withdraw the 325th
Division of the Regular Army, which is now
deployed in South Vietnam and across the
line in Laos? Would It take home the other
Men it has infiltrated into the South?
Would it stop sending arms and ammunition
into South Vietnam? Would the campaign
of apaassination and sabotage in the South
cease? We have been trying to find out
what would happen if we were to suspend
our bombing of the North. We have not
been able to get an answer or even a hint.
Those who complain about air attacks on
military targets in North Vietnam would
carry more weight if they had manifested, or
would manifest now, appropriate concern
about the infiltrations from the North, the
high rate of military activity in the South,
and the ruthless campaign of terror and as-
sassination which is being conducted in the
South under the direction of Hanoi and with
its active support.
The situation in South Vietnam
Let me now underline just a few points
about the political and economic situation
in South Vietnam. For we know well that,
while security is fundamental to turning the
tide, it remains vital to do all we can on the
political and economic fronts..
All of us have been concerned, of course,
by the difficulties of the South Vietnamese
in developing an effective and stable govern-
ment. But this failure should not astonish
us. South Vietnam is a highly plural society
striving to find its political feet under very
adverse conditions. Other nations?new
and old?with fewer difficulties and unmo-
lested by determined aggressors have done
no better. South Vietnam emerged from the
French Indochina war with many political
factions, most of which were firmly anti-
Communist. Despite several significant ini-
tial successes in establishing a degree of po-
litical harmony, the government of President
Diem could not maintain a lasting unity
among the many factions. The recent shift-
ing and reshuffling of Vietnamese Govern-
menta is largely the continuing search for
political unity and a viable regime which can
overcome these long-evident political divi-
sions.
And we should not forget that the destruc-
tion of the fabric of government at all levels
has been a primary objective of the Vietcong.
The Vietcong has assassinated thousands Of
local officials?and health workers and
schoolteachers and others who were helping
to improve the life of the people of the
countryside. In the last year and a half, it
has killed, wounded, or kidnapped 2,291 vil-
lage officials and 22,146 other civilians?
these on top of its thousands of earlier
victims.
Despite the risks to themselves and their
families, Vietnamese have continued to come
forward to fill these posts. And in the last
8 years, no political dissenter of any con-
sequence has gone over to the Vietcong.
The Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects, the
Cambodians (of which there are about a
million in South Vietnam), the Montag-
nards?all the principal elements in South
Vietnamese political life except the Viet-
cong itself, which is a very small minority?
remain overwhelmingly anti-Communist.
The suggestion that Ho Chi Minh probably
could win a free election in South Vietnam is
directly contrary to all the evidence we have.
And we have a great deal of evidence, for
we have Americans?in twos and threes and
fours and sixes?in the countryside in all
parts of Vietnam. In years past Ho Chi
Minh was a hero throughout Vietnam. For
he had led the fight against the Japanese
and then against the French. But his glam-
our began to fade when he set up a Commu-
nist police state in the North?and the
South, by contrast, made great progress un-
der a non-Communist nationalist govern-
ment. Today the North Vietnamese regime
is badly discredited. We find the South Viet-
namese in the countryside ready to cooperate
with their own government when they can
do so with reasonable hope of not being
assassinated by the Vietcong the next night.
At the present time, somewhat more than
50 percent of the people of Vietnam live in
areas under shifting control. And about 25
percent live in areas under varying degrees
of Vietcong control. But even where it suc-
ceeds in imposing taxes, drafting recruits,
and commandeering labor, the Vietcong has
not usually been able to organize the area.
We have a good deal of evidence that Viet-
cong tax exactions and terrorism have in-
creasingly alienated the villagers. And one
of the problems with which the South Viet-
namese Government and we have to deal is
the large scale exodus from the Central High-
lands to the coastal areas of refugees from
the Vietcong.
It is of the greatest significance that, de-
spite many years of harsh war, despite the
political instability of the central govern-
ment, and despite division of their country
since 1954, the people of South Vietnam fight
OS with uncommon determination. There is
no evidence among politicians, the bureauc-
racy, the military, the major religious groups,
the youth, or even the peasantry of a desire
for peace at any price. They all oppose sur-
render or accommodtion on a basis which
would lead to a Communist takeover. The
will to resist the aggression from the North
has survived through periods of great stress
and remains strong.
The central objective of our foreign policy
is a peaceful community of nations, each free
to choose its own institutions but cooperat-
ing with one another to promote their mu-
tual welfare. It is the kind of world order
envisaged in the opening sections of the
United Nations Charter. But there have been
and still are important forces in the world
Which seek a different goal?which deny the
right of free choice, which seek to expand
their influence and empires by every means
including force.
The bulwark of peace
In defense of peace and freedom and the
right of free choice:
We and others insisted that the Soviets
withdraw their forces from Iran.
We went to the aid of Turkey and Greece.
We joined in organizing the European re-
covery program and in forming the North
Atlantic Alliance.
We and our allies have defended the free-
dom of West Berlin.
We and 15 other nations joined in repel-
ling the aggression in Korea.
We have joined defensive alliances with
many other nations and have helped them to
strengthen their defensive military forces.
We supported the United Nations in its
efforts to preserve the independence of the
Congo.
We insisted that the Soviet Union with-
draw strategic weapons from Cuba.
Had we not done these things?and
others?the enemies of freedom, would now
control much of the world and be in a posi-
tion to destroy us or at least to sap our
strength by economic strangulation.
For the same basic reasons that we took
all those other measures to deter or to repel
aggression, we are detezmined to assist the
people of South Vietnam to defeat this ag-
gression.
In his last public utterance, recorded only
half an hour before his death, a great and
beloved .American, Adlai Stevenson said:
"There has been a great deal of pressure
on me In the United States from many
sources to take a position?a public posi-
tion?inconsistent with that of my Govern-
ment. Actually, I don't agree with those
protestants. My hope in Vietnam is that re-
sistance there may establish the fact that
changes in Asia are not to be precipitated
by outside forces."
I believe, with the President, that 'once
the Communists know, as we know, that a
violent solution is impossible, then a peace-
ful solution is inevitable,"
The great bulwark of peace for all free-
men?and therefore of peace for the millions
ruled by the adversaries of freedom?has
been, and is today, the power of the United
States and our readiness to use that power.
in cooperation with other free nations to
deter or to defeat aggression, and to help
other free nations to go forward economi-
cally, socially, and politically.
We have had to cope with a long series of
dangerous crises caused by the aggressive ap-
petites of others. But we are a great na-
tion and people. I am confident that we will
meet this test, as we have met others.
THE TASKS OF DEFENSE
(Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara, before the Defense Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee, August 4, 1965)
The issue in Vietnam is essentially the
same as it was in 1954 when President
Eisenhower said:
"I think it is no longer necessary to enter
Into a long argument or exposition to show
the importance to the United States of
Indochina and of the struggle going on there.
No matter how the struggle may have started,
It has long since become one of the testing
places between a free farm of government
and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to
have the greatest significance for us, and
possibly for a long time into the future.
"We have here a sort of cork in the bottle,
the bottle being the great area that includes
Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the sur-
rounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of
millions of people. * *
The nature of the conflict
What is at stake in Vietnam today is the
ability of the free world to block Commu-
nist armed aggression and prevent the
loss of all of southeast Asia, a loss which
in its ultimate consequences could drasti-
cally alter the strategic situation in Asia
and the Pacific to the gravedetriment of our
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Own security and that of our allies. While
15 years ago, in Korea, Communist aggres-
sion took the form of an overt armed attack,
today in South Vietnam, it has taken the
form of a large-scale intensive guerrilla
operation.
The covert nature of this aggression, which
characterized the earlier years of the struggle
in South Vietnam, has now all but been
stripped away. The control of the Vietcong
effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and
incited by Communist China, has become
increasingly apparent.
The struggle there has enormous implica-
tions for the security of the United States
and the free world, and for that matter, the
Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese
and the Chinese Communists have chosen to
make South Vietnam the test case for their
particular version of the so-called wars of
national liberation. The extent to which
vialence should be used in overthrowing
non-Communist governments has been one
of the most bitterly contested issues between
the Chinese and the Soviet Communists.
Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khru-
shchev, fully endorsed wars of national lib-
eration as the preferred means of extending
the sway of communism, he cautioned that
"this does not necessarily mean that the
transition to socialism will everywhere and
hi all cases be linked with armed uprising
and civil war. * * * Revolution by -peaceful
means accords with the interests of the
working class and the masses."
The Chinese Communists, however, insist
that;
"Peaceful coexistence cannot replace the
revolutionary struggles of the people. The
transition from capitalism to socialism in
any country can only be brought about
through proletarian revolution and the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat in that coun-
try. * * * The vanguard of the proletariat
will remain unconquerable in all circum-
stances only if it masters all forms of strug-
gle?peaceful and armed, open and secret,
legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and
mass struggle, and so forth." (Letter to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.)
Their preference for violence was even
more emphatically expressed in an article in
the Peiping People's Daily of March 31, 1964:
"It is advantageous from the point of
view of tactics to refer to the desire for
peaceful transition, but it would be inappro-
priate to emphasize the possibility of peace-
ful transition. * * * the proletarian party
must never substitute parlimentary strug-
gle for proletarian revolution or entertain
the illusion that the transition to socialism
can be achieved through the parliamentary
road. Violent revolution is a universal law
of proletarian revolution. To realize the
transition to socialism, the proletariat must
wage armed struggle, smash the old state
machine and establish the dictatorship of
the proletariat. * ? ?"
"Political power," the article quotes Mao
Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel
of a gun."
Throughout the world we see the fruits
of these policies and in Vietnam, particu-
larly, we see the effects of the Chinese Com-
munists' more militant stance and their
hatred of the free world. They make no
secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test
ease, and neither does the regime in Hanoi.
General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese
Army, recently said that "South Vietnam is
the model of the national liberation move-
ment of Our time. * * * If the special war-
fare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in
South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be
defeated everywhere in the world." And,
Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam,
pointed out that "The experience of our
compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the
attention of the world, especiD17y the peoples
of South America."
It is clear that a Communist success in
South Vietnam would be taken as proof that
the Chinese Communists' position is correct
and they will have made a giant step forward
in their efforts to seize control of the world
Communist movement.
Furthermore, such a success would greatly
increase the prestige of Communist China
among the nonalined nations and strength-
en the position of their followers everywhere.
In that event we would then have to be
prepared to cope with the same kind of
aggression in other parts of the world wher-
ever the existing governments are weak and
the social structures fragmented. If Com-
munist armed aggression is not stopped in
Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence
of small nations in America's pledges of sup-
port will be weakened and many of them,
in widely separated areas of the world, will
feel unsafe.
Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far
greater than the loss of one small country
to communism. Its loss would be a most
serious setback to the cause of freedom and
would greatly complicate the task of prevent-
ing the further spread of militant Asian com-
munism. And, if that spread is not halted,
our strategic position in the world will be
weakened and our national security directly
endangered.
Conditions leading to the present situation
in, South Vietnam
Essential to a proper understanding of the
, present situation in South Vietnam is a
recognition of the fact that the so-called
insurgency there is planned, directed, con-
trolled, and supported from Hanoi.
True, there is a small dissident minority in
South Vietnam, but the government colild
cope with it if it were not directed and sup-
plied from the outside. As early as 1960, at
the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese
Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and
? General Giap spoke of the need to "step up"
the "revolution in the South." In March
1963 the party organ Hoc Tap stated that the
authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware
that North Vietnam is the firm base for the
southern revolution and the point on which
it leans, and that our party is the steady and
experienced vanguard unit of the working
class and people and is the brain and factor
that decides all victories of the revolution."
Through most of the past decade the North
Vietnamese Government denied and went to
great efforts to conceal the scale of its per-
sonnel and materiel support, in addition to
direction and encouragement, to the Viet-
cong.
It had strong reasons to do so. The North
Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon
the attention of the world its massive and
persistent violations of its Geneva pledges
of 1954 and 1962 regarding noninterference
in South Vietnam and Laos.
However, in building up the Vietcong
forces for a decisive challenge, the authori-
ties in North Vietnam have increasingly
? dropped the disguises that gave their earlier
support a clandestine character.
Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infil-
trated from the North were old French and
American models acquired prior to 1951 in
Indochina and Korea.
Now, the flow of weapons from North Viet-
nam consists almost entirely of the latest
arms acquired from Communist China; and
the flow is large enough to have entirely re-
equipped the main force units, despite the
capture this year by government forces of
thousands of these weapons and millions of
rounds of the new ammunition.
Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the per-
sonnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and
equipped in the North and ordered South,
were former southerners.
But in the last 18 months, the great ma-
jority of the infiltrators?more than 10,000
of them?have been ethnic northerners,
mostly draftees ordered into the People's
Army of Vietnam for duty in the South.
And it now appears that, starting their jour-
ney through Laos last December, from one to
three regiments of a North Vietnamese regu-
lar division, the 325th Division of the North
Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the
Central Highlands of South Vietnam for
combat alongside the Vietcong.
Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy,
Hanoi's desire for decisive results this sum-
mer has forced it to reveal its hand even
more openly.
The United States during the last 4 years
has steadily increased its help to the people
of South Vietnam in an effort to counter
this ever-increasing scale of Communist
aggression. These efforts achieved some
measure of success during 1962. The South
Vietnamese forces in that year made good
progress in suppressing the Vietcong insur-
rection.
Although combat deaths suffered by these
forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over the
1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450), Viet-
cong combat deaths increased by 72 percent
(from about 12,000 to 21,000). Weapons lost
by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in
1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost
by the Vietcong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The
Government's new strategic hamlet program
was just getting underway and was showing
promise. The economy was growing and the
Government seemed firmly in control.
Therefore, in early 1963, I was able to say:
"* * * victory over the Vietcong will most
likely take many years. But now, as a result
of the operations of the last year, there is a
new feeling of confidence, not only on the
part of the Government of South Vietnam
but also among the populace, that victory
is possible."
But at the same time I also cautioned:
"We are not unmindful of the fact that
the pressure on South Vietnam may well
continue through infiltration via the Laos
corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the pos-
sibility that the Communists, sensing defeat
in their covert efforts, might resort to overt
aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously,
this latter contingency could require a
greater direct participation by the United
States. The survival of an independent
government in South Vietnam is so impor-
tant to the security of all southeast Asia and
to the free world that we must be prepared
to take all necessary measures within our
capability to prevent a Communist victory."
Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early
1963 proved to be well founded. Late in
1963, the Communists stepped up their ef-
forts, and the military situation began to
deteriorate. The Diem government came
under increasing internal pressure, and in
November it was overthrown. As I reported
In February 1964:
"The Vietcong was quick to take advantage
of the growing opposition to the Diem gov-
ernment and the period of uncertainty fol-
lowing its overthrow. Vietcong activities
were already increasing in September and
continued to increase at an accelerated rate
in October and November, particularly in the
delta area. And I must report that they
have made considerable progress since the
coup."
Following the coup, the lack of stability
in the central government and the rapid
turnover of key personnel, particularly senior
military commanders, began to be reflected
in combat operations and throughout the
entire fabric of the political and economic
structure. And, in 1964, the Communists
greatly increased the scope and tempo of
their subversive efforts. Larger scale at-
tacks became more frequent and the flow of
men and supplies from the north expanded.
The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose
rapidly and the pressure on the civilian pop-
illation was intensified.
The deteriorating military situation was
clearly reflected in the statistics. South
Vietnamese combat deaths rose from 5,650 in
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1988 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of
weapons lost from 8,250, to 14,100. In con-
trast, Vietcong combat deaths dropped from
20,600 to 16,800 and, considering the
stepped-up tempo of activity, they experi-
enced only a very modest rise in the rate of
weapons lost (from 5400 to 5,900).
At various times in recent months, / have
railed attention to the continued buildup
of Communist forces in South Vietnam,
pointed out that although these forces had
not been committed to combat in any sig-
nificant degree, they probably would be after
the start of the ram:soon. season. It is now
clear that these forces are being committed
In increasing numbers and that the Com-
munists have decided to make an all-out
attempt to bring down, the Government of
South Vietnam.
The entire economic and social structure
is under attack. Bridges, railroads, and high-
ways are being destroyed and interdicted.
Agricultural products are being barred from
the cities. Electric powerplants and com-
munication lines are being sabotaged.
Whole villages are being burned and their
population driven away, increasing the
refugee burden on the South Vietnamese
government.
In addition to the continued infiltration of
increasing numbers of individuals and the
acceleration of the flow of modern equip-
ment and supplies organized units of the
North Vietnamese Army have been identified
in Heath Vietnam, We now estimate the
hard core Vietcong strength at some 70,000
men, including a recently reported increase
in the number of combat battalions. In ad-
dition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 ir-
regulars and some 30,000 in their political
wares; i.e., tax collectors, propagandists,
etc. We have also identified at leaat three
battalions of the regular North Vietnamese
Army, and there are probably considerably
More.
At the same time the Government of
South Vienam has found it increasingly dif-
ficult to make a commensurate increase in
the size of its own forces, which now stand at
about 545,000 men, including the regional
and local defense forces but excludine the
national police.
Cotabat deaths on both sides have been
mounting?for the South Vietnamese from
an average of 143 men a 'week in 1964, to
about 270 a week for the 4-week period end-
ing- July 24 this year. Vietcong losses have
rine from 222 a week last year to about 680
a week for the 4-week period ending July 24.
Most important, the ratio of South Viet-
namese to Vietcong strength has seriously
declined in the last 6 or 7 months from about
8 to I -to about 3 or 34 to 1; the ratio of,,
combat battalions is substantially less. This
is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even
though the greater mobility and firepower
provided to the South Vietnamese forces by
the United States help to offset that dis-
advantage.
The South Vietnamese forces have to de-
fend hundreds of cities, towns, and hamlets
while the Vietcong are free to choose the
time and place of their attack. As a result,
the South Vietnamese are stretched thin in
defensive positions, leaving only a small cen-
tral reserve for offensive action against the
Vietcong, while the latter are left tree to con-
centrate their forces and throw them against
*elected targets. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Vietcong retains most of the
Initiative.
Even so, we may not as yet have seen the
full weight of the Communist attack. Pres-
ently, the situation is particularly acute in
the northern part of the count/a' where the
Communists have mobilized large military
forces irtach pose a threat to the entire re-
gion and its major cities and towns. Our
air attack may have helped to keep these
forces off balance but the threat remains
and it is very real.
Clearly, the time has come when the people
of South Vietnam need more help from us
and other nations if they are to retain their
freedom and independence.
We have already responded to that need
with some 75,000 'U.S. military personnel,
including some combat units. This number
will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately
with the deployment of the Air Mobile Divi-
sion and certain other forces. But, more
help will be needed in the months ahead Rad
additional U.S. combat forces will be required
to back up the hard-pressed Army of South
Vietnam. Two other nations have previded
combat forces?Australia and New Zealand.
We hope that by the end of this year others
will join them. In this regard, the Koreans
have just recently approved a combat divi-
sion for deployment to Vietnam, which is
scheduled to arrive this fall.
Role of U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam
As I noted earlier, the central reserve of
the South Vietnamese Army has been seri-
ously depleted in recent months. The prin-
cipal role of U.S. ground combat forces will
be to supplement this reserve in support of
the frontline forces of the South Vietnamese
Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces
will deal with the pacification of areas
cleared of organized Vietcong and North
Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate for
them than for our forces.
The Government of South Vietnam's
strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve
the initiative, to expand gradually its area of
control by breaking up major concentrations
of enemy forces, using to the maximum our
preponderance of airpower, both land and
sea based. The number of fixed-wing at-
tack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Viet-
nam will increase manifold by the end of the
year.
Armed helicopter sorties will also increase
dramatically over the same period, and ex-
tension use will be made of heavy artillery,
both land based and sea based. At the same
time our air and naval forces will continue
to interdict the Vietcong supplies line from
North Vietnam, both land and sea.
Although our tactics have changed, our
objective remains the same.
We have no desire to widen the war. We
have no desire to overthrow the North Viet-
namese regime, seize its territory or achieve
the unification of North and South Vietnam
by force of arms. We have no need for per-
manent military bases in South Vietnam or
for special privileges of any kind.
What we are seeking through the planned
military buildup is to block the Vietcong
offensive, to give the people of South Viet-
nam and their armed forces some relief from
the unrelenting Communist pressures?to
sive them time to strengthen their govern-
ment, to reestablish law and order, and to
revive their economic life which has been
seriously disrupted by Vietcong harassment
and attack in recent months. We have no
illusions that success will be achieved quick-
ly, but we are confident that it will be
achieved much more surely by the plan I
have outlined.
Increases in U.S. military forces
Fortunately, we have greatly increased the
strength and readiness of our Military Estab-
lishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds
of forces which we now require in southeast
Asia. The Active Army has been expanded
from 11 to 16 combat ready divisions.
Twenty thousand men have been added to
the Marine Corps to allow them to fill Out
their combat structure and at the same time
facilitate the mobilization of the Marine
Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squad-
rons of the Air Force have been increased by
51 percent. Our airlift capability has more
than doubled. Special forces trained to deal
with insurgency threats have been multiplied
elevenfold. General ship construction and
conversion has been doubled.
During this same period, procurement for
the expanded force has been increased great-
ly: Air Force tactical aircraft?froen $360 mil-
lion in 1081 to about $1.1 billion in the orig-
inal fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft--
from $1.8 billion to $2.2 billion; Army hell-
copters?from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Pro-
curement of ordnance, vehicles and related
equipment was increased about 150 percent
in the fiscal years 1962-64 period, compared
with the preceding 3 years. The tonnage of
modern nonnuclear air-to-ground ordnance
in stock tripled between fiscal year 1961 and
fiscal year 1965. In brief, the Military Estab-
lishment of the United States, today, is in
far better shape than it ever has been in
peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie
ahead.
Nevertheless, some further increases in
forces, military personnel, production, and
construction will be required if We are to de-
ploy additional forces to southeast Asia and
provide for combat consumption while, at
the same time, maintaining our capabilities
to deal with crises elsewhere in the world.
To offset the deployments now planned to
southeast Asia, and provide some additional
forces for possible new deployments, we pro-
pose to increase the presently authorized
force levels. These increases will be of three
types: (1) Additional units for the Active
Forces, over and above those reflected in the
January budget; (2) military personnel aug-
mentations for presently authorized units in
the Active Forces to man new bases, to handle
the larger logistics workload, etc,; and (3)
additional personnel and extra training for
selected Reserve component units to increase
their readiness for quick deployment. We
believe we can achieve this buildup without
calling up the Reserves or ordering the invol-
untary extension of tours, except as already
authorized by law for the Department of the
Navy. Even here the extension of officer
tours will be on a selective basis and exten-
sions for enlisted men will be limited, in gen-
eral, to not more than 4 months,
The program I have outlined here today
and the $1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal
year 1986 Defense appropriation bill now be-
fore the committee will, in the collective
judgment of my principal military and ci-
vilian advisers and myself, provide the men.
materiel, and facilities required to fulfill the
President's pledge to meet the mounting ag-
gression in South Vietnam, while at the same
time maintaining the forces required to meet
commitments elsewhere in the world.
THE CHALLENGE OF II-NTAIAN NEED
(Address by the President to the Association
of American Editorial Cartoonists, the
White House, May 13, 1965)
The third face of the war
The war in Vietnam has many faces.
There is the faze of armed conflict?of ter-
ror and gunfire?of bomb-heavy planes and
campaign-weary soldiers. ? ? *
The second face of war in Vietnam is the
quest for a political solution?the face of
diplomacy and politics?of the ambitions and
the interests of other nations. ? *
The third face of war in Vietnam is, at
once, the most tragic and most hopeful. It
is the face of human need. It is the un-
tended sick, the hungry family, and the il-
literate 'child. It is men and women, many
without shelter, with rags for clothing, strug-
gling for survival in a very rich and a very
fertile land.
It is the most important battle of all in
which we are engaged.
For a nation cannot be built by armed
power or by political agreement. It will rest
on the expectation by individual men and
Women that their future will be better than
their past.
It is not enough to just fight against some-
thing. People must fight for something, and
the people of South Vietnam Tuna know that
after the long, brutal journey through the
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dark tunnel of conflict there breaks the light
of a happier day. And only if this is so can
they be expected to sustain the enduring will
for continued strife. Only in this way can
long-run stability and peace come to their
land.
And there is another, more profound rea-
son. In Vietnam communism seeks to really
impose its will by force of arms. But we
would be deeply mistaken to think that this
was the only weapon. Here, as other places
in the world, they speak to restless people?
people rising to shatter the old ways which
have imprisoned hope?people fiercely and
justly reaching for the material fruits from
the tree of modern knowledge.
It is this desire, and not simply lust for
conquest, which moves many of the individ-
ual fighting men that we must now, sadly,
call the enemy.
It is, therefore, our task to show that free-
dom from the control of other nations offers
the surest road to progress, that history and
experience testify to this truth. But it is not
enough to call upon reason or point to ex-
amples. We must show it through action
and we must show it through accomplish-
ment, and even were there no war?either
hot or cold?we would always be active in
humanity's search for progress.
This task is commanded to us by the
moral values of our civilization, and it rests
on the inescapable nature of the world that
we have now entered. For in that world, as
long as we can foresee, every threat to man's
welfare will be a threat to the welfare of our
own people. Those who live in the emerging
community of nations will ignore the perils
of their neighbors at the risk of their own
prospects.
Cooperative development in southeast Asia
This is true not only for Vietnam but for
every part of the developing world. This is
why, on your behalf, I recently proposed a
massive, cooperative development effort for
all of southeast Asia. I named the respected
leader, Eugene Black, as my personal repre-
sentative to inaugurate our participation in
these programs.
Since that time rapid progress has been
made, I am glad to report. Mr. Black has
met with the top officials of the United Na-
tions on several occasions. He has talked to
other interested parties. He has found in-
creasing enthusiasm. The United Nations is
already setting up new mechanisms to help
carry forward the work of development.
In addition, the United States is now pre-
pared to participate in, and to support, an
Asian Development Bank, to carry out and
help finance the economic progress in that
area of the world and the development that
we desire to see in that area of the world.
So this morning I call on every other in-
dustrialized nation, including the Soviet
Union, to help create a better life for all of
the people of southeast Asia.
Surely, surely, the works of peace can
bring men together in a common effort to
abandon forever the works of war.
But, as South Vietnam is the central place
of conflict, it is also a principal focus for
our work to increase the well-being of peo-
ple.
It is that effort in South Vietnam, of which
I think we are too little informed, which I
want to relate to you this morning.
Strengthening Vietnam's economy
We began in 1954, when Vietnam became
independent, before the war between the
north and the south. Since that time we
have spent more than $2 billion in economic
help for the 16 million people of South Viet-
nam. And despite the ravages of war, we
have made steady, continuing gains. We
have concentrated on food and health and
education and housing and industry.
Like Most developing countries, South
Vietnam's economy rests on agriculture.
Unlike many, it has large uncrowded areas
of very rich and very fertile land. Because
of this, it is one of the great rice bowls of
the entire world. With our help, since 1954,
South Vietnam has already doubled its rice
production, providing food for the people as
well as providing a vital export for that
nation.
We have put our American farm know-
how to work on other crops. This year, for
instance, several hundred million cuttings
of a new variety of sweet potato, that prom-
ises a sixfold increase in yield will be dis-
tributed to these Vietnamese farmers. Corn
output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962
to 100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has
more than doubled since 1955. Many animal
diseases have been eliminated entirely.
Disease and epidemic brood over every
Vietnamese village. In a country of more
than 16 million people with a life expectancy
of only 35 years, there are only 200 civilian
doctors. If the Vietnamese had doctors in
the same ratio as the United States has doc-
tors, they would have not the 200 that they
do have but they would have more than
5,000 doctors.
We have helped vaccinate, already, over 7
million people against cholera, and millions
more against other diseases. Hundreds of
thousands of Vietnamese can now receive
treatment in the more than 12,000 hamlet
health stations that America has built and
has stocked. New clinics and surgical suites
are scattered throughout the entire country;
and the medical school that we are now'
helping to build will graduate as many doc-
tors in a single year as now serve the entire
civilian population of South Vietnam.
Education is the keystone of future devel-
opment in Vietnam. It takes trained people
to man the factories, to conduct the admin-
istration, and to form the human founda-
tion for an advancing nation. More than
a quarter million young Vietnamese can now
learn in more than 4,000 classrooms that
America has helped to build in the last 2
years; and 2,000 more schools are going to
be built by us in, the next 12 months. The
number of students in vocational schools
has gone up four times. Enrollment was
300,000 in 1955, when we first entered there
and started helping with our program. To-
day it is more than 1,500,000. The 8 million
textbooks that we have supplied to Viet-
namese children will rise to more than 15
million by 1967.
Agriculture is the foundation. Health,
education, and housing are the urgent hu-
man needs. But industrial development is
the great pathway to their future.
When Vietnam was divided, most of the
industry was in the North. The South was
barren of manufacturing and the founda-
tions for industry. Today more than 700
new or rehabilitated factories?textile mills
and cement plants, electronics and plastics?
are changing the entire face of that nation.
New roads and communications, railroad
equipment, and electric generators are a
spreading base on which the new industry
can, and is, growing.
Progress in the midst of war
All this progress goes on, and it is going to
continue to go on, under circumstances of
staggering adversity.
Communist terrorists have made aid pro-
grams that we administer a very special tar-
get of their attack. They fear them, because
agricultural stations are being destroyed and
medical centers are being burned. More than
100 Vietnamese malaria fighters are dead.
Our own AID officials have been wounded and
kidnapped. These are not just the accidents
of war. They are a part of a deliberate cam-
paign, in the words of the Communists, "to
cut the fingers off the hands of the Govern-
ment."
20865
We.intend to continue, and we intend to
increase our help to Vietnam.
Nor can anyone doubt the determination of
the South Vietnamese themselves. They
have lost more than 12,000 of their men since
I became your President a little over a year
ago.
But progress does not come from invest-
ment alone, or plans on a desk, or even the
directives and the orders that we approve
here in Washington. It takes men. Men
must take the seed to the farmer. Men
must teach the use of fertilizer. Men must
help in harvest. Men must build the schools,
and men must instruct the students. Men
must carry medicine into the jungle, and
treat the sick, and shelter the homeless. And
men?brave, tireless, filled with love for their
fellows?are doing this today. They are
doing it through the long, hot, danger-filled
Vietnamese days and the sultry nights.
The fullest glory must go, also, to those
South Vietnamese that are laboring and dy-
ing for their own people and their own na-
tion. In hospitals and schools, along the
rice fields and the roads, they continue to
labor, never knowing when death or terror
may strike.
How incredible it is that there are a few
who still say that the South Vietnamese do
not want to continue the struggle. They
are sacrificing and they are dying by the
thousands. Their patient valor in the heavy
presence of personal physical danger should
be a helpful lesson to those of us who, here
in America, only have to read about it, or
hear about it on the television or radio.
We have our own heroes who labor at the
works of peace in the midst of war. They
toil unarmed and out of uniform. They
know the humanity of their concern does not
exempt them from the horrors of coniffict, yet
they go on from day to day. They bring
food to the hungry over there. They supply
the sick with necessary medicine. They help
the farmer with his crops, families to find
clean water, villages to receive the healing
miracles of electricity. These are Americans
Who have joined our AID program, and we
welcome others to their ranks.
A call for aid
For most Americans this an easy war. Men
fight and men suffer and men die, as they
always do in war. But the lives of most of
us, at least those of us in this room and those
listening to me this morning, are untroubled.
Prosperity rises, abundance increases, the
Nation flourishes.
I will report to the Cabinet when I leave
this room that we are In the 51st month of
continued prosperity, the longest peacetime
prosperity for America since our country was
founded. Yet our entire future is at stake.
What a difference it would make if we
could only call upon a small fraction of our
unmatched private resources?businesses and
unions, agricultural groups and builders?if
we could call them to the task of peaceful
progress in Vietnam. With such a spirit of
patriotic sacrifice we might well strike an
Irresistible blow for freedom there and for
freedom throughout the world.
I therefore hope that every person within
the sound of my voice in this country this
morning will look for ways?and those citi-
zens of other nations who believe in human-
ity as we do, I hope that they will find ways
to help progress in South Vietnam.
This, then, is the third face of our struggle
in Vietnam. It was there?the illiterate, the
hungry, the sick?before this war began. It
will be there when peace comes to us?and
so will we?not with soldiers and planes, not
with bombs and bullets, but with all the
wondrous weapons of peace in the 20th
century.
And then, perhaps, together, all of the
people of the world can share that gracious
task with all the people of Vietnam, North
and South alike.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE August 25, 1965
U.S. DRIVE TO NEGOTIATE IN v1.17-
AM?RU, GOLpBERG, AND
WINDY SPYT T. IT OUT
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
New York Times headlined the Monday
night CBS news special on Vietnain as
"U.S. Diplomacy by TV." This inter-
rogation of Secretary Rusk, Ambassador
Goldberg, and Presidential Assistant
4 Btmdy once again contributed greatbr to
the understanding by tlAmerican peo-
ple of our policies in Vii ant.
la the Judgment of the New york
Times, this broadcast may also have
served another vital ptirPose. In that
broadcast, as Max Frankel reports in this
morrrimes New York Times, Secretary
Rusk may well have imparted to Hanoi
the fact that it could ex4fect no military
respite without negotiations, and that
this country is ready, willing, and anxi-
ous to negotiate on the basis of the 1954
Geneva agreement and, again, of the
1982, Laotian agreements. The Secre-
tary spells out in detail the nature of the
Set-determination, the free secret bal-
lot election in South Vietnam to which
We agree.
Mr. President, there is an unusually
abigir exposition of our will to negotiate
tcdcreaSed by Ambassador Goldberg and
by Mr. Bundy. Let me read briefly from
It:
Mr. Eforreerr. But can one not hasten this
prorese somewhat? Can OAR not ripen the
Wet diplomacy by creating eiretunstances
14 which the other side Neill find it napes-
? to come to the oceneerence table, by.
for instance, dramatizing a desire to return
to Geneva, or perhaps some dramatic, sub-
Iglantive but dramatic, approach by President
Sieihipsrea?a summit conference on this prob
;Om which / think everyone recognizes is a
/Spit serious problem?
Ur. GOLDBERG. MY. Battelet, how More
drapatic can the President of the United
be? He made a public declaration
Omit this in Baltimore, "unconditional ills -
missions," and then some oritios said that
the President did not mean "negotiations."
So then in the letter that he sent down with
MO to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, he used the ward "negotiations" to
rotit at rest this thing that people were
belting about. Following which, we sent
aCtertter to the Security Council, in which
WirOtari, "We call upon anyone, any member,
not only of the Security _Council, but of
the trnited Nations, to participate with us in
this effort."
The 17 nonalined nations made a pro-
por,41. We said that they would form the
bailie for a negotiation. And then?I can't
go through all of the 15 efforts that were
made. Mr. Davies went to Hanoi. We said
that we welcomed that initiative. The Com-
nannwe.alth ministers made a declaration.
We said we welcomed that initiative. Mr.
Nkrumah .has indicated some Interest; we
did not discourage it.
personally feel that you never denigrate
any party nor a great nation by indicating
a desire for peaceful resolution of a conflict.
The President has done this. He's gone all
out for this purpose.
Ur. Horse:err. The purpose of my ques-
tion, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one
conld not do more than just indicate a will-
ingness to accept, indicate acquiescence -
-,
Mr. BUNDY. Well, we have done that, Mr.
Hottelet, in the specific case that you men-
tioned. It seems to me that the fact is,
and it's very clear, really, and increasingly
recognized around the world, we are un-
conditionally ready for negotiations; we are
unconditionally ready to return to Geneva
if others are; we are unconditionally ready
for the good offices of the United Nations in
any way that they can be made effective; we
are unconditionally ready to meet with all
Interested governments and go to work on
this problem, and we have said so in every
sharp and fiat, and the President is fond of
Saying, in every State of the Union. And I
believe the message has been heard.
Mr. President I ask unanimous con-
sent that the transcript of this historic
and significant interview be printed at
this point In the RECORD, together with
the fascinating interpretation of the sig-
nificance of the interview by Max
Frankel, published in today's New York
Times.
There being no objection, the trans-
cript and interpretation were ordered
to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT?VIETNAM
PERSPECTIVE: "WINNING TIM PEACE"
(Part III of four parts, as broadcast over
the CBS Television Network, Monday,
August 23, 1965)
Participants: Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg,
Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy.
Reporters: CBS News United Nations Cor-
respondent Richard C. Flottelet, CBS News
Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, CBS
News White House Correspondent Harry
Reasoner.
Produced by CBS News.
AresromsCER. This is the third of four spe-
cial 1-hour broadcasts by CBS News, "Viet-
nam Perspective." In the past 2 weeks, the
new decisions and the American military
effort in Vietnam were examined. Tonight,
"Winning the Peace."
The paths to a peaceful settlement in
Vietnam will be discussed by three Govern-
ment officials. Now here is CBS News White
House Correspondent Harry Reasoner.
Mr. REASONER. Good evening. We're in the
John Quincy Adams Room of the State De-
partment in Washington for the third in our
series of programs with the U.S. policymak-
ers on Vietnam. Across from me are three
distinguished officials whose task it is to
pursue perhaps the most difficult andillusive
of our objectives in Vietnam, the pursuit
of peace.
We're happy to have back with us the
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who with the
President formulates our foreign policy and
who heads our diplomatic offensive in south-
east Asia.
This is our newly designated Ambassador
to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, who
is exploring the avenues of a peaceful set-
tlement in Vietnam through U.N. channels.
And this is McGeorge Bundy, Special As-
sistant to the President, who has played a
key role in the formulation of our policies
in Vietnam and who, a few weeks ago on
this netefork, defended the administration's
position with some professors who disagree
with it.
Seated with me are two CBS News col-
leagues, diplomatic correspondent Marvin
Kalb, who regularly covers the State Depart-
ment and who is just back from one of
many trips to Russia. And U.N. correspond-
ent Richard C. Hottelet.
Gentlemen, I'd like to begin with a fairly
basic question. It's been quite a weekend
in Vietnam. We bombed close to China
again. We bombed for the first time some
targets that could be described as less di-
rectly military than before, and there is a
kind of new optimism about how the ground
fighting is going. Is this the moment? Is
this the time for negotiations? I'd like each
of you to reply to that briefly. Secretary
Rusk?
Mr. Rosie. Well, that depends on the other
side in their assessment of the situation.
We have been ready for a long time to make
peace in southeast Asia.. Our problem is to
get the other side to the conference table.
We just don't know. The other side must
make that decision.
Mr. REASONER. Ambassador Goldberg?
Mr. GOLDBERG_ I think any time is a good
time 101? negotiations. The only way to re-
solve conflict is to go to the bargaining table,
to use a term that I am very well familiar
with, and it seems to me that this is not de-
termined by the calendar, or even by the
course of military events. This Is deter-
mined by the genuine desire of the parties
to the conflict to remove the problem from
the battlefield to the bargaining table. So
for me, any time is a good time to negotiate.
Mr. REASONER. Mr. Bundy?
Mr. Boxes. Well, it's certainly true that it
is our position that now is a good time to
negotiate. We have had that view for many
months, have tried to make It clear in every
way, public and private, at every level of dis-
course, from the President on down. It Is
also true that the response from Hanoi, still
more from Peiping, has been consistently and
powerfully negative. No later than a week
ago, in an interview with the correspondent
of the French newspaper Le Monde, Ho of
Hanoi made it very plain that they were not
prepared to negotiate except on terms of all
power to the Communists. I believe it to be
true that military success of the kind which
we have seen in recent days does help us
bring nearer the day when there will be effec-
tive negotiation.
Mr. ROTTELET. It also reinforces the ques-
tion that some people have asked of whether
you ought to negotiate at all, or whether, if
you find the tables turning your way, if you
are gaining any kind of military ascendancy,
whether you shouldn't use that advantage,
press it to checkmate Communist aggres-
sion, which is the U.S. professed aim,
not only in Vietnam, but all through south-
east Asia and Laos and in northeast Thailand
and Malaysia as well. In other words, Why
should we negotiate? is the question.
Mr. BUNDY. / think all of us would agree,
and I know this to be the position of Presi-
dent Johnson, that we are ready to negotiate
and that we are not disposed to take the
view that because the battle is going well we
are unwilling to talk about it. In our view,
the effort to end the aggression must con-
tinue, while the aggression continues, but
we are prepared for discussion and for nego-
tiation at any time.
Mr. KALB. There is in the air right now in.
Washington something which has not been
here before, at least in the last couple of
months, and that is a wispy kind of feeling
that maybe there is some optimism here and
some grounds for optimism. I'd like to ask
you, Mr. Secretary, what are the grounds for
optimism? What is the evidence that gives
rise to this sense?
Mr. RUSK. Well, I think the fact that
President Johnson has made it very clear that
we are not going to be pushed out of South
Vietnam and that we shall meet our commit-
ments to South Vietnam has made a big dif-
ference to this situation. I think also the
fact that international opinion is not sup-
porting the effort of Hanoi to take over South
Vietnam makes a difference, because I think
they were hoping at one time that there
would be a buildup of international opinion
that might cause the United States to change
its attitude toward our commitment.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Gentlemen, may I make an
observation on the Secretary's statement?
New to diplomacy, I have been reading in
diplomacy. Talleyrand made a statement
about the Vienna Congress in which he said
that the great powers there assembled were
too frightened to fight and too stupid to agree.
And I think in a very simple measure, we
can say of American foreign policy in this
situation, that it is clear from what the
President has said, from what the Secretary
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA
*August 25, 1965
of State has said, Mr. Bundy said in his
teach-ins, that the United States very defi-
nitely is not too frightened to fight. That
has been demonstrated.
Mr. Rusx. Let me come back, Mr. Kalb, if
I may, to Mr. Bundy's reference to the inter-
view?in Le Monde, Ho Chi Minh on August
14. He seemed to be saying there that a
precondition for peace is the withdrawal of
American forces. Well, under the circum-
stances, this is quite an unrealistic point
of view, because those forcea are there solely
because of the intervention of outside forces
from Hanoi in South Vietnam. Now one
would suppose that peace requires that there
be a withdrawal of those North Vietnamese
forces that have penetrated into South Viet-
nam. If you don't like the word withdrawal,
you can use the word redeployment, but it
is that infiltration which is solely responsi-
ble for the presence of American combat
forces in South Vietnam.
Now, obviously, we and others have been
giving a good deal of thought to the basis
on which peace can be achieved. I think
the entire record of the United States since
1945 shows that we want peace and not war
and that all of our effort in this postwar
period has been directed to that end. Well,
now, in South Vietnam, the cessation of out-
side aggression, the cessation of this infiltra-
tion from the north is certainly fundamental
because that would make it possible for
American forces to come home. We should
like to see full performance on all sides of
the military clauses a the 1954 agreements.
We have said repeatedly, time after time,
that as far as the United States is con-
cerned, we have no interest in military bases
or a permanent military presence in south-
east Asia. Well, now, that is in accord with
the 1954 agreements and that should be one
of the essential elements of a peaceful set-
tlement.
Now as far as South Vietnam internally is
concerned, we have a deep commitment to
the simple notion of self-determination. In
the 1954 agreements, it was anticipated that
there would be elections, through secret elec-
tions?through secret ballot, and that the
peoples of Vietnam, north and south, would
have a chance to express their?their opin-
ions, and we are prepared for elections in
South Vietnam to determine what the people
of that country want in terms of their own
institutions.
And then the question of reunification
which has been troublesome over the years.
Again, it is instinctive with the United States
to say, What do the people want? What-do
the people want? And there again, to find
out in North Vietnam and South Vietnam
what the ,people themselves really want on
this matter is important. Now, this isn't
very simple. And it doesn't mean that both
are going to want reunification. The people
in the north would want reunification only
if there were a Communist regime through-
out the country. The people in the south
don't want reunification on that basis, but
It is for the people of Vietnam to decide that
at such time as they have a chance to express
their views freely on that point. So what
we are talking about here are the simple
elernbnts of a settlement which were reached
basically in 1954 and again in 1962 in the
Lao agreements.
Mr. HOTTELET. Mr. Goldberg, you sit at
probably the most sensitive listening post in
the world. Do you get any indication from
the?your colleagues at the United Nations
that the other side has gotten this message
of?that we are not too frightened to fight,
not too stupid to talk?
Mr. GOLDBERG. Not yet. Not yet in all can-
dor. We have to persevere with patience,
and experience and hope. Our message is
loud and clear. The signal that the Secre-
tary has refererd to on occasion, saying that
negotiations will take place when you hear
No. 157-4
a signal, has been made by the United States.
Our President has stated publicly to the
world that we are prepared to sit down in
'unconditional negotiations, discussing the
points that Hanoi has made, discussing the
points we have made and to arrive at a dur-
able settlement, a durable settlement. I am
hopeful?I am hopeful?and I continue in
this hope that we will get a similar signal
from the other side. It's very simple to make
that signal. The President did it at Balti-
more. He did it on other occasions. He has
done it since. He armed me with a letter to
the Secretary General when he said very
plainly that we are ready to negotiate uncon-
ditionally all problems and to negotiate on
the basis of their position and our position,
and I think we are looking for a signal from
the other side.
Mr. REASONER. Mr. Secretary, I think that
there's some confusion in this country about
these 1951 agreements which are mentioned
so often. For instance, I don't know how
many Americans realize it's an agreement
that we didn't sign. Does?could you out-
line why we did not sign that and if we
would sign a similar agreement now?
Mr. Rusx. Well, we did not formally sign
those agreements, but Gen. Bedell Smith,
who was then Under Secretary of State, made
a statement at the time which in effect em-
braced those agreements on behalf of the
United States, and said that any attempt to
violate those agreements by force would be
looked upon by the United States as a threat
to the peace. So that we do believe that
the 1954 agreements, in their essential prin-
ciples, do provide a basis for peace in south-
east Asia. What we do not believe is that
the settlement of 1954 can be upset by force
by any party.
Mr. REASONER. Mr. Bundy, for reasons
which you've explained, and the President
has explained, the war in Vietnam has gotten
bigger. Our participation in it has increased.
How do we know that it won't continue to
escalate until eventually we have world war
III? Is there some kind of a tacit under-
standing on how far both sides go?
Mr. BUNDY. I know a no tacit under-
standing, Mr. Reasoner, but I think it is fair
to say that all parties?and all those con-
cerned?are aware of the danger of enlarge-
ment of the conflict. We certainly are on
our side. We have lived with crises large
and small over a 20-year period now?in Ber-
lin, in Greece, in Korea, in Cuba, and else-
where?and I think Americans can be proud
a the care and the prudence and the re-
straint which their government has shown
in this generation of effort. Under the lead-
ership of President Johnson?a man of peace
if there ever was one?we are conducting our
affairs in that tradition and with that pur-
pose of restraint. We believe that there is a
similar recognition?although not always a
similar recognition a the rights of others?
there is a similar recognition of the hazards
of any great enlargement of the conflict on
the part of the parties interested on the
other side. We cannot be sure of what they
will do. We can be sure, and we must be
accountable for what we do, and that is why
our entire effort has been directed at things
related specifically to what is being done to
and in South Vietnam. That's what we are
concerned with; not the fate of any other
regime elsewhere; not the safety or security
of any larger power nearby which we do not
threaten. We are concerned with the fulfill-
ment of our obligations in South Vietnam,
a limited objective, and the nature of those
limitations we've made just as clear as we
know how.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Bundy, could you convince
us, and thereby provide us with the evidence
that leads you to feel that the American
bombing of North Vietnam is specifically
related to acts of terrorism in South Viet-
nam, and that this will convince the Vietcong
operation in South Vietna.m that they must
stop what they're doing?
Mr. BTINDY. No, the bombing in North Viet-
nam is not?I would not relate it specifically
and directly to any one action in South
Vietnam, but to the campaign in South Viet-
nam, and to the program pursued by Hanoi
against South Vietnam it is related and
related most directly. The targets are mili-
tary targets: military lines of communication,
military barracks, military depots. There
has been no miscellaneous bombing of any
old target in North Vietnam or anywhere so
far as we can avoid it. The targets have
been directly related to a campaign of in-
filtration, a oampaign of military control,
and a campaign of organized terror where
the heartbeat of that campaign is in Hanoi.
Mr. HOTTELET. Getting back to China, I've
heard the assumption expressed that China
will not intervene directly in Vietnam as long
as the regime the Communist regime of
North Vietnam?is not in danger of being
overthrown, and as long as there is no mas-
sive incursion of American power on the
ground. Is this, in fact, an assumption that
guides your policy?
Mr. Rusx. Well, I think we are at some
baaard in trying to think like the members
of the Politburo in Peiping. It is my im-
pression that the Communist world does not
want a general war over southeast Asia. Un-
fortunately. some of them want southeast
Asia. Therefore, we cannot be completely
sure at the end of the trail which desire on
their part will predominate. But, the author-
ities in Peiping must know that they have
undertaken to support an effort in South
Vietnam right up against an American com-
mitment of which they were fully informed.
Therefore, they must recognize that there are
very large hazards if they themselves elect
to pursue this by direct intervention. Now
we, therefore, have been acting with a com-
bination a firmness and prudence in an
effort to keep wide open the doors of peaceful
settlement. This has characterized American
policy in all of these postwar crises to which
Mr. McGeorge Bundy referred, and we would
hope very much that the time will oome
when it will be recognized on the other side
that pushing this matter militarily is not
worth the risk at the end of the trail, and
therefore, that they will bring this to the
conference table for settlement.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, there are a num-
ber of people in Washington who study the
China problem who believe that, on the con-
. trary, it is precisely a war in southeast Asia
that the Chinece want. It is precisely the
bogging down of an enormous number of
American troops in southeast Asia that the
Chinese want, both for internal political rea-
sons as well as a Justification of their pod-
tion in terms of their quarrel with the Rus-
sians. What evidence can you provide that,
indeed, the Chinese?I'm not talking about
the Russians now?do not really want this
kind of?of a larger and deeper American
involvement, even running the risk of war
with America?
Mr. Rusx. Well, one can only judge by
their actions thus far and by impressions one
gets from those who have been in touch with
Peiping. There is a comment going around
in the Communist world these days that
Peiping is prepared to fight to the last Viet-
namese. There is a certain caution and pru-
dence in their action, more so than in their
words, but when you analyze these mat-
ters from the point of view of basic na-
tional interest, objectively in terms of what
can be at the root of their thinking, I myself
cannot believe that it is a rational idea that
the principal powers involved in this busi-
ness could look with favor upon the outbreak
of a general war. It doesn't make sense from
anyone's point of view.
Now, that means that it is important to
do what we can not to let events take con-
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O68 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
trol; to try to keep some sort of control
over the situation so that contacts among
the capitals might have a chance to find a
*Way to a peaceful settlement. And that is
One Of the reasons...Why, one of the principal
reasons why Pr?dent Johnson has tried to
act With the combination of the firmness and
Prudence that he believes the situation re-
quires.
Mr. Burne Could I pick up from what the
Secretary said for one moment and say that,
in the first place, that nothing is more
important than the Maintenance of pru-
dence and of edective control of our own
operations by our own Government. That's
the meaning of the insistent, direct surveil-
lance which the President maintains over
Major military decisions, and specifically,
over decisions which affect military action
against North Vietnam. This is a matter
which he keeps under his own control by the
etneetiat and with the support of the senior
Military commanders concerned.
And just one more point. Obviously, the
Chinese would be delighted to have us mis-
manage our affairs in South Vietnam and in
southeast Asia so that we got more and more
engaged in something less and less success-
ml. It is our object and our purpose and our
responsibility to do a better job than that,
and to do that job within the limits of pru-
dence, restraint, and decency which we are
trying to follow.
Mr. Gosaseec. Could / summarize Ameri-
tan policy in this area by quoting an
alielezit Greek wise man, Polybius, who said
that "the purpose of war"?and I would
describe It in terms of our attitude toward
Hanoi?"is not to annihilate the enemy, but
to get him to mend his ways." And this,
in fact, is what we have been attempting to
do, prevent aggression, and this has been
Made clear time and time again. We?the
President said, my distinguished predecessor
at the United Nations said, we don't covet
spay territory, we don't seek to establish any
Military bases; we are acting the way we
do to step aggression, And when you move
only to stop aggression, not to promote ag-
gression, / thing the dangers of a general
War are minimized.
Mr. Kum. Mr. Ambassador, the?every-
thing that you said is certainly true, and
this is precisely what the administration is
saying. At the same time, people said in
the Chinese capital, who have to view it
from the point of view of their national
interest?you can say that we're not building
bases around China, but when the Chinese
leaders look out at the map, they can see the
presence Of American military forces from
One end of the Chinese border to the other.
When you bomb, as we did today, to within
81 miles of the Chinese border, people re-
eponsible for Chinese national security prob-
ably would look with some great concern
about that. I am trying to understand what
Makes you feel that they're not that deeply
etencerned, or that they don't feel that bomb-
ing 31 miles on this side of the border might
not lead to 31 miles on the other side of the
border.
Mr. Gorseeree. Mr. Kalb, for a very simple
reason: because we have stated as a matter
Of direct public policy to the world, a coin-
letitment which America has made to every-
body, that if aggression ceases from the
north, our activities in South Vietnam will
likewise cease. This Is a pretty broad state-
ment, quite different from statements that
were made by other powers at other paints
In the history of South and North Vietnam.
Mr. Harriman There was a time in the
Korean war after the cessation of lire, and
before the armistiee was signed, when?as
President Eisenhower revealed not long ago--
he got tired of waiting for the Chinese to
sign the armistice and threatened or prom-
ised to use all American power, including
nuclear power, aganst the Chinese. He said
they got the message and they came to the
conference table. San you envisage any simi-
lar circumstances in Vietnam?
Mr. latrax. Well, I think we'll have to let
that question ride for the future. There
already was a negotiation going on at that
time, and the problem was to bring it to
a final conclusion. In a major sense, the
fighting had already been brought to a con-
clusion by the earlier discussions of the
cease-fire. We may get to a point where
a cease-fire gets to be the crucial element
there in Vietnam.
Mr. Kalb, if I could return to your point
for a second. I don't believe that ideological
differences are as profound as to cause
Peiping to be concerned about what they see
around their borders when they know that
we would come home if Hanoi would leave
South Vietnam alone, and that we would
not have bases or troops in southeast Asia
If these countries could live in peace. Now
they can pretend, given their ideological
commitments, that they somehow are afraid
that we have in mind a major attack on
China. There's nothing in the record to
show that. Nothing in the conduct of the
last 16 or 20 years to give any support to
that idea.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, you are suggesting
then that the American confrontation?if I
can use that large word?in southeast Asia is
really the United States and North Vietnam,
and not the broader confrontation of the
United States and Communist China?
Mr. Rosso Well, I think, In the first in-
stance, it is clear that what Hanoi is doing
is our principal problem and explains why
we're in South Vietnam with military forces,
so that we're not involved in a confrontation,
the purpose of which, on our side, is to de-
stroy the regime in Peiping. We have two
divisions in Korea, because, among other
things, several hundred thousand Chinese
came into the Korean war in 1G60-51, and
this posed a problem of the security of South
Korea. But throughout this postwar period,
force has been initiated by the other side.
The free world has had to meet that force
with determination, but the free world has
also met it with the kind of prudence and
restraint that keeps open the doors of peace-
ful settlement. And all I would say on that
to our colleagues in Peiping, if they want to
test whether or not the United States is ag-
gressive, then let them live at peace with
their neighbors, and they would find out
that the United States is not aggressive with
respect to mainland China.
Mr. Keen. We're talking in a kind of a
shorthand, though, sir. Isn't it more direct
in some way at this stage, given the dimen-
sion of the danger, to have a more direct
link of communication with the Chinese
Communists? I'm aware of the Warsaw
conversations, but we've had enormous-polit-
ical differences with the Russians; we've
been able to establish a hot line to Moscow.
What about some kind of line directly to
Peiping?
Mr. Rusin Well, I tinter we've had more
discussions with Peiping over the last 10
years on more important subjects than has
any government that recognizes Peiping,
with the possible exception of Moscow. Our
problem with Peiping is not communication.
Our problem is that when we have talks with
them, they begin by saying that there can
be no improvement in the situation until we
are prepared to surrender Formosa to the
mainland, and that means turning over 11
million people against their will to Peiping,
and we make it clear that this is not possible,
and I must confess, the conversation gets to
be implacable and harsh and takes well-
known lines as represented In the public
statements of the two sides.
Mr. Bumpy. Going by their own conversa-
tions, Mr. Irseb, and their own?what they
say to journalists, the few and race ones
August 25, 1965
whom they,receive, the Peiping government
itself has said over and over again, framing
the matter in its own terms, that what is at
Issue in Vietnam is fundamentally a matter
for the Vietnamese people to decide. This Is
exactly what we think. We believe that the
center of this question is in what is being
done to and in South Vietnam. It is not in
Peiping, except as they may be engaged in
support and assistance to those who are at-
tempting to destroy a given society and
replace it with one fashioned in their own
image. And I believe the people in Peiping
know that, and ./ believe they understand
clearly that it is only by their action and by
their decision that there can be the kind of
enlargement which would involve direct
danger to them.
Mx. Reesorrea. This question has come up
several times about letting the people of Viet-
nam decide what they want to do. Is this,
indeed, the case, or it it a case, as in other
U.S. policy, where theme are limitations, where
there are certain options denied them? Sup-
pose South Vietnam decided that it wished
to make a separate peace. Would we accept
It?
Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think when you asked
that question earlier to Ambassador Taylor
he said that he just didn't think that was
a realistic possibility. My own judgment is,
on the basis of one short visit and innu-
merable reports and a great many discussions
with others who have been there much
longer, that there is no problem, from our
side, of confidence in the ability of the peo-
ple of South Vietnam, given a free choice and
conditions of reasonable peace, to frame their
own future in ways with which we would
be happy to live; that, it is an unreal ques-
tion to suppose that they would freely choose
to cast their lot with the Communists.
Mr. Reesorera. Nevertheless--
Mr. BUNDY. There is a great deal on--
Mr. REASONED. It is not an unreal ques-
tion, to this extent: that some intelligence
estimates this spring indicated this would
be a possibility. Now, if?even if it is un-
likely---
Mr. BUNDY. I ens not aware of those---
Mr. REASONER. It must be something we
consider.
Mr. BUNDY. Intelligence estimates, Mr.
Reasoner. Really not---
Mr. REASONER. Well, then put it on a pure-
ly hypothetical basis. To think through the
unthinkable, what would be our attitude?
Would we accept it?
Mr. litame. Well, let me put it the other
way around, and say teat the United States
is obviously not in a position to make the
kind of effort and to make the kind of sac-
rifices which we are making if there were
not effort and sacrifice by the people and
government of the country to which we are
giving assistance. There is that kind of ef-
fort. There is that kind of sacrifice. Our
attention focuses most naturally upon the
battles in which Americans are heavily en-
gaged, and we feel, most naturally, Amer-
ican casualties. But the rate of casualties
and the rate of effort is running many times
to one on the Vietnamese side as between
us.
Mr. Hormel.. Are there any points on
which the peace aims of the United States
and the Government of South Vietnam do
not coincide?
Mr. BUNDY. Well, there's a constant prob-
lem of discussion over the exact ways in
which we would state our peace alms, but the
current situation is that?and the Secretary
can speak to this better than I can?that the
Foreign Minister of the Government of South
Vietnam, and the Secretary himself, have
made closely parallel statements about our
peace aims.
Mr. BUSONER. I don't mean to be offensive,
and I certainly recognise your right to de-
Cline to answer this question, but In Santo
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Domingo we retained a possibility of a veto
Over a government. This was clear. This
denied certain options to people in the way
Of self-determination. Do we retain similar
veto over possible decisions out of Viet-
nam?
Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, you're talking
about an island I love. I was down there.
And the point that I think needs to be made
is rather that these two situations are closely
parallel. Our action there, first to save lives,
then to prevent a particular kind of Com-
munist hazard, has developed into an action
designed precisely to give a reasonable op-
portunity for the people of the Dominican
Republic to make their own choice about the
kind of government and the kind of society
they want to have. Now, a small island in
the Caribbean, and a newly-independent
country operating within international agree-
ments which somewhat affect its interna-
tional position on the other side of the
world?these are two very different situa-
tions, but my own belief is that the funda-
mental purposes of the United States in both
areas can be defined in the same broad
terms.
Mr. Rusx. Mr. Reasoner, there's a very
deep commitment of the American people to
the simple notion that governments derive
their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and we have not seen a govern-
ment, a Communist government, brought to
power by the free election of its own people.
Now, we have overwhelming evidence from
all sections, sectors, areas, groups, in South
Vietnam that they do not want what Hanoi
is offering to them in South Vietnam.
Therefore, I do not believe that we need fear,
from the point of view of freedom, that we
need to fear what the effect would be of
genuinely free elections among the people of
South Vietnam. I've heard some people who
were not, I think, in a very good position to
know the details, speculate that 80 percent
of the people in South Vietnam would elect
110 Chi Minh or accept Hanoi if they had
a free election. That just doesn't fit any of
the evidence that we have about the attitude
of these people.
MT. REASONER. I was thinking not so much
of elections as of a coup which would put
into power, without reference to the people?.
as essentially the present government is,
without reference to a majority of the peo-
ple; it's not established that way yet; they
don't know how, Ambassador Lodge says?
but if they had a government whi6h wanted
to make peace, do we retain veto power over
that peace?
Mr. BUNDY. Mr. Reasoner, the coup-mak-
ing power, to put it in those terms, does
rest, as Ambassador Taylor was suggesting
last week, primarily with the military.
There's no hint of this in the military. The
people underestimate the degree of the com-
mitment of all factions, not the Communists,
to a non-Communist solution in South Viet-
nam. One of the principal Buddhist leaders
said to one of our people the other day on
a point that comes up occasionally with
respect to negotiation, that he hoped very
much that we would not give any interna-
tional diplomatic recognition to the Viet-
cong. The Vietcong did not represent the
South Vietnamese people, but only an agency
of the Communists in the North. This is a?
there are divisions and difficulties, many,
varied and fascinating, among the non-Com-
munist forces in South Vietnam, but not on
this issue.
Mr. HOTTELET. The Vietcong has been
treated as a monolithic force, which is really
not human, because human beings are dif-
ferent and even if they are bound by a dis-
cipline or bemused by an ideology, they do
have their own antecedents and they do have
their own tastes. How much is being done
now and what will be done more in the
future to?to insert a wedge into the dif-
ferences that must exist inside this theoreti-
cally monolithic Vietcong?the nationalists,
the patriots, the people who are just peasants
Wanting to live a life of their own?
Mr. Rosic. Well, there are various elements
in the national liberation front. I think it
is true that not all of them are Communists,
although the Communists have, in even re-
cent weeks, declared that they are the domi-
nant factor and they must themselves be the
ones to give the orders. I think there may
also be some tensions between some of the
southerners and some of the northerners
within the liberation front. But basically,
they are united on the notion that the pro-
gram of liberation front must be accepted
as a solution for South Vietnam and that
the liberation front itself must have a dom-
inant role in the government there, regard-
less of the fact that this is not the wishes of
the overwhelming majority of 14 million
South Vietnamese.
Mr. GOLDBERG. May I add a word in this
connection? I was looking at the Geneva
agreement last night. The Geneva agree-
ment, despite what is said in Hanoi, did not
contemplate, nor does it say anything about
a coalition government in which the libera-
tion front would occupy the dominant role
that Hanoi would like to accord it. The
Geneva agreement says that "the Vietnamese
people, north and south, should enjoy fun-
damental freedoms, guaranteed by demo-
cratic institutions"?I am reading?"estab-
lished as a result of free, general elections
by secret ballot." Now, it's very interesting
to see the contrast in positions. When we
talk about returning to the essentials of the
Geneva agreement, which Hanoi says it
wants and which we say we subscribe to,
we rely upon the fact that there shall be
self-determination. Hanoi relies upon the
fact that they should take over the Govern-
ment in their image before there are free
elections. Well, we all have had a bit of
history in this since the war. I don't recall
after that has been done elsewhere that
there have been any free elections. Now,
surely the acid test is whether you are will-
ing to subscribe to the principle of free elec-
tions. That, we have said, we are ready to
subscribe to. If we are ready to subscribe
to it, it must reflect a considerable degree of
confidence?confidence which is lacking on
the other side.
Mr. BUNDY. To put it another way, the
Geneva Conference included as a participant
the State of Vietnam. The current position
from Hanoi is that there is no question of
Saigon authorities. This is the very lan-
guage of Ho Chi Minh, so what they wish to
do is to foreclose the question of choice by
the establishment as the only authentic rep-
resentative, again his own language, their
agent, controlled from within by a clearly
Communist Party, the Vietcong.
Mr. Rusx. And without elections.
Mr. KALB. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
before that?or Mr. Bundy did actually, that
you and the Foreign Minister of South
Vietnam have come out with statements
that are rather similar as to what both
countries want in South Vietnam. We have
yet to hear what the Prime Minister of
South Vietnam actually wants and there
have been stories that there are possible
differences already even in this early period
of Ambassador Lodge's return, of differences
between the two; the Prime Minister was not
there when the Ambassador arrived. Do you
feel, sir, that negotiations as we have been
discussing them is in any way realistic, or
possible, given the possibility of continued
political instability in South Vietnam or the
continued absence of statements from the
new South Vietnamese governments that
aline themselves with us?
Mr. Rosic. Oh, I think the political insta-
bility in South Vietnam Is itself directly re-
lated to violence in the countryside and the
conditions of the war. During the Greek
guerrilla operations, for example, there were
20869
some eight Greek governments in the period
of some 15 months of guerrilla operations.
It isn't easy to sustain an orderly govern-
ment based upon elections throughout the
countryside when thousands of local officials
are being assassinated or kidnaped and
when the normal processes of the economy
are interrupted by sabotage of routes of com-
munication, so that there is a connection
between the political possibilities of what we
would call a democratic and constitutional
government and peace throughout the coun-
try. I have no doubt that?that the South
Vietnamese themselves would move toward
a government rooted in popular support and
that this could be easily demonstrated if the
conditions of peace made it possible for them
to proceed on that basis. A few weeks ago,
as you will recall, they did have provincial
elections, for a large number of those who
were eligible to vote did in fact register, over
two-thirds, and that some '73 percent of
those who were registered did in fact vote,
even though the Vietcong were opposing
those provincial elections. There were mul-
tiple candidates. From our point of view,
they were free elections and we can be?I
think, take some confidence in the fact that
if given a chance, if given some possibility of
peace, these people in South Vietnam would
know how to establish a government and
base it upon popular support and get on
with the main job which would be their first
choice.
Mr. KALB. And yet, sir, the Prime Minister
of the country, the air commodore, has ex-
pressed his impatience publicly with the
politicians in South Vietnam. He's even ex-
pressed a certain admiration for dictators of
the past. Do we really have a sense that
this is the kind of government that we can
go to the conference table with?
Mr. Rusx. Oh, I think that we go to the
conference table with the government of
South Vietnam. I think that their war aims
and our war aims are basically he same and
that if the country can get some peace, then
there can be a rapid development of their
political, economic, and social institutions in
the direction which would cause all of us to
applaud them and give them full support.
Mr. HOTTELET. You don't say, sir, that the
war aims are identical. What are the points
of difference?
Mr. Rum. Well, perhaps I could say
"identical" as far as my present knowledge is
concerned. I'm not aware of any significant
difference in the war aims of our two coun-
tries. The central thing, gentlemen, the
central thing is that the aggression from the
North, the infiltration of men and arms from
the North, must be stopped and the South
Vietnamese be allowed to work out their own
problems themselves without the use of force
from the outside. Now, this is the major,
central, overriding point. The details are
incidental to that central point and on that
there's no difference between us and Saigon.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Can I phrase?rephrase the
Secretary's remark in a simple way? I was
writing it down as he said it. If we look at
the public record, and the public record is
not unimportant in this area, the goal of
Hanoi policy as recently expressed is to wage
a 20-year war to impose a Communist regime
on South Vietnam. The goal of American
and South Vietnamese policy is to determine
their own destiny, by democratic means
under conditions of peace.
Mr. Rosx. I think an examination of
Hanoi's, Peiping's, broadcasts in the last
several months will indicate that they were
leaning rather heavily on three points: One,
that they could score a military success in
South Vietnam?we know that will be denied
to them; secondly, that international opin-
ion somehow will build up in such a way as
to put sufficient pressure on the United
States to cause us to change our commitment
to South Vietnam?we know that that will
not occur. And, third, that divisions inside
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20870 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE August 25, 1965
the United States will cause us to change
our view of this matter?we don't believe
that Will occur. Therefore,. Hanoi, I think,
must face the fact that three essential Pil-
lars in their policy are weak pillars and,
therefore, we would hope very much that
they would realize that this Matter must be
brought to some conclusion.
Now, I don't want to exaggerate the role
of public discussion and public debate.
You'll recall, for example, that the Greek
guerrilla problem was not settled in debate.
At a certain stage the guerrillas simply began
to wither away. You'll recall that the Berlin
blockade was not lifted through a debate in
the Security Council. It was done through
private contacts ahead of time by?between
the Soviet Union and the United States.
Sinillarly, the Korean war was not settled in
a __debate in the United Nations. It was
Oittled by contacts among the parties. And,
tat4ilfsforia, We believe that were in a period
Where the real views of the various parties
need to be explored by channels that are
available, in order to see Whether the basis
for a peace exists. I've indicated myself
earlier in this program what seemed to us to
be the main lines of a peaceful settlement, as
far as we're concerned. There are many de-
tails which can't be elaborated, because we're
net at a negotiating table. But I do believe
that it is important for us to pursue the
quiet diplomacy, whether in the United Na-
tions or in other respects, because it is in
that way that we shall, I think, get the key
signals at some stage that might bring this
to the conference table.
Mr. HOTTELET. But can one not hasten this
prOeess Somewhat? Can one not ripen the
qtliet diplomacy by creating circumstances
in which the other side will find it necessary
to Caine to the conference table, by, for in-
stande, dramatizing a desire to return to
Geheva, or perhaps some dramatic, substan-
tive but dramatic, approach by President
aolaia,son?a summit conference on this prob-
lera, Which I think everyone recognizes is a
Meet serious problem?
Mr. ?MOBERG. Mr. Hottelet how more dra-
matic can the President of the United States
be? He made a public declaration about
this in Baltimore, "unconditional discus-
siOns," and then some crates said that the
President did not mean "negotiations." So
then in the letter that he Sent down With
me to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, he used the word "negotiations" to
put at rest this thing that people were talk-
ing about. rollosving which, we sent a letter
to the Security Council, in which we said,
"We call upon anyone, any member, not only
of the Security Council, but of the United
Nations, to participate with us in that of -
fort."
The 17 non.alined nations made a pro-
posal. We said that they would form. the
basis for a negotiation. And then?I can't
go through all of the 16 efforts that were
made. Mr. Davies went to Hanoi. We said
that we welcomed that initiative. The Cora-
monveealth Ministers made a declaration.
We said we welcomed that initiative. Mr.
Nlartu:na,h has indicated some interest; we did
not discourage it.
I personally feel that you never denigrate
any party nor a great nation by indicating
a desire for peaceful resolution of a con-
flict. The President has done this. lie's
gone all out for this purpose.
Mr. HOTTELET. The purpose of my ques-
tion, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one
cesald not do more than just indicate a
willingness to accept, indtcate acquiesc-
ence--
Mr. Bunny. Well, we have done that, Mr.
Hottelet, in the specific case that you men-
tioned. It seems to me that the fact is, and
it's very clear, really, and increasingly rec-
ognized around the world, we are uncondi-
tionally ready for negotiations; we are un-
conditionally ready to return to Geneva if
others are; we are unconditionally ready for
the good offices of the United Nations in any
way that they can be made effective; we are
unconditionally ready to meet with all in-
terested governments and go to work on this
problem, and we have said so in every sharp
and flat, and the President is fond of saying,
in every State of the Union. And I believe
the message has been heard.
Mr. ICALB. Mr. Bundy, at one time there
was an unadverteseci pause in the bombing
of North Vietnam. I wonder, sir, if the ad-
ministration might not?in following up
Dick's line of questioning?might not con-
sider that an advertised or unadvertised ef-
fort along these same lines might not be
contemplated, because the leaders in Hanoi?
and you keep making reference to the other
side?have certain things that they must go
on, too?
Mr. Bunny. Well?
Mr. Kama In addition to public state-
ments, they have the fact that they are
being bombed.
Mr. Burner. You talked about this matter
in this series a couple of weeks ago, and I
think the Secretary then made the point
that at the time of the unannounced pause
there was information about its existence
was, in fact, conveyed to the governments
most concerned, and in the first instance, to
the government in Hanoi. They were in no
doubt that this was happening. They were
in no doubt that we would be watching to
see whether there was any response or any
secondary action.
Any time that we thought that there was
a promise of action and response in terms of
the reduction of the activities which had
made this trouble, there would be no hesi-
tation in the United States about making
appropriate adjustments in our own mili-
tary activity.
Mr. Rusk. Yes, I'd like to assure you that
we have not been negligent in our business,
and that hardly a week goes by that the
other side doesn't have a chance to indicate
what else would happen if the bombing
ceased.
Now, I said in our earlier program that we
would be willing to consider cessation of
the bombing if it were a step toward peace.
Now that remains open, that possibility.
But what else would happen? Would the
325th North Vietnamese Division go home?
Would there be a cessation of the bombing
In South "Vietnam, where it's occurring all
the time among the South Vietnamese and
against our own forces?
In other words, the target here is peace,
and all of these incidental aspects of it
ought to be fitted into a movement toward
a genuine, permanent, peaceful settlement of
this situation.
Mr. REASONER. There's a question here I'd
like to address to Mr. Bundy. If, as we seem
to feel, that we have some years ahead of us,
or some weeks or months or possibly years,
making South Vietnam strong, waiting for
a signal, what happens to the war in the
meantime? It seems to get a little bigger
all the time. Our participation seems to get
stronger. Is there a limit to that?
Mr. STYMY% Well, our actions there?and
this is a point which I think Secretary Mc-
Namara spelled out with some care a couple
of weeks ago on this program?our actions
there have been essentially actions in re-
sponse and in reply, and what has enlarged
the war has been the increasing commitment
directed from, supplied by and coming from,
very often and increasingly, coming from
North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Our
own forces are there because of actions which
have been necessary In response. That is why
we feel so strongly that the question here as
to whether it's going to get worse or better,
the question as to when it will come to the
peace table, is one in which one has to
think about more than just the U.S. position.
Our determination is to assist and support
a people who are defending themselves
against an effort to make them a Communist
power?part of a Communist power. That
effort has been the effort which seemed nec-
essary and appropriate at each stage, and
only that much. We ars not in a position
to say to our countrymen in this country
when that will end. We think that the
American people understand why they are
there, why these sacrifices are necessary. We
hope that it will not grove larger, the conflict
in South Vietnam. We will do what we can
to limit it. But we cannot be unwilling and
unready to do our part.
Mr. Holm= Looking ahead to the per-
manent peace settlement, you have stresseed
your adherence to the essentials of the
Geneva agreement and you have stressed the
need for self-determination. When the
United States refrained from signing the
Geneva agreement, Bedell Smith also sug-
gested that free elections should be super-
vised by the United Nations. Do you see a
role for the United Nations in making cer-
tain that any future Ge:neva agreement on
Vietnam is actually honored by those re-
citals?
Mr. Rtesx. Yes; I would hope that the
United Nations could play an important
part in connection with any settlement. But
that would depend upon the attitude of all
the parties, including Hanoi and Peiping.
and thus far, both of those capitals have
rather pushed aside and rejected participa-
tion by the United Nations. But if there
could be organized an international inspec-
tion force, a police force, to supervise a peace-
ful settlement, if there could be a strong ef-
fort to build upon the capability of the
United Nations to bring about economic and
social development in the area, then I think
there's a very important role for the United
Nations in connection with the making and
keeping of the peace, and I would hope very
much that the other parties would make it
possible for the United Nations to play that
kind of role.
Mr. GOLDBERG. Before we leave this sub-
ject, may I make an observation on what
Mr. Bundy just said. We are not the ones
that are talking about a war that lasts 10
or 20 years. Ho Chi Minh has been talking
about that. We are talking about a peace
that should be negotiated here and now.
Here and now.
Mr. Brener. That's a very important point.
I'd like to just make one comment in finish-
ing up on that. We don't know when, but
the sooner the better, and we are absolutely
sure that It is the order to all of us from our
President, from our Nation's President, that
we shall never be second, never be slow, never
be without energy and imagination in trying
to find ways of bringing a peaceful and
decent settlement to this contest.
Mr. RosiC. Mr. Reasoner, it seems to me
that each citizen in the United States has
a special obligation in thinking about such
a problem as South Vietnam. I think it
really isn't enough just to worry about it
and be concerned about it and be anxious
about the future. Of course, all of us are
concerned about it and anxious about the
future. But each citizen might consider
what he would do if he were the President
of the United Srates, facing the choices
faced by the President of the United States,
to enter into the full agony of the question,
what does the United States do in this situa-
tion? And I have no doubt that if each one
of us should look very hard at the nature of
the aggression, at the nature of the American
commitment, the importance of the inte-
grity of the American commitment, at the
many efforts made to find a peaceful settle-
ment,- that the citizen would, thinking of
himself as President for the moment, would
conclude that we have to make good on our
commitment, but at the same time we have
to explor^ CV-ry sibility for a peaceful
settlement. And that is what President
Johnson !a doing.
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August 25, 1965 CONGRESS1ON L, ? 01,
Mr. REasontat. Gentlemen, I'd like to
thank you very much for coming, as we
leave some millions of citizens considering
what they would do if they were the Presi-
dent of the United States. You may have
spoiled a lot of people's sleep, Mr. Secretary.
Thus far in our four-part series on Viet-
nam, we have examined the critical decisions
that our country faces, the questions of how
we can win the war there; and tonight, how
we can win the peace. Two weeks from to-
night, on September 6, in the conclusion
of Vietnam Perspective, we shall take a close
look at what kind of a war it is we're fight-
ing thbre. Teams of CBS News correspond-
ents and camera crews will film a single day
of combat at different locations, to bring to
you, in color, Vietnam Perspective: "A Day
of War." This is Harry Reasoner. Good
night.
[From. the New York Tines]
H.S. DIPLOMACY BY TV?JOHNSON'S AIDS
BEGIN PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF HANOI'S PLAN
FOR "BASIS" OF SETTLEMENT
(By Max Frankel)
Wasainaurox.?The Johnson administra-
tion has begun a subtle effort to discover
whether it can agree with North Vietnam
on a broad but deliberately ambiguous
statement of objectives for future negotia-
tions.
? Last night, before a nationwide television
audience that was never fully briefed on
what it was witnessing, leading 'U.S. policy-
makers in effect addressed the North Viet-
namese Government in Hanoi and responded,
point by point, to its 4-month-old proposal
for a "basis" of settlement.
It was diplomacy by television, but elab-
orate files of earlier assertions were needed
to follow the drama enacted by Secretary
of State Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, the
President's assistant for national security,
and Arthur J. Goldberg, permanent repre-
sentative at the United Nations.
The exercise was part of a new Washing-
ton peace offensive that is not, however,
confined to peaceful means. Officials ac-
knowledged today that their call for nego-
tiations, "the sooner the better," was being
reinforced by increased military pressure
against the Communists in both North and
South Vietnam.
The bid for a peace conference marked
the biggest stride yet away from the admin-
istration's reluctance of last winter to move
toward the bargaining table and its hesita-
tion, as late as February, even to utter the
word "negotiation."
A FArsavL CHOICE IN HANOI
The change is being attributed here to
the estimate that the rapid buildup of U.S.
military strength should by now have per-
suaded North Vietnam that Americans will
not be militarily pushed out of southeast
Asia.
The accelerating offers of negotiation are
also timed to coincide with what is thought
to be a fateful choice in Hanoi between a
major increase in its military effort and
attempts to arrange at least a ceasefire.
"I think the fact that President Johnson
has made it very clear that we are not going
to be pushed out of South Vietnam and
that we shall meet our commitments to
South Vietnam has made a big difference to
the situation," Mr. Rusk asserted.
"Military success of the kind which we
have seen in recent days does help us bring
nearer the day when there will be an effec-
tive negotiation," Mr. Bundy said.
By success, officials here are said to mean
not only the Marine Corps victory over a
large Vietnam force in a favorable coastal
position near Chulai but also mounting re-
ports that the Communist guerrillas are
Short of food, medical supplies and ammu-
nition and unable to mount the kind of
summer offensives they 11-A To .11-ed.
The essence of the administration's mes-
sage to North Vietnam was that it could
expect no respite in further military action
but that it would find the United States
prepared to reach an accommodation on the
"basis" of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on
Indochina.
Simultaneously, Secretary Rusk and his
colleagues played heavily on the evidence
that neither the Soviet Union nor Commu-
nist China was eager to become involved in
the fighting to help North Vietnam. Mr.
Rusk went so far as to taunt Hanoi with the
"comment going around in the Communist
world these days" that Peiping was "pre-
pared to fight to the last Vietnamese."
The heart of the developing diplomatic
situation is the word "basis." In effect, both
sides are now attempting to formulate not
the conditions or terms of a final settle-
ment, but the broad definitions of purpose
and objective that will serve as the "basis"
of negotiations.
Successfully framed statements of the
"basis" of negotiation are customarily vague
enough to allow each side to interpret them
In its own way, so as not to foreclose gen-
uine bargaining at a conference. But be-
cause they tend to reveal much about a
negotiator's intentions, they are often con-
tested with the same energy as a final
settlement.
The origin of the present exchange is Pres-
ident Johnson's offer April 7 to consider
"unconditional discussions."
North Vietnam replied April 13 with a
four-point peace formula that has been
widely misinterpreted as a set of "precondi-
tions" for negotiation. Actually, the four
points were followed by the statement that,
if they were accepted as the "basis" for a
settlement, North Vietnam would find it pos-
sible to "consider" the reconvening of an
international conference.
Officials here thought at the time that
many parts of the proposal were acceptable
and that others could be refined to become
acceptable. But it was not until July 28
that President Johnson offered publicly to
discuss North Vietnam's proposals, among
others.
Without actually saying so, his aids under-
took that discussion last night.
The North Vietnamese formula stipulated
the following:
Recognition of the sovereignty and unity
of all Vietnam and agreement that, under
the 1954 Geneva accord the United States
must withdraw all military troops and weap-
ons from South Vietnam and end the
bombardment of North Vietnam.
Strict respect for these military provisions
of the Geneva accord in the indefinite period
in which Vietnam will remain divided into
north and south.
Settlement of the internal affairs of South
Vietnam by the South Vietnamese people
themselves, in accordance with the program
of the Vietcong's political arm, the National
Liberation Front, and without foreign in-
terference.
Settlement of the question of the peaceful
reunification of Vietnam by the people of
both zones, without foreign interference.
Mr. Rusk dealt directly with the four points
by stating that the Johnson administration
wished to see "full performance on all sides
of the military clauses of the 1954 agree-
ments."
ONE MAJOR POINT OF DIFFICULTY
Whereas the Communists had stressed the
need for the United States to agree to talk
about its military withdrawal, Mr. Rusk said
the Communists had to end their "outside
aggression." On paints 1 and 2, therefore,
he indicated there need be no disagreement,
provided that Communists military activi-
ties were halted in exchange for U.S. actions.
On point 4, about the eventual peaceful
reunification of Vietnam, the Johnson ad-
ministration also indicated that it agreed
with the Communist statement that this
should be settled by the Vietnamese them-
selves.
This left point 3 as the major difficulty
of the moment. Apparently, the Communists
contend that a solution in accordance with
the Vietcong's program requires some kind
of coalition government in South Vietnam
In which Communists and their sympathizers
would play the leading role.
The United States has said it would never
agree to this. Instead, Mr. Rusk reiterated
the administration's offer to conduct free
elections in South Vietnam.
Officials here say they will agree to bar
"foreign interference" in these elections if
North Vietnam, too, agrees not to Interfere
in them.
Mr. PROXIVIIRE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that an editorial en-
titled "Toward Vietnam Talks," pub-
lished in today's New York Times, com-
menting on the welcome desire to
negotiate now as expressed by Rusk,
Goldberg, and Btuidy, be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TOWARD VIETNAM TALKS
The Johnson administration has followed
the military success on Van Thong Peninsula
with a convincing demonstration of its de-
sire for early negotiation of a Vietnamese
settlement.
Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, and
McGeorge Bundy in their hour-long CBS
television interview Monday night made it
clear that the Marines' extraordinary combat
feat has not revived old Washington dreams
of military victory. On the contrary, the
entire tone of the discussion underscored
Mr. Bundy's assertion "that now is a good
time to negotiate."
? In substance, what President Johnson's top
advisers had to say was new only in bringing
together many of the bits and pieces of
American policy that have emerged gradually
since President Johnson's April offer of "un-
conditional discussions." But that very
process clarified the opening position the
United States is taking in informal peace
contacts and showed how far Washington
has moved in its readiness to facilitate peace
talks.
Washington and Hanoi seem to be within
negotiating distance of each other now ex-
cept on two significant points: Hanoi's in-
sistence that the Vietcong represent South
Vietnam at the conference table and that
Saigon be excluded; and Hanoi's demand for
a coalition government in South Vietnam
with Communist participation, if not domi-
nance. On the first, Washington proposes
that Saigon represent South Vietnam and
that the Vietcong sit in Hanoi's delegation_
On the second, the United States has coun-
tered with the challenge of free elections to
choose a South Vietnamese Government.
Ways undoubtedly can be found to narrow
these differences once Hanoi decides, as
Washington clearly has, that it too wants a
negotiated settlement. The real question
Is whether the Van Tucing battle has moved
Hanoi in this direction.
LIVINGSTON CLARIFIES RELATIONS
OF LIQUIDITY TO CORRECTION
OF U.S. PAYMENTS BALANCE
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, one
of the Nation's most pressing economic
problems is the persistently adverse bal-
ance of payments. It has a serious ef-
fect on the policies of Congress. It
should affect the judgment of Congress
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20872 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 25, 1965
on how big a defense budget we can af-
ford?a Judgment which will be made by
the Senate this very day. It should enter
into our decision as to haw much to
spend on foreign aid?a decision on
which this body will pass in a few days.
Even in our domestic spending measures,
the balance of payments has real rele-
vance.
The Joint Economic Committee and
the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency have both had &series of hear-
ings on the balance of payments, and I
expect to say much more on this matter
In the next few days. Unfortunately, in
spite of the unavoidable responsibility
of Congress for policymaking decisions
that go to the heart of the balance-of -
payments problem, many Members of
Congress have little opportunity to learn
the real nature and significance of the
problem.
It is not only a matter of adopting
policies that will decrease our spending
of dollars abroad and increase the spend-
ing by foreign countries here. It is also
a Matter of the correction of the deficit
in the U.S. balance of payments in such
a way that the growth of free world
economies is not restrained, and partic-
ularly so that trade is not choked and
Our deficit dollars and our loss of gold
have supplied the ready cash that has
fneled free world and especially trade
etpandon in the long and fortunate
phatWar economic boom_ in the free
Prwapitate and indiscriminate
Fang off of this deficit could provoke
free world deflation and recession as
the ready cash disappears.
Yet we must correct our adverse bal-
anee of payments. The relation between
the recondite term "liquidity" and our
balance of payments is Welled out clearly
and simply in a remarkably revealing
ertiore written, by Columojat J. A. Liv-
ia:40ton and published in this morning's
Washington Post. I ask unanimous con-
Sent that the article be printed at this
Paint in the RE ORD
There being no objection, the article
WAS ordered to be printed in the RECORa,.
as follows:
litiamarz IS A MATTER or NATION'S Senna=
By 3. A. Livingston)
Damned if we do and damned if we don't.
That's the American dollar dilemma?Yours,
Miner and, as a matter of high policy, Presi-
dent Johnson's.
The President is caught between the indus-
trialiZed nations of Europe which now have
more dollars than they want and the under
developed nations of the world Which need
more dollars than they have.
Most European countries are no longer cap-
ital short. They no longer rely on the United
States to prime their investment pumps.
Pleads:sat Charles de Gaulle of Prance doesn't
went French companies and markets taken
over i)y American money.
Underdeveloped nations, especially those in
Latin America, are captial poor. Their gold
ralerves are tow. Their principal asset in in.
camlnerce is the dollar. It. the
I:tilted States slows down the outflow of dol-
lars, they'll be distressed: "What will the
Woiriddo for liquidity?"
A strange recondite Word Is liquidity?
What iS it?
To an American businessman it's dollars
in the bank or a line of credit to get dollars;
to a French businessman it's francs in the
bank es a line of credit to get francs; to an
Englishman it's pounds, and so on.
But to a finance minister OE central banker,
It's gold, or the equivalent of gold. Five and
ten years back, the dollar was liquidity plus.
It was not only as good as gold, but even
better.
Why? Because gold is an inert metal. It
takes up space. It has to be guarded. It
doesn't earn money. Dollars do.
A decade ago central banks invested their
dollar holdings in U.S. Treasury bills or cer-
tificates of deposit with commercial banks at
21/2 percent or so. They were happy with the
return.
Today they can earn nearly 4 percent on
their dollar holdings and are uneasy. Thus,
central banks of Europe have reduced their
dollar holdings from $8.8 billion at the end of
last year to $6.8 billion at the end of May.
Again why? Arithmetic.
Total potential claims?I 0 U's?outstand-
ing against U.S. gold have climbed to more
than $27 billion, but the gold stock has
dropped to less than $14 billion, as you can
see:
Year
Claims
Gold
Gold to
clairos
Billions
Billions
Percevt
1955
$13.6
$21. 75
160
1960
21.3
17.80
84
1865
27.4
13.86
51
Any central bank can convert dollars to
gold by presenting a chit to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York. The Bank of
France has been doing this regularly of late.
But there's a difference between having $1.60
Of gold for each dollar of potential claim and
only a haif dollar.
That explains the commitment of the
President and Secretary of the Treasury
Fowler tc equilibrium in the U.S. balance of
payments. They seek to curb the outflow?
the increase?in claims against the dollar.
These claims are, in effect, foreign credits to
the United States. And we've exhausted our
line of credit.
But many economists and central bankers,
especially the central bankers of underdevel-
oped nations, feel that this commitment
cramps international commerce. World
liquidity?gold plus dollars?won't rise
rapidly enough to support trade expansion.
To reconcile the differences between rich
and poor nations, Secretary Fowler has is-
sued a call for an international monetary
conference.
The objective: To assure the liquidity the
world needs to grow on by reaching agree-
ments on new techniques and fiats to sup-
plement?to buttress?gold and the dollar.
For this purpose, he leaves this week to visit
the leading finance ministers of Europe.
THE CALENDAR
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of Calendar
Nos. 620, 621, 622, and 401.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jections, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT OF PART II OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE,
RELATING TO DIVORCE, LEGAL
SEPARATION, AND ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (11.R, 948) to amend part II of the
District of Columbia_ Code relating to di-
vorce, legal separation, and annulment
of marriage in the District of Columbia,
which had been reported from the Com-
mittee on the District of Columbia with
amendments on page 1, line 8, after the
word "least", to strike out "six months"
and insert "one year"; on page 2, line 18,
after the word "for", to strike out "one
year" and insert "two years"; and, on
nage 3, line 4, after the word "the",
where it appears the first time, to insert
"legal".
The amendments were agreed to.
The amendments were ordered to be
engrossed, and the bill to be read a third
time.
The bill was read the third time, and
passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD an excerpt from the re-
port (No. 638), explaining the purposes
of the bill.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PURPOSE OE THE BILL
The purpose of this bill is to amend ex-
isting law relating to the residence require-
ment for divorce, legal separation, annul-
ment of marriage, and maintenance of chil-
dren and former wives in the District of
Columbia.
H.R. 948, as amended, if enacted, would
amend existing law so as to provide:
1. Divorce:
That where the cause for divorce occurs
within or without the District, either party
to the marriage may bring the divorce action
if either party has been a resident of the
District of Columbia for 1 year next pre-
ceding the commencement of the action.
Existing law requires the petitioner to
have been a bona fide resident of the Dis-
trict for a period of 1 year when the cause
arose within the District or a resident for
2 years when the cause arose outside of the
District.
2. Annulment:
An action for annulment of a marriage
performed outside of the District of Colum-
bia may be maintained if one of the parties
to the action is a bona fide resident of the
District at the time of commencement of
the action. In case of a marriage performed
within the District of Columbia, either party
may bring an action for annulment and the
residence of the parties at the time the ac-
tion is commenced shall not be a factor in
determining whether the action shall be
maintainable.
Existing law requires that the petitioner
must have been a bona fide resident at the
District of Columbia for a period of 1 year,
in order to maintain an action in annulment,
regardless of whether the marriage was per-
formed within or without the District of
Columbia.
3. Affirming validity of a marriage:
An action to affirm the validity of a mar-
riage, whether performed within or without
the District of Columbia, may be maintained
if either party is a bona fide resident of the
District of Columbia at the time the ac-
tion is brought.
No residence requirement relating to the
affirmance at a marriage is stated in exist-
ing law.
4. Grounds for divorce:
(a) An absolute divorce may be granted
on the ground of actual or constructive de-
sertion which has continued for a period of
1 year.
Present law provides for absolute divorce
on the ground of desertion only after a pe-
riod of 2 years.
(b) Voluntary separation without cohabi-
tation is a ground for an absolute divorce af-
ter a period of 2 years.
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21014 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
election results where Negro citizens were
excluded from the polls.
This challenge involves more than the im-
mediate question of unseating the Missis-
sippi Congressmen. It is a testament of
courage and a declaration of determination
on the part of many Negro citizens. By
bringing this challenge they affirm their be-
lief that ultimately, through the orderly pro-
cess of law, the U.S. Constitution will be up-
held. The Members of the House must be
given the opportunity to prove that they
are right.
On the opening day of Congress, 149 Mem-
bers of the House voted against administer-
ing the oath to the Mississippi congressional
delegation. What has since been revealed
only confirms the judgment that Mississippi
has trampled upon the U.S. Oonstitution by
denying American citizens tile right to vote.
We cannot condone the election of U.S.
Representatives who gained their seats
through an unconstitutional election. There
are those who risked their lives to present
this challenge to the House in order that we
may exercise our solemn obligation to the
Constitution of the United States. On Sep-
tember 21 we are determined that the House
will have that opportunity.
The following Members of Congress have
agreed to support the resolution of Septem-
ber 21 discharging the House Administration
Committee from further consideration of the
Mississippi challenge and declaring the con-
tested seats vacant:
John Brademas, 3d District of Indiana.
George E. Brown, Jr., 29th District of Cali-
fornia.
Phillip Burton, 5th District of California.
Jeffery Cohelan, '7th District of California.
John Conyers, Jr., 1st District of Michigan.
Emilio Q. Daddario, let District of Con-
necticut.
Charles C. Diggs, Jr., 13th District of
Michigan.
John G. Dow, 27th District of New York.
Ken W. Dyal, 33c1 District of California.
Don Edwards, 9th District of California.
Leonard Farbstein, 19th District of New
York.
Donald M. Fraser, 5th District of Minne-
sota.
Jacob II. Gilbert, 22d District of New York.
Seymour Halpern, 6th District of New
York,
Augustus P. Hawkins, 21st District of Cali-
fornia.
Charles S. Joelson, 8th District of New
Jersey.
Paul J. Krebs, 12th District of New Jersey.
Joseph G. Minish, 11th District of New
Jersey.
Patsy T. Mink, at large of Hawaii.
Robert N. C. Nix, 2d District of Pennsyl-
vania.
Adam C. Powell, 18th District of New
York.
John A. Race, 6th District of Wisconsin.
Ogden R. Reid, 26th District of New York.
Joseph Y. Resnick, 28th District of New
York,
James Roosevelt, 26th District of Cali-
fornia.
Benjamin S. Rosenthal, 8th District of New
York.
William P. Ryan, 20th District of New
York,
James H. Scheuer, 21st District of New
York.
Charles A. Vanik, 21st District of Ohio.
Weston E. Vivian, 2?Di Strict of Michigan.
Lester C. Wol 3d Dist ict of New York.
PLAYING POLITICS WITH MAN-
KIND'S FUTURE
(Mr. WOLF'F asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, the Re-
publican leadership of this House has ex-
hibited once more its inclination to play
politics with the peace of the world?
rather than join in a serious effort to
bring about a just peace in Vietnam.
Constructive criticism is to be en-
couraged in a democracy, but political
demogoguery aimed at dividing this
country for the sake of their own warped
conception of their domestic advance-
ment endangers our national security
- and directly abets the Communists in
their effort to pit American against
American.
There was not a single constructive
thought on how to bring about peace in
Vietnam in the Republican White Paper.
We were instead treated to a political
diatribe aimed at dividing the most re-
spected of our national leaders. We have
a commitment in Vietnam?it is a com-
mitment to peace and to that end we are
engaged at this very moment in maxi-
mum resistance. But the true colors
show through today?they reveal a com-
mitment to political harangue while the
future of mankind hangs in the balance,
and the security of our country as well.
They reveal a dedication to a trigger-
happy former candidate who still
breathes strong in the Republican breast.
They reveal that the Republicans have
never quite understood why we are in
Vietnam.
Perhaps if they would get out from
under the weighty tomes of their erudite
research into the present for a moment,
they would realize that the real problem
facing the world is how to bring about
peace in Vietnam?a d not how to get
elected next year.
VIETNAM
(Mrs. MINK asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, I rise to-
day out of grave concern that our dia-
logs for peace are being smothered by
partisan efforts to cast upon our present
administration and upon the Democratic
administrations of the past, the sole re-
sponsibility for the crisis that now exists
for us and for the world in Vietnam.
Let us not forget that since the Geneva
agreement of 1954, until 1960 this coun-
try was led by the Republican Party and
much could be said about things that
could have been done then which might
have prevented this painful situation in
that part of the world today. But of
what use Is hindsight when what we
must seek today is a means to end this
war and to bring the parties to the con-
ference table? We must be looking to
the future and working through every
possible means to bring an end to this
conflict.
I am thoroughly convinced that our
President is earnestly doing everything
within his power and resources to seek
the peace in Vietnam. I are, equally cer-
tain that few are completely satisfied
with the progress of our efforts to bring
this matter to the stage of constructive
negotiation. However, I believe that
just as we are impatient that the talks
August 25, 1965
begin, still in our anxiety to end this
war we must be willing to allow the
President the fullest degree of flexibility
to bring about the desired result. We
can continue to urge that he seek the
involvement of the United Nations, but
he has told us that he is doing every-
thing possible to take this matter to the
United Nations. Where bombs failed to
bring the necessary conciliatory attitude,
the President called for a temporary
cease-fire, to no immediate avail. He
has agreed to negotiate without precon-
dition, but still he has had no affirma-
tive response.
The critical period of the monsoons
is nearly over and we have been able
to hold our lines. I am firmly of the
opinion that Hanoi will, if not already,
begin to understand that the peace con-
ference is the only course left to take.
Being of this belief I do now urge the
President to persist in his repeated ef-
forts to draw Hanoi to the conference
table in an ever-increasing demonstra-
tion of good faith and determination that
negotiations will in fact begin.
Let us stop this dialog of war and more
war preparations, of blame and accusa-
tions, and begin in earnest our prepara-
tion for peace. Certain of our goal, why
should we wait? Let us ready the con-
ference site. Let us send to Geneva our
country's foreign policy technicians and
statesmen now. Let us commit our
course for peace immediately. Let us
invite our allies to journey with us once
again to Geneva to resolve a new peace
treaty for Vietnam. .Let us hasten to
sit as a nation determined that our will
for peace shall be done. Let us wait
upon Hanoi in Geneva and in so doing
win this war with utter and complete
faith that our President is right in his
great expectations for peace.
And finally let us promise now with-
out reservations that the bombs shall
cease to fall from the very instant that
the negotiations begin.
Let us be prepared to match every mili-
tary dollar that we have spent these past
11 years in Vietnam with a like dollar for
peace, for the restoration of this war-
torn country, for its economic develop-
ment, for education, for food and medi-
cal care for its desperately poor people.
Let us produce a lasting peace and
credit ourselves as a nation with faith
that peoples everywhere liberated from
the fear of hunger and deprivation will
choose the way of freedom.
HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
(Mr. CONTE asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his
remarks.) -
Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, through
all of my career in public life, both in this
great body and in the senate of the Com-
monwealth which I am pleased to repre-
sent here, I have never felt compelled to
support any action which would circum-
vent established procedures. Although
I have been asked from time to time to
support procedural shortcuts, I have al-
ways tested the question against my
commitment to the rules of normal leg- j
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ku,gust 25, .1965
Matthews
Mills
? Morris
Murray
Natcher
O'Neal, Ga.
Passman
Poage
Purcell
Quillen
Randall
Rivers, S.C.
Roberts
Andrews,
George W.
Andrews,
Glenn
Bonner
Burton, Utah
Cabell
Roudebush
Satterfield
Scott
Seerest
Selden
*Smith, Calif.
Smith, Va.
Steed
Stephens
Stubblefield
Taylor
Teague, Tex.
Tuck
NOT VOTING-19
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?HOUSE 21013
Tuten
Utt
Waggonner
Walker, Miss.
Walker, N. Mex,
Watson
Watts
White, Tex.
Whitener
Whitten
Williams
Willis
Cramer
Harvey, Mich.
Holland.
Hee
Itornegay
Landrum
Mathias
O'Brien
Rogers, Tex.
Rumsfeld
Sisk
Thomas
Thompson, N.J.
Toll
So the bill was passed.
The Clerk announced the following
Pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Mathias for, with Mr. Cramer against.
Mr. Thompson of New Jersey for, with Mr.
Bonner against.
Mr. Toff for, with Mr. Kornegay against.
Mr. Thomas for, with Mr. Rogers of Texas
against.
Mr. Holland for, with Mr. Landrum against.
Mr. Mel' for, with Mr. George W. An-
drews against.
Until further notice:
Mr. Xee with Mr. Eumsfeld.
Mr. Sisk with Mr. Glenn Andrews.
Mr. &Erten with Mr. Harvey of Michigan.
Mr. HALPER,N changed his vote from
"nay" to "yea."
The result of the vote was announced
as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
Mr. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 2580,
as amended, is almost wholly a Repub-
lican bill. Its substantive content repre-
sents more of H.R. 9136 than any other
proposed bill in this field.
The most significant changes made by
the subcommittee a it completely re-
wrote the administration bill all came
from HR. 9136, the Moore Immigration
bill. These are:
First. Abolition of the national orig-
ins system after 3 years?not immedi-
ately or after - years, allowing for
a reasonable period of adjustment.
Second. Reallocation of unused quota
numbers during the transition to over-
subscribed countries during the 3-year
interim?a provision that will result in a
complete dean Up of the backlogs of
qualified intending immigrants.
Third. Elimination of all delegation
of authority to the executive branch of
control over immigration policy and re-
tention of complete authority in the
Congress.
Fourth. First emphasis in the prefer-
ence schedule upon the reuniting of
families?not to the importation of
skilled labor as proposed by the admin-
istration.
Fifth. A numerical limitation upon
the number of refugees to be admitted.
Sixth. Stricter controls and restric-
tions upon immigrants entering for gain-
ful employment?nowhere found in the
administration or any other bills, in this
area.
Seventh. A limit upon admissions
from colonies and dependencies.
Eighth. Provision that in the event
immigration from the Western Hemi-
sphere increases by 10 percent over a
5-year average, the President must re-
port to the Congress, with his recom-
mendations if any.
Additionally the Republicans are re-
sponsible for the elimination of a long
list of provisions which would not have
been in the best interests of the United
States.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
have 5 legislative days in which to extend
their remarks on the bill just passed.
The SPEAKER pro tempore tMr.
ALBERT]. IS there objection to the re-
quest of the gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
STATUTORY CHALLENGE TO THE
REPRESENTATIVES FROM MIS-
SISSIPPI
(Mr. RYAN asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, today 31
Members of the House announced that
on September 21 we will bring to the
floor of the House a privileged resolution
with respect to the statutory challenge
to the Representatives from Mississippi.
The statutory challenge is now pend-
ing before the House Administration
Committee. Under rule XI, section 24, of
the Rules of the House it should have
been finally reported by July 4. Instead
there has been inordinate delay.
The House must have the opportunity
to confront this vital issue during this
session of Congress. The facts are clear.
There is no excuse for further delay.
In the 1964 congressional elections a sub-
stantial number of American citizens
were denied the right to vote. The un-
constitutional denial of the right to vote
makes these elections illegal, and the
seats should be vacated.
Courageous citizens of Mississippi,
members of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party and civil rights workers
from other areas have risked their lives
to present the testimony concerning the
systematic intimidation, harassment,
terror, and murder which has prevented
Mississippi Negroes from voting.
I urge all Members of the House to join
in support of this resolution which will
be brought before the House on Septem-
ber 21.
Mr. Speaker, I include at this point in
the Recoso the statement which I is-
sued today concerning the privileged res-
olution which will be brought to the
floor on September 21.
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM P.
RYAN ANNOUNCING PLANS To BRING Mrs-
SISSIPPI CHALLENGE TO HOUSE FLOOR ON
SEPTEMBER 21
The statutory challenge to the seating of
the Mississippi Congressmen is now pend-
ing before the House Administration Com-
mittee. This challenge is based on the de-
liberate and unconstitutional disenfranchise..
ment of American citizens in the 1964 con.
gressional elections in Mississippi. We are
determined that the House have the oppor-
tunity to confront this vital issue during this
Session of Congress.
We therefore plan, under the rules and
precedents of the House, to bring to the
floor on September 21 a privileged resolu-
tion discharging the House Administration
Committee from further consideration of the
challenge and declaring the contested seats
vacant, unless the committee reports to the
House before then.
We are convinced that Members of the
House should have the opportunity to vote
- on this challenge before the session adjourns.
That is clearly the intent of rule XI, section
24, of the Rules of the House, which states:
"The Committee on House Administration
shall make a final report to the House in all
contested election eases not later than six
months from the first day of the first reg-
ular session of the Congress to which the
contestee is elected except in a contest from
the Territory of Alaska, in which case the
time shall not exceed nine months."
The 6-month time limit expired on July
4, yet the matter has not yet come before
the House.
There has been great delay.
In complying with the statute governing
the challenge, (title 2, U.S. Code, sec. 201 at
seq.) the contestants obtained over 600 dep-
ositions supporting their care. These deposi-
tions were filed with the Clerk of the House
on May 17. The Clerk promised to print
the depositions as required by the statute,
then reversed his position. It was not until
July 29 that the Clerk transmitted the print.
ed record to the Speaker who then referred
the record of the challenge to the Committee
on House Administration.
During the delay in printing the record,
the contestants filed their briefs, pursuant to
the statute. These briefs were filed on June
28, and copies were served on that date on
the contests as. In spite of this fact, the
Clerk has taken the position that the con-
testees brief does not have to be filed until
September 1.
Despite the delay in printing, the chal-
lenge has been before the committee since
July 29. To date, the committee and its
Subcommittee on Elections have not sched-
uled a single meeting on the challenge.
The facts supporting the challenge are
clear. There is no substantive reason for fur-
ther delay. There is no question that in the
1964 congressional elections a substantial
number of American citizens were denied the
right to vote in Mississippi because of their
color. This unconstitutional denial of the
right to vote has been accomplished by a
deliberate policy of intimidation, harass-
ment, and terror, and even murder.
Mississippi's deliberate policy of disen-
franchisement has been overwhelmingly
documented. The U.S. Department of
Justice has lawsuits in no less than 30
of the 82 Mississippi counties. The Civil
Rights Commission has issued reports con-
cerning the terror tactics used to stop
Negroes from voting in Mississippi. There
have been at least five murders since 1961
directly connected with the effort to register
Negroes. In fact, just this week a minister
was critically wounded because of his in-
volvement with voter registration. In addi-
tion, the 2,932 pages of depositions filed in
support of the challenge constitutes a vivid
record of the almost unbelievable brutality
perpetrated against Negroes who try to ex-
ercise their basic constitutional right to vote.
Never before has any issue been so thor-
oughly documented prior to action by the
House.
The current challenges, moreover, do not
present new and untested questions. to the
House. They are thoroughly supported by a
long line of precedents. In over 40 election
contests in the past, the Rouse has set aside
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21040 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August 25, 1965
Not only is the citizen entitled to fair rep-
resentation he is also entitled to full repre-
sentation. When we deal with fair repre-
sentation we are concerned that each man's
vote shall be equal to his neighbor's. When
we deal with full representation we are con-
cerned with the quality of that representa-
tion. I believe we have solved the problem
of fair representation and that we should
now address ourselves to the problem of
proper representation.
Consider the almost impossible burden
that is placed on a Member. The bulk of the
work of the Congress is in committee and
logically previous congressional experience
plays a large role in a Member's ability to
perform as well as eventually serving as a
committee or subcommittee chairman. But
to develop seniority he must get reelected.
With an election scheduled every 2 years he
must be campaigning constantly. For his
survival he must keep "one face" back in
the district ready to meet the demands
for constant service by the people. He must
answer thousands of letters, as well as tele-
phone, wire and personal requests on varied
and sundry subjects. He is faced with end-
less demands on his time, effort and money
for political activities,
All this is vital to survival but has little
to do with the legislative business of the
House. He is expected to know the com-
plex parliamentary maze of the House, to
consider thousands of bills, and hundreds of
major items of foreign and domestic legis-
lation, to study the committee reports, the
messages from the President and from the
departments. He must keep up with the
'work of his office, receiving delegations and
reading and answering an ever increasing
volume of mail. Running for office every 2
years takes him away from his legislative
work. Before he can learn the duties and
obligations of his office during the first
term, it's time for him to go back home to
seek reelection.
The framers of our Constitution were con-
cerned that the Members of the House should
be responsive to the people and believed that
the 2-year term was the answer. They be-
lieved that a Member could take care of the
work of the House with plenty of time left
to spend in his district. The demands on
his time for legislative work extended from
4 weeks to 12 weeks a year. It was possible
then, when Government was small. No one
could foresee that the time would come when
our Government would be so large, its op-
erations so complex, our military strength
so mighty, our financial, military and moral
commitments so extensive, and our economic
Influence so pervasive, that the business
of the House, if it were to be wisely at-
tended to by its Members would require great
exertions and intense dedication and time
without limit. Last Congress was in session
until December 81.
Democracy is dedication of our elected
representatives to their jobs, and what we
must never forget, it is also the freedom of
those representatives to do their job. Any-
thing less is not democracy. A Member is
not able to do the job, or at least to do
It effectively when. he must turn his energy
for a large part of every 2 years to campaign-
ing back home.
It is true that in a democracy every elected
officer must periodically give an account of
his stewardship to the people who may then
either accept or reject him, and this is as
it should be. But to ask a Member of this
House to clei this every 2 years impairs his ef-
fectiveness in office.
I know there are some who will say we
urge this change for self-gain and for self-
perpetuation in office. If they would but
stop a moment and think, they would see
that this is not true. To change the term
of a Member of the House of Representa-
tives requires a constitutional amendment
and we know that this could take several
years. By the terms of the resolution it can-
not take effect until more than 1 calendar
year after its ratification, and then only in
the year in which the President's term be-
gins. That means not before 1968.
The effect is to synchronize the terms of
the President and' the Members of the
House. By the time this amendment be-
comes effective many of the Members of this
House?and that does not exclude this
speaker?may no longer be Members. But
that should not change our position. If
we can improve the effectiveness of future
Congresses we should do so, even if we will
not be part of them.
I would like to make one other important
point about the 4-year term. f firmly be-
lieve that when you elect a person of one
party as President, he ought to have the
majority of his party in the Congress so that
the responsibility is on the party, if we be-
lieve in the two-party system.
I know that it has occasionally happened
that the President has been elected from one
party and the majority from the other party
are elected to Congress. In off years very
frequently the control will change in the
Congress so that we had a majority party
different from that in the White House.
But if we really want a strong two-party
system and we believe in it, then the re-
sponsibility should be on the party and
there shouldn't be this device of denial of
responsibility when it comes to election
time. The man in the White House and
the majority should be of the same party.
Then If they don't live up to their pledges,
if they don't do the job the people expected
they can turn them out 4 years later. You
avoid this divided responsibility. You don't
give the Members the opportunity to say,
"We don't have a member of our party in
the White House," and you don't give the
man in the White House the opportunity
to say, "Those Members in the majority are
of the opposite party and they are not going
along with me." I think it would make for
a stronger Government.
I urge this commltte to fai3rably report
House Joint Resolutio 78.
THE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM
(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr.
GRIDER) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, Presi-
dent Johnson has made it unmistakably
clear time and time again that the
United States seeks peace?peace with
honor?in Vietnam.
No one can deny that we face a most
complex situation in southeast Asia.
The answers are not easy.
The President, however, has been very
frank in informing the American public
of the problems we face there.
The result of Mr. Johnson's forthright
leadership is overwhelming popular sup-
port throughout the Nation for our pol-
icies in Vietnam.
A fine editorial from the August 13,
1965, edition of the American Jewish
World recently came to me. I think it
reflects what most Americans feel.
The editorial pointed out:
It is our belief, and we state it here with-
out reservation, that the great, vast body of
American opinion is with the President in
his conduct of this diflionit, complex, frus-
trating, and misunderstood campaign in
Vietnam.
The editorial went on to recall the
dread lessons freemen learned in the past
from the Hitler era. That lesson, as
President Johnson so aptly said in his
report to the Nation recently, is that
aggression and tyranny breed on soft-
ness.
America must stand up to communism.
America must uphold its commitments.
America must defend freedom in its hour
of need.
President Johnson is doing atl of this.
For this, every American should be
thankful.
The editorial from the American Jew-
ish World follows:
OTJR NATION'S ROLE IN VIETNAM
"We are ready now, as we have always
been, to move from the battlefield to the
conference table." These are theme words?
a credo symbolizing America's essential
stance in the Vietnam struggle and express-
ing this Nation's thoughtful and resolute de-
termination to fight for the sake of peace.
For 8 tense days late last month the Na-
tion waited while President Johnson de-
liberated America's immediate course of ac-
tion. The announcement, when it came, told
of his program for a significant troop build-
up in Vietnam, but the even keener signifi-
cance of his statement lies in the limited
nature of the increase, the limited objectives
he set forth, and his heartening, profundly
responsible emphasis on a search for a peace-
ful solution "at the conference table."
It is our belief, and we state it here with-
out reservation, that the great, vast body of
American opinion is with the President in
his conduct of this difficult, complex, frus-
trating, and misunderstood campaign in Viet-
nam. It is our corollary belief that, by and
large, the American people feel and under-
stand that what we are engaged in, in Viet-
nam, is a defense not of the Vietnamese
alone?valid and vital as that is?but it is
an action of commitment in defense of the
very concept of life free of the grisly Com-
munist embrace and the threat of its pres-
sures.
One aspect of the situation that make us
most responsive to our President's leader-
ship in the Vietnam situation is that its ac-
tion springs from the dread lessons of the
Hitler era. It was silence and inaction on
the part of the West that kept strengthening
Hitler to the point of no return. We are
grateful that we have a President who reads
history aright?who has both the wisdom
and the creative courage to avoid the Scylla
of a Munich, the Charybdis of Ethiopia.
We, too, must look at contemporary events
with an intelligent eye: discerning that where
we have stood up to Communist aggressions?
as in Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Korea, and
Cuba?we have succeeded in stemming the
tide. This is our role and responsibility in
today's boiling world?and thank God we
have a leader who sees it so clearly, who
knows so deeply that there is no hope for a
world of reason and sanity, of peace and
growth, until the forces of wanton aggression
and brazen lawlessness are checked and de-
feated.
America's difficult role in southeast Asia
has been a severe testing time. We are speak-
ing to the world in tones unmistakable: if
they have been misinterpreted, it may be be-
cause here in America the voices of criticism
have been amplified way out of proportion
to the numbers they represent. And their
loudness, in fact, is what may be persuad-
ing Hanoi and Peiping that the American
President is pursuing an unpopular course.
It is not one we can contemplate with pleas-
ure, but we Americans have shown that we
know how to confront unpleasant and haz-
ardous situations with determination and
how to proceed from resolve to victory.
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August 25, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 21039
ice by telegram, minute service by telephone,
and most of my people know they can call
me collect?and they do. If they are any-
where within 400 miles, every Member knows
that you never know When a constituent is
going to walk in on you without an appoint-
ment.
So, in addition to our getting home fre-
quently, we know how they are thinking, and
they let Us know how they are thinking by
their constant contacts with us.
My district, like Mr. Cines, has over
600,000 population, and I tell you, Mr. Chair-
man, that I know how they are thinking, be-
cause they keep me advised, and I make
it my business to know how they are think-
ing. Only recently, without any political
campaign in progress we had B legislative
clays during a 2-week period. I was home 7
nights of the 8 legislative days, because it
was necessary for me to be there to know
how these people were thinking and keep
the engagements that I had made to meet
with them.
We are closer to our people today than ever
in the history of the country. We could not
14Cany closer.
New, with reference to the legislative prob-
lem, or the state legislative reaction, the
point that Mr. CORMAN raised: Our experi-
ence out of New York State, and we have
41 Members today out of New York State,
is that most of our Members who come here
to the House have served in the State legisla-
ture, either as an assemblyman or as a sena-
tor, and more frequently they serve first in
the so-called lower house or assembly, then
elected to the senate and then came here as
Meinbers of Congress. One of the reasons
why we have had difficulty in increasing
salaries of the Members of the Congress and
increasing terms of Once is that some of our
colleagues say this is going to increase the
competition for our seats. I think one rea-
son the State legislators will vote for a 4-
year term for us, while theirs may be 1, 2, or
less, is because they have an eye on coming
here, I say this is good, because we need
experienced legislators coming here. The
best men, I think, by and large, and this is
net intended to be as any reflection because
the gentleman sitting to my right, Mr.
TENZER, is a first termer?he never served
In the State legislature. He is one of our
best Congressmen and one of our best repre-
sentatives. But by and large the man who
comes here with legislative experience on
the local level makes a better Member of
Congress.
So, if these men have an eye on our seats,
so mueb, the better. It will keep us on our
toes, and the day that anybody in my dis-
trict can take My seat by an election, good
hick to him. If the people are tired of me,
then it is time they retired me, and sent a
better man here, or a man whom they
thought was better.
This also brings Me to the point about
my distinguished friend's recommendation
that in order to get the Senate to go along
with this, let's not give them any com-
petition. I said before the Joint Committee
on Reorginization of the Congress the same
thing I now say to this committee: If the
only way we Can get the Members of the
body to go along with this recommendation
is to assure them of no competition, then
Aet's not have the amendment. I say, if
there is a man in that body who does not
want to or who is s,fraid to meet his con-
iititutents and stand for reelection, because
Mesizber of the House may be able to beat
hint ahd take his seat away from him, he
does not deserve to be there. If that is
what is going to stop this amendment from
going through, then let's not have it.
They have this competit on now, because
men Who are running here every 2 years
would rather run there for 6 years. They
will have more competition that way than
they will get by going along with a 4-year
term for the Members of the House.
I can say this and say it so vigorously and
forcefully, because I have no desire to stand
for election to the other body, and this is
not sour grapes, because nomination to the
other body has been offered to me twice in
my State, and rejected by me. I intend to
continue and to complete my political serv-
ice to my country in the House of Repre-
sentatives if God spares me. So, this is en-
tirely without any selfish interest on my part.
I think this is the most undignified thing
to say to any Member of Congress, present
or future, that you come to the House of
Representatives, and by doing it, you forgo
your right to run for any other office. If
a man, because of his service here, thinks
that his people feel he will make a better
public official in some other office, we ought
not to, and certainly not by constitutional
amendment, deprive him of that right to
prepare himself for other office by his work
here. I think this is basic to our democ-
racy, that any man who stands for office,
when elected should have a right to have his
eye on a higher office or another office.
Now, if this means that he does not serve
his constituency as well in the House of
Representatives, they will catch on to it and
they Will very soon retire him. On the other
hand, if by his service here he earns another
office, they will give it to him.
The reason I oppose a staggering of the
terms, or a 3-year term, is because I feel that
It we believe in a two-party system, the only
way you strengthen the two-party system is
by having the term of office of the Member
of the House coterminous with that of the
President. I say the President should have
a majority of the Members of the House of
his party, and I say the majority of the Mem-
bers of the House should have in the White
House a member of their party. I do not go
for this business of saying as it is so often
said, that canipaign planks or platforms are
something to run on during election time
and run away from after election time. I say
that pledges made by way of platform planks
and as pledges during a campaign are prom-
ises that are 'binding upon us, and if we do
not keep those promises when the time comes
for reelection, the electorate should turn us
out. We should not have this division as we
have had so many times of a President being
able to run for reelection and saying: "Now,
look, give me a House this time of my party.
I did not have it in the last session of Con-
gress, and, therefore, I could not give you
what I promised you." And do not let Mem-
bers of the House run for reelection on the
pretense, or making the pretense, "Well, we
-do not have a man of my party in the White
House and, therefore, I could not give you the
legislation that you should have had." If
we believe in the two-party system, then the
man in the White House and the majority
of the Congress should be of the same party
to the fullest extent that the people want it,
and then 4 years later they could go before
the people and there would be no excuses
that we could not deliver on our promises be-
cause there was an opposite party that was in
control of the other branch of the Govern-
bent.
This. gentlemen, I say is the reason why
we should have a 4-year term coterminus
with that of the President, and I do hope
that when your deliberations are completed
in executive session, you will bring forth a
resolution or an amendment which will be
submitted to the States for ratification which
will give us a 4-year term. I personally will
vote against a 3-year term. I personally
would vote against any provision that would
call for staggering of the offices. I person-
ally would vote against any provision that
would deprive a Member of the House of
Representatives of the right to run for any
other office because he is a Member of the
House.
I know that those who have different opin-
ions, whether it be Mr. CHELF or Mr. TENZER,
or other Members, are voicing these opinions
and putting forth their considerations just
as conscientiously and with the same high
motives as I am. When that is done and
the resolution is brought before the House,
and the House votes, I will how to the ma-
jority, whatever it may be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DONOHUE (presiding). Thank you.
Any questions?
Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Chairman, I must say
that I am somewhat persuaded by Mr. Min?
TER'S argument about the 4-year term being
coterminus with the President's election. I
did not mean to indicate in my exchange
with Mr. CHELF that I did not think that
the State legislators ought not to be allowed
to run for Congress. I would pose the ques-
tion again, and I think it is a reasonable
one. I do not believe three-fourths of the
State legislators will approve of this con-
stitutional arnendment. I believe 50 of the
States would; if the people themselves voted
on it, and that is why I think we should
give some consideration as to the method of
ratification. And, of course, there is no ques-
tion, though I did- not come from our State
legislature, our best Members are those who
did. And that is a good training ground.
But I seriously question whether State legis-
lators, so many of them with 2-year terms,
would ratify a 4-year term for us and wheth-
er we might be better off in getting public
expression from the voters in a secret ballot.
Mr. MULTER. Frankly, Mr. CORMAN, I think
this matter of ratification by State legisla-
tors is outmoded. This should be submitted
to the people, whether it is this kind of a
constitutional amendment, or any other.
Now, I agree with you that if this were
submitted to the people of the 50 States, it
would carry overwhelmingly. I am not sure
that it would carry in the State legisla-
tures, too, in the State legislative bodies.
also, but if we can bring forth an amendment
which will bypass the State legislative bod-
ies, I am for it, not because I do not trust
them, on the other hand, I feel that if we
send this to the States, there will be enough
pressure from the people on the State legisla-
tors to do this job, and they will be in fear
of being confronted with a situation of
"Look, if you do not go along with us,
maybe you will not get elected next time."
This is a matter that affects the people and
I think they will take an interest in it. It
is unlike some amendments where the legis-
lative bodies may freely express their own
opinion and disregard the opinions of the
people in their States. This is not that kind
of an issue. This is one where the people
are going to be intrested, and I think they
will put the pressure on their State legisla-
tive bodies.
Mr. DONOHUE. Thank you, again.
We will include in the record at this point
the prepared statement of Mr. MULTER'S.
(The prepared statement submitted by
Mr. MULTER follows:)
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate and thank you
for the opportunity to come before your
committee today in support of my resolu-
tion House Joint Resolution 78, which would
amend the Constitution of the United States
to provide that the term of the Members of
the House shall be 4 years instead of 2 years.
At the outset you ought to know that the
majority of the Members of the House favor
this resolution. I have been in this fight a
long time. I have introduced a bill for this
purpose in every Congress, except one, since
I came to Congress in 1947. Back in 1949
I took a poll of the Members on the issue of
a 4-year term-319 Members voted in favor
of the proposal and 110 against. I believe
the support of this measure by Members
and nonmembers alike is overwhelming.
The Nation is properly devoting much
thought and discussion to the problem of
fair representation in the House. I suggest
that it is time we think about the problem of
meaningful representation.
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August 25, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?HOUSE
The world, and - particularly the COM-
munist masters, would de well to pay heed
to the American Character and to American
history,
HIGHWAY TUNNELS IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA
(Mr. CLARK (at the request of Mr.
GRIDER) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. CLARK. Mr. Speaker, along with
construction of the rapid transit system
recently approved by the House of Rep-
resentatives, completion of the inter-
state highway system in the District of
Columbia is a matter of urgent neces-
sity. The rapid transit system will pro-
vide the best conceivable means of car-
rying great volumes of people into and
out of the downtown area during the
rush hours. The highway system, on the
other hand, in addition to its many other
uses, represents the most efficient means
of routing motorists around the down-
town area, away from surface streets.
Though all signs are that construction
of the rapid transit system will forge
ahead, the District highway program is
in deep trouble. In part its problems
are financial and these can only be solved
by the passage of legislation increasing
District gas taxes and borrowing author-.
ity. In part its problems are esthetic
and social and the solution of these is
fax more complex.
Some people are against the District
highway program because it represents
change. In my view, those people are
misguided for change is bound to occur
and properly constructed highways are
one means of assuring that the change
is for the better.
Others resent the program because
they fear it will destroy the appearance
of the city and uproot thousands from
their homes, in too many people who can
afford to be uprooted. These fears, I am
sorry to say, are all too well-founded,
for the present District highway program
is bound to mar the appearance of the
city. And the sole blame rests with the
highway engineers who have shown an
appalling lack of imagination in design-
ing and locating proposed sections of the
Interstate Highway System in the Dis-
trict.
This is a period in which all of us are
taking an increasing interest in the ap-
pearance of the National Capital. Our
First Lady is leading a campaign to
beautify the Capital. She has the solid
support of all of us.
It is scarcely consistent with this cam-
paign to inundate Washington with miles
of surface and depressed multilane free-
ways. It does not require a great deal
of esthetic sense to realize that such
highways are bound to be ugly. And
just as disturbing is the fact that they
are bound to move thousands of low-
income families out of their homes at the
very time when Government at last has
the tools to provide a much-needed in-
crease in low-income housing.
In urban areas throughout the Nation,
increasing attention is being paid to
?
highway tunnels as a means of avoiding
ugliness and the destruction of homes.
San Francisco and New York are con-
sidering major highway tunnels. This
kind of construction is bound to become
increasingly popular. This is especially
true because modern technology has sub-
stantially reduced the cost of construct-
ing tunnels and additional technological
advances are in sight which should re-
duce the costs still further.
Unfortunately, the District Highway
Department does not seem to be able to
read the signals. I know of only two
occasions in recent times where it has
been willing to construct highway tun-
nels and in both cases it was forced to
do so by other units of Government.
The first was the Lincoln Memorial tun-
nel which is being constructed at the
insistence of the Department of the In-
terior. The second is the inner loop
center leg tunnel which Congress itself
demanded.
Otherwise the District Highway De-
partment has been dragging its heels. I
note that the Engineer Commissioner
has stated recently that he opposes a
tunnel for the south leg of the inner loop
on grounds of cost.
It seems to me that when we talk
about costs we ought to include the cost
of lost parklands and of damage to in-
dividuals and neighborhoods. And we
ought to talk about the cost to the Na-
tion of having the appearance of its
National Capital seriously damaged.
As dedicated as I am to the proposi-
tion that the interstate highway system
must be completed in the District, I am
equally committed to the view that this
can and must be done without harm to
the city. And I cannot be a fervent
supporter of the District highway pro-
gram until I am persuaded that the
highway engineers have objectively con-
sidered ways of avoiding such harm, in
particular through tunnel construction.
I believe the House District Committee
will do the Nation a just service by in-
sisting that this be done.
The highway program is much to val-
uable to go down the drain because the
engineers lack imagination. But that is
precisely where it is headed and it is time
the Highway Department woke up to
that fact.
SPECIAL INDEMNITY INSURANCE
FOR. SURVIVORS OF SERVICEMEN
KILLED IN COMBAT ZONE
(Mr. HANSEN of Iowa (at the request
of Mr. GRIDER) was granted permission
to extend his remarks at this point in
the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. HANSEN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker,
yesterday I introduced H.R. 10630 which
Is a bill to provide special indemnity in-
surance for the survivors of servicemen
killed or who die as a result of injuries
suffered in a combat zone.
With the involvement we now have in
world affairs, it is apparent that we will
be called upon many times to give as-
sistance to nations that are threatened
by a Communist takeover. At the pres-
ent time we are moving toward the com-
mitment of 100,000 troops in Vietnam.
These men are being called upon to place
their lives on the line in the fight for
21041
freedom. It is not too much to ask their
Nation to assure them that in the event
of their death the family which they
leave behind will at least be provided
with a small amount of security.
I am aware that the whole matter of
insurance for servicemen was given a
long study and it was concluded that a
compensation program would be more
feasible than an insurance program.
However, I feel that with the hazardous
duties given these men and the fact that
some insurance companies have a can-
cellation clause in their policies that we
should do everything possible to remove
a heavy mental strain now being imposed
on these men. It is my hope that the
Members of this body will support the
passage of this bill.
OBJECT OF A SEARCH
(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr.
GRIDER) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, few things
give us more pleasure and inspiration
than to see the development and the un-
folding of the mind and spirit of a young
man or a young woman; to see them
wrestling with the great mysteries and
challenges of life, to see them groping for
truth through the maze which sur-
rounds life, and to see them find their
way through the labyrinth and come to
the high, clear ground of a better under-
standing of life and of God with feet
firmly planted upon this good earth.
I have seen the unfolding of such a
story in my own family in a nephew,
Branson H. Willis, Jr., son of my only
sister. He, as an 18-year-old boy wrote,
as a theme while he was a student at
Fort Lauderdale Junior College, his story
of search for the meaning of life, for
truth, for God. He revealed his diffi-
culties and his doubts as a searching
boy, maturing into manhood, would do.
This is what he wrote:
INTRODUCTION
This is my story. It is a story of search.
It is a search of meaning, of value, of place-
ment according to relativity. Time will
bestow on me my goal. Will others be as
fortunate? Others live with it and perhaps
never realize their questions and wonder-
ings. If they had the courage to realize
their doubt and unsureness then they too
would be searchers and ultimately finders of
truth and knowledge.
I am a vagabond lured on by the vision of
a splendor land somewhere; a maverick im-
mune to any brand that accepts fences; the
driftwood that knows only change is con-
stant; the searcher who knows that treasure
found is less than treasure sought. Some-
thing bigger, finer, and more wonderful than
anything I have every known awaits me
somewhere, somehow, sometime.
These are my ways of saying I am search-
ing. I am trying to find. I must find.
It is hard to put into words my reasons
for searching and my object of search.
Maybe it is easy to fill a darkened room with
light by pulling on a switch, but, ah, finding
the light switch in a darkened room! Maybe
it is easy to open a door by turning a key
in the lock, but, ah, finding the right key
on the key ring in the dark!
I am searching for the meaning of God.
Not so I can be a Christian. I don't believe
there are many Christians in the world today.
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21042 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August 25, 1965
There are, however, many acceptors. I am
searching for God because he is the answer
to truth, to beauty, and to peace. Ian not
even sure if there is a God, or if I believe
there is a God.
People believe that being a Christian
means going to church, giving to their
church, and believing in God. Therefore,
they believe they will go to heaven (if there
Is a heaven?or hell). But, how many of
these people have stopped to think and ask
themsleves, Is there a God? Is there? I
have just always accepted it as something
that Ls?and always has been.
Now I cannot just accept it. I have to
know for sure what God means and who God
Is. Is God the crystal blue lake that sleeps
peacefully at the foot of tall, strong pines?
Is God the sunrise of a million breathtak-
ing colors over a calm ocean? Is He the
hands of a surgeon who delivers the Email
fragile baby? Is He the darkling thrust
Who fills the desolate night air with blessed
hope whereof he knows, and I am unaware?
Until I have the feeling, the realization oi
complete existence in God-consciousness, I
anit a separate entity appealing to a long-dis-
tal:We God, and am inclined to doubt whether
my appeals can reach One who has so many
sparrows to watch in their fallings.
There is a lumpy sequel to this story.
Shortly after writing these words, my
nephew, joined the U.S. Air Force, of
Which he has been a part for more than
2 years. Now as a man?tall, straight,
and strong.
He has not only found himself as a
wan, but he has found the things that,
make life meaningful to him. He is im?-
ablaturably proud of the Air Force, of
America, and deeply dedicated to the
service of his country and to the preser -
vation and perpetuation of all that it
Stands for. And he has, too, found God,
in church, in Sunday school, and in his
private life.
I bring this matter to this RECORD
somewhat to give encouragement to
other boys who may be going through
Shriller struggles but principally to pay
tribute to the Air Force of our country
for what it has done to make this trou-
bled boy a strong, assured, God-fearing
American man. For this additional con-
tribution it is making in the spiritual
Mahn to the strength of America, multi-
plied countless times, I am sure, in the
/Ives of other boys and girls, we of this
Congress and of this country who sup-
port this great Air Force, can take great
pride.
(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr.
GLIDER) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
[Mr. PEPPER addressed the }louse.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Appendix.]
SITUATION OF HUNGARIANS IN
TRANSYLVANIA
(Mr. DENT (at the request of Mr.
Gamut) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, last Wednes-
day my distinguished colleagues from
several States, under the leadership of
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
HALPERN] have discussed in detail the
discrimination and repression of the
Hungarian minority in Rumania, some
1.75 million strong, by the present Com-
munist Rumanian regime. They provide
ample evidence by reference to articles,
and by submitting voluminous witness
material on the situation.
I would like to express my complete
agreement with their conclusions and
remind us that abridgment of human and
civil rights, and the forcible assimilation
process against national minorities are a
matter of concern for all free peoples,
because peace like justice is indivisible.
Of course, we are aware that Communist
governments whatever their present
stripe have oppressed and continue to
oppress their citizens and that the ulti-
mate solution must be the creation of free
elected and responsible governments in
these countries where commtinism was
imported from the Soviet Union under
Stalin in violation of the intentions and
desires of the peoples. Yet, in 1965, the
naked oppression of a minority which is
occurring in a Communist country which
tries to improve its standing and eco-
nomic and cultural relations with the
Western powers should not and must not
be countenanced by us.
Mr. Speaker, we must take firm and
unequivocal action in condemning these
Communist Rumanian discriminatory
measures. Not only the Hungarian
minorifi which is the particular target of
the persecution, but all of the Rumanian
citizenry is suffering under an unen-
lightened police rule and I am raising my
voice against the abridgment of human
and civil rights of all Rumanian citizens,
particularly the Hungarian minority. I
know that the Foreign Affairs Committee
will take action soon on my resolution
House Resolution 51, and that we will
soon have the opportunity to vote on this
issue as a body.
LABOR SHORTAGE FACING PICKLE
GROWERS
(Mr. RACE (at the request of Mr.
Game) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. RACE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday
my distinguished colleague from Michi-
gan [Mr. Csesitsrao], addressed this body
and outlined an alleged crisis now facing
the pickle growers of his State. Mr.
CEDERBERG pointed out that he has been
contacted by pickle growers in his State
who allegedly will suffer severe losses
from unharvested crops caused by a se-
vere labor shortage. I am afraid that
the Michigan pickle growers have not
told my good friend, Mr. CEDERBERG, the
entire story.
I know that it is somewhat unusual
for a Wisconsin Member to be so con-
cerned over the Michigan pickle indus-
try, but in this instance many young
men in my district have suffered finan-
cial hardship at the hands of this group.
And I have doubt that other young men
in other parts of this country have also
suffered.
Before I go on any further, I would
like to bring to the attention of the
Michigan pickle growers at least 14
young men from Wisconsin have ex-
pressed their desire to work in the fields,
harvesting the pickle crop. They are:
John Moser, Rural Route 1, Allenton,
Wis.
Edward Schoenecker, Rural Route 1,
Allenton, Wis.
Richard Schuster, Rural Route 1, Al-
lenton, Wis.
George Beder, Route 3, Hardford, Wis.
George Schaefer, 121 Storck Street,
Slinger, 'Wis.
Roger Millerman, Route 1, Slinger,
Wis.
Thomas Ruetlen, 215 South Washing-
ton Street, Slinger, Wis.
Terry Cowan, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.
Kieth Cowan, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.,
Warren Retzlaff, 214 Lawndale Avenue,
Slinger, Wis.
Bert Hultman, 206A North Washing-
ton, Slinger, Wis.
Jim Killeen, Route 1, Slinger, Wis.
Charles Tennies, 218 Lawndale Avenue,
Slinger, Wis.
Gerald Fries, 111 Buchanan Street,
Slinger, Wis.
These young men were part of the
A-TEAM program?athletes in tempo-
rary employment as agricultural man-
power. This program was sponsored
by the U.S. Department of Labor to re-
lieve the anticipated shortage of the
agricultural workers after the expira-
tion of Public Law 78. On June 24, 1965,
the D. & B. Pickle Growers of Unionville,
Mich., agreed to provide employment
for these 14 young men and other
A-TEAM members from Wisconsin.
These youths were to report to work on
July 29. The A-TEAM members were
preparing to carry out their part of the
contract. Other employment had been
offered, but refused by these young men
because the D. & B. Pickle Growers of
Unionville had committed themselves by
contract. But on July 27, the D. & B.
Pickle Growers decided to break their
contract with these young men.
Mr. Speaker, can you imagine the
shock I experienced when I learned that
these young men, many of whom need
summer jobs to finance their education,
were the wanton victims of an orga-
nization known as the D. & B. Pickle
Growers.
I was even more shocked to learn that
the D. & B. Pickle Growers canceled
their contract because they "were not
able to arrange satisfactory feeding ar-
rangements as required for the use of
A-TEAMS." I have further been ad-
vised by the Wisconsin Employment
Service that:
Wisconsin A-TEAMS will not be used to
harvest cucumbers (in Michigan). The
various growers who previously used foreign
workers to harvest their crops have either
found sufficient local labor, interstate labor,
or have reduced their acreage.
I contend, Mr. Speaker, that no labor
shortage exists in the cucumber fields
of Michigan. What there is a shortage
of, is the type of labor that can be forced
to live in shacks and eat substandard
meals. With the expiration of Public
Law 78, Mexican nationals are no longer
available to be exploited. When the
Michigan pickle growers finally come to
accept this?I am certain the cucumbers
will be harvested.
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August 25, 196OPProved Usititking
Tribute to the Honorable
Clarence 3. Brown
SPEECH
OF
HON. WRIGHT PATMAN
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 23, 1965
Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I regret
the tragic necessity of expressing at this
time my deep sense of personal bereave-
ment at the passing of my friend and
colleague of many years in this House,
the Honorable CLARENCE J. BROWN of
Ohio.
When he passed to his eternal reward,
he had completed 50 years of public serv-
ice which began in 1915 when he assumed
the office of State statistician of Ohio.
He was elected his State's Lieutenant
Governor 3 years later. At 23 he was
the youngest elected State officer in
Ohio's history.
He was elected Ohio Secretary of State
in 1926, and was reelected to serve three
successive- terms. Under his leadership
the election laws of Ohio were completely
redrafted and have since served as
models upon which other States have
based reforms in their electoral machin-
ery.
CLARENCE BROWN came to the Congress
to serve Ohio's' Seventh Congressional
District in 1938, and was reelected to
every succeeding Congress, often with-
out opposition.
My hard-working friend, CLARENCE J.
BROWN, dedicated to his district, his con-
stituents, his State, and his country,
rarely missed a rollcall and never
neglected to answer a constituent's letter.
His slogan in so many of his campaigns
was typical of the man: "Stick to the
man who sticks to his job."
He served his party long and faith-
fully, as a delegate to its national con-
ventions, as a member of its national
committee, and as a congressional cam-
paign manager.
He was a successful businessman and
farmer in private life. He was reared in
Blanchester, Clinton County, Ohio, was
graduated from the high school there,
read law with a local attorney, and then
attended Washington and Lee Univer-
sity. He was made an honorary mem-
ber. of Omicron Delta Kappa by that uni-
versity in 1946. He also received an
honorary LL.D. degree from Wilmington
College in 1928.
His service on the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee in his
early years in Congress gave evidence of
his ability and the seriousness which he
brought to all of his congressional duties.
His later service on the Government Op-
erations Committee and the House Rules
Committee was outstanding.
All who knew him will miss his out-
spoken integrity, his unfailing good will,
and his informed counsel. The deepest
sympathy is extended to his children in
this hour of their grief. They have lost
a beloved father, the House of Repre-
sentatives has lost a dedicated and able
senior Member, and the Nation has lost
one of its most patriotic sons.
tO
The Withere
-Ropmw0003ooi 30005-0
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 25, 1965
Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks in the
Recona, I submit to my colleagues the
second timely article from Newsweek by
Ray Moley on our faltering merchant
marine:
THE WITHERED ARM?II
(By Raymond Moley)
Above the din of jet aircraft, the news
did not penetrate to the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee that the future of our posi-
tion in southeast Asia rests on sea transport.
Simultaneously with the ominous weaken-
ing of Singapore in the defense of the crucial
Malacca Strait, the committee canceled a
cargo ship added by the House to the build-
ing program which is a vital part of our
power to meet critical events in the
Far East.
War in Vietnam, like the Korean War,
is a maritime operation that rests on our
capability of delivering men and equipment
across thousands of miles of sea. For Korea
we had "a bridge of ships" which is gone
today.
In an article recently prepared for publica-
tion, Adm. John D. Hayes, U.S.N., retired,
points up that in the Korean War, Japan
was a base of operations not unlike Britain
in the war against Germany. We have no
such nearby base today and must depend on
the more distant Okinawa, Guam and Philip-
pines. In Japan there is virulent opposition
to our Vietnamese policy and a political
situation that is none too stable.
FINISHED WITH ENGINES
At Danang, Hayes points out, Marines
landed from virtually the same ships that
landed their ancestors on Okinawa in 1945
and at Inchon in 1950, The 1'73d Airborne
Brigade was not airlifted from Okinawa to
Saigon. It was transported in aging LST's,
of which only a few now remain.
When the Korean war began, we had 2,868
fairly new and efficient dry-cargo ships. To-
day there are only 131 under 15 years of age.
In the Government reserve there remain,
along with the famous old Liberties finished
with engines, a few hundred efficient World
War II vessels. The Navy, calling last year
for ships for an amphibious exercise, found
that about 157 ships of the active merchant
fleet could meet requirements of speed and
cargo-lifting equipment and, of these, only
121 had an additional required feature in
standard cargo rig.
In 1957 the replacement program of the
subsidized lines began to take effect. The
world's finest ships are among the 99 built at
vast expenditure by those companies with
the help of the Government's construction
subsidy to the shipyards. They have very
great speed, which is of the essence in war-
time. Where shore facilities are inadequate
for unloading, they are self-sufficient. Many
ships of the subsidized fleet are already in
service to Vietnam. But the building pro-
gram in the face of developing demands in
the Far East has been slowed down by
budgetary decisions.
An air transport carries limited cargo, but
this is a question of millions of tons. Be-
sides, all aircraft are hungry consumers of
fuel, which is transported by sea. There is
great tanker tonnage available, but we are
deficient in those of handy size for shallow
ports. Only a few have been built.
THE LENGTHENING REACH
A4819
Equipment must go by sea not only to an
increasing number of American troops but
also to the South Vietnamese Army. Food
must go to the population, and bases must
be built with material brought by ship.
Meanwhile, cargo ships must haul the sup-
plies for Armed Forces elsewhere. There is
the lifeline to Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and
Alaska. A number of vessels are committed
by law to serve essential trade routes. We
ship foreign aid and must also try to con-
tinue to carry the 5 percent of our com-
mercial cargoes that go by U.S. ships?when
they are not strikebound.
More than 99 percent of all American over-
seas transport is by ship.
May we look for help from our maritime
friends? The price is rising, for they are
busy and also carry for the Rus,sians and
Red China. Many of their ships have been
thriving in the enemy supply line to the
Vietcong. While the power of Britain falters
at Singapore, her shipping companies?
whining "Freedom of the seas"?lengthen
the Communist reach toward the free world's
British-protected jugular vein east of Suez.
Japan, like Britain and West Germany, builds
ships for the Communists, and demands that
we return Okinawa?a staging base for the
war in Vietnam. It is in that peculiar one
world of international shipping that we must
now shop around to supplement our fourth
arm of defense.
Governor Scranton's Building Program
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES G. FULTON
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, August 19, 1965
Mr. F'ULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr.
Speaker, under leave to extend my re-
marks in the RECORD, I include the fol-
lowing article from the Pittsburgh Press,
August 24, 1965:
GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S BUILDING PROGRAM
Governor Scranton has proposed an in-
crease of almost 50 percent in the borrowing
power of the General State Authority, which
borrows money to build State buildings and
then gets the money back through rentals.
And it is a recognition of the newly realized
importance of higher education that fully
two-thirds of the increase would be devoted
to that purpose.
The 14 former State teachers colleges, now
reconstituted as liberal arts State colleges,
for instance, offer college courses at substan-
tially less tuition cost than other institutions.
They are reported now as having full enroll-
ments and turning away qualified applicants.
Mr. Scranton's program would invest $137,-
500,000 in these institutions, and there is
little doubt that such a program would
accommodate more students.
Pennsylvania State University's growth for
many years has been dependent on how
much money it could budget. The proposed
program would provide 830,500,000 for facil-
ities for this university. Another $125,400,-
000 would go to buildings for State-aided
universities, with Pitt getting $19,641,561.
The next largest item in Mr. Scranton's
program?largest of its kind to be suggested
yet?would go toward a juvenile delinquency
control program. Again, this is a known
need; the Scranton program would build up
to present and prospective requirements.
Other projects, in "standby" category, would
supply housekeeping requirements at vari-
ous State institutions.
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A4820 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX August 25, 1965
A word of caution may be in order. 11)e-
sirable as these projects are, and assuming
that they are within the financial capacity
of the State government, it should be pointed
out that if they are undertaken, they will
swell the budget requirements for each of
the affected institutions. If more dormitory
space results in more students, it also will
result in more teachers and more operating
expenses. There is thus an assured addi-
tional cost, beyond the cost of the physical
facilities themselves.
Before acting on the program, the legis-
lature should check carefully the financial
effects on each of the institutions that will
be included. Growth to meet a need is
highly desirable; but growth should be care-
fully planned to avoid a sudden outstripping
of the financial abilities of the colleges.
We have had recently in Pittsburgh an ex-
ample of what can happen when quick
growth of a university outstrips its money
resources. Undoubtedly, the University of
Pittsburgh can use the facilities Mr. Scran-
ton listed for it in his new program. The
legislature should be sure that Pitt can af-
ford them and that providing them will not
disrupt the Pitt budget.
The Situation of the Hungarians in
Transylvania
SPRPCH
OF
HON. JOSEPH P. ADDABBO
OF NEW YORK
rs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 18, 1965
Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, it giv(,s
me a real pleasure to join my distin-
gUished colleagues, ably led by the gen-
tleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN ]
in 'discussing the sorry plight of the 1.75
Million Hungarians in Rumania who are
the special target of Communist persecu-
tion by the Rumanian Communist re-
gime. On March 25, 1965, I introduced
a resolution together with many of them
to condemn the discriminatory practices
of the Communist Rumanian Govern-
ment against the Hungarian minority.
Disconcern for human rights, denial of
equal economic opportunity, forced set-
tlement of those with professional diplo-
mas into purely Rumanian areas several
hundred miles from their place of resi-
dence, slow, but constant elimination of
any instruction in Hungarian language
in schools, police terror against those
who dare to dissent even in a mild form
denial of the freedom to attend the
church services and let children attend
religious classes, are all forms of persecu-
tion devised to break the will of the pop-
ulation to exist as an ethnic unit, and to
"solve the Transylvanian question" by
breaking up into atomized units the
Hungarian minority.
This is not only contrary to what we
believe in the West about human rights
and dignity, and about equal rights to all
citizens, it is even against Communist
theories in this respect, though between
theory and practice there are usually un-
bridgeable chasms in Communist states.
But even international obligations are
? being violated by the Rumanian Com-
munists. For in the 1947 Paris Peace
Treaty which gave to Rumanian rule the
northern, more Hungarian-inhabited
parts of Transylvania, there was a cla,use
that the Rumanian Government will
"not discriminate among its citizens on
the basis, of sex, religion, or language."
The many witnesses, journalists clearly
Prove that such discrimination does exist
in Communist Rumania in violation of
the treaty pledge.
Rumanian Communist constitution
even extends the equal rights to all citi-
zens and also assures the free cultural
and linguistic development of the na-
tionalities in Rumania. All these guar-
antees are violated by the constant prac-
tices of discrimination, which are less in
the form of statutes, but in the form of
administering the statutes and ordi-
nances. Por example, there still exists
an ethnically diluted "Mures-Magyar Au-
tonomous Province," but though it was
established as a reservation for Hun-
garian culture and self-administration,
it has Rumanian police officials, most of
the two councils are mixed or com-
pletely _Rumanian, and in the theater at
the capital of the province, Marosvasar-
hely?Turgu Mures?the plays are per-
formed in Rumanian 5 nights, in Hun-
garian once or twice a week, and even
those are usually translations from Ru-
manian. The place and street names are
supposed to be, under law, bilingual; vis-
itors report unanimously that there are
no Hungarian place names left, and only
a few old bilingual street names in some
suburbs. Also even in the "Mures-
Magyar Autonomous Province"?which
never housed more than 29 percent of the
Transylvanian Hungarians?railway,
post and other officials either do not
know or refuse to answer in Hungarian,
and even the sales clerks in the cities only
speak in Rumanian in order not to lose
their jobs.
Mr. Speaker, under these circumstances
it is our duty to solemnly protest these
abridgements of human and civil rights
and to make sure that when negotiations
are conducted with the representatives of
the Communist Rumanian Government
these facts are also taken into con-
sideration by our policymakers. There-
fore, I am joining my colleagues in
strongly denouncing this unjust dis-
crimination which finds its immediate
origin in the sympathetic attitude of the
Hungarians in Transylvania toward the
heroic Hungarian freedom fighters in
1956.
Farm Minimum Wage To Trigger Food
Cost Rise
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HAROLD D. COOLEY
OF NORTY1 CAROLINA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 25, 1965
Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Speaker, the
blanketing of farm labor for the first
time under the minimum wage law, as
PropOsed in the bill (}LR. 10518) ap-
proved by the Committee on Education
and Labor, will certainly mean, if en-
acted, a rise in food and fiber costs of
substantial proportions throughout the
Nation.
Moreover, the legislation could have
devastating consequences for the work-
em themselves.
it certainly will hasten the substitu-
tion of machines for manpower on our
farms, and eliminate thousands upon
thousands of farm jobs. This would
mean a new migration of unemployed
farmworkers to our cities, to create
poverty faster than it can be cured.
Mr. Speaker, the impact upon the ma-
jority of commercial farm operations may
be severe indeed, for where Profits do
now exist in agriculture they are thin
and these operators are unable, under
present prices paid to farmers, to absorb
the added cost of the wage levels con-
templated by the new legislation. These
costs must be passed on to consumers in
the form of higher prices for food and
fiber, or the farmers themselves will be
forced into bankruptcy.
These are my conclusions, and I am
sure this represents the judgment of
other Members of this body, after at-
tending this morning an informal meet-
ing of House Members to review the pro-
visions and evaluate the impacts of H.R.
10518, this new minimum wage legisla-
tion Which soon will come into this
Chamber for consideration.
Mr. Speaker, I am entirely in sympa-
thy with all effort to improve the income
and working conditions of farm labor.
But I am convinced that a minimum
wage law in itself, without other consid-
erations and adjustments, could be dis-
astrous to the farmworkers themselves.
These questions first must be answered:
First. How will the consumer react to
higher food costs?
Second. Where will the hard pressed
farm operators get the money to pay the
increased wages, unless there is an in-
crease in food and fiber prices?
Third. What will prevent the move-
ment of fruit and vegetable production
just across the border into Mexico, where
there is plentiful labor and vast areas of
fertile acres now are being opened to ir-
rigation? Such a movement already has
begun.
Fourth. How many hundreds of thou-
sands of jobs will be eliminated in agri-
culture by the substitution of labor sav-
ing machines?
Fifth. How will our cities cope with
the problem of the new influx of unem-
ployed farm people who are untrained
for work in these cities, and must look
to relief for sustenance?
Mr. Speaker, the Nation has just been
agitated by the prospect of a small in-
crease in the cost of a loaf of bread. An
Increase of seven-tenths of 1 cent in
the price of wheat in. a loaf was contem-
plated originally in the Omnibus Farm
Bill that passed the House last week, as
our Committee on Agriculture sought to
improve the income of our wheat pro-
ducers who have not had a raise in pay in
15 years. The millers and bakers told us
the seven-tenths of a cent increase in
the wheat cost would mean a 2 cents a
loaf hike in the price of bread. The
consumer resistance was such that we
amended the farm bill to provide that
the Government, instead of consumers,
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