STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400180009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 22, 1964
• Content Type: PAPER

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DRAFT
AdOJ t
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Stabili?ing the Situation in Southeast Asia
The Communists may well see an opportunity for broad forward
movement in the recent course of events in Southeast Asia. The
political climate is dominated by widespread speculation on neutralist
solutions for the area sparked by France's recognition of Communist
China and deGaulle's statements as well as Prince Sihanouk's efforts
to obtain international guarantees of Cambodian neutrality by threatening
to turn to Hanoi and Peiping. The Communists may well believe that
the United States is unwilling to exert its power effectively to defend
its positions in Southeast Asia., They, as well as deGaulle and Sihanouk,
must be disabused to any such ideas; and our :friends, especially the
Thais and Vietnamese, must be reassured as to our determination and
intentions.
In our view the recent Communist advances in central Laos highlight
the 'continuing erosion of the situation in Laos. We have a clear and
understandable. immediate issue -- the continued flagrant Communist
violation of the Geneva Accords.
Objectives
;.With respect to Laos, we must undertake a series of coordinated
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political and military actions designed (1) to discourage the Communist
side from continued advances against the neutralist/conservative forces,
(2) to give us additional time to continue the efforts we have been making
to strengthen and consolidate areas under the control of neutralist/
conservative forces, and (3) to preserve our freedom of action in responding
tut props
to any further actions undertaken by the Communists. 'Ihea actions lo
not involve committing U. S. forces to Laos.
In the broader context of Southeast Asia, our actions must be designed
to give the Communist side reason to believe that we are prepared to
escalate the conflict in the area in order to defend our positions there.
Cur.. actions should in no way foreclose options we may later wish to
pursue with respect to South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam as well as
Laos. Communist concern should be reinforced by gradually accumulating
evidence of our willingness to support actions against North Viet-Nam
itself under the presently approved plan (OPLAN 34-A-64) or on a
more extensive scale. We should make it clear that our actions stem
from our concern. over the situation in Southeast Asia as a whole, and that
our actions with respect to Thailand and Laos are indeed coordinated
with bur assistance to South Viet-Nam.
While none of the actions we propose is decisive in itself, all of
them taken together should represent some actual increase in United
States, military capability within Southeast 'Asia and demonstrate our
concerh-over the course of recent events together with our determination
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to reverse that course. .
Reconvening of Geneva Conference?
We do not propose to reconvene, the Geneva Conference on Laos at this
time. Nevertheless, the Communist side could do so, and Prince
Souvanna might if he became extremely discouraged over the situation
in Laos. Moreover, at some futpzre time, it might actually be in our
interest that a Conference be held. In any event, the measures which
we are proposing would tend to put us in a stronger position to participate
effectively in such a Conference should one occur.
Regional_ Cooperation
In view of Souvanna's key importance in the Geneva settlement, it is
essential to coordinate closely with him, obtaining his support or tacit
acquiescence.
we must.
'obtain full Thai cooperation and support, consulting in advance and
treating the Thai as partners.
This coordination is particularly important because both Souvanna
and the Thai may have reservations on varying specific actions to be
taken. Their reaction will be conditioned by the intensity of Communist
pressures and our willingness to meet them squarely.
The actions we propose will not in themselves cause Prince
Sihanouk to accelerate his timetable to threats unless they are executed
fn such a manner as to cause suspicion that they are directed against
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b. With regard to Southeast Asia outside of Laos (timing as mutually
agreed by Department of State and Department of Defensek.
***(l) Deploy additional US combat forces (ground and/or air) to
Thailand.
***(2) Deploy a carrier group in South China sea to area off South
Viet-Nam.
(3) Expansion and/or extension of current Special Warfare
Exercise in Thailand, if feasible.
(4) Earlier scheduling of the SEATO air exercise now scheduled
in; Thailand for April, if feasible.
2. That, together with the foregoing measures, we move in the diplomatic
arena (a) to reassure our allies as to our intentions to stand by US
commitments in Southeast Asia, (b) to indicate that the US is considering
further measures for coping with Communist aggression in the area, (c)
to produce evidence of North Vietnamese intervention in Laos and South
Viet-Nam. Among the diplomatic measures to be taken, we will:
(a) Publicize fully Communist actions in Laos in violation of
the Geneva Accords.
(b) Consult with Souvanna Phouma in order (1) to convince him of
our intention to prevent the Communists from destroying the
Actions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Group A of Phase II
** Actions No. 1 of Group C of Phase II
***,Actions 1, 3, and 4 of Group B of Phase II. It is impossible at this
time to determine the duration of deployment.
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the Geneva settlement and to uphold the position of his government
and (2) to obtain his support or tacit acquiescence in our course
of action.
(c) Consult fully with Thailand
I Continue to encourage the Thai to strengthen their
military forces in Northeast Thailand
(d) Coordinate with Thailand the extent and character of SEATO approval
and. involvement.
(e) Obtain maximum support and contributions from the UK, Australia
"and New Zealand.
(f) Urge the British to go to the Soviets again urgently and demand Co-
Chairmen action in support of Souvanna. IT the Soviets continue to
gtafl, the British should issue a unilateral. statement in reply to
Souvanna's appeal.
(g) Follow up the British approach with a direct approach of our own
to the Soviet Co-Chairman. We should also speak to the Poles.
(h) Inform the Indian and Canadian governments and their ICC Commissioners
,of our projected actions, and continue to press them for more forceful
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