A STAFF REPORT FOR SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD RE: LAOS: APRIL 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 3, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

Ap
92d Congress
1st Session
LAOS : APRIL 1971
A STAFF REPORT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY
AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NOTE.-Sections of this committee print have been deleted at the
request of the Department of State, Department of Defense,
and Central Intelligence Agency. Deleted material is indi-
cated by the notation "[Deleted]."
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-324 WASHINGTON : 1971
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMI:C B. PEARSON, Kansas
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri, Chairman
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana JACOB K. DAVITS. New York
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
PAT HoLT, Staff Assistant
JAMES G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Assistant
RICHARD M. Moosa, Staff Assistant
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CONTENTS
Preface --------------------------------------------------------------
I. Introduction ---------------------------------------------------
II. Summary and general observations------------------------------
III. The military situation------------------------------------------ 3
IV. Air operations------------------------------------------------- 7
V. The military assistance program-------------------------------- 12
VI. CIA activities-------------------------------------------------- 14
VII. The AID program---------------------------------------------- 17
VIII. Miscellaneous points-------------------------------------------- 19
IX. Future prospects----------------------------------------------- 21
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At a meeting in executive session on May 21, the Subcommittee on
U.S. Security Agreements and Comrnitnients Abroad received a re-
port, classified "top secret," from James G. Lowenstein and Richard
M. Moose of the subcommittee staff on a trip which they had made to
Laos on behalf of the subcommittee. The information contained in
their report added considerably to the subcommittee's understanding
of the nature and extent of the activities of the United States in Laos.
T felt that the importance of this information was such that it should
be brought to the attention of the Senate and accordingly a closed
session was held for this purpose on June 7 at my request and with
the concurrence of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
The staff of the subcommittee has now reviewed the report with
representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency. After considerable discussion of the basis
and need for continued security classification of much of the infor-
mation in the report-a process which lasted 5 weeks-the representa-
tives of the executive branch agreed to publication of the report as now
issued. Nevertheless, considerable information has been deleted at
their insistence.
While T do not agree that the publication of some of the material
which has been deleted from the report which follows would adversely
affect our national security, the information which does appear will
give the American public a. far better picture of U.S. involvement in
Laos than can be found in any previous public government report.
STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman,, Subcommittee on United States Security Agree-
ments and Commitments Abroad, Committee on Foreign
Relations.
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During our visit to Laos from April 22 to May 4, 1971, we met with
Ambassador Godley and the senior and junior civilian officials and
military officers in the I U.S. Mission. In addition, one or both of us met
with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma ; the Foreign and Defense
Delegates and the Transport Minister; the Commander of Military
Region V and the Governor of Xiang Khouang Province; the Pathet
Lao representative in Vientiane; reporters, teachers, and others in pri-
vate life; and a number of other Ambassadors. We spent a weekend in
Savannakhet with the Ambassador and Chief of the AID Mission who
were there to open an airfield during which time we visited the Air
Operations Center, the [deleted], the irregular force base camp and the
irregular training camp known as "Whiskey Three"; a day at the
Long Tieng base, the headquarters of Genertl Vang Pao, with whom
we lunched, and at Site 32. a village composed mostlyy of resettled Meo
refugees which is north of the Plain of Jars and is the only enclave in
that area not under Pathet Lao control; and a day in Thailand at
I?dorn, visiting the 7/13th Air Force and the 1802 Joint Liaison De-
tachment [deleted], and at Nakhon Phanom Air Base, visiting [de-
leted] which is the activity that runs the so-called electronic battlefield
in southern Laos.
II. SUAMARYAND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
A. Most observers in Laos say that from the military point of view
the situation there is growing steadily worse and the initiative seems
clearly to be in the hands of the enemy. There are apparently no plans
for retaking and holding any of the two-thirds of the country no
longer tinder govermnent control but only a, hope, not too firmly held
Laa some quarters, that the one-third of Lao territory now under gov-
ernment control can continue to be held. Since. Lam Son 719, moreYao
territory has come under enemy control, and there are about three regi-
ments more of North Vietnamese forces in southern Laos than there
were before the Lam Son operation. U.S. air operations continue in
both northern Laos and in the south against the Ho Clii Minh Trail.
In both cases the number of sorties this year is down in comparison
with last year, the reduction being proportionally greater in the north.
The principal reasons for this reduction are, first of all, the fact that
fewer aircraft are now available because some squadrons are being re-
deployed from Southeast Asia, and, second, the additional demands
imposed on remaining aircraft by the situation in Cambodia. Since
February 1970 we have been using B--52s in northern Laos on a regular
basis, a fact the Committee had not been told and that was not made
public until the open Committee hearing at which the Under Secre-
tary of State testified on May 3. We are, however, now flying about
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[deleted] times as many B-52 sorties in southern Laos as in the north-
ern part of the country. The Royal Lao Air Force has doubled its
sortie rate in the past year, but the attrition rate of their limited num-
ber of T-28 aircraft is high. We are filling the gap. The "truck kill"
rate of North Vietnamese trucks is also high, having reportedly
reached the astronomical total of over 100 a (lay in April of this year,
but even some U.S. military authorities in Southeast Asia discount
these figures, most by about 30 percent. And despite everything that
is being done in the air by the United States, and on the ground by the
South Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodlians, supplies continue to move
through Laos into Cambodia and South Vietnam. The Air Force
claims that only about one-third the quantity of supplies is getting
through this year compared to last year, but others point out that
the fact remains that the North Vietnamese are moving sufficient sup-
plies through Laos to sustain their military operations.
B. The war in Laos is run in most respects by the Embassy in
Vientiane. In fact, this undertaking seems to consume it considerable
portion of the time of the senior officers in the)VIission. The "Operations
Meeting" at the Embassy-which lasts from 9 a.m. to approximately
10:30 daily, including Saturday, and at which the Ambassador pre-
sides-is devoted in large part. to detailed briefings by the Army and
Air Attaches and the CIA Station Chief which cover practically every
military engagement of the preceeding 24 hours. Air operations are
followed very closely, even down to the types of ordnance employed,
as are the details of the deployment and support of Royal Lao Army
and irregular forces.
C. The United States continues to train, arm, and feed the Lao
Army and Air Force and to, train, advise, pay, support, and, to a great
extent, organize the irregular military forces under the direction of
the CIA. The combat element of these irregular forces is about as
large as the combat element of the Royal Lao Army. These irregular
forces include not only the forces under General Vang Pao's command
in Military Region II, but forces in every other military region of
Laos except the area immediately around Vientiane. The cost of these
irregular forces has been increasing every year, in part because as
more territory has fallen under Pathet Lao control it has become
necessary to rely increasingly on. air transport and in part because of
the rising cost of ammunition. These irregular forces have become, the
cutting edge of the military, leaving the Royal Lao Army as a force
primarily devoted to static defense.
D. [Delete.] In the past few months the Chinese have increased
their air defense capabilities along the road they are, building in north-
ern Laos. The road now reaches to the Ou River, marking the division
of responsibility between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese on
the east, and is only, some 45 miles from Pak Beng on the Mekong in
the west. The number of Chinese forces along the road has increased
from 6,000 two years ago to between 14,000 and 20,000. The concentra-
tion of anti-aircraft and associated radar installations along the road,
which has been greatly increased in recent months, makes this area
one of the most iea.vily defended in the world. The area around the
road, and north of it, is off -limits to U.S. aircraft, and supposedly to
I ,ao aircraft as well, although it was bombed in January 1970 by two
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l,ao Air Force planes. Whether related or not, the buildup of anti-
aircraft facilities followed this attack.
E. The number of Thal in Laos, at the time of our visit, was about
[deleted]. Since then, [deleted]. We were told that these "irreggular"
volunteers, as they are characterized by Thai and American officials,
are recruited for service in Laos from outside the regular Thai Army.
They are said to receive lower pay and allowances than regular Thai
Army personnel [deleted]. The costs involved are channeled through
CIA, although U.S. officials told us that they thought some of the
funds come from the Defense Department budget. As far as the fu-
ture is concerned, [deleted].
F. The Royal Lao Government continues to be almost totally
dependent on the United States, perhaps more dependent on us than
any other government in the world, and this dependence appears to
be increasing as the war continues and the military situation worsens.
The cost of U.S. military assistance to Laos has risen rapidly in the
past few months with the fiscal year 1972 program doubling since
January, mostly as the result of the rise in the cost of ammunition
and ordnance being supplied to both the Royal Lao Army and Air
Force and the irregular forces and the higher rate at which this
ammunition and ordnance is being used. The United States provides
not only for all of Laos' defense needs but for day-to-day needs as
well And on the political front, we gathered from our conversations
with various Lao that it has been made plain to all opponents of the
present Prime Minister-primarily the southern politicians and gen-
erals-that we wish to see him continue in office and that any change
in government might jeopardize continued U.S. support.
G. The Lao Government's budget for the current year is 18.3 billion
kip or, converted to dollars at the official rate of 500 kip to the dollar,
$36.6 million. By contrast the partial total of estimated U.S. expendi-
tures in Laos in fiscal year 197 1 is $284.2 million, composed of an
estimated $162.2 million in military assistance, $52 million in the
AID program, and $[deleted] million spent by CIA exclusive of the
Thai irregular costs. This partial total of estimated U.S. expenditures
amounts to $141 per capita for the approximately 2 million Lao under
government control compared with a per capita GNP estimated at
$66. Not included in the above U.S. expenditure total are items such
as the cost of U.S. air operations in northern or southern Laos or the
cost of Thai irregulars in Laos. The planned increase in fiscal year
1972 military assistance coupled with All) and CIA expenditures
a.t this year s level would bring the total of these three programs
up to $374 million. So far as we can determine, the only overall figure
ever released by the executive branch for any category of current aid
to Laos is the $52 million estimate for the AID j)rogram in fiscal year
1971, although during the Symington subcommittee hearings in 1969
the fiscal year 1971 military assistance program was estimated at $90
million. In point of fact, we were told that the actual final total for
that year was $146.4 million, as noted in the section below on the
military assistance program.
1I. U.S. activities in Laos show the interlocking relationship
between all U.S. agencies in Laos and all U.S. activities and commands
in Southeast Asia. Thus, [deleted]. The sortie rate of U.S. tactical
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aircraft is kept at ITdorn, but this information does not include the
rates for B-52s or Navy aircraft. These figures are kept by 7th Air
Force in Saigon. Within Laos, the CIA trains and advises irregular
forces, but until last. week AID had provided these forces with rice
in Military Regions I and II, while the military assistance program,
operated ostensibly under AID in Laos, provides food and equipment
to the regular Lao Amy. The U.S. Air Force flies the. planes that
bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but much of their targetine information
comes from CIA, and the final approval for their missions, at least
in some cases, comes from the Embassy.
1. Finally, there is an evident determination among V.S. officials in
Laos to continue to prosecute the. war with only gradually reduced
secrecy. It is argued, with regard to air operations. that many of these
planes are based in Thailand and are there pursuant to agreements
with the Thai Government which stipulate that (deleted]. As far as
operations of the irregular forces are concerned, some say that CIA
is not used to prosecuting a. war in public and does not see what pur-
pose would be served by doing so. Underlying many of these argu-
ment.s for maintaining secrecy is the feeling that much ofwhat the
United States is doing does violate the Geneva 1ereements of 1962,
and ancillary "understandings" thereto; and that while our violations
are. justified/by antecedent North Vietnamese violations, putting our,
violations on the public record, while North Vietnam continues to
deny that it is violating the agreements, would make it far more diffi-
c.ult, if not irnpossihle, to reactivate the provisions of the 1962
agreements.
Since last Julv. the enemy has extended his control to the western
edge of the Plain of Jars, past Muong Soni and Sam Thong, while
pushing further west in southern Laos, taking Muong Phalane, shortly
after Lam Son 719 ended. To the west of the area in which South
Vietnamese forces were active during Lana Son 719, a whole new net-
work of trails has been constructed, although the enemy continues to
use the routes in the area, in which the Lam Son operation took place.
Enemy forces have put increasing pressure. on the important towns of
Seno and Pakse, both of which are now only a. few kilometers from
the area under enemy control. Virtually the entire Bolovens Plateau
area is now held by the North Vietnamese, the few remaining Lao
outposts on its western edge having been captured in the last few days.
In sum, over. 60 percent of Laos is no longer under Lao Government
control.
The generally accepted figure for the entire population of Laos has
been 2.8 million, although some dispute this figure and claim that it
is closer to 2 million. On the basis of the 2.8 million figure, the Embassy
claims 2.1 million under government control, although a publication
issued by the AID Mission sets the figure at 1.7 million.
In the weeks immediately preceding our visit to Vientiane, Luang
Prabang had been under virtual siege. The airfield had been rocketed
and the enemy surrounded it on all sides. During the time, that we
were there, the enemy pulled back, indicating an intention not to take
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a
the royal capital. During the same period, however, they rocketed the
principal base at Long Tieng daily with rocket attacks averaging 30
a week-
Tr ying to estimate enemy intentions is a constant concern of Ameri-
can officials in Vientiane as it is in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.
The prevailing assumptions at the time of our visit were that the North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao would continue the war in the north
despite American and Lao bombing; that they could continue to move
supplies through Laos into Cambodia and South Vietnam although at
a reduced rate, again regardless of the bombing, and in fact could do
in Laos pretty well whatever they wished during both wet and dry
seasons provided they were willing to take heavy casualties in some
cases; that they probably would not try to take Luang Prabang because
it is the site of the Royal Palace and home of the King and such
an attack would therefore have a deleterious effect on public opinion
in Laos; that the Royal Lao Government forces will [deleted]. In
this connection, both American and Lao officials told us that they
would consider the loss of Long Tieng to be a disastrous psychological
blow and hence had determined. that it should be defended. Under-
standably, General. Yang Pao was particularly adamant on this point
for Long Tieng represents virtually the last foothold of the Meo peo-
p i e in northern Laos.
Recent new developments atlecting the military situation, all re-
ported in the press since our visit, have been the deployment., for the
first time, of North Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles in southern
Laos, the development of a road system into the Plain of Jars which
will enable the North Vietnamese to operate throughout the rainy
season, and the occasional sighting of North Vietnamese MIGs over
Lao territory, a potential new hazard for the Lao T-28s and the U.S.
pilots flying Forward Air Control missions in small observation planes.
B. FRIENDLY FORCES
Friendly forces in Laos consist of I deleted] in the royal Lao Army,
[deleted] in the neutralist army, [deleted] in the Royal Lao Air Force,
and some 30,000 Lao and [deleted] Thai irregulars (which are de-
scribed in section VI below). Friendly forces thus total. between 95,150
and 97,650 compared to enemy l`or?ces of about 115,000 to 139,000.
Of the [deleted] in the Royal Lao Army, somewhere between
[deleted] and [deleted] are irnfantry, depending on whether the Army
Attache estimates of those present for duty is taken or the Lao Army
figure is used 'as a basis for calculation.
It has apparently become increasingly difficult in the past year' or
so to maintain an adequate level of manpower in the Royal Lao Army.
There are very few enlistments and uo national conscription system.
From time to time manpower requirements are set by Royal decree
for each military region, and quotas are then levied on provinces and
villages. What follows is said by some to resemble a press gang opera-
tion in which only those without political connections end up,ni the
Army. We were. told that 30 percent of all. new recruits desert.
The length of service in the Royal Lao Army is 2 years and the basic
pay for a private is equivalent to $5 per month plus allowances for
depen.detits. Soldiers apparently seldom receive all of the money or
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food to which they are entitled, and the rolls of some units are said
to be padded with personnel who never existed or who have been
killed, are missing, or have deserted. We were told about one unit in the
neutralist army, for example, which was supposed to have 300 men
but when mustered could produce only 25. Another American told us
that such an accomplishment would be the envy of many other battal-
ion commanders.
The estimate of enemy forces in Laos as of April 20 was between
114,765 and 139,000. The 139,000 estimate is composed of 100,000 North
Vietnamese and 39,000 Pathet Lao. The estimate in March of 1968 was
91,690 composed of 40,045 North Vietnamese troops and 51,645 Pathet
Lao.
It thus seems clear that the North. Vietnamese have been able to
increase the level of their forces in Laos despite the heavy casualties
they have taken. In fact, at the time of our visit there were three more
regiments of North Vietnamese forces--about 15,000 men-in southern
Laos than there before. Lam Son 719 began, although some of the
enemy forces who fought in Laos during that operation had returned
to North Vietnam.
[Deleted.]
Of the North Vietnamese in Laos, some [deleted] are in infantry
battalions; [deleted] in transportation, engineering, and communica-
tions units; [deleted] in anti-aircraft and artillery units, [deleted]
in Pathet Lao infant.rv battalions or as advisors to such battalions ; and
[deleted] in armored units. [Deleted.] In all, about 80 percent of the
North Vietnamese are in southern Laos in Military Regions III and
IV.
As for the Pathet Lao troops, [deleted] are infantry battalions with
some [deleted] of .these in Military Region I: [deleted] each in Mili-
tary Regions II and IV; [deleted] in Military Region III (where.
North Vietnamese strength is particularly high) ; and [deleted] in
Military Region V. About 60 percent of all Pathet. Lao forces-combat
and support-are in northern Laos.
The ratio of enemy killed to friendly killed in action is far lower
than the ratio released for Vietnam. In the period from 1968 through
the first 4 months of 1971, the irregular forces lost 8,020 killed in ac-
tion (of which 6,873 were. lost in _Military Regions I and II). while
killing an estimated 22,726 of the enemy. During this same period the
Royal Lao Army lost 3,664 killed in action, while, killing 8.522 of the
enemy. The enemy kill ratio is thus far higher for the. irregular forces.
At the same time, however, the brunt of irregular losses has fallen
heavily upon tribal groups such as the. Moo, which is one of the reasons
why Thai irregulars have been brought into Military Region IT.
The North Vietnamese units are definitely carrying the brunt of the
fighting and taking most of ilie casualties, and most. Pathet Lao units
have North Vietnamese cadre. It seems to some observers that the. North
Vietnamese are deliberately sparing the Pathet Lao for the future
when they will vie for political control in Laos with non-Communist
Lao forces whose, numbers will have been greatly reduced by war losses
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inflicted by the far more numerous North Vietnamese. During our stay
in Vientiane, a number of Pat.het Lao, possibly as many as 200, were
reported to have "rallied" to the Government side. Authorities in Vien-
tiane were endeavoring to exploit these defections which they believe,
on grounds which were not altogether clear to some observers, to be
indicative of a "trend."
The number of Chinese forces along the road they are building in
northern Laos has increased from between 6,000 and 8,000, the figure
given the subcommittee 2 years ago, to somewhere between 14,000 and
20,000.
The Chinese have also moved in a heavy new increment of radar-
directed anti-aircraft weapons, increasing the number by 100 in the
last 6 to 7 months to the present total of 395, including for the first
time guns of 85mm and 100mm, the latter said to be effective up to
68,000 feet. Since early 1970, they have also [deleted]. Of the Chinese
troops along the road, those who hold to the lower figure of 14,000
say that between 3,000 and 3,500 are members of anti-aircraft crews
and the rest construction workers, while those who give the higher esti-
mate say that anti-aircraft crews total 6,000 to 7,000.
As a result of recent work done on the road, it will be a motorable
all-weather surface dual-lane highway by August all the way from
the Chinese border to Muong Hnon, although there has been no ex-
tension of the road past Muong Huon since February 1970. In addi.-
tion to upgrading earlier road construction, the Chinese have, since
November 1970, constructed eight small arms firing ranges of a kind
normally associated with garrisons of ground troops as well as large
headquarters buildings and 66 basketball courts. There are 154 camps
along the road. The western branch of the road still ends 45 miles
from Pak Beng on the Mekong River, scene 20 miles from Thailand.
On the eastern leg of the road, only a bridge or ferry across the River
On needs to be built to connect with the road which has been recon-
structed from Dienbienphu into Laos.
We were told, on originally inquiring, that there had been no prov-
ocation which would account. for the sudden buildup in anti-aircraft
defenses along the road. After farther inquiry, however, we leaned
that the Lao Air Force had bontbed the road at least twice. In the
most recent and important such incident, two Lao T-28s from Luang
Prabang flew over the road in January 1970 and claimed to have been
fired upon by the Chinese. In their debriefing the pilots stated they
had then destroyed 10 trucks. This claim could not be confirmed from
later photography, although the photographs did show craters on
the road. [Deleted.]
TV. AM OPERATIONS
U.S. air operations in Laos have declined in the course of the past
year and are now below the level of the first 9 months of 1969. At that
time, the United States was flying about [deleted] sorties a day in
northern Laos and [deleted] a day in. southern Laos, a total of 1-00
sorties a day. One year ago, the average daily rate, was about 3150
sorties-[deleted] in northern Laos and [deleted] in southern Laos.
In April of this year, the rate averaged about 340 sorties a day-[de-
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leted] sorties a day in northern Laos and [deleted] a day in southern
Laos, although during the last week in April, while we were in Laos,
the sortie rate averaged 282 a day-[deleted] in the north and [de-
leted] in the south.
On February 18, 1970, the United States began B-52 missions
against northern Laos, The White House confirmed in March 1970
that one B-52 mission had taken place in northern Laos, butthere had
been no subsequent disclosure that B-52's were bombing northern
Laos on a regular basis. In fact, the Committee had not been informed,
even on a classified basis, that 13-52 raids had been extended to north-
ern Laos, although several times executive branch. witnesses were pre-
pared so to testify in executive session if asked. Our telegram from
Vientiane reporting on B-52 operations in northern Laos was relayed
to the Committee by the Department on April 29, 1971. Wfien Under
Secretary Irwin was asked about B-52s at the public hearing on May
3, he acknowledged the fact of B--52 operations in northern Laos but
said.that lie could not supply sortie figures as these were not available
in the State Department. It is interesting to note, in this connection,
that documents dealing with B-52 operations in northern. Laos are
classified "Top Secret" while B-52 operations in the. south are con-
sidered "Secret."
The figures we were given by the Embassy in Vientiane indicated
that the B-52 sortie rate in northern Laos is higher in 1971 than it
was in 1970. We were told in Vientiane that in the first 4 months of 1971
there were [deleted] B-52 sorties in northern Laos and that in all of
1970 there had been [deleted] B--52 sorties in northern Laos.* B42
sorties in northern Laos constitute a small percentage of total B--52
strikes in Laos, both north and south. For all of Laos B--52 strikes
are now averaging [deleted] to [deleted] a day.
The reported figures for the number of North Vietnamese and
Pathet Lao trucks damaged or destroyed are growing at a geometric
rate. We were told that, during the first 29 days of April, 69 trucks
had been destroyed and over 4,133 damaged in northern Laos and over
4,850 destroyed and 1,155 damaged in southern Laos. For previous
years, the figures given us for trucks destroyed or damaged were 3,291
in 1967 ; 7 ,332 in 1968; 9,012 in 1969; and 12,368 in 1970. These figures
are not taken seriously by most U.S. officials, even Air Force officers,
who generally apply something on the order of a 30. percent discount
factor. One reason why there is some skepticism about the truck kills
clammed by the Air Force is that the total figure for the last year
greatly exceeds the number of trucks believed by the Embassy to be in
all of North Vietnam.
Truck kill and dam tue figures are arrived at through a set of criteria
developed by the Air Force. It is assumed, for example, that if a truck
is hit, by a 40mm shell it is destroyed and that if the shell hits within
10 feet of the truck it is damaged. One Air Force officer told us that
if the truck kill figures proved, on further analysis, to be unrealistic,
*Subsequently, in response to a question in an open -onunittee hearing on May P. the
Under Secretary of State said that he did not know lhow many P. 52 sorties had been flown
in northern Laos in 1970 and 1971 but would provide the figures. Under cover of a top
secret letter dated June 10, 1971, from Assistant Secretary of State Alshire, the figures
given were [deleted] sorties in 1970 and [deleted] as of May 197a-indicating a lower
sortie rate in 1971 than in 1974.
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the criteria would then be changed. Another commented that he as-
sumed that the North Vietnamese were intelligent enough to set off
decoy explosions when trucks were being attacked so that they would
be counted as destroyed or damaged even if not hit.
"Through put" figures, which refer to the estimated number of tons
transported into South Vietnam or Cambodia by either trucks or
water-borne means, are kept at 7/13th Air Force. They vary widely
with the. season and cannot take account of such unknown factors as
stockpiling. In January and February 1970, we were. told, between
1,500 and 2,500 tons were estimated to~be "in put" and between 1,150
and 1,250 tons as "through put" a week. In January and February 1971,
"in put" averaged between 2,000 and 3,300 tons a week while "through
put" averaged between 1.35 and 200 tons a week. The figures for the
week of April 14-20 showed an "in put" of 1,932 tons and a "through
put" of 824 tons, a record figure for 1971. We were told that the Lam
Son operation had not slowed the trend and that the seasonal trend
this year follows the same general pattern as last year, although at a
considerably lower level. Last year 33 percent of the "in put" was
getting throuffh. This year only 10 percent is getting through. And in
the course of the first 4 month; of this yyear, 4,000 to 5,000 tons have
gotten through, which is exactly half the amount that it is estimated
got through in the first 4 months of last year. These figures are re-
gerded with considerable skepticism by some U.S. officials who point
out that as a matter of fact the North Vietnamese continue to be able
to get. the supplies through to Cambodia and South Vietnam that they
require, for the military operations they are conducting.
*
The Royal Lao Air Force has more than doubled the number of
sorties flown in the past year. One. year ago they were flying [deleted]
sorties a month. Now the rate is [deleted]. Of this total, about [deleted]
axe T-28 bombing sorties and [deleted] are AC-47 gunship sorties.
The Roval Lao Air Force has [deleted] AC-47s and about [deleted]
T--28s. Somewhere between [deleted] and [deleted] of the T-28s were
in commission every day during our visit and available for bombing
missions. [Deleted] T-28s were reserved for training and were kept
at Udorn, as were those being repaired. The Lao Air Force has been
promised [deleted] additional T-28s through the mlitary assistance
program by the end of this December. Ten of these are, however,
borrowed from the Thai Air Force program and will have to be re-
turned or replaced.
We noticed that none of the Lao Air Force T-28s we saw in
Vientiane, Savannakhet, Long Tieng, and Udorn were marked except
for serial numbers on the tail, a fact that seemed to come as a surprise
to some American officials when it was mentioned. It seems clear that
this procedure would allow them to be interchanged with other T-28s.
* * *
The sortie rate of the 7/13th Air Force seems to provide a rough
index to the intensity of the air war in Laos. In January 1970, monthly
sorties in Laos reached a high point of 14,000, of which about [deleted]
were in northern Laos and [deleted] in southern Laos. The sortie rate
then began to decline, the rate of sorties in northern Laos more rapidly
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than the rate in southern Laos, and total sorties in April of this year
were 8,299. The projection for the next fiscal year is that the total.
will. further decrease to an authorized maximum of [deleted] a month.
U.S. sorties in Laos are controlled by a complicated set of "Rules of
Engagement and Operational Authorities." These rules seem to make it
impossible for villages or other nonmilitary targets to be bombed. In
brief, target information is developed either by Royal Lao Army units,
CIA irregular units, electronic means, aerial visual reconnaissance, or
photo intelligence. 7/13th or 7th Air Force then selectes targets and
these requests are passed to the mission in Vientiane. Planned strikes
are first reviewed by the Air Attache, or--for targets in southern Laos
outside the Trial area-by the Air Operations Center at Sava.nnakhet,
and then passed to a junior Foreign Service officer in the Embassy
(known locally as the "Bombing Officer") for "validation" or ap-
proval. Ile checks proposals against the rules of engagement and the
latest aerial maps which show nonmilitary "structures" in order to
make certain, for example, that the proposed strikes are targeted more
than 500 meters from "active villages" (defined as one building, hut,
or structure not validated by the Embassy for a strike) and at least
500 meters fram friendly intelligence teams. If there is any doubt in the
Bombing Officer's mind, he passes the request on to the Deputy Chief
of Mission or Ambassador for final decision. In 1970, 86 percent of all
requests for tactical air strikes, 76 percent of the requests for B'-52
strikes in northern Laos, and 70 percent of the requests for strikes
in special operating areas, which are explained below, were approved.
When U.S. tactical aircraft arrive over targets, they are controlled
by U.S. Forward Air Controllers accompanied by Lao spotters.
B-52 strikes are directed against two categories of special operat-
inn areas : SOLOAS, which are specially validated areas, and PAR-
VELAS which are partially validated areas. These special operating
areas are, in effect, free fire zones. They are areas in which it has been
determined by the Embassy that there is no civilian population or
civilian structure of any sort. SOLOAS are considered to be validated
without further clearance except when napalm is used. PARVELAS
require 72-hour advance notice to the Embassy. At the time of our
visit there were 11 SOLOAS and four PARVELAS.
There is one other kind of prevalidated strike area known as a
SOA (special operating area) in which tactical air strikes can be made
against any military target without specific validation. In these areas
the Embassy has predetermined that there are no "active villages."
Napalm may be used within the SOA for several kinds of targets, and
any type of ordnance approved for use in Laos may be jettisoned
within the SOA. At present one group of SOAs covers most of the
Plain of Jars plus Route 7 leading from North Vietnam to the Plain.
The rules of engagement for U.S. air operations vary from one area
of Laos to another. In eastern Laos pilots have maximum flexibility
whereas in the far north, adiacent to China, there are no U.S. combat
air operations. In fact, no U.S. aircraft are permitted to enter this
area without Embassy Vientiane, CINCPAC, and JCS approval.
[Deleted.]
American pilots who fly Forward Air Control missions do so out
of five Air Operations Centers. These are located in Vientiane, Pakse,
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havannakhet. Luang Prabang, and Long Tieng. In theory each Amer-
ican Forward .Air Controller has a Lao pilot in the back seat who is
there because he knows the ground situation and can communicate
with ground Forward Air Guides. There are 53 Royal Lao Army
Forward Air Guides and 129 from the irregular units spread through-
out all military regions.
Given the apparent stringency of these rules of engagement, it is
difficult to see how roads with civilian traffic, villages and groups of
civilians could have been bombed, rocketed, or napalmed. It seems
clear, however, although the rules are stricter now than they were
some, years ago, that mistakes do happen (especially when Forward
Air Controllers begin flying missions as soon as they arrive at Laos)
that some pilots have deliberately violated the rules of engagement,
expending ordnance. against- unauthorized targets (the town of Khang
Khay being a notable example) ; and that the system itself is so coin-
plicated that it cannot possibly be. foolproof. Indeed, the effort to
provide in the rules of engagement, for every contingency appears to
create obvious loopholes. One is the rule which allows ground fire to be
returned virtually anywhere in Laos when a, U.S. plane is participating
in a search and rescue operation or is flying in support of infiltrating
or exfilt.rating troops.
There are plenty of instances known to American civilian employees
who have been in Laos for some years in which civilian targets have
been bombed. There is a certain reluctance, especially on the part of
the Air Force, to admit that mistakes have happened which tends to
undermine the credibility of official claims made. about the infallibil-
ity of the conduct of the air war in Laos. The Embassy itself is quite
insistent that the rules are scrupulously observed. Yet it apparently
has no system for regular photographic review of the, results of incli-
viduat strikes. although it can and does ask for special photography if
there is reason to believe a violation has occurred. We made several
attempts to obtain photographs of specific towns which Nye had been
told had been bombed. The Embassy was unable to produce such photo-
graphs and neither was 7/13th Air Force. The Lao Ministry of Infor-
mation was reported to have photographs of bomb damage on the
Plain of Jars. In response to its efforts to obtain copies of these for us,
the Embassy was given only photographs of sightseeing dignitaries
and fuzzy distant views of Xieng Khouangville.
The Royal Lao Air Force is not bound by the same rules of engage-
ment and is theoretically free to do what it wishes, although we were
told that U.S. officials have sought to do their best to influence the
Lao to adhere to the same general principles. Nevertheless, Lao T-28
bombers have attacked towns, Sara vane being a well-known case in
point, the Chinese road and other targets that are clearly off-limits to
U.S. aircraft. As noted above, Lao T-28s are not marked so some of
these attacks may well be blamed on the United States. U.S. Forward
Air Controllers have been able to assume control over virtually all of
the Lao Air Force sorties in Military Regions III, IV and V, but not
in Military Regions I and II. Furthermore, Lao Air Force pilots are
ach military
given special combat allowances which are different in each-
region, and at least in some military regions they are paid a bonus for
each sortie so that, there is an incentive not to adhere too strictly to
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rules of engagement. Lao AC-47 gunships are not controlled by For-
ward Air Controllers but control their own missions, although most
of these missions occur in situations where friendly troops are in con-
tact with enemy forces.
Aircraft loss figures are difficult to obtain in Vientiane, but we were
told that between January 1970 and April 1971 there have been 25
I.S. aircraft and 13 crew members lost in northern Laos and 56 air-
craft and 53 crew members lost in southern Laos. These totals do not
include U.S. Forward Air Controllers (five FACs and one Air Oper-
ations Center commander were lost- in 1970 and three FACs in the
first 4 months of 1971), the B-52s (although none has been lost in
combat in Indochina) or Navy carrier aircraft.
In addition to military aircraft operations, there is a large U.S.
civilian fleet, operating in Laos run by Air America, Continental Air,
and Lao Air Transport. These three carriers operate under contracts
with AID, although funds are provided by AID, the. Defense Depart-
ment, CIA. and the State Department. The funding; arrangements are
worked out in Washington.
We were told that the civilian air fleet, consists of 20 helicopters, 12
C-123s, 7 C-7As, 5 helios, 10 Porters, 7 C-46s, and 1 Volpar. The
C-123s and C-7As are "bailed" aircraft; that is, they are rented from
the Air Force. Like the Lao T-28s, they tire unmarked.
In fiscal year 1970, the air transport contract costs involved were
$5 million for AID (of which $0.5 million was for "bailed" aircraft),
$[deleted] million for CIA, and $11.7 million for the AID Require-
ments Office which administers the military assistance prograsn. Air
transport contracts thus totaled $26.2 million. We were told that this
total is up about 10 percent in fiscal year 1971.
Half of AID's fixed wing contract of $3.5 million was for refugee
relief. Some of the CIA contract goes to ferry Americans back and
forth each. da.y to Long Tieng, Sam Thong, and refugee sites, as the
military situation is so precarious that Americans (to not remain there
overnight. There are, for example, 55 Americans at Long Tieng and
Sam Thong who are shuttled back and forth from Vientiane every day.
The most recent information the Committee has received from the
I)ennartment of Defense on the Defense Department funded military
assistance program in Laos is a document dated January 26, 1971, and
entitled "Estimated Amounts Included in MilitarFunctions Appro-
priation Fiscal Year 1972 Budget for Support of-Free World Forces
in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand and Related Costs in Fiscal Year 1970,
Fiscal Year 1971, and Fiscal Year 1972." That document gives as total
estimated figures for funding the military assistance program in Laos
amounts of $74.2 million in fiscal year 1970, $117.3 million in fiscal year
1971, and $125.8 million in fiscal year 1972. In Vientiane we were told
that the fiscal year 1970 program ceiling was not $74.2 million but. $125
million (although even that ceiling has been exceeded by $21.4 million,
so that the total military assistance program ceiling for fiscal year
1970 was not. $74.2 million but $146.4 million). We were also told that
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as a result of "recent messages from Washington," the fiscal year 1971
ceiling had been increased to $162.2 million, and the fiscal year 1972
ceiling to $252.1 million.
The explanation which we were given for the increase in total pro-
grain for fiscal year 1972, which is double the original estimate of the
new funds needed, was the sharp increase in fighting and the rising
cost of ammunition and ordnance. According to figures given us in
Vientiane, these ammunition and ordnance costs were $79.4 million
in fiscal year 1970, declined to $51.7 million in fiscal year 1971, but
rose to $136.3 million in fiscal year 1972. Of that $136.3 million, the
Royal Lao Air Force is to receive $[deleted] million (compared to
about. half that amount in fiscal year 1971), and the irregulars will
require an additional [deleted) million worth of ammunition. Inci-
clentally, the other most noticeable change in the program between 1970
and 1.972 is the rise in operating costs of the Lao Air Force from$74.3
million in fiscal year 1970 to [deleted] million in fiscal year 1972, re-
flecting costs of the [dcletecl] T-28s to be provided the Lao by the end
of this.calendar year.
Military assistance costs are thus rising steeply, as they have
throughout the program. According to the figures we obtained in Vien-
tiane, the cost of the military assistance program when it began in
fiscal year 1963 was $11.9 million. That cost rose to $21.4 million in
fiscal year 1964, $40.8 million in fiscal year 1965, $59.7 million in fiscal
year 1966, $80.8 million in fiscal year 1967, $79.4 million in fiscal year
1968, $90.4 million in fiscal year L969, and-as explained above-$146.4
million in fiscal year 1970, $162.2 million in fiscal year 1971, and $252.1
million in fiscal year 1972. The cost of military assistance thus doubled
every year between fiscal year 1063 and fiscal year 1965, doubled again
between fiscal year 1965 and fiscal year 1967, and in fiscal year 1972 it
will be more than three times as large as it was in fiscal year 1967 (and
25 times as large as it was when it began 9 years ago).
The military assistance program is designed to support a Defense
Department "force goal" recently increased from [deleted] to
[deleted]. As noted above, Royal Lao Arniy and Air Force strength
is now [deletedJ.
The Royal Lao Air Force has some [deleted] T-28s, [deleted] C-47s,
[deleted] 1I-34 helicopters, and [deleted] small 0-1 and U-17 air-
craft. It is "authorized" [deleted] T-28s. The rate of loss of T-28s
has been about [deleted] a year, although in this fiscal year almost
that many have already been lost. As noted above, [deleted] new T-28s
are scheduled to be provided between now and December, although 10
of these will go to the Thai Air Force to replace the 10 now on loan
from that program.
The logistical functions of the military assistance program are
administered in Laos by the AID Requirements Office rather than by a
MAAG as would normally be the case. This device is used in order to
maintain the appearance of U.S. compliance with the prohibition
against foreign military advisory personnel contained in the. 1962
Geneva Agreements. The Requirements Office has 34 U.S. direct hire
employees, all of whom are former military personnel but are. now
AID employees; 24 third country nationals; 93 local employees; and
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65 Filipinos under contract to Eastern Construction Co. In addition,
there are three Defense Department employees, 1?1 U.S. dependents,
three local employees, and 24 Filipinos under contract to the Eastern
Construction Co. who run an English language school for Lao military
personnel. We did not have the chance to hearhow Lao who have. been
taught English by a Filipino use the language, but. those who have say
the end product is ofen quite unique.
The Requirements Office has regional offices in each military region
where liaison work is done with the Army and the Air Force. We were
told that there is not much emphasis in the Requirements Office opera-
tion on end-use checking because, it was stated to us, a Presidential
waiver has been granted. (In Cambodia, on the other hand, we had
been told that there has been no such waiver, and end-use requirements
thus continue to be used as a justification by the Defense Department
in arguing for an increase in the size of the Military Equipment
Delivery Teams and more direct control over the military assistance
program by CINCPAC.)
In addition to the Requirements Office personnel, Army Attache
personnel also work with the Lao Army and Air Force in the military
regions. Of the 127 authorized Army Attache personnel, 24 are assist-
ant Army Attaches stationed in the five military regions working with
Royal Lao Army units. In addition to gathering information and doing
some end-use checking, they perform what seems to amount to an
advisory function. One officer from the Army Attache office is per-
manently detailed to USIS where his job is to "publicize the Lao
Government to the Lao people." Incidentally, these Army personnel
wear uniforms in the field and are referred to by rank. The Air Force
personnel in the Air Operations Centers do not wear uniforms, are
called "Mister" and say they are with the AID Mission if asked.
The most effective military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army,
but the. force known previously as the Arin6e Clandestine, then as the
SGU (for Special Guerrilla Units) and now as the BGs (for the
French term Bataillens Guerriers). The BCT units are. Part of the
irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and,
to a great extent., organized by the CIA. The BG units have become
the cutting edge of the Lao military forces, as one U.S. official put it.
The Royal Lao Army forces are concentrated near centers of popula-
tion, lines of communication, depots, and airfields and in fact 3,000
members of the Army, or over 5 percent of the force, is tied up in
straight guard duty.
Royal Lao Army units are all controlled by individual military
region commanders who are frequently likened to warlords. We were
told that Vientiane authorities are thus not at liberty to move them
from one region. to another as the overall military situation may re-
quire. Apparently each such move requires negotiation with regional
authorities. The BG units, because of the American connection, are
relatively free from such constraints. We were told, for example, that
at the outset of the recent crisis in Luang Prabang, the Prime Minister
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asked for irregular units to defend the capital,. The request was refused,
and the Prime Minister was compelled to negotiate with the regional
commanders in order to increase the forces around Luang Prabang.
The Prime Minister's success in this negotiation was cited as an in-
dication of a growing sense of national responsibility on the part of
regional military and political figures or, at least, as a manifestation
of their devotion to the king.
In addition to the greater flexibility with which they may be used,
the irregular forces are considered by American officials to be better
disciplined and more capable of conducting independent unit opera-
tions. It is the BG units that do most of the day-to-day patrolling,
ambushing, and attaching throughout the country. As for other irregu-
lar units, [deleted], self-defense units organize the defense of villages
and commando teams go out to destroy trucks, nd supplies and ambush
troops.
All of those in the BG units are volunteers (referred to by the
Americans in charge of the program as "assets") with the exception
of some 1,500 cadre personnel and officers from the Royal Lao Army.
The CIA supervises the operation closely and claims that, [deleted],
the irregular units receive the rations and pay due them. Also unlike
the Royal Lao Army, they are guaranteed evacuation by Air America
helicopters and subsequent medical care, which for at least some of
there is in a U.S. field hospital at the Royal Thai Air Force base at
Udorn, Thailand. CIA "Case Officers" supervise the training and
advise on operations of these irregular units, but we were told that
they do not accompany them on operations.
BG units and other CIA supported paramilitary and intelligence
units exist not only in Military Region IT, -where. they first began as
a force of Meo tribesmen tinder General Vang Pao, but in every mili-
tary region., except Military Region V around Vientiane. There are
[deletcdl in Military Region I. [deleted] in Military Region IT,
[deleted] in Military region III, and [deleted] in Military Region
IV. About 38 percent of the irregulars are thus in Military Region IT.
In fiscal year 1967, the irregular forces totaled 37,800. Their strength
rose to 39,800 in fiscal year 1969, but then dropped to present totals
by March of this year. The authorized force level for U.S. support is
[deleted]. The size of the irregular forces has been reduced since
fiscal year 1969 because of attrition, principally desertion, heavy
casualties, and the financial restraints incurred by budgetary limita-
tions. Wre were told that the costs of these forces have gone up as
increased combat activity resulted in the expenditure of more ordnance
and because of the necessity to rely more and more on air transport
as more Lao territory has fallen under enemy control. The CIA budget
for the Lao irregulars was [deleted] million in fiscal year 1969. This
year, we were told in Vientiane, it is expected to be about $[deleted]
million. This figure does not include the costs connected with the
Thai irregulars.
At the time of our visit to Long Tieng on April 28, there were
[deleted] Thai there, at the nearby base of Sam Thong, and at Hill
1663 near Sam Thong. (There was also a small Thai team of [deleted]
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16
men at Vain Yu in Military Region I.) The. Thai irregulars are under
[deleted] and the overall command of General Vang Pao, Commander
of -Military Region It. Of these [deleted].
Most of the irregulars have. been recruited, we were told, as a "volun-
teer force" outside the Thai Army, although [deleted]. The. Thai
irregular program developed during the past year and was designed
by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in
Laos. The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars
in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death
benefits), and operational costs in Laos. We were told that the details
of the funding were not known in Vientiane. as all of this bookkeeping
is done in Washington. We were also told, however, that. some of the
funds probably come from the Defense Department budget. The pay
and allowances of the Thai irregulars are said to be less than those of
regular Thai Army personnel [deleted.]. The Thai irregulars are
transported from Thailand to Laos by Air America and are returned to
Thailand when their tours are up again by Air America. We were told
that the Embassy wanted to [deleted] the [deleted] with (deleted]
because the 1- I deleted 1 were more mobile and thus "could do things the
others could not do." As for the future. [deleted]. The need for Thai
"volunteers" results from the fact that the military manpower base in
Laos is estimated to be 1.14,765 and. the Lao Army, neutralist army,
irregulars and Pathet Lao all must draw from thi1 base which is now
exhausted. (General Vans; Pad's forces, for example, have suffered
>,~72 killed and 5,426 wounded since 1967: as a result 40 percent of his
forces are no longer -Meo but Lao Thung). Thus additional military
manpower can only come outside Laos. Estimates of the number of
additional [deleted]. We also understand that there have been inter
rn'ttent discussions reurarding the possibility of [deleted].
Incidentally, we asked what motivated Thai to volunteer for the
irregular forces in Laos in light of the'heavy losses they have suffered.
IVe were told that the principal motivation was [deleted].
O. [DELETED]
The irregular force camps continue to be kept behind a barrier of
strict official secrecy. This applies particularly to the principal camp
at. Long Tieng. Reporters are not permitted on either Air America,
Continental, Lao Air Force, or civilian planes which land, or which
even might land, at Long Tieng airport. the only means of reaching the
camp. Every nonofficial American or Lao who wishes to flv to Long
Tieng must. have written permission from General Vang Pao, and
passengers are checked both getting on and getting off planes. In fact,
a few chosen reporters have been allowed to visit Long Tieng but they
have. been sworn to secrecy.
The principal arguments we heard for the need to continue to main-
tain secrecy were these : first, that General Va.rrg Pao does not want to
allow the press to visit because his military security would be com-
promised : second. that if reporters were permitted to visit Long Tieng,
they would concentrate on the role of the T7nited States. overlooking
Van.g Pao's contribution, third, that CIA is a clandestine organza-
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tion not used to operating iii the open and that its operations in other
parts of the world might be compromised if the techniques and indi-
viduals involved in Laos were to become known ; fourth, that were U.S.
activities publicized, the United States would be accused of violating
the Geneva Agreements of 1962 and it would thus be more difficult
to re-establish the Geneva Agreements as a framework for a future
settlement in Laos; and fifth, that the details of the Thai presence
would become known which would [deleted].
VII. Tiu AID PROGRAM
The total Lao budget for this year is 18.3 billion kip or $36.6 million.
The estimated total of U.S. economic assistance to Laos in fiscal year
1971 is $52.036 million, a total that has been about the same since
fiscal year 1969 when it dropped from the higher totals of fiscal year
1967 and fiscal year 1968.
The scope of the AID program covers virtually every aspect of Lao
civil administration. As a publication of the AID Mission in Laos
states, there are 24 broad projects involving various fields, 145 activi-
ties going on to implement these programs, and some 550 different
individuals jobs.
The broad categories of the AID program are economic stabiliza-
tion (the Foreign Exchange. Operations Fund which offsets the. effect
of the Lao Government's budget (Itficit), programs related to security
(such as assistance to refugees, medical assistance., and air transport),
the maintenance of governmental services (such as hospital operation,
darn repair, school building, teacher training, public administration,
police training, and highway maintenance), social infrastructure (such
as education and. nurse, training), and economic development (such
projects as rice production, fisheries, i,,ricultural research, irrigation,
power, industry, and roads). - -
Points of interest froin the AID publication "Facts on Foreign Aid
to Laos" :
(a) The government obtains 90 percent of its foreign exchange from
the Foreign Exchange Operation Fluid. Contributions to the fund
totaled $22.4 million in 1969. the last year for which figures were pub-
lished, of which the United States contributed between $16.1 million
and $18 million, depending on which set of AID figures is accepted.
Ata, minimum, in any case, the. TTnited States contributed 72.5 percent
of the foreign exchange provide(]. The other contributors were Japan
with $2 million. France with $1.7 million (although it is said that the
French have a special arrangement with the Fund which permits them
to remove foreign exchange so that their contribution is often less than
,it appears to he),the United Kingdom with $1.7 million, and Australia
with $0.7 million. When the Fund was originally established in 1964.
with a total contribution of 87.8 million, the United States provided
x11.3 nercerit of the total. That percentage has gradually increased and
has been over 70 percent since 1967.
(b) The Lao have recently had. to expend an estimated $4.5 million
in foreign exchange each-year to import rice, the production of which
began to decline in 1960.
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(c) Exports were valued at $2 million and imports at $42.2 million
in 1969. The United States was the principal source of imports in the
first half of 1970, providing about 34 percent. of total imports, followed
by Indonesia and Thailand, each with about 19 percent, Japan with 11
percent, and France with 9 percent. Since independence, the trade
deficit of Laos has always been financed by foreign economic assistance.
In 1969, 67 percent of the country's imports were financed by the
Commodity Import Program of the United States and by the Foreign
Exchange Operations Fund.
(d) Lao budgetary expenditures for security last year equaled total
government receipts.
(e) Over two-thirds of budget revenues are derived from customs
duties and more than half of this suns comes from duties on gold.
Direct taxes provide less than 10 percent of the total revenue.
(f) The literacy rate in Laos is 20 percent compared to 41 percent
in Cambodia, 60 percent in South Vietnam, and 68 percent in Thailand.
(g) The United States has constructed or improved 3,272 kilometers
of road, which is slightly less than half of the total road network of
6,392 kilometers of asphalt, gravel, or laterite and earth roads in Laos.
(h) In any given year 25,000 to 30,000 people become refugees in
Laos. The Royal Lao Government estimates that since 1964 over
600,000 people have been displaced by the war. The number of refu-
gees "supported by the government," to use the phrase found in the
AID publication, rose from about 108,000 in January 1963 to 275,000
in Jannarv 1970 and declined somewhat by May 1. to 257,800. (While
refugees depend on the (rovernment, for support, the government in
turn depends on the United States for support. In fiscal year 1971, the
United States provided $17.3 million for refugee relief.* U.S. aircraft
drop approximately 50 tons of rice each day at a total of 120 drop
sites for refugee use, and at ,in air delivery cost of $58 a ton which is
about equal to the original price of the rice, and the Public Law 480
food donation has risen from 3,700 metric tons in fiscal year 1968 to
9,800 in fiscal year 1971.)
(r) AID has constructed 76 percent of the total number of elemen-
tary classrooms in Laos, 100 percent of the. teacher training schools,
and 22 percent of the secondary schools. In all, 88 percent of the
students enrolled in schools in Laos attend schools which have received
U.S. assistance.
(,;) Economic assistance front other countries has been at an annual
amount considerably less than that, contributed by the United States.
The Nam Naum Dam is described in the AID pub] icat.ion as a. regional
project implemented under the auspices of the Mekong Committee and
financed by grants from a consortium of nine donor nations.
The donations-
onations total $28.6 million, but of this amount the United
States has contributed $15.6 million. The Asian Development
Bank haq granted Laos $250,000 for a feasibility study of agricultural
activities and a $973,000 loan for an irrigation project. The total as-
sista.nce from U.N. agencies amounted to $968,000 in calendar year
1970. France, which contributes the second Iargest. amount of foreign
assistance to Laos, is now giving between $6 and $7 million a year,
most of it for technical and educational institutions. British assistance
has dropped from a previous high point of $6 million to about $2.5
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million -annua:Ily, of which $1.7 million is the British contribution to
the ForeExchange Operations Fend. Japan provided, in 1970,
$1.7 n illion to the Foreign Exchange OperationsFund, $500,000 worth
of agricultural equipment and $30,000 worth of humanitarian assist-
ance for refugees. Australian assistance had reached an annual level
of $1.2 million by 1970 including a. $700,000 contribution to the stabili-
zation fund. West Germany has loaned the Royal Lao Government 6
million DM for the Vientiane power distribution system. Canada,
Thailand, New Zealand, and India have provided lesser amounts of
assistance.
In addition to its own activities in Laos, AID provides support for
both CIA and the military assistance program. The AID food dis'
tribution program, for example, feeds irregular military units as well
as their families who often are nearby in refugee camps. Until recently,
this program had also been totally funded by AID, but it is now,
funded almost entirely by the Defense Department. As noted earlier,
both the air operations branch and the Requirements Office of AID
are heavily involved in military ln_ograms. While visiting Savannak-
het we learned that the airport which was being dedicated that week-
end as an AID public works project had, in fact, been funded from
Department of Defense appropriations.
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
A. In the subcommittee hearings in 1969, the number of U.S. per-
sonnel as of September 30 totaled 891. Of this total, 558 were so-called
direct hire and 333 were. contract personnel. In his speech on March 6,
1970, the President gave a total or 1,040 consisting of 616 direct hire
and 424 contract. The figures we were given total between 1,143 and
1,231. Every set of figures we received, and they were given to its sev-
eral times in the course of our stay, showed 663 direct hire, but the
number of contract personnel varied from 480 to 568. We noticed that
the number of Air America personnel was now somewhere between 276
and 415. The figures we were given covered the full range. The figure
we were given for direct hire AID employees pranged from 330 to 395.
It seemed clear to us that there is considerable confusion in accounting
for the number of Americans in Laos. and that the various categories
of people are shifted to try to keep the numbers as low as possible.
III all fairness it should be said that the highest version of various
categories include CIA personnel who must be hidden in various
components of the mission staff, which may well account for some
of the confusion, and that the various contract arrangements also make
it difficult to categorize some personnel.
B. The mission does not seem to have made much of an effort to
keep a record of what factors have been responsible for "generating"
refugees. As a result, they are unable to provide proof to counter alle-
gations that most refugees are generated by I' I.S. bombing. Some of the
officers who work in the refugee. affairs section of AID, many of whom
have been in thwe country for years, estimate that between 2 to 5 per-
cent are due to the bombing. They say that the rest of the refugees
have come out because of their dislike of the North Vietnamese and
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their fear of general military activity, the most dreaded, aspect of which
is the bombing. They also say that in .the northeast about 30 percent
of the population has chosen to remain in Pathet Lao territory while
70 percent has left.. On the other hand, the few on-the-spot surveys
that have been conducted tend to put more weight on either the experi-
ence of bombing, or the fear of bombing, as a reason for moving. Cer-
tainly that was the principal reason given by a group of refugees with
whom we talked outside of Seno, only a few miles, incidentally, west
of Dong Hene captured by the. enemy 10 days after we left Laos.
Those who work most closely with the refugee problem are particu-
larly concerned about the fate of the refugees from the tribal areas,
such as the Meo. There appears to be little prospect of these people
returning to their native areas, and although they have paid a heavy
price in lives to defend their homelands against the North Viet-
namese-thereby defending the capital and the Vientiane plain as
well-the minority people. continue to be looked clown upon by the
ethnic Lao who control the Government. Some Americans believe that
the situation of the minority peoples poses a potentially serious prob-
lem as more of thorn come to recognize what little security the gov-
ermnent in Vientiane affords to then.
C. The Embassy in Vientiane told us that the latest figures that
they have for U.S. personnel missing in Laos as of January 19, 1971,
showed 232 U.S. personnel, including one Air America pilot, miss-
ing since April 1, 1965. There is no firm evidence, according to CIA,
that any of these men are being held prisoner in Laos by either the.
North Vietnamese or the. Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao representative
told its that Prince Souphanouvono, had stated recently that the Pathet
Lao were holding prisoners, including some. Americans, and that these
prisoners were being held in a safe place. We asked him if a list of the
prisoners could be obtained, pointing out that the North Vietnamese
had provided such a list. He said that the North Vietnamese had not
provided a list until after the bombing had stopped and that the Pathet
Lao, similarly, would not do so as long as the bombing continued.
D. The Royal Lao Government, is holding 92 North Vietnamese pris-
oners of war. The number of North Vietnamese prisoners taken has
thus been low in proportion to the number killed and wounded. There
were 17 prisoners taken in 1968, 15 in 1969, 26 in 19 70, and 15 in 1971.
Similarly, there have been few North Vietnamese "ralliers"; that is,
those who have. come over to the other side. These ralliers totaled 17
in 1968, 15 in 1969, 18 in 1970. and two in 1971. By comparison, there
were 725 Pathet Lao prisoners taken in 1965, 1,21311n 1969, 412 in 1970,
and 144 in 1971. Similarly, there have been far more Pathet Lao ral-
l iers-2 7 0 in 1968, 401 in 1969, 174 in 1970, and 239 in 19 71, The ex-
planation given for the low number of North Vietnamese prisoners
is that the North Vietnamese prefer to commit suicide rather than per-
mit themselves to be captured. We. also heard reports, however, that the
Lao sometimes shoot. North Vietnamese wounded prisoners, esp^c.ially
when Lao forces are in retreat.
Last. year there were discussions between the Lao and South Viet-
namese governments about turning over North Vietnamese prisoners
in Laos to South Vietnam. The decision was made not to do so. The
United States took 110 position in these discussions except to say that
it would assist both governments in whatever decision was reached.
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E. The cable of instructions sent by the State and Defense Depart-
ments about our trip asked our Embassies in any country visited to be
frank and forthcoming and to avoid confrontation at all costs but
stipulated four subjects which were not to be discussed with us. These
were: (1) the deployment of nuclear weapons; (2) military contin-
gency plans or military rules of engagement past, present or proposed,
including the operational details of joint integrated air defense; (3)
the operational details of sensitive operations, the disclosure of which
would clearly jeopardize the safety of U.S. forces; and (4) military
assistance program plans and programs beyond fiscal year 1972 (in
connection with which the Embassy was instructed to say, if the sub-
iect, arose, that no decision had been taken beyond 1972). The instruc-
tions also said that no documentation should be provided and that if
documentation were requested, guidance should be sought from Wash-
iington. In summary, the cable noted that our approach "will likely be
that of participants in an adversary process."
F. [Deleted.]
IX. FU'ITIRE PROSPECTS
No one we niet in Laos, American or Lao, seems to have a prescrip-
tion for the future other than to continue to do what is being done
now. Some observers pointed out to its that, in the long run, the odds
are heavily against defending Laos, given the advantages the North
Vietnamese enjoy. These are. a 1,300-mile front along which they can
attack; short, well-developed and increasingly heavily defended sup-
ply lines; a sanctuary largely safe from direct attack; a population
10 times that of Laos; and a, larger, more experienced and better nio-
t.iva.ted army. In their more optimistic moments Lao and Americans,
as well as most western observers, expressed a, guarded belief than the
Lao will be able to cling to what remains of their territory until the
war ends in Vietnam, believing that the war in Vietnam will end in
an agreed settlement in which the great powers will participate and
that this settlement will lead to a similar resolution of the situation
in Laos.
There. is a sporadic dialogue. between the Pathet Lao and Lao Gov-
ernments, and a Pathet Lao representative has arrived in Vientiane
within the past week to present new proposals. But these new pro-
posals are apparently harder than previous proposals and include a
demand for a bombing cessation throughout Laos-not just in parts
of Laos, as in previous demands-hefore talks can begin.
Thus, the prospect of negotiations seems shin indeed. In the first-
Iplace, the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese are in the strongest
military position they have ever enjoyed, and it is difficult to imagine
what, from their point of view, they might gain by a compromise
which did not bring an end to U.S. bombing of the Trail. In the
second place, as long as we continue to provide the Lao with the
means for continuing the war, even though at a high cost to us in
money and an exorbitant cost to them in lives, and as long as the leaders
of Laos see no crucial need to negotiate, the initiative for a political
settlement will not come. from the Lao. The latest series of attacks
all along the line in Laos may. however, force Lao leaders. to alter
their attitude toward negotiation, particularly if additional Ameri-
can Or Thai help is not forthcoming. Finally, as far as U.S. policy is
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concerned, it is quite apparent that many American officials regard
the continued prosecution of the war in .Laos; as an essential adjunct
of our current -military strategy in Vietnam because, in their vietr,
it ties down two or more North Vietnamese divisions and permits us
to exploit Lao territory to interdict the Trail, thereby buying time
for Vietnamization. In this sense, we are indeed using the Lao for
our own purposes at an increasingly heavy cost to them in lives and
territory. At the satire time, U.S. officials also believe that if U.S. air
activities in Laos were stopped, the military situation would. be even
more serious in Military Regions II, III, and IV and that all of Mili-
tary Region IT, including the vital base at Long Tieng, could be lost.
The Thai irregulars constitute t new complicating factor. one not vet
fully acknowledged by some accustomed to dealing, with Laos within
the. context of an Indochina war. Some observers pointed out to us,
however, that it would seem to follow from the presence of these Thai
in a key strategic location in Laos that the Thai will inevitably be
parties to any negotiation with the North Vietnamese, the :issue for
them beine' the line demarcating areas of influence in Laos. And in con-
nection with areas of influence, it was pointed out to us that the prac-
tical effect of the Chinese road is that the Chinese border has already
been shifted southward to encompass a: substantial portion of northern
Laos.
Both the Royal Lao Government and the United States Government
seem to consider themselves tied inextricably to the concept of the
1962 Geneva Agreements. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. indi-
cated in his conversation with us that he regards these. agreements as
a commitment on the part of the great powers in general, and the
United States in particular, to provide military assistance and fi-
nancial support. He also seems to view the agreements as a pattern
for the future. It is difficult for some observers to see how agreements
violated so blatantly, by both parties, can be regarded. as a realistic
basis for a future settlement when they have not. accomplished this
end so far. Yet the statement is persistently heard in Vientiane?
from both Lao and United States officials-that the Geneva Agree-
ments of 1962 can be implemented after the war in Vietnam is settled
or in conjunction with a settlement. And no one seems willing to ad-
mit the possibility that there may be no final settlement but merely
a continuation of the war in Vietnam, though perhaps at a somewhat
reduced level.
If there is no settlement in Vietnam and the war also continues in
Laos, Laos will remain a hostage available to the North Vietnamese
should they wish to draw American an-power away from Cambodia
and South Vietnam, embarrass the United States, threaten Thailand
or bring, the Chinese into closer involvement. Perhaps the only real
protection the Lao have is whatever limits the North Vietnamese wish
to place on themselves. Some U.S. officials believe that these limits
include not taking over the whole country but continuing to use Lao
territory as a supply route while assisting the Pathet Lao as a politi-
cal-as well as military-force with the final objective of a partitioned
Laos in which the ea-tern portion will be eoverned by the Pa.thhet Lao
and the western portion by a regime not rmsympa.thetic, to North Viet-
nam. Meanwhile, t he area under government control shrinks steadily,
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the cost to the United States rises, the Pathet Lao consolidate their
hold on territories no longer under government control and the Lao
Government's professed policy of neutralism continues to hang by the
single human thread of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Ile, in
turn, seems to be increasingly isolated from other powerful political
figures in his country who wish to involve the United States, or the
Thai, even further in the defense of what remains of their country,
knowing that they cannot possibly defend it themselves.
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