LETTER TO MR. THOMAS MCFEE FROM JOHN A. BROSS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400170026-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 9, 1966
• Content Type: LETTER

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9 September 1966
Mr. Thomas McFee
Office of Science and Technology
Room 207
Executive Office Building
Dear Tom:
You have asked me for a statement of the functions and
responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence's Staff for
National Intelligence Programs Evaluation. I am enclosing a copy
of Mr. McCone's letter of 3 September 1963 establishing this Staff
and also a copy of President Kennedy's letter of 16 January 1962 to
which Mr. McCone's letter refers. lam also enclosing a copy of
a directive approved by Mr. McCone which, I think, accurately
states the role contemplated for my Staff at the time of its creation
in November 1963. These terms of reference, however, have never
been circulated or used.
It may be helpful to say a word or two about the history
of the development of the DCI's coordinating responsibility. As you
know, of course, the statutory authority for this authority is the
National Security Act of 1947. This act reflects conflicting pressures
which existed at the time the statute was drafted and still exist today.
On the one hand, the experience of Pearl Harbor was a motivating
Influence emphasizing the need for centralization of direction and
control over all the intelligence activities and estimating facilities
of the Government as regards intelligence affecting the national
security. On the other hand, the arrangements established by the
act were imposed upon and had to accommodate departmental and ser-
vice intelligence components which commanded very considerable
resources, at home and abroad, and were deeply entrenched in the
organizational patterns of the departments and services which they
served and to which they belonged. The act accordingly emphasizes
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the Importance f a coordinated intelligence effort but expressly
pr*vtdss that the individual departments of the Government "shall
continue to collect, evaluate. correlate and disierninate departmental
Intelligence. " The various functions assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency are expressly stated to be "for the purpose of coordinating the
Intelligence activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interests of national security." The only specific
authority which the statute confers upon the Central Intelligence Agency,
however, is "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating te the
national security." Otherwise, the Central Intelligence Agency's
legal function is to act as adviser to the National Security Council
on intelligence matters, specifically including measures for improving
the coordination of the intelligence effort. The National Security
Council, through NS= 1, has directed that the Director of Central
Intelligence, as an individual, "shall coordinate the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States in accordance with existing law and
applicable National Security Directive." The net effect of this legal
matrix is a community, the components of which have defined responsi-
bilities, derived in large measure from the departments in which they
are embedded (except for CIA which is required to evaluate all intelli-
gence relating to the national security), and a DCI who coordinates the
community.
AU this may be rather elementary but seems to me worth
restating as I occasionally find considerable confusion about the extent
f the DCI's authority even among senior and experienced officials of
he Goverw:nent. The point of course is that the national intelligence
effort derives from what is, by legal definition, a community and not
an integrated institution. The Dcr ? mission is thus truly defined as
"coordinator" and not as "manager."
A good deal of concern was expressed during the early
1930"s about the need for more effective coordination of intelligence
activities and in 1936 the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board recommended that the PM should appoint a deputy or chief of
staff to who= responsibility for the direction of the affairs of the Agency
could be substantially delegated, leaving the PCI himeetf free to concern
himself with the affairs of the intelligence community as a whole. The
then DCI, Allen Della*. elected to reverse this process and appointed
=
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a Deputy for Coordination to whom he sought to delegate coordinating
responsibilities. He appointed a distinguished retired military officers
General Lucien Truscott, to this position. General Truscott devoted
thrme or four years to the problem of definieg and rationalising the
allocation of responsibilities among variOUS intelligence ageacies.
This was accomplished largely through the renegotiation of the various
NSCIDs which govern the responalbilities of the various intelligence
agencies. On General Truseetti a retirement, a Special Assistant
for Coordination was substituted for the position of Deputy.
President Kennedy's letter to Mr. &itCone restated the
philosophy which was earlier enunciated by the President's Board
to the effect that the DCI should concentrate on the affairs of the
community as a whole and delegate his responsibilities for the Agency
to a Deputy. Perhaps the most significant portion of this letter is the
authority which it confers on the Director of Central Intelligence to
deal directly with heads of departments and. jointly with them, to
undertake a continuing review of all programs conducted by the Govern-
ment involving foreign intelligence activities. In responding to this
Presidential directive. Mr. McCone was particularly concerned about
the increasing sise, complexity and cost of the intelligence effort of
the Government as a whole, of which the Bureau of the Budget and the
Congress were increasingly aware. An institutional basis already
existed for coordinating the flow of substantive information and Judg-
ments to policy makers through the Board of National Estimates and
the Office of Current bxtelligence in CIA. These arrangements were
compatible with CIA's own statutory responsibility -. to correlate and
evaluate national intelligence -- and were and are working effectively.
An adequate basis for the coordination of espionage and counter intelli-
gence activities had, by 1960, finally been achieved. Mr. McCowns
therefore um his immediate problem as that of ratiesialising the
budgetary aspects of the community and providing for the most effective
possible allocation of resources.
It was the view of those responsible for its establishment
that he NIPE gaff, which Mr. McCone created in the fall of 1963,
should function as an extension of the DCI' s personal office and develop
nformation necessary to permit informed judgments about the
anis appropriate for particular programs, the degree of overlap
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and duplication in existing activities and the measures and resources
required to fill intelligence gaps. etc. Except for Central Intelligence
Agency programs. all resources required to carry on intelligence
activities of the Government are funded through budgets presented and
defended by other departments. principally the Department of Defense.
Nevertheless, it has been generally recognized that the [CI has an over-
all interest in the size and character of the intelligence programs
funded through these budgets and perticulovrly a responsibility for
determining the needs which these programs serve. The problem
has been to make the DCrs *voidance in this respect as effective and
*pacific as possible.
We have adopted a number of approaches to this proble
a. We have worked on the development of a
central inventory of intelligence resources. This hae
been a difficult undertaking. Intelligence activities
conducted by the Defense Department are presented,
in conformity with Defense Department requirements
and procedures, in a number of different programs
using different methods and categories for purposes
of describing the level of effort attributable to functional
or geographical targets or support. We have provided
DCI representation in the reviews of each of the three
major intelligence programs conducted for the Secretary
of Defense and have formulated procedures which permit
an expression of the Dcr s views about the size and scope
appropriate for these programs. Any attempt at a
consolidated presentation of intelligence resources in
an integrated program seems to us premature. Never-
theless, we are working towards the establishment of
a common depository of information about intelligence
programs and resources which should ultimately be
useful in determining the relative amount of intelligence
effort which should be directed at particular objectives.
b. IN e have been preoccupied with various efforts
to strengthen institutional arrangements which tend to
contribute to a centralised understanding and direction of
the intelligence effort. Primarily we have tried to strengthen
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the US113 committee structure so that the needs of the
community for information can be translated as clearly
as possible into the particular product of a specific
intelligence ystem or activity. An example of this is
the work which has been done to identify the specific
requirements of the Government for communications
intelligence. The SIGINT Committee of USIA has been
made clearly responsible for providing guidance to the
Secretary of Defense and the National Security Agency
regarding the needs of the intelligence community for
coverage of particular communications sources and links.
A subcommittee of the SEGINT Committee staffed with
appropriately qualified individuals haa been established
for this purpose. R is serving very substantially to
lactose* our understanding of the contribution reasonably
to be anticipated from commrr activity to specific national
intelligence needs and thus our ability to focus the COMINT
effort of the Government.
c. V. have initiated a series of studies or rye's
using what appear to be particularly qualified consultants
to help us appraise and rationalise the total effort aimed
at particular targets or problems.
d. In view of the mutual interest in improving
the effectiveness and efficiency of intelligence programs
conducted under the authority of the Secretary of Defense,
a number of reviews have been initiated jointly by repre-
sentatives of the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. The
most recent example of these is the Joint Imagery Interpre-
tation Review Group which was established to examine
and make recommendations for the most efficient allocation
of respoasibilities for the interpretation of photography and
related coverage obtained through overhead reconnaissance.
This is a rather general statement of what we aro doing and
trying to do it. As you can see, we have been concentrating
on the budgetary and program aspects of the community and on eppor-
r strengthening organisational arrangements calculated to
mprove, within eaten** law. and regulations, the DCI's capacity to
monitor and guide the con,munity. Obviously, a continuing objective
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of all reviews conducted by the DCI or in which he participates is
to ensure that the totality of available resources and information
available from all sources and systems is brought collectively to
beer on significant problems. Obviously also, we are most
concerned to ensure a proper definition and appreciation of the needs
of the Government for particular categories of information and with
the process by which requirements are formulated and levied on
collection and analytical facilitie?.
Apart from our concern with resources. however, we are
available to assist the DCI in any aspect of his community responsi-
bilities. We have in the past been involved in matters as different
as the degree of duplication considered permissible as between
publications issued by different intelligence agencies on comparable
subjects and in security problems arising from the behavior of
personnel of a particular agency.
A. regards the particular field of information handling
and the practical possibilities for automation and related improvement
in methods for the processing, storage, retrieval and collation of
information. I have thought it wise to await the results of Bill Knox's
panel investigation before initiating any specific action on the DCI's
behalf. I am confident that your report will be extremely helpful and
look forward to its completion with a great deal of interest.
rely,
John A. Bross
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