CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE EXTENSION OF REMARKS 21 JANUARY 1970
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 2, 2002
Sequence Number:
32
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 21, 1970
Content Type:
OPEN
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 3.38 MB |
Body:
00000010032-0 E 15]
January 21, 197~ppr~cJ1~TLIZEG(3K'-ClxtRensions~o3R
ear s
ENSIONS OF . REM
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APf'RO- Smith, Ill. Talmadge Yarborough
1'RIATIOIVS, 1970 Sparkman Thurmond Young, N. Dak.
HON. MIKE % Stevens Williams, Del.
l/ il:OiFACi 1~+4+ Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATE-5 Senator from New Mexico (Mr. ANDER-
soN) , the Senator from Georgia (Mr.
Wednesday, January 21, 1970 UsS LL),, the Senator from Missouri
Mr. M'cCLEI,L,AN., Mr. Presidex>,t, on r. SYMINGTON)-, and the Senator from
behalf of the-, distinguished majority Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS) are necessarily
leader, I ask unanimous consent to have absent.
printed in the Extensions of Remarl s ti I also announce that the Senator from
expurgated transcript of the proceedings West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) is absent
December. 15, 1969, which has been pre- 1. Iurtner announce that the Senator
paled under the direction. of the,. Sen- from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) is ab-
ator from Louisiana, (Nil'., EL~s pER); sent because of a death in his family.
and that subsequently it be published at Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
the appropriate place in the body of the Senator from Iowa (Mr. MILLER) is nec-
permanent RECORD of December 15, 1969. essarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without The Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
objection, it is so ordered. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.
The Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
COOPER) is absent because of illness in
CLOSED SESSIO'T his family.
Mr.11)fANSFIELD. Mr. President, Under, The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum
rule XXXV, I move t4lat the doors of the is present.
Chamber be closed and that the Preside Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
ing Officer' direct that the galleries be amwouldes of the those Presiding officials who Officer read the
lcleared. Mr. ' President, I do so only to nho will will be
he
bring this matter to a head, lowed under rule XXXVI to be in the
Mr. F'I7I,B1 IGHT. I second the ingtion Chamber.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAY> The PRESIDING OFFICER. Perhaps
it would
in the chair). The motion having ,been m be appropriate for 2 of the o nresif
made and seconded that the Senate go, g Officer to read from section
into closed session, the Chair, pursuant rule XXXVI which governs the question
to rule XXXV, now directs the Sergeant- raised d by by the distinguished majority
at-Arms to clear the galleries, close the leader.
doors of the Chambers and exclu..e Section 2 of rule =VI reads:
all 1 When acting upon confidential on Execu-
offtcials of the Senate + not Sw4?p to Live business, unless the same shall be con
secrecy.
sidereci an. open Executive Session, the Sea-
(At 1 o'clock and 9 minutes p.m. the ate Chamber shall be cleared of all persons
doors of the Chamber were closed.) except the Secretary, the Chief Clerk, the
paiaClpal Legislative Clerk, the Executive
Clerk, the Minute and Journal Clerk, the
CALL OF THE ROLL, Sergeant-at-Arms, the Assistant Doorkeeper,
a.ad such other ofAcers as the Presiding Of-
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. president, I sug- fiver shall think necessary, and all such of-
gest the absence of a quorum. flyers shall be sworn to secrecy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, are
will call the roll. . the majority and minority secretaries
The assistant legislative clerk called included?
the roll, and the following Senators ans- The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the
wered to their names. past, the orders have been interpreted
Aiken
Allen
Allott
Baker.
Bayh
Bellmon
Bennett
Bible Gravel
Boggs Griffin
Brooke Gurney
Burdick Hansen
Byrd, Va. Harris
Byrd, W. Va. Hart
Cannon Hartke
Lase Hat$eld
Church Holland
Cook Hollings
Cotton Hruslm
Cranston Hughes
Curtis Inouye
.Metcalf. .The PRESIDING OFFICER. They are
Mondale covered by the previous order.
Montoya Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in
Murphy . addition to that, the joint leadership has
M?skie asked the Parliamentarian for a memo-
Nelson randum on the question of the official
Pas ? Reporters. On the basis of previous ses-
Pearson ore
Pearson siDns, I ask unanimous consent that the
Dodd Javits Proxmire
Dole) Jordan, N.C. Ribicoff.
.
Dominick Jordan, Idaho Saxbe
1lagleton Kennedy Schweiker
Eastland Long Scott
Ellerxder Magnuson Smith, Maine
[No. 231 Leg.) and ,expanded to include the majority
Ervin Mansfield and minority secretaries, The Senator
Fannin Mathias is correct.
Fong McCarthy
Fuibright McClellan Mr. MANSFIELD. And the Parliamen-
Goldwater McGee . tarian and the Assistant Parliamentari-
Goodell McQovep
Gore McIntyre an.
F,lc~cllu W?l,n.zs.e 1Luues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
-it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
further ask, unanimous consent that, at
the conclusion of the closed session, the
transcript of the remarks of each Sen-
ator who participatel in the proceedings
be delivered to the Chief of Official Re-
porters; that the Senator shall have the
right to revise his own remarks; that
such Senator shall deliver his revised re-
marks to the Chief Reporter, who shall
then deliver the transcript to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Louisiana (Mr.
ELLENDER), as acting chairman oT the
Subcommittee on Defense Appropria-
tions; that the expurgated version of
these proceedings be prepared under the
direction of the Senator from Louisiana,
and that there be deleted from the tran-
script anything which might be classi-
fied; that such record of proceedings
be made public by being printed in the
permanent CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the
date on which they occurred; and that
the Chief Reporter turn. the shorthand
notes of the Official Reporters over to
the Secretary of the Senate to be kept
in secret and not to be disclosed with-
'Out leave of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, in ad-
dition to the persons authorized to be
in the Chamber, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the counsel to the Committee
on Appropriations, Mr. William Wood-
ruff, and the staff consultant to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Walter
Pincus, be permitted to be present.
Mr. TOWER. Reserving the right to
object, Mr. President, It would be proper
to inquire as to the security clearance
of the two staff members..
Mr. MANSFIELD. They have been
cleared.
Mr. TOWER. They have been cleared?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, without ques-
tion.
Mr. ELLENDER. Without question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, it is
my understanding that one of the pur-
poses of this closed session is for me to
provide answers to the questions that
were propounded by the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FTLBRIGHT)
in his letter to the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations. I am prepared
to proceed with this information. I ask
the indulgence of Senators to listen to
the. questions and the answers as I shall
read them.
Question No. 1: What treaties, agree-
ments, or declarations provide the basis for
our defense commitment and military assist-
ance to the Royal Lao Government?
The answer is unclassified. It reads as
follows :
The basic US policy towards Laos is that
of support for its independence and neu-
trality. We have no written or oral defense
commitment to Laos.
In 1962, the US and other parties to the
Declaration of Neutrality of Laos, agreed to
respect and observe the neutrality of Laos.
Under Article IV, the parties undertake in
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
E 152 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -. Extensions of Remarks January 21,
the event of a violation or a threat of viola-
tion Of Lao sovereignity, Independence. neu-
trality oor territorial integrity, to consult
jointly with the RLG and among them-
selves "in order to consider means which
might prove to be necessary to ensure the
observance of these principles."-Pasi; Royal
Lao Government efforts to obtain consulta-
tion among all the parties have been
unsuccessful.
After North Vietnam failed to respect the
Geneva Agreements, by not withdrawing
about 6,000 of their troops after signing
the Geneva Agreements in 1962, the RLG In
September 1962 requested the US to provide
supplies and repair parts for US furnished
equipment, training ammunition, and con-
sumable supplies for national defense of
Laos. This assistance is permitted under Ar-
ticle VI of the Protocol of the Declaration
of Neutrality which states; "The introduc-
tion into Laos of armaments, munitions and
war material generally, except such quan-
tities of conventional armament as the RLG
may-consider necessary for national defense
of Laos, is prohibited."
In 1984, when NVN significantly In-
creased its military support of the Pathet Lao
and use of Lao territory to infiltrate men
and material into South Vietnam, the RLG
requested additional US assistance against
this threat to its neutrality and territory.
The RLG was fully within its rights to do so.
In response to this request and to assist
Laos in meeting this Increased threat to Its
national defense created by communist ag-
gression, we increased assistance to Laos.
This increase in assistance was in a spirit
of a response proportionate to the threat.
In sum, we complied with the Geneva
Agreements. The North Vietnamese violated
these agreements by (1) attacks against the
Royal Lao Government (2) use of Lao terri-
tory to carry out aggression in South Viet-
nam. Our assistance to Laos has been limited
and in response to North Vietnamese viola-
tion of the Agreements.
This assistance has been to preserve the
independence of Laos, under the general pre-
cepts of international law-which allow a na-
tion to seek assistance in Its own self-defense.
This is classified: [Deleted.)
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a brief interruption?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. GRIFFIN. In response to several
inquiries from Members; I wish to ask
the Chair to state what the pending busi-
ness is. The pending amendment has not
been printed and is not available on the
desk of each Senator. Therefore :[ think
it would be helpful if the pending amend-
ment could be read again.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will read the pending amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 46, between lines 8 and 9, insert
a new section as follows:
"Sac. 643. None of the funds appropriated
by this Act shall be used for the support oa
local forces in Laos or Thailand except tc
provide supplies, materiel, equipment, and
facilities, including maintenance thereof, or
to provide training for such local forces."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING` OFFICER. The
amendment has been offered by the
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER)
and the Senator from Montana (Mr.
MANSFIELD).
Mr. ELLENDER. I shall reread the
classified portion of the answer to. ques-
tion No. [deleted].
Question No. 2:
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator
yield for eiarification, before he goes to
the next question?
Mr. ELLENDEfR. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I correctly un-
derstand from the Senator's statement
that no treaty of any kind has been en-
tered into and that no agreement, of any
kind has been submitted to the Senate
authorizing these activities in Laos?
Mr. ELLENDER. I am just reading
from the statement.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is that not clear?
There is no treaty. Do they contend there
is any agreement or treaty?
Mr. ELLEND:ER. It is in accord with
the Geneva agreement.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIT`LD. Under the protocol
of the Southeast Asian Treaty, Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam were
brought under its umbrella. The proviso
was that we would come to their assist-
ance if they were attacked by Commu-
nist forces from, outside. But it also said
that any such move would be subject to
due constitutional process.
Mr. FULBRI(HT. Did not Laos itself
remove itself from under that umbrella?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not believe so.
I think Cambodia did but not Laos.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think Laos did.
They were trying after 1962 to establish
a neutrality; so it would not be brought
into this.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator may be
right.
Mr.. ELLENDER. If the Senator has
evidence to that, effect, let him present it.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. I was just
trying to clarify the situation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOLE
in the chair). The Senator from Louisi-
ana has the floor.
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield so that the
Senator from Idaho may propound a
question.
Mr. CHURCH. If I correctly under-
stood the statement the Senator read,
the only formed obligation the United
States assumed with respect to Laos--
Mr. GURNES_'. Mr. President, will the
Senator speak :louder? We cannot hear
him.
Mr. CHURCH. If I correctly under-
stood the written statement which has
just been read by the Senator from Lou-
isiana the nature of the formal obliga-
tion assumed by the United States is
to consult with other signatories to the
Geneva Accord on Laos in the event of
aggression. That is the only formal
commitment.
The present activities in the nature of
aerial sorties over Laos are in violation
of the Accord. [Deleted.]
Mr. PASTOR:E. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield on that point?
Mr. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr. PASTORS. Did not the Senator
read that all attempts at consultation
were futile?
Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.
Mr. PASTORRE. That, we did try to
consult and that this was all rejected?
Mr. ELLEND 11. Yes, but I may state
this also. There is no question but that
[deletedl these sorties were [deleted I for
the purpose interdicting men and sup-
plies coming down the Ho Chi Minh
trails into South Vietnam. [Deleted.]
However, the Senator from Arkansas
had extensive hearings on all this mat-
ter. If he has anything different from
the answers I am reading it might be well
if it were stated for the Senate.
(Subsequently, on December 17, Mr.
MANSFIELD made the following state-
merit, which by unanimous consent is
printed in the RECORD at this point:)
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,' on
Monday, there was an exchange between
the distinguished Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. FULBRIGHT) and me relative to
whether the kingdom of Laos had re-
noutlced its adherence to the Southeast-
ern Asia Treaty' Organization, otherwise
known as SEATO.
I indicated that I thought only Cam-
bodia had stated it would not be under
the SEATO umbrella and that Laos was
still in that category.
Under the corollary to the SEATO
agreement at Manila in 1953, I find that
I was wrong. and that the distinguished
chairman of the Fo: eign Relations Com-
mittee was right and that in the Neutral-
ity Agreement Laos did declare its in-
tention to not recognize the protection
of any alliance or military coalition in-
cluding SEATO.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Declaration on the Neu-
trality of Laos be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the docu-
merit was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
DECLARATION ON THE NEUTBALrrY OF LAOS
The Governments of the "Union of Burma,
the Kingdom of (2'umbodia, Canada, the
People's Republic of China, the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam, the Republic of
France, the Republic of India, the -Polish
People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam,
the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the United States of America, whose repre-
sentatives took part in the International
Conference on the S'.': Clement of the Laotian
Question, 1961-62;
Welcoming the presentation of the state-
ment of neutrality by the Royal Government
of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of
this statement, which is, with the concur-
rence of the Royal Government of Laos, in-
corporated in the present Declaration as an
integral part thereof, and the text of which
is as follows:
"The Royal Govern.rient of Laos,
"Being resolved to i'ellow the path of peace
and neutrality in conformity with the Inter-
ests and aspirations of the Laotian people,
as well as the principles of the Joint Commu-
nique of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and
of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in order
to build a peaceful, neutral, Independent.
democratic, unified and proseprous Laos,
"Solemnly declares that:
"(1) It will resolutely apply the five prin-
ciples of peaceful re-existence in foreign
relations, and will develop friendly relations
and establish diplomatic relations with all
countries, the neighboring countries first and
foremost, on the basis of equality and of re-
spect, for the independence and sovereignty
of Laos;
"(2) It is. the will of the Laotian people
to protect and ensure respect for the sover-
eignty, independence. neutrality, unity, and
territorial integrity of Laos;
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
gpprQ xxeQ~~(~ lI~a~g$@,2 CI -RDR72-003 000300010032-0
ianuary 1, 1970 1.6JJGF VRX 7ZFW :- Extensions of Kemarks
(3) It will not resort to the use or Threat political nature to any assistance which they shall include members of 'foreign military
of force in any way which might impair the may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos missions, foreign military advisers, experts,
peace of other countries, and will not inter- may seek; instructors, consultants, technicians, ob-
fere) i the internal affairs of other countries; (e) they will not bring the Kingdom of servers and any other foreign military per-
4) It will not enter into any mfl1tary Laos in any way into any military alliance sons, including those serving in any armed
alliance or into any agre . eiiient, whether mill- or any other agreement, whether military forces in Laos, and foreign civilians eon-
foxy or otherwise, wh ch is inconsistent with or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her, netted with the supply, maintenance, stor-
ii
the neturality of the Kingdom of Laos; It will neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to Ing and utilization of war materials;
not allow the establis)iment of any foreign enter into any such alliance or to conclude (b) the term "the Commission" shall mean
military base, on Laotian territory, nor allots any such agreement; the International Commission for, Supervi-
any country to lase Lao-flan territory, for (f) they will respect the wish of the King- sion and Control in Laos set up by virtue of
military purposes or for the purposes of dom of Laos not to recognise the protection the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and com-
Interference in , the, internal affairs of other of any alliance or military coalition, includ- posed of the representatives of Canada, India
countries, nor recognize "'he protection of tug SEATO;, and Poland,. with the representative of India
any alliance or inilltary coalition, including (g) they will not introduce into the King- as Chairman;
SEATO. dom,of Laos foreign troops or military per- (c) the term "the Co.?Chairnren" shall
"(5) It will not allow any foreign interfer- sonnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they mean the Co-Chairmen of the International
ence in. the Internal affairs of the Kingdorn in any way facilitate or connive at the in- Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian
of Laos in any form whatsoever; troduction of any foreign troops or'military Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in
"(6) Subject to the provisions of Article b personnel; the.offices,of Her Britannic Majesty'sPrin-
of the Protocol, it will require the withdrawal (h) they will not establish nor will they cipal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
from Laos of all foreign troops and military in. any way facilitate or connive at the es- and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union
personnel, and will not allow any foreign tablishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any of Soviet Socialist Republics respectively;
troopsor military personnel to be introduced foreign military base, foreign strong point (a) the term "the members of the Con-
into Laos; or other foreign military installation of any ference" shall mean the Governments of
"(7) It will accept direct and uncondi- kind; countries which took part in the Inter-
t1tomal aid from all, countries that wish to (I) they will not use the territory of the national Conference for the Settlement of
help the Kingdom of Lacs build up an Inde Kingdom of Laos for interference in the in- the Laotian Question, 1961-1962.
Laos; country, including their own for interfer- All foreign regular and irregular troops,
"(6) It will respect the treaties brat agree;- ence in the internal affairs Of the Kingdom foreign para-military formations and foreign
relents signed in conformity with the inter= of Laos? military personnel shall bet withdrawn from
errs oY the Laotian people and of the policy 3. Appeal to all other States to recognise, Laos in the shortest time possible and in any
of .peace and neutrality of the Kingdom, in respect and observe in every way the rover- case the withdrawal shall be completed not
parttculas the Geneva Agreements of 1962, eignty,independence and neutrality, and also later than thirty days after the Commission
and will abrogate all treaties and agreements the unity and territorial integrity, of the has notified the Royal Government of Laos
which to contrary to those principles. Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of
"This statement pf neutrality b7 the Royal action inconsistent with these principles or this Protocol its inspection teams are present
Government of Laos shall beprorriugated with other provisions of the present Dec- at all points of withdrawal from Laos. These
oonstittvtior ally and shall have the force of laration. points shall be determined by the Royal
law. 4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or Government of Laos in accordance with Ar-
"he Kingdom of Laos appeals to all the threat of violation of the sovereignty, inde- ticle a within thirty days after the entry into
States participating in the International pendence, neutrality, unity or territorial in- force of this Protocol. The inspection teams
Conference on tl)e Settlement of e Lryotiai tegrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult shall be present at these points and the
Question, and to all other Sates, tO recognise jointly with the Royal Government of Laos Commission shall notify the Royal Govern-
the sovereignty, indepein'Ae e, neutraland among themselves in order to consider ment of Laos thereof within fifteen days
unity said territorial integrity of Laos, to measures which might prove to be necessary after the points have been determined.
ooa#rnin to these principles in all respects, to ensure the observance of these principles Article 3
and to refrain from any action inconsistent
therewith," and the other provisions of the present Dec- _ The withdrawal of foreign regular and
laration. irregular troops, I p
Oonfi ?ming the principles of respect for foreign ~ar
the sovereignty, independence, unity and 6 The present Declaration shall enter into motions and foreign military personnel shall
hall
territorial Integrity of the lain Om of Laos force on signature and together with the take place only along such routes and
etsi.Ynmoni? ~f rn?Fna li+~. he. Fh'.. D..,..,1 l3,.,,_ .- _ _ _ __ _ _
which are embodied in the Geneva;4gree-
merit, of 1954;
Empiiasizing the principle of ' respecat for
the neutrality of the Kingdom 'ott Laos;
Agreeing that the above-mentioned;grin=
triples constitute a basis for the peaceful
settlement of the Laotian question:
Profoundly convinced that the independ
ence and neutrality of the Eli gdom`of .Laos
will assist the peaceful democratic develop
mentOf tAae Kingdom of.Laos?will assist,the
e
in two
y one h und" i y -
that country, as well as the strengthening of
peace and security In South-East Asia; , third day of July one thousand nine ne hundred
1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with and sixty-two in the English, Chinese,
the will of the Government and people of French, Laotian and Russian languages, each
the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the text being equally authoritative,
statement of neutrality by the Royal Gov- PRiTOCOL TO THE DECLARATION ON THE
ernment of Laos of July 9, 1952 that they NEUTRALITY OF LAOS an gx9eption leave in Laos for _a limited
recognise and ,will respect and observe in ' The Governments of the Union of Burma, period of time a precisely limited number of
every way the sovereignty, independence, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the Peo- French military instructors for the purpose
neutrality, unity and territorial integrity OT pie's Republic of China, the Democratic Re- of training the armed forces of Laos.
the Kingdom of Laos. public .of Viet-Nam, the Republic of France, The French and Laotian Governments shall
2. Undertake, in pairticular, that tie Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, inform the members of the Conference,
(a) they will not commit or_participate In the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of through the Co-Chairmen, of their agree-
any way ` h any act which might directly or Viet-Nam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the ment on the question of the transfer of the
indirectly impair the sovereignty, independ- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the French military installations in Laos and
ence, neutrality, unity or territorial integ United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- of the employment of French military in-
rity of the Kingdom of Laos; ein J,reland and the Upited.States of Amer- structors by the Laotian Government.
(b) they will not resort to the use or threat Ica; Article 6
of force or any other }treasure` which might Having regard to the Declaration on the The introduction into Laos of armaments,
impair t'he peace of the Kingdom of Laos Neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962;
munitions and war material generally, ex-
they will refrain from all direct or Have agreed as follows: cept such quantities of conventional arma-
indirect. Bute e> yggipy,t irate np4, Srs Article.1 ,meats as the Royal Government of Laos may
of the dom of Laos;
g . ,. , ? For the purposes of this Protocol consider necessary for the national defense
(d)` they will not attach conditions of a .(a). the term "foreign military personnel" of Laos, is prohibited.
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA=RDP72-0,0337R000300010032-0
ernment of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be re- by the Royal Government of Laos in con-
garded as constituting an International sultation with the Commission. The Com-
agreement. The present Declaration shall be mission shall be notified in advance of the
deposited in the archives of the Governments ??i?} -A i ~~ -11 --1 ...,~,,a,..,-,..-
.-
i~cj, u,.si LlN?, n1111:11 ?11W11 141-
nish certified copies thereof to the other sig-
natory States and to all the other States of
the world.
- In -witness whereof, the undersigned
Plenipotentiaries have signed the present
D
claration. ,
The Introduction of foreign regular and
Irregular troops, foreign para-military for-
mations and foreign military personnel into
Laos is prohibited.
Article 5
Note is taken that the French and Laotian
Governments will conclude as soon as possi-
ble and arrangement to transfer the French
military installations in Laos to the Royal
Government of Laos.
if -,; Qt.ipn_ Q2veriAie l cgnsiders it.
necessary the Frencia Government may as
E14
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R00030001.0032-0
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks Ja' i.uali 21, 1970
Artfole 7
All foreign military persons and civilians
captured or inteted during the course of
hostilities in Laos shall be released within
thrity days after the entry. into force of this
Protocol and handed over by the Royal Gov-
ernment of Laos to the representatives of
the Governments of the countries of which
they are nationals in order that .they may
proceed to the destination of their choice.
Article 8
The Co-Chairmen shall periodically receive
reports from the Commission. in addition
the Commission shall immediately report to
the do-Chairmen any violations or threats
of violations of. this Protocgi, all signlticant
steps which It takes in pursuance of this
Protocol, and also any other important in-
formation which may assist the Co-Chairmen
in carrying out their functions. The Com-
mission may at any time seek help from the
Co-Chairmen in the performance of As du-
ties, and the Co-Chairmen may at any time
make recommendations to the Commission
exercising general guidance.
The Co-Chairnen shall circulate the re-
ports and any other important information
from the Commission to the members of the
Conference.
The Co-Chairmen shall exercise supervi-
sion over the observance of this Protocol and
pervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.
The Co-Chairmen will keep the members
of the Conference constantly informed and
when appropriate will consult with them.
Article 9
The Commission shall, with the concur-
rence of the Royal Government of Laos, su-
pervise and control the cease-fire in laos.
The Commission shall exercise these func-
tions in full co-operation with the Royal
Government of Laos and within the frame-
work of the Cease-Fire Agreement or cease-
fire arrangements made by the three politi-
cal forces in Laos, or the Royal Government
of Laos. It is understood that responsibility
for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest
with the three parties concerned and' with
the Royal Government of Laos after its for-
mation.
Article 10
The Commission shall supervise and con-
trol the withdrawal of foreign regular and
irregular troops, foreign pars-military for-
mIttions and foreign military personnel. In-
spection teams sent by the Commission for
these purposes shall be present for the period
of the withdrawal' at all points of withdrawal
from Laos determined by the Royal Govern-
ment of Lace In consultation with the Com-
mission in accordance with Article 3 of this
Prptoool
Article 11
The Commission shall investigate cases
where there are reasonable grounds for con-
sidering that a violation of the provisions of
Article 4 of this Protocol has occurred.
It is understood that in the exercise of this
function the Commission is acting with the
concurrence of the Royal Government of
Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in
full co-operation with the Royal Government
of Laos and shall immediately inform the
Co-Ciiairrnan of any 'atolattons or threats of
violations of Article 4, and also of all signifl-
cant steps which it takes in pursuance of this
Article it,. accordance with Article 8.
Article 12
The,, Commission shall assist the Royal
Government of Laos in cases where the Royal
Government of ;Laos considers that a viola-
tion of Article 8 of this Protocol may have
taken place. This assistance will be rendered
at the request of the Royal, Government of
Lads and in full co-operation with it.
Article 13
The Commissions shall exercise its func-
tions 'Under this 2 otocal. Ill' close co-
tion With the Royal Government of Laos.
It Is understood that the Royal Government
of Laos at all`levets will render the Commis-
sion all possible assistance in the perform-
ance by the Commission of these functions
and also will take all necessary measures to
ensure the securiit'y of the Commission and
its inspection teams during their activities
in Laos.
Article 14
The Commissicn functions as a single
organ of the International Conference for
the Settlement of the Laotian Question,
1961-1962. The members of the Commission
will work harmoniously and in co-operation
with each other with the aim of solving all
questions within the terms of reference of
the Commission.
Decisions of the Commission on questions
relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 8
of this Protocol or of the cease-fire referred
to in Article 9, conclusions on major ques-
tions sent to the Co-Chairmen and all rec-
ommendations by the Commission shall be
adopted unanimously. On other questions,
including procedural questions, and also
questions relating to the Initiation and car-
rying out of Investigations (Article 15). deci-
sions of the Commission shall be adopted by
majority vote.
Article 15
In the exercise of its specific functions
.which are laid down in the relevant articles
of this Protocol the Commission shall con-
duct investigations (directly or by sending
Inspection teams), when there are reasona-
ble grounds for considering that a violation
has occurred. These investigations shall be
carried out at the request of the Royal Gov-
ernment of Laos or on the initiative of the
Commission, which Is acting with the con-
currence of the Royal Government of Laos.
In the latter case decisions on Initiating
and carrying out such Investigations shall be
taken in the Commission by majority vote.
The Commission shall submit agreed re-
ports on investigations in which differences
which may emerge between members of the
Commission on particular questions may be
expressed.
The conclusions and recommendations of
the Commission resulting from investiga-
tions shall be adopted unanimously.
Article 16
For the exercise of its functions the Com-
mission shall.,-as necessary, set up inspection
teams, on which the three member-States of
the Commission shall be equally represented,
Each member-State of the Commission shall
ensure the presence of its own representatives
both on the Commission and on the inspec-
tion teams, and shall promptly replace them
in the event of their being unable to per-
form their duties.
It is understood that the dispatch of in-
spection teams to carry out various specific
tasks takes place with the concurrence of
the Royal Oovern:nent of :Laos. The points
to which the Commission and its inspection
teams go for the purposes of investigation
and their length of stay at those points shall
be determined In relation to the require-
ments of the particular investigation.
Article 17
The Commission shall have at its disposal
the means of communication and transport
required for the performance of its duties.
These as a ride will be provided to the Cent-
mission'by the Royal Government of Laos
for payment on mutually acceptable terms,
and those which :Ghe Royal Government of
Laos cannot provide will be acquired by
the Commission from other sources. It is
understood that the means of communica-
tion and transport will be under the admin-
istrative control of the Commission,
Article 18
The costs of. the operations of the Corn-
mission shall be borne by the members of the
Conference in accordance with the provisions
of this Article.
(a) The Governmiiu:ts of Canada, India
and Poland shall pay the personal salaries
and allowances of th=sir nationals who are
members of their delegations to the Com-
mission and its subsicl.ary organs.
(b) The primary responsibility for the
provision of accommodation for the Com-
mission and its subsid:tary organs shall rest
with the Royal Government of Laos, which
shall also provide such other local services
as may be appropriate. The Commission
shall charge to the Fund referred to in sub-
paragraph (c) below any local expenses not
borne by the Royal Government of Laos.
(c) All other capital or running expenses
incurred by the Commission in the exercise
of its functions shall 13e met from a Fund
to which all the members of the Conference
shall contribute In the following propor-
tions
The Government of the People's Republic
of China. France, the- Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America shall contrib-
ute 17.8 per cent each.
The Governments of Burma, Cambodia,
and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam,
Laos, the Republic of Viet Nam and Thai-
land shall contribute 1.3 per cent each.
The Governments .f Canada, India and
Poland as members of the Commission shall
contribute 1 per cent e,3eh.
Article 19
The. Co-Chairmen shall at any time, if the
Royal Government of Laos so requests, and
In any case not later than three years after
the entry into force of this Protocol, pre-
sent a report with appropriate recommenda-
tions on the question of the termination of
the Commission to the members of the Con-
ference for their consideration. Before mak-
ing such a report te Co-Chairman shall
hold consultations with the Royal Govern-
ment of Laos and the Commission.
Artii.Tei 20
This Protocol shall enter into force on
signature.
It shall be deposited in the archives of the
Governments of the United Kingdom and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Which shall furnish certified copies thereof
to the other signatory takes and to all other
States of the world.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Pleni-
potentiaries have signed this -Protocol
Done In two copies hi Geneva this twenty-
third day of July one thousand and nine
hundred and sixty-two in the English, Chi-
nese, French, Laotian and Russian lan-
guages, each text beln3 equally authorita-
tive.
Mr. FULBRIGIIT. [Deleted.)
I am not at this time saying we should
not be doing this. I am saying it is being
done without the knowledge of the Sen-
ate and it is being done without any au-
thorization by the Congress. If it can be
done in Laos there is no reason why it
'Could not be done in Surma, Malaysia,
Singapore, or anything else. It is the
same general principle involved as was
involved in the arguluent about the com-
mitment resolution. That is, has this
[Government now got to the point where
the executive branch is considered to be
within its rights to undertake this kind
of major operation without consulting
Congress, without, any specific treaty or
other authorization. Actually what we
'are doing is against the agreement of
1962.
If the amendment offered by the ma-
jority leader and the Senator from Ken-
tucky (Mr. dooPEa) is adopted, and if it
means anything si?;nifieant, it means
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
onr 2-
? CIA-RDP,772-00 3 00300010032-0
=
January 21, 1970 C0NGRESS1O1NARELUK x en z s 7 e a E 155
that these air strikes cannot be con- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not making an nothing new. I do not approve of it. We
tinued. Some may think it .has 'little argument that we should retire. I say have got to make the best of it and live
meaning. I think it has. If it means any- that we should know what actually is with it.
thing of substance, it "means that the taking place. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator may
strikes by our Air Force, working out of Mr. MANSFIELD. All right. That is know the situation but I did not know
Thailand, must be stopped. If it'cfoes' not different. the situation on these bombings in the
mean anything at all and is an idle.ges- Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I am north. [Deleted.] I did not know it. I did
What t. ''trying to reveal^-what is going on in not know apparently what the Senator
ture ho be i
is important is that this ques- Laos. If our interest in Laos is so great, knows about this operation. But I do not
tion is not idle It strikes me that .if we why do we not just follow the usual see, if this is in the national interest,
expect to preserve' our system' of`-gov- constitutional procedures called for by why it is not open and public knowledge
ernment, which every Senator is sworn- such circumstances? and we declare it to be in our interest to
to support, then wve,have'to know, and we Mr. MANSFIELD. I understood the wage it in the usual manner. This is
ought to know, what we are voting for Senator to indicate that we should cut what I do not understand about this
when we vote vast sums. down on our support- whole operation, and what the majority
leader and others have said they regret.
The acting chairman specified the Mr. F=RIGHT. T did not make any
amount of money, $90 million,' for the such indication at all. I ,am trying to Nearly everyone that has spoken out
Royal Laotian Army [deleted]. , . ' have revealed what we are doing and recently has said that they think it was
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, will why. a mistake to become involved in Vietnam
the Senator yield`s Mr. MAI' SFIELD.' It is not secret. or, in this instance, in Laos. [Deleted.]
Mr. E LBl `IIHT. I yield. Everyone knows. This is escalating into a major operation.
Mr. ELDER, X yield. Mr. ELLENDER. Of course, all that [Deleted.]
Mr. MANSFIELD, First, the Meo has been said is tied in with the South Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]
group, under General Vane are, I'believe, 'Vietnamese war, Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]
considered a ?part of the Royal Laotian Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]
Army, if my memory serves me correctly. President the Senator from Montana Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]
Second, both the Ana or from Arkan made my point much better than I Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]
sas and the senate as,a~ whole a e fully could myself with referenbe to the step- Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]
awake f my very deep personal feelings up in the bombing of Laos and especially' Mr. ELLENDER. [Deleted.]
about our involvement in Vietnam arid of north Laos the stepup` corresponds Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]
Southeast Asia. 13ut I would point out with the increase of the' nuiipbeir of the I think we should know how much we
that what we have seen is "more than North Vietnamese troops in Laos. It was, are spending for this operation which
an eightfold increase, since 1962, of the to our interest to bomb those troops: It is beginning to be a major war. To
North Vietnamese backbone 'the Pathet also is much more preferable to bomb stretch the concept of the SEATO treaty
Lao, from 6,000 to' 50a00i1, or" perha s them, than to send our men in there. ? into this area is a major expansion of
55,000, North Vietnamese. Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I it. I say, I see no reason why the ad-
On, the other side of the; comp hi ac- thought the `statement of the Senator ministration could not apply this con-
cordance with t1ie,S eneva Accorejs. of ' from 'Arkansas _Just a moment ago was cept to anything it wanted to do in
1962, we withdrew. our military forces' that if we agreed to this amendment` 'Burma or in Malaysia, or any other
completely except for` an advisory ?group it would then be illegal to do any more place, if they follow this style of op-
representing the, various services. Sen- of the bombing and we would be out of eration. I think this is strictly against
ators may recall also that in 1963,' again business. That is the point at question- the constitutional system which Mem-
if my memos serves,me correctly, ' Pres here. bers of this body are supposed to sup-
ident John V. Kennedy then considered Mr. ELLENDER. We do not agree to port. 'Senators are supposed to know
seriously the dispatch of a number of that, but that is his interpretation, what they are voting for. [Deleted.]
Maripe units up to the Mekong because Mr. FULBRIGHT: I said if it ine`ant Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
of 4' 1 possible mflltration intq the anything at all, it means the -bombings Senator yield?
area around *Vientiane to, overthrow the` in the north should stop. Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Laotian Government and the' further Mr. GURNEY. It is a question of Mr. STENNIS. I did not get to attend
possibility of an overspill Into Z"hailaiidy whether we' should be doing it in the all of the Appropriation Subcommittee
which would then involve an all of outs, open, but the amendment would pre- hearings this year. However, I want to
an ally under the Southeast Asia Treaty vent it. refer to a point we had up when the
Organization. Mr`. FULBRIGHT, It is riot my amend- authorization bill was before the Senate
To, look at it particularly, without any ment. It is the amendment of the Sen- because it contained an item for $2.5
personal feelings, insofar as I can if we ator from Kentucky` (Mr. COOPER) and billion, which was the sum finally agreed
were, to take away this air support from "the majority leader. I did not offer the upon, for all of Southeast Asia, for spe-
the".Royal "Laotian Army and the Ro `a1 amendment. cial military aid.
3,aotian Government which is ' leii}g Mr. MANSFIELD. The amendment We have been carrying on military aid
furnished . at the request of the Lao would not prevent it. In many forms since World War H. A
Government, it is quite possible that the Mr. FULBRIGHT. 'If the amendment very small sum of military aid is involved
50,000 to 55,000 North Vietnamese wfio would not prevent the bombing, then directly here. That goes to the Royal
are in Laos, contrary- to the Geneva it has. no significant effect. Laotian Army. That money was in the
accords-I think they were a signatory Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator bill we authorized. It is not involved In
to those accords-wgpld then,finn A would yield further, the important thing the bombing.
to sweep down Into the Mekong to tae: Is to make sure that no combat troops I was asked in that debate if we had
over ; thegapitals of Luang Prabacig and get Involved in Laos, and I mean com- any military forces in Laos by the Sen-
Vientiane, What, would be o}lr Qftionsii` 'bat troops on the ground. That is the ator from California (Mr. CRANSTON). His
they got that far and they did not stogy danger?That is the great danger. That question was: Did we have any armed
at the Mekong? is what I though the Senator from Ar- ground forces? I said no. We did not go
So, we are up against a delicate ques- kaiisas was interested in. into the bombing, [deleted].
tion. If we want this Government to? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see how Back to the money, in my best judg-
survit}e aid w.-were. ,signato y to. tie military bombing is not combat. When ment, about $94 million of this money is
Gengva a cords-d4 we, do al tettin YOU say "combat" I assume the Senator authorized in the authorization bill,
the Patliet Lag take over in f t Anne . means infantry? where we had the Cooper amendment. I
ing-letting the North Vietnamese .take Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right, argued then that the Cooper amendment
over, with their Pathet nLa ets, in Mr. FULBRIGHT. Ground troops. did not touch the money we spent on our
effect making it a part of Nort Vietnam? ]MANSFIELD. Ground. troops. But on troops, whether it was in Laos or
Mr. FUI,BRIGIIlI am not mal pq pn the use of the Air _ Force has been, in elsewhere. That is still my opinion.
argument that we shguid get to tedthe N Vietnamese on A word on the merits of the bombing;
Mr. MANSIi'7EL alri, just pointing the [e] and Chi 1Vlinh Icra~il thisis one of die most effec?ive'tlilrigs
del
out the possibility and elsewhere in Laos: That is 'really- *0 ` have been able to do concerning the
T I?
Approved For Release, 2062/01/2.2 :.CIA-RDP72-00337R00030001 b032-0
-
LUiN(:iR.ESSIONAL RECQ -
Extenasioi s of Remarks January 21,
watinn Spu ' Asia. It grew just like
the ,weir in grew a little at a
time, We all- kwwhat the Ho Chi
Mph Trail means` and what it has
meant. There is no way to estimate
where we would have been in that war
if we had not been able to do this bcmb-
ing and inflict the punishment it caused,
always at-the request of the Laotian
Government, As I have always under-
stood it.
I do not think we could consider limit-
ing the amount we have to spend on
bombing there any more than we could
limit it in South Vietnam, as long as
we are at war. I. think this amendment
would be very unfortunate. It reads:
None' or the funds appropriated by this
Act shall be used for the support of local
forces in Laos or Thailand exoept to provide
supplies, materiel, equipment
That raises a question: Could we give
them battle support with our own Air
Poree?
If anything is to be adopted, it ought
to be made clear that we are limiting
the amendment to money support, not
bombing support.
So far as I know, we do tot have any
ground troops over there, and never
have had. [Deleted.l I mean fighting
ground troops. -
My additional point here is on the
word "support." [Deleted.]
Mr. ELLENDER.. Mr. President, I wish
to further state, as I said a while ago,
that we have had an interpretation of
this amendment, and I am informed that
the adoption of it would not prevent this
bombing. That Is why I suggested, in
open session a while ago, let, us adopt the
amendment and let the conferees meet
and get such information as they desire
and look into the amendment further to
darify it so that, if nedessaay, these
bombings can be continued.
Mr. OURNICY. Mr. President will the
.senator yield?.
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. GURNEY. I am confused. I just
heard the- chairman of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee say that, in his opinion,
the adoption of the `amendment would
prevent the bombing.
W. BLLENDER. I received that In!or-
mation from [deletedl, and the author of
the amendment, Senator MANSFIELD.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator let me proceed to explain what
I meant? i said unless we use the word
"suppor;t," limit it to direct financial sup-
port, it would but out the bombing, be-
clause "support" can be interpreted as
bombing.
Mr. DOM1NICS. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ELL ENDER. I yield.
Mr. WMINK`K. I remember being at
the 'White House in 1967-amt I think the
distinguished Senator from Arkansas was
there at the time- ,
Mr. RNUS09 Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me for an announce-
ment, without' losing his might to the
floor, for, about Ulf a minute?
Mr.
D! rM~t .Surely. `
Mr. ffi'AGNt q. Mr. P esident.we
had "called a gtsf the full Appro-
priations Committee for 2:30 p.m., to
consider the i EW,appropriation bill, but
in view of the executive session, I think It
would be wise for us to wait until we got
through the ?eXeci tive session, and then
we will meet downstairs.
I thank the. Senator for yielding.
Mr. VS.LEidDElR . Mr. President, I will
yield to the Senator from Colorado in a
moment. I would prefer that I, be permit-
ted to give these ,answers. That was the
purpose of the executive session.
Mr. DOMI]NIICK. Let me make a couple
of comments here.which are of interest.
When we were a'& the White House in
1967, and President Johnson called us
down in equia thirds on Monday, Tues-
day, and Wednesday in 1967, I think the
Senator from Arkansas was there. At
that time a map was shown of South-
east Asia by Secretary McNamara? on
which he had dots in Laos. Someone
asked what those dots were. He said,
"Those are the areas [deleted] we are
engaged in bombing." [Deleted.] This
was at the White -louse in 1967. 1 was
there. We knew and I knew what was
going on in Laos, for a considerable pe-
riod of time.. I am surprised that: the
Senator from Arkansas apparently did
not know but here is what bothers me
about this knendinent, and I wonder if
I can address this to the Senator from
Louisiana. If we have no combat troops
there-and as far as I know, we do not
have-and if we are not spending any
money there for support of ground
troops-and as for as I know, we are
not-then it seems to me if we put in the
bill a prohibition on the use of fonds
for troops when we do not have any
there, all we are doing Is raising a cues-
tion in the mind - of the enemy as to
whether we are doing that and giving
them one more propaganda weapon.
That is the problem--not whether this
affects the bombtag, because I do not
think it hits the bombing, but whether
or not we are going to give the enemy
one more item so they can take the ball,
run with it, confuse our allies, and mis-
inform some of our friends.
Mr. ELLENDER, I think the amend-
ment is slnect'le as to how the money is
to be used It states "except to provide
supplies, materiel, equipment, and facili-
ties, including maintenance thereof, or
to provide training for such local forces."
I think it is specific enough to indicate
that this money will be used for supplies,
material, equipment, and training; of
local forces.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. I think Senators must
understand that all, of Laos must be con-
sidered in context. They cannot separate
southern Laos, from northern Laos. The
fact is that the Futhet Lao could not
hold all of the sizable area they have if
it were not for the 50,000 North Viet-
namese troops. If the North Vietnamese
did not have possession of north Laos,
there would be no Ito Chi Mimi trail. We
must do anything we can to weaken the
North Vietnamese efrorts in Laos with
reference to our own efforts. We roust
interdict what thiiy use as a line of
communication.
T am concerned. that. this measure
1970
might Indeed prevent our being able to
airlift paramilitary forces around Thai-
land to help them deal with insurgent
activity there.
I would point out that. most of the Thai
Communist infrastructure is not ethnic
That, it is rather ethnic Chinese and
ethnic North Vietnamese. Thailand is the
target for the next so -called war of na-
tional liberation, and Laos is now being
used as a staging ar,~a for Communist
activity in Thailand.
I might further note that the Chinese
are now building a road In northern Laos
to aid in the establishment 'of a line of
communication to niake war against
Thailand more feasible and possible. I
think this is a very mischievous amend-
ment indeed, and I would like the opinion
of the Senator as to whether its enact-
ment would preclude our support of
paramilitary forces in Thailand.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I have
just read the purpose of the amendment,
and in order to obviate this executive ses-
sion we are now havr;.:g, my suggestion
was that we accept the amendment and
let the conferees deal with it. The con-
ferees will be able to get all the informa-
tion possible, and the advice of the De-
fense Department. We are here trying to
give the answers to questions that we
have been asked by the S nator from
Arkansas, and I was in hopes that we
could go along with that. 1: hesitate to
read tomorrow's newspapers and find out
what is going to be in the newspapers
about this session. It may be nothing new,
but it will be sensational.
Mr., MANSFIELD. dir. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Just to go along
with what the Senator- from Texas was
saying about the building of that road
from Meng-La in Yunnan to Muong
Soul, that construction. has been going
on for months and yeiu's, as a matter of
fact. The Thai Government has said
there are two divisions of Chinese
troops along that road, and the road is
being built toward northern Thailand.
As a matter of fact, the road is not be-
ing extended except a mile or so out of
Muong Soul toward Thailand, but it is
being built in the other direction toward
the direction of Dienb;ienph.u-in North
Vietnam. There are no Chinese divi-
sions there, accordirl, to Souvanna
Phourna. Iin the last day or two, he
stated there are five Chinese battalions,
some labor and some antiaircraft bat-
talions. As I said earlier, last August
when I visited the area there were ru-
mors that there were anywhere from
three to 10 Chinese battalions. The best
evidence is that. tht re were four or five
at the time.
Mr. TOWER. If the Senator will yield,
I accept the Senator's statement that
there vuere some antiaircraft and labor
battalions there, rather than maneuver
battalions but the fact of the matter is
that not only is that road traversing
across northern Thailand, but there is a
spur that goes down toward the Mekong
River under construction.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Tl.e Senator may be
right, but I do not be .lieve. it is under
construction. They stopped the construc-
tion going south and west toward the
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
January 21, 197 pp' t ' o I n r ool rose-o t157
the area going east toward the road to combat troops; not our combat troops? There are none there now.
Dienbbic hu: T'fiat noes riot mean that Mr: - MANSFIELD:- 'Well "including Mr. ALLOTT. Since we do not include
they are not pfanning on going ahead maintenance thereof"; I would not be them, the term "local forces" does not
and doing at, but they are not doing it able to define that. I would think that include U.S. Government troops, and
' navfrient to the Laos soldiers to the par- they are eliminated from this amend-
now..
- Mr. "POWER. That does not mean they
cannot do it. Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct'.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. lELL1NDER. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. So that we` will 'know,
when the Senator answers ' questions,
what we are trying to legislate here, it is
thought that the conference may deal
with it, but if we agree to the amendment,
we ought to know what we are `doing.
Therefore,. I should like to address-a
question to the author of the amendment,
or the Senator proposing it, as follows-
. First, is this amendment intended to
deal in any way with U.S. forces in
combat?
' Mr. MANSF!IELD.' It is intended to keep
ground troops out of combat in Thailand
and. Laos.
Mr. DAVITS, Will the Senator' point
.out the words in this amendmentwhich
would effect that result?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The words them-
selves, I think, are self-explanatory. It
~ays~ None of the funds ,appropriated lay, this
act shall be used for_ the support of local
forces in Lads or Thiland, except to pro-
vide supplies, materiel, equipment, and fa-
cilities, including the maintenance' thereof,
or to ptovide training for such local forces.
Mr r A VIT$
Are the local forces ra-
,
1?i+"` W, S v-y' There is nothing in this language that
Mr. MANSFIELD: They ey are indigenous will prevent American combat troops
forces, both Thai and Laotian. from being used; and the way the Sena-
Mr.. am endm JAVITS. that deals i with h word id tor defines. It, there is something in here
is this ent that prevents combat troops which are
ic
an forces at all? Indigenous from being paid; and I think
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. all the rest of these interpretations. defy
this: Mr. We e understand IMy second question is the words of the amendment as sub-
to what we are
to give them.-supplies, materiel' equi matted
p-
ment, facilities, maintenance'and-traln- One.function we ought to perform
ing. Now, what are we not going to give is to find out what the majority of the
them by this amendment? Senate wants to do, and then be sure
Mx. ' MANSFIELD. Ground combat that the amendment we pass does it.
troops., For myself, I would say if what you
Mr:. 3AVITS, American combat troops want to do is continue the present situ-
are rued aut; they are not provided for. ation, you ought to have the words broad
But we are nQt going to give them money enough to continue it. Now that we un-
to engage in combat with or pay salaries derstand what it is, that you want to
of soldiers who fight? "keep American involvement out, then we
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, we are; and ought to say at least something like that
that would be continued, because if we In the amendment, which I submit it
did, not subsidize the Laatialis,"'they does not say now.
would not last 'for, a fortnight. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is en-
Mr.. JAVITS, Oat is exactly what Y ''titled to his opinion. I have stated what
am hoping we can reveal to the Senate, .I think the distinguished Senator from
to the meaning of the amendment. Kentucky meant and what I think the
Mr. MANSFIELD, That 'is common amendment means, and we will have to
knowledge. If the Senator read the New ` let the Senate decide.
York Times, from his own State, just Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the
lac: an Laos, This is not secre ; this
is public information.
Mr. JAVITS, The Senator does not
quite follow me. If we did pass this
amendment, it would result in affirmative
act on, atwould utQ wh>ttever R'eare.
paying, f we pay combat troops directly
or indirectly; that is true, is it `not, it
to our leader? I think the Senator from
New' York -has performed a very valid
task here. '15o I' understand, I ask the
Senator 'from Montana, that the term
"local forces" as used here eliminates
all t1.S: ground troops?
Mr. MA1vSF'IELD.It does not elimi-
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I think
that this brings about an interpretation
of the word "support." The Senator from
Mississippi took the position that he
would want it spelled out as financial
support. I think that would distort the
meaning of the amendment.
Why would it not be all right to say
combat troops in front of support?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would prefer to
leave it as it is. If there were to be any
changes, I would prefer that the Sena-
tor from Kentucky be responsible for
them.-
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the rea-
son I raise the point is because what we
are talking about, as the Senator from
New York indicated, is what we mean
by support. Do we mean American com-
bat forces? That is the support we are
talking about. And yet, the word "sup-
port" is all-encompassing and could
mean anything at any time to anybody.
The is the problem. What is meant by
support? Does it mean American com-
bat forces? Does it mean American
money? -What does it mean? I think we
have to clarify it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have tried to clar
ify it. It means what is going on at the
present time.
Mr. PASTORE. That is only part of
the history, but not part of the amend-
ment,
,Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator and I
look at it in different ways.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
'For 'Release 2002/d1/22 CIA-RDP72-003378000300010032-0
be allowed to continue. Mr. MANSFIELD. '-Chat is correct.
Mr. DAVITS. We would provide the They are to be given no consideration at
supplies, material, equipment, facilities, all, except to stay out.
and the maintenance thereof. Mr. ALLOTT. Then we are talking
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is true. about maintaining the status quo. In
Mr, JAVITS. That is very different line 4, the amendment says "including
froi} line troops; those are transporta-` maintenance thereof," and that could
tion forces, their equipment, et cetera. include the payment of salaries and sup-
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator had port to indigenous troops?
better go to Laos and see what kind of Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.
troops they have. They have not cut Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, with all
them. down- in divisions and outfits like due deference, I say to my beloved col-
we-have; they are all combat troops, 'league that the way the amendment is
whereas about, a fifth of ours are com- written it says, "shall be used for the
bat troops, and the others are support support of local forces in Laos or Thai-
troops. land, except to provide supplies, materiel,
Mr. JAVITS. If the Senator will bear equipment, and facilities, including the
with me, what t am trying to get before maintenance thereof." "Including the
the Senate is, if we vote for the amend- maintenance thereof" means the sup-
ment, is what we are doing affirmative or plies, materiel, equipment, and facilities.
negative? And unless he writes an undisputed legis-
Mr. MANSFIELD. You would be voting lative record that this does include the
for what is going on now, by reiterating, payment of salaries, the amendment in
once again, as the National Commit- my opinion cannot mean anything.
mexlts Resolution says, that under no cir-? Mr? MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
cumstances except through due consti- Senator from Colorado, like the Sena-
tutional processes will there be combat tor from New York, is entitled to his
ground troops of this country used in opinion. I have given the Senate what
I think is intended by the Senator from
Laos or Thailand.
Mr. DAVITS. May I say to'my beloved Kentucky and me. The Senate will have
to decide.
colleague, if that is in his amendment- Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
then he is putting it in by the interpre- Senator yield?
r~ ? ' L U NLTXt,)S1QNAL Rk;t? U3wll --Extensions of Remarks Jait car? T 970
should, l*e t9aska d questtpon. Undoubt- di eu; n to the elanfusion and that the is not going to be denied the right to
edly it has mid answered t crrituaitrn over
the inter ret%tton would supply aid to these I cople doing all of
I3o i 1"' td abet earlier, run r=partat 3,_let alone around these things there now to help us.
Would the amendment prohibit the the wtrzld _I,.agree_an.kee ing 1 e zLOUn ore __.
use of tactical aitcralt at' any place in Mr ELL P 't. Mr. President, I reit- out. I do not think they should have
Thailand or Laos? erateei *hat I sale awhile ago. The only gone into South Vietnam. But they did.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Unfortunately, no. Teaso:x .I.siis;gested that the Senate go If we are ever threatened again in that
Mr. GOLDWATER. It will not, pre- acing with the aamendment was to ob- part of the world, p,rrticularly in an
vent the use of tac?%cal air support in viate what is takijgg place now. Because, area with the type of geography in
Northwestern, Thailand? as far. a I am concerned, I suggest that northwestern Thailand and Central
Mr. MANS:FIEL D. No. when the time comes, we vote it into the Laos, our troops are not equipped to fight
Mr. GOLDWATER. Or in the south- bill or out. there. And we cannot :help sunless we do
ern provinces where it might be needed? Mr. JAVITS. Air. President, will the so with tactical air, or possibly with
Mr. MANSFIELD. No. Senator yield? .,_ .,. strategic-air. However, not at this point.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Or, .as they say, Mr. T NDEE,. Mr-President, I yield If we are going to vote on the amend-
up in Central Laos, around the Plaine first to the eenatcu f Michigan. meat, I accept the wcrd of the majority
des Jarres? - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The leader at any time. Inasmuch as there is
Mr. MANSFIELD. No. What the Sen- $eunatar-from.,Michigan is recognized. a dispute between the majority and mi-
ator ought to keep in mind is that the Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the dis- nority leaders as to whether it applies to
Point being made by the Senator from tinguiahed inajori v leader responded to air, I think we should make it :clear.
Arkansas, if I understand it correctly, is a que. tuan by the Senator from Arizona Otherwise, we are going to pull the rug
that there has been a tremendous step- and indicated Ids interpretation as. out from under some wonderful help in
up 10 the amount of activity tdeleted]. spons>rof the amendment that the Ian- Thailand and Laos,
[Dele ted?] gunge was not intended to preclude cer- Mr. ELLENDER. It is not a matter of
Mr. GOLDWAT'ER. That is largely tafn t ombing activities-by ourAir Force, disagreement between rae and the major-
where the support is. Mr. MaNSPrwr;D. I said, unfortunate- ity leader. He gave his interpretation
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct, al- ly, no I deleted ] .
most entirely. Mr. GRIFFIN. But I think in view of Mr. GOLDWATER. The [deleted]
Mr. GOLDWATER. None of our troops the fret that the Senator from Arizona agrees that support does not include
are engaged in- active combat. carne into the Chamber only recently, he technical or strategic or reconnaissance
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not on the ground. should, be aware of the fact that there is or supply by air?
Mr. GOLDWATER. Is the Senator some dispute about the meanng of the Mr. ELLENDER. I said to the distin-
convinced that the language does not wards .in the amendment, guished Senator from Montana--wheth-
prevent the use of aircraft for tactical As L xecal;l. the distinguished chair- er or not his amendment was in keeping
air support for reconnaissance flights man cf the Foreign Relations Committee with section 638 (a) in the appropriations
and for rescue flights? earlier indicated his understanding that bill, appearing on page 43-and the an-
MT. MANSFIELD. It would not pre- line effect of the language would be to swer was "Yes."
vent that, in my opinion. preclude ]such bombing. And as I under- Mr. MONTOYA. Mr.President, will the
Mr. GOLDWAT R. I hope the Sena- stood the chainnan of the Armed . Senator yield?
for is right, Because I just returned from services Committee, he said it could pre- Mr. ELLENDER. As I have said, I
there this morning, And contrary to elude such bombing. should like to continue answering the
what we have been thinking, the ]nil- Cex,airily, .the remarks of the distin- questions and then have a vote on wheth-
tration has stepped up tremendously, guishe d Senator from Wyoming (Mr. er it is desired to have this amendment
Friday night 600 trucks started in McGE m) - were very appropriate. in the rill.
from the border of North Vietnam. It is very obvious that there is con- Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
I am very frank to say, and I shall fusion-as to the meaning of the lan- Senator yield?
address myself to the subject later this guage. Accordingly. It would be ill- Mr, ELLENDER. I yield to theSenator
week, that if we do not' resume the advlseI to agree to such an. amendment. from Idaho. He has boen on,his feet for
bombing of North Vietnam, I see no way Therefore with to associate myself some time now.
to come out on this,' with .he remarks -of `the Senator from Mr, CHURCH. Mr. President, it seems
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Arizor a (Mr. GOLDWATER). to me that we are all agreed pretty much
Senator yield? Mr. MANSFIELD. The war in Viet- on, what our objective,is..The Senator
from Montana has repe_
Mr. MENDER. I yield. nam i; very confusing and tragic in and repeatedly mentioned
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I think the of itse f. It; the Senator from Aril sna has empha-
dialog here in executive session makes To :mt down to the nub of what our sized it. I.think we are agreed that what
the point that ought to guide us in what asnencment purports to say-and I say we want to prevent is the introduction
we do on the pending proposal. it is, this without-fearof equivocation inso- of American combat troops into Laos and
that we should be reluctant to adopt far as the Senator from Kentucky is con- Thailand-ground troops. That is our
the amendment because its meaning or cernee there shall be the use of no purpose. We certainlyy should be able to
intent Is subject to too many interpre- . U.S. troops in "Thailand or Laos- write the language to put our purpose
tations. While the matter that concerns laeriod=_totL1 Bn Itraiigle all you want into effect.
the Senator from Arkansas is a very about maintenance of supplies. That Is Mr. GOLDWATER. Why do we not
understandable one, the pending resolu- what is ie ns. spell it out?
tion could not possibly clatify it. - Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I Mr. CHURCH. Of co.=rse.
Does it mean we are going ~into Burma agree with my friend the Senator from Let me make this suggestion. There is
or Malaysia without it? Hardly. We have Michigan. The word "support" taken in no reason why this language cannot be
made it clear downtown. And the Senate a milit manner does -mean help. It made to conform to our objective. It is?a
has made it clear before on how it re- means everything. simple objective. We have been through
lates to our present status, in Vietnam. I ce^tainly abide by the word of the two wars-one in Korea and one in Viet-
I think it has made it so clear that I majority leader.-'I'fowever, when he says namutIve were really cornmeiaced by
believe we would be well advised not to support troops in the military, that is executive decision. We are in a situation
proceed along the lilies envisoned in the exactly what itmeedas, In Laos in which it took extraordinary
to
rts on the-part onc cerni iningTes ntare
amendment at this time, particularly in if w,, deny suppc t, then we deny tac- g
a public way. tical a r bombing and supply and recon- oeat t information n cng the e n et
we are
I think it would only tend to confuse naisanee and Lthings. we supply them of our involvement
t our there. prerogative-which
going to reassert
or hobble our Government in its efforts there now. i think we all want to do-as a part of
to seek a meaningful and responsible If there is any question about this, I the constitutional. process in determin-
way to disengage itself from Vietnam. think it'ought to lmmade perfectl r clear ing questions of war and peace and the
I -think we have contributed In this in the :unendnaeiit that the United States nature of the foreign policy of the United
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
rf ` Approved For Release 2002/01/22: CIA-7RDP72-00337R000300010032 O
January 21, 19 70 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks
States, we ought to ,draw some lines with
respect to'Laos and 'T'hai'land.
All we would have to? d4 to accomplish
that would be ,"to revise the proposed
amendment in the following manner:
BEc. 643. None of the funds- appropriated
by this Act shall be used to finance the in-
troduction of American combat troops in
Laos or Thailand.
I think that would accoinplisi, our ob-
jective.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. "Ground."
Mr. CHURCH. We could put "ground"
in. That would. accomplish our purpose,
and it would reassert our right to deter-
mine how public money should be used
In foreign countries, particularly in so
sensitive an area as Laos and Thailand.
I should like to offer this as an amend-
ment to the amendment offered by the
Senator from Montana and the Senator
from Kentucky.
T.he PRESIDING OFIIICER. Will the
Senator send his amendment to the desk,
please?
Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, I
should like to ask
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the
f en a,tor from Louisiana indicate whether
he has yielded for the purpose of an
amendment being offered to the amend-
ment?
Mr. ELLENDER. First, I will yield to
the distinguished Senator from New
Mexico, and then I. will continue with
the answers to the questions submitted
by the Senator from Arkansas. If Sen-
ators desire to take action immediately
on this amendment, we can do so
shortly.
Mr. MONTOYA. I think there is una-
nimity here, in that there is confusion
about what this amendment means.
I was going to ask the majority lead-
er, in view of his interpretation, if he
would consent to the following lapguaae
in his amendment, so that it would read
as follows:
None of the funds appropriated by this
Act shall be used to provide combat troops
for the support of local forces in Laos or
Thailand, except to provide supplies, ma-
teriel, equipment, and facilitie$, including
maintenance thereof, or to provide training
for.,such local forces.
The .. words added to the amendment
would be after the word "used," and the
new words would be "to provide combat
troops,"
Mr. ELLENDER. "Ground."
Mr. MURPHY. "Ground troops."
Mr. MONTOYA, "`Ground combat
troops" could be, used, or "combat
troops." "Combat troops" is a more ge-
neric term,
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, if we
took 5 minutes for .a quorum call, I am
sure we could work out language satis-
factory. to all concerned.
Mr. ELLENb i,. Mr, President,,we are
In executive session now, at the request
of the distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana and the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas, and I will not yield further
until ,I have finished with _ the answers
to .the. questions of the Senator of Ar-
k&nsas,
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a brief question
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President. I have a
brief question. Now that so many Mem-
bers of the Senate have decided that the
majority leader does not know what he
means with his proposed amendment,
will the Senator from Louisiana proceed
with his explanation, as he started to do?
That is my question,
exists between the United States or Its
agencies and the present Royal Laotian
Government or its Prime Minister, Sou-
vanna Phouma?"
This question was answered in my re-
ply to question No. 1.
Question No. 3: "What military as-
sistance, including manpower, material,
and training, Is the United States pro-
viding through this bill?"
As I stated previously, this bill in-
cludes approximately $90 million for the
support of the Royal Laotian Army pur-
suant to specific authority included in
the Department of Defense Procurement
and Research and Development Author-
iation Act. The arms and ammunition
the United States provides are within the
framework of the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ments. Article VI of the Protocol to. the
Agreements permits the introduction In
Laos of armaments, munitions and war
materials necessary for Lao national
defense.
[Deleted.]
I have here a list of what this money
is to be used for. If Senators desire, I can
go into every item named here. Other-
wise, it is available to Senators to look at.
Mr. FULBRIQHT, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield, for clarification?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said it
is approximately $90 million for the
Royal Lao Army,
Mr. ELLENDER. That is correct.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. [Deleted.]
Mr. ELLENDER. That is in another
matter. As I said to the Senator from
Arkansas earlier, this is an item that
cannot be identified,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I want to reiterate,
since more Senators have entered the
Chamber, that I do not at this time raise
a question as to the wisdom of these-ac-
tivities. I raise the question only that
Senators ought to know what they are
voting on.
Mr. President, it seems, to me that
every Senator is entitled to know, if he
is voting for this bill, that he is not only
voting $90 million for the Royal Lao
Army [deleted].
The Senator from Arizona, a moment
ago, made a point which led me to be-
lieve he would be in favor of authorizing
these activities. If they are in the interest
of this country why must they all be kept
secret? The only reason in the world I
brought up this matter was not to argue
with the Senator that we should not be
bombing in the north [deleted] but so
that Senators would know, among other
things [deleted].
These [deleted] are as much as the
entire budget of the country of Laos.
It is approximately the same as the
budget of the Laotian Government,
After Senators know all these things,
Approved for Release
E 159
in the interest of the United States to
continue this 'escalation of a conflict in
Laos, which could well lead to another
Vietnam.
A few Senators have said it is a great
tragedy. We have gotten bogged down in
Vietnam. It is simply that we should
know what is involved in this matter. I
do not understand, in view of what was
said by the, Senator from Arizona, why it
is not also proper to say, "Yes, this is
what we are engaged in, and it should be
authorized."
Mr. ELLENDER. The Senate now
knows it, since the Senator announced
it.
Do Senators desire me to read how
many rifles are involved?
SEVERAL SENATORS. No, no, no !
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Summarize it. What
is the material?
Mr. ELLENDER. What is the money
for? It is going ?to be used to purchase
carbines, rifles, machine guns, artillery,
and engineering equipment. It states
the amount to be spent in each category.
Approximately one-third of the total is
for ammunition.
Question 4: As of today, what is the
total number of U.S. military personnel in
Laos and describe the manner in which they
operate?
Answer: There are [deleted] U.S. military
personnel stationed in Laos. These are either
part of or attached to the attache staff.
[Deleted. f
With regard to personnel stationed in
Laos, the U.S. Ambassador has jurisdic-
tion over all U.S. personnel and U.S.
activities in Laos, including the military
I just mentioned.
Question 5: Describe in detail activities
over Laos of U.S. Air Force, including both
those activities, if any, based in Laos, and
those, if any, based in Thailand.
(a) What, if any, is the current monthly
sortie rate over northern Laos for U.S. Air
Force aircraft?
(b) How does that rate, if any, compare
to one year ago and two years ago?
(c) The contemplated sortie rate, if any,
over northern Laos in the coming 12 months?
(d) How do these sortie rates, if any, com-
pare to U.S. Air Force sorties directed toward
the Ho Chi Minh Trail?
Answer: The U.S. conducts photo and re-
con missions over Laos, and as the Presi-
dent said, interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail.
(Deleted).
Question 6: What, if any, have been the
total number of, U.S. military personnel
killed, wounded, and missing in North Laos
since 1962?
Answer: (Deleted). Casualties in Laos are
included as part of the total casualties in
Southeast Asia. They are not broken out
separately.
Question 7: How does this compare to per-
sonnel lost in operations solely against the
Ho Chi Minh Trail?
This was covered in my reply to question
number six.
Now, Question 8: What is the amount of
the personnel, operating and maintenance
and military assistance which is included
in this bill for Laos and Laos related activi-
ties?
Answer: Approximately $90 million is in-
cluded in fiscal year 1970 Appropriations Bill
for support of the boyal Laotian Army.
(Deleted).
That is all the. questions.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I think
2002/0:1 /22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0'
E160
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
CONGRESSIONAL I CORD Extensic, ors of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the
Senator from. Louisiana yield to the Sen-
ator from Wyoming?
Mr. ELLENDER. I Yield.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I think
that our discussions here have reiterated
the` point which I make again; namely.
that there is great uncertainty as to what
we ran put into words. The meaning of
those words will vary widely, and it seems
to me, in reflecting upon them, that all
it can do is to complicate the problems
of then President, as he seeks to pursue
disengagement. ,It could even give the
wog` impression to the other side at a
critical moment like this.
Therefore, to try to protect as much
as we can, I would move to table--
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No, no-- -just a mo
meat-Mr. President, if we are going to
vote, we should vote in open session. I
intend to be heard on it. There will be
no tabling motion, or any other kind of
motion, in secret session.
. Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Wyoming will state it.
Mr. McGEE. Is a tabling motion in
order?
The `PRESIDING OFFICER. A tabling
motion is in order if the Senator from
Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER) yields the
floor or yields for that purpose.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I
yielded to the Senator from Wyoming for
a question, However, I have nothing
further to state, unless there are other
questions to be asked,
Mr. ANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Louisiana yield ,to me?
Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that we
should have our votes on this matter in
public, that we should nst evade the
issue, that we should face up to it. Sen-
ators will recall during the last execu-
tives session that this matter carne up
and we decided to vote in public.
Let me refer to what the, distinguished
Senator from Kentucky said when he in-
troduced practically this same amend-
ment in September of this year, an
amendment which was agreed to by the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi
(Mr. STENNIS) the chairman of the com-
mittee, and the Senate as a whole,
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Montana yield at that
point?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. 3TENNIS. On the basis that it did
not apply to the funds in the bill then
being considered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That ibb correct. But
let me-read what the Senator from Ken-
tucky said in his latter to all Senators
on September 15:
I will Introduce the enclosed amendment,
or one, substantially similar on September
17 and-will ask that it be made the pending
business at the first opportunity. The
amendment would not affect clause (l), or
restrict the support of Vietnamese or other
Free world forces fighting In Vietnam. It
would prohibit the use of funds for the en-
gagement of the armed forces of the-U'nited
States in combat in Laos and Thailand in
support of local forces of Laos and Thailand.
Its purpose Is to prevent, if possible, the
United States from becoming involved In a
domestic war in Laos and Thailand, without
the authority of the Congress.
And then he enclosed a copy of his
proposed amendmnent, which is almost
similar to the amendment now before
this body.
At that time, in explaining his amend-
ment, he said :
My amendment is designed to prohibit
the use of our Armed Forces in combat sup-
port--in combat support of local forces
in Laos or Thailand and to keep them out
of situations in which they might become
engaged in combat which could lead into
war in Thailand or. Laos as it did in Viet-
nam. The language means our forces can-
not be used in combat in support o- local
forces unless an emergency arose where
the President's constitutional authority
would come Into play except by joint au-
thority of the Executive and Congress.
Thus, I think, despite the fact that
there is a certain: amount of confusion,
the Cooper amendment speaks for it-
self. I do not think it needs any change.
The intent is clear, not only at, this
time but during debate on the author-
ization bill, and I would hope it would
be accepted so that this Congress could
go on record once again as backing up
the national commitments resolution
which it passed same months ago.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.'The Sen-
ator front New York (Mr. JAVIrs) is
recognized.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from New York yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Sc irator
from Vermont.
.Mr. AIKEN. Mr, President, I think the
distinguished Senator from Montana
knows exactly what the amendment
means. It means that we will permit our
Government to continue doing in Laos
what it is doing n.ow, but would prohibit
the start of another Vietnam war in that
area.
I believe, further, that the vote on this
amendment will be interpreted by the
country as it dee;usion that we are sup-
porting President Nixon's efforts to with-
draw honorably from Vietnam and de-
escalate out forces, as he is doing al-
ready.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should
like to have a word--and I shall be happy
to yield to the chairman. The words of
the amendment are confusing. The words
will not do what the majority leader says
he wishes them to do. But the words can
be changed.
I would propose, if we have the oppor-
tunity to propose, how the Senate can
work its will if it wants to do what the
Senator from Montana says the amend-
ment does, It, does not do it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. will
the Senator from New York yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
New York was on the floor of the Senate
when the Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
COOPER) offered this amendment in Sep-
tember. The Senator from New York did
not raise an .argument then. The amend-
ment was spelled out then; it is spelled
out now. It is practically the same amend-
ment which we are considering at, this
time.
Mr. JAVITS. I do not know whether
Reinarks
Jun ua'r?y 21, 1970
I was on the floor o1 the Senate or not.
I hope the Senator will not be upset with
me. I am trying to help the Senator to
accomplish what he desires, in a way
in Which the Senate can legislate with
dignity. I am not trying to cross him
at all; I am trying to be helpful.
This must be done here; it cannot be
done in public. [Deleted.]
He merely wishes to inhibit two things,
as I understand: first, the use of Amer-
ican combat troops; second, the support
of local troops other than in respect to
logistics and trainingg That can be ac-
complished with word:,, retraining intact
the right to bomb from Thailand and
from South Vietnam, and to inhibit the
use of American combat troops in Laos.
But I respectfully submit that these
words-whether I was on the floor of the
Senate then or was awake or asleep-do
not do that. They do not have anything
to do with combat troops, but deal only
with the use of these funds for the sup-
port of local forces and how they shall be
managed.
Second, this is a real constitutional
test. This is the first time we are trying
to match the power of the Senate with
the power of the executive. We have got
to make both work, because we will not
retain our power unless we make them
work.
The commitments resolution says that
we may act either by a declaration of
war or by a concurrent resolution. As to
Southeast Asia, we have acted by a
joint resolution-the Ci'ulf of Tonkin res-
olution. That resolution is ample enough
in its words to quality under the com-
mitments resolution. It lets us do every-
thing we want to do :in Laos and Thai-
land as well as in South Vietnam.
Now what we are tryirol to do is to
limit that resolution to some extent,
which I think, as I understand, is right
and important to do in an appropriation
bill, unless we want to repeal the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution altogether.
Therefore, if the opportunity presents
itself--and I hope very much that the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE)
will not press his motion to table-I
shall seek to modify, with all respect to
the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANS-
FIELD) and the Senator from Kentucky
(Mr. CoopER), so that the Senate may
know what we are doing.
I shall move to amend the proposal
to read as follows:
None of the funds ,. prop:riated by this
act shall be used for ground forces in Laos
or Thailand except to i,.?ovide supplies, ma-
teriel, equipment, and facilities, including
maintenance thereof, for the support of
local forces or to provide training for such
local forces.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator Yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. The thing that fright-
ens me about this amendment is this:
Are we not inducing and encouraging
North Vietnam to intensify its infiltra-
tion in Laos to the disadvantage of our
plan to withdraw troops from South
Vietnam?
On second reflection, after reading
the amendment of the Senator from
Montana very carefully and listening to
his explanation, I think we should
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
January 21, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -Extensions of Remarks
either accept his amendment or do
without his amendment, because if we
become too clear, I am afraid that all
we are going to do Is to hint to our en-
emy to the extent that he will intensify
his infiltration in Laos, and thereby dis-
rupt the President's plans to withdraw
troops from South Vietnam.
We all know that Is what we mean.
The Defense Department knows what we
mean. We have 'been assured time and
time again that the do not intend tb
use combat forces. We recognize the fact
that they are not using combat forces
In Laos, Therefore, why do we not let
that stand there and rely on one an-
other's iriterity, rather than put` our
selves in the position of encouraging the
enemy to intensify the infiltration be
cause they know what we are going to
do7 .::
Mr. ,fAVITS, We have already in the
sense used by the Senator encouraged
the enemy by what we have done, all they
need to be encouraged, by everything we
are doing, including with our own forces
reductions in Vietnam, We are not go-
ing to give them any more signals that
we do not intend to intensify the war.
Now we are looking into our own situ-
ation. We? do hot want to get into an-
other situation where, without our 1hiow
ing-and Senator Fulbright is ' right-a
lot of things get done, and then they are
faits acc?mpli, whether we like it`or not.
it npt going to go into, the details
ka
of how, the Gulf of Tonkin' Resolution
was recommended and discussed' and
how it was used, and the toll in lives as `a
result.
I will say this to the Senator from
Montana: I will gil'er no amendment un-
less he wants it, but T am telling .him
that the words he, has proposed do not
do anything like he has in mind to do
but If he wants it that way, I will leave it
that way.
Mr., MANSFIELD. I disagree.
Mr. F L IMRIGH' ', Mr. Preside,'t the
purpose of my submitting the questions
I did to the chairman of the'Appropria-
Lions, Committee, was simply, as I wl
state once. more, to have this matter
disused so Members of theena>fe
know what they are doing: In effect, we
are spending,` if I understood the- figures
in an wer to my question [deletedl.
About [deleted] we are spending in `a
different war, going on within Laos be-
tween, the R oval Laotian Army, the
Pathet Lao,, and whatever troops the
North Vietnapiese have iniiltrated;thei,
which are estimated to be about $0,000.
[Deleted.]
I do not see any reason why this
should not be authorized if it is jr oar
interest. I do not believe it is, If I under-
E 161
part in that, and I am not proud of hav- this body had a right to know what it is
ing been taken in by the then adminis- voting on. This is an appropriation bill.
tration and, in my view, deceived. In not We are appropriating at least $400 mil-
having asked the kind of questions we lion, which I do not really believe is au-
are asking here today, it is possible that thorized, because It is very far removed
that experience has made me more sensi- from the activities in 'Vietnam, and I
tiveto being .deceved by any adminis- believe that as to Laos, we are violating
tration than I otherwise would have been. the 1962 convention. I do not believe that
I think it is important that Members it is acceptable; I do not believe it is, in
of this body who have to explain this to international law, that if someone else
their constitutents at least know what violates the laws, you are also entitled
they are voing for. It might be embar- to do it. You are in a case of genuine
rassing to any Senator if he is not aware self-defense. If this was a threat to the
of the war in Laos to have someone say security of this country, of course, we
to him, "I have a friend whose son was would be entitled to defend ourselves, It
killed In a bombing raid over North is quite a different international question,
Laos." As a matter of fact, I had, in my to maintain that we are entitled to [de-
prepared statement, excerpts of letters leted] against an enemy in northern
from members of families where sons had Laos, when the situation in Laos has very
been flying over North Laos. One of much the aspect of a civil war.
them is from a wife of a soldier who has The war in Vietnam began, before we
not returned. These are letters that came ever had any combat troops there, as a
to me as a Member of the Senate. They civil war. Once we entered it with com-
are not classified. I was intending to read bat troops in the Kennedy administra-
them in open session, but we went into tion, then it became an international
Executive Session before I could. I will war. But I believe most people would
put them in the RECORD after we are agree it was a civil war until we did
back in open session. send combat troops into South Vietnam.
We ought to know about this, the size In Laos, we do not yet have ground
of it, and also whether it is in the na- combat troops, I would Certainly support
tional interest. I think it is a question and do support the objective of the
we have to raise. amendment of the Senator from Ken-
But that is not the question I was try- tucky and the Senator from Montana
lug to solve in Executive Session. I was that we do not want to put in ground
simply trying to make every Senator combat troops. I do not want to continue
aware of-the kind of actions we are per- the activities of bombing without our
suing, and then we can draw our own knowledge or authorization. If we wish
conclusions as to whether or not, in con- to authorize it, that is another matter.
tinuing to escalate this activity as we I would close with this thought: It is
have since the beginning of the year, we not' only the secrecy in Laos. We run
are running the risk of another Viet- - into the same thing in the Philippines
nam, of going far beyond the intentions, and Thailand. [Deleted.]
I believe, of the present administration. I do not see that that is a good excuse.
We are led to believe-and I believe- Recently, in the Philippines, we found
the ' figuresabout the . deescalation in they do not wish to make public the
Vietnam, but I have seen very little pub agreements that have been made, by
Iished on this matter in Laos. Some per- which you use your constituents' money
sons say this 'has all been in the papers. , and the prestige of this country in an
I have never seen much of it in any news-' agreement with the Philippines as to
paper. what we pay for their troops.
In some of the testimony, when we It has been said here that it is much
asked this question of our Ambassador _ better to hire troops than to send our
[deleted], own boys. Well, it may be, especially if
the war is not in your national interest
This practice as between the legisla- and not in defense of your own country.
ture-the Senate-and the Executive, Whether or not it is a proper policy to
with respect to our Ambassador [deleted] hire troops to go fight anywhere around
an unaccetpable practice. I have been the world where your true interests are
An this body 25 years, and 2 years in the not involved, and you make a mistake-
other body, and I have never before which Vietnam has generally been
heard an Ambassador. tell the com-, agreed by many Senators to be-is quite
mitt], that he cannot talk about C he another matter from defending your
letedl, under instructions. He said he own homes.
had, been instructed [deleted], But in any case, in conformity with
I have never heard before any am- .the hearings conducted by the Senator
bassador take such a position. from Missouri-and I am very sorry he
Recently, the fifth amendment wass is not here, but he has to be away because
taken by Army officers, but that is also , his wife has been very ill-the only rea-
stood correctly from the remarks of the. less unprecedented. Here we had Ede- son I brought this up, and I think he
Senator from Arizona, he may not agree leted]. would have if he had been here, is to
wit] that' I do not want to put, words gn This again indicates a certain attitudemake the point that we run into this at-
hfs n]cliztll, 1?tt~t he believes this is of such on the paid of the executive branch- titude on the part of the Executive that
a nature that we ouglit'to 'do it. and I dp not day it is test this Executive, these matters are not the affair of the
This As not anything new. The origin 'but the previous administration, too. As Senate,, that we are not entitled to know
of the war is not attributable to this a matter.oj fact, Mr, Katzenbach went what is' -going on and :where vast sums
'admi'nistration., phis is no; partisan ef- further than anybody had ever gone be- of money are being._spent, that it is a
for(,t4 pin anything on this administra- fore in denigrating the role of the Sen- secret matter, so secret they cannot even
tibn. It is a question of the role the .Sergi- ate In the whole matter ?of foreign rela- tell the Senate,
ate plays .1 n matters of this kind tions, especially the war power. That is the e s iftial reason, why I
I ~haii not eitexate what liappened on Iattiought it was my duty to raise this. thought this discussion was in the na-
the, GttIf o onkfn, xesoiu era I question. The central question is whetlieia tional interest
Approved .Far Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
E162
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks January 21, 1970
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to the for a question?
Mr. I'ULBRIGHT. I yield,
Mr. CHURCH. I think we are all
agreed that the Senate ought to exer-
cise. ith constitutional responsibility as
intended by the commitmeits resolution.
The Senator remembers the Gulf of
Tonkin affair, as well as anyone in this
Chamber. Is it not true that, at the time,
we acted in the context of a situation in
which, we were told that American de-
stroyers had been attacked on the high
Seas, and that certain retaliatory strikes
had been made by our Navy in response?
Thereupon, we hurriedly passed a reso-
lution authorizing the President to take
whatever action was necessary in South-
east Asia to protect the interests of the
United States.
We did not draft that resolution with
sufficient precision, and afterward we
learned that the resolution was beirg
used by the President as justification for
sending half a million American troops
into agigantic ground war in Vietnam.
Now we face the first opportunity, to-
clay, to reassert the, constitutional re-
sponsibility of the Senate in compliance
with a resolution we passed earlier in the
session, and the question is, Are we go-
ing to assert our authority to protect this
country from involvement in another
Vietnam, in Laos or Thailand, without
the consent of Congress?
The language with which we are pre-
sented is just as imprecise, if not more
so, and much more ambiguous, than the
language we used in the Gulf of Tonkin
resolutloli.
I think if we are to assert our respons-
ibility we should do so in clear and .pre-
cise language. That is the lesson of the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution; and, in the
face of, that lesson, we certainly ought
not to le content with language as vague
and ambiguous as that contained in the
amendment offered by the distinguished
majority leader. I -would implore him to
considei some revision of that language
which would make, it perfectly clear that
we are undertaking to restrict the use
of the money in this bill to bar the fi-
nancing of American ground troops in
Laos and Thailand. I think the language
can easily be made perfectly clear, and
if we are going to speak at all we should
not speak in an ambiguous way, but in
a way that makes it clear, not only to
us, but to the President and everyone
concerned, just what we mean.
On this basis, I ask the majority leader
to reconsider the language in the amend-
ment he proposes. I want to support it,
but Ido think it does not carry out the
intent he wishes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen?-
ar,or,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there
was nothing ambiguous about the lan-
cage in the Gulf of Tokin resolution,
nothing ambiguous at all, and maybe
Were is a point to be made In not being
too clear in what you write down, but in
following out the intent as expressed at
the time.
The distinguished Senator from Ken-
ucky knew what he was doing, and he
studied this language. He made its intent of ground forces there, we might, as
clear during the time that the authori- stated by the Senator from Rhode Is-
zation bill was before us for considera- land, be simply inviting ground infiltra-
tion; and I have tried to make. it as tion of larger numbers of ground forces
clear as he did last September, from North Vietnam and perhaps even
I would point out that you can make from Red China.
language so clear that, in becoming clear, So it seems to me, reluctant as I am
you become involi,ed in places like Laos ever to vote for the laying on the table
and Cambodia on a ground combat basis. of a well-intended amendment-and
There is no question as to what the particularly when it comes from the ma-
intent of this "armbiguous language" is. jority leader-it seems to me that is
I do not think I could change it. I am about the only thing we can do.
certain the Senator from Kentucky would I might say if we agree to the amend-
not. I think this is a good amendment, ment as it is now, when it certainly re-
is in accord with .the national commit- lates and can be held to relate to the
ments resolution, and is certainly far Air Force as well as to the other forces,
more effective, I think, from a senatorial because it says, "none of the funds ap-
point of view, than the Tonkin Gulf res- propriated by this act, shall be used for
olution was. We got taken in by that, but the support of local forces in Laos or
we will notget taken in by this, Thailand" that it does not limit itself
Several Senators addressed the Chair. to ground support.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, I shall yield further It does include, by possible, and by res-
in a minute. sonabic interpretation, the, Air Force.
It is true that the language of the Gulf And if we should agree to an amendment
of Tonkin Resolution was not ambiguous. in those words and the Exewutive would
What was ambiguous about that pro- continue to use the Mir Force as it is
posal was, first, that the representation now used, I think it would be interpreted
about what actuary had happened in the by many editorialists and fine citizens
Gulf of Tonk:?n actually was not true, and from one end of the country to the other
second, that the President stated clearly as meaning that the President was
that the purpose was not to widen the violating the decision of Cohgress as
war, not to bring in North Vietnam. He written into the act.
was of the view, and all of the adminis- It seems to me that we are caught in
iration spokesmen were, that if we would a situation under which we can do little
show unity, and dcs it quickly, the resolu- else except lay on the table the
lion was designed to prevent any widen- amendment.
;ng of the war, or any further belligerent i fully agree with he Senator from
activities on the part of North Vietnam. I Montana that the action shall be taken'
would say that the committee and, in a public meeting. I have no feeling
hrough the committee, the Senate, was that that should not be done.
deceived. Mr. MANSFIELD. It will be.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I cer- Mr. HOLLAND. Hoye ever, my feeling is
'.,ainly agree with the motives of the dis- that that is the only thing we can do,
tinguished majority leader. I think he unless we are permitted to :Limit this to
has made those motives clear. He wants the prohibition of the use of ground
to prevent our involvement, or Senate forces in Laos. And there seems to be
approval of our involvement, In any substantial reason why we cannot so limit
,!,round war in Laos. this amendment.
However, I agree completely with the I regret that we are in this position.
Senator from New York that the wording i regret that the Senator from Kentucky
of the amendment,, which I understand cannot be here. I appreciate the loyalty
is really the wording of the Senator from of the Senator from Montana in trying to
Kentucky, does not limit itself to that stand by the amendment of the Senator
purpose or that motive. from Kentucky. However, I do not be-
I noticed, and I hope the majority lieve the amendment is limited to what
leader will follow me, that when he read the distinguished Senator from Montana
the two excerpts from the statements of would like to limit it.
the Senator from Kentucky in Septem- And being in a much more general
her, when we were debating the authori- condition, I do not think we should
zation legislation, that neither of those adopt it at this time. I feel that it should
statements applied only to the Armed be laid on the table.
Forces which are used on the ground. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
They might be interpreted just as clear- should like to address a question to either
iv as referring to the Air Force. The Seri- my distinguished colleague, the chair-
ator from Arizona has already made it man of the Committee on Foreign Re-
entirely clear that we are using the Air latlons, or to the leadership, whichever
'Force over Laos [deleted], and that we one might be willing to answer it.
are continuing to :i0 use them and will I am concerned, and have been all
continue to so use them. along, about all of the actions we take
Mr. President, I was hoping that; we that put us in an apologetic position in
could find words here to make the world opinion and esteem with respect to
amendment apply only to any use in the the war in Vietnam.
fsuture, or at any ti,nie, of ground forces It seems to me that for a long time
there without the concurrence of Con- about all we have been doing Is giving
gress. encouragement to the enemy. I say that
Mr. President, I find, however, that in all deference.
those on the committee, several of them, If we are going to pull out uncondi-
feel that if we used, those limiting words tionally, then let us pull out and get it
and made it clear that we were talking over with. I am persuaded that what we
hilly about the use of ground forces and are doing is slowly and maybe pain-
were preventing or- prohibiting the use fully-maybe that is what we intended
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
January 21,
Approved For Release 2002/01122 CIA-RDP72-00337R00.0300010032-0
1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Extensions of Remarks E 163
to do and will do >Iltin tely urnIng
over outhe ist siEL tq whocver ants to
gl?ab it tip --and `t sink we know who will
grab 'and sulvertit
Aside from that ..I point out before t
ptb`ui'id the question; that I think-we
should have li, ,rrnetl gi~r Ies?on ,;I seIc orn
iia}k about thin iss Ze H .ever, nk
we- shouldh Ye learned from ouraexpgri
enge"iii South Vietnam and it Sapthi
Kt rest that we shouldnever go into an-
ather war, with ground troops or other-
wise; except that we go in to win.
I think that has been our tragic mis---
take and 'that if entering the the-Vietnam.
war vas a InUtake then our not fighting"
to win has oinpounded that mistake.
We have telegraphed from our Gov-
erhn ent to the ether side the'rnessage
we do not warn towin a victory rather
that we are just begging the other side
to quit.,
That strategy has 'not worked. It will
not work, in my judgment.
If we are to give another signal . with
this resolution, it will avail us? nothing.
suss now written, this proposed amend-_
-inept can be interpreted as one chooses.
As has been indicated in the debate, the
leader can Interpret it as,l~e wants to.. 1 ,
ban put a different interpretation upon.
it. . And? so can anyone else., It , is very
ambiguous. However, the ,..best way, to
approach this, if that is what we want to
d'i-and I am perfectly willing, because
1-do not think the President should com-
mit ground forces there without the
consent of Congress-would be for this
body to have an understanding with the
President that he will not do it, That,, it
seems to me, would be suilicient. If,hp
gives us his pledge that he will not do it
'~Vitlout 'codling to, Congress, I will take
his word for it. He is the President of the
United States, and there, is no reason for
ally? of us to doubt his good faith and
- assurances.
It We do .that, we ill not need the
pending amendment in- the form,ili which
it is offered. I cannot vote for it _in the
form m which it is offered. If there are
celtain ni,qdflcations xpade,a,xid the ma?t-.
ter comes to a vote, I will vote for it.
But I doubt the. wisdom of this pro-
cedure.
1fany things we have -'clone publicly
have not been a credit to, or in tb, inter-
est of our country. I do not blame tlie-
other side for not negotiating. Why
should they? They appear to be.getting_
what they want without mal[ipg any
edncesslons. If we keep going as we have
been, unless it is possible to so effectively
Vletnamize the war that the. South Viet
naniese can take it over and win, the
Communists will soon take. over South
Vietnam.
I for one, would like to know that
Congress will be conslted ktefore;ground
troops are committed,uand I do riot lzlow.
of,;anyone that does not want.tp know.
Perhaps I am mistaken, but I think that
is a sentiment of the Senate, Why, not
do it by taking the word of the President
and relying upon it?
-t:We can always take action if We need,
to d$ so. KoweYer,, r would rather do It,
that way than to? signal again. to the
other side. that, our p.giWtry is divided
and. wilt become further divided; that
is to the distinguished Senator from
Louisiana.
While 'I have the TCoor, let ine saythat
I have been "listening with interest to
the arguments''agafnst the language in
the Cooper mendment. "Ambiguous"
does not get to the point. We ought to be
more definite we ought to be more clear.
May I.point out that one amendment
to the amendment offered is as follows:
None of the funds appropriated by this
Act shall be used for ground forces in Laos
or Thailand except to provide supplies, ma-
teriel, equipment, and facilities, including
maintenance thereof, for the support of local
forces or to provide training for such local
forces.
The effect of that would be to put U.S.
combat troops in-Laos. .
So I think there is something to be
said for ambiguous language, and there
is a great deal more to be said for the
intent of the Senate.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Mr. McGEE. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. T suggest thatthe Senate
resolve itself back into open session. I
think that way we will bring this matter
to a conclusion a little earlier.
Mr. MANSFIELD. We will.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield?
Mr. McGEE. r yield.
Mr. CASE. I wish to express agree-
ment with the conclusion just stated by-
the majority leader. The language is am-
biguous.'Our beloved colleague, the Sen-
ator from Kentucky, has a very subtle
mind, and so does our majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not I.
Mr. CASE. The Senator from Montana
has. This is said very kindly. That lan-
guage could be interpreted to exclude,
as the Senator -from Kentucky said in
the statement the Senator from Montana
read about it, it seems to me, air sup-
port. I 'do not think there is doubt about
that. The Senator from Florida made
that point. If by "combat troops" is
going to be meant just ground combat
I am going to support the ambiguity,
because I think any public statement we
snake is likely to. get us into much worse
trouble in the world than just repeating
what we have said before. I think we
can all agree on one thing: We are not
going to have American foot soldiers go
in -there. Beyond that, I am note sure
what this amendment would do, and I do
not think it matters too much. But, on
the basis that there is a great deal of
ambiguity here as to exactly what may
be permitted, sc long as that one basic
thing is excluded, that is the medicine
we had better take today.
. Mr, THURMOND. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McGEE. I am glad to yield.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I feel
very strongly about the words uttered by
the distinguished Senator from Florida
and the distinguished Senator from Ar-
kansas about what constitutes the proper
course for us to follow. 1 have been to
Vietnam. I have firm convictions about
the matter. I am of the opinion that we
could have won the war long ago, and
should)iave done it, and we are fighting
we continue'to fight among ourselves and
that some want to give the enemy their'
way about ` everything. And they are
getting their way more, and more as`we
continue to make concessions ' without
any comparable action whatsoever from
the other side.
I `would rather to dolt with an agree-
ment with the President. And I think we
can accomplish more by that approach
and better protect our country than we
can by adopting this proposed ambiguous
amendment.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President--
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I yield to
the Senator from Arizona without losing
my right to the floor. '
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, if
the majority leader's decision holds that
the vote will be outside the executive
session, I suggest to the majority leader
that lie declassify the executive hearing.
I think it would appear rather foolish
to the American public to have the result
of a vote without being able to read what
we were voting on and all'of the argu-
m ent and debate.
I say this with all due ' respect. Frankly',
outside of [deleted] there is nothing that
could not be declassified.
I suggest to the majority leader that
in the interest of the country, if we have
a public vote, the record should be made
public. 'If it has to be sanitized, let it be
sanitized.
I think that too many things have been
said today that have long needed saying.
I think the American public would be
encouraged and strengthened if it could
read some of the remarks that have been
made, even if we have to delete some of
the numbers and make some declassifica-
tion, and I would hope that the majority
leader would take the proper steps to see
that the record, as we have listened to
It today, will be made available to the
public.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McGEE. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. We will follow the
usual procedure agreed, to by the Senate
on all previous occasions in which we
have been in executive session, by means
of which it will be up to the chairman
of the committee in charge of the bill-
to wit, in this instance, the distinguished
senior Senator from .: Louisiana (Mr.
ELLENIER)-to approve, to sanitize and
to clear the final version, just as it was
up to the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi (Mr., STENNrs) when a similar
occurrence arose during the considera-
tion of the defense authorization bill.
So far as I am concerned, I believe
that the Senator from Louisiana will
not be picayunish, that he will be pretty
broad in allowing what can get through.
Frankly, I have heard nothing in this
executive session which I think should
be kept secret, but I think the precedents
of the Senate should be and must be
upheld, and we will leave the final de-
termination. as to what the. sanitizatiopi
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0 ~' -
E 164 CONGRESSIONAL RECOR;P---Extensions of Remarks Jamu i'y 21, 1970
the war! in Vietaa now, because we did
not will in Korea. if we do not win this
war, we will fight again.
The Senator is just as right as he can
be when he says we should not go into a
war until we have to; that once we get
into a war, we ought to win it. But that is
beside the point at this time.
The question now, before the American
people is,,what course can we, the Senate
of the United States, follow to help to
bring t4e war in Vietnam to a close as
soon as rossible?
I am convinced that any words we ut-
ter or any actiofi we take indicating di-
vision in this country will tend to extend
the war. I am convinced that the mora-
torium march in Washington opposing
the Vietnam war helped to ex-tend the
war, because it showed a division in this
country. Other similar demonstrations
will do the same.
I am firmly of the opinion that we
should table this motion, as the Senator
from Wyoming indicated he would like
to do, and leave this matter with the
President, Let the leaders. of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations confer with the Presi-
dent. If they cannot work something out,
then the Senate can consider any other
action.
I should think that the best thing to
do today would be to stand behind our
President and show unity. I hope the
Senate will follow that course.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McGEE. I yield to the Senator
from California.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have
sat quietly in the background, and I have
listened attentively. With all due respect
to the majority leader, I think the mere
fact of the amount of time we have been
discussing, the meaning of the amend-
ment is, evidence enough that there is a
misunderstanding.
I do not- think there is any great divi-
sion of opinion as to what happened in
the Gulf of Tonkin. I do not think there
is any great division-I do not see how
there can be---among those who have
read the record, that the entire involve-
ment in Vietnam has been a series of mis-
takes. The involvement in Korea began
with a mistake, and then we went on
from-one mistake to another.
I think the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas made a-: very wise statement
when he said that we ought to try to
find-our way out of this morass. I do not
think we accomplish anything by per-
mitting any thought or feeling or word
to come out of the Senate which would
further confuse or further divide the
American people.
I do not think anyone in this Chamber
does not know and understand that con-
trived confusion, division, and polariza-
tion has been the most important tactic
of the enemy for at,least the Past 2 years.
So I would say that two things occur:
First, we are talking about. a condition
that I am not sure really needs, our at-
tention at this time.. The President of the
United States, who has done: more to get
us out, who, I think we all agree, is trying
sincerely to bring it to an end, has said
that there will bero more Vietnams. I
think we can trust:bim. Until we find out
to the ontrary, I believe we should trust
him. SoI do not think it needs any em-
bellishment on our part.
As the Senator from Arkansas = Mr.
MCCLLLLAiN) has suggested, I think that
perhaps there should be a policy, an
arrhgement, an agreement, whereby,
before tins ever happens again, the legis-
lative and the executive branches would
sit down together. I can envision cir-
cumstances in which, if the debate vent
on as long as this debate has gone on,
as to possible action needed, the action
might be lost before our decision was
made. This is perhaps one of the reasons
why, at the outset, the Chief Executive
was charged with these matters.
I would suggest that we be very cau-
tious. First of all, we should find out ex-
actly what we want to accomplish and
make sure we are doing it. I must say
that, after listening attentively to all
the explanations and to all the divisions
of opinion, 'I am not certain what might
result. I do not wEmt any more Ameri-
can troops to go ar..yvwhere to fight.
But I also do not want to signal to
the enemy, who are watching carefully,
who.are listening carefully, who are very
sensitive, and in these matters of at-
tempting to divide, our citizens, adept.
They are experts. They have played the
propaganda game successfully for 35-
years. I know something about it; I have
studied it.
They are wondering what we are say-
ing here and how to use it to their ad-
vantage. Senators know as well as I know
that there is not anything they do that
is not motivated from political considera-
tions, including their military activities.
It is always planned for political effect
and it always has been. If we are going
to vote on this matter in public, I assume
we will have s, discussion and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in public; and that we
will have an opportunity to vote on a
resolution under which there will be no
question as to what is the exact meaning.
Before we vote in public I hope we all take
into full consideration what we would be
accomplishing with regard to the gen-
eral welfare, future, and safety of our
country, to make certain we will never
again by hoodwinked by something like
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
I think we have talked a long time, and
I think everybody understands the niat-
ter quite well. I would be perfectly happy
if we could get on to other matters.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr, President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. McGEEI,. I yield to the Senator
from Vermont.
Mr. All EN. Mr. President, however, I
want to say the Senator from Montana
knows exactly what he intends with his
resolution. It is perfectly plain to anyone
who wants to understand it. We have, of
course, Many different types of people
and many different schools of thought in
this country,
We have those who want to get out
of Vietnam precipitately, regardless of
the cost; we have those who want to go
on expanding the war until victory is
achieved, regardless of the cost in lives
and dollars; sold, then, we have those
who believe that pescE.~ can be restored
in Southeast Asia, if we approach the
subject in a sensible manner with a grad-
ual withdrawal, such as President Nixon
is now attempting to do.
I just want to say if there are any
misunderstandings about the Senator
from Montana or the Senator?from Ken-
tucky, they can be applied equally
against the President, of the United
States who is trying to bring about
peace over there and to do away with
the excessive expense }:nd who, I judge,
is opposed to war for the sake of war.
Mr. MCCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
posed the question in r I previous re-
marks, Can anyone an>wer it, primarily
the leadership on either side and the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations that has jurisdiction over these
matters. I would like to know whether
the President has been. consulted with
respect to any plan to put any ground
troops into Laos?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCLELLAN. I coine back to the
question: Why cannot ;Eris matter be re-
solved simply by an ut derstrmnding with
the President that - it will not be done
except that he comes to the Congress for
approval?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. NIcCLELLAN. It seems to me if
that has not been done, to take this ac-
tion precipitately is somewhat an affront
to the President.
I trust the President. I agree with the
distinguished Senator from Vermont
that he is doing everytil:ing he can to get
us out of the Vietnam situation. I think
he is acting in good faith. I hate to vote
for something here that I think would
cast an aspersion or reflection that the
Senate doubts the President's good faith.
It has not been done; I'now of no threat
to put ground troops in there. Why then
should we take this proposed action?
It seems 'to me a simple conference, a
simple communication between the lead-
ership of this body and the President,
and his response thereto would be suf-
ffcient to allay this whole issue.
We can put our confidence in that ap-
proach and that is the way we should
operate. If we must heve a vote on this
resolution, I cannot .support it in its pres-
ent form.
The President said that we are not
going to have any more Vietnams. I trust
him, but if we have any doubt, why not
contact him and get an assurance we
could all accept and rely on.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I yield to
the Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, no
Senator raised any question about mis-
trust of the President, nor 3hould any
Senator do so.
What we are tr, in; to do in this
amendment is support the President, who
has said that he will not send ground
combat troops into Laos. His words have
been backed up by his Secretary of State,
who said, in,response to a question con-
cerning the possibility of being involved
1n Laos on a ground combat basis:
The President won't let it happen.
Approved For Release 2002/01/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
MIj_tJI VVCW rVl RCICQ,7C LVVLiV IILZ , VIM-rcF7r 1L-VV I RVVVJVVV I VVJL-V
January 21, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions o Remarks E 165
Continuing, Secretary of State Rogers' made me believe was his policy. I do not it seems to me, that itun derscores and re-,
said believe the 'h'ounding Fathers intended iriforces the constitutional role of this
mean we have learn d one lessoji,`aiid our system to mean the Senate should body in
that the projection of-foreign policy
I think the dues=
is we are not goin
p& ilt any major ask the President what he means about intents and directions
wars in the, mainland o Asia again and we something and take his word for it. tion that remains is whether the message
are not going to send American troops there, We should not have this complicated has been delivered and I can see no
and we certainly aren't going to do it` unless system unless the three branches play reason to doubt that the message has
we have the American public and. the Con-
greys behind us, their respective roles. There is nothing come through loud and clear, and no
I applaud the Secretary of State and wrong with our understanding of the doubt has been heard downtown for some
words in the amendment of the Senator time,
the President of the United States for from Montana. I; shall support it, It is I fail to see what more in the form
their statements, sentiments, and intent. intended to be a limitation of the present of a public resolution it could achieve
But remind Senaors t h a t w ire, apart program. that the President. has not already heard
of this Government, too, and that we I wish to refer to the point, made by on that question.
share a part of the blame, a good part, my senior colleague on,going all out in Therefore, Mr. President, in that con-
for getting
n" i eolvw ed vin 'Vietnam. , the war. I agree with him. I do not be- text, I am resuming my motion to table
oulif get behind this.. lieve that we should get into a war when the pending resolution.
resolution which means something ,and is it is not sufficiently clear that the na- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
meant to be helpful to the President so tional interest is involved, and there is for the yeas and nays.
that we can put into effect what we dg no question that we will go all out to The yeas and nays .were ordered,
cided to do in our national commitments win it. It would. be a terrible mistake_ to Mr, ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the
resolution., get into a war in which one is ambivalent Senator yield?
~ Mr. MoGEE. Mr. President, I yield to in his attitude toward going all out in_ Mr. MANSFIELD.- Mr. President, I
the Senator. from Arkansas. a war. move that the Senate return to-
10 FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, first, Why did not President Johnson go all The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
I wish to make the record clear so that the out? I can guarantee that I was not one motion is not debatable.
record is not confused In the" rejnar"ks. of his advisers, during the period when Mr. ALLOTT.._ Mr. President, I was
ofethe Senator from South Caroljn , and, he was refusing to go all out. He did not going to-ask if the. Senator from Wyo
I believe one other SezlatQr, I do not be- consult me from about September 1965 ming would withhld his motion for a
lieve he said, "distinguished senior Sen- until December a year ago. It was not moment.
ator from Arkansas" but be should have. done on my advice. Why did he not go.. Mr. McGEE. How much time does the
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will all out? I think one of the reasons was Senator from Colorado need?
th
i
ld
t
e Sen ?
e
or y
? that he was doubtful about the validity.
Mr. FBR>'GHT. I yield. of the war he had ufide;taken. I 'do not
Mr. TIuITJ,t2,ZUlONA.I meantsenipr Sep}- know why he did not go all out. In World
ator from Arkansas. War II, we went all out for unconditional
Mr. 'ULDRIGHT. I just wanted to surrender, We won that war,
make clear that he was referring to the It is of course true that the previous
senior Senator. administration over a fpll 3 or 4 years.."
With respect to the matter of trusting refused to go all out, which is. the tradi-
the President, certainly I.did not, wish to_ tional way. There must have been some
raise that question. The Penator_ from, reason fpr it, Not only was it a, disaster
Montana 1~ut. it on g proper basis. This for the country, but it also, discredited
is a constitiitigna question and, the Sex - the President himself, Clearly he was not
ate has a rolp to play. I say once more out to discredit himself. He of course did
the purpose o my actions here ,today was not wish to bring about a situation in
to inform the Senate so that We, could, which he Gould n,, pt run for election again.
play that, role -with full inforrpation. That is unprecedented in our history. But
about what we are doing in this area. _ , it does raise the question that maybe the.
?3owever, 3t does not seem,,to ,me, this war was ill founded and maybe it was
question of tri}sting the President Should. not justified in the first place. In_ the
be brought up in this fashipn, I supported present circumstances we face. I believe
very strongly the previous President, that we support the President's objective.
President Johnson, Hg,rarion,a platform The only difference that I know of in
in "1964 "of .no wider war. The .Senator most people's minds is not the President's
froze. .Arizona will, recall. the nature of objective, but whether the means he has
that perhaps a little better than I,,ISup- adopted to achieve the objective are cal-
ported President Jollz~ on, One of the, culated to, do" so, this is an instance in
issues, and I believe the Senator from which we can have honest differences of
Arisoona will agree, was "no wider, war," opinion. I certainly do not disagree with
President Johnson said throughout the the announced objective of the President,
summer a41d early fall, of 1964 that be but I do not 'think it disloyal or un
was against a wider war. American to suggest that the policy he
I believe the -Senator, , from Arizona is following is not likely to achieve his
did advocate some. of the things that objective. It is purely a matter of judg
were later done by President Johnson, ment.
Mr.,GOLPWATER. Mr. President, will' I should like to do anything I can to
the Senator, yield? help him achieve his-announced objec-
Mr. G.,gI 2W4i.TEA his heart he. ment, the amendment of the Senator Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, this
knew I was -right, from Kentucky and the Senator from, is the only way I can get hold of the
Mr. FULBRIGHT, As I look back upon Montana, would certainly strengthen his members of my committee to say that I
It, I believe you were, too. Anyway, I and to resist if pressure is put upon him was not going to have a meeting if this is
did, not support the Senator, frorl?., Ari t . _wfden the war and to make it more going to continue much longer. I am
zona, I supported the Deu}ocratic,nomi-, difficult for him not to withdraw and ton 'hopeful that we can continue the HEW
nee, tie 1Qw w t i%pened, conclude, I would say, the tragic war, in appropriations meeting when we get
Via. fox as theoxnili .lJkizig a corn- South Vietnam. through with the vote.. I am sure that
mltmentthat he is going to follow a .par-, Mr, McGEE, Mr. President, the de- we can at least clean up or at least finish
titular "policy in a ward I do not believe- .liberattons of this, body this afternoon was not going to have a meeting if this is
Presiddent Johnson fnllnxx-1 nrlla++ ie bairn b
?f
l
suc
een
Approved; Fqr Release 2002/01/22 CIA=RDP72-0,0337R00030001OQ32-0
Mr. ALLOTT. One minute.
Mr. McGEE. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator from Colorado.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Wyoming would have to ask
unanimous consent-
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, the Senator
from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE) may yield
to the Senator from Colorado (Mr. AL-
LoTT) for"1 minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Montana? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
The Senator from Colorado is recog-
nized for 1 minute.'
'Mr, ALLOTT. Mr. President, all I
wanted to say was that; I believe we are
in basic accord. I was going to suggest
to the majority leader that we might
be able to come out with a positive res-
olution affirming the decision of the
President not to use U.S. combat troops
in Vietnam. In this way we would solidi-
fy the country and solidify the sense of
the Senate not to denigrate our own
position in our joint responsibility, and
also not feed the fuel of Communist
propaganda aroufld the world.
Mr. McGEE. Mr: President, I ask unan-
imous consent' that :1 may yield 15
seconds to the Senator from Washing-
ton (Mr.'MAGNUSdN) in order to make an
announcement.
E 166
Approved For Release 2002101/22 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300010032-0
CONGRESSIONAL RECD I) - Extensions ? of Remarks Jag2 ry
Mr. I ANSFIII . M. President, I ask
for the rands. ;
The PRWIDING O 'XCF .. The yeas
and nays have already been ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. 'resident, I
move that the Senate return to legis-
lative, open session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Ques-
tion is on agreeing to the motion of the
Senator from Montana.
The motion was agreed to and, there
-
upon ,at 4:27 o'clock p.m. the doors of
the Chamber were opened, and the open
session of the Senate was re?umed.
FANNIN NOTES INDL=STR t
PROBLEM
HON. SAM STEIGER
OF ARIZONA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
,
Wednesday, January 21, 1970
Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Sr. Speaker,
in the midst of an extremely difffcult
inflationary situation it is ironic that we
are also facing an international trade
problem of such purgeoning prpp'ortions
that it may threaten our domestic econ-
omy.
In last Sunday's Arizona Republic,
business and financal'editor'Don Camp-
bell printed an interview with Arizona's
Sonator PAUL FANNIN outlining the scope
of this problem and some of the actions
which must be taken if a trade crisis
is to be avoided.
Senator FANNn notes some of the com-
plexities which have gotten;usinto our
current international logjarl and puts
forth some interesting and innovative
ideas on how the problem may be at-
tacked.
Mr. Speaker, I include the article to
which I have referred, whidh appeared
an the Arizona. Republic on Sunday,
January' 18, in the RECORD at this point:
INDUSTRY AT THE CROSSROADS?---IMPLACABLY
PINCERS OF SOARINC. COSTS, Low TARIS's''S
STRANGLING MANUFACTURERS IN TILE MAR-
KETPLACE
(By Don G. Campbell)
With the possible exception of performing
brain surgery In the back of a truck camper
while 1 negotiating the Coronado 1h-ail, few
i;bings corn quite so close to :;seer impos-
.;ibility as that of understanding our tariff
laws.
And yet, ironically, few International ar-
'angements strike so decisively, at the-man-
n-the-street's pocketbook and arouse, so
_nuch emotionalism as this complex network
of duties that each country erects to protect
As domestic commodities and products from
.mports.
Ideally, of course, all coulitrtes should be
to constituted that tariffs wouldn't be neces-
;ary and there would be, literally, "free trade"
with everyone competing-no strings at-
tached-With everyone else. But life is one
t.hing,, art Is another, and free trade is an art
;hat Is as elusive 'today as it was when inter-
riatiorsal commerce began.
The fact that the United States Is, day by
day, getting into an increasingly critical po-
Iitio'n In its foreign trade is no particular
Beret, belt' very con4plexity of how we got
into our current jam helps to obscure the
seriousness Of it. As our productions costs
oar, the fewer goods we sell overseas: The
fewer goods we sell overseas, the more jobs
are lost domestically.
And, at the same time, the more foreign
markets we lose, the ? more American manu-
facturers axe tempted to move some of their
operations abroad to compete more evenly.
The result; the loss of even more jobs here
in the United States.
One of )rte more vocal advocates of taking
action in thin area before the damage is lx-
reversible is Arizona's senior U.S. Senator,
Paul J. Fannin, whose concern is underscored
by the fact that Arizona's role as a foreign
exporter IS growing by leaps and bounds--up
to $98.2 million in 1966 (the latest year avail-
able), exclusive of agricultural items, from
$63 million just six years earlier. It was in
1366 that Arizona finally nosed Colorado out
of the No,, l sport in escorts among the Moun-
tains Mates.
The key to the crisis, Sen. Fannin said
this past week in an interview, is the infla-
tionary cycle in the United States and, in
particular, the soaring cost of labor-which,
since 1965, has risen at twice the rate of out-
put per man hour.
As a case in point, Sen. Fannin cite- the
disparity between labor costs among the ma-
jor auto producing countries. In the United
States, according to Fannin's figures, labor
costs in the industry amount to about $5,31
an hour asngaiost:
Argentina, $1.19; Australia, $1.52; Brazil,
$0.96; Germany, $2.20; Italy, $1.99; Japan,
$1.40; Mexico, $2.04; South Africa, $1.05;
United Kingdoms, $117.
Undoubtedly, too, laanrcin feels, labor con-
siderations are also the prime factor in the
explosive growth at imports currently
crippling the domestc shoe industry. As re-
e5tntly as 1959, for instance, shoe imports
equaled only 3.5 per cent of U.S. shoe pro-
duction but, last year, they equaled 37.5 per
cent of it, and the industry estimates that
by 1975 one out of every two pairs of shoes
sold in the United States will -be foreign
made.
File industry, Fannin said, also reckons
that for every 10 million shoes imported
(and there were 200 million of them in lti69),
there are roughly 3,000 job opportunities lost
for domestic shoe workers,
Hurt even more, of course, Is the consumer
electronic industry, Of the total market of
12.5 million television sets labt year, for in-
stance, a full 4.;, million of them, 33 per cent,
caitlie from abroad. 'the industry estimates
that the Import share of this will rise to 43
percent of the arket in the current year.
In the case of tape Instruments, the battle
already has been decisively lost-a full 10.3
million of the 11.9 million tape machines
sold last year, 90 per cent-were imported.
This year, the Industry expects the import
share of the market to rise to 92 per cent.
But, while "Cheap foreign labor" is the
traditional rallying cry of the protectionists,
Fannin said, the whole problem is a bit more
complex than that, The disparity in labor
costs, is further complicated by unfavorable
tariff struetureS cosni;l.g out of the "Kennedy
Round- of tariff negotiations--a drastic re-
duction in the tariffs on about 100,000 prod-
ucts Involved in world trade and a move that
was decidely dverdue.
The negotiations were the result of eon-
greasibnal action in 1963 giving the late
President , the authority to slash import
duties up to 50 per cent across the board.
The knotty details of the authorization, how-
everkept all 46 nations involved in the
matter bu$y clear up until it was flnallly
signed into law on Nov. 13, 1967.
"The trouble is," Sen. Fannin said, ""hat
the tariffs worked out were supposed to even
up the productive capacities of the countries
involved. Countries like Mexico, with a much
lower productive capacity than the United
States, were protected from a flood of imports
with relatively high tariffs."
The trouble Is, the Arizona senator said,
the situ tion changed quickly and, by the
time the nonstop negotiations on the Ken-
nedy Round had been completed, the pro-
21, 1970
ductivitl' capacity of such Countries as Japan
and Germany had drastically changed--they
no longer needed the "p -otectinn" that the
high tariff still gave theri.
Meanwhile, of course, inflation in the
United States had Continued at a dizzy pace
alai-- Between soaring caste and disadvan-
tageous tariff barriers---A>aterioaa goods were
rapidly being priced out of the market. (In
France, for instance, tariffs are based on
"1sorsepoker units" which :makes the duty on
a Volkswagen only $16 while on a Chevy II,
with only twice the "horupowel' units,'" the
duty is $130).
In order to sell abroad, ,it all, then, Anieri-
can manufacturers have heels fleeing to such
free-port assembly zones as Mexican border,
Taiwan a nd Singapore-- n: rt merely to pick up
lower priced labor, but to execubs an end -run
around the tariff barriers, too. The result:
plants that should be built In the United
States, (`.'You can train ass .American Indian,"
Sen. Fannin said,"to asse-noble apart just-as
easily as you can teach a Korean.") are being
built abroad and staffed by foreigners.
By the end of 1970, the electronic industry
est'ima-ten, all hut two of the mayor American
manufacturers will be Lnporting complete
TV sets, or substantiali r finished chassis,
from their own foreign plats for sales in the
United States.
No one, Fannin said, wants to try to
counter this by launch' ng a drive for a
return to the isolationistic high tariffs also-
cited with the disastrous Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1931 which would simply result
in retaliatory tariffs around the world, shut-
ting us completely out of all nuerkets.
The solution, Arizona's senior senator be-
lieves, has to be a return to realism on the
part of organized labor in the United States,
plus legislation that would give American
industries the same inceritives for building
plants in the United Staten, as they now have
for building them abroad.
"I don't see how labor (',in take much sat-
isfaction in getting worcers a $5-an-hour
scale," Fannin said, "if there aren't any jobs
to be filled-and that's the direction we're
going."
Currently under study by the Treasury
Department, he added, is I-roposed legislation
that he has drafted that would domesticate
some-of the incentives-;;uch as tax defer-
ments on funds reinveal n'd in plants--that
American manufacturers now enjoy in set-
ting up foreign subsidiaries.
But the time is short, rand the squeeze is
rapidly becoming a string ohold.
HON. MASTON O'N:EAL
OF GYORG It
IN THE HOUSE OF RErPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, Janue.ry 21, 1970
Mr. O'NEAL of Georg; i a. Mr. Speaker,
the Albany Herald, a distinguished news-
paper in my :district, on January 5, 1970,
paid a most deserved tribute to one of
America's most dedicated and respected
public servants, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Di-
rector of the Federal Bireau of Investi-
gation.
A little over 5 years ago this body
unanimously adopted :1 rescSution ex-
pressing the hope that Air. Hoover would
"continue in his presen'. office for many
years to Come.' I would like to reiterate
that hope now.
Mr. Speaker, I inc.lu6e; In the RECORD
the editorial entitled ".5. Edgar Hoover,
Patriot" :
Approved For Release 2002/0,1/22 : CIA-RDP72-00337R0'00300010032-0