TARGET STUDY OF NORTH VIETNAM

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 13, 2000
Sequence Number: 
30
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 11, 1965
Content Type: 
STUDY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9.pdf262.4 KB
Body: 
e e73 Approved For Release412.001/0SMI:tik-RDOM400666R900200020 -9 TARGET STUDY OF NORTH VIETNAM OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS 11 June 1965 immliff6FMEma NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9 Approved For Release.2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T00666a100200020030-9 S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM 1. Nature of the Economy and its Vulnerabilities The North Vietnamese economy is basically one of subsistence agriculture with only a small modern industrial sector concentrated in a few centers, including Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh', Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen. This small industrial sector is heavily dependent on Imports of machinery and raw materials, primarily from Communist China and the USSR; on the other hand, North Vietnam generally imports little? food, depending very largely on domestic production to feed its population of about 18 million. The main transportation links with other countries are via the port of Haiphong and the rail line to China via Dong Deng., North Vietnam's capacity for producing military items, many of which are crudely fashioned, is restricted to grenades, mines, mortars, and ammunition for small arms. All of North Vietnam's heavy military equipment and most of its small arms and ammunition are obtained by imports from Communist countries. Hencey'the Viet Cong military effort is not primarily dependent upon the North Vietnamese economy fprequipment and supplies. Nor are Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam significantly dependent upon the major military installations in the north, such as airfields. and military headquarters. The Viet Cong logistic requirements are relatively small; it obtains food and SOMB military supplies in South Vietnam. S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9 Approved For Release 4001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T006661W200020030-9 S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM Potential vulnerabilities, translated into possible target systems, are discussed below and in the annexes appended to this report. The neutralization of key industrial, transport and military targets could constitute a serious blow to the Hanoi regime and adversely affect its determination to carry on the present conflict in the face of mounting escalation of the conflict. Of the potential target systems discussed, wenote;that the crippling of the key transport and military facilities (discussed in Part III of Annex 1 and in Annex 2) would complicate the problems of (continuellogistic support for large-scale operations in South Vietnam, reduce North Vietnam's defensive capabilities (particularly air defense) and markedly slow down the level of operations of the modern industrial sector in North Vietnam. However, we have not been able to identify a target system in North Vietnam which, if successfully attacked, would carry with it a higher degree of assurance of crippling the effectiveness of Viet Cong ground forceresentlideployed in South Vietnam. 2. Potentialjndustrial and Transport Ta4....aet Systems Electric power generating facilities, heavy industry, transportation) petroleum storage depots, and the port of Haiphong are discussed as possible target systema in Annex 1. The principal conclusions are: a. Eight powerplants account for nearly 8o percent of electric generating capacity and serve about 90.percent of North Vietnam's - 2 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2001/0E6PWRIBRiT00666R000200020030-9 Approved For Release001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T006661394)0200020030-9 S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM industry. Severe damage to these plants would have an immediate and long lasting effect on industrial production and would impair .operations at the port of Haiphong. b. Five heavy industry plants account for North Vietnam's steel capacity (presently under construction), virtually all cement and fertilizer output, and the only large modern machine building capacity. All of these facilities represent key Soviet or Chinese aid projects and they have military significance apart from their symbolic value. c. Six rail/highway bridges and the port of Haiphong are the major transportation targets because the flow of supplies from China and the USSR flows over these routes. Interdiction of the key bridges together with the entrance to the port of Haiphong would not only slow down the importation of military supplies, but also greatly reduce imports of those taw materials on which North Vietnamese industry depends. There is also a major petroleum storage area in .Hanoi and one in Haiphong. Loss of POL stocks and severe damage .to the country's largest storage facilities would curtail motor, air and water transportation and could therefore affect military Activities as well as the operation: of the economy. 3. Potential Military Targets There are four major airfields in North Vietnam which normally accomodate military aircraft (MIG fighters and 1L-28 bombers) as .well aa transports for military and civilian use. Effective.. -3- Approved For Release 2001/03/02 :Ielfolgattaq#6R000200020030-9 Approved For Re!eau 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T0066V000200020030-9 S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM neutralization of these facilities and aircraft would temporarily cripple the North Vietnamese tactical and air transport capability, as well as their ability .to strike targets in South Vietnam. Replacements could be provided by the USSR and/or Communist China; after repair a fighter defense and bomber offense could be reconstituted quickly. Hence, repeated interdiction would be required. (See Annex 2) Neutralization of airfieX-ds;the Hanoi SAM sites and other key military facilities would have two predictable effects: (1) It would serve notice of U.S. determination to attack military targets anywhere in North Vietnam, and (2) It would reduce U.S. and South Vietnamese aircraft losses if follow-up air attacks were planned on key industrial or transport targets, since most of these key installations are in the Hanio-Haiphong area. 4. Vulnerability of Rice Crop to Flooding The probable consequences of attacking North Vietnamese rice supplies by flooding the Tonkin delta as a consequence of breaching its levees is considered in Annex 3. We have not made a study of the operational feasibility of breaching the levees in the Red River (Tonkin) delta. However, a successful attack might severely flood as much as half a million hectare's,* and losses could run to 17-7- * A hectare is 2.471 acres. - 4 - S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9 Approved For Release...2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T0066661.000200020030-9 S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM three quarters of a Million tons of rice. If only the main levees were breached, and the secondary levee system remained, rice losses probably would be on the order of 200,000 tons. We believe the Communist Chinese could make up this deficit from their own production of 75-80 million tons of rice and supply their own people by additional imports of wheat. Wheat is freely available on the world market, and the Chinese (as well as the Russians) have ample foreign exchange to purchase the quantities required by North Vietnam. If a completely successful attack were to achieve a significant reduction in rice supplies in North Vietnam, which the Chinese or Soviets were unsuccessful in making good for some unknown reason, the Hanoi regime would undoubtedly impose selective rationing. The military forces and essential industrial and government workers would continue to be fed adequately. It would be the least important sectors of the population, such as the old people, who would suffer deprivation. Hence, an attack on the rice crop by flooding the Tonkin delta would be unlikely to achieve a significant military impact. Further, it would almost certainly incense world public opinion against the United States as the perpetrator of an inhuman act and could strengthen the determination of the North Vietnamese to resist. 5 S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2001/03/W2 .1W141513")*00666R000200020030-9 ApprovedForRelease2001/03/02:CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9 Nee S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM 5. Other Target Studies Annex 4 is a brief annotated bibliography of other target studies on North Vietnam, including possible sabotage targets. Additional details on certain potential target systems are available in these studies, particularly the 7 April 1965 analysis ititled, Location and SignificarlQ:Oof Electric Powerplants in the Hanoi-Haiphong Power Network of North Vietnam. ORB/ERA (11 'Tune 1965) - 6 - S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020030-9