CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000100180198-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 198
• Publication Date: June 13, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

Vol. 113
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tZon~rnstonaL
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1967 No. 92
House of Representatives
tfausrG' A-PPeoPe+k-~,o~s
The House met at 11 o'clock a.m.
The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch,
D.D., offered the following prayer:
Abide in Me, and I in you. As the
branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except
it abide in the vine; no more can ye, ex-
cept ye abide in Me.-John 15: 4.
Spirit of God, pressed by the insistent
demands of public duty and pursued by
the details of daily routine, we are glad
for this quiet moment of prayer when in
all reverence of mind and heart we may
kneel at the altar of Thy presence and
find that in Thee our souls are restored,
our strength renewed, and our faith takes
on new life.
We, the Members of this body, con-
scious of our responsibilities as the lead-
ers of this great Republic, unite in pray-
ing for Thy guidance as we faithfully
endeavor to do our best for our people
and what is right in Thy sight. Give to
these Representatives the will to work
together for the good of our Nation and
for the benefit of all our people.
Grant unto them and to all of us the
spirit to resist the pressure of selfish
appeals, and to our people may there
come the insight to realize that sacrifices
must be made by all and that there is no
substitute for honest labor and genuine
faith. In the midst of a changing world
abide with us and hold us steady now
and always. In the Master's name we
pray. Amen.
THE JOURNAL
The Journal of the proceedings of yes-
terday was read and approved.
MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE
A message from the Senate by Mr.
Arrington, one of its clerks, announced
that the Senate had passed, with amend-
ments in which the concurrence of the
House is requested, a bill of the House of
the following title:
H.R. B424. An act to authorize appropria-
tions for procurement of vessels and aircraft
and construction of shore and offshore estab-
lishments for the Coast Guard.
The message also announced that the
Senate had passed bills, joint and con-
current resolutions of the following titles,
in which the concurrence House is
requested:
S. 1281. An act to authorize the appropria-
tion of funds to carry out the activities of
the Federal Field Committee for Develop-
ment Planning in Alaska;
S. 1586. An act to amend sections 3 and 4
of the act approved September 22, 1964 (78
Stat. 990), providing for an investigation and
study to determine a site for the construction
of a sea-level canal connecting the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans;
S.J. Res. 88. Joint resolution authorizing
the operation of an amateur radio station by
participants in the XII World Boy Scout
Jamboree at Farragut State Park, Idaho,
August 1 through August 9, 1967; and
S. Con. Res. $0. Concurrent resolution to
print a report entitled "Mineral and Water
Resources of Alaska."
CORRECTION OF VOTE
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall
No. 97 I am recorded as not voting. I was
present and I voted "yea." I ask unani-
mous consent that the permanent REC-
ORD and Journal be corrected accordingly.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Florida?
There was no objection.
CALL OF THE HOUSE
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the
point of order that a quorum is not pres-
ent.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is
not present.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a
call of the House.
A call of the House was ordered.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names:
[Roll No. 132]
Abbitt
Fascell
Purcell
Arends
Fino
Riegle
Ashley
Frelinghuysen
Ronan
Aspinall
Fuqua
Ruppe
Ayres
Gubser
Satterfield
Brown, Calif.
Hanna
St Germain
Brown, Mich.
Herlong
St. Onge
Celler
Hosmer
Smith, N.Y.
Clark
Jones, Mo.
Sullivan
Collier
Kelly
Talcott
Conyers
Kupferman
Thompson, N.J.
Corman
McEwen
Widnall
Dawson
Mathias, Md.
Williams, Miss.
Dingell
Moorhead
Willis
Dow
O'Neal, Ga.
Young
Eilberg
Pelly
Younger
The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 381
Members have answered to their names,
a quorum.
By unanimous consent, further pro-
ceedings under the call were dispensed
with.
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker,
I ask unanimous consent that the Special
Subcommittee on Education be allowed
to sit this afternoon.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentlewoman from
Oregon?
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I object.
The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.
PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON
RULES TO FILE PRIVILEGED RE-
PORTS
Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the Committee
on Rules may have until midnight to-
night to file certain privileged reports.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Mississippi?
There was no objection.
DEPARTMENT___OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS. 1968
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move that
P Holis resolve itself into the Comm-TV--
tee of the Whole House on the State of
the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 10738) making appropriations for
the Department of Defense for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1968, and for other
purposes; and pending that motion, Mr.
Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
general debate be limited to 4 hours, the
time to be equally divided and controlled
by the gentleman from California [Mr.
LlPscoMBI and myself.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
motion offered by the gentleman from
Texas.
The motion was agreed to.
11 7061
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I3 70,62 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ing along pretty well toward an early For the forthcoming fiscal year 1968,
Accordingly the House resolved Itself adjournment. However, if we should in- the tentative administrative budget
into the Committee of the Whole House dulge that fond hope, we would prob- deficit projection in January was $8.1
on the State of the Union for the con- ably be in error and headed for disap- billion-resting, lleweyer, as always, on
sideration of thebill H.R. 10738, with Mr. pointment, because the Committee on a number of legisTa~ive actions. That
RosTENxowsxl in the chair. Appropriations, after the passage of this projection was recently revised upward
The Clerk read the title of the bill. bill, must come to a screeching halt with by the executive branch to $11.1 billion,
By unanimous consent, the first read- respect to the five remaining bills sched- an increase of $3 billion. The revenue
ing of the bill was dispensed with. uled for enactment at this session. Even projection was lowered by $1.5 billion;
The CHAIRMAN. Under the unani- though this is the 13th day of the sixth estimated expenditures were elevated by
mous-consent agreement, the gentleman month of the year, and only 17 more days $1.5 billion.
from Texas [Mr. MAHON] will be recog- remain before the new fiscal year begins, As to the tentative character of the
nized for 2 hours and the gentleman from the Congress has not enacted the neces- projected deficit for fiscal 1968, I pointed
California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] will be recog- sary authorizations for the five remain- out on the House floor on January 24-
nized for 2 hours. The Chair recognizes ing appropriation bills. the day the President's new budget was
the gentleman from Texas. For the reasons we stated we cannot submitted--that even if only a handful
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, this is move with expedition until we have au- of selected budget assumptions and Ion-
a rather memorable day in the history thorizations for such things as Coast tingencies did not materialize, the ad-
of the Congress and in our service in the Guard procurement, the poverty pro- ministrative budget deficit for 1968 could
Congress in that the bill l,Zeing presented gram, military construction, foreign aid, go as high as $18.3 billion, and supplied
for the consideration of the Committee the atomic energy program, the space the details in tabular form. And in a
today is the largest single appropriation program, and a number of others. So, letter to all Members of the House on
bill ever presented to the Congress. this is about the end of the road-we March 14, I said:
Mr. CMairman, this means that this is are at a pause-until we get the neces- Even the $8.1 billion deficit for fiscal 1968
the largest single appropriation request sary legislative authorizations. The next hinges significantly on Congress enacting
ever presented to any legislative body bill will have to come after the next the 6 percent surtax proposal, a postage in-
in the history of the world. fiscal year begins. I would add that our crease, an acceleration of corporate tax
Back. in World War II, the War De- appropriations hearing on the unfinished collections, and approval of $5 billion of
partment appropriation bill for fiscal -bills have largely been completed, ex- participation certificates. The proposed pay
year 1944 carried funds in the sum of cept for the closing supplemental bill. increase is in the budget at $1 billion. If
just this series is not estimated
$59 billion. The five remaining bills will cover by Congress,
some $20.9 billion of known budget re- deficit for r actions instance, the estimated
Then, just before the outbreak of the quests plus any last minute supplements. deficit would be $18.3 billiont
war in Korea, we had all of the appro- I am not critical over the lack of au- This is not the time to discuss whether
priation bills lumped into one package. thorizations because I realize we need there should be a tax increase. But these
It was a single-package appropriation _____ _, .. .. ._ - _11r,_ - _ ._ _
ver al
these authorizations. the contingencies and uncertainties still
of the departments and agencies o
ernment, including the Department of To see the aggregate picture, we would surrounding the revised $11.1 billion
Defense, but even it carried an amount have to add to the $126.9 billion which budget deficit figure, have evoked esti-
of less than $34 billion. So, by any com- we will have acted upon when we pass mates of an. administrative budget deficit
parison., we are undertaking today to this measure, and the $20.9 billion-plus upward of $24 to $29 billions in fiscal
deal with astronomical sums heretofore remaining-about $15.2 billion which is 1968. This alone should compel us to
ulunatched which involve the fortunes automatic because these sums represent greater prudence in conference deal-
and the destiny of our country-and for so-called permanent appropriations ings, in considering the $20 billion, plus
that matter, the world-not to mention which include principally the interest on in budget requests remaining to be
the impact which the expenditure of the national debt. For the entire session, voted on, and in voting on all legislative
these funds will have upon our own the budget requests for appropriations authorizations.
domestic economy. will total about $163,000,000,000, more or J_Vith this defense bill today, we will
OVERALL APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY FOR THE less. have.,, redlle ldent January
SESSION Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make these budget by $a nza nn QVk Is con-
Now, Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion preliminary remarks in connection with srderably better than was done last year.
that this a good Ctime hairman, it to level with the whole fiscal picture. Appropriate fig- It is considerably better than was done
that h on such questions as when with ures will be put in the RECORD in more the year before. Maybe it is not good
will adjourn, a matter over which many w detail. enough, but the bills which have passed
will us j are no special ventral, and on There are those who have said that have passed almost by a unanimous vote.
what we have done appropria ntrolonwise to there is no way to keep up with the ap- I assume that generally the will of
date. and one ations business. There are ways, the Congress has been accomplished in
We have already considered and formation and one way is which to is note being g carefully printed from om making the $3 billion reduction.
passed through the House of Represent- time to time in the CONGRESSIONAL We do not know what the other body
atives at this session 10 bills from the RECORD. I cite the RECORD for today, and will do. Out of the 11 appropriation bills,
Committee on Appropriations. This bill, for March 23, May 25, and June 5. There it has acted on, I believe, four, it is im-
if passed, will make the 11th appropria- will be other reports on the status of possible to tell what the final outcome
tion bill passed by the House of Repre- the appropriations business in the com- will be on appropriations at this session.
sentatives during this session. ing weeks and months. There must be a meeting of the minds
Mr. Chairman, with the passage of For example, I am going to write every on the part of both bodies, the House
this bill, we will have acted upon $126.9 Member of the House, a letter again this and the Senate. We hope we may in-
billion of the President's budget requests week and give some of these basic facts
for appropriations. We will have acted in order that we may all work together, I crease the level of reductions in the
upon about' 85 percent of the requests hope, in a continued, concerted effort to forthcoming bills.
for appropriations which we will prob- hold the line on spending, at least to Mr. Chairman, under leave granted,
ably be asked to act upon this year, and bring the appropriations down to as low I include a summarization of the totals
we may be prone to feel that we are sail- a level as may be reasonably possible. of the appropriations bills to date:
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Summary of action on budget estimates of appropriations in appropriation bills, 90th Cong.,
1st seas., as of June 18, 1967
"back-door" type appropriations, or permanent appropriations r under previous legislation. Does include
indefinite appropriations carried in annual appropriation bills]
All figures are rounded amounts
Bills for fiscal
1967
A. House actions:
Budget requests for appropriations considered___________
Amounts in 11 bills passed by House____________________
3. Change from corresponding budget requests .________
B. Senate actions:
1. Budget requests for appropriations considered__.---------
2 . Amounts in 4 bills passed by Senate____________________
3. Change from corresponding budget requests .________
4. Compared with House amounts in these 4 bills __.________
C. Final actions:
1. Budget requests for appropriations considered___________
2. Amounts approved in 3 bills enacted____________________
3. Comparison with corresponding budget requests------
$14,411,000,000
14, 238, 000, 000
14, 533, 000, 000
14, 457, 000, 000
-76,000,000
+219, 000, 000
14, 533, 000, 000
14, 394, 000, 000
2, a $112, 477, 000, 000
2.8 109,611, 000, 000
9073, 000, 000
8:954,000,000
-119,000,000
+90,000,000
1, 458, 000, 000
1, 383, 000, 000
Bills for the
session
$126,888,000000
123,849,000:000
H 7063
There is another factor here. If you
calculate from the Treasury Department
statements, the spending for defense-
and I mean the whole Department of De-
fense-it will be observed that the spend-
ing rate in March and April was higher
than that which was estimated in the
budget.
In 1 month it was $300 million higher.
Whether it will continue that way, it is
impossible to predict.
We may have a supplemental request
later in the fiscal year, but it will not
23, 606, 000000
23,411,000:000
on the part of the President and the
Secretary of Defense and the administra-
tion generally.
-195,000,000. So I did feel it proper to make these
+309,000,000 contrasts between the bases of the budget
15, 991, 000, 000
15, 777, 000, 000
I Permanent appropriations were tentatively estimated in January budget at about $15,212,066,000 for fiscal year 1968.
2 Includes advance funding for fiscal 1969 for urban renewal and mass transit grants (budget, $980 000,000? House, $925,000,000).
al And participation sales authorizations as follows: Total authorizations requested in budget, t4,300,060,000; total in House
bils, $1,946,000,000.
I would like now if I may, Mr. Chair-
man, to turn to a discussion of this huge
measure which is before us. The late
Clarence Cannon, longtime chairman of
the Appropriations Committee, looked
with a great deal of disfavor upon a
practice that has grown up in commit-
tees when the members arise and heap
praise upon the members of the coon-
mittee in control of the bill or of the sub-
committee, including eloquent praise of
the staff. This is not supposed to occur
in well-ordered committees, but since
this bill is so big, I believe a few en-
comiums would be permitted if I can be
brief.
DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, FISCAL YEAR 1968
I would say that no committee of the
Congress is, in a general way, much
stronger than its staff, and I challenge
any committee to produce a. better staff
than we have on the Committee on Ap-
propriations. It is not large, but I believe
it is better to have a good, professional,
experienced staff than to have a large
staff overflowing almost into the corri-
dors who may be tempted to engage in
make-work activities.
I would say further than the gentle-
man from Florida [Mr. Sncss], who is
the ranking majority member of the De-
fense Subcommittee, has been especially
helpful. He has often presided when I
have been at other subcommittee hear-
ings.
The gentleman from California [Mr.
LIYscolSl has distinguished himself on
the minority side as a man of great sta-
ture, industry, and ability.
I pay these special compliments to
these two gentleman-and I withhold
nothing from other members of the sub-
committee who have been likewise faith-
ful in, the performance of their duties.
We have heard of 4 credibility gap and
maybe I just .created one here in these
words of praise but I think not.
It was said that we were not given the
truth last year as to defense appropria-
tion, requirements and spending. Well,
this issue has been greatly, exaggerated
and overstated.
In the defense bill last year, we were
told early in the session that the finan-
cial planning assumptions upon which
the budget was based last year presumed
that the war would end before June 30,
1967. Nobody thought that it would ac-
tually end at that time. But the conflict
was escalating rapidly and it was diffi-
cult to calculate with precision the exact
requirements. We were told that other
requests would be made to us, but that
they could not and would not be pre-
sented until a later date when more pre-
cise requirements would be known.
This situation brought on a lot of con-
troversy and argument. But we were told
generally what the facts were. Besides
that, we knew them from our own anal-
yses and we did not need to be told
of the situation.
But the budget this year for defense is
based upon entirely different financial
planning assumptions and the com-
plaints applied to the 1967 defense
budget cannot be applied to the 1968 de-
fense budget which is before us.
The January defense budget which is
before us assumes that the war in Viet-
nam will continue throughout the fiscal
year 1968 and into fiscal year 1969.
So this budget may be adequate-al-
though I admit I doubt it-but my
doubts do not arise because of any fear
of misrepresentations having been made
to the Congress. I just have the feeling
that as the result of the progress, or the
lack of progress, being made in the war
in Vietnam costs will go beyond those
which were calculated in the January
budget.
The January budget is predicated upon
having fewer than 500,000 men in Viet-
nam during fiscal 1968. There are indi-
cations that we may require more than
500,000 men. Therefore, I say there is
considerable likelihood that additional
funds may be required later in the year.
Anyone who wishes to read the mate-
rial available knows this. It has already
been made clear in testimony before con-
gressional committees including the Ap-
propriations Committee.
for the fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year
1968.
BASIS OF COMMITTEE ACTION
Now you may ask "Why in Heaven's
name is a reduction in the defense budget
being recommended in this bill in the
sum of $1.2 billion at a time when costs
may be greater and at a time when we
are engaged in a war?"
This, I think, is a pertinent question
and requires discussion at this time.
I would say to the House that in
previous years we have often said, "You
have overfunded certain programs. We
are going to reduce a certain activity by
a certain number of dollars, but since
we know you are going to need this
money in the same general area for other
programs which we think are under-
financed, we are going to leave this
money in the bill."
This year we decided that this ap-
proach would tend to cause less control
over funds. We provided funds based
upon our analysis of the justifications
presented. If additional funds are needed
for some escalation of the war beyond
that which is anticipated in the budget,
the Defense Department can come and
ask us for more money.
If you will get a copy of the report
and turn to page 2, you will find that the
total budget request is $71.5 billion and
the total amount recommended in the
bill is $70.3 billion.
You will also note that while this is
the largest bill ever considered by this
Government as a single appropriation
bill, it is only $65.5 million above the
total appropriation for similar purposes
for the current lscal year. The total ap-
propriation for fiscal 1967 was made in
several bills: the regular appropriation
bill, the defense supplemental bill, and
the increased pay costs in the second
supplemental. So this is not a great ad-
dition to the amounts provided for the
current fiscal year.
If you have time to read three pages
in this report, I recommend reading
page 3, which discusses the committee
approach to the bill, a portion of page 3
and page 4 which discuss the scope of
the bill.
When we discuss the scope of this bill,
we find that the committee added in this
bill $404 million above the budget, funds
not requested but generally opposed by
the administration.
The pages referred to follow:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
COMMITTEE APPROACH TO THE BILL
The budget request before the Committee
totals $71.6 billion. The estimated carryover
of unexpended funds on July 1, 1967, is $43.7
billion. The sum of the carryover funds and
the $70.3 billion recommended in the bill
equals $114 billion.
In its review of the budget, the Commit-
tee determined that in some instances funds
were requested for purposes which, in the
judgment of the Committee, did not require
appropriations at this time. Such funds are
deleted :From the bill.
The Committee found that, in some in-
stances, funds requested in the budget were
not needed for the purposes requested. These
funds have also been deleted. This appears
to be the most logical approach to a Defense
budget at this time.
Although considerable sums are involved
in the total recommended reductions, and
world developments may create the require-
ments for substantial funds in addition to
those recommended, it did not seem appro-
priate to provide such sums in the bill as
"blank check" amounts to be used for pur-
poses which had not been justified before
the Committee or discussed by Defense wit-
nesses.
The Committee-is, however, of the opinion
that funds over and beyond those carried
over from previous years, and those included
in the pending bill, will probably be required
for fiscal year 1968. The tempo and cost of
the war in Southeast Asia are on an upward
trend. The costs of wars can never be pro-
jected precisely. The actions of the opponent
weigh heavily on such matters. No decision
has been made to increase military man-
power above those strengths provided for in
the estimates. Rates of consumption of am-
munition, aircraft loss rates, and so forth,
are based on the latest data available at the
time of budget submission. If additional
amounts are subsequently requested, they
will of course be given a high priority.
The action of the Committee is based upon
the budget request before it; efforts have
not been made to anticipate the effect of
future world events on Defense needs. The
highly dangerous situation in the Middle
East emphasizes the absolute requirement
for the continuation of a high level of mili-
tary strength which the accompanying bill
seeks to assure.
Emergency funds and other fiscal authority
granted to the Department provide flexibility
to meet unbudgeted and unanticipated
events, and to permit both the Executive and
Legislative Branches the time to react to
such events.
The reductions recommended by the Com-
mittee will not hamper the war effort in
Southeast Asia. They are made in programs
not directly related to the prosecution of
the war. The Defense Department estimates
that of the $71.6 billion of new funds in the
budget about $20.3 billion will be required
for the war and about $51.3 billion will be
required for Department of Defense efforts
in other programs. This compares with the
$70.2 billion appropriated for fiscal year 1967
of which the Department estimates about
$21.3 billion will be required for the war in
Vietnam.
SCOPE OF THE BILL
-The bu t estimates for fiscal ear ,
for tlla militaLy-LUngtions covere b this
~~.iIL~ total $ 1,584,000,000, i ud aro-
. YYN.Y.~Ly[ A - - - t.
Tga jwmT~ hill oirlns for npp=-
pr?ia&Jp>ais Of $70 2,2995=Q.OnA. _ _r+ *pnse~f
>81.288.SD0,000 below the esti ,t~A11j21 oi)ri _,a-
ns for sca ear 1967 il1t1L +n~ the glln-
plemen a ense AourOgriaLi~ ^~rL9fiZ,
and spl} cable amounts the_Secon ,,, Suu-
p entaI Apprap ation_.Act?_ JQA17 t Vital
$70.2,2 29:622,000. The amounts recommended
in. the it or 1968 are, in the a g r i e an
innrr ?Sale of A6 , above t e2~a`roPrla-
ipns t
Of the reductions recommended by the
Committee, $467.7 million was made manda-
tory by the exclusion from the authorizing
legislation of $301.1 million for fast deploy-
ment logistics ships and $186.6 million for
conventional destroyers. Other reductions are
related to program changes occurring since
the budget was formulated as, for example,
a slow down in the F-111B aircraft program
occasioned in part by the crash of one of the
test aircraft.
It should be pointed out that the net re-
duction of $1,288,800,000 consists of overall
reductions of nearly $1.7 billion offset by in-
creases of slightly over $0.4 billion. The in-
creases stem from the funding of certain
procurement and research and development
items authorized by Congress over and above
the budget, and from the Committee posi-
tion that certain military capabilities should
not be permitted to be reduced during the
forthcoming fiscal year.
Each of the items and its relation to the
previous general discussion' will be covered
in more detail later on in this report.
A summary of additions and decreases fol-
lows :
Additions :
Continuation of B--52 strength__
Continuation of Air Force Re-
serve Components airlift capa-
bility :
appropriation increase------
(Within available funds)-
EA-NA aircraft----------------
A- 6A modifications (within avail-
able funds) __________________
DLG(N), full funding on nuclear
power guided missile frigate--
DLG(N), advance procurement--
C-130 airlift aircraft --___---____
G-7 Caribou aircraft --____-_____
CX-2 aeromedical evacuation
aircraft ---------------------
Aircraft modification in support
of Southeast Asia future re-
quirements __________________
ASW-(fund highest priority
items within available funds) _
AMSA-in support of authorized
program --------------------
Total, appropriations recom-
mended above budget----
12. 1
(14.4)
106. 7
114.8
20.0
60. 0
12.5
25. 0
(33.0)
25.0
Decreases
Fast deployment logistic ships,
failed of authorization----__- 301.1
Conventional destroyers, failed of
authorization --------------- 166.6
Recoupments of excessive un-
obligated balances --------- -__ 251.0
Civilian employment----------- 136. 0
Multi-service aircraft, support
procurement ______________?_ 125.0
'_11B program stretch-out_____ 78.2
Technical manuals and data__.. d^-
Tactical and support vehicles,
including autos______________ 55.8
Resources management system__ 52.7
Commercial airlift rates (new
CAB authorized) ------------ 468.9
AID/DOD realignment of S.E.
Asia functions--------------- 47.4
Contract termination charges
funding policy on ------------ 46.9
Permanent change of station
travel (Army) --------------- 44.0
Revised ship conversion pro-
gram ----------------------- 42.1
Research, and Federal Contract
Research Centers_____________ 22.8
Management studies, and studies
& analyses------------------ 22.4
Support of Eastern Test Range__ 15. 0
Army overcoat material --------- 14.6
Boards of Civil Service Ex-
aminers --------------------- 8.9
All others______________________ 138.4
Total reductions in appropria-
tions below budget --------- 1,692.8
CONTINUATION OF B-52 BOMBER STRENGTH
The additional funds were provided for
the following purposes: For a continua-
tion of B-52 strength equivalent to three
squadrons. Forty-five planes were sched-
uled for elimination from the fleet late
in the year, for the continuation of which
we provided $11.9 million.
RESERVE AIRLIFT CAPABILITY
For a continuation of the Air Force
Reserve components airlift capability,
we provided $12.1 million to keep eight
Reserve units and three National Guard
units in operation.
We added these funds because at this
troubled time of war in the Far East
and the threat of war in other areas of
the world, including the Middle East, we
did not think we ought to deprive our-
selves of B-52 strength or airlift
strength. So we took this action.
ADDITIONAL EAGA AIRCRAFT
We provided $106 million for certain
aircraft, for the use of the Marines in
Southeast Asia, as to which, I believe, no
one could complain.
COST OF WAR IN VIETNAM
I would point out that in the bill be-
fore us about $20 billion is scheduled for
the cost of the war in Vietnam and about
$51 billion is for the overall cost of oper-
ating the Defense Department,
We did not make reductions which we
felt would impinge in any significant way
upon our war effort in Vietnam. The re-
ductions made would not have direct
application to the war in Vietnam.
We provided, above the budget, for the
modification of certain types of aircraft
required in Vietnam.
NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR SURFACE NAVAL
VESSELS
We provided for additional ships for
the nuclear Navy. With the passage of
this bill we will have provided for the
Navy 111 ships which have nuclear
propulsion.
I will not go into detail on that. The
funds are given in detail in the report.
I see the gentleman from South Caro-
lina standing, the eminent and able and
articulate chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Armed Services. He had the
audacity to walk by me, as I spoke ear-
lier, and in reference to my statement
that I challenged any committee to pro-
duce a better staff than we have"on the
Appropriations Committee, he said very
boldly but in a low tone, "I challenge
you."
I yield to the gentleman from South
Carolina.
Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman.
What I said, Mr. Chairman, was that I
accepted the gentleman's challenge about
staff, as the gentleman knows.
Mr. MAHON. That is correct.
Mr. RIVERS. I just wanted to be cer-
tain. I do agree with the chairman, that
he does have one of the finest staffs.
Mr. MAHON. We do, and the other
committees, including the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, have able staffs. The
staffs of the various committees are very
important to the welfare and work of the
Government.
Mr. RIVERS. I believe the gentleman
has a magnificent staff. There is no ques-
tion about that.
I want to ask the gentleman about
nuclear propulsion for ships. Do we prop-
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 7065
erly take care of the nuclear propulsion
for surface ships? What about the two
DLGN's which our committee inserted
to give this country surface nuclear pro-
pulsion?
Mr. MAHON. We agreed with the gen-
tleman's committee as to the requirement
for nuclear powered guided missile frig-
ates. With respect to these nuclear
frigates, we fully fund one, and we pro-
vide $20 million for long leadtime items
for the other, which in the judgment of
the committee will in no way defer or
delay these important ships.
Mr. RIVERS. What does that mean in
terms of numbers of ships? Last year we
funded one, this year we have funded
`another. That makes two. Then the gen-
tleman appropriates for long leadtime
items for one more ship? Is that correct?
Mr. MAHON. That is what we have
done.
Mr. RIVERS. So the gentleman's com-
mittee has satisfied the authorization?
Mr. MAHON. Yes; we have in that we
have fully funded one nuclear powered
frigate and provided for, long-lead-time
procurements for another. This will pro-
vide for an orderly procurement pro-
gram. The gentleman is correct.
Mr. RIVERS. Two ships including one
with long leadtime items. I want the
Congress to understand that we have
now four of the nuclear surface ships.
Four is all we possess. This will give us
six, and with long leadtime items for one
more. The strongest nation on earth will
have only the capacity for seven surface
nuclear ships. This is so ridiculous that it
is ridiculous. It is so disgraceful that it is
disgraceful.
Mr. MAHON. There is considerable
controversy between the executive and
the legislative branches as to the nuclear
powered ships, but we have funded in
AIRCRAFT $4 billion for research and development
on ABM systems, including the Nike X,
Now, in this bill, in addition to the nu" the Nike Zeus, or any concept involved in
clear ships about which we have had defense against the ballistic missile. Last
Department -of Defense will have avail-
able to it for the next fiscal year the
total sum of $114 billion for the func-
tions covered by the bill. That is the sum
of $43.7 billion In carryover funds and
the $70.3 billion in funds carried in this
bill.
We made a reduction in the F-111B
program, the Navy version of the F-111,
in the sum of about $78 million. We did
it in large measure because test aircraft
No. 4 crashed, and this delayed the pro-
gram. Instead of funding 20 of these
Navy planes as requested, we would fund
12 in this bill.
We made some reductions in various
programs otherwise, some on permanent
change of station travel, some on re-
search and development, and some on
the support of the Eastern Test Range,
and on other matters.
We made total reductions in the
amount of $1,692.8 million, and we made
increases in the amount of $404 million,
making a total decrease in the budget
estimates of $1.3 billion, as shown in the
excerpts from the report which have
been inserted in these remarks.
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
I believe it would be well to talk a bit
about civilian employees. There was a
request for approximately 50,000 addi-
tional civilian employees. About 17,000
plus were requested as substitutes for
military personnel needed In Vietnam
and elsewhere. The others were for gen-
eral utilization in the Department of De-
fense.
We made a reduction of 1,150 em-
from the budget estimates.
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSIL R!1(_ARM
I should mention the antiballistic mis-
sile program, which is the most expensive
program, in many ways, confronting the
this. ill-wlch we have not-tha.t if we for approximately $20 billion to carry
pass tlas bill and it becomes the law, the on the war. I would estimate that prob-
were, against the programs, but we lish the fact, in my judgment, that the
thought they were overfunded. House. of Representatives is, in support
1 would remind my colleagues, If any- of the war effort in Southeast Asia, be-
thinks we have been niggardly in cause if we vote for this bill we will vote
e Rise we thought that some of the pro-
au h4uizatic .
n we reduced certain funds be-
tional destroyers, and for fast deploy-
ment logistic ships. They were elimi-
Now, as to the decreases, and I will
only cover them very rapidly here they
are detailed in the table I inserted ear-
lier, $467.7 million in decreases results
frs& . t,1e faj`lure of authorization, That
called AMSA.
REDUCTIONS BELOW
lion for the C-7 Caribou aircraft. We
have provided for additional aeromedical
evacuation aircraft.
We provided $25 million above the
budget for development of a new long-
range bomber, the followon to the B-52
the budget for additional airlift aircraft,
the C-130 airlift aircraft; and $12.5 mil-
ably 99 percent of the Members of the
House will vote for the bill. The world
should interpret this, friend and foe
alike, as an evidence that the elected
Representatives of the people in the
House of Representatives are in support
of the prosecution of the war for freedom
in Southeast Asia.
I would say further that in previous
bills, most recently in the supplemental
bill for Vietnam of $12 billion, we have
expressed our support of the war effort.
It is not that we are entirely happy with
the progress of the war, or all of the
tactics being followed, but we are in
support of the overall objectives of the
nation.
I think, then, unless there are some
special questions, this is about as much
as need be said at this opening of the
debate on this bill.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman
for yielding. I think that the committee
ought to be commended for having re-
jected the demands for a most substan-
tial increase in civilian personnel. I think
the committee should also be com-
mended for taking note of the overlap-
ping and duplication of certain training
of civilian employees. Whatever else I
may have to say about the action of the
committee, I do want to commend them
in regard to those things about which
Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman
for those comments.
Mr. GROSS. May I ask the gentleman
this question: I do not want to go over
a lot of figures. The gentleman read
them off rather rapidly. Some of them
are astronomical. But do I understand
now that the total bill this year, when
everthing is totaled up, will be somewhere
in the neighborhood of $163 billion, or
was it $141 billion that the gentleman
gave?
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman now is
not discussing defense only but the over-
all budget?
Mr. GROSS. The overall
should make that plain.
Mr. MAHON. The $163 billion figure
is the probable, or now indicated overall
total budget estimate of appropriations
for the year, including the fiscal 1967
supplementals of some $14.4 billion which
we have already had. These, of course,
ut which will not come before us for a
ote.
Mr. GROSS. So the funds that carry
Mr. MAHON. The defense portion of
those are included in the total defense
expenditures. They are not included in
the $70.3 billion.
Mr. GROSS. They are not included in
this bill?
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ABM. This year we are providing in this
bill something over $700 million. In the
military construction bill other fund
will be considered.
We have provided the amount of the
budget estimate for the ABM, except for
$11 million. We made a reduction of $11
million in the ABM program because wit-
nesses testified, upon inquiry, that there
was $11 million which could not be used
during fiscal year 1968 as a result of the
ut I would say that the passage o
 H 7066
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
Mr. MAHON. No.
Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman.
I have one other question. Can the gen-
tleman give us an estimate of the
monthly cost of the war in Vietnam as
of this time?
Mr. MAHON. I would say that if you
would divide 12 into about $21 billion,
you would have something in that gen-
eral area.
Mr. GROSS. I was under the impres-
sion some time ago that the total rate
of spending in Vietnam for the conduct
of the war was some $2 billion a month.
Somewhere I seem to recall a figure of
between $4 billion and $5 billion which
was expended iil'the war in the month
of March. I can understand in some
months there could be an increase.
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman knows
that even with all of the computers in
the Government, it is impossible for any-
one to determine just what spending
should be assigned to Vietnam in every
case and what should be assigned gen-
erally to the overall defense program of
the country.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? }
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Klorida.
Mr.SIKES. I think it would be help-
ful to point out in connection with the
cost of approximately $25 billion in the
last fiscal year there were some one-time
build-up costs and construction costs
that will not have to be repeated during
the current fiscal year, Hopefully this
year the cost may be less.
Mr. GROSS. I see. I thank the gentle-
man for yielding.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I would
like to join the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations and the chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Defense
in commending the workof our staff and
the other committee members with whom
I serve.
Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gen-
tleman from Texas [Mr. MmioNl, chair-
man of the Committee on Appropriations,
has presented to the members of the
committee an excellent report on the
bill.
Mr. Chairman, the bill before the
House of Representatives today, H.R.
10738, will provide appropriations of new
obligational authority in the amount of
$70,295,200,000 for the Department of
Defense for fiscal year 1968. This bill
provides appropriations for the regular
military functions, including our Nation's
military assistance related to the conflict
in Southeast Asia. The bill does not pro-
vide for other military assistance, mili-
tary construction, military family hous-
ing, or civil defense. These other require-
ments are considered in other appropria-
tion bills.
The fiscal year 1968 defense budget
request as submitted to the Congress by
the President was $71,584,000,000. The
Appropriations Committee, after lengthy
hearings and after exploring all the
categories of our military _ programs,
found it necessary to make some addi-
tions to and reductions from the Presi-
dent's request.
The committee total program recom-
mended additions above the budget are
$481.4 million, of which $77.4 million
will be financed from available funds
making the total net appropriations
above the budget $404,000,000. The total
committee reductions to the budget
amount to $1,692,800,000 for a net re-
duction to the President's budget request
of $1,288,800,000.
It must be emphasized that where re-
ductions were made they will have no
adverse effect on our ability to carry out
our activities in Southeast Asia.
Funds are deleted when in some in-
stances it was determined the purpose,
in the committee's judgment, for which
they were requested were not needed.
Other reductions were made mandatory
by program exclusion from the author-
iZing legislation and other reductions are
related to program changes.
The additions to the budget were
made necessary because the committee
has taken the position that certain of
our military capabilities should not be
reduced during the coming fiscal year as
recommended by the Secretary of De-
fense and we have added amounts for
other items which were authorized and
known to be needed but not requested
by the Secretary of Defense.
The bill before us is of great impor-
tance in that it represents in dollars over
one-half of all budgeted activities of the
U.S. Government for the 12-month
period beginning July 1, 1967.
Funds provided in this bill will affect
directly or indirectly the daily activities
of probably every American and every
American institution, both public and
private, in the coming 12-month period
and in the period beyond.
Though it is difficult to comprehend
fully the magnitude and complete sig-
nificance of all aspects of this fiscal year
1968 appropriation for the Department
of Defense, what can be easily compre-
hended is that these funds are vital and
they are necessary to serve and preserve
the vital interests and purposes of our
Nation.
Some of the items in my opinion pos-
sibly could have been higher, others
lower. But the bill represents the com-
bined judgment as to the appropriate
amount that should be provided. I sup-
port H.R. 10738 as reported by the
committee.
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I
-make the jaoint of order that a quorum
is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will
count.
Sixty-three Members are present, not
a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names:
[Roll No. 1331
Abbitt
Dowdy
Railsback
Anderson,
Eckhardt
Reid, N.Y.
Tenn.
Fuqua
Resnick
Arends
Gubser
Rumsfeld
Ashley
Hays
Ruppe
Ayres
Herlong
St. Onge
Ben
Hosmer
Sisk
Carter
Howard
Smith, N.Y.
Celler
Ichord
Steiger, Ariz.
Clark
Irwin
Teague, Calif.
Conyers
Jones, Mo.
Thompson, N.J.
Corman
Kelly
Widnall
Cowger
McEwen
Williams, Miss.
Davis, Wis.
Mathias, Calif.
Willis
Diggs
Pelly
Young
Dow
Pool
Younger
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. RosTENRoWsKI, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, reported that that
Committee having had under considera-
tion the bill H.R. 10738, and finding it-
self without a quorum, he had directed
the roll to be called, when 383 Members
responded to their names, a quorum, and
he submitted herewith the names of the
absentees to be spread upon the Journal.
The Committee resumed its sitting.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
California [Mr. LIr'scoMa].
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Of immediate concern is the war in
which we are engaged in Southeast Asia.
Defense expenditures contained in this
bill which are attributable solely to
Southeast Asia operations are impossible
to determine precisely. Although the ad-
ministration estimated that about $20.3
billion of the budget will be required for
the war, the question properly asked:
Will that be enough? The actual costs
could well be running to a magnitude of
$25 to $30 billion or more per year.
The Defense Appropriations Subcom-
mittee has taken every opportunity to as-
sure that every program directly related
to our Southeast Asia operations is ade-
quately funded.
Even though the Secretary of Defense
at the hearings stated that the war has
been adequately funded, his statements
were made several months ago and it is
now becoming increasingly clear that
the administration may again have to
come to the Congress with a defense sup-
plemental request for fiscal year 1968.
Recent statements by administration
spokesmen, includingthe President, made
after our hearings had concluded, indi-
cate to me that the administration may
have once again delayed a decision to
realistically fund the war effort.
It is not appropriate to provide sums
inn the bill as "blank check" amounts
without first having Defense witnesses
justify the purposes and needs for funds.
Therefore, - if for any reason increased
funds are needed the administration
should come forward with a funding re-
quest without delay. The President and
the Secretary of Defense should submit
such estimated funding needs before
action on this bill is completed by the
Congress.
The tremendously expensive Southeast
Asia military operations are having a
direct, and in some instances an adverse
effect, on some facets of many of the de-
fense programs which are in the budget
before us. It cannot be otherwise when
one-quarter or one-third of the budget
and perhaps a like amount of our mili-
tary combat units are directly involved
with that war. If priority programs in
this budget, not related to the war, are
known to be in need of funds Congress
should also be informed of such needs.
I have directed these comments to
the war in Southeast Asia in order to
point out that although it is true that
this defense budget is the largest ever
proposed since World War II, the dollar
figure by itself can be a dangerously mis-
leading indicator of the degree of secu-
rity it provides both for today and for
the future.
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Today this Nation possesses in total
the most powerful military might in the
world. But we must remind ourselves of
that which our enemies know well. Today
our military resources may well be
stretched thin and the Department of
Defense should evaluate the adequacy of
its resources. In this regard the testi-
mony before the committee indicates a
need for concern.
For example, General Greene, Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, said on
March 16, 1967, in response to a question
about the deployment of additional
troops to Vietnam:
Our present situation Is this: We have some
73,000 Marines ashore in South Vietnam to-
day. We are unable to deploy additional
troops and at the same time to maintain
our rotation base and also to be ready to
handle other contingency requirements, for
example, in the Caribbean, Mediterranean,
and Europe.
If we were to deploy additional units,
which of course we could do very rapidly,
in order to maintain them in the Western
Pacific we would have to mobilize.
Statements such as these indicate the
seriousness of the situation we face today
and the need for constant attention by
the Congress to military capabilities and
plans.
COMMITTEE APPROACH TO THE BILL
The committee report on the Defense
appropriation bill before the House to-
day is a comprehensive document which
should be read and studied carefully by
every Member of Congress.
It discusses broad areas relating gen-
erally to the management and adminis-
tration of the Department of Defense and
the defense programs which are of con-
cern to the committee.
One of the broad areas where reduc-
tions are recommended relates to studies
and analyses. The committee is con-
cerned about the upward trend in ex-
penditures in the Department for studies
and analyses on many nontechnical mat-
ters. Sometimes studies are contracted
for which are not really needed or used.
Sometimes it appears studies are resorted
to as devices which delay and defer deci-
sionmaking.
As discussed in the report, though it is
recognized that there is a need for out-
side studies in some cases, if Federal per-
sonnel cannot operate without the help
of outside studies and reports, they could
be replaced with personnel who can. The
committee has therefore reduced the
budget request amounting to $22.4 mil-
lion for management studies and studies
and analyses.
The committee also deleted funds for
the so-called resources management sys-
tem. This action, again, was taken only
after the n litter was thoroughly studies,
weighed, and evaluated. While is is per-
haps true that significant changes should
be made in the budgeting and accounting
system of the Department, it was the
considered opinion of the committee that
placing this system into effect as planned
could bring about massive change which
to some extent would temporarily dimin-
ish " congressional control. Also it could
produce inflexibility of program struc-
ture. As pointed out in the report, the
Department could perhaps conduct more
extensive tests than those already con-
ducted to determine the merits and feasi-
bility of the program. The report indi-
cates that the committee would not ob-
ject to further testing of a new system
provided the breadth of the test does not
exceed one major command per military
service. The budget reduction pertaining
to the resources management system in
the bill amounts to $52.7 million.
The committee also took note of poten-
tial problems in the area of fiscal man-
agement relating to carryover funds for
various items of procurement and re-
search, development, test, and evalua-
tion. Funds for such projects generally
are made available until expended be-
cause often the timing on such items is
not known or there are other uncertain-
ties or complications. This is certainly
understood. But this also means that un-
expended funds carried over can and do
accumlate. As stated in the report the
accumulation and continuation of large
unobligated balances is an indication of
poor management and could threaten
congressional control of the appropria-
tion process,
The committee has emphasized that a
constant review must be maintained and
funds recouped where no longer needed
for their original purposes. Reductions
have been made in various accounts
totalling $251 million because of the com-
mittee's assessment as to the availability
of accumulated funds that can be re-
couped in lieu of new appropriations.
The number of civilian employees in
the Department of Defense has been in-
creasing sharply. The increase is out of
proportion to the demands placed upon
the services by Southeast Asia operations
in the opinion of the committee. The bill
therefore contains significant reductions
in the funds requested for new personnel.
For fiscal years 1967 and 1968 the aver-
age increase in civilian personnel in the
Defense Department is 171,905. Of this
75,000 are related to the civilian-military
substitution programs, under which cer-
tain positions staffed by military person-
nel are being filled by civilians. The re-
mainder, however, about 96,400, are new
positions. The Department estimates that
of the total amount an increase of 49,439
is for fiscal 1968. The bill recommends an
overall reduction of 18,150 civilian posi-
tions, which represents a reduction of
36.7 percent of the increase requested for
fiscal year 1968. The reduction is not re-
lated to the civilian-military substitution
program. Its purpose is to cut back on
the huge increases the Department is
proposing for its work force and to help
reverse the trend toward undue growth of
Federal agencies.
The action deemed necessary _ by the
committee in these and related activities
indicates in my opinion the need for im-
proved administration and programs in
many areas throughout the Department
of Defense.
A summary of additions and decreases
made by the committee follows:
[In millions of dollars]
ADDITIONS
H 7067
Continuation of B-52 strength----
Continuation of Air Force Reserve
components airlift capability:
Appropraition Increase --------
12. 1
(Within available funds) -------
(14.4)
EA-6A aircraft ------------------
106. 7
A-6A modifications (within avail-
able funds) __________________
DLG(N), full funding one nuclear
powered guided missile frigate__
114.8
DLG(N), advance procurement--_
20. 0
0-130 airlift aircraft_____________
60. 0
C-7 Caribou aircraft-------------
12. 5
CX-2 aeromedical evacuation____
16.0
Aircraft modification in support of
future Southeast Asia require-
ments ------------------------
25.0
ASW (fund highest priority items
within available funds) --------
(33.0)
AMSA (in support of authorized
program) ---------------------
26.0
Total program increases----
481. 4
Less financing from available
funds -------------------------
-77.4
Total appropriations recom-
mended above budget----
DECREASES
Past deployment logistic ship, pro-
gram failed of authorization____
301.0
Recoupments of excessive unobli-
gated balances ----------------
251.0
Conventional destroyers, failed of
authorization -----------------
166. 6
Civilian employment ------------
136.0
Multiservice aircraft, support pro-
curement _____________________
125.0
F-111B program stretchout______
78.2
ec nical manuals ana aata
Tactical and support vehicles, in-
eluding autos -----------------
55. 8
Resources management system----
52. 7
Airlift commercial rates (new
CAB authorized) ______________
48.9
AID/DOD realinement of Southeast
Asia functions ----------------
47.4
Contract termination charges,
funding policy on______________
46. 9
Permanent change of station travel
(Army) -----------------------
44.0
Revised ship conversion program--
42. 1
Research, and Federal contract
research centers --------------
22. 8
Management studies, studies, and
analyses ----------------------
22.4
Support of Eastern Test Range____
15.0
Army overcoat material----------
14.6
Boards of Civil Service examiners__
8.9
All other ________________________
138.4
Total reductions in appro-
priations below budget__-_ 1,692.8
Net reductions in appro-
priations below budget--- 1,228.8
NEED TO EVALUATE MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT
The responsibility for managing our
Defense Establishment is an awesome
responsibility. This Nation must be
grateful that there are always those who
are willing to come forward and shoulder
that responsibility. Recognizing the mag-
nitude of the managerial responsibilities
and services rendered does not preclude
the requirement to evaluate the past and
present performance of that manage-
ment.
It is the task of any management to
make decisions and the success or failure
of management is reflected by the re-
sults. Decisions made today by the De-
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H 1'068
partment of Defense will determine our
military capabilities and the Nation's
welfare tomorrow.
The performance of the DOD manage-
ment, therefore, must be evaluated in
terms of our military posture-in terms
of our military capabilities to influence
actual and potential events such that the
interests of this Nation are protected and
advanced. If our interests are anywhere
,not protected because of the lack of a
capability to exert military superiority,
this then would reflect adversely on the
management of our Defense Establish-
ment.
STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE
The overall power advantage which a
nation holds over its enemies and which
enables it acting alone or in concert with
its allies effectively to control the course
of military and political situations is its
"strategic advantage."
We must be concerned with what is
happening to our Nation's strategic ad-
vantage.
Although our military posture is built
around many varied forces, it is the
forces which serve primarily for strate-
gic purposes which make the greatest
apparent contribution toward achieve-
ment of strategic advantage. In the
budget * structure they are called the
Strategic Forces.
STRATEGIC FORCES
In the Strategic Forces there are of-
fensive forces such as land- and sea-
based ballistic missiles, bombers, mis-
siles launched from aircraft, and recon-
naissance elements. The defensive Stra-
tegic Forces consist of such items as
manned interceptor aircraft, surface-to-
air missiles, warning, surveillance, and
control, systems.
If our Strategic Forces make up the
largest part of our military posture which
are needed for our national security, the
question which must be asked is: Should
we permit the Soviet Union or any other
nation to acquire a capability greater
than our own in any element of the Stra-
tegic Force structure?
Should there be any doubt that Amer-
ica must possess strategic advantage if
our vital interests and purposes are to be
served and preserved? If there are any
reasonable doubts whatsoever of the ex-
tent of Soviet or any other nation's stra-
tegic capabilities, should not those doubts
be ,resolved by positive decisions which
favor our own capabilities? The manage-
ment of our Defense Department has
been asked these questions in many ways
on many occasions.
For instance, Secretary of Defense
McNamara., on March 6, 1967, was asked
if there could be any reasonable doubt
as to the extent of the intercontinental
ballistic missile capability of the Soviet
Union, even if we credit the Soviets with
the capability to deceive our intelligence
gathering means. The Secretary, in reply,
expressed his belief that our intelli-
gence estimates could be off but only
slightly. Though the remainder of his
response was classified, a significant in-
sight into some of the disagreement that
exists on this point was provided when
General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was asked to comment
on the Secretary's response. General
Wheeler said:
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOU,SE_ - _ - June 13, 1967
As a matter of fact, I am not in full
agreement with what the Secretary said.
There are several things which I believe
worthy of comment. First, the Soviets are, as
shown in thelast year, increasing very sub-
stantially their deployment of hardened
ICBM's. I said in my statement on the ABM
that the Joint Chiefs do not know whether
the offensive and defensive buildup of the
Soviets Indicates they are seeking strategic
superiority or strategic parity.
DECISIONS AFFECTING STRATEGIC FORCES
Several instances can be cited which
indicate the adverse effect an our Strate-
gic Forces due to Defense Department
decisions.
The manned bomber aircraft, such as
the B-52, is an element of our Strategic
Offensive Forces. It is capable of carry-
ing nonnuclear as well as nuclear pay-
loads. The requirement for that type air
craft is well established. Yet, in this past
year three B-52 bomber squadrons were
phased out at an accelerated rate, and
even though the Congress last year spe-
cifically provided for the continued op-
eration of these squadrons through fiscal
year 1967.
And unbelievable as it may seem in
view of the significance of the B-52 to
our Strategic Forces and the action
taken by Congress last year, the Presi-
dent's budget as presented to the com-
mittee this year again called for a phase-
out of another three squadrons.
The committee has added funds to the
bill to continue the B-52 bomber force at
a level of 600 aircraft.
It is essential that an advanced
manned strategic aircraft-AMSA-be
available as a replacement for the B-52
which is aging and is no longer in pro-
duction. Yet the Office of the Secx,etary
of Defense reduced by $25 million the\
funds which were requested by the Air
Force for fiscal year 1968 and which are,
by the Defense decisionmaking process
could create a gap both in capabilities
and in numbers of our aircraft.
_Car rintihallistic missile system--
ABM-program is snot a eexampTe in
volving a. strategic force of where funds
added by the Congress have not been
effectively utilized.
The Soviets have been building and de-
ploying their ABM system for some time
and the administration policyrnakers
have known of those Soviet activities.
And, as to offensive missiles which
could be used against us. General
Wheeler pointed out that the Soviets are
increasing very substantially their de-
ployment of improved ICBM's, while the
Secretary himself told the committee it
it believed that Red China too is pur-
suing its nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programs with high priority.
The arguments which favor a go-ahead
decision are well known and they in my
opinion are sound. There is almost unan-
imous agreement by our top military
leaders and other responsible American
officials that this Nation must have an
antiballistic missile system. A decision
is needed which will keep us moving at
least enough to stay even with and per-
haps catch up to the Soviets.
Gen. Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army, expressed his feelings
to the committee on March 10, 1967, on
the need to begin immediate deployment
of an ABM. General Johnson said:
Now, one cannot argue against discussing
the issues that are to be discussed with the
Soviets, you cannot argue that at all. How-
ever, the uneasiness that I feel is basically
this: When do we stop discussing and when
do we reach a decision point?
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
required in order to move ahead with` '""" "a vu iur
the required The go-ahead for the con- years unanimously supported the posi-
tinued AMSA development must be given ree
d to deploy N Nihis kke e X. The e Joint o sh now pro-
so that the operationally capable aircraft ecndi Chiefs'
will be available when it is needed. The ment t to to maintain is based
the total l the strategic ic require-
will deemed it necessary to again clear balance clearly e
emphatically support AMSA at a higher United States. clin favor no
level and $25 million was added to this \decision nits been made *until e to this begin moment te-
bill. The bill makes $51 million, the $26 Imenet t of of an been
requested, and the $25 million a ABM system.
added, available only for the AMSA General l reasons Wheeler once again presented
,the cogent 1?eawhich compels this
program. )Nation to proceed with no further delay.
The Congress 1 year ago provided $55 { He reminded the committee of the in-
million above the budget estimate to )formation from the Intelligence com-
maintain a production capability for the ( munity, and made public in the last year,
F-12 long-range interceptor aircraft, the `that the Soviets are deploying one and
most sophisticated fighter-interceptor elpossibly two ABM systems. He disclosed
port on the Defense appropriation bill for
fiscal year 1967, those funds were added
because such action was deemed desir-
able for our military security. Those
funds to this day have not been released
to the Air Force by the Office, Secretary
of Defense. Failure of the Secretary of
Defense to allocate the funds in a timely
way for F-12's has already resulted in a
loss of the option to keep the production
plant warm. This, it turn, has caused a
serious delay in the available operational
date of the aircraft and it is evident there
will be need for an increased amount of
funds in order to start up the production )destruction capability-that is, our ability
plant when a decision is finally made. to destroy their industry and their people,
Second, to complicate the targeting prob-
As in the case of AMSA, the delay in 1lem which we have in directing our strategic
the go-ahead for the interceptor aircraft forces against the Soviet Union.
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
States would undertake a preemptive nrst Tense Department planned d to inactivate
strike against the Soviet Union, even under the Department
by July 1967. It was
bility, permitting them freedom to pursue into effect, such as issuing termination
It should be remembered that those
its to expand Soviet defensive and of-
cisively building their capabilities thus
"permitting them freedom to pursue
specific items where it was the judgment
of Congress that increased funding was
called for. While we can and do supply
the Secretary of Defense on numerous
occasions has completely refused to put
the funds to use for the stated purpose.
In the interest of our national security it
is vital that Congress continue its efforts
to see that needed programs are ad-
vanced and funded.
AIRLIFT OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE COMPONENTS
e buildup in Vietnam developed,
the Air Force Reserve and Air National
Guard were requested by the Military
Air Command to help meet our air trans-
port needs. They responded effectively
and well, providing many thousands of
flying hours and thousands of tons of
transported cargo to Vietnam and else-
where. The Air Guard and Reserve con-
tinue to make this valuable transport
contribution to our national welfare.
In spite of this the Defense Depart-
ment last year attempted to phase out
three airlift units of the Air National
Guard. The units which it attempted to
inactivate are located at White Plains,
N.Y.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; and Van Nuys,
Calif.
The Defense Department again at-
tempted to inactivate those units and it
also scheduled for phase out during the
final quarter of fiscal year 1968 the unit
at Homestead, Pa. These four units last
year produced a total of 18,125 produc-
tive flying hours, flying a total of 16,-
014,673 ton-miles. The Defense Depart-
meet also planned to phase out eight Air
Reserve airlift units during fiscal year
1968.
Obviously these and other airlift units
are making a 'very meaningful contribu-
tion to our effort in Southeast Asia. They
are also a valuable source of training
and a valuable source of trained. per-
sonnel for any emergency situations.
aircraft, would have had to begun some
time ago, very likely before action would
be completed on this regular Defense ap-
propriation bill which is now before the
House. For that reason the Supplemental
Defense Appropriations Act, 1967, which
was approved on April 4, 1967, contains
provisions requiring that not less than
40 Air Force Reserve troop carrier and
airlift groups and not less than 25 Na-
tional Guard airlift groups shall be
maintained during fiscal year 1968. The
effect of this is to maintain the airlift
groups at their present level.
The bill before us provides $26.5 mil-
lion-$12.1 million in appropriations and
$14.4 million in available funds-for con-
tinuation of Air Force Reserve compo-
nents airlift capability as called for by
Public Law 8, 90th Congress, the 1967
Defense supplemental appropriations bill.
RETENTION OP 8-52 AIRCRAFT
The committee has provided funds
amounting to $11.9 million over and
above those requested in the budget in
order to provide for the continuation of
600 B-52 aircraft in fiscal year 1968. The
amount provided is based on the further
continuation of this number into fiscal
year 1969.
As proposed in the Defense budget, this
represents yet another area where action
was taken contrary to the express direc-
tion of Congress and which would reduce
our defense capabilities. Last year, in
response to a proposal to phase our three
B-52 squadrons from the fleet, Congress
added $6 million to the Defense bill spe-
cifically pointing out that the additional
funds were to main the B-52 fleet at 600
aircraft. In spite of this, however, the De-
fense Department proceeded with a
modified phaseout of 45 B-52's, placing
20 in storage and 25 in what it termed a
ready status.
In view of the obvious need for bomber
aircraft capability and the fact that Con-
gress took special care to emphasize our
need in this area In connection with the
Defense appropriation bill last year, it is
highly disturbing that this phaseout
should have been carried out even in a
modified way. It Is even more disturbing
that for fiscal year 1968 the Department
of Defense has come to the Congress with
plans-to phase out an additional 45
B-52's. Fifteen would be placed in moth-
balls and 30 in units in ready status.
Certainly the situation in the world to-
day shows a great need for keeping our
strategic bombing force at as full and
complete a level as possible.
The B-52 can play a most significant
part in the case of airborne alerts of our
Strategic Air Command. Airborne alert
is a unique method of providing a show
of force during periods of crisis with a
portion of our nuclear capable forces. At
the time it is in operation, those aircraft
airborne are not subject to a surprise at-
tack from either intercontinental or sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles. As
H 7069
such, they constitute a force capable of
immediate attack, if required.
We do not know what kind of engage-
ment we would be called upon to fight in
the future. For this reason we must main-
tain our best options against a threat we
cannot predict with certainty. As we have
seen in the case of Vietnam and other
areas it is to our benefit to have flexibil-
ity in our operational capabilities. Our
goal must be decisive strategic supe-
riority.
The B-52 is also of importance to the
Air Force in meeting its collateral re-
sponsibilities such as conducting anti-
submarine warfare and protecting
shipping, interdicting enemy seapower
through air operations, and in laying
mines from the air. These are missions
of obvious far-reaching importance and
the B-52 is necessary to help fulfill these
responsibilities.
It is vital to retain the B-52 highly
trained efficient crews together so that
they would be available should the situa-
tion call for their service. The Depart-
ment of Defense however, in addition to
going ahead with the inactivation against
the express direction of Congress, actu-
ally accelerated its phase out schedule
from the fourth quarter of fiscal year
1967 to the third quarter in order to fi-
nance additional civilian personnel au-
thorized by the Secretary of Defense and
in order to make additional pilots and
other personnel available elsewhere.
PILOT SHORTAGE
Personnel is the most important asset
of our military services. Yet the budget
and testimony throughout the hearings
concerning the management of personnel
resources in the Defense Department de-
picted what to me seems an incongrous
situation. The budget requests an in-
creased number of civilians on the pay-
roll while the services have been denied
the numbers of military personnel which
they had requested. And this while we are
at war.
For example, the Air Force request for
military personnel was reduced by almost
26,000 by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. With that action the Defense
Department is actually planning a net
reduction of 11,500 in the military per-
sonnel strength of the Air Force in the
coming 12 months. On the other hand,
the DOD planned to increase the civilian
strength of the-Air Force by 5,863 during
the same period of time.
It was in the category of military per-
sonnel available to fly aircraft, however,
that the most glaring example of acts of
ommission or commission in personnel
management were revealed. Each of the
services-the Army, the Navy, the Ma-
rines, and the Air Force-are short pilots.
The pilot situation in many instances
is serious. Since it takes many months to
train a pilot, this shortcoming will not be
rectified soon and it is obviously the re-
sult of an accumulation of past actions
compounded by 2 years of war in
Southeast Asia.
The hearings revealed the office of
the Secretary of Defense disagreed with
an Air Force request to increase its pilot
production rate. As a consequence, the
total number of pilots by which the Air
Force requested to increase its previously
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
approved pilot production program was
reduced by 376.
The OSD disagreement with Air Force
pilot training needs was particularly
evident as concerns Air National Guard
pilots for which the Air Force requested
299 pilot training spaces. This request
was denied and the Guard was left with
145 spaces-the same number it had pre-
viously. This In spite of the fact that the
increased pilot production is needed now
by the Guard to meet the forced attri-
tion losses which it can foresee occurring
2 years from now. This, also in spite of
the fact that the Air Force pilot training
course to which Guardsmen are sent, Is
the only reliable source of Air National
Guard pilots.
The Chief of the National Guard Bu-
reau believes that a lack of Air Force
training facilities is the reason pilots
cannot be trained at the rate requested.
The Army, too, is in critical need of
aviators. Its shortage is of several years'
standing and it will not meet its flight
training program objectives for some-
time into the future. Testimony of Army
witnesses shows that the Army requested
a training rate of 800 pilots per month.
The OSD cut that rate to 610 per month.
Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval
Operations, stated the Navy's case this
way on March 15, 1967:
We do have urgent pilot needs brought
about by low pilot training quotas in the
early sixties and by the severe pilot reten-
tion problems we face today.
to open additional training bases or a No. 4 aircraft means there may well
need for additional trainer aircraft or be as much as 6 months or more addi-
for any other reason additional funds tional slippage to the date by when the
are needed, I feel certain those funds Navy will find out if the aircraft it is
will be provided by the Congress once the attempting to develop will be satisfac-
Department of Defense comes forward tory or not.
and makes known those needs. Four preproduction models of the F-
THE NAVY VERSION OF THE TFX AIRCRAFT. 111-funded for in the fiscal year 1966
THE F-111B program-are scheduled for delivery be-
The F-111B aircraft which the Navy gining with No. 6 about 1 year from now.
is trying to satisfactorily develop is an As of the time of the hearings, complete
outgrowth of the TFX program which specification weight changes had not
was established with the insistence of the been determined but it was believed that
top level of the Department of Defense the full package of weight changes would
that both the Navy and the Air Force be incorporated in aircraft No. 7.
should develop an aircraft of common. In addition to the weight problems
basic design. In the case of the TFX the there have been several other problems
Navy and Air Force versions have both of continuing concern to the Navy and
suffered from compromise in perform- to the committee as the development and
ance by the emphasis on commonality, testing program unfolds.
Including the funds in this bill, over For example, pilot visibility has been
$5 billion will have been approriated for inadequate for safe carrier landing; the
all purposes for the various Air Force plane has been tall heavy and a more
and Navy versions of the F-111-type air- favorable balance needs to be achieved
craft and their associated systems. for carrier deck operations; and this
The President's budget request in- Navy development aircraft has now
cluded $418.1 million for R.D.T. & E. and grown tremendously in size.
procurement of a Navy aircraft and mis- Also, the need for an improved engine
sile weapon system which is known as with greater thrust across the entire
the F-111B/Phoenix system. thrust spectrum has been determined.
Because so many years have now An improved engine is now in the de-
elapsed since its need for such a weap- velopment stage with a hoped for de-
ons system was first conceived, the Navy, livery schedule to begin early next year.
this past year restudied what its re- Aircraft No. 8 would be the first air-
quirements might be. craft to include all change for the new
The Navy, by its study and exams- engine now required.
nation of all available evidence this past Also of continuing concern to ev
r
e
yone
More detailed information presented Year confirmed that the Soviets might is the escalated cost figures. The original
the committee reveals that the shortage Possess a highly sophisticated threat 1962 estimates for the Navy F-111B pro-
of Navy pilots will become increasingly capability against the fleet by the mid- gram was for a unit flyaway cost of $3.5
severe. The short fall of pilots in the 1970's. The study indicated that the de- million. Program changes up to last year
coming year is expected to reach almost veloping F-111B/Phoenix system will on the Navy's version have resulted in
2,700 and regardless of whether the meet the Navy's needs for the mid-1970's an estimated unit flyaway cost of $8.0
Southeast Asia war ends or not it will if the system's performance matches the million armed with Phoenix missile sys-
take 3 or 4 years to overcome the pilot Performance assumed in the study and tem. Additionally, over the same time
shortage in the Navy. if the aircraft can meet the Navy's car- period the estimated cost for support
Present capabilities for training Navy rier suitability requirements. equipment for each aircraft has in-
pilots are taxed to the limits. The Navy It is increasingly apparent that the created to $3.0 million from $800,000.
cannot train them at a rate greater than Navy F-1116 was the most ill-advised As a consequence of these problems it
now planned because of the overload to undertaking to come out of the TFX pro- Is impossible for the Navy to determine
its training command. According to Navy gram which is now over 5 years old. whether or not the production aircraft
Capt. W. R. Flanagan of the Bureau of The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral will be something they consider satis-
Personnel, the Navy's capacity to train McDonald, told the committee that if it factory.
pilots is limited by its limited physical were possible to start over again he Clearly much yet needs to be learned
plant, by its limited number of trainer would not follow the' course established in the test and development stage of the
aircraft, and by its shortage of instruc- by the Defense Department. The Ad- Navy's version of the TFX.
tors and maintenance personnel. miral testified: Admiral Bowen, Deputy Chief of Naval
The Marine Corps estimates Its pilot i would have designed a plane giving full Operations for Development, testifying
shortage now at approximately 850 and consideration to the weight limitations that on April 5, 1967, said:
that this shortage will grow to over 1,000 are imposed upon operations from an air- We do not really know whether this plane
In the coming craft carrier.
year. It was revealed at the [the P-111B] is satisfactory for Navy pur-
hearings that the Marine Corps was un- As of early this spring the Navy had poses as envisaged until we have completed
the flight test of the plane incorporating the
able to go to a wartime pilot manning five research and development F-111B
level in South Vietnam. Incredible as it aircraft flying. Aircraft Nos. 4 and 5 had
may seem the marines are fighting a war been put togther in a laborious and ex-
using peacetime pilot manning levels. pensive superweight improvement pro-
The committee provided in full the gram. From flight tests of Nos. 4 and 5
amount of funds requested by the De- the Navy hoped to obtain important in-
fense Department for aircraft pilots. formation on the flying qualities, per-
This includes flight Pay and other related formance and carrier suitability of Its
personnel costs, training programs, flying version of the TFX. Preliminary evalua-
hour programs, and so forth. tion flights of those two aircraft began
In the time since the hearings con- on March 16, 1967. Tragically, one of
cluded the Air Force announced a pro- those planes, No. 4, crashed on April
gram of "selective retention" which ap- 21, which date was after the committee
parently is based in part on Its need for had heard most of the testimony con-
pilots. However, it seems to me that the cerning the F-111 programs. From the
pilot shortage problem is one which testimony a possible overall 2-year
probably will require additional action slippage in the program had been indi-
by each of the services. If there is a need cated. Unfortunately, the loss of the
Because of the difficulties encountered
which have led to slippages and slow-
down in the program occasioned in part
by the crash of one of the test aircraft,
the committee determined it could not
recommend the full $287 million budget
request and reduced it by $78.2 million
for the F-111B.
Further the bill contains a limitation
which states that the $208.8 million rec-
ommended in the bill shall be available
for the F-111B aircraft program only.
Thecommittee took this action to keep
these funds under better control of the
Congress. If for any reason the F-111B
program does not proceed in a timely
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June 13, 1967
one and perhaps two ABM systems for
their own defense. Last year, aiming at
the deployment of an ABM system, the
Congress added $167.9 million. Those
funds were not used In fiscal year 1967.
For initial deployment, the accompany-
ing bill provides $298 million, which Is
In addition to the $168 million appro-
priated in fiscal year 1967 for this pur-
an aircraft which will meet the Navy
requirements. Whether the aircraft
which eventually develops will still be
designated the F-111B is immaterial.
What is needed by the Navy is an air-
craft which can fulfill a Navy mission.
Including the funds in this bill, nearly
$5 billion will have been provided by
Congress for a ballistic-missile defense
system. It is our Nation's principal effort
to provide defense against attack by
intercontinental missiles or missiles
launched by submarines.
The committee is firmly of the view
that funding is required to continue es-
sential research, development, test, and
evaluation of the Nike X system. There
is little controversy concerning such
R.D.T. & E. efforts and the bill contains
$442 million for this purpose.
The question as to whether and when
to begin deployment of the system in con-
troversial and the committee noted the
combined opinion of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff which slid call for immediate de-
ployment. Over 3 months have now
elapsed since the testimony was heard.
The Secretary of Defense on the other
hand proposes that no action be taken
to begin deployment of Nike X pending
the outcome of discussions with the So-
viet Union. The Soviets of course are
capable now of directing ICBM's against
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE
manner or if it should be cancelled be-
cause of all the difficulties being encoun-
tered, the Secretary of Defense could not
reprogram or transfer these funds to
some other program.
It is to be hoped that the Department
of Defense will eventually come up with
In commenting on the reluctance to
begin to deploy the Nike X system on the
part of the administration, our commit-
tee report states:
It would appear that the initiation of de-
ployment of "light" or "thin" defense, now,
may very well be a most useful first step to-
ward whatever level of ballistic missile de-
fense ultimately appears necessary.
In other words, the report, adopted
unanimously by the committee, says:
"C=et oing."
"-""~"~'^NVCLEAR ESCORT SHIPS
The Defense appropriation bill before
the House shows the continuing strong
support of the House Appropriations
Coniniittee for nuclear propulsion in our
major surface warships and, of course,
in our submarines.
The bill contains $134,800,000 for two
nuclear-powered guided missile de-
stroyer leaders. These ships are known
as the DLGN. Of the amount appropri-
ated, $114.8'million is for the full fund-
Ing of one DLGN, and $20 million Is for
advance procurement for the second
ship.1 would personally prefer full fund-
ing for both ships.
The budget request of $166.6 million
for escort vessels was for two conven-
tionally powered destroyers. Authoriza-
tion to construct such ships was denied
however in the Defense Authorization
Act of fiscal year 1968 and the two nu-
clear powered escort vessels were au-
thorized instead.
The action in this bill and in the De-
fense authorization bill represents mean-
ingful progress in the long, continuing
struggle toward gaining acceptance by
the Defense Department of the concept
of nuclear powered surface ships.
At least four major fleet escort ships-
destroyers or frigates-are assigned to
each aircraft carrier. These escorts are
designed to operate either on independ-
ent missions against enemy targets or
as part of a coordinated protective screen
to destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, sub-
marines, and surface ships that attack
the force.
The Department of Defense did not
request any major fleet escorts In the
fiscal year 1964, 1965, or 1966 shipbuild-
ing programs. In the fiscal year 1966 pro-
gram, Congress, on its own initiative,
authorized $150,500,000 for a new, nu-
clear powered frigate-DLGN---appro-
priated $20 million for procurement of
long leadtime items for this ship, and
urged the Department of Defense to in-
clude the funds required for completion
of this ship in the fiscal year 1967 budget
request. The Department of Defense did
not proceed with the procurement of
long leadtime items, nor did they ask
for funds for the nuclear frigate in the
fiscal year 1967 budget.
However, the Department of -Defense
did ask for two nonnuclear guided mis-
sile destroyers in the 1967 program.
The fiscal year 1967 authorization act
authorized the two nonnuclear guided
missile destroyers, reauthorized one nu-
clear frigate, and authorized $20 mil-
lion to be appropriated for procurement
of long leadtime items for another nu-
clear frigate.
The House Appropriations Committee
recommended that Congress appropriate
funds for a nuclear frigate, and further
recommended that funds not be appro-
priated for the nonnuclear destroyers.
These recommendations of our commit-
tee were incorporated in the fiscal year
1967 Defense Appropriation Act. As the
bill emerged from conference, money
was provided to fund one nuclear frigate
and provide funding for the procure-
ment of long leadtime items for an ad-
ditional nuclear frigate.
The fiscal year 1967 Defense Authori-
zation Act included a provision that:
The contract for the construction of the
nuclear powered guided missile frigate for
which funds were authorized under Public
Law 89-37, and for which funds are author-
ized to be appropriated during fiscal year
1967 shall be entered Into as soon as practi-
cable unless the President fully advises the
Congress that its construction is not in the
national interest.
The Secretary of Defense has now re-
leased to the Navy the funds for con-
struction of one nuclear frigate, the
DLGN-36, but he has not released funds
to initiate procurement of the long lead-
time items for the second nuclear frig-
ate.
H 7071
In the fiscal year 1968 Department of
Defense budget request the Secretary of
Defense again requested two nonnuclear
destroyers, but failed to request funds to
complete the second nuclear frigate. On
May 23, 1967, both the Senate and the
House accepted the conference report
of the House-Senate Armed Services
Committees on the fiscal year 1968 De-
fense authorization bill which provided
that the two nuclear frigates be substi-
tuted for the two nonnuclear destroyers
requested by the Department of Defense
and agreed to a provision in the authori-
zation bill that.
The contracts for the construction of the
two nuclear powered guided missile frigates
shall be entered into as soon as practicable
unless the President fully advises the Con-
gress that their construction is not in the
national interest.
In its action on the bill before the
House now, the House Appropriations
Committee continues to support the po-
sition that we must have more nuclear-
powered surface warships. Furthermore,
it is clear that all future major fleet es-
corts should be nuclear powered.
The committee, as set forth in the re-
port, expects the Department to proceed
with the construction of the one DLGN,
the advance procurement of the other,
and to request funds for the construc-
tion of the remaining authorized DLGN
in the fiscal year 1969 shipbuilding pro-
gram.
The Department of Defense should
proceed with the contracts for the con-
struction of both nuclear-powered frig-
ates in fiscal year 1968 as soon as practi-
cable. We must get on with building
more nuclear-powered surface escorts for
our nuclear carriers.
This subject has been thoroughly, re-
peatedly studied and considered by re-
sponsible committees of Congress. The
facts clearly support the action being
taken by Congress to provide all nuclear-
powered escorts for our nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers.
SUMMARY OF THE BILL
TITLE I-MILITARY PERSONNEL
H.R. 10738 contains a total of $21,927,-
800,000 for military personnel. This is
for pay and allowances for clothing, sub-
sistence, permanent change of station
travel, and other personnel costs. The
amount in the bill is a decrease of $73.2
million below the budget estimates. A
substantial portion of the reduction
comes as a result of recently announced
reductions in the rates for commercial
airlifts. Another major portion of the
decrease results from savings possible in
Army travel costs as proposed in the
budget.
Language in the bill provides for an
average strength of the Army Reserve
personnel of not less than 260,000 and
not less than 400,000 in the National
Guard.
Funds provided in the bill for opera-
tion and maintenance total $18,994,200,-
000 for fiscal year 1968.
This title covers generally the every
day expenses involved in running the
military establishment, including force
units in training and combat; medical
care for personnel and their dependents;
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H 7072 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
to operate logistics support systems;
command controls; communications sys-
tems; dependents overseas education; for
the support of free world forces in South
Vietnam; and to operate base establish-
ments in support of these functions.
The funds supportan.active inventory
of 34,468 aircraft, 938 active ships, 204
service hospitals, 54 major service supply
depots, the direct hire of 905,195 civilian
employees, and support of 628 active mili-
tary installations.
As proposed in the bill, the "Operations
and maintenance" Is reduced by a net
amount of $352.8 million, none of which
are directly related to our operations in
South Vietnam. These include such areas
as savings because of reduced commer-
cial air carrier rates, a cutback in the
amount of additional civilian employees
requested, reductions in excessive man-
agement studies by independent firms,
a holdup in the implementation of a pro-
posed new resources management system,
a reduction in the enrollment of the over-
seas dependents education program, and
various other reductions.
TITLE III-PROCUREMENT
The total contained in the bill for
procurement is $22,261,200,000. This is
a reduction of $655.8 million below the
budget estimates. Basically, the funding
provided under this title Is to allow the
Defense Department to secure equipment
and weapons systems. -
For the Army $5.5 billion is contained
in the bill to procure ammunition,
weapons, and vehicles, aircraft, guided
missiles and necessary supporting equip-
ment. This includes funds for fixed and
rotary wing aircraft, surface-to-air mis-
sile systems, for potential procurement
of long leadtime components for mis-
siles, radars and ground support systems
for the Nike X antiballistic system, and
surface-to-surface missiles. It provides
funds also for such items as tracked com-
bat vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artil-
lery, and air defense guns.
For the Navy and the Marine Corps,
$2,9 billion procurement funds are pro-
vided in the bill for fixed and rotary wing
aircraft, missiles, and related equipment.
The sum of $1.42 billion is provided
for the construction. of 28 new vessels
and conversions of 21. The types of ves-
sels involved range from ballistic missile
submarines, submarine tenders, nuclear
guided missile frigates and destroyers to
amphibious ships, minesweepers and
patrol ships, and auxiliary craft. For
other procurement for the Navy and the
Marine Corps a total of $3,011,000,000 is
provided for ordnance, weapons systems,
communications and electronic equip-
ment, ammunition and other items,
The amount provided for Air Force
aircraft procurement is. $5.59 billion.
This is for procurement of combat, air-
lift, trainer, helicopter and aeromedical
aircraft, for modifications and support
programs. $1.34 billion is contained in
H.R. 10738 for the procurement of a
variety of missiles, including ballistic,
air-to-air, air-to-ground, and target
drone missiles. Other Air Force procure-
ment funds for munitions, vehicles, elec-
tronic and other supporting equipment
totals $2.4. billion.
The Defense Supply Agency, the De-
fense Communications Agency, and
other Defense-wide activities are funded
at $40 million in the bill.
TITLE IV-RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALTYATION
H.R. 10738 provides $7.1 billion for re-
search, development, test, and evalua-
tion for the military services.
The funds included in this title are
vital to our overall defense effort so that
new weapons systems can be pursued
aggressively and purposefully to main-
tain our military effectiveness.
The funds provided are to move ahead
in such critical fields as the antiballistic
missile, antisubmarine warfare, missile
development, and a host of other proj-
ects throughout the services.
The amount provided represents a re-
duction of $171.2 million in the amount
requested for research, development, test
and evaluation. Reductions were made in
the request for funds for the Federal
Contract Research Centers and for
studies and analyses generally.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today,
H.R. 10738, provides necessary funding
for our defense program in our National
interest.
The committee and the staff worked
long hours, weeks and months on the
measure to get it in the best shape pos-
sible, In our judgment, to bring before
the House for consideration.
When so many billions of dollars are
involved there are bound to be areas
where cuts and modifications can be
made. We have attempted to the best of
our ability to locate these areas and
where they were found recommend re-
ductions from the amounts requested in
the budget.
All the time, however, we were ever
mindful of our needs in Vietnam and no
reductions were made which directly or
indirectly will affect our efforts in South-
east Asia.
In other instances it was our decision
that additional funds must be provided
and this we have done. These have been
discussed in detail on the floor here to-
day and in the report.
In those cases where I have com-
mented critically on aspects of the de-
fense program today I have done so be-
cause in my opinion certain things need
to be aired and discussed in the best in-
terest and welfare of our Nation.
I urge the House to support H.R.
10738. -
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. I yield to the gentle-
man from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. Is this F-111B plane now
costing $9 to $11 million per copy?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. The original flyaway
cost 5 years ago was $3.5 million. At the
present time it Is estimated that the
F-111B flyaway cost is $8 million plus
support equipment costing about $3 mil-
lion, or an estimate per unit of $11 mil-
lion.
Mr. GROSS. This Is one of the most
disgraceful chapters in the history of the
Department of Defense. Beginning with
the award of this contract to the firm to
June 13, 1967
which the contract went, the General
Dynamics Corp. at Fort Worth, Tex.-
and I am not going into details for the
gentleman knows the story better than
I do-but It Is one of the most disgrace-
ful chapters in the history of the Depart-
ment of Defense. I want to commend the
gentleman for the searching inquiry that
he gave this matter in the hearings be-
fore his committee. I thank the gentle-
man for yielding.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. I thank the gentle-
man. I know that he has been in the
forefront in trying to keep tab on the
F-111 program up, as he refers to it, the
TFX. There is a great deal of additional
information to be disclosed in the days
and months to come.
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am happy to yield
to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I was in-
terested in the observation which the
gentleman made that the Department of
Defense has identified, out of the fund-
ing represented In this bill, approxi-
mately $20.6 billion as being attributable
directly to the cost of the war in Viet-
nam.
I noted then that the gentleman went
on to say that in his opinion the real
cost of that war probably amounted to
between $25 and $30 billion a year. The
question which I would put to the gentle-
man is simply this: Does the gentleman
therefore believe that in addition to this
bill it is likely we will have a supple-
mental appropriation bill In the amount
of $13 to $18 billion? Is that a correct
inference?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. No. I did not give a
figure such as that, but I have confidence
that we will have a figure which I esti-
mate at this time will vary anywhere
from $3 to $8 billion. It is our estimate,
which we verify from the cost of the
efforts in Vietnam. I believe it is recog-
nized by the Committee, that we are
going to be faced with an additional
supplemental bill.
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. If the
gentleman will yield further, I suppose
the other variable in the picture is the
possibility of escalation, about which we
read something in the paper just this
morning.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. If we have to send
additional personnel to Southeast Asia,
if the attrition rate of our aircraft in-
creases, if the sinking of our ships and
other factors increase, if the use of am-
munition increases, we will be faced with
additional supplemental appropriations,
and I must say this is recognized by our
committee.
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. If the
gentleman will yield further, I merely
want to add to what has already been
said. I compliment the gentleman on an
extremely fine and informative state-
ment. The Information he has presented,
especially with respect to the reluctance
of the Department to proceed with the
advanced manned strategic aircraft, and
the information with respect to the F-
111B program and the TFX program
should be spread on the RECORD. The
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD'- HOUSE H 7073
gentleman has made a good contribu- that the Russians are bringing in me- The problem before us is equally di-
tion In pointing them out today. dium range missiles with which to strike vided between securing the countryside
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield U.S. bases or Vietnamese cities from and pacification. Because of poor per-
20 minutes to the gentleman from Flor- North Vietnam. The American people formance, or waste, or black market, or
Ida [Mr. SIKEsl. want the Vietnam war won, for they are some of all of these, it has been neces-
(Mr. SIKES asked and was given per- concerned with the fact that it goes on sary to place the problem of pacification
mission to revise and extend his re- and on and the end Is not in sight. in military hands also.
marks.) The total cost of the war to Israel was There is growing awareness that the
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, it Is dis- $100 million. The U.S. Defense Establish- situation behind the lines in Vietnam
appointing to note that some of the top ment costs twice that much every day for has been deteriorating. The pacification
people in the Pentagon Are leaving Gov- 365 days a year, year in and year out. program in many areas is failing to se-
ernment service. Among these are De- It should be noted that the Israelis did cure the countryside and win over the
fense Deputy Secretary Vance, Under not allow themselves to be influenced by peasant. Our troops can win battles but
Secretary of the Navy Baldwin, and Ad- third parties. They wasted no time with behind the battlelines the communities
miral McDonald, Chief of Naval Opera- useless diplomatic flip-flap, or the endless are strongly laced with Communist sym-
tions. I do not think too much can be said cacophony of the U.N. They looked after pathizers. The job of weeding out the
about the caliber of these men or the Israel's interests first and talked after- Communist infrastructure, organizing
quality of their contributions to Ameri- wards. These facts it would be well to the village population, and economic de-
can defense. Each of them has been out- keep in mind. Again, there may be noth- velopment is considered the weakest link
standing in his field and each will be ing significantly new or different in what in the strategic concept. This is the cru-
sorely missed. It is not easy to replace they did on the field of battle, but it is cial key to an allied victory or eventual
such men and the Pentagon has been well to remember that the winds of defeat of allied aims and justification of
fortunate to have had their services. change blow constantly. What was good American sacrifices.
It has been stated that this is the that we read in yesterday's books may be We know that our field commanders
largest appropriation bill in history. It outdated today. We must be certain that want additional forces and there doesn't
has been estimated that the House is Israel's military leaders have not learned seem to be much doubt that they will
being asked to approve a billion dollars something that we have failed to teach have been made available. We still have
every 5 minutes. All of this bears out the our own, a long, long way to go. During the past
fact that even though we are fighting an Even so, it has been a long time since year, we have gained some in territory
undeclared war, it is one of the biggest in the Communists have won an important held and in population controlled. But
American history. It should Also be victory in Vietnam. An effort has been the percentage gained is small compared
pointed out that this measure provides underway for months to mount a sus- to the size of the effort put forth. From
the most effective defense package in his- tained and effective offensive by the this point forward, it may be possible to
tory. The committee has seen fit to rec- North Vietnamese regulars. Presumably roll up the enemy forces and to get on
ommend some deletions and some addi- such an offensive would include a sub- with the job of pacification at a more
tions. All of them are sound. The addi- stantial part of that country's remaining rapid pace than has heretofore been pos-
tions are of particular moment in that effective forces. North Vietnam desper- sible. If the threatened offensive can be
they strengthen our defenses in areas ately needs a major victory for the contained and defeated decisively, the
which obviously are very Important- morale of its own people, for that of the end of the fighting could come much
AMSA, ASW, EA-6A aircraft, nuclear Communist world, to provide grist for more rapidly than now appears in pros-
frigate, airlift capability, the continua- the Communist propaganda mills and for pert.
tion of B-52 strength, and others. the doves In this country who still want In the meantime, the fighting appears
I think it is almost certain to be found to go to the conference table. more and more to be an American re-
that we have not faced up to the full re- To the credit of the U.S. forces, they sponsibility. This is had to fathom. We
quirements for funding the Vietnamese have kept the Communists off balance to have spent much time, money, effort, and
war. We have, however, approved the the point that their offensive still is not equipment-yes, lives-in helping to de-
budget estimate. If the present scale of underway. Their supply lines continually velop effective Vietnam forces. The re-
fighting continues through another fis- are being disrupted. Their concentrations suits have not fulfilled expectations.
cal year, the cost will be nearer $30 bil- of manpower and equipment are under Many people wonder why more effective
lion than $20 billion. Possibly, and hope- steady harrassment. This should indicate use cannot be made of the Vietnam
fully, this scale of fighting will diminish, that the military situation In Vietnam is forces. It is their war. It is time that the
and so will the costs. well in hand. But it does not take into U.S. high command found a way to
Before we get too deeply into the details consideration the fact that half of South secure more effective support from the
of this bill, let us consider the amazing Vietnam's area or more still is outside the Vietnamese toward insuring their own
success of the Israel forces in the Mid- control of the South Vietnam Govern- freedom. For years we have heard of the
east. This compels a very careful anal- ment. Some of It is safe only by day. importance of spending the taxpayers'
ysis by U.S. strategists of Israel tactics Despite the presence of half a million money to help build up forces of other
on the field of battle. By defeating the U.S. forces who have acquitted them- nations so that in time of emergency
armies of three nations in less than ,a selves magnificently, a very large part of those forces, rather than American,
week at the cost of 679 d
th
d
h
ea
,
ey
ave Vietnam is Communist-controlled or would bear the brunt of the fighting,
accomplished a feat unmatched in the Communist-infiltrated. The actual job Regretfully, history records but little in
history of warfare. We and our allies of fighting and even that of pacification practice to justify that theory. There are
have lost as many in the same period in has fallen more and more upon American exception, particularly in the case of
Vietnam with very little to show for it soldiers. _ Korea.
and I do not decry their sacrifice. The most productive area, the delta, is I think it important that there be full
I realize full Well that the circum- largely in Communist hands. I have understanding of the concern of the
stances ,are,,eptirely different. Neither pointed out many times that the delta is committee about the proposed reorgani-
terrain or foe are comparable, But there the principal food reservoir of Vietnam, zation of the Reserve components. You
should be lessons to be learned. Signifi?? but its abundant rice crops benefit the will have noted the language in the re-
cantly,'the Israelis made all-out and best Communist armies and the Communist port on page 7 which deals specifically
use of their facilities, including full use supporters, even the North Vietnamese, and clearly with this subject. This lan-
of airpower. For most of the time that more than it benefits the South Viet- guage is intended to prevent the dis-
we have been in Vietnam, we have fought namese. By whatever means are neces- banding of combat units in a time of ser-
a, one-handed ,war, despite the protests sary, we should insure the clearing and ious danger to the United States unless
of U.S..field commanders,. It goes on and pacification of the delta before another the proposals have been fully justified
on and the casualty lists mount. More year runs out. U.S. forces which were in- before the proper committees of Congress
and m,Slre Russian equipment is being tended to help alleviate this situation and until such time as formal legislative
brought in to offset our air superiority have had to be moved northward to the expression can be made.
and the losses, there, too, in men and area of the DMZ to meet the new off
n - Th
e proposed reorganization of the
planes, are piling up. Now we are told slue threat which is building there, e
Reserve components is altogether too
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 H'7074
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
similar to the merger proposal which
would have eliminated the Reserves a
few short years ago. Since that time, it
is significant that the Reserves have
gradually been whittled down and so
has morale. Beginning with a strength
of 300,000, they were reduced step by
step to the present level of 260,000 which
is provided for in the accompanying bill.
The reorganization plan, however, would
reduce them further to 240,000 and elim-
inate all combat units.
By way of history, the present reor-
ganization plan was submitted by the
Department of the Army to the Section
5 Committee which is charged with re-
sponsibility in these matters. The Sec-
tion 5 Committee is made up of officers
from the Regular forces, from the
Guard, and from the Reserves. Despite
OSD support for the reorganization plan,
it was approved by a vote of only 11 to
10. The plan would strip all combat
units from the Reserves, including four
brigades and 316 smaller units, with an
authorized strength of more than 50,000
men in combat units. It would eliminate
15 divisions in the National Guard. A to-
tal of 400 combat units would be affected.
Ten of the 21 who serve on the Section 5
Committee supported plans to give com-
bat units to the Reserves also.
It will have been noted that we have
In the bill before the House a floor of
260,000 for the Reserves and 400,000 for
the National Guard. There also is lan-
guage in section 638 which was added to
deal with a threatened merger at an
earlier date. That language is largely
meaningless insofar as the present prob-
lem is concerned because it refers to un-
expended balances rather than to the
total appropriation. Since action must
be taken at this time to show the interest
of Congress, we have written language
into the report which we feel is strong
and meaningful. Our procedure avoids
legislation on an appropriation bill. It
gives further opportunity to the Com-
mittees on Armed Services of the House
and Senate to take any legislative action
which may be required. Such an oppor-
tunity is before the Congress in H.R. 2
which :has passed the House and which is
awaiting action in the Senate. H.R. 2 will
have to be amended to be effective in the
present case but at least it provides a
vehicle to which amendments are ger-
mane. I would call attention to the fact
that wader the language in our report, a
reprograming action would be required to
accomplish the realinement which has
been proposed. This would require at
least a, measure of compliance with the
intent and interest of the Congress in
knowing more about the proposal by the
Department of Defense.
Essentially, then, we have been asked
to approve carte blanche a plan which
has not been reviewed by Congress. In
fact, Congress has not even been given
the courtesy of a request for approval-
during or after the budget submission.
the liberal press has par-
ithfull
F
y
a
roted the Pentagon propaganda support- widespread. They come from highly- tive weapons. The comparative inactiv-
ing the cutback in combat units in the placed individuals in and out of the mili ity of the United States in this field un-
Reserve components. They say this will tary. Included in these objections is a doubtedly will encourage the Russians to
result in better trained and more effec- statement by the national executive continue discussions while stepping up
tive waits. I fail to see what magic units committee of the Reserve Officers As- their own anti-ballistic-missile deploy-
can be trained,-adequately equipped, and sociation which includes members of all ment. Every week that goes by widens
combat sharpened in the Guard but not branches of the service and a statement
in. the Reserves, or by what magic battle from the Senior Reserve Commanders
effectiveness in either Guard or Reserves Association. These individuals know
can be gained through disbanding com- what the effect of such a reorganiza-
bat units and making their trained per- tion would be. Please note, however, that
sonnel into clerks and food handlers. the Congress is not attempting to say
It is very obvious that we live in a to the Pentagon that it can or cannot
world of crisis. We have just gone carry out a reorganization. We realize
through a very serious period in. the Mid- that reorganizations sometimes are
dle East and it cannot be said today that necessary. We simply are asking that the
all the probleips in that area have been proposed realinement be deferred pend-
resolved. We are confronted with a re- ing such time as formal legislative ex-
quirement for more troops in Vietnam. pression can be made in the matter.
The field commanders there have re- The bill and the report before you
quested them and it should be obvious make no mention of it but it is entirely
that they are necessary. Vietnam, which possible that serious damage is being
started out to be a little war, has become done to the Navy's selected or drill pay
one of the biggest in our history. We are reserve. During the past 4 years the
spread thin. If there should be another strength of this force has been cut from
crisis anywhere which involves American 155,000 to 126,000 despite the fact that
forces, it will also almost certainly be the Joint Chiefs have approved a
necessary to call up the Reserves. For strength for the Naval Reserve forces of
some strange reason, they have not been 160,000 and despite the fact that the
used except in very limited numbers in Chief of Naval Operations and the See-
the Vietnam war where the Reserve retary of the Navy have for 3 years rec-
components could have contributed ommended to the Defense Department
much. an increase for the Naval Reserve to
If preparedness is to be insured by this reach this planned strength. The fact
bill, we should not, in its passage, ap- that the situation is serious is empha-
prove by indirection the loss of combat sized because the Navy's Selected Re-
units. Preparedness should be a central serve is a "D" Day reserve which cannot
theme of this Nation's policies. It is ob- depend upon fillers to build it up to
vious that our Nation may at any time strength when reporting for active duty.
need every trained military man that it It has been estimated that more than
has. If this is true it is equally obvious $7 million is needed to build the drill pay
that we should be strengthening, not program to 132,000 people by the end of
weakening, all our forces including the the next fiscal year.
Reserves; that dedicated, trained, and ex- Let me get into other areas. I cannot
perienced manpower, organized and say that we have accomplished anything
ready, and the drill strength Reserves of significant in this bill toward attain-
both the National Guard and the USAR ment of. an anti-ballistic-missile system.
be given full support and encouragement A year ago on good authority that the
to carry out the assignments which may Russians were building such a system
at any moment be theirs. this committee provided funds to initiate
Again, this would not be the case if construction of a system of our own. The
the new plan for reorganization of the money was not used although the Secre-
Reserve components is carried out as tary of Defense confirmed late in the
proposed by the Secretary of the Army. year that a Russian system is under con-
Under this plan, as I stated, the organ- struction. We have money in this year's
nation Reserves would be composed en- budget to continue testing but that is
tirely of support forces. All combat ele- about all. The committees of Congress,
ments now in the Reserves would be the House and the Senate, the Joint
transferred to the National Guard or Chiefs, the Secretaries of the Army,
abolished. In substance, the Reserves Navy, and Air Force agree that the
would become hewers of wood, bakers of United States should have an antibal-
bread, and carriers of water. I do not de- listic-missile system. But the Secretary
cry the function of support forces. With- of Defense disagrees. His word is law in
out them no army can win. But I am the Pentagon. We are embarked on one
concerned, and seriously concerned, with of those strange quests in which America
the proposal to abolish 15 National. sometimes finds itself. Instead of pro-
Guard divisions; to abolish four infantry viding for our own defense, we hope to
brigades which. I am informed are now convince the Russians by talk that they
full strength and capable; and to abolish should dismantle the anti-ballistic-mis-
several hundred USAR combat units, sale system they are building. Through-
with their 50,000 trained and experienced out her military history Russia has not
men. It would appear that in the thirst had a break like this. Months have
for economy or merger of the Reserves, passed and they still are busily engaged
as the ease may be, would not be suffi-? in building an anti-ballistic-missile sys-
ciently compelling to cause a weakening tem to protect their nation and to re-
of the Nation's military capability in the adjust the balance of military power in
face of its serious commitments world- their favor. But they say they are willing
wide, in a time of grave international to talk about it. That does not provide
pressures. me with any substantial degree of com-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 7075
the gap and increases the danger to the
United States and to American citizens.
Now to manned aircraft. Throughout
this bill it will be noted that there Is
a gradual scaledown of manned air-
craft. In fact were it not for the efforts
of this committee and the Congress we
would be much weaker today in manned
aircraft than we now are. It is proposed
to continue that scaledown even for fis-
cal 1968 when the Nation is very defi-
nitely engaged in a serious war which is
testing our military resources. There are
altogether many people in the Pentagon
who still seem to look upon the war in
Vietnam as a minor engagement to be
carried on one-handedly while the grand
scale of the Pentagon's program for some
mythical future engagement is carried
forward as the primary objective. It
would occur to me that the primary ob-
jective of the Department of Defense
should be to win whatever war we find
ourselves engaged in and to do so as
quickly as possible and to think of the
grand program later.
There may be new danger in the Rus-
sian submarine threat with their missile
launch capability and their threat to
American shipping. During recent years
there have been few indications of stress
by Soviets on submarine construction.
Apparently this resulted from Soviet em-
phasis on their anti-ballistic-missile
system and even on the belief that the
Soviet submarine program was sufficient
In numbers and capability for any re-
quirements that might be placed upon it.
It does not now appear that this is the
case. There seems to be a renewed em-
phasis on Russian submarine program
with a high degree of modernization.
For a long time the United States held
the edge in the submarine field in quality
even though badly outnumbered. This
picture can rapidly change if indications
of improvements and progress In the
Russian submarine are borne out. It is
entirely possible that we should be plac-
ing much more emphasis on submarine
construction to reflect Soviet increases
in numbers and their added defensive
capability.
This is the best report that has accom-
panied any defense appropriations bill.
It deals more carefully and explicitly
with the background of our funding prob-
lems than any previous report, and spells
out the particular reasons for each of the
committee's important actions. Reading
it will take time, but it is well worthwhile.
A great deal of work is required for a
measure of the magnitude and detail of
this one. The services of a great many
people go into it. Long hours through
many `days of hearings and study are re-
quired. 'iaoh of the committee and staff
members with whom I have worked are
die a large measure of appreciation
for the product which is before you. How-
ever, I would like particularly to call your
attention to the very dedicated effort of
the distinguished gentleman from Cal-
ifornia [Mr. LrpscomBl. I suspect that he
has put in longer hours and given more
effort to the bill than did any other in-
dividual. His contributions were monu-
mental and he, particularly, is worthy
of credit.
This Is not to take credit from the
chairman of the committee, the distin-
guished gentleman from Texas [Mr.
MAHON], whose great contributions to
defense are so well recognized. It is his
leadership which has insured a balanced
defense program time after time when
those in the Pentagon seemed disposed
to follow too closely the defense pana-
cea of the moment.
The cuts that have been made are
not crippling. It is a healthy thing that
the committee has faced up to the fact
that military expenditures must not, be-
cause of their nature, be immune from
the same close scrutiny that should be
given to other governmental expendi-
tures. Since the serious buildup began in
Vietnam, it has not been possible to make
meaningful cuts. The continuous escala-
tion of warfare has meant an anticipated
need for more money than that being
appropriated each year. This situation is
understandable, but in itself it is produc-
tive of carelessness and waste. It should
now be obvious to the Pentagon that
Congress is again looking carefully at
expenditure and will expect an equally
careful scrutiny by the Department of
Defense as expenditures are made. At
least in some instances where cuts were
made, they could have been deeper. Yet
the committee does recognize the neces-
sity of leaning over backward to provide
funding for all the items needed to sup-
port the fighting forces. The cuts set
forth in this bill are an indication of
renewed interest on the part of the com-
mittee in obtaining savings where savings
are possible.
When you consider the fact that we are
involved with a deficit between $14 and
$29 billion, it is time to think about
savings and to wonder whether we really
cut deeply enough; particularly in the
fields which are not associated with
winning the war in Vietnam and which
smack so strongly of bureaucratic build-
up at so many levels. There are areas
which offer promise for further reduc-
tions In spending. I am not at all certain
that we have cut deeply enough into pro-
posed additions for civilian personnel or
that we have tightened the lines enough
on the nonprofit corporations.
The nonprofit institutions are the
organizations which are set up to pro-
vide services to the Government by con-
tract and who attract for their operating
personnel individuals who are not will-
ing to work for the salaries paid to Gov-
ernment employees. The organizations
have borne a charmed life. There seems
to be too little indication of an effort by
the Pentagon to require them to hold
down expenditures or to require a realis-
tic return from the projects assigned to
them. Admiral Rickover, who is one of
the most capable thinkers in the Penta-
gon, has stated repeatedly that the De-
partment of Defense needs more in-
house capability rather than contract or
nonprofit operations. Certainly the hour
is late and Congress should be reestab-
lishing a measure of control on continued
expansions in noncombat areas. I have
long been convinced that the Pentagon
is running studies into the ground. At any
time witnesses do not have an answer to
a congressional query, they say the mat-
ter is under study.
The rapidly escalating number of civil-
ian employees now In the Department of
Defense is to me an equal cause for con-
cern. Every year we hear of savings in
the operation of the Pentagon, but each
year there is a mounting wave of higher
costs. I question that there is really much
that can be substantiated in the way of
real, not theoretical, savings, in many of
the activities which are carried on there.
The United States employs nearly 3 mil-
lion civilians worldwide. The number has
increased by several hundred t.iousand
in the past few years. Mushrooming
Washington shows where most of them
have found a happy home.
A part of the civilian buildup has to
do with substituting civilians for mili-
tary. Testimony reveals that there is no
plan to convert these jobs back to mili-
tary slots when the fighting in Vietnam
has ended. This means maintaining a
very large civilian establishment and a
cutback in the Military Establishment
when conditions return to normal. I do
not think this is a healthy program. Ob-
viously, we cannot have an all civilian
Military Establishment. We must have
people in uniform to fight battles and
win wars. They need promotion oppor-
tunities. We can have so many civilians
in the Military Establishment that there
will be no place for military personnel
other than in overseas defense posts.
That adds to the problem of separation
of families. In time of emergency we
would have fewer military personnel to
report to battle stations and there would
be the problem of delay which would
result from requirements to train addi-
tional personnel to fill the ranks. I just
do not think this program has properly
been thought through.
Very possibly many of the studies
which are designed to evaluate Penta-
gon programs are useless or irrelevant or
both. The entire field has been studied
by the Government Operations Commit-
tee and their findings are scorching. They
show duplication and ineffective conclu-
sions and too frequent disregard of the
findings of the studies. This is the sort
of thing our committee seeks to elimi-
nate. There are too many cases of studies
made of studies and nothing concrete to
show savings to the Government.
There are areas of activity in which I
am sure the taxpayer would welcome a
greater show of zeal on the part of gov-
ernmental negotiators. Some of these,
such as the case of U.S. negotiations for
compensation for U.S. bases and operat-
ing facilities in France, are in the hands
of the State Department, rather than
OSD. It would be very well, however; at
whatever level, to urge U.S. negotiators
to work harder to get something of value
for whatever property we leave in France
or wherever. The French appear to be-
lieve that they can get our installations
and nonmoveable equipment for little or
nothing. Frequently this is what happens
and the taxpayers are tired of it. So far
we have just exactly nothing to show for
our efforts.
Now finally this: Because we have car-
ried on the war In Vietnam while ad-
hering to a policy of business as usual at
home; because we have leaned over back-
wards to keep from exposing the average
American to any hardship or deprivation
as the result of war, there are many who
have overlooked some very significant
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H 7076 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
facts. it should be emphasized that there
are some among us; those who bear the
brunt of battle, those who bear the bur-
den of keeping open supply lines and
their families, who are in a war. They
are bearing a burden just as serious and
frequently, just as great and just as dan-
gerous as that in any major crisis in our
country's history. For those who carry
the load in Vietnam the exposure to dan-
ger, the separation of families, the incon-
veniences which most people knew in
prior wars when our whole Nation was
mobilized in once again a way of life.
The fact that most Americans are not
personally involved in the war does not
diminish the sacrifices required of the
fighting men and their families, and it
should result in greater appreciation for
them on the part of the rest of us. They
have Performed magnificently and they
are entitled to the respect and admira-
tion of the American people. Theirs has
been an example which should not be
overlooked even by those who conduct
demonstrations, burn draft cards, and
desecrate the American flag.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. SIKES. Of course I yield to the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services.
Mr. RIVERS. Is the gentleman satis-
fied with .the Hebert bill on the reorga-
nization of the Reserve or the Guard?
Mr. SIKES. H.R. 2, which the gentle-
man aptly refers to, is an important
measure that has twice passed the House
and which now awaits the action of the
Senate. That bill, while it would not now
deal specifically with this situation,
would not now deal specifically with this
situation, would at least prove to be a
vehicle to which germane amendments
would be applicable as an expression of
the congressional interest and intent in
this matter.
Mr. RIVERS. Within the framework of
this proposal by the gentleman from
Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT], and Senator
RUSSELL has assured me-and it is the
first time he has done it-is such that he
will schedule this bill for hearings. If he
does, it will certainly pass. Within the
framework of this bill, is it not the gen-
tleman's understanding and assurance
that we can work out, by legislative and
congressional mandate and action, a
mandate to protect the integrity of the
Guard and of the Reserve components?
Mr. SIKES. It would be my hope that
the problem of Reserve reorganization
can be dealt with in this manner. That
is exactly the reason we have placed lan-
guage in our report to deal with the sub-
ject rather than writing new law into the
bill itself. Our committee has leaned over
backwards in an effort to avoid legislat-
ing in an appropriation bill.
Mr. RIVERS. Well, of course.
Mr. SIKES. We have asked that the re-
organization be deferred through the
medium of the language of the commit-
tee report until such time as an expres-
sion of the Congress could be manifested
through regular legislative channels.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield further, I think the
gentleman and his committee have done
a wise thing.
And, further, Mr. Chairman, I can as-
sure the gentleman that we on the House
Committee on Armed Services do have
the same concern. We are going to keep
the numbers as they are, and the in-
tegrity of these units will be preserved, if
humanly possible, in this area.
Mr. Chairman, I want the distin,
guished gentleman from Florida [Mr.
SIRES] to continue his great assistance
to us, because the gentleman knows so
much about it and we do need his help.
But, again, I want to congratulate the
gentleman for helping us save those units
from those people in. the Pentagon who
are seeking to change our policy in the
Guard and in the Reserves until the Con-
gress clearly stepped in and stopped it.
Mr. SIKES. I appreciate very much the
comments of the distinguished gentle-
man from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS],
the gentleman who has contributed so
much to the defense of America.
Mr. Chairman, permit me to warn that
what is desired here for the preservation
of combat units will not be attained sim-
ply by the language of the report, or by
the language of H.R. 2 as it now is writ-
ten. H.R. 2, however, does provide a vehi-
cle to which amendments dealing with
the subject can be offered.
Further, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to call attention to the fact that the lan-
guage of our report and the reprogram-
Ing action required thereunder, would
require at least a measure of compliance
with the intended interest of the Con-
gress in learning more about the justi-
fication of the proposals which are made
by the Department of Defense on the Re-
serve components.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. SIKES. I yield further to the gen-
tleman from South Carolina.
Mr. RIVERS. Not necessarily indispen-
sable to the consideration of this Con-
gress, because we could provide that the
divisional setup shall be maintained, if
we have the assignment of missions or
units.
Mr. SIKES. That is correct. And, we
recognize that reorganizations are neces-
sary from time to time in order to keep
the military forces modern and effective.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield further, I would
much rather have a responsive force cut
up in smaller units than have larger
forces with no missions and no equip-
ment, as has been true in the past.
Mr. SIKES. That is the point. Today,
however, the Congress is particularly dis-
turbed about the proposed elimination of
combat units as such.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I
yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRn].
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I join with
the distinguished gentleman from Flor-
ida in paying tribute to the chairman of
this subcommttee, the Honorable GEORGE
MAHON, of Texas, for the diligence and
hard work that has gone into this com-
mittee report.
I particularly pay tribute to the gen-
tleman from California who sat in this
committee and spent more time studying
this bill and the justifications and the
June 13, 1967
statements of the various witnesses than,
any other member of the committee.
This committee report is a compro-
mise report, worked out under the lead-
ership of the gentleman from Texas and
the gentleman from California after
many hours of testimony, morning and
afternoon every day in each of the weeks
of the last 5 months.
This is a good committee report-the
best committee report that has ever ac-
companied a defense appropriation bill
since I have had the opportunity of serv-
ing on the Committee on Appropriations
in 1953.
This is one of the best reports that
has ever come from the Committee on
Appropriations accompanying a bill cov-
ering the national security costs of our
country. It is a good report in many re-
spects because it faces up to the many
challenges which we as a nation must
face during the next few years.
It points up some of the weaknesses of
the Department of Defense, as far as the
management of that Department is con-
cerned, as far as the planning and pro-
graming of that Department are con-
cerned, and also it recognizes for the first
time that we are not clearly and ade-
quately estimating the defense costs of
our Nation as far as the third largest
war which this country has ever been
involved in is concerned and that is the
war in Southeast Asia, In Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 10738,
the largest single appropriation measure
ever considered by the Congress. The
distinguished chairman of our commit-
tee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
MAHON] and the ranking minority mem-
ber of our committee, the distinguished
gentleman from California [Mr. LrPs-
coMB] have done their usual outstanding
job In outlining the contents of this bill.
For my part, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to make some general comments
about the bill and the report and then
briefly discuss some of the larger ques-
tions that concern all Americans.
ABSENCE OF ADDITIONAL VIEWS
First, Mr. Chairman, let me point out
that there are no "additional views" at-
tached to the report this year. I am
pleased to report this and would like
briefly to explain why the minority mem-
bers of this subcommittee did not sub-
mit "additional views" to the fiscal 1968
report as we have for the past 2 fiscal
years.
Basically, there are two reasons.
First, agreement was reached in mark-
up among all members on several major
items contained in this bill. One of the
more significant is the language con-
tained in our report-House Report No.
349-on page 3 which clearly indi-
cates that substantial additional funds
will be required for Southeast Asia ac-
tivities in fiscal year 1968.
My own view, Mr. Chairman, after
hearing the testimony so far before our
committee, is that the administration
has once again underestimated South-
east Asia requirements by a minimum of
$5.5 billion for fiscal year 1968.
The second reason there are no "ad-
ditional" or "minority" views is that our
deep concerns about the future posture
of our country in the national security
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE
arena especially in the decade of the
1970's and beyond were amply spelled out
in last year's additional views contained
in House Report No. 1652 and in my own
extensive remarks which appear in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD dated June 28,
1966,
Since very little has changed in the
intervening period, there seems to be no
compelling reason to restate our very
deeply held views on these vital matters.
I will very briefly summarize those con-
cerns a little later in my remarks, Mr.
Chairman.
VIETNAM REQUIREMENTS UNDERFUNDEIS=
AGAIN
No member of this committee, major-
ity or minority, can take pride in the
fact that the experience of the fiscal year
1966 and 1967 Southeast Asia require-
ments is to be repeated again in fiscal
year 1968, albeit on a soinewhat smaller
scale.
In fiscal year 1966, Southeast Asia re-
quirements were underestimated in the
original budget by some $15 billion.
In fiscal year 1967, Southeast Asia re-
quirments were underestimated by over
$13 billion.
In this budget, Southeast Asia require-
ments, on the bases of our hearings
these past 5 months, are underestimated
by a minimum of $5.5 billion. There is
evidence that they could well go much
higher.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me it would
be much better in a time of war to state
accurately the defense needs of our Na-
tion. This is a minimal requirement.
Actually, it would probably, be far bet-
ter to overstate defense requirements in
a time of war rather than coming back
the following January each year with
substantial supplemental requests after
all or most domestic appropriations
measures have been adopted.
. This would be the fiscally same course
to follow.
This would be the prudently wise thing
to do,
Mr. Chairman, the budget that is sub-
mitted to this committee is supposed to
be based upon a ground force level in
Vietnam of 500,000 men during the fiscal
year 1968. That is 500,000 ground forces,
plus 87,000 Navy, and 100,000 Air Force
personnel, all engaged in this, the third
largest war in the history of our coun-
try.
Yet the Department of Defense and
the President in submitting this budget
have once again underestimated the cost
of this conflict, and in the budget sub-
mission the figure of $20.3 billion is used
when every member of our committee on
either side of the aisle knows full well
that this is an underestimation of those
costs,
According to my informants in the De-
partment of Defense-and My inform-
ants. he,v been. better about cost figures
than ?tl e direct testimony of the Secre-
tary of Defense in both ,fiscal .1966 and
fiscal 1 67 ~tslg the same criteria that
was,US Tn figuring the $20.3 billion, the
expeM1turerate in Southeast Asia war
CoSti fot' April and May is closer to $4 bil-
liori rno th,Tbe annual cost of the war
in Vietnam Is .closer to $28 billion for
fiscal year 1968 than it is to the estimates
given in the budget submitted early in
January.
Why do I think it is important to point
this out now? It is important for us to
have these cost figures before the Con-
gress as we review the various domestic
programs that are going to be considered
by this Congress in the next few months.
We have been fighting the Vietnam war
on the basis of "Fight now, pay later,"
for too long. The situation has developed
here where in both fiscal 1966 and 1967,
we have had supplemental requests of
$13 billion-plus at the start of each new
session of Congress.
After all the domestic programs have
been funded, then we come up with a
supplemental approach to finance the
costs of the war. In every major war that
this country has ever been involved in
people have been willing to make sacri-
fice after sacrifice in order to cover the
costs and support the fighting men that
are assigned by our Commander in Chief
wherever they happen to be assigned.
And I say that the American people to-
day are also willing to make sacrifices,
but in order to make those sacrifices, the
costs must be estimated on a fair and
accurate basis, and the people must be
told in advance what those costs are.
With supplemental requests of over
$13 billion in 1966 and supplemental re-
quests this year of over $13 billion, al-
ways coming in after the domestic pro-
grams have been funded, the Congress
is unable to establish a clear set of prior-
ities as far as funding various programs
in the Federal Establishment, in this
federal system of ours, and it is time, it
seems to me, that we recognize that in
periods of war it is better to overestimate
your stated expenditure rate, your stated
appropriation rate, than to underesti-
mate it to the extent that it has been
underestimated by the current manage-
ment in the Department of Defense.
CREDIBILITY
The problem, Mr. Chairman, is that
this administration attempts to blame
the war in Vietnam and the consequent
increases in defense spending for the
"national sales tax" we call inflation and
for the deteriorating state of our econ-
omy, not to mention the prospectiife
massive deficit we are facing in this
fiscal year and in fiscal year 1968.
Yet, Defense spending since 1960, as
we have seen, has risen 68 percent while
nondefense spending has skyrocketed
some 97 percent.
If more accurate forecasts had been
submitted with the original budgets in
fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968, there
is no question in my mind that Congress
would have more responsibly and thor-
oughly scrutinized nondefense programs
and the prospect of a massive deficit of
over $25 billion in fiscal year 1968 prob-
ably would not have been as likely.
Mr. Chairman, the budget deficit for
fiscal year 1968 was originally estimated
at $8.1 billion. That estimate has now
been officially revised to some $11 billion.
Members of this Subcommittee on De-
fense are also members of the full Com-
mittee on Appropriations and must pass
judgment on the funding requirements
of all other levels of Government activ-
ity.
11 7077
We are also Members of the Congress
who are required to judge all authoriza-
tion levels when they come to the floor
of the Douse for final action.
Our responsibility to our own con-
science and to all our colleagues in the
Congress cannot be appropriately dis-
charged in the face of incomplete or
misleading information.
"Yet, this is precisely what we have had
to contend with in increasing degrees
'during the past 2 years.
The inflation we faced last year and
today, the sluggishness of our economy,
the inappropriateness of some of the
legislative actions this Congress has ap-
proved in the past 24 months, the pros-
pects of a large and, apparently
necessary tax increase-all of these
problems and many more can be attrib-
uted in part to an incomplete under-
standing by Congress of the true and
largely predictable requirements of
Southeast Asia activities in the _ past 2
fiscal years.
Mr. Chairman, in no area of national
need-domestic or foreign-can this
Congress fulfill its responsibilities ade-
quately until it insists upon and obtains
full, complete and accurate information
from the executive branch of our Gov-
ernment.
It is this which has led us to the posi-
tion we are in today, where domestic ex-
penditures have increased by 97 percent
since 1960, while Defense expenditures
have increased only by 67 percent-at a
time when we are engaged in a massive
war.
At no time in the recent history of this
country-either in the time of World War
I, or World War II, or in the Korean con-
flict-did domestic expenditures go up at
a rate of 97 percent. As a matter of fact,
during World War I, and during World
War II, and during the Korean conflict,
just the opposite was the case in the ad-
ministration of our budget and fiscal
Matters.
Mr. Chairman, a budget is nothing
more than the fiscal plan of our country.
It is sent to the Congress at the start of
each year to give some indication on the
part of the executive branch as to what
the fiscal plans are for the next fiscal
year. The credibility of the budgets that
have been submitted have been com-
pletely discounted as far as Defense is
concerned during each of the last 2 fiscal
years, and the same thing is true this
year. I point this out not in the interest
of criticism.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make
the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will
count. [After counting.] Fifty-three
Members are present, not a quorum. The
Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names :
IRoll No. 134]
Abbitt
Celler
Hanna
Anderson,
Clark
Heckler, Mass.
Tenn.
Conyers
Horlong
Arends
Corman
Holifleld
Ashbrook
Daddario
Hosmer
Ashley
Diggs
Kelly
Ayres
Dow
McEwen
Battin
Dowdy
McFall
Berry
Fuqua
Moss
Brown, Calif.
Gubser
Polly
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
Pepper
St Germain
Widnall
Pickle
St. Onge
Williams, Miss
Pool
Skubitz
Willis
Resnick
Smith, N.Y.
Young
Ruppe
Thompson, N.J. Younger
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PnrcE of
Illinois) having assumed the chair, Mr.
ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union, reported that that Com-
mittee, having had under consideration
the bill H.R. 10738, and finding itself
without a quorum, he had directed the
roll to be called, when 387 Members re-
sponded to their names, a quorum, and
he submitted herewith the names of the
absentees to be spread upon, the Journal.
The Committee resumed its sitting.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] has 11 minutes
remairdng.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, the point
that I was attempting to make before-the
quorum call was that this bill does not
fund the war effort in Southeast Asia.
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, if the gen-
tleman will yield, I think the gentleman
should take the well. He looks better
down there and he was doing so well
and on a matter of this importance i
think he should address the Committee
from the well of the House.
Mr. LAIRD. I want my distinguished
friend, the gentleman from Pennsyl-
vania, to be completely comfortable. Al-
though I might be more comfortable
where I am now standing, I will yield to
his suggestion and take the well.
Mr. Chairman, additional war costs
will be funded in a supplemental appro-
priation bill which will come before the
Congress early in the second session of
this 90th Congress.
The expenditure rate in Vietnam will
be closer to $28 billion than the $20.3
billion which is earmarked, in this ap-
propriation bill and as set forth by the
President in his budget as submitted to
the Congress. This is true on the basis
of the present rate of expenditure of am-
munition, and the present steaming rate
in Southeast Asia today.
Ammunition and steaming costs are
underestimated by in excess of $1,500,-
000,000 in this bill on the basis of the
present use of ammunition and fuel in
Vietnam in the third quarter and now in
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1967.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr.:MAHON. I would like to exchange
views with the gentleman from Wiscon-
sin, if he will permit.
Is it not true that last year we were
told that under the assumptions under-
lying the military budget for the fiscal
year 1967, the current fiscal year, if the
war should continue beyond June 30,
1967, that additional funds would be re-
quired?
That is question No. 1, which I am
sure the gentleman would answer,
"Yes."
Mr. LAIRD. The answer to that ques-
tion is, "Yes." But to further amplify
that answer, even if the war had ended
on the 30th of June 1967, I am sure the
distinguished gentleman from Texas
knows full well that a supplemental ap-
propriation bill would have been needed
and necessary in order to restore the
drawdown on stocks and supplies, the
loss of aircraft, and the loss of helicop-
ters that would have been needed in or-
der to put the Defense Establishment in
the same position in which it was 18
months earlier.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. LAIRD. I am happy to yield to
my distinguished chairman.
Mr. MAHON. Everyone I know of, in
and out of Government, thought that
in all probability the war would con-,
tinue beyond June 30. Therefore, the
gentleman from Texas now on his feet?
and the gentleman from Wisconsin, and
many others said early last year that
there would have to be a supplemental
appropriation. The Defense Depart-
ment, the President, and many others
said that there would have to be a sup
plemental bill. We shouted this view
from the housetops. It was well known..
Mr. LAIRD. They said that after they
were pressed, but they never admitted
they would need a supplemental if the
war would have ended on a certain given
date. This was a false assumption to
start with in drawing budgets.
At no time in the history of warfare
or defense planning has any administra-
tion, to my knowledge, assumed a given.
date that a war would end. This has
never happened in the history of any
military establishment or in the history
of any country in the world that a given
date was picked upon which the war
would end, and they would draw budget
assumptions based upon a given fixed
date for the end of the war.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. LAIRD. I am happy to yield to the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. MAHON. Of course, it is true that
in making any budget certain assump-
tions must be made. Some of them may
be arbitrary. I myself felt that the as-
sumptions underlying the fiscal 1967 de-
fense budget were not as realistic as they
should have been but the assumptions
were clearly delineated.
Mr. LAIRD. I know the gentleman
does not like to use the word "phony,"
but they were false, were they not?
Mr. MAHON. They were not false and
they were not phony. They were based
upon technical budgetary assumptions.
Mr. LAIRD. I do not think it is a very
technicalassumption to project the way
on which a war is going to end and base
assumptions on that date.
Mr. MAHON. The gentleman knows
that the war was escalating rather rap-
idly and it was impossible to tell exactly
how much money would be needed. We
were told that additional funds would be
needed if the war continued. It can be
argued that a more definitive figure
should have become available earlier. I
am not arguing that point. The purpose
of this colloquy, in my judgment-
Mr. LAIRD. If the distinguished gen-
tleman will permit me, he is defending
the assumption that was used in the
1967 budget that on a certain date the
war would end. If that was such a good
assumption to make in the fiscal year
1967, why did they not use the same as-
sumption in 1968? The gentleman from
Texas knows full well that they did not
use the -same assumption in the 1968
budget.
Mr. MAHON. The fiscal year 1968 budg-
etary assumptions are entirely different,
in most ways, from those for fiscal 1967.
So while you and I shouted from the
housetops last year that there would have
to be a large supplemental, this year the
situation is quite different because the
budgetary assumptions are different.
Mr. LAIRD. I agree absolutely with the
gentleman that the supplemental will be
just about half the supplemental of this
year.
Mr. MAHON. My point is, that we all
agree there will probably have to be a
supplemental because the expenditures
for the war will very likely go beyond
those which were calculated in the Janu-
ary estimates. Even though a greater
number of troops than those present now
have been funded in the budget, we
think it very probably will go beyond
that figure. The estimated personnel fig-
ure for Vietnam is less than 500,000. We
believe the figure will very probably go
higher. Therefore, we think there will
have to be some additional funding. The
fact that we did not fully fund the costs
of the war in fiscal year 1967 early in the
year did not influence the war effort, in
my opinion. It may have influenced some
other things.
Mr. LAIRD. The gentleman from Texas
knows full well that it did influence some
other things. However, when we get into
the other parts of our fiscal planning,
in the other areas of fiscalresponsibility
in which the Congress has certain re-
sponsibilities, we can easily see that by
underestimating these costs and by using
a false assumption-that the Secretary
of Defense, as well as others in the ad-
ministration, knew was a false assump-
tion, to pick out of the hat a date when
the war is going to end-that is certainly
the way to mislead people as to what the
total overall fiscal plan of our country
should be.
Mr. MAHON. But the gentleman from
Texas and the gentleman from Wiscon-
sin were in no way misled, and assuming
our colleagues haveconfidence in us, they
knew all along that there would be a
heavy supplemental, and that defense
costs would soar. Therefore, when the
Great Society programs and domestic
programs generally were considered, it
was known that there would be addi-
tional sums needed. So this should not
have adversely influenced Members of
Congress.
Mr. LAIRD. The Members full well
know that when the Secretary of Defense
was asked at the press conference in
January 1966, about the projection I
made that the supplemental request for
1967 would be well over $10 billion, he
said it was false, He came right out and
said it was false. And my assumptions
were correct, and his were wrong. I see
the Secretary of Defense in this budget
has not used the same assumptions he
did in 1967. The assumptions are some-
what different. But I would never want
to be in a position of arguing that the
assumptions he used in 1967 were a
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
proper means of estimating defense ex-
penditures while we were engaged in the
third largest war this country has ever
been engaged in. He would have been a
great Secretary of Defense if we had been
at peace during his tenure, but unfor-
tunately we are at war, and in estimating
costs and budgets, we have to let our
people know what the costs are, so that
they can tighten their belt in other areas
of the economy.
Mr. MAHON. I am not, enamored of
the defense budgeting system which was
employed for the current fiscal year, but
I want to proceed further. There are
assumptions underlying the 1968 budget,
to the effect that the war will continue
throughout fiscal year 1968-that is,
through June 30, 1968, and beyond that
time-,
Mr. LAIRD. For at least that amount
of time, The assumption goes far beyond;
there is no cutoff date on June 30, 1968.
The war is a continuing thing and pro-
jections are in this budget.
Mr. MAHON. But the additional costs
will be required for 1969. So my point is,
if one lacks agreement with the budget-
ary system for the current fiscal year,
he should realize fully that if the war
does not escalate beyond the present
estimated level, the probabilities are that
if there is a supplemental-and there
probably will be-it will be relatively
small as compared to the supplemental
of 1967.
Mr. LAIRD. I agree with the gentle-
man from Texas. It will be less than the
supplemental for 1967, but it will be a
sizable supplemental. If the manpower
level goes above 500,000 troops on the
ground, then we will have to have a much
larger supplemental, a supplemental of
at least $5.5 billion. But even if the war
stays at the projection of 500,000 troops
on the ground, we will still have to have a
supplemental appropriation bill for 1968.
We could take examples. Ammunition for
destroyers-right now I can tell the gen-
tleman on the basis of information I
have from the Defense Department-was
underestimated at the very time the
Secretary of Defense was making his
budget submission to the Defense Appro-
priations Committee by many millions
of dollars.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield further?
Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman
from Texas.
Mr. MAHON. It s true that we reduced
the defense budget by $1.6 billion. We
also added-on $400 million. We made
a net reduction. We do not feel that these
reductions, will interfere with the war
effort, We are supporting the committee
report and the funds requested in this
bill, because neither the gentleman from
Wisconpn nor I believe that we should
at this time give a blank check for an
undetermined amount of money which
may later be required. We would rather
they would lay the further requests be-
fore us in clear terms when the need is
more ap Arent. -
There re, the fact that the costs of
the war nay to some extent be unfunded
is in no way a reason why we should in-
crease the budget or attempt to guess as
to what*the additional figure may be, or
provide a blank check to the Executive
for expenditure of funds which have not
been justified.
Mr. LAIRD. I agreed with the gentle-
man from Texas.
The reductions made here in no way
will affect the war in Vietnam. It is a
reflection on the part both of the ma-
jority and of the minority members of
the committee that we should have
tighter control over budgetary processes
so far as the Department of Defense is
concerned. This is what we have tried to
set forth in our committee report, which
is agreed to by both the majority and
the minority members.
Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, if I may,
I would like to touch on one or two other
points of general concern to all Amer-
icans in connection with our Defense
Establishment
NEED FOB A BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION -
Mr. Chairman, I referred earlier to the
additional views submitted by the minor-
ity members of this subcommittee last
year. In connection with those views we,
together with other Members of Con-
gress, introduced a resolution calling for
the early establishment of a Blue Ribbon
Commission, made up of the highest
calibre experts from both the civilian
and military communities, to conduct an
independent and objective evaluation of
the projected defense posture of this
country.
My own rather extensive defense of
the need for such a commission is con-
tained in my remarks of last June 28
alluded to earlier.
Those of us who introduced this resolu-
tion did not do so lightly.
We came to the conviction that it is
vitally needed only after deep delibera-
tion and much soul-searching and after
noting the grave concern felt and pub-
licly expressed by leading members of
both parties in and out of Congress, by
high-ranking military officers, by past
holders of the Nation's highest positions
in the Department of Defense-both
military and civilian-and by almost uni-
versal concern in the journals and pub-
lications of this country that deal pri-
marily with defense matters.
We came to this conviction ; s well
after noting the cavalier disregard on the
part of the Office of Secretary of Defense
with respect to clear direction by Con-
gress in several vital matters, with re-
spect to unanimous recommendation on
the part of the Joint Chiefs, and with
respect to the apparent reliance in that
office on preconceived assumptions that
often fly in the face of all available evi-
dence.
We came to it finally, Mr. Chairman,
because it is no longer possible to rely
on the unsupported pronouncements of
the highest officials in the Department
with regard to the most vital matters of
concern to Congress in discharging its
constitutional responsibilities in the area
of national security.
SUMMARY or CONCERNS
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like
briefly to restate in summary fashion the
principal concerns that point, in my
judgment, to the need for early estab-
H 7079
lishment of such a Blue Ribbon Com-
mission.
First, the defense structure of any na-
tion is determined by that nation's for-
eign policy.
Primarily, it is our belief as stated in
last year's additional views that certain
basic changes have taken place in the
defense policy of the United States since
1961. These changes need immediate
evaluation by this impartial Blue Rib-
bon Commission. Among he changes, the
following are particularly significant:
First, a changed attitude toward the
cold war and, as a result, a different
assessment of the potential and current
threat;
Second, a changed attitude toward the
desirability or necessity of pursuing ad-
vanced weapons development as vigor-
ously as possible; and
Third, a changed attitude toward
those areas of defense and defense plan-
ning which should receive priority.
In foreign policy, the basic assump-
tions upon which the administration ap-
pears to base its defense strategy include
the following:
First, that there has been in recent
years a reduction in tensions between
the free world and the Communist
bloc-except China-and that further
accommodations in the future can be
anticipated and should be encouraged;
Second, that our military force struc-
ture should be related primarily to the
"visible" threat posed by potential ad-
versaries;
Third, that nuclear war is as unthink-
able to the Communists as it is to the
United States and the free world and
that, therefore, the balance that is be-
ing achieved between the Soviet Union
and the United States with regard to
strategic forces should not be upset;
Fourth, that the United States should
continue to assume a posture of response
both in the area of "crisis control" such
as Vietnam and in the area of weapons
development; and
Fifth, that the threat from world
Communism has, in fact, eased during
the course of recent years and, therefore,
any attempt to maintain a decisive su-
periority in the years ahead would re-
verse this trend.
In defense policy, the basic assump-
tions would include:
First, that the aggressive pursuit of
advanced weapons development such as
the antiballistic missile system-ABM-
or the advanced manned strategic air-
craft-AMSA-would lead to a "reac-
tion" on the part of the Communists
that would accelerate the "arms race"
and that, therefore, whenever possible,
such decisions should be stretched out,
studied to death, or postponed.
Second, that the level of effort in new
weapons systems should be tied, predom-
inantly, to what the potential enemy is
doing and that the determination of
what "the other side is doing" must be
based on "visible" information.
Third, that the Defense Establishment
must be prepared to execute and imple-
ment a strategy of "flexible response,"
one that permits the United States to
gradually escalate any conflict and that
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
will not force us into the dilemma of
"humiliating retreat or nuclear war."
It is our belief that many of the as-
sumptions that guide our foreign and de-
fense policy may be unrealistic and incor-
rect. The experience of the past 6 years
bears out this contention. The impor-
tance of a complete evaluation of these
assumptions cannot be overstated.
We believe that there has not been a
reduction in tensions but, rather a re-
duction in our desire to recognize Com-
munist actions for what they are.
We believe that our military force
structure should not be :related to the
"visible" threat but rather to the capa-
bilities of the Communists and to the ful-
fillment of our own national objectives.
We believe that nuclear war should be
"unthinkable" to the Communists but
that this country should not base its
plans on that illusive hope.
We believe that the strategy of - re-
sponse both with regard to crisis situa-
tions and with respect to weapons devel-
opment should give way to a strategy of
initiative. We would define a "strategy
of response" as one in which this Nation
permits a situation to become so serious
that it must take extraordinary steps
even to return to the status quo, and a
"strategy of initiative" as one in which
this Nation, when it first sees the pos-
sibility of a situation developing, will
take steps to prevent its becoming a
crisis situation either with respect to po-
tential conflicts or to new advances in
weapons development.
We believe that the threat from world
communism has not eased and that,
therefore, it is of the utmost importance
that this Nation maintain a decisive
superiority in offensive and defensive
weapons.
We believe that the Soviet Union is
not "leveling off" its effort in advanced
weapons development and that it is, as
a matter of fact, aggressively pursuing
new development both in outer space and
inner space. Secretary McNamara's be-
lated admission of this last November
should make this fact clear, Mr. Chair-
man.
Finally, we believe that under the poli-
cies of the past 5 years, rather than es-
cape the dilemma of "humiliating retreat
or nuclear war," we have actually en-
larged that possibility, in effect, adopt-
ing policies that have reduced rather
than. increased our options.
To reverse this. situation, four basic
requirements are necessary:
First. A more objective and realistic
assessment of the threat coupled with a
thorough reevaluation of our foreign
policy;
Second. A return to greater participa-
tion by and acceptance of military judg-
ment in what are predominantly military
affairs;
Third. A more aggressive pursuit of re-
search and development especially in the
area of advanced weapons; and
Fourth. A reassessment by the Con-
gress of its own role in the area of na-
tional security.
There is, in our judgment, little possi-
bility that these requirements can or
will be fulfilled unless the initiative
comes from the Congress. It is for this
reaspn that we have called for and
strongly support the establishment of a
blue ribbon commission of military and
civilian leaders to reassess and reevalu-
ate the defense posture of this Nation
now and for the future.
Only in this way, Mr. Chairman, can
the American people be reassured that
this Nation is buying the very best de-
fense consistent with the long-term best
interests of the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Wisconsin has expired.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
10 minutes to the gentleman from Mis-
sissippi [Mr. WHITTEN].
(Mr. WHITTEN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Chairman, I do
not expect to take much time on this
particular topic, but the discussion be-
tween the gentleman from Wisconsin
and my chairman, the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. MAHONl brings to mind the
fact that if we would finance the Defense
Department as we did during World War
II, and as I believe we should be doing
now-that is, by providing funds as they
are needed instead of trying to fully
fund in advance-this discussion would
be needless.
I look back to 1955, when we were dis-
cussing this matter on the floor, and to
my remarks at that time. I pointed out
that as a result of full funding the De-
fense Department had continued to buy
airplanes which would not fly because
they had the money and did not want
to cancel the contract because that might
cause unemployment. There are many
similar examples.
There may be some jockeying for posi-
tion here between my colleagues on the
committee.
I do not want to let this statement
conclude without also commending the
very fine work done by our chairman, the
gentleman from Texas and by the other
members of the subcommittee. This is a
long and detailed and complex bill.
I do say again that this argument
about whether something is full funded
or not might have some repercussions
in a political way, I do not know, but
any department which has in addition
the funds in this bill some $40 billion
or $50 billion of unspent funds, and a
great amount of money not obligated, is
a department about which there is no
need to worry whether it has enough
money to finance itself for the next year.
There might be some argument about
the wisdom of funding some domestic
programs or whether we should do this
or should not do some other things. The
point I want to bring out today is the
fact that I have gone back through the
records to 1961. For that whole period I
cannot see where. a single thing has
worked out like the Secretary and his-as-
sociates at the Pentagon anticipated it
would. I cannot see today where anything
in Vietnam today is in line with the way
it was projected and estimated to us by
our experts and throughout that whole
time the Secretary of Defense has im-
posed his will not only on the Defense
Department but has consistently tried to
virtually eliminate or weaken the Re-
serves and National Guard combat units.
Here again, we find public announce-
ment, without congressional approval or
knowledge, by the Secretary of Defense
that he is going to abolish combat ui}its
of the Reserves and the Guard. This ac-
tion is unsound. Our committee has again
disapproved such action and has called
upon the Secretary to hold such action
up unless approved by the Congress.
TIME TO CHANGE OUR COURSE
Mr. Chairman, we need to review to
reassess, and, I believe change our for-
eign policy. I can see how years ago you
may have had high hopes for the United
Nations when it was created, but I can-
not see how those same folks would have
any hopes for it now, having had ob-
served its failures, right up to recent
weeks.
Mr. Chairman, after World War II,
we went around the world injecting our-
selves into the internal affairs of just
about every nation that would let us help
them with foreign aid, underwriting the
incumbent governments, governments
which sold our goods to their people for
what the traffic would bear.
Of course, once the governments we
aided got thrown out the new govern-
ment had no use for us. That is the
answer to the feeling against us in so
many areas around the world.
All nations engaged in the recent war
in the Mideast were recipients of our
aid-as a matter of fact we first went
into Vietnam with foreign aid. We see
the results, a war with no apparent end,
unless we change our course.
Let us take further stock of our posi-
tion today and think about how we got
there.
Think of it. Only a few short years
ago we were confronted with communism
in Cuba. This was halfway around the
world from Russia and a place greatly
to her disadvantage. When her hand was
called, she got out. Where do we con-
front communism today? We are half-
way around the world, with all of the
disadvantages on us and with the ad-
vantage with communism.
We have read the word "Vietcong"
so frequently in the press that most folks
today do not stop to realize that the
Vietcong are the South Vietnamese who
do not agree with us and are trying to
throw us out of their country. They are
not North Vietnamese but South Viet-
namese. Those South Vietnamese who
give us lukewarm support we call South
Vietnamese. -
There are six volumes of hearings here.
I challenge you to read them and come
out with any feeling that the South Viet-
namese on our side want to put out very
much themselves except to satisfy us.
Why have we had to put our soldiers in
there? Because though we could train the
South Vietnamese to the point of using
this equipment themselves, all too fre-
quently too many had little desire to
fight. If they-had had half of what the
Israelisshowed last week, there would be
a different story. The war would likely
have been over. Besides, we don't know
who is with us and who is not.
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL ' RECORD - HOUSE
H 7481
On another point we are here today we need to go all out to get rid of the (Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given
presuming that we can continue to spend Vietcong, and to bring North Vietnam permission to revise and extend his re-
$20 billion to $25 billion a year in Viet- to her knees, we must then at least say marks.)
nam and that our economy can stand it. to the lukewarm South Vietnamese that Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I am
Well, can it? We turned down the other we say we are trying to free, "All right. indeed honored
Subcommittee obeen on f the Cthis
day an increase in the ceiling on our We have given you equipment; we have great Defense
national debt to $375 billion, a level we trained you. We have broken the mittee on Appropriations. I do not think
are bound to reach if we follow our pres- enemy's force. If you have any heart in that there is any more important conv-
ent course. It has been estimated that we you, then take this equipment and get mittee in the House and, certainly, none
have an inflationary spiral of $27 billion going, because we have done our share." that is harder working and one which
this year. That means $27,000,000,000 loss I do not see any other way open to us. spends more hours listening to the testi-
in the value of our savings. I know that I say to you today the only plans to win mony of experts from the Department of
the Defense witnesses testified we had an that you will see in these hearings are Defense than do we, the members of the
average of 7 percent inflation each year. that we hope to stay there until they de- Defense Subcommittee.
In other words, it costs 7 percent more cide that they cannot win-and all the Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I
each year to buy the same thing that time the Vietcong and the North Viet- did not pay tribute to my distinguished
you bought the year before. How long namese win each day they keep us tied colleague, the chairman of this com-
can our economy stand up to this course down. mittee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
without a crackup? Now, Mr. Chairman, the Vietcong MAHON], and commend the gentleman
Now, what am I getting to? I am say- group of South Vietnamese-one can see for the fair and impartial manner in
ing that we owe it to the men we have that they have an issue. They are like the which he conducts our hearings. You
in South. Vietnam, trying to help people Israelis. They are instilled with a desire have already heard about the gentleman .
who do not have the enthusiasm for to push foreigners out of what they con- from California [Mr. LIPSCOMs]. He has
themselves as their South Vietnamese sider their land. And, I seriously question worked like a Trojan this year on this
relatives whom we call the Vietcong, whether we should have ever gone there. most important bill. Unfortunately, be-
have for driving us out. But we are there, and I say that we owe cause of committee conflicts not all com-
Our supply lines reach half way it to our boys who are fighting to see that mittee members have been able to be
around the world. We are greatly com- they are permitted to win. We need to there to help him as much as we would
mitted with millions of men behind the win in the interest of the safety of our like, but the gentleman from California
460,000 in Vietnam. We have recom- country. We must get this war over with [Mr. LIPSCOMB] has carried the ball in a
mitted ourselves- to Southeast Asia to the for as long as it continues we will be over- magnificent manner and has performed
point that Russia could have called us extended over the world, dangerously so. an outstanding job. We Members of the
to task in the Middle East and likely And, thirdly, Mr. Chairman, our econ- House are very indebted to both of these
would have if the Israelis had not been omy calls for getting this war over. Do men, the distinguished gentleman from
victorious so quickly. Who knows, our not let them tell you that the GNP-the Texas [Mr. MAHON], and the distin-
tie down in the Far East may have set gross national product-is increasing at guished gentleman from California [Mr.
off Egypt. Could they not tweak our nose so great a rate that we can stand a $25 LIPSCOMB].
In Berlin? Or any where else where we billion war in South Vietnam year in and Mr. Chairman, I wish to bring to the
have commitments. We need to get this year out without a crack up in our do- floor of the House my grave misgivings
war over, or get it in condition to turn mestic economy. and reservations about the $208.8 mil-
fighting over to the South Vietnamese Mr. Chairman, what is the gross na- lion which is being committed in this
Government, with every advantage on tional product? I asked our Director of fiscal year 1968 bill for procurement of
their side. Unfortunately we do not seem the Bureau of the Budget when the hear- 12 F-111B airplanes for the Navy.
to have a plan to win. ings first commenced this year about this, Mr. Chairman, during our long hours
If you will read these hearings you and he said that the gross national prod- of hearings which extended over a period
cannot find a plan to win. The best uct is the value of goods and services. of several months, we on the Defense
that I can point out to you about our They count the face value of services Appropriations Subcommittee heard tes-
plan to win is that the Secretary says: on the ground that you would not pay timony from the Secretary of Defense,
"We will stay there until they get con- for those services unless they are worth the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and
vinced they cannot win." When a smaller it. But, you know, they put the same face ? Air Force as well as from the Joint Chiefs
country like Vietnam can tie up the value on governmental services, govern- of Staff and their top echelon military
United States and leave us wide open to mental programs, even though they may and civilian backup witnesses.
trouble in the Middle East, Africa, and be completely wasteful. In other words, Out of these hearings have come six
everywhere else, it is a sorry day. We the more you waste in the case of gov- volumes involving more than 3,500 pages
certainly should not let this condition ernmental services, the more your GNP of testimony cleared for publication, and
continue. I am no military man, but is. So, the more worthless governmental thousands more pages of top-secret in-
neither is Mr. McNamara. I have sat in services you have the greatest the GNP formation were deleted for either rea-
on a good many defense hearings. I and therefore the more such programs sons of security or as part of the Penta-
started listening to defense problems and they say "we could afford." gon's policy of deleting material for polit-
plans long before the Secretary. I went Mr. Chairman, I say that it is time for ical purposes, but the testimony which
to inly this no exnet . in 1943, but I am curt us to put up and not to shut up, to issue has been permitted to stand open for
enough no ex expert, I do believe I am jI the necessary orders to win for these public inspection still is sufficient to give
would lea leave a these hese military however, decisions that up I boys whom we have over there; to issue some insight into the opinions of the
And from that testi-
to the military,` including those that the the order to clean out these North Viet- military moray, even expeerrtts. iA numerous deletions,
Secretary of Defense has appointed. It is namese from South Vietnam, for we have it is not difficult to discover overwhelm-
my belief that we have reached the point the power with which to do it. And, Mr.
Chairman, when we have done that, we ing arguments against the Navy version
where we have to go all out. I know many of the TFX or, as it has come to be
of my colleagues on the committee will should said to the South Vietnamese, in known, the F-111B.
agree with me on this and I have reason addition to training, expertise, and the Let me quickly capsulize the stormy
to believe many military leaders agree. i tremendous amount of equipment which history of the TFX, Navy version, as it
believe we must go all out to push the we have furnished you, we have given you was originally called. The TFX is now
Vietcong back and to bring a collapse every advantage over your enemies, now, labeled, as I have said, the F-111B, and it
of North Vietnam's ability to support. like Israel, you take it and go from here. is the brainchild of Defense Secretary
Now, as for fear China may get in the Now, Mr. Chairman, no one can win for McNamara who, in 1963, said he wanted
war. We should think of Israel. If we are those who do not have the desire to win- a fighter aircraft of great dependability
afraid of China under the present condi- We should put it up to them. for joint use by the Navy and the Air
tions, would we not be more afraid 10 Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield Force.
years from now when she has had 10 15 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio This concept of commonality would
years in which to progress? When I say [Mr. MINSHALLI. save at least $1 billion, according to Sec-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
retary McNamara. The award of the con- Original design and specifications have Mr. FLOOD. That is all very fine, but
tract for the TFX touched off a contro- been thrown out the window. Future it is only partly so. I did start at them
versy which is raging as of this day, and prototypes will look different and be about the Bomarc missile a number of
4 years later one thing is clear: General different especially as to weight and years ago, but I dropped the ball and the
Dynamics, with headquarters in Fort flying characteristics. gentleman in the well picked up the ball
Worth, Tex., has failed to develop an It is a changed aircraft with a changed and did a lot of research and work on it
aircraft for the Navy at its Long Island, mission. and carried it through to where we now
N.Y., plant which, despite repeated de- American taxpayers are being asked know where it is as of this afternoon.
sign changes, fails to measure up to the to take a chance that the Navy can over- We have information but because of its
minimum standards set by the Navy for come serious problems of overweight classification, we cannot divulge it.
introduction into its inventory. which affect the plane's range, speed, But I can remember using the expres-
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the acceleration, maneuverability, fuel con- sion on the floor at that time in the
gentleman yield? sumption and weapons carrying char- earlier days and in meetings with the
Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentle- acteristics. Air Force people that this missile will
marl. Recently, I gave serious thought to not even be good enough to knock the
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am sure striking out procurement funds for the starlings off the Archives Building in
the gentleman, when he referred to a Navy F-111B, in this appropriation bill. Washington where we are having a lot
single-engined plane, did not actually The situation recalls one that con- of trouble with that problem.
mean a single engine. fronted me several years ago when the Mr. MINSHALL. I remember the gen-
Mr. MINSHALL. I will say to the gen- defense bill came before this Chamber. tleman making that statement-and it
tlelxian, No, I did not. I have on some I am sure that many members of this is just as true today as it was then-if
glasses that do not improve my eyesight defense subcommittee remember the not more so. Only, I might add further
for close work. situation. It was about the Bomarc. that what the
Mr. FLOOD. I would say to the gentle- gentleman mentioned,
man that my glasses do not help, either. At that time I was a relatively new mem- which is classified, secret, bears out what
INSHALL. my glass I presume I will have ber of the defense subcommittee, and the gentleman has said.
Mr. 11at
to go back to my original glasses. I thank even though I have gained a total of 9 Mr. FLOOD. Could the gentleman give
the gentleman for calling that to my years' experience on the subcommittee, us at least the amount of money-would
attention and correcting ng I certainly do not now consider myself a the gentleman consider that classified or
Even these orrndards far the Navy military expert and I do not pretend to would he consider the whole document
veEven t the stand avy be a prophet. But I do remember in 1960, classified?
r F 113 have reduced despite strong pressures, I armed myself Mr. MINSHALL. I would be glad to do
drcations astic toally the
satisfy tom orrig al been ego of those design specifl- who with information that I had received that. I have it in another document here
caiginslly conceived the ducpupose, both in the subcommittee and from pri- that is not classified.
origin ylity approach for our military vate sources on the question of reliability The Bomarc program was subse-
circraft. regarding the Bomarc missile. Like the quently curtailed but not before nearly-
Any dollar savings which might have F-111-B the Bomarc had a bad history in answering my colleague's query-?
been achieved savings
the commonality have of throwing good money after bad after nearly $3 billion tax dollars went down con beet ache been canceled out long ago. repeated tests and repeated failures. In the drain. I
as a Mir. Chairman, I do not come to the whrhic the airifore finally agreed totcut In all candor, I feel that this will be
floor today as a military expert, but I $160 million from the Bomarc funds, the fate of the situation, I1 am But in view ng for F- I.B. of
have listened intently to the experts, and My efforts to eliminate the remaining world scon today I of not funss am
the experts on the record and fre- $200 million for Bomarc were defeated elimination today of these funds. I le-
quently off the record are overwhelm- later on the House floor. giving the Secretary of Defense the bene-
ingly against the Navy F-:111B. Based on At the height of the Bomarc con- fit of every doubt for the sake of the
testimony before our Subcommittee on troversy, Phil G. Goulding, military security of our country. I hope that he
Defense, and statements of the highest affairs reporter for the Cleveland Plain is right.
ranking naval officers, both in the com- Dealer-and I emphasize again-I did As I said earlier, we have had days of
mittee and out of the committee, the not then nor do I now claim to be a mili- testimony on the F-111B. Much of it has
F-111B at its very best is an "iffy" air- tary expert but Phil G. Goulding's views been deleted from the printed hearings
craft. Why is it "iffy"? The plane was on defense matters were considered ex- for security reasons, and I might also say
originally hailed-as having a dual mis- pert enough in 1960 and his opinions stamped "Secret" in many Instances
sion as a fighter-interceptor and as an were so highly valued in this area that merely to protect Pentagon political
aircraft platform for launching attacks he subsequently was tapped by Secre- interests.
against a possible threat in the 1970's. tary McNamara to serve in the post he Let me refer you to just a few excerpts
Some contend that this threat may now fills at the Pentagon as Assistant which escaped the military censor's red
never materialize. Be that as it may, one Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. pencil in this year's printed hearings.
thing is certain: The F-111B's capability In his report on efforts to cut Bo- On page 839, part 2, of our hearings:
to meet such a threat does not exist mare funds, Goulding wrote in the May Secretary Nitze: We do not have a F-111B
today, nor is It certain it ever will exist. 1, 1960, Plain Dealer: which contains in it the changes which we
Economy and efficiency were major Rep. William E. Minshall (R) of Cleveland think are either desirable or necessary to
boasts of Secretary McNamara's much- probably is more responsible than any other give us full confidence in carrier suitability.
touted commonality concept which we man for cuts of hundreds of millions of dol- Yet we are asked to spend more than
were told would save billions of dollars. lars being made in the Bomarc anti-air-
The F-111B originally was estimated at craft missile program . . . Chief supporter $200 million to procure them 12 such
T e F-111 of the third-term Republican has been the aircraft.
per copy, per plane, if you missile itself, which stubbornly refuses to On page 847, part 2, of this year's
will. Today procurement costs, depend- pass its flight tests and which has lagged be- hearings, the following colloquy:
ing on who is giving the figure, the hind its development schedule. If Minshall Mr. Minshall: ... If you had to all
figure averages out to $8 million or $9 is right, and if reductions now recom- over again would you follow the scour dothe
million per plane. American taxpayers mended by the House Appropriations Com- Defense Department has or would the Navy
are being asked to gamble an additional mittee are upheld he will have earned his start over and design its own airplane?
$208.8 million on an aircraft which is $22,500 salary for the next 3,000 years. Admiral McDonald, Chief of Naval Opera-
already more than 2 years behind sched- Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the tions: I wasn't here at that time, Mr. Min-
We. American taxpayers are being asked gentleman yield? shall. If I had been around at that time I
to procure a Navy plane which is still at Mr. MINSHALL. I would only add one might not be here now.... No, I would not
least ,a year and a half from even being thing and that is the gentleman who is have done it that way.
tested on and off a carrier's deck. The now standing, the gentleman from Penn- Admiral rinshau: What would you have none?
initial testing of a changed key prototype sylvania [Mr. FLOOD] is probably just Ad signed a r plane ne giving gI full wonsi have dto
will not be done until November of this responsible, if not more responsible for rosideration to
year. the weight flimitations rom that are imposed upon
helping-to delete these funds than I. operations from an n aircraft carrier.
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE
But they want us to procure 12 such
planes immediately.
Look at page 234, part 4, of the hear-
ings.
This colloquy is with Vice Adm.
Thomas F. Connolly, Deputy Chief of
Naval Air Operations:
Mr. Minshall: ... There are a lot of
things about the F-111B that have not been
proven or checked out. Is that a correct
statement?
Admiral Connolly: That is right.
Mr. Minshall: But you ask in this budget
for 20 aircraft, F. 111B, a bird that has not
been checked out yet?
Admiral Connolly: Of course, Mr. Minshall,
I am up here defending the President's
budget.
And that is the crux of the Navy's
argument when all is said and done.
They are defending the President's
budget-Mr. McNamara's budget, in
reality, and they are being stifled in voic-
ing their criticism.
The current issue of the Saturday Eve-
ning Post, in its excellent article, "Is This
Plane a Billion Dollar Bungle," contains
this significant quote in regard to the
F-111B:
"There is a fear of recriminations," one
highly placed source explains. "Most Navy
people feel we have to go along on this and
keep, our mouths shut or there won't be any
Navy."
Even so, sifting through the volumi-
nous hearings, we find the Navy admit-
ting to a serious lack of pilot visibility
in the F-111B. Admiral Connolly, on page
229, part 4, himself says:
There is a lot of work to do on the air-
plane. There are configuration changes to
make the visibility for the pilot better.
The combat ceiling of the aircraft is
considerably lower than was originally
considered desirable. Dr. Robert A.
Frosch, the Assistant Secretary for the
Navy for Research and Development, ad-
mitted on page 402 of part 3 that the
Navy does not know whether the plane
will flunk or pass all of the tests.
He told our subcommittee:
On the basis of flight tests with the final
configuration aircraft we cannon` expect to
know that until next year.
I asked in subcommittee and I ask
again on the floor today: Why does the
Navy want the F-111B when it is such
a questionable aircraft based on the testi-
mony we have heard in years past? Look
at what Adm. F. H. Michaelis replied to
me under questioning a year ago in our
defense subcommittee-and he was in
charge of the program. The date was
April 19, 1966. I asked him his opinion
of the F-111B.
Admiral Michaelis replied:
It is a very questionable aircraft for car-
rying out the Navy mission ... question-
able to perform the missions for which it
was designed in the Navy.
The Navy's lack of enthusiasm for the
TFX is conspicuous on the record.
I assure you that, off the record, it is
far more emphatic.
I debated long and hard with myself
about jintroducing an amendment today
asking that the, $208.8 million procure-
ment ,money for the 12 F-111B's be elimi-
nated,from the budget.
I know all of the facts about this air-
craft. I feel strongly that it is as big and
perhaps even more costly a mistake than
Bomarc.
If this were 1960, when Bomarc was
the issue, I would not hesitate for a
moment to ask this House to eliminate
procurement funds for the Navy's TFX.
Fortunately there were alternatives to
Bomarc.
But under Defense Secretary McNa-
mara there is no alternative to the F-
111B.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yielde,
Mr. MINSHALL. I will be glad to yield
to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr.
GROSS].
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the gentleman for yielding and I want
to tell him of my appreciation for his
good work on the Appropriations Com-
mittee. Apparently the committee got
better answers from the military than
it did from the civilians in connection
with the F-111 planes. I was most inter-
ested to read on page 839 of the hear-
ings the following colloquy:
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does the Navy have in its
possession now a F-111B that is carrier-suit-
able?
Secretary NITZE. We do not have a F-111B
which contains in it the changes which we
think are either desirable or necessary to give
us full confidence in carrier suitability.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. So the answer is "No."
Secretary NITZE. We have not yet tested it
on the carrier. The contractor claims it
should be in its present configuration, but we
do not believe that.
Mr. MINSHALL. Why not just say "No," Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary NITZE. I want to be precise.
Mr. MINSHALL. "No" is a pretty precise
word.
Secretary BROWN. Some things can be pre-
cise without being accurate.
This appears to be another contribu-
tion to the credibility gap and evasion
that seems to flourish in the Department
of Defense under Secretary McNamara.
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I will
let the gentleman decide that for him-
self. I think the record speaks for itself.
There were some evasive answers on this
subject, many of which do not appear in
the printed record, but I believe this col-
loquy the gentleman has so well pointed
out typifies the response of the Pentagon
to the F-111B program.
Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MINSHALL. I yield to the gentle-
man from Texas.
Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I ap-
preciate the gentleman's remark that in
spite of his reservations on this system, at
this juncture in world affairs, the situa-
tion being what it is, he does not propose
to offer an amendment to further curtail
or cut back or slow down this program. I
feel very strongly that any such an
amendment would be a grave mistake.
The Navy says it needs this plane. It is
not true that, in spite of any of the de-
velopmental problems that have oc-
curred, as might be fully understandable
in any such revolutionary new program,
this program, according to the Navy and
the Air Force, still represents the greatest
single advance in the state of aerial war-
H 7083
fare, wrapped together in a single pack-
age, that we have ever had. This is how
Secretary Nitze and the program project
officers expressed' it to me and it seems
to me that they should know.
Mr. MINSHALL. I believe when the his-
tory is written, we will know more about
that. -
I would like to point out I believe the
F-111B part of the program will be the
most significant failure-if the gentle-
man has been listening to my remarks-
that we have ever had in this country
since the Bomarc boondoggle.
Mr. WRIGHT. I am sure the gentle-
man does not want it to- be a failure.'
Mr. MINSHALL. I certainly do not. I
said in my remarks I hope Secretary
McNamara is right, and that is why I
gave him the benefit of every doubt and
did not move to strike out the funds for
the Navy version of the TFX commonly
known as the F-111B.
Mr. WRIGHT. I believe history will
prove Secretary McNamara right. I,
having had some familiarity with the
program, believe it will be a truly great
success.
Mr. MINSHALL. The gentleman
should know about it. He is from Texas
and he should know.
Mr. WRIGHT. That is exactly correct.
I have had the privilege of following this
program very closely since its inception.
The F-111B, however, is not made in
Texas but in New York. But if I had been
from California or Florida or any other
State, knowing - what I do about this
program, I would be just as strongly
for it.
Mr. MINSHALL. I would like to con-
clude by saying: that despite the fact
that it cannot perform its original mis-
sion, the substitution of existing aircraft
might or might not be feasible.
This is not 1960. The world climate has
changed radically from those cold war
days.
International tensions are near the
breaking point. We are in a hot war in
Vietnam. We have just witnessed an ex-
plosion in the Middle East. The world is
holding its breath until a new trouble
spot erupts.
And, thanks to the omnipotent man in
the Pentagon, we are stuck with the
Navy TFX, at least for the immediate
future.
In deciding not to offer an amend-
ment striking procurement funds for the
F-111B, I can only, echo the words of
the eminent Senator RUSSELL of Geor-
gia:
If (McNamara) is right, we will save a few
dollars.
If he is in error, may a benign Providence
save these United States.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
10 minutes to the gentleman from Ala-
Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr.
Chairman, first I should like to pay my
respects to our distinguished chairman,
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON].
I have served under three chairmen of
the full Appropriations Committee dur-
ing my tenure in office, and I have yet
to see one who in my opinion has done
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
a better job than has the gentleman
from Texas.
This is a big bill. It is the biggest bill
that will come before the Congress-$70,-
295,200,000-to provide the weapons of
war for our servicemen who are today
engaged in what I consider to be one of
the worst wars, if not the worst war, this
country has ever been involved in.
There are high ranking members of
the military who have agreed with that
statement; namely, that this is the worst
war this Nation as ever been engaged in.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, it seems
that only those who have relatives in
the jungles of South Vietnam are con-
cerned about this war. The man on the
street, who has no son or no relative
in South Vietnam-and the Members
know it-has an attitude of "I couldn't
care less."
I want to pay my respects to that little
country of Israel. I hope the leaders of
this country will learn something from
the actions of Israel last week. I believe
the record of that war is one of the most
brilliant chapters ever written in the
history of wars,
A little nation, completely surrounded
by enemies, outnumbered three to one
both In personnel and in equipment, with
full knowledge of the fact that Russia
was threatening to go to the aid of her
enemies, won a war In the unbelievable
time of about 5 days.
It was for one reason, Mr. Chairman.
Israel fought that war to win. Israel car-
ried out the statement made by the late
General MacArthur, that In war there is
no substitute for victory.
Israel cared nothing for the threats
of Russia. Figuratively speaking, she used
the words of Admiral Farragut when she
said, "Damn the Russians, full speed
ahead." And, bless her heart, she came
out victorious because she fought that
war to win.
My great concern, Mr. Chairman, Is
that our people are not fighting the war
to win in South Vietnam. Either one of
two things is happening. Either we are
not fighting to win, or we cannot win. It is
one of the two.
I will say that if this great and power-
ful. Nation, the most affluent nation in
the world, cannot whip a little country
like North Vietnam, which is not as big
as the State of New Jersey-a little na-
tion that has no air force and has no
navy-then we have no business in the
war business, and we ought to beat our
swords into plowshares and declare to the
world that we are a nation of Quakers
and get out of the war business com-
pletely.
Something is going on that I cannot
pinpoint. I know that I have talked to
many, many, many military men.
I have been on this committee for 23
years- I asked a very high-ranking offi-
cer, "Do you have enough equipment?"
His answer was, "Yes, sir." I asked, "Do
you have enough planes?" He said, "Yes,
sir." I asked, "Do you have enough guns
and ammunition?" He said, "Yes, sir."
I asked, "Well, why can you not whip
that; little country of North Vietnam?
What do you need to do it?" His answer
was, "Targets-targets."
Now, you know, if we had sent a team
of experts all over the world looking for
the very worst place to commit our
troops, that team of experts would have
come back with a report that would have
had South Vietnam high on the list as
being the worst place to commit troops.
During those 23 years I have been on
the committee military men have told
me and the committee that in a guerrilla-
type war you cannot hope to win unless
you have a superiority of 10 to 1. We have
nothing like that superiority today in
South Vietnam.
According to the latest reports, we
have approximately 435,000 men in South
Vietnam. General Westmoreland recently
said he needed 200,000 to 250,000 more
troops in South Vietnam. The French
stayed there for 10 years fighting. They
had the best troops in the world down
there, members of the Foreign Legion.
The French had 600,000 troops in South
Vietnam. Did they win? The answer is
no. I do not believe you can win a land
war in Southeast Asia. You must have a
superiority of 10 -to 1. One man in the
jungle with a rifle is worth 10 men out
in front of him.
My prediction here is that If this war
continues to be fought as it has been
for the last 6 years, we will be there at
least another 20 years. To say that this
great Nation is pinned down in South
Vietnam is an understatement. We are
pinned down by a little nation that will
not rate 75th in the family of nations.
That little nation today has the most
powerful, the most affluent nation in the
world pinned down. And I say that Is an
understatement.
We can win if we fight to win, in my
humble opinion. I think the most cou-
rageous decision ever made in the history
of this Nation was made by former Presi-
dent Harry Truman when he ordered the
use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima. He
served notice on the Japanese Govern-
ment, "You surrender within 3 days
or expect further bombings." Hearing
nothing from the Japanese on the third
day the second bomb fell on Nagasaki,
and the war ended, and literally thou-
sands of lives were saved, because we had
planned for the first week in November
of 1945 what would have been the blood-
iest invasion in the history of the world.
Maybe some of you men were in the Pa-
cific at that time waiting for the invasion
onto the main islands of Japan the first
week in November of 1945. The coura-
geous action of Harry Truman brought
that cruel World War II to an end. That
second bomb which fell on Nagasaki was
the last bomb that we had in our arsenal.
We could not have gotten additional
bombs until March or June of 1946.
I think we can win this war if we fight
to win, but if we continue going as we
have for the last 6 years, we will never
win. I told the Secretary of Defense when
he was before the committee, we have to
get tough in order to win this war. Power
is the only thing that the Communists
understand. I remember when I served
as district attorney in Birmingham, Ala.,
an old police officer told me, "You must
never pull a gun on a man unless you are
ready to kill him." The same advice is
good for a nation that commits troops to
battle. Never send troops into battle un-
less you are willing to back them up with
every resource at your command. And,
not to do that for those kids in South
Vietnam is a criminal shame and an in-
justice.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Alabama has expired.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I yield the
gentleman from Alabama 2 additional
minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
Alabama is recognized for 2 additional
minutes.
Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr.
Chairman, I told the Secretary, "Mr.
Secretary, let us win this war. The people
are getting restless. Our casualty lists
are going up now to the point where the
number killed runs anywhere from 250
to 300 a week. Now, let us pick up that
telephone and call those people in Hanoi
and tell them we will give them 30 days
to get out of South Vietnam, and if you
are not out within 30 days, then we are
going to bring you to your knees. We
think we can do it with conventional
weapons but, frankly, I would have no
compunctions about using the big weapon
to bring this war to an end and thus save
the lives of young Americans."
Mr. Chairman, there are those who say
that it might jeopardize the lives of the
people in this country. So what? This is
war. And, we all should share the burden,
And I am thinking of that kid in the
snake-infested, malaria-infested, sniper--
infested jungle. That little fellow's life Is
in danger 24 hours a day. I hope that we
can follow the courage of Israel and
Harry Truman and bring this nasty, dirty
war to an early conclusion.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield
15 minutes to the distinguished gentle-
man from Ohio, the ranking minority
member of the full Committee on Appro-?
priations [Mr. Bow].
(Mr. BOW asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
what my distinguished friend, the
gentleman from Alabama [Mr. Ax-.
DREWS], had to say about what happened
in Israel, because what I am going to
speak about today took place over there,
since I think that war-and I believe
the gentleman from Alabama would per-?
haps agree-was won by civilian soldiers,
their reserve components-a great many
of them-rather than the Regular Army
units over there.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk
a little about the realinement of the
Guard and the realinement of our Re-
serve combat units.
Mr. Chairman, I was very much dis-
turbed when I learned that the Penta-
gon had decided to wipe out 15 National
Guard divisions and a number of Reserve
units and set up eight divisions and ab-
sorb many of those that were being taken
over.
Mr. Chairman, I think every member
of this Committee has in the past had
great pride in the Guard units of their
respective States. I know I have great
pride in the great 37th Division of the
State of Ohio.
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Mr. Chairman, in 1963 four Guard
units were deactivated, the primary
reason being given for the elimination
of these divisions was the alleged in-
efficiency resulting when command was
divided.
Now, Mr. Chairman, that is exactly
what they are doing in this reorganiza-
tion plan. They are dividing the com-
mand. They are taking these divisions
and setting up brigades and assigning
many of the brigades of your States to
other States.
Now, all of this was done without the
consent or the knowledge of the Con-
gress of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, permit me to cite to the
Members of the Committee section 104
of the United States Code which states
that no change in the branch, organiza-
tion, or allotment of a unit located en-
tirely within a State may be made
without the approval of its Governor.
Section 104(c), goes on to say:
To secure a force, the units of which
when combined w4l1 form complete higher
tactical units, the President may designate
the units of thg",National Guard, by branch
of the Army or organization of the Air Force,
to be aintained Jn each State and Terri-
tory, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, and the
Distrlc of. Colupihia. However, no. change
in the ,~ra icTi organization, or allotment of
a unit.,l,ocated en~I rely within. a State may
be made without the approval of its governor.
The plan was 4made by the Pentagon
was taken up with the adjutants general
of the ' various States in Indianapolis a
few, weeks ago prior to its being con-
sidered; by any committee of this Con-
gress. I believe after they had made their
plan and met with the adjutants general
they took it to one of the subcommittees
of the Committee on Armed Services but
not to the Congress.
I have bone advised they take great
pride over at the Pentagon in the fact
that nine Governors have already ap-
proved of this plan after some weeks,
nine out of A. I know at least one Gov-
ernor who has vetoed the plan. __
What I am disturbed about is how
they can go ahead in the executive
branch of the Government and take
away these units from the States with-
out any consideration of the Congress. I
say to you that the Congress has the
authority, as the law provides, to take
some part In the determination of the
setup of these organizations.
I have been greatly tempted to offer
an amendment to this' bill which would
limit and prohibit the Defense Depart-
ment from making these transfers. It
could be done with a limitation. How-
ever, the distinguished gentleman from
Florida [Mr. SIKES] offered an amend-
ment to the report. He accepted one
amendment which I offered to his report.
And I call your attention to that on
page 7 under realinement of Army Re-
serve components, in which is said:
The Committee has considerable misgiv-
ings over the prospect of disbanding combat
units of the Reserve Components in a time
of crisis. The, proposal for a major realign-
And v1 go on to say why. Then we
say In the report and direct, that the
proposed realinement be deferred pend-
ing such time as formal legislative ex-
pression can be made in the matter."
It seems to me, when a Committee
on Appropriations directs them to with-
hold until there is legislative authority,
that the Defense Department should ac-
cept that direction. And with the state-
ment made here on the floor by the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS], who said
the other body is going to consider H.R.
2, and that he was opposed to the re-
alinement and the taking down of these
divisions, I am with some reluctance go-
ing to withhold my limitation amend-
ment.
Mr. SIRES, Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. SIKES, Mr. Chairman, the gentle-
man should be commended for his in-
terest in this important subject. I am
sure he would want me to call attention
at this point to the fact that the action
of the Committee on Appropriations in
directing that this reorganization not be
affected pending further action by the
Congress was unanimous on the part of
a 51-member committee and, that only
In deference to the fact that ours is an
appropriation committee and not a leg-
islative compnittee, was the' language
placed in-the report rather than written
into the bill as a binding limitation.
Mr. BOW. The gentleman is correct.
I may say to the gentleman I was pre-
pared at that time to offer the limitation
in the committee, but the `gentleman's
language as amended in the report
caused me to withhold the offering of
the amendment. I am going to withhold
the amendment today, on the basis that
the Defense Department will take cog-
nizance of this discussion and of the
language in the report, until 'H.R. 2 is
acted on by the other body and comes
out of conference and until there has
been a conference on this bill.
Mr. LIPSCOMB, Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. I want to join the dis-
tinguished gentleman from Ohio in his
remarks and support him one hundred
percent. I believe that with the gentle-
man from Ohio [Mr.` Bowl laying this
on the record, It will help the Depart-
ment of Defense to realize that the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, by the lan-
guage in the report, means exactly what
it says.
H 7085
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to read an article which appeared
in the Cleveland Press concerning the
37th Division which my good friend, the
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Bow] has
mentioned.
The article is as follows:
TAPS FOR THE 37TH?
Unless the order is reversed, Ohio's proud
37th Infantry Division is about to slip into
history after having helped make it for a
half century.
The death warrant for the Buckeye corps.
Identified by its round red and white shoul-
der patch, was handed down yesterday when
the Defense Department announced its re-
tirement after maneuvers this summer. It is
part of the Pentagon's streamlining program
for the Army National Guard.
For Ohio National Guard officials, the news
was not surprising. More than two years ago
the Pentagon announced its modernization
intention, and many observers expected the
37th to be demobilized then.
Writing at that time of the 37th's impend-
ing retirement, Press Military Editor Robert
Stafford said: "It has a record of gallantry
in combat unmatched by any other National
Guard division, of conduct above and beyond
the call of duty in three wars, and of patrio-
tic response to any call to service in peace
as well as war."
Stafford pointed out that the 37th's record
is all the more impressive because it was com-
piled by "weekend warriors"-the civilian-
soldiers suddenly called to fighting duty.
They became professionals fast, though, as
the Germans can testify in World War I
(Meuse-Argonne front) and the Japanese in
World War II (Bougainville).
Eight members of the 37th have won
Medals of Honor. One of them was Pvt.
Rodger Young whose heroism was memorial-
ized in the famous "Ballad of Rodger Young."
The fighting 37th, 1917-1967. Ohio-and
the nation-can be proud.
Mr. BOW. I appreciate the gentle-
man's remarks and am glad that he has
read this statement from the Cleveland
Press into the RECORD.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BOW. As always I am delighted to
yield to my good friend, the gentleman
from Wisconsin.
Mr. LAIRD. I thank my distinguished
friend, the gentleman from Ohio, for
yielding to me at this time.
I know of my colleague's long interest
in the National Guard and the record of
the State of Ohio Guard units. I too come
from a State that has a long and dis-
tinguished history with our 32d Division
during World War I, in World War II,
and again during the Berlin crisis. It
was one of two National Guard divisions
that were called up by President Ken-
nedy. It was combat ready in a very short
period of time.
I think it is important that the lan-
guage suggested by the gentleman from
Florida and the gentleman from Ohio
and contained in this report be called
to the attention of every Member of this
Committee.
I am confident that the Department
of Defense will honor this language and
that a congressional committee will be
given an opportunity to have a thorough
review in connection with the bill, H.R.
2, which is currently before the other
body.
I have been assured that in the case
of Wisconsin our National Guard unit
I believe It is incumbent upon the De-
partment of Defense to withhold this re-
alinement until it gets some good and
adequate exp?essions of the Congress of
the United States as to just what should
be done and how it should be done.
Therefore, I commend the gentleman in
the well for his remarks and offer him
my support.
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BOW. I am delighted to yield to my
colleague, the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. MINSHALI,. Mr. Chairman, my
colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, as
usual has made an outstanding state-
ment regarding the realinement of the
-National Guard and the Reserve units
throughout the country. He is certainly
to be commended and I join him in every-
thing that he has said.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
can maintain some identity of its own by
probably changing its name from the
"32d Division" to the "32d Brigade." It
will 'be an independent brigade.
I think it is important that this be
thoroughly reviewed by the legislative
committees of both the House and the
Senate and that the language sponsored
by the gentleman from Florida and the
gentleman from Ohio does just this. I
think they have made a valuable con-
tribution to this report and to the con-
sideration of this bill, and I commend
them. for their intrest and the job that
they have done in behalf of the National
Guard and the Reserve.
Mr. BOW. I thank my colleague, the
-gentleman from Wisconsin.
May I say In addition, that under the
change suggested of calling the division
a brigade rather than a division, it would
no longer be a complete unit and the plan
contemplates the elimination of major
generals and a couple of brigadiers and
at least eight colonels. In other words,
the divisions will be eliminated if they
are changed to brigades.
These men have been trained for com-
mand. And this is the important element.
If you are going to keep manpower, this
is important. But you are going to have
stretcher bearers, cooks, bakers, and
others to fill it up. You will take from
the top echelon all these combat-ready
divisions.
Mr. LAIRD. Of the Reserve. The gen-
tleman is talking about the Reserve. The
National Guard brigade will be a combat
brigade.
Mr. BOW. But you are going to lose
your top officers. You are going to lose
eight colonels in that division and you
are not going to have a complete unit.
You are not going to have artillery sup-
port. I recognize the brigade as one thing.
Some of these brigades will be under the
command of other States and National
Guard units.
I should like to make one other state-
ment and then I shall be glad to yield to
both of my friends who would like me
to yield. I would like to point out why
I believe Congress has a great stake in
this. Does the Congress have anything
to do with it, or is it Mr. McNamara's
computers that can do all of these
things?
I would like to refer to the Constitution
of the United States, which many of us
forget to read at times. What does the
Constitution have to say about this?
In'article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution there appears the following lan-
guage, giving powers to Congress. The
Congress has the power-
To raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
That is the responsibility of Congress.
Continuing to read:
To provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress In-
surrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in
the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment
of the Officers, and the Authority of train-
ing the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress;-
Not by the Secretary of Defense.
There are four, five, or six paragraphs
in the Constitution outlining the author-
ity of the Congress.
Some of you will say to me, "The Pres-
ident is the Commander in Chief."
That is correct. Let us turn to the lan-
guage of the Constitution that gives him
his authority, after reading' these para-
graphs on the authority of the Congress
in this matter. Under the Constitution,
which we have taken an oath to support
and defend, article II, section 3, states:
The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United
States.
He is the Commander in Chief. He will
decide where we are going to bomb and
to send troops after we raise them, after
we get up the organization of them. That
is our responsibility, not the computers
in the Pentagon.
So I urge my friends that if we get into
this question in H.R. 2, where if we find
they have violated this direction in the
committee report, the Congress will ac-
cept its responsibility under the Consti-
tution and see to it that these units are
not destroyed.
I would like to speak a little more about
the units, but first I yield to my friend
from Pennsylvania.
Mr. FLOOD. I thank the gentleman.
As the gentleman knows, some of us have
been at this for a number of years. I
compliment the gentleman on his posi-
tion, especially his reference to the Con-
stitution. Of course, my leader on this
subject is the distinguished gentleman
from Florida, both on the Reserve and
the Guard. I rise only to join with my
friend, the gentleman from Wisconsin
[Mr. LAIRD]. I am from Pennsylvania. Of
course, everyone has heard of the 28th
Division. You do not have to go beyond
that.
Mr. BOW. I might say to the gentle-
man that I congratulate him. The 28th
Infantry Division is going to stay in ex-
istence. It .is not one of the 15 divisions
that have been taken away. But the 28th
Infantry Division of Pennsylvania will
include a Pennsylvania brigade, a Mary-
land brigade and a Virginia brigade.
So the great old Pennsylvania division
of the hometown boys is now going to
be infiltrated.
Mr. FLOOD. Except that a number
of years agomy grandfather hadtrouble
with some of those fellows at Gettys-
burg, and they found that if you cannot
lick them, you join them.
Mr. BOW. The gentleman is correct,
and it raises a rather interesting ques-
tion about how they are going to get
along with each other.
Mr. FLOOD. Oh, just like we do here.
Mr. BOW. Fine.
Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BOW. I yield to the gentleman
from Indiana [Mr. BRAY].
Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I congrat-
ulate the committee for making this
very fine effort, which we hope will be
successful, to save the destruction of the
Guard and Reserves. I read very care-
fully the section of the report entitled
"Realinement of Army Reserve Compo-
nents," which is on page 7 of the report.
I do want to say that it does express the
intent of Congress, that the Secretary
of Defense go no further in destruction
of Guard Reserves until Congress has the
time and the opportunity to do some-
thing about the matter.
I want also to mention that for the
last 6 years there have been organiza-
tions, reorganizations, and attempted re-
organizations and rumors of reorganiza-
tions, each of which would make the
Guard and Reserves a weaker and less
effective force.
I do want to say we must do every-
thing we possibly can to save and
strengthen the Guard and the Reserve.
The constant reorganization, the con-
stant threat of reorganization, is destruc-
tive of the morale of any unit. That is
academic. The fact that the Guard and
the Reserve have been able to maintain
their morale and their willingness to per-
form-in spite of the tremendous handi-
cap that has been placed upon them by
this constant changing policy and the
constant attempt to reduce and reorga-
nize and reorganize, which has been
going on now for 6 years-is very com-
mendatory of the officers and men of
those services.
Also I want to mention here an article
in the New York Times of June 13, 1967,
by Charles Mohr, entitled "Rapid Mo-
bilization of Reservists a Key Factor in
Israel Victory." The article is as follows:
RAPID MOBILIZATION or RESERVES A KEY
FACTOR IN ISRAEL VICTORY
(By Charles Mohr)
BANIYAS, SYRIA, June 12.-The Israeli Army
is a highly professional striking force but it
is composed overwhelmingly of amateurs.
Israel's military reserve and mobilization
system, a model of efficiency, constituted one
of the major factors in the quick victory
achieved against the Arabs.
The army that destroyed six Egyptian divi-
sions in the desert, conquered Jerusalem and
dislodged the Syrian Army from fortified hill
positions did not exist physically four weeks
ago. It existed in the card indexes of the
offices of reserve units in every Israeli town
and city. Some of the best units were com-
bat-ready only twelve hours after comman-
deered taxis began delivering call-up notices
tO Israeli homes, mostly on the evening of
May 20. Even "sloppy" units were ready
within 48 hours.
It is this reserve-mobilization system that
gives Israel a highly responsive striking force
without imposing on her the burden of sup-
porting a large regular army. It is a volunteer
army in a real sense. During the present
crisis some reserve units had a 108 per cent
response to the call-up as overage and dis-
charged reservists tried to get back into com-
bat units.
There were almost no evasions of the call-
up orders. "Next to Nasser," said a lieutenant
colonel, "our biggest obstable to success was
people arguing with us and trying to get in
the action."
LIFE ENDS AT 45
"I don't know about other countries," said
another officer, "but in Israel the male cli-
macteric comes at 45 when you must leave
the active reserves. We say life ends at 45."
For the ingenious, however, there are ways
to see action after 45 and they were eagerly
taken advantage of. Part of the Israeli war
plan is to mobilize a large number of civilian
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
vehicles. The owners of such vehicles have with the Commander of the Israel Army,
the right to volunteer to drive them even if he might receive some good advice as to
overage, and most owners did so almost joy-
ously.
There is universal conscription for both
boys and girls, the former serving 30 months
and the latter 20 months, usually at about
age 18.
These conscripts spend their entire active
service in training because the Israeli staff
believes that only a superbly trained army
can protect the country. No time is wasted
on garrison duty or in occupying static de-
fense posts. Normally a special border police
force guards the nation's frontiers.
IMGIILAR r'' ORCE IS SMALL
Thus the conscripts in service are not real-
ly a part of the "regular" army, although
the description is usually applied to them.
The true regulars consist only of a small
group of officers of the rank of captain and
above and senior noncommissioned officers=
a nucleus around which the army is built
at full mobilization.
After national service training men are
assigned to reserve units and remain in them
until age 45. Those reservists keep basic per-
sonnel equipment, such as fatigue uniforms,
webbing boots, at home.
Like most democratic nations, Israel has
a grumbler's army in peacetime, and a 90
percent response to annual training call-ups
is considered good.
"Every device of the human imagination
is used to avoid the training call-ups," an
officer said, "and although by law we are
allowed to call men up for 30 days each year,
political pressures mean that most men get
less than a week's training each year, which
is not enough.
"But when war comes, all this changes and
the . same men who have fought for exemp-
tions fight to get back in."
The call-up notices are usually delivered
at night or in the evening by taxi drivers
and other messengers because, as one staff
officer says, "They are at home then and
that is when you catch your fish."
One Haifa civilian who fought his way
to this Syrian town described it this way:
"I came home from a drive with my wife
and children and there it was-greetings!"
The summoned reservist makes his own
way to the armory or storehouse of his unit,
where he, is issued weapons, ammunition
and other equipment. None of this is as
smooth or easy as it may sound for the small
number of regulars who must maintain
these stores in a state of readiness.
"Even the flashlight issued to a company
commander must be filled with fresh bat-
teries," said one regular.
Ideally, the plan is that every tank and
jeep should be able to start at a touch of
the ignition button. Fuel is regularly
changed, batteries are checked and radiators
are kept flushed.
The military system is built around a
philosophy that is almost totally offensive
and does not anticipate prolonged defense.
Israel's military doctrine is essentially to at-
tack, but first, to plan for the attack.
On the first day of the war, 25 Arab air-
fields were bombed and strafed, some re-
peatedly, within three hours. On the Syrian
front, assault infantry units knew far in ad-
vance exactly how they would tackle Syria
strongpoints.
Though discipline sometimes seems in-
formal, that does not mean it is lax. Instant
and determined response to combat orders
is expected and officers who let an attack bog
down may be removed almost immediately
strengthening of the Guard and Re-
serves instead of weakening them.
Mr. BOW. Mr. Chairman, I thank the
gentleman.
In conclusion, I would like to say that
in World War I the Guard units of the
various States were immediately called
into action and the Guard units served
admirably and with great distinction
throughout that world war. Our 37th
was one of those.
Then came World War II, and one of
the first divisions activated was the 37th
Division of Ohio. It made the long trek
back to the Philippines and the return
of the Pacific and South Pacific to vic-
tory. It was my great honor to be with
them, not as a member of the division,
but as a war correspondent with the 37th
Division, from the landing at Lingayen
through the trip down into Manila,
through the liberation. of Manila, and
the liberation of Baguio, through the
battles up over Balate Pass and down
into the Cagayan Val4ey. I saw this great
division operate. May I say it is one of
the very few divisions that left this coun-
try early in the war with Maj. Gen. Rob-
ert S. Beightler, commanding-one of
our great commanding officers. And
after Bougainville and Guadalcanal and
going up through the Pacific, it returned
victorious after the war, with Major
General Beightler still commanding the
division.
Very few divisions in World War II
went out with their original commanders
and came back with them.
These units have been depended upon
for the preservation of our freedom over
the years. They have been ignored and
now are being decapitated. Fifteen
States are going to lose these great
divisions.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that the De-
fense Department will pay heed to this
language in the report and that it will
not be necessary again to discuss this
question until the House has had an op-
portunity, with the Senate, to bring in
legislation which will protect these fine
units.
Mr. Chairman, the plan contemplates
the elimination of one major-general
officer-and eight-colonel or lieutenant
colonel-subordinate commands within
each combat division. The headquarters
scheduled for deactivation are integrated
units possessing the required tactical,
logistical, and administrative capabilities
for command and control of their sub-
ordinate units. Long years of training
and close coordination is necessary to
train these cohesive command and staff
entities. There appears to be no evidence
of any replacement for these control
headquarters which would retain the
years of experience and close coordina-
tion.
The proposed plan will require such a
multitude of headquarters to clear com-
from command. mand and control matters that efficiency
This a,;ticle veryiclearly shows that will be lost. For example, the 38th In-
the reserves of Israel were most ef- fantry Division based in Indiana has
fective. Perhaps if the Secretary of De- brigades in Ohio and Michigan. Three
fense would discuss the use made of Governors, three adjutants general,
reserves in the recent Egypt-Israel war three State headquarters detachments,
H 7087
and two U.S. Army areas will become in-
volved in all actions of the 38th Division.
Command and control of a combat
division requires a highly trained and
effective team of commanders and staff
members at all levels. The higher the
level of command the more complex and
demanding the mission becomes. Confi-
dence is gained through experience and
frequent contacts between all levels of
command and staff. The requirement to
coordinate all matters with such a mul-
titude of higher headquarters is un-
realistic.
An infantry division deactivated, and
replaced with an infantry brigade con-
sisting of a headquarters and three in-
fantry battalions represents a loss of 927
officers, ranging in grade from second
lieutenant to major general, and the
years of experience represented by their
total commissioned service.
Based on commissioned service, and
only minimum times in each grade, the
officer personnel of an infantry division
represent a minimum of 4,113 years of
military experience.
Mr. Chairman, may I refer to the
proven competency of National Guard
officers.
National Guard officers have proven
efficiency through all periods of service.
The following extracts from Jim Dan
Hill's book "The Minute Man in Peace
and War" shows various comparisons
between Regular Army and National
Guard officers during World War II.
At the time of induction in 1940 there
were 21 major generals in the Regular
Army and 21 major generals in the Na-
tional Guard. as of January 1, 1945, five,
or 23 percent, of the Regular Army major
generals were still in the service and that
nine, or 42 percent of National Guard
major generals were still in the service.
At the time of induction in 1940 there
were 45 brigadier generals in the Regu-
lar Army and 74 brigadier generals in the
National Guard. As of January 1, 1945, 26
or 57.8 percent. of the Regular Army
brigadier generals were still in the serv-
ice. As of June 30, 1945, 43, or 58.1 per-
cent, of the National Guard brigadier
generals were still in the service.
At the time of induction in 1940 there
were 704 colonels in the Regular Army
and 273 colonels in the National Guard.
As of January 1, 1945, 273, or 39 percent
of the Regular Army colonels were still
in the service, and that 148, or 54 per-
cent of the National Guard colonels were
still in the service.
Of the 1,100 lieutenant colonels In-
ducted in 1940, 883 were still in the serv-
ice at the end of the war.
Of the 1,379 majors inducted in 1940,
1,129 .were still in the service at the end
of the war. -
Of the 14,604 company grade officers
inducted in 1940, 12,405 were still in the
service at the end of the war.
Additionally, 3,168 enlisted men held
reserve officer commissions and were
commissioned when inducted in 1940. Of
these, 2,686 were still in the service at
the end of the war.
More than 75,000 National Guardsmen
received commissions through the officer
candidate school program during World
War U.
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It is of particular significance that the
losses expressed in the various grades
were results of all factors, from losses in
combat to physical disability, but that
the age in grade policy established just
before Pearl Harbor caused more separa-
tions than any other single cause.
Let us consider the impact of reorgani-
zation on unit efficiency.
The redesignation of units will in many
instances, involve a change of branch
which results in changes in mission, or-
ganizational structure, equipment re-
quirements, personnel, and required
skills.
This so-called "streamlining," while
effectively accomplished on paper, rend-
ers redesignated units relatively inef-
fective during the transition period re-
quired to completely effect the change
due to the following:
First. Negates existing training results,
and, generates a requirement for the de-
velopment of new training programs.
Second. Time required for procure-
ment of new and/or different equipment.
Third. Lack of qualified officer and
noncommissioned officer personnel in the
new branch.
Fourth. Loss of time and continuity as
a result of adjustments in command
structure.
Fifth. Increased administrative re-
quirements-administrative actions, rec-
ords, supply transactions, and so forth.
Sixth. Effect on morale.
Let us consider also the loss of hard
skills as a result of deactivation of divi-
sions.
Inasmuch as the retention and place-
merit of personnel in the National Guard
is predicated on authorizations con-
tained in tables of organization and
equipment, the deactivation of divisions
and their replacement with brigades will
render hard skilled and professionally
qualified personnel in the following cate-
gories as excess: Fixed- and rotary-
winged aviators; medical and dental
professional personnel; legal profes-
sional personnel; signal, engineer, and
logistical career field personnel; and,
maintenance personnel.
It is noted that all artillery with the
divisions is eliminated without an ap-
parent replacement. With five artillery
battalions to be lost in each division this
is an elimination of 75 battalions.
Military doctrine as taught in the U.S.
Artillery and Missile School requires the
assignment of minimum necessary artil-
lery to the combat division. It is axio-
matic that additional artillery must be
available to the divisions from corps and
Army.
No provision appears to have been
made in the troop list for artillery to
reinforce that contained organic to a
combat division.
Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BOW. I am delighted to yield to
my colleague.
(Mr. MYERS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. MYERS. Mr. Chairman, it is with
deep concern that I discuss with you,
my colleagues of the House of Repre-
sentatives, a proposal recently an-
nounced by the Defense Department to
reorganize again the Reserve components
of the Army.
The Secretary of Defense acknowl-
edged in his annual posture statement
on the military forces that he could not
merge the Army Reserve into the Na-
tional Guard. The Congress, following
months of investigation in depth and
extensive hearings, has twice rejected
the Defense Department's proposal to
merge the Army Reserve into the Na-
tional Guard, and has established the
requirement for maintenance of sepa-
rate components in the appropriations
bills and the Reserve bill of rights which
has been passed by the House of Repre-
senatives in this session as H.R. 2.
In December 1965, the Secretary of
Defense ordered 748 Army Reserve units
inactivated, saying this was necessary
in order to eliminate the low-priority
units. He declared these low-priority
units were not needed in the Army's
contingency plans.
All six combat divisions of the Army
Reserve were inactivated and approxi-
mately 55,000 well-trained Army reserv-
ists were affected in the 748 units elimi-
nated.
These inactivations were ordered by
the Secretary of Defense in direct defi-
ance of the expressed wish of the Con-
gress that the action shculd not be car-
ried out until the Congress had an op-
portunity to review the proposed unit
inactivations.
The Defense Department said the in-
activations had to be completed by De-
cember 31, 1965, in order to eliminate
units that were low priority and were
not needed under the contingency plans.
It hastened to accomplish the destruc-
tion before the Congress came back into
session in January.
At the same time, it should be noted
that there were twice as many low
priority units in the National Guard,
also presumably not part of the con-
tingency plans, but the Guard's units
have not been touched.
I would not in any way cast a reflec-
tion on the i ne dedication and service
of the officers and men of the National
Guard. However, I cannot but wonder
at the Defense Department's deliberate
and persistent moves in these last 24
months to destroy the Army Reserve in
violation of the desires of Congress.
The Secretary of Defense has further
said in his posture statement of this
year that, since the Congress has not
approved the merger of the Army Re-
serve Into the National Guard, he was
directing the Secretary of the Army to
find other ways of accomplishing the
same objectives. In other words, under
orders from the Secretary of Defense,
the Army must find ways to reorganize
the Reserve into the Guard and thus to
circumvent the will of the Congress.
The words are not the same, but the
intent is clear.
And so the Army has now prepared
this new reorganization proposal which
should be reviewed with that background
in mind.
I am informed that this reorganiza-
tion proposal includes the following:
First. Inactivating all combat and
combat service support units in the Army
Reserve, This includes four high priority,
immediate ready brigades that are part
of the required contingency force struc-
ture.
Second. A reduction of the Army Re-
serve's strength to 240,000, which is 20,-
000 below the minimum strength of not
less than 260,000 mandated for the Army
Reserve by the Congress.
Third. Establish the strength of the
Guard at 400,000.
Fourth. Eliminate the 15 low-priority
Guard divisions and convert them to bri-
gades.
The effects of this reorganizaton-
which is nothing more than a further
piecemeal implementation of the merg-
er-are far reaching with a heavy im-
pact of Reserve component readiness
that the casual announcement of the De-
fense Department does not reveal or in-
dicate.
Consider these untold facts:
First. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not
recommend or approve a reduction on
the Reserve components below 660,000--
400,000 for the Guard and 260,000 for
the Army Reserve. I am told-their recom-
mendations for the Reserve components
are said to exceed 660,000.
Second. The four-star commanding
general of the U.S. Continental Army
Command which is responsible for train-
ing and preparing for combat all the
units going to Vietnam has not concurred
with the plan because of the loss of unit
readiness it would cause.
Third. The chief, Army Reserve, a man
of 40 years' experience in the National
Guard, Regular Army, and the last 17
years in the Army Reserve, does not con-
cur with the plan. The chief, Army Re-
serve, is responsible for the personnel,
training, and equipping of the entire
Army Reserve.
Fourth. The Army staff is reported in
disagreement on the proposal, even
though the matter is one of special inter-
est to the Secretary of Defense per-
sonally and a proposal which the Regular
Army has been "expected" as "good
soldiers" to support.
This is evidenced by the fact that
when the Section 5 Committee voted on
the plan that vote "approved" the plan
by a slender margin of only one vote--
11 to 10.
In the committee there are seven Na-
tional Guard members who may be pre-
sumed to have voted for the proposal.
The seven Army Reserve members were
100 percent a#-ainst it. This left the seven
Regular Army general, members of the
Army staff agencies divided 4 to 3 on the
proposal.
Fifth. The General Staff Committee on
Army Reserve, made up of seven Regular
Army members and seven Army Reserve
members voted 9 to 5 against the pro-
posal. They also voted to keep combat
units in the Army Reserve and to main-
tain an average strength in the Army
Reserve of not less than 260,000.
Sixth. More than JO0 well-trained, Im-
mediate Ready Army Reserve units with
a strength of almost 40,000 would be in.-
activated under the plan, only to turn
about and immediately reactivate new
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identical units in the Guard, or upgrade,
train and equip low priority Guard units
in order for them to reach the already
existing immediate ready standards of
the Army Reserve units that would be
inactivated.
Seventh. All units of the Army Reserve
are now Immediate Ready, high priority
units that are part of the contingency
plan requirements.
Eighth. The Guard's structure now in-
eludes more than 100,000 in the low pri-
ority category, not part of contingency
requirements. Yet, the Pentagon is push-
ing for the inactivation of the Army Re-
serve's high priority units that are essen-
tial to the contingency plan.
Ninth. In the Army Reserve alone, tre-
mendous turbulence would result from
this proposed reorganization. It would
disrupt more than one-third of the en-
tire Army Reserve and many thousands
of dedicated, trained men will be left
with no units in which to train.
The Congress traditionally has sup-
ported the needs of the national defense
and the Nation's security has been re-
garded above all else. The element of
cost has been a secondary consideration.
However, we cannot overlook the cost
to the taxpayer, especially when a pro-
posal is submitted which has apparently
subordinated real military requirements
and the needs of the national defense
to other considerations of questionable
nature. '
This reorganization would destroy
well-trained units of the Army Reserve
that are needed in our contingency plans
only to activate or build up other similar
or identical units in the Guard.
The trained officers and men of
these Army Reserve units would, for the
most part, be lost, just as they were in
December 1965 when the previous large
scale Reserve inactivations took place.
These units of the Army Reserve and
their personnel have been trained and
equipped at, great expense and now we
are to be asked to condone their in-
activation only to turn around and
activate the same type units in the
Guard, or to take low priority units in
the Guard and bring them up to the
standards of the already existing Army
Reserve units being inactivated.
This defies understanding.
There seems to be no real military
justification for the plan.
We know from the hard lessons of the
1965 inactivations of the 748 Army Re-
serve units that their personnel will not
volunteer for service in the Guard. When
those units were inactivated, the end re-
sult was that only about 2 percent of
the Army reservists volunteered for serv-
ice in the,Guard.,, The rest ofthose 55,-
000 reservists were largely lost.
The Army Reserve, in 1965, had six
combat divisions, all with outstanding
World War II records. Some of these in
1965 had reached an advanced state of
training that included company, level
Army training tests and live fire exer-
cises with close-in, overhead artillery and
air support.
It wast this point the Secretary of
Defense, with the glib comment that
their people would be absorbed and
trained in other needed units, proceeded
to inactivate these divisions.
Many of those officers and men of the
inactivated units have found no other
units in which to train. For a while, a
large number were carried as over-
strength in units where they had no
specific assignments or requirement. As
of now, almost the entire 55,000 have
been lost.
Some few officers and men are contin-
uing to hold onto reinforcement training
units which they formed after the in-
activations, and which are meeting with
no pay and almost no support from the
Army. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
promised these RTTJ's would receive
support, but it is noted that there is no
funding for such support in the 1968
budget.
I have often thought, especially in
light of recent ominous international
developments, that we may wake up one
day and wish we had those six fine Army
Reserve divisions. In fact, if newspaper
reports are correct, we are sending men
and units into battle today who are less
well- trained than the units and men af-
fected by the 1965 inactivations and who
also may have had less training than
those units and men the Secretary of De-
fense is now proposing to eliminate
from the Army Reserves.
This new plan becomes more incon-
sistent when you consider that the De-
fense Department is about to call up
some 31,000 Army Reservists as "pun-
ishment" for not participating in the
Reserve program. The public has not
been told that the majority of these men
cannot participate because there are no
units left in their areas.
A callup of Reserves if needed for
the defense of our country, is one thing.
But to "punish" these men when they
are caught in a situation beyond their
control that was created by the Penta-
gon itself is a highly questionable ac-
tion.
Yet, at this moment the Pentagon is
proposing to inactivate more units, mak-
ing it impossible for more men to meet
their military obligations.
There is talk of mobilization of Re-
serves. This has become a matter of al-
most daily speculation.
There was a recent press report of a
15,000-man-division size-unit having
been formed in Vietnam from bits and
pieces to meet ar, urgent troop require-
ment just below the DMZ.
Press reports o a few weeks ago said
the 1st Armored Division is now being
stripped in order to form a new brigade
to meet Vietnam troop needs.
There are continuing reports of pilot
shortages.
General Westmoreland is known to
want and to need more troops. When the
speculation arose only a few months ago
that Vietnam troop needs might rise as
high as 600,000, these predictions were
ridiculed by the Pentagon. Yet today we
are nearing that figure and new specu-
lation raises the estimates.
It is in the face of these facts that we
are being presented with a Pentagon
proposal that will reduce the Army Re-
serve to a new low, will inactivate im-
portant high priority units, drastically
lower unit readiness, will eliminate such
needed units of the Army Reserve as
H 7089
immediate ready brigades and aviation
units staffed with skilled personnel and
pilots, and which will create new and
widespread turbulence and loss of morale
in the Army Reserve.
This seems almost unbelievable, but
it is true.
I view these developments with the
greatest alarm.
There is a clear and, I believe, urgent
need for the Congress to stand firmly on
its previous rejections of the Reserve-
Guard merger and to refuse to be hood-
winked by this new proposal. It cannot
be justified as being in the national in-
terest any more than the first merger
plan which the Congress found to be
poorly planned and would damage our
national security. This new proposal is,
if anything, worse than the first one.
The Congress must stand firm on its
present language in the appropriations
bill and the Reserve bill of rights-H.R.
It must be made clear once and for all
that these bills mean what they say and
that the maintenance of strengths and
the preservation of the separate com-
ponents is a matter of high interest to
the Congress. The Defense Department
must understand that the Congress will
expect compliance with the language of
the bills which state that the National
Guard will maintain an average annual
strength of not less than 380,000 and the
Army Reserve an average strength of
not less than 260,000.
There must be no compromise.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
10 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD].
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, as all of
us know, nothing sounds as sweet to the
ears of a Congressman as the sound of
his own voice. It is rather late in the
afternoon. It is rather late in this bill.
First, I do not want the Members to
believe that I am sailing under false
colors with these black glasses. I have got
a "bum" right eye. I did not walk into a
barroom door, as I want the Members to
see. It just leaks, somehow. The appear-
ance is perfectly proper and entirely
legitimate.
Second, I understand, after some 20
years of service on this committee, what
the rules are and what one should or
should not say, but I am a natural
maverick and nonconformist. Otherwise,
how could one expect anybody with a
mustache like this to be elected to Con-
gress from the heart of the coal fields?
So one has to be sort of a nonconformist.
I want to say the same thing now that
I said about this time last year, and at
about this time of the day.
I hope there will be no quorum call,
because this is one of my annual
speeches. I desire to talk to these real
hard core interested persons.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FLOOD. I yield to my friend from
Missouri.
Mr. HALL. I should like to accom-
modate the gentleman with a quorum
call. I, too, believe it is a perfidy and
an injustice to the Nation to consider a
$71 billion appropriation bill, worthy as
its intent may be, with so few Members
on the floor. Only my respect for the
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self'-styled nonconformist gentleman of
Pennsylvania, and his expertise here in
this area and particularly in the defense
features of the Panama Canal Zone, plus
my desire not to "set him down" in the
middle of a good speech, precludes my
point of order.
Mr. FLOOD. I agree with that, but, as
the gentleman knows, these are not
trained seals. We are all prima donnas.
We all have rights.
The redeeming feature of this is that
it expresses great confidence, it is an
extraordinary exhibition of confidence,
in the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Defense, from the great State of
Texas, that in his sublime hands would
rest the fate of the Nation and of this
great bill.
Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I agree
with the gentleman. I make the point
of order that a quorum is not present.
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman please withdraw his point of
order?
Mr. DEVINE. Does the gentleman not
want the Members present to hear him'?
Mr. FLOOD. I am probably the last
speaker. There is only an amendment, or
perhaps two, for consideration. I am
satisfied with the sound of my own voice
and that of the gentleman.
Would the gentleman please withdraw
his point of order?
Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I with-
draw the point of order.
Mr. FLOOD. Now, my remark about
being a nonconformist is this: I have
been on this committee for many more
years than many of you can recall. This
is largely for the new men who are here.
I regard the members of this subcom-
mittee with an esteem and respect which
is difficult to fathom. You sit there for 5
or 6 hours a day, for 5 and some-
times 6 days a week, for 5 months at a
time and then consider supplementals,
and you develop an affection and a re-
gard for your colleagues that you reserve
only for members of your family. I have
said it is true on my side now down
South-and I was raised in the South,
although how long ago is none of your
business-and this Is not unparliamen-
tary language, Mr. Chairman, but the
word "damnyankee" down there is one
word and not two. In some parts of the
State of Pennsylvania where I come
from "damndemocrat" is just one word,
too. Now, these damndemocrats on this
subcommittee go on like Tennyson's
brook, forever and forever.
As I have told you, I have been on
there 20 years, and I have been low man
until this year when we had the good
fortune to bring in the gentleman from
West Virginia [Mr. SLACK] and my good
friend from New York [Mr. ADDABBO],
who have contributed much and who
in the years ahead will bear a great deal
of this burden. How these men can do
what they do is beyond me. Everyone of
these Democrats up to the subcommittee
chairman does a tremendous job.
The distinguished gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD], sits to my right
as the ranking Republican on Health,
Education, and Welfare, the second big-
gest bill, which we brought in just a
short time W. We miss GERRY FORD. It
was a loss to the Republican Party, I
think, and to this House and to the
Nation when GERRY had to leave us after
15 years to take over the mantle of
leadership. He did his homework.
Mr. RHODES of Arizona we have seen
here for years. As a leader how he got
there I do not know. I do not know the
rules on your side. They write their own
there. On our side we do not have any
rules. We would not dare to have a
caucus. I have been at one caucus in 20
years, and the blood was so thick on the
floor that we have not had one since.
Now let me tell you this: This is what
I would like the public to hear. You all
know-oh, I slipped there when I said
"you all"-you see what influence will
do-the public should know that never
have I heard in 20 years acrimony, vili-
fication, abuse, or one word of partisan
politics on either side of the aisle on this
Subcommittee on Defense. Not once in
20 years. In view of the tremendous and
fantastic problems involved, just try and
match that. You cannot match it. It is
unbelievable. That is the way we come to
you today.
The trouble with this bill now is years
ago I could talk here for an hour because
I was mad about things that were not
in it or mad about things that were in
it. Every year it is getting tougher and
tougher for me to talk 10 or 15 minutes,
because I have fewer and fewer things
to get mad about. I have some things-
some things.
I went down, Mr. Chairman, to the
launching of the greatest fighting ship
in the world 3 weeks ago, the great fight-
ing aircraft carrier, the John F. Ken-
nedy.. named after our beloved and re-
vered President. My heart was in that,
but I never felt so bad in my life as I
did when she started down the ways.
And, Mr. Chairman, if you have never
been to the launching of a great fight-
ing ship, when it is started afloat, and
after the bottles of champagne have been
broken, and she starts slowly to move
down those ways, and the band plays
"Anchors Aweigh," and if the lump is not
in your throat, there is something the
matter with you-there is something the
matter with you. I have been to 50, and
the last one was just like the first one.
But you know, Mr. Chairman, what
the trouble was. Mr. McNamara and "Mr.
McNamara's Band" at the Pentagon
made one of the most shocking errors
and mistakes in the history of our mili-
tary Establishment. The trouble is, Mr.
Chairman, that that great carrier is not
nuclear powered. That is a disgrace. She
was obsolescent the minute she hit the
water. That broke my heart, because I
came to this floor and I beat my breast
and pulled handfulls of hair out of my
head and did everything but get down
on my knees and pray to you that a
nuclear carrier as provided for under my
proposed amendment, should be con-
structed. I got a lot of votes, but not
enough.
So, Mr. Chairman, we have gotten no
place, and I am mad about that. I feel
better right now, however.
But, second, this bill fully funds one
nuclear frigate and the money for lead-
time on a second nuclear frigate is made
available.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania has expired.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5
additional minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. FLOOD. I thank the distinguished
chairman of the full Committee on Ap-
propriations.
Mr. Chairman, the money providing
for leadtime procurement is made avail-
able.
Mr. Chairman, I introduced an amend-
ment in the subcommittee to fully fund
both of these two nuclear frigates, con-
forming with the authorization act. That
is the practice of the Committee on Ap-
propriations. But, that does not impress
them. I had the vote of my distinguished
friend from Alabama [Mr. ANDREWS],
and I say to the gentleman now, Mr.
Chairman, never as long as I am on this
subcommittee will I ever again vote for
a combat ship of the line which is not
nuclear powered-never, never again. I
hope you do not; I hope you do not.
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. FLOOD. I yield to my distin-
guished friend, the gentleman from Cali-
fornia [Mr. HOLIFIELDI.
(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
thank my distinguished friend, the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD],
for yielding. The gentleman knows how
dear to my heart this subject matter is,
and how dear to the heart of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy is this sub-
ject. That committee has been fighting,
along with the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Appro-
priation, for this very objective which
you have achieved in today's bill.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to compliment
the distinguished gentleman from Penn-
sylvania [Mr. FLOOD] for his stand on
this matter over the years and also I wish
to compliment the Committee on Appro-
priations for the courageous position that
it has taken. They are 100 percent right.
Mr. Chairman, it is also a great pleas-
ure for me to stand up and add my hum-
ble commendation to the words that the
gentleman from Pennsylvania has just
spoken and for the action which the
gentleman's Committee on Appropria-
tions has taken.
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, I know the
position of the distinguished gentleman
from California as chairman of the com-
mittee dealing with this subject, and I
know the position of my distinguished
friend from South Carolina, whom I call oer
"cousin," the great chairman of the
great Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives.
Mr. RIVERS. First cousin.
Mr. FLOOD. Yes, first cousin.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wish
to thank the distinguished gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD] for his
defense of nuclear propulsion of surface
ships.
Mr. Chairman, I told the Secretary of
Defense that so long as I occupy the
Chairmanship of the Committee on
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7
Armed Services, there will never be an-
other conventional-powered carrier. I
have also gotten word to the DOD that
there will be other frigates, nuclear-
powered, for the future.
Mr. Chairman, we never received any
help out of the Department of Defense,
but we have come up with these two nu-
clear-powered frigates. We had quite a
fight with the other body in the confer-
ence, but it is wonderful to have the
backing.of the great Joint Committee on
Atomic. Energy and the backing of the
great Committee on Appropriations,
working in conjunction with the Com-
mittee on Armed Services.
Mr. Chairman, one must remember
that if it were not for the Congress, we
would not have a singglar nuclear-
powered submarine today. The Congress
has been the beginning of all this..
Mr. Chairman, it is just refreshing to
me to see the gentleman from Pennsyl-
vania [Mr. FLOO)] with his strength back
again, making his own appealing plea
and defending the things that ought to
be done. May God bless the gentleman.
There, will. never be another like you.
Thank God you are on our side.
Mr. FLOOD. I am for you also.
You know, he is a very fast studier, Mr.
Chairman, because I just wrote that out
for him, about 3 minutes ago, and how he
memorized it so fast I do not know.
Mr, LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. FLOOD. Mr, Chairman, I yield to
quite a character. If you ever heard this
man on the back of some admiral, chew-
ing him out as a cross examiner, it would
do your heart good because he will never
allow a witness to get away from him
without losing at least one ear. So I yield
to my friend from Wisconsin [Mr.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the
gentleman for yielding to me.
I would like just to substantiate what
he had said about, partisan votes in our
committee. We have never had a parti-
san vote in our committee since I first
went on the committee in 1953; by parti-
san vote I mean one in which we divided
on in our committee on the basis of our
political associations.
Mr. FLOOD. I will say to the gentle-
man that is correct.
Mr. LAIRD. We put aside all partisan
politics. We try to make our decisions
based on what is best for the national se-
curity of the country with defense appro-
priations.
Mr. FLOOD. The gentleman does not
mean we have never had some very stiff
arguments, does he?
Mr. LAIRD. Oh,, we certainly have had
some very stiff arguments, that is true.
Mr. FI:,QOD. Trie gentleman does not
mean that it. have; not had trouble with
him, and that he has not had trouble
with me, but we always got along.
Mr. LAIRD. But we have always got-
ten along. We have been able to resolve
our differences. Our dispute here is with,
the Department of Defense. We are dis-
appointed in their not going forward
with the nuclear frigate last year. We
appropriated lead time money for this
last year.
Mr. FLOOD. That is right.
Mr. LAIRD. What I am afraid of is
that they may very well hold back, in-
sisting upon conventional power again.
This would be a great mistake because
we just built an obsolete carrier. When
we launched it, the launching was on the
television all over this country, and that
carrier was obsolete the day it was
launched.
Mr. FLOOD. Can you imagine sitting
there with me when she went down those
ways? It would break your heart.
Mr. LAIRD. I was glad I was not there
with you because it would have broken
my heart, too.
Mr. FLOOD. I want to add just one
more additional thing, even though I dis-
like taking up this additional time and
holding things up:
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman has expired.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the gentleman 5 additional minutes.
Mr. FLOOD. I will not take that much
time. I will do it in English.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is
recognized for 5 additional minutes.
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, there is
one thing that sooner or later we must
take a look at. ' I do not know who is
going to do it, but somebody must take
a look at it, and that is this business
in the Department of Defense of making
it mandatory that every officer must serve
a tour of duty in almost every bureau
or department in the hope that he will
become Chief of Staff of the Army or
the Air Force, or commander in chief
of naval operations in the Navy; that
he must have a couple of years of service
in every office in the Pentagon. This is
simply 19th century thinking, it is an
obsolete thing and it should be corrected.
I do not know how we would do that,
but as a result of that what we get is
appalling incompetence in those sections.
The fiscal people and the budget people
are good, but when they send up line
officers, we should not have line officers
coming up there in the first place, and
they do not like it, and I do not blame
these officers, especially officers from
four-striper up. They do not want to be
here. They want to be with the fleet, or
they want to be with the troops, and I
do not blame them. That system should
be changed.
I hope as soon as we can that a proper
committee or a special commission be
named to revise that entire procedure
which is an archaic and obsolete -method
of filling these bureau chiefs. It is a dan-
gerous and a bad thing.
Finally this: I know the Fourth of July
is approaching, and I am going to make
some speeches on the Fourth of July,
and so are you.
I do not intend this as a rehearsal-I
do not want to try it-but I would just
like to say this. I hope for obvious rea-
sons that there is not one vote in this
House against this bill-not one.
Now I can understand why a handful
of my friends may have voted against
the supplemental bill for South Vietnam.
That is pretty clear and understandable.
But there is less than $20 billion out of
the $71 billion in this bill for Vietnam.
In all conscience-as strong as you feel
on that subject, I would hope, as I say
H 7091
for obvious reasons, that this be a unani-
mous vote as a warning and as a sign to
the world. I know this bill and I know
what is in it, so far as finite man can
know with a can of worms like this-and
it is a can of worms. But make no mis-
take about this. We on this subcommit-
tee know, and I now report to you, if you
have any doubts, the United States of
America is the richest, the strongest and
the most powerful nation on the face of
this earth-bar none. There is not a na-
tion or a combination of nations in the
world that does not know it.
We did not ask for this job. God knows
we did not ask for this job. But we have
it and, Mr. Chairman, that is the way
it is going to be. There is only one thing
for a leader to do, a leader must lead or
quit, lead or get out. Two laps around
the track, and go to the showers, hand
in your uniform, get out or leave. Mr.
Chairman, from now on this Nation in-
tends to lead, whether anybody likes it
or not.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania has expired.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield
such time as he may require to the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Hox-
TON].
Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in support of H.R. 10738, a bill making
appropriations for the Defense Depart-
ment in the fiscal year which begins
July 1.
Other than the crisis years of World
War II, this measure directs the spend-
ing, of more money than ever before in
the history of our Nation for the com-
mon defense. I rejoice not in the estab-
lishment of such a record. Yet, I recog-
nize its necessity both to assure our de-
terrent posture in a world frequently
strained by the ambitions of arms and
to insure the fulfillment of American
commitments in Southeast Asia.
If this bill related directly to the ques-
tion of how we should pursue our mili-
tary course in the next year, I might be
inclined to comment further; for there
are questions on my mind, too, about the
effectiveness of our military strategy in
ending the aggression in Vietnam. But,
that is not what is really before us today.
Our Constitution vests the President
with the responsibility to direct military
engagements. His departments have
come to Congress asking appropriate
funds to carry out this responsibility.
Our colleagues on the Appropriations
Committee have given these requests
their laborious and dutiful attention,
amending them . where they felt it
needed, reducing them where they be-
lieved it prudent, and affirming them
where their wisdom counseled them to
do so. The committee report and the
statements we have heard today from
our colleagues who took the testimony
and then wrote the bill offer their own
evidence of the competent and compre-
hensive determinations which surround
the committee's recommendation.
As I stated a moment ago, the sheer
size of this bill is indicative of
the strategically imperiled world in
which we live. That it should require of
the resources of the United States $70
billion in 1 year to maintain democ-
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racy's defenses can only be viewed as
regrettable. And, I feel certain I share
the feeling of so many of my fellow
Congressmen and citizens that a much
better world would result If this Nation
could devote similar financial strength.
to pursuits like education, housing, ur-
ban revitalization, health, and pollution
control.
Still, reality makes us realize that
without the freedom protected by such
defense expenditures, even that which
we now are applying to these peaceful
undertakings simply could not be.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I yield
15 minutes to the gentleman from Ari-
zona [Mr. RBODES], a member of the
committee.
(Mr. RHODES of Arizona asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Chair-
man, there is really nothing lower any-
where than the junior member of a
subcommittee, on the minority side. Rec-?
ogr.fzing that fact, I wish to inform my
colleagues, and I am sure they will re-
ceive this knowledge gratefully, I do not
intend to consume all of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to try
to prove that I am a great military strat-?
egist-because I am not a great military
strategist-I have not been on this com-
mittee long enough.
But I have been on the committee long
enough to form a great and lasting ad-
miration for the other members of the
committee and for the staff of the com-
mittee. It has been said that this is a
hard-working committee. It is a hard-
working committee.
It has been said that the members are
devoted to their duties. They are devoted
to their duties.
It has been a great experience for me
to be able to be on the committee, to
compare notes and to listen to the in-
cisive questioning by the members of the
committee of those who come from the
Pentagon building to justify their budget.
This is a $70 billion budget. It started
out to be $71 billion. As befits my station
on the committee, I am going to do some
nit-picking. Somebody has to nit-pick a
little bit and I think in my position I
can do a good job of it.
The Item I am going to talk about is
three-tenths of a millionth of this par-
ticular budgetary request. The item I am
going to talk about amounts to $20,000.
If you will turn to page 75 of part V
of the hearings, you will see the follow-
ing colloquy under the heading of "Beau-
tification Program":
BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM:
Mr. LIPSCOMB. What was the item you.
mentioned about the report on natural beau-
ty?
N[r. HoRwrrz. This is money provided to
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
Mr. LIPecoMR. What has this to do with
the Defense Department?
Mr. HoRWITZ. It is our share of this pro-
grain, and of course we do have our real
estate holdings where we carry out certain
programs to keep them looking nice.
(Off the record.)
Mr. ANDREWS. Is that amount for beauti-
fication an assessment against the Defense
Department?
Mr. AIRHART. If I remember correctly this
was the President's report.
Mr. ANDREWS. The so-called beautification
program?
Mr. AIRHART. That is right.
Mr. ANDREWS. I believe you stated you made
the contribution because it was assessed.
Mr. AIRHART. The Budget Bureau would
make a determination as to each partici-
pating agency's share of the cost.
Mr. ANDREWS. I assume then all or most od
the Government agencies are assessed so
much for beautification.
Mr. AIRHART. I should think this would
include a great many of them, not all.
Mr. Chairman, the meaning of all of
this is that someone in the President's
office decided that various branches of
the executive department should be as-
sessed for some beautification program
somewhere. The Bureau of the Budget
decided how much each of them was to
pay, assessed them accordingly, and the
money was put into a beautification pro-
gram for some purpose somewhere, we
know not what or where. In fact, the
people who testified from the Depart-
ment of Defense were not very firm in
their own knowledge as to where this
particular sum of money went. I do not
know how much total money was raised
by the executive department in this way,
but it seems to me obvious that this is a
clear circumvention of the power of the
Congress to appropriate.
Going on, Mr. Fisher was asked where
this money came from. I will read the
colloquy:
Mr. Lipsconsa. And then there was a repro-
graming action taken?
Mr. FISHER. Internally.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. For you to obtain the $20,-
000 to pay your share?
Mr. FISHER. We financed it from internal
resources.
Mr. LIescomB. Have you told us where you
obtained the money to do this, from what
funds?
W. FISHER. No, sir; we have not.
Mr. LIPscoMB. This is what you are going
to tell us for the record?
Mr. FISHER. We will; yes, sir.
(The information following:)
The $20 thousand was derived from within
the OSD funding due to the refinement of
Supplies and Materials estimated require-
ments.
As one member of the Appropriations
Committee, I would like to serve notice
on the executive department that this
sort of thing, which is apparently a
brandnew gimmick, had better stop. We
do not intend that this type of circtun-
vention of the authority of the Con-
gress--actually the duty of the Congress
as set forth by the Constitution-will be
thwarted by operations such as this car-
ried out through the Bureau of the
Budget or any other part of the executive
department.
Now, some more nit picking, but this
is a little bigger nit because I imagine
if what I propose were done, it would
save something like three one-hundred-
thousandths of the $70 billion which we
are appropriating. This involves the du-
plication of effort amongst the three
services insofar as service schools are
concerned.
For example, each of the services has
a Judge Advocate General School. It is
true that the main Judge Advocate Gen-
eral School is the Army school located
at Charlottesville, Va. But the other two
services also have JAG schools.
The same Code of Military Justice
applies to personnel of the armed serv-
ices. The laws which pertain to them
may not be identical, but they are cer-
tainly almost identical insofar as their
approach is concerned. I defy anyone
to put forward a cogent argument as to
why it is necessary to have three sep-
arate Judge Advocate General Schools.
It seems to me they could very well be
consolidated into a Department of De-
fense Judge Advocate General School,
and I, for one, recommend that this be
done.
As a former JAG officer-I might say
a retired JAG officer-I happen to know
that ,before long new arrangements will
have to be made in Charlottesville or
elsewhere for, the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral School of the Army. When this is
done, I hope that the school will be made
Into a DOD school, and the officers from
all services, who are lawyers and who
need to be oriented or trained in military
justice, will be sent to this particular
school.
Other schools in the same category
concern training for hospital corpsmen.
It is my understanding that all three
services train their corpsmen differently.
On chaplain schools, I cannot imagine
why it would be necessary to have three
different chaplain schools. Certainly the
finance schools of the three services
could be consolidated, as could all of
the management types of schools.
I do not have any idea how much
money could be saved, Mr. Chairman, if
the schools of the types I have mentioned
were consolidated, but I daresay it would
be a rather substantial sum. I venture
to say it would be at least equal to three
one-hundred-thousandths of this very
large budget.
One of the topics often mentioned by
members of the subcommittee during the
course of the hearings was a concern that
this Nation was becoming myopic con-
cerning our responsibilities in Vietnam--
that our concentration on Vietnam was
so deep, so intense, that we were neglect-
ing our duties and responsibilities
throughout the world.
I noticed in the newspapers not too
long ago a mention of the fact that we
probably have 40-some treaties with
other nations involving some obligation
or another on the part of the United
States of America. None of us wants the
United States not to be in a position to
fulfill treaty commitments. But I do not
know what these commitments are.
One thing I definitely suggest is that
there be some sort of high-level meeting
between the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense, so that at least
the latter may be informed-if he is not
already-as to what the possible mili-
tary commitments of this Nation might
be, as a result of these treaties.
When we think of the magnitude of
the commitment in Vietnam, when we
think of what could have happened in
the Middle East not too long ago, when
we think of what could happen in South
America and other areas of the world in
which we are interested and in which
we have treaty obligations, we realize
that we in Congress are facing a task, in
carrying out the responsibilities of this
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 7093
Nation, of a magnitude which we prob- Air Force, by the nature of its mission, comparable size if they are conventional-
ably cannot even visualize. there are jobs which should be filled and ly powered than if nuclear powered. But
We realize that the executive branch must be filled by pilots. measured over a span of years, it now ap-
also is facing the responsibility of plan- I hope that in our zeal to hold down pears that no defense funds are actually
ning for future actions which they prob- pilot training and our necessity to man saved through the construction of con-
ably cannot visualize. aircraft we have not set up ground rules ventionally powered vessels.
I hope that some day there will be an for filling jobs which take pilots out of It was pointed out during the hearings
inventory made of these responsibilities, jobs they should fill. I suspect we have that new naval vessels being built today
that we may face up to them realistically done this. may reasonably be expected to provide
in the cold hard light of the late 20th I hope the Department of Defense will for our defense during the next 35 years,
century, to determine whether or not we engage in a reappraisal of this whole or into the 21st century. Viewed from
as a nation really can survive the situation to make certain that the pilot this standpoint we would do well to ask
type of burden which we apparently training program is adequate to fulfill ourselves whether or not the Congress
have assumed throughout the years, and all the needs of the Air Force, but also should not take a stronger position with
to make if necessary some agonizing re- that, pilots will continue to have the op- regard to planning and procurement of
appraisals as to our national responsi- portunity to move into command and nuclear-powered vesselsnow.
developed in which bilities, squared with our national ability staff positions not directly related to fly- The the Middle quick crisis focused our attenped n
to discharge those responsibilities. ing.
In doing this, of course, it is going to We are told that already there are the possibility that we may be required
be necessary for us to make certain very pilots who are doing a second tour of to establish a military presence in sev-
basic assumptions. Many of our responsi- duty in the Vietnam theater. Rotation eral parts of the world at once during
bilities were assumed when the use of of military personnel certainly is to be some series of international events.
nuclear weapons was contemplated, if desired. I believe all of us agree this is Speed of deployment and flexibility of
necessary, to fulfill them. If we are going a fine morale factor. When one rotates logistics is critical in a situation of this
to carry out those same responsibilities a man from his tour of duty and then kind. The vessels which can get there
with conventional weapons, then we have a year later sends him back, I wonder fastest and stay on station longest will
a brand new game as far as training, how good a morale factor that is? have the greatest value to us. The world
procurement, and logistics of our Armed I recognize the need for pilots, but at outlook today does not offer us any as-
Forces are concerned. We have new de- the same time we should grind into the surance that a future year will not find us
cisions to make as to our national eco- need for pilot training some question of faced with two or three critical situations
nomic ability to fulfill these responsi- whether this is the type of thing we want separated by thousands of miles of ocean. st that bilities under the rules of the game as to do, or whether we should train more Prudence
ra dde to the ubes of ldt u ges ability fe b u e re-
pared
they now exist. It is important that we pilots than we are now.
make these basic decisions and square Mr. Chairman, in closing I also want set of circumstances.
them with the action which the rest of to express my agreement with the com- During the hearings it was also testi-
the world might reasonably expect us to mittee in insisting that we maintain cer- fled that to bring our Navy up to full
take in the event of aggression else- tain airlift capabilities of the reserve cognizance of all modern developments
where in the confines of our globe. arms of the Air Force. The C-5 is to be would cost some $15 to $20 billion. As a
I believe it is also necessary that we a great airplane. I hope that we will worldwide power we must have a Navy
look at one very important part of our proceed posthaste to build it and to de- with worldwide capabilities, so it follows
defense arsenal as it exists today. ploy it. Certainly it is not now built and that modeerni atiot of he Navy is not
Throughout the hearings, whenever the it is not now deployed.
Air Force and the Army or the Navy were Therefore, at this time, in order to ful- alternatives for debate.
in the room testifying, they were queried fill the commitments which we have not During the coming years we will find
concerning their pilot training programs. only in Vietnam but also in other parts that the money must be spent and the
The Air Force had 2,956 pilots programed of the world, it seems to me to be great modernization must be effected. The de-
for training in fiscal year 1967. In 1968 wisdom on the part of the Congress to bate will center upon the question: how
this goes up to 3,492. I, for one, hope that insist that the National Guard airwings best can the goal be accomplished, and
this is enough, but I am not satisfied that which were scheduled for deactivation will feature the nuclear versus conven-
this is enough-for this reason: We have be retained as active units of the Air Na- muChl ipowered vessel. But today tare
spin the g the two uab tt the h effete
been fulfilling our pilot requirements in tional Guard. costs less
Vietnam and elsewhere by taking some Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield have
hard actions which a lot of us a never thought gsuch time as he may e tleman from West c Virginia [Mr. trained naval officers to study, and that
would be necessary to take. g
One o of the actions s is to take people SLACK], a member of the subcommittee. experience is being gained every day in ia.
from jobs which are not flying jobs and Mr. SLACK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in the waters of Southeast Asoperation of The compari put them back in the cockpit after years support of this legislation. nuclear and conventionally powered vef
of limited flying and at ages which are Mr. Chairman, one of the less impos-
appears our be luth Vietnam the
far advanced from those which one ordi- ing dollar items in this multibillion-dol- sels in support
narily ascribes to a combat pilot, and lar bill, amounting to a total of only avoidable appears that our first
then send them out to combat. $134.8 million, provides funds for the
I should say, in the next breath, these construction of a nuclear-powered guided line fighting forces must all be nuclear are
rely older pilots have certainly acquitted missile destroyer leader, and for ad- powered if the high seas in on maxi mum
themselves beautifully. They are fine vance procurement activity on another defense.
pilots. They are good men. ship of the same class. This item is not def. (ens SLACK asked and was given per-
-1.t the same time, one wonders for how large as today's military expenditures to revise asked and a -wend his re-
long ,we should rely on this type of pilot go, but it appears to be a forerunner of mission marks)
reserve. In other words, should we not be events to come. marks.)
may Mr. consume Chairman, , I the yield
training more people so that it is not During recent years there has been such Mr. MAHON.
necessary to take pilots out of nonflying growing a conviction in the minds of time he c from New 'York
fobs and put them back in the cockpit? many that all major naval vessels will tinguished ing shed ed gentleman member of he sock
Many of them are literally "flying grand- one day be nuclear powered. But during committee.
fathers," capable though they may be. those same years there has been a reluc-
Also, is it really a good thing to take tance on the part of defense planners to (Mr. ADDABBO asked and was given
pilots out of nonflying jobs and send move firmly away from conventionally Per is kssio.) n to revise and extend his
them back to pilot duties? .
In many instances it is true, I am sure, It is quite true that nuclear-powered Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, the
that there are jobs which can be han- vessels cost more in the construction and House today has the task of passing on
died by nonpilots just as well as any preparation stages. For the same amount the largest single defense appropriations
pilot can handle them. However, in the of money we can obtain more vessels of bill in the history of this country. After
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
months of study and review, the Appro- certainly become a more powerful in- Congress before they realined the Na-
priations Committee-of which I am a stitution with each succeeding year. Yet, tional Guard and the Reserve forces of
member-now asks this body to approve except for the limitation to two terms, this country.
more than $70 billion for our national I cannot think of any respect in which Mr. Chairman, it just does not make
defense during fiscal year 1968. I want to the Congress has seen fit to put addi- sense to me at this time to eliminate
assure my colleagues that the commit- tional braking power upon the Office of these National Guard units and these
tee, under the leadership of its distin- the Presidency. For example, I raise the Reserve units, when our country, as this
guished chairman [Mr. MAHON] and question: What limitations are placed on report says, is in a time of crisis.
ranking minority member [Mr. Lips- the President of the United States in Now, Mr. Chairman, most of the Na-
COME,I has approved only those expendi- respect to the military forces to be cre- tional Guard divisions that will be elimi..
tures which proved under rigorous in- ated by this bill? Can he send these forces nated by the Secretary of Defense are in
vestigation to be absolutely necessary to on his own personal decision any place camp right now training. These 15 divi-
our national defense. in the world for almost any type of mis- sions are in camp right now.
About three-tenths of the proposed ap- sion? In the absence of a declaration of You know, Mr. Chariman, Secretaries
propriation, or more than $21 billion, war, does the President really have this of the Department of Defense in the past
represents the rising cost of the war in authority? We face the possibility if not have tried to update and not eliminate
Vietnam. Because the action of the oppo- the prospect of the President sending these National Guard units.
nent., as it may either increase or de- another 200,000 or 300,000 combat forces Mr. Chairman, I recall that the 36th
crease, is unpredictable, costs in Vietnam to South Vietnam. Upon what legal au- Division in World War I-at least I was
cannot be precisely projected. Nor did thority will the President undertakesuch told today-had a cavalry regiment that
the committee attempt to anticipate the an action? Would it be the Gulf of fought in World War I. They did not do
effect of future world crises, such as the Tonkin resolution? Was this really an away with the 36th Division when they
Middle East war, on our national defense explicit, act on the part of the Congress brought in tanks and mechanized the
requirements. I concur with the other authorizing the President to go that far division. They eliminated the cavalry
committee members in the belief that we in that region of the world so as to put a regiment and put in an armored regi-
must continue to improve our ability to half a million people into combat? I ment in place of the cavalry regiment.
deal with international crises as they question really whether the Congress has Mr. Chairman, when they had the
may Occur. measured up to its constitutional re- horse-drawn artillery, they did not elim-
I lament as I know mai,y others do the sponsibilities in recent years. The re- inate these divisions, but the Secretary
fact that the greatest part of our budget, sponsibility, the duty-not just the right, came in and ordered that there be
year in and year out, must be devoted but the duty-to declare war. It seems brought into the division the self-pro-
to securing our homefront and those of to me that we have really shirked our pelled artillery weapons.
our allies from the threat of useless and duty, and I direct this criticism at myself Mr. Chairman, my point is that you
despicable aggression. I am dismayed to as well as others. do not have to eliminate a division or a
think, that we are spending more each We seem to have been willing to let Reserve unit in order to bring it up to
year fighting a protracted war in Viet- the President, on his own, make a fateful date or to build it up to the present war
nam than we are on all the new domestic decision to send military forces into bat- level. You can still keep the individual-
programs combined. Just think what a tle on the Asian mainland. Does the ity of the various units involved.
fraction of this proposed defense expend- President have adequate authority to Mr. Chairman, it is said that these are
iture could do at home to aid the poor, send half a million soldiers to other good National Guard divisions, and they
improve health care and facilities, up- places in the world if, in his opinion, the are.
grade education, discourage crime-in national interest so directs? Could he
short, treat the maladies which permeate send them into the Middle East, for Mr. Chairman, I quote the 31st Divi-
America and, especially her cities. sion which is composed of men from
Defense esp is not r cities but example, if war should break out and he Mississippi and Alabama. These spending should decide that this is really what
mandatory. It is like medicine which is ought to be done? sions, rmyn in ers a are listed rs Rn l ulax necessary for staying alive. As we In other words, has the Congress sent Army officers
divisions enlisted Secretar l
strengthen our defense we also seek ways yielded completely in these modern-day sent to these diviasions by the Secretary
and means to a lasting peace and until a circumstances to the Executive the Con- of Defense.
better remedy is found a strong defense gress right to declare war? Mr. Chairman, the 31st Division in
is still one of the best deterrents to pos- To me, Mr. Chairman, these are sober 1965 had 88 individual-type units or bat-
sible all-out aggression by those who questions that deserve our attention. teries-company-sized units. These 88
would try to destroy free and independ- Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I have units which were graded by Regular
ent nations. no further requests for time. Army personnel who grade them as
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, I Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 being superior, excellent, satisfactory, or
yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from minutes to the gentleman from Missis- not satisfactory-in 1965 all 88 of these
Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY]. sippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY]. units received a superior rating which
(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given (Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was indicates that they were proficiently
permission to revise and extend his re- given permission to revise and extend trained and ready to fight.
marks.) his remarks.) These are the units which the Secre-
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I was Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, tary of Defense is trying to eliminate.
much impressed with the presentation I would like to limit my remarks to page In 1966 this same division-and these
just a few minutes ago of the gentleman 7 of the report made by the Committee same figures will hold true for other
from Ohio [Mr. Bow], in which he set on Appropriations pertaining to the re- divisions of the National Guard-of the
forth quite clearly and properly the con- alinement of the Army Reserve compo- 88 units that went to camp, 81 received
stitutional responsibilities of the Con- vents. My friend, the Congressman from a superior rating by regular Army per-
gress in respect to military forces; that Pennsylvania [Mr. FLOOD], said that he sonnel and seven received a satisfactory
is, not only the responsibility to raise was the last speaker of the day on the rating.
armies and navies but the responsibility Democratic side. I certainly agree with Mr. Chairman, it is the opinion of
to regulate them. him, because I cannot compare with others-it is not my opinion alone-that
This, is truly a bill to raise an army, him. Also he said that "damnyankee" If you eliminate these National Guard
to provide for the paying of the men was one word, and I certainly want to divisions and these Reserve units, and if
and their equipment. It does raise some agree with him on that, too. you realine them, it is going to take at
additional constitutional questions which I would like to commend the chair- least 3 years during which to bring these
I attempted to raise at a rather late hour man of the Committee on Appropria- new concept brigades and these new Re-
in connection with the draft bill several tions, the Congressman from Florida serve units up to the trained level that
weeks ago. I Mr. Sl c s], and also the gentleman from these National Guard divisions and these
When engineers build a larger engine, Ohio [Mr. Bowl, in seeing that these Reserve units have at this time.
they generally put a bigger brake on it. statements were inserted asking the De- Mr. Chairman, insofar as I am con-
Through the years the Presidency has partment of Defense to come to the cerned this is a very important point.
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June 18, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the
distinguished gentleman from Florida.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I wish to
compliment the gentleman from Missis-
sippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY] for a very sound
statement and for his strong interest in
this matter.
Further, Mr. Chairman, I wish to agree
with the gentleman that it is a lot sim-
pler, less costly, and more effective to
keep a combat-trained man in a combat
unit than it is, to convert him to a carrier
of water, a hewer of wood, or a baker
of bread.
Mr. Chairman, we must have proper
logistical support units. We cannot win
*wars without them. However, it just does
not make sense to convert combat-
trained units to logistics support units.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman,
I Certainly agree with the statement of
the distinguished gentleman from Flor-
ida and I.thank the gentleman for his
remarks.
.Mr. Chairman, another real danger
that I see-
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Mississippi has expired.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
the gentleman 1 additional minute.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman,
another real danger that I see-and I
would like the Members of Congress to
hear me out on this-is that in most
States you are going to lose individual
units. For Instance, I can use my State
as an example where we now have 120
company- and battery-sized units located
throughout the small towns of my State
which are participating National Guard
units. However, under the new proposal,
we will have to cut back to 79 units.
That represents a reduction of 41 units.
However, the problem under the new
proposal is where you have a company-
or battery-sized unit, you could end up
under this new proposal with a platoon
or even a squad.
I certainly think at that time it is un-
reasonable and unbelievable and cer-
tainly not in the best interest of the
country to realine these National Guard
divisions and also the Reserve units, and
I hope the Secretary of Defense will heed
the request of Congress.
I recall to the Members of Congress
that the concept of citizen-soldiers is
older than this Nation Itself. Certainly
Congress should be consulted when such
sweeping action is taken by the Secre-
tary of Defense.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
5 minutes ttZ, the gentleman from Texas
[Mr . WRIGHT]
",Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, because
of the well-iptentioned_ comments of my
friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
MINSHALL], and because of certain other
things that have been said and written
.with regard to the F-111 program, I
should like to take this time simply to
accentuate the positive. I want to bring
to the attention of the Members of this
House some of the really fine advances
that this program does symbolize and
embody. The F-111 is a magnificent air-
craft and all of America has ample cause
to be extremely proud of it.
Those pilots who took the F-111 plane
to the Paris air show, Col. Ray O. Rob-
erts And Maj. Robert K. Parsons, re-
turned reporting that it had been the
sensation of the entire show. They re-
ported that the Russians had been so
impressed that they had spent hours
walking around it, looking at it, photo-
graphing it and even asking if they
might scrape a bit of metal from its
wings to, take back with them. This
clearly indicates- '
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. WRIGHT. Of'course I will yield
to the gentleman, but'I have only started.
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I
would like to just make the record clear
and state that the F-111 that was at the
Paris air show was the Air Force version
of the F-111, it is the other version of the
F-111, the so-called F-111B with which
I was critical.
Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I appre-
ciate the gentleman's elucidation. It is
true that the planes demonstrated in
Paris were F-111A's. But I believe the
worldwide reaction to the stunning new
developments In this program applies
with equal force to both versions.
Mr. MINSHALL. They are two differ-
ent airplanes, weightwise, flight charac-
teristics, and in many other respects.
Mr. WRIGHT. Of course, they are two
slightly differing versions of the same
basic design, in spite of the best efforts
of the Defense Department to achieve
the maximum degree of commonality.
Mr. MINSHALL. That commonality
concept has gone out of the window. The
Air Force version of the F-111 is as dif-
ferent as night is to day with respect to
the Navy version.
Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I appre-
ciate the gentleman's deep interest. I did
not ask him to yield earlier until he had
spoken for about 10 minutes, and I have
only 3 or 4 minutes remaining in which
to emphasize some of the really positive
advances achieved in this revolutionary
new development in airpower. Permit
me, therefore, to emphasize those things
which apply to both the Navy and Air
Force versions of the F-111.
We have all heard a lot about com-
monality. I believe it is a valid goal to
achieve. Adm. T. F. Connally, Deputy
Chief of Naval Air.Operations, after fly-
ing the plane, said he believed that De-
fense Secretary McNamara was right.
Admiral Connally expressed his own
opinion that the commonality factor
would save many hundretL of millions of
dollars in the follow-on programs and in
parts and maintenance. He spoke en-
thusiastically of the performance char-
acteristics of the F-111B. He said, "I
think this F-111B is going to land on that
carrier like a lady." I have talked person-
ally with Secretary Nitze and the Navy
project officers, and I have no doubt of
their enthusiasm for this program.
But let me mention just two or three
things that have not yet been brought
out in this debate. I believe you will see
why the Navy spokesmen are enthusiastic
for the F-111B. It brings together in one
package the greatest number of totally
revolutionary new advances in the state
H 7095
of the art of air-to-air warfare that we
have ever seen in the United States.
First, of course, is the swept-wing de-
sign, the first of its kind. It is truly revo-
lutionary and extremely significant. By
extending the wings at a 90-degree angle
from the fuselage the plane is capable of
very low speed takeoffs and landings.
This, of course, is extremely important
on aircraft carriers and on short, hastily
built jungle landing strips. But with the
wings swept back alongside the fuselage,
it can fly 2i/2 times the speed of sound.
One plane contains both extreme capa-
bilities. This makes it the most versatile
combat aircraft ever developed by Ameri-
can industry.
Another extremely significant innova-
tion is the modulated turbo-jet engine
which, for the first time in jet aircraft,
will permit a wide range and a rapid
change in speed. Heretofore military jet
aircraft have had, let us say, to coin
some terminology, just two gears, low
gear and floorboard. There were only two
choices-either subsonic speed or full
jet power. But with the modulated turbo-
jet engine in the F-111, we do not have to
just kick on the afterburners and go from
a very slack speed into top speed. Our
pilots will have a wide range of speeds
where they can modulate and make much
more flexible the speed and maneuver-
ability of the aircraft.
Nothing has been mentioned in this
discussion about the truly revolutionary
new radar fire control system. This is an
almost unbelievably spectacular advance
in target tracking and controlled fire-
power. Better by far than anything that
any nation has conceived in the past, the
F-111's fire control system is capable of
firing simultaneously at six targets, and
while destroying those six targets, it can
maintain a constant computerized track-
ing of 16 more simultaneously. This fan-
tastic new development has been tested
and proven in more than 8,000 hours of
ground and airborne operation. It works.
There has never before been anything
like it in the history of warfare.
An equally dramatic thrust forward is
involved in the Phoenix air-to-air mis-
sile in the F-111. It will extend the ef-
fective range of air-to-air missilery by as
much as five times the present distance.
Think of it. With this new system it will
be possible to destroy targets in the air
from five times the distance. Consider
the advantage.
In other words, if we can knock out a
target that is 10 miles away today, this
new forward-looking missile system will
be able to knock that target out from
50 miles away.
The airplane also embodies a new ejec-
tion capsule system, which for the first
time, will work at extremely low levels on
the ground and on the water, and insure
the survivability of the pilots.
Each one of these new systems is a
daring and truly spectacular advance in
the art of aerial warfare and, wedded to-
gether as they are in this revolutionary
new airplane, they constitute the great-
est potential advance in aerial combat
capability that the Nation has ever put
together in a single production program.
So I am sure you can see why I say
that it is high time to accentuate the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
positive about the F-111. There is no
need to be the least bit defensive about
it.
It is inconceivable to me that the Con-
gress would want to delay by 2 weeks or
2 days-let alone 2 years--the entry of
this badly needed weapons system into
our inventory.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
such time as he may consume to the gen-
tleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELDI.
(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I
have come to the floor of this House
many times before to discuss the issue of
nuclear propulsion for the surface war-
ships of our Navy. On May 29, 1967, I
told you about the commissioning of the
nuclear frigate Truxtun and the sad state
of affairs represented by the recent
christening of the nonnuclear aircraft
carrier John F. Kennedy. The Kennedy
could have and should have been nuclear
powered.
On May 8, 1967, I spoke in support of
the fiscal year 1968 defense authoriza-
tion bill presented on the floor of this
House by the distinguished chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee,
the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS. That
bill, as originated in the House and as
subsequently agreed to in a Senate-House
conference and signed into law by the
President on June 5, 1967,, authorized
three new nuclear submarines, long lead-
time procurement funds for a third nu-
clear aircraft carrier, and two new nu-
clear powered guided missile frigates
which Congress substituted in place of
two nonnuclear destroyers requested by
the Department of Defense. This law,
Public :Law 90-22, represents a forward
step toward equiping our Navy with the
finest in nuclear powered surface war-
ships-;a step which is badly needed and
long overdue.
The bill before the House today ap-
propriates funds for these nuclear-pow-
ered warships. In my capacity as a Inem-
ber of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy I have delved deeply into the fac-
tors involved in the value of nuclear pro-
pulsion for warships. As you all know, the
Joint Committee has studied and an-
alyzed the question of nuclear pro-
pulsion for submarines and surface
warships for many years. This intensive
review was required before the commit-
tee could recommend to Congress the re-
search and development effort necessary
to build a nuclear Navy "second to none."
As I stated before, the defense appro-
priation bill for fiscal year 1968 includes
funds for two nuclear-powered frigates
substituted by Congress in place of two
nonnuclear-powered destroyers requested
by the Department of Defense. Further,
the appropriation bill includes funds for
performing the contract definition of a
new class major fleet escort called the
DXG; the Armed Services Committee
Report No. 221 dated May 2, 1967, on the
fiscal year 1968 defense authorization
act and House Report No. 270 dated May
22, 1967, on the Senate-House Armed
Services Committee conference contain
language which prohibits using any of
these funds for the design of any major
fleet escorts not powered with a naval he intends to ask for the remainder of
nuclear propulsion plant-a step which I the funds for the third carrier next year
also endorse, Of course, the intent of this and another in a future year.
provision is not to confuse you with the At least four major fleet escort ships-
nomenclature used for various types of destroyers or frigates-are assigned to
ships; the intent clearly is to provide all each aircraft carrier. These escorts are
nuclear escorts for our nuclear aircraft designed to operate either on independ-
carriers--no matter whether they are ent missions against enemy targets or as
called DLGN, DDGN, DXGN, or DXN's, part of a coordinated protective screen to
or anything else. destroy enemy aircraft, missiles, sub-
The aircraft carrier continues to be marines, and surface ships that attack
one of our prime naval attack weapons. the force.
It provides a movable platform from The facts behind the action recom-
which to launch airplanes wherever they mended by the House Armed Services
may be needed. It is a floating airbase Committee and the Joint Committee on
complete with maintenance and repair Atomic Energy to proceed now on a
facilities. It has proved to be a vital as- nuclear-powered surface escort warship
set in support of our military activities in building program can be assessed by re-
Vietnam. The tremendous problems and view of the reports I identified in my floor
expense of building up land airbases in statement of May 8, 1967. To this list I
Vietnam continue to demonstrate the should add House Report No. 270 dated
great advantages of the aircraft carrier May 22, 1967, on the conference of the
concept. Senate and House Armed Services Com-
However, to fully exploit the full po- mittees concerning the fiscal year 1968
tential of the carrier task group, every- defense authorization bill.
thing possible must be done to minimize In addition, the Joint Committee on
the logistic support required to sustain Atomic Energy is currently preparing for
the ships in a combat environment. Elim- public release a report prepared by the
ination of the requirement for a continu- committee staff on the issue "Nuclear
ous supply of propulsion fuel makes Propulsion for Major Fleet Escorts" and
nuclear-powered ships valuable. This be- a record of executive hearings held this
came abundantly clear to the members year on the naval nuclear propulsion
of the Joint Committee when we studied program.
this problem in 1963 and prepared our The committee staff report, of about
report on nuclear propulsion for naval 450 pages, will give the complete history
surface vessels. See the December 1963 of nuclear propulsion for naval surface
Joint Committee report entitled "Nuclear warships. It will be a document that will
Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels." be useful to every person who is inter-
The Department of Defense has finally ested in the national defense of our
come to realize this, in the case of air- country, It is well documented. It will
craft carriers-after Congress repeat- furnish the complete story on this prob-
edly pointed it out. They still have not lem of whether we should go back to the
recognized this important truth in the days of the sailing vessels, you might say,
case of ships built to escort nuclear by using oil, because oil today in the
carriers. propulsion of our neval vessels is just as
In fact. I saw an interesting item in obsolete as sails were when oil took over.
Sunday's Washington Post about Navy This report and the record of hearings
Secretary Nitze being designated to re- provide a complete chronology of the
place Cyrus Vance as Deputy Secretary positions of key people in Congress, the
of Defense. The article said: Navy, and the Department of Defense
Perhaps one of Nitze's greatest accom- from 1961 when the Enterprise first went
plishments there (as secretary of the Navy) to sea up to as recent as May 29, 1967. It
was to use McNamara's own yardsticks=cost- also specifically considers all the studies
effectiveness-to convince a doubtful Seere- and correspondence provided to Con-
tary that all carriers in the future should
be nuclear gress by the Navy and the Department
powered. of Defense since 1961 on the isssue of
I do not mind letting Secretary Nitze whether or not the Navy should have
have some credit. nuclear-powered surface warships. These
As I was saying, we must be able to studies and correspondence are pub-
operate attack carrier task forces any- lished in the report to the maximum ex-
where on short notice. Nuclear propul- tent permitted by consideration of our
sion in our naval striking forces will national security.
greatly enhance our capability to operate I am sure you will agree that the case
our carrier task forces throughout the is clear and well supported that we, the
oceans of the world-without the en- Congress, will have to take extraordinary
tangling logistic support problems cre- steps if the Navy is to get the number
ated by conventional fuel requirements of nuclear-powered major surface vessels
and free from the constant changes in they need. It is certainly clear that the
the worldwide political climate. Navy does not need more "studies" on
Our one nuclear-powered aircraft-car- this issue. No one has ever won a war
rier, U.S.S. Enterprise, which is now de- with paper studies.
ployed for the second time in Vietnam, The Present Middle East crisis clearly
has set record after record since she supports the conclusion reached by the
joined the fleet 5 years ago. She has Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the
proven so effective in battle in Vietnam Senate and House Armed Services Com-
that the Secretary of Defense requested mittees, and the Senate and House Ap-
a new nuclear-powered attack carrier in propriations Committees that the Navy
last year's bill, asked for advanced pro- proceed now building nuclear-powered
curement funds for the third nuclear car- major warships. This crisis supports the
rier this year and has told Congress that position of Congress that it is not in the
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
best interest of this country, either About one-third of this total is for carrier
short term or long term, to continue propulsion fuel, about one-third for es-
building nonnuclear major surface war- cart fuel, and the remaining one-third
ships, as has been repeatedly proposed for aircraft fuel, Thus, nuclear power in
by the Department of Defense. the carrier would reduce the fuel require-
While only a small fraction of our ments in the logistic pipeline by one-
domestic consumption of petroleum third and nuclear power in the escorts
comes from the Middle East, more than would reduce the fuel pipeline to the
half the petroleum products used in striking forces by another one-third.
Vietnam have been coming from Persian The Chief of Naval Operations pointed
Gulf sources, On June 7, the Secretary out over a year ago that-
of Defense announced that he was in- The compelling reason for the Navy's
i
n
l
e
ion
r
a
n
ear pow
r
ecommend
for
uc
t
yoking an emergency plan to provide strong
products for our forces in surface warships is based on the increased
petroleum
Southeast Asia' without being dependent survivability and tactical flexibility which de-
upon the Middle East. This plan involves rive from freedom of dependence on propul-
sion fuel oil logistic support.
more than doubling the number of tank- The dependence of U.S. air power on the
ers which have been supplying our fuel distribution system in the western Pa-
Southeast Asian forces. cific is well known. The vulnerability of the
In addition to the possibility of losing system to attack, particularly the overland
these Mideast petroleum products at' and terminal fuel distribution required for
their sources for political reasons, the land-based air operations, is a matter of con-
closing of the Suez Canal will further cern. While the Navy's underway replenish-
ment groups are considered to be less vulner-
inerease the difficulty of transporting able, they can also be brought under attack.
'
Current utilization of Enterprise and Bain-
petroleum products since tankers will
now be forced to take the longer route bridge is reducing our dependence on fuel oil
around the Cape of Good Hope. I com- and thus strengthening our total air posture
mented publicly on the importance of in Southeast Asia. The introduction of
nuclear power in warships to decrease CVAN68 and other nuclear-powered warships
our military dependence on' petroleum could be of critical importance to the efficient
supplies last Saturday. projection of air power during the early
1970's. "
Over and alcove the obvious difficulty From the above you can see that the
and increased cost involved in this move,
I hope you all remember that no one is Chief of Naval Operations appreciates the
attacking these logistic supply forces, no importance of nuclear propulsion in min-
bombs dropped, no shells fired, or no tor- imizing logistic support requirements.
pedoes fired at these tankers. Our sur- However, it appears that other officials in
face Navy, fortunately, has been fighting the Department of Defense have either
a "War College" exercise where nobody forgotten these lessons or feel that for
is firing at them. They have every possi- some reason they can be ignored.
ble advantage. How often must history repeat itself
The Joint Committee hearing record before these lessons are learned by the
and report documents some history people in a position of responsibility in
which is pertinent to this situation and the Department of Defense; before they
I would like to summarize some of this pick up the step of the drummer leading
for you. the way toward a modern Navy for this
For example, how many remember that country?
it was largely due to our submarine and The bill before you is an important step
air attacks on the Japanese fuel supply as it provides funds for two more nu-
lines from Southeast Asia to Japan dur- clear-powered guided missile frigates to
ing World War II that the Japanese war escort our nuclear aircraft carriers. An
machine was beaten to its knees, very overwhelming vote of support should
much shortening that war in the Pacific? make it clear to the Department of De-
Do you remember when the Atlantic fense that the American people, through
Coast beaches of the United States were their elected representatives in Congress,
coated with oil from sunken tankers-our believe this is the direction this country
tankers sunk by German U-boats right should go.
off our own coast? We lost some 130 tank- Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, it is under-
ers to German U-boats in World War II. standable that there are several Mem-
Our logistic support forces are poten- bers who are trying to stop the Defense
tially more vulnerable today-with the Department from reorganizing the Re-
advent of foreign nuclear submarines and serve components; however, the fact is
longer range aircraft and missiles. that the structure of our Army Reserve
To assess the importance of reducing components desperately needs reorganiz-
the liquid fuel required by naval striking ing. It lacks 989 units which are needed.
forces through the utilization of nuclear It has 1,076 units which are not needed.
correcting this situation can the
Onl
b
y
y
propulsion, it should be borne in mind
that the monthly usage rate of petroleum structure be made to conform to that
products fgr tfie Navy's ships and aircraft which the Joint Chiefs of Staff unani-
is as great as the mously say is required. And only if the
heast Asia toda
`
o
i
y
fi
a
lt
maximum monthly rate the Japanese Joint Chiefs recommendation is met, can
o
ort p
m p
c
aa.p
were able
et+ole
o+
t^
into tli'e home Islands during World War None of us are wise enough to know
II. The quantity of ship and aircraft fuel exactly how many artillery battalions,
currently required per month for the car- ordnance companies, combat brigades,
rier strike groups alone in Southeast Asia divisions, special forces, and other units
is two-thirds as much as the average the Reserve components ought to have.
mont~ilyrequirement for the U.S. carrier That is the job for professionals. To try
strike forces in the 5 months of the Palau to substitute our judgment under the
campaiggn-one of the peak naval opera- circumstances seems to me outrageous.
tions of World War II in the Pacific. The Reserve Subcommittee of the
117097
Armed Services Committee on which I
sit has been fully briefed on the proposed
reorganization. It provides the Gover-
nors with the forces which they need for
local disturbances while at the same
time continuing the U.S. Army Reserve
at virtually its current strength. Fur-
thermore, the plan is not intended for
implementation for another 2 months-
a schedule purposely designed to en-
able the Congress to be fully informed
with respect to the plan and to permit
further consideration of H.R. 2, a bill
which this House passed overwhelmingly
only 4 months ago, and which explicitly
endorses the authority of the military to
establish, reorganize, or deactivate units
as required by contingency and war
plans.
We have no business, particularly at
a time when we have nearly 500,000 men
in Southeast Asia and over 200,000 men
in Europe in telling the military profes-
sionals that they cannot put our Reserve
forces into the condition necessary to
adequately serve the national interest. To
the contrary we ought to be telling the
Army to get on with the job.
Mr. Chairman, to set the record
straight on the proposed realinement of
our Reserve components, I submit, in ad-
dition, the following statements from the
Department of Defense:
REALINEMENT OF ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL
GUARD APPROVED BY SECRETARIES MCNAMARA
AND VANCE
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
and Deputy Secretary Cyrus R. Vance an-
nounced today that the Army has proposed,
and they have approved, a plan for realign-
ing the Army's Reserve and National Guard
forces to improve significantly the early de-
ployment capability and combat readiness of
the United States Army's Reserve Forces.
The realignment, to be started this year
and to be completed by next summer, is de-
signed to provide Army Reserve Forces as
recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the Secretary of Defense in April 1967, and
to bring the Army's Reserve Component
structure into balance with contingency
plans and the supporting equipment pro-
gram.
Because of its serious imbalance, the pres-
ent Reserve Component structure has seri-
ous readiness deficiencies. More than.a thou-
sand units in the current structure are not
needed. Most of these surplus units are
manned at only 50 percent of full wartime
strength and no equipment is being pro-
cured for them. At the same time, the Army
Reserve Forces need almost a thousand units
it does not have.
The Reserve Forces will be realigned to:
a. Bring the force structure into conform-
ity with that needed to satisfy military
requirements and for which equipment pro-
curement has been authorized.
b. Update the Reserve Force structure.
c. Provide adequate forces for the needs of
each state.
d. Locate the units in the proposed struc-
ture geographically and in relation to popu-
lation so that in the event of mobilization
the burden is shared equitably among states
and populations.
e. Diminish the need to assign involuntar-
ily to reserve units individuals who have
completed two or more years on active duty.
Under the proposed reorganization, the
Army's Reserve Components will consist of
units with a total paid drill strength of 640,-
000. Units in the new structure will be
manned at an average of more than 90 per-
cent of full wartime strength. The new struc-
ture will be supported with equipment, tech-
nicians, spare parts, and all the other es-
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sentials necessary to achieve required readi-
ness.
The structure of the Army's Reserve Com-
ponents under this new plan will consist of
eight combat divisions, 18 brigades, 13 Train-
ing Divisions and the necessary supporting
units to reinforce the Active Army and to
provide the support required for the Reserve
units.
At present there are 23 divisions, 11 bri-
gades and 13 training divisions in the Army's
Reserve Components. Of the. 23 divisions,
only 8 are manned at 80% of full wartime
strength. The remaining 15 low-priority di-
visions are manned at 50% of full wartime
strength. Equipment is not being procured
for the 15 low-priority divisions.
The realignment plan continues paid drill
units in both the Army National Guard and
the Army Reserve. The paid drill strength
in the Army National Guard would be 400,-
000 and 240,000 in the Army Reserve.
The Army National Guard will consist of
8 divisions, 18 brigades, other combat and
combat support units, and service support
units necessary to maintain equipment and
to satisfy state needs. Sufficient forces will
be allocated to the states to meet require-
ments for units needed in the event of civil
disturbances and natural disasters.
The Army Reserve will consist of mobiliza-
tion base units, including 13 training divi-
sions, two maneuver area commands, the
Army Reserve schools, and the service sup-
port units except those necessary to provide
for the Army National Guard and state
needs.
The allocation of all combat and combat
support units to the National Guard will give
the Guard the units most relevant to state
missions and will provide a basis which has
not existed heretofore for allocating a given
type unit to the Guard or to the Reserve.
There 38 precedence for this action in the
Reserve Components of the Air Force. In
the Array, the Army National Guard is pres-
ently composed of approximately 84% of
combat and combat support units. The
United States Army Reserve, on the other
hand, consists primarily of Mobilization
Base and Service Support units with about
79% of its strength in units of that type.
The transition from the current structure
to the proposed structure will be accom-
plished by:
a. Consolidating each of the existing 15
low-priority Army National Guard divisions
into a high priority divisional or separate
brigade.
b. Forming a division base and high
priority divisional bridage from each of the
eight existing high priority National Guard
divisions.
c. Forming the additional 19 divisional
or separate bridages needed from the 11 high
priority brigades now in the structure and
from low-priority units being discontinued.
d. Organizing the resulting 8 division bases
and 42 brigades into force of 8 high priority
divisions and 18 brigades.
e. Utilizing the Immediate Reserve and
the residual assets of the Reinforcing Re-
serve to form the remaining units required
in the proposed structure.
The Selected Reserve Force will be sub-
stantially unchanged.
The Army estimates that approximately
92% of the units in the proposed structure
will consist of units in the current structure
which will continue in being with no change,
or will be continued after making a moderate
conversion such as the conversion of a 105-
mm battalion to a 175mm battalion. Eight
percent of the units in the proposed struc-
ture will be newly activated. A significant
proportion of these activations would be re-
quired in any event, because units that do
not now exist, or do not exist in the number
required, must be added to the structure.
The plan is intended for implementation
after the 1967 summer field training has been
substantially completed, and will be com-
pleted before the beginning of summer field
training 1988 so that all units may then
attend training in their realigned con-
figuration.
Secretary McNamara emphasized the im-
portance of the reorganization in order that
the total force structure-Active and Re-
serve-will have the units required to enable
the Army to respond promptly in meeting
any emergencies that may arise in the
future.
Detailed stationing plans will be worked
out by the Commanding General, Contin?-
entai Army Command for the units in the
Army Reserve and by the Chief, National
Guard Bureau and State Adjutants General
for the units in the Army National Guard.
STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
CYRUs R. VANCE, REGARDING REALINEMENT
OF ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD,
MADE JUNE 2, 1967
The Reserve Forces of the United States
are in the best shape in their history but
more needs to be done. Secretary McNamara
and I yesterday approved an Army plan to
strengthen further the combat readiness of
the Reserve Forces for contingencies any-
where in the world.
The Army's plan is based on an assessment
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of what Reserve
Forces our nation needs, and what forces are
surplus.
When the Army received the results of the
Joint Chiefs' analysis, Secretary Resor and
General Johnson developed this plan, de-
signed for streamlined readiness and sus-
tained effectiveness.
Our country must have a modern and up-
to-date reserve forces structure. What we
want and what we must have are reserve
forces, manned, trained and equipped, to
carry out missions within a balanced force
structure.
This is precisely the objective of the
Army's plan. The realignment will assure
maximum effectiveness. The fighting edge of
the reserve forces will thus be further
sharpened.
This plan is the culmination of six years
of effort to improve the readiness and effec-
tiveness of our reserve forces. Six years ago
our reserve forces lacked readiness objectives
that were adequately linked to our contin-
gency war plans. Thousands of units
throughout the country were undermanned
and ill-equipped. Many were surplus to our
military requirements. Major steps to cor-
rect these deficiencies were taken in 1982 and
1.965, and a third will be taken with this new
Army plan. In the process we will have elimi-
nated more than 3500 unneeded units, and
will have added to our force structure more
than 2000 needed units. We feel that great
progress has been made over the last six
years. The plan which is now before us will
give us a balanced, ready, and effective re-
serve force.
The proposed reorganization will eliminate
about 1000 unneeded units in the Army Na-
tional Guard and the Army Reserves, and
will create approximately 1000 new units.
These activations will make the reserve
forces compatible with the Active Forces
and will give us an improved support struc-
ture for both Reserve and Active Forces.
National Guardsmen and Reservists under
the realignment plan will know that they are
fulfilling a heightened role in our nation's
defense. Our civilian leadership and our
military commanders will know that they
have balanced reserve forces on which they
can count for rapid response if necessary.
And the American people will know that this
major gain in national defense can be main-
tained for years to come at the minimum
cost possible.
Our reserve forces have served the nation
in an outstanding manner in the past. This
realignment will give them even greater op-
portunities for more effective service to our
nation in the future.
STATEMENT OF MR. STANLEY R. REsoR, SEC-
RETARY OF THE ARMY, JUNE 2, 1967
Gentlemen, as you came in you were issued
a press release which has a number of charts
attached that provide information concern-
ing the proposed Reserve Components re-
organization we are announcing today.
There are several matters which I would
like to emphasize with regard to this pro-
posed reorganization.
Under the reorganization plan which we
are announcing today the Army's Reserve
Components will have 8 combat divisions, 18
brigades, 13 training divisions and the re-
quired reinforcing and supporting units with
a total paid drill strength of 640,000. Units
in the proposed structure will be manned at
an average of over 90 per cent of full war-
time strength and will be fully supported
with equipment, technicians, and spare
parts.
The Army National Guard will have a paid
drill strength of 400,000 and will include 8
combat divisions and 18 combat brigades. It
will also include the necessary service sup-
port units to provide essential maintenance.
The Army Reserve will have a total paid drill
strength of 240,000 and will include 13 train-
ing divisions, whose mission is to prepare in-
dividuals for combat, 2 maneuver area com-
mands, the USAR schools and service support
units.
The plan will achieve the following major
objectives:
It will bring the reserve force structure
into conformity with that needed to satisfy
military requirements and that for which
equipment procurement has been authorized.
It will give the reserves the 8 combat divi-
sions, 18 brigades and supporting units rec-
ommended by the JCS.
It will update the reserve force structure
to conform to modifications which have been
made in the Active Army over the last two
years.
It will continue to provide adequate forces
for the needs of each state.
It will locate unitsgeographically and in
relation to population so that the burden
of mobilization will be shared equitably
among the states and population.
It will diminish the need to assign invol-
untarily to reserve units individuals who
have completed two or more years of active
service.
Unlike the reorganization proposal which
we made in 1965 and 1966, the current plan
will maintain units and paid drill strengths
in both National Guard and the Army Re-
serve.
The proposed reorganization can be ac-
complished without an unacceptable degree
of turbulence. Ninety-two per cent of the
units in the new structure, measured in
terms of total strength, will be units al-
ready in the current structure which will
be coninued with no change or with merely
a conversion to closely related types of units.
The Selected Reserve Force consisting of
3 divisions, 6 brigades and 150,000 men will
remain substantially unchanged except for
modernization of certain support units to
conform to changes made in similar units
in the Active Army.
We intend to begin implementing the plan
after field training is completed this sum-
mer. This will permit Congress time to take
action on pending legislation which may be
relevant to the plan. A major portion of the
reorganization will be accomplished by con-
solidating existing units not required by cur-
rent plans into new units which are re-
quired. This will enable us to retain most
of the trained personnel now in the Reserve
Components.
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STATEMENT ' OF GEN. HAROLD K. JOHNSON, serve Components be fully equipped and organization will permit additional improve-
CHIEF OF STAFF, V.S. ARMY, JUNE 2, 1967 properly supported to enable them to engage ments in readiness.
In their annual review of the military in sustained land combat promptly when I want to pay special tribute to those mem-
forces the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyzed the called upon to do SO. - bers of the Army National Guard and the
requirements and military force levels needed When this reorganization is completed and U.S. Army Reserve who have devoted so much
to fulfill the requirements of the national when the resulting force reaches the pre- time and energy to the security interest of
military strategy. From this analysis, it was scribed strengths, equipment levels, and our country. A new opportunity now presents
determined that the forces in the Army's Re- readiness, it will meet the requirements for itself which will require an intensified effort
serve Components should consist of 8 dtvi- Reserve Components in the Army as we see and renewed devotion on the part of these
sions and 18 brigades, together with other them today and in the foreseeable future. individuals. I know that it is their basic pur-
Units to t, augment and and co anmmpp asemen Active vThe establishment of the Selected Re- pose to continue to devote their talents and
Army forces. The Joint Chiefs of f Staff rec- serve Force was a first step in reaching a energies to the nation's security and that all
Army
ornritended that all of the units in the Re- higher state of readiness. The proposed re- other interests become secondary.
Comparison of present and proposed Reserve component structure
IMMEDIATE RESERVE UNITS
Air defense ------------------------------------------------
Units to round out Active Army------------------------------
Brigades (now 11 brigades, to be increased to 18 brigades)______
Mobilization base and training units -------- _--------------- .-_
8 division forces-------------------------------------------
__________ _________ _ --- -- --
Support to other services---------------------------------
State headquarters and U.S. Army Reserve schools, staff and
faculty------------------------------------------------
Subtotal------------------------------------------
REINFORCING RESERVE UNITS
Other divisions (15 divisions, Army National Guard)____________
Nondivisional units----------------------------------------
Command headquarters, divisional___________________________
Subtotal--------------------------------------------
Total -----------------------------------------------
Proposed structure
Army National U.S. Army
Guard Reserve
Army National
Guard
U.S. Army
Reserve
Total
Manning level
Thousands
Thousands
Percent
7.4 --------------
77. 0 88.7
43.6 15.9
8.7 66.9
164.8 72. 5
2. 5 11. 4
7. 4
165.7
59.5
75.6
237.3
13.9
85
80
75-80
75-100
75-80
70
10
88
65
9
222
---------
---------45
66
--------- 6
16
14
5
100
90
90
90-100
90
90
240
96. 3 --------------
13.6
.7
96. 3
13.6
.7
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
--------------
I418.5 I 260. 0
I 678.5
r Breakout of strength between Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve and between categories is approximate and subject to refinement.
Comparison of present and future structure
Combat divisions---------------------------------------------------------
Training divisions------------- -------------------------------------------
Command headquarters, divisional__________________________________________
Combat brigades ----------------------------------------------------------
Maneuver area commands_________________________________________________
Air defense battalions____________________________________________________
Field Army support command______________________________________________
Support brigades--------------------------------------------------------
Adjutant Generalunits ----------------------------------------------------
Civil affairs units---------------------------------------------------------
COSTAR units------------------------------ -------------------------
Finance units ----------------------------------------------------------
JAG units---------------------------=--- ---- ---- ------------- --------
Hospitalunits ----------------------------------------------------------
Military police battalions --------------------------------------------------
Publicinformation units---------------------------------------------------
PSYOPS units------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------
Garrison units -----------------------
Ter inal units----------------------------------------------------
Total companies and detachments+ ----------------------------------------
Paid drill strength (thousands)r ------------------------------------------
U.S. Army
Reserve,
Army
U.S. Army
rve
R
Immediate
Reserve r
Reinforcing
Reserve 2
Immediate
Reserve8
National
Guard
ese
8
0
23
0
8
0
13
13
13
13
0
0
5
0
0
7
4
11
0
18
2
2
2
44
0
44
31
0
0
0
1
0
3
4
4
36
96
132
116
1
77
77
51
51
38
38
208
248
18
19
53
53
0
196
196
226
226
15
107
122
121
121
6
4
10
0
11
34
25
59
35
35
8
8
6
0
0
18
18
4
4
0
19
19
19
19
2
520
480
1
575
3
7 575
2,90
3,400
6, 300
,
307.9
,
110.6
,
260
08:5
40
240
640
1 Manned at 80 percent or higher or full wartime strength; necessary equipment being procured. a Fiscal ximt1967 budget strength.
2 Manned at 511 percent of full wat-time strength; no equipment being procured. year
s jyjanned at 90 percent or higher or full wartime strength; to be fully supported with equipment,
technicians, and spare parts.
.:{yAJOR- UNITS dIYERENTLYv IN THE ARMY
NATIONAL GUARD
Immediate Reserve divisions and brigades
normally manned at 80% war-time strength
for which equipment is being procured.
IC141T AND LOCATION
:.;.
30th Armored 'Division, Tennessee.
50th Armored Division, New Jersey.
26th Infantry Division, Massachusetts.
28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania.
80th Infantry Division, North Carolina.
88th Infantry Division, Indiana.
42d Infantry Division, New York.
47th Infantry Division, Minnesota.
53d Armored Brigade, Florida-South Caro-
lina.
86th Armored Brigade, Vermont-Connecti-
cut.
29th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii-California.
69th Infantry Brigade, Kansas-Missouri.
92d Infantry Brigade, Puerto Rico.
258th Infantry Brigade, Arizona-Missouri-
Virginia.
67th Infantry Brigade (Meth), Nebraska-
Iowa.
Reinforcing Reserve divisions (National
Guard) manned at 50% war-time strength
for which no equipment is being procured.
" . UNIT AND LOCATION
27th Armored Division, New York.
40th Armored Division, California.
48th Armored Division, Georgia.
49th Armored Division, Texas.
29th Infantry Division, Virginia-Maryland.
31st Infantry Division, Alabama-Missis-
sippi.
32d Infantry Division, Wisconsin.
33d Infantry Division, Illinois.
36th Infantry Division, Texas.
37th Infantry Division, Ohio.
39th Infantry Division, Louisiana-Arkan-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
41st Infantry Division, Washington-Ore-
gon.
45th Infantry Division, Oklahoma.
46th Infantry Division, Michigan.
49th Infantry Division, California.
Current and proposed paid drill strength of
Army National Guard by State--Continued
MAJOR UNITS IN THE ARNG UNDER THE PRO-
Maryland---------- ----------
6, 843
POSED REORG
NI
Massachusetts
15
001
A
ZATION PLAN
Michigan--------- -------------
,
9
999
Eight divisions and eighteen brigades, all
Minnesota_________________
,
10, 850
to be manned at 90% full war-time strength
Mississippi________________
10, 928
and fully supported with equipment, tech-
ni
i
Missouri
Montana _..--------------__----
9, 299
2
477
c
ans and other essentials for readiness.
Nebraska
,
4
861
UNITS AND LOCATION
Nevada__
,
880
New Hampshire_________________
2
280
26th Infantry Division
New Jersey---------------------
,
14, 761
Hq and Base, Massachusetts.
New Mexico New York
3,398
24
765
Brigade, Massachusetts.
Brigade, Massachusetts. _
North Carclira North Dakota___________________
,
11, 262
2, 993
Brigade, Connecticut.
Ohio---------------------
15, 892
Oklahoma--------
8
974
28th Infantry Division
Oregon -- -----------------
,
6,718
Hq and Base, Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania________________- - -
18,753
Brigade, Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico Rh
6,923
.
Brigade, Maryland.
ode Island
South Carolina____
3, 343
11
053
Brigade, Virginia.
South Dakota___________________
,
4
145
Tennessee
,
11
734
30th Infantry Division ?
Texas
,
17
225
Hq and Base, North Carolina
Utah
,
4
886
.
Brigade, North Carolina.
Vermont
Virginia -----------------------
,
3,144
7
698
Brigade, Georgia.
Washington_..___________________
,
6, 757
Brigade, South Carolina.
West Virginia_______________.._--
3,576
Wisconsin-----------------
9
942
38th Infantry Division
Hq and Base, Indiana.
-----
Wyoming-- ----
,
1,681
Brigade, Indiana.
Brigade, Michigan.
Brigade, Ohio.
CURRENT LOCATION OF U.S. ARMY
42d Infantry Division
Iiq and Base, New York.
Brigade, New York.
Brigade, New York.
Brigade, Pennsylvania.
47th Infantry Division
Hq and Base, Minnesota.
Brigade, Minnesota.
Brigade, Illinois.
Brigade, Iowa.
30th Armored Division
Hq and Base, Tennessee.
Brigade, Tennessee.
Brigade, Alabama.
Brigade, Mississippi.
50th Armored Division
Hq and Base, New Jersey.
Brigade, New Jersey.
Brigade, New York.
Brigade, Vermont.
Infantry Brigades (Sep) (14): Arkansas,
California, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Puerto Rico, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.
Infantry Brigades (Mech) (Sep) (2):
Nebrasska, Texas.
Airborne Brigade (Sep) (1) : Alabama.
Armor Brigade (Sep) (1) : California.
Current and proposed paid drill strength of
6, 467
14, 877
9, 750
9,653
10, 500
8, 450
2, 443
4, 334
950
2, 243
14,183
3, 267
24, 520
11, 037
2, 600
14, 991
8, 400
6, 309
17, 943
7, 000
2, 900
9, 714
3,757
10, 588
17, 409
4:618
2, 900
7, 761
5, 904
3, 066
9, 940
1, 564
RESERVE
TRAINING DIVISIONS MANEUVER AREA COM-
MANDS AND SUPPORT BRIGADES
UNIT AND LOCATION
Training divisions
100th, Kentucky.
104th, Washington, Oregon.
108th, North Carolina, South Carolina.
70th, Michigan, Indiana.
76th, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, Rhode Island, Maine.
78th, New Jersey.
80th, Virginia, Maryland.
84th, Wisconsin.
85th, Illinois.
89th, Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska.
91st, California.
95th, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana.
98th, New York.
Maneuver area commands
87th, Alabama.
75th, Texas.
Support brigades I
103d, Iowa.
301st, New York.
377th, Louisiana.
Mr. McCLURE. Mr. Chairman, ac-
cording to an article in This Week mag-
azine last Sunday, all of the wars in
America's history have cost $500 billion.
The bill before us today is thus equiva-
lent to 14 percent of that figure. When
you add what was appropriated in sup..
plementals earlier this year, you will find
that the 90th Congress already has au-
thorized defense spending totaling as
Alabama..
16, 16,283
15
355
Alaska -..
2, 253
,
1
940
Arizona _..----------------------
.2, 948
,
2
800
Arkansas .______________________
7, 720
,
8
050
California_____________
22, 332
,
21
958
Colorado--__-_?--_
2,987
,
2
706
Connecticut
6, 393
,
5
800
Delaware __
:3,130
,
2
800
District of Columbia_____
:1, 714
,
1
705
Florida------
8,333
,
7
549
Georgia_________________ --
H
7,613
,
8, 800
awaii------------------------
Idaho
4, 253
4, 595
Illinois-----
3,408
11, 563
3, 319
11
338
Indiana-----
11,596
,
10
489
Iowa
8,333
,
7,811
Kansas ------------ -----------
--
Kentuck
8,401
7, 300
y---?----------------
Louisiana
5, 502
7, 726
4, 957
7
890
Maine-----------------
2, 788
,
2, 800
" Infantry vs. Mechanized status is under
study.
much as the entire cost of all American
wars prior to World War II.
And so I cannot help wondering why
it is, with these billions upon billions
available for our defense effort, we stag-
ger on and on through a seemingly end-
less stalemate in Southeast Asia? What,
indeed, will it take to achieve victory or
even a face-saving settlement? If this
budget cannot do the job, then it prob-
ably cannot be done.
The root of the problem must lie with
those who administer the program.
Under proposed reorganization, one new
brigade will be added.
Strangely enough, it is in the civilian
offices at the Defense Department where
the will to win is about as obscure as the
reasons given for our presence in Viet-
nam in the first place.
Mr. McNamara's conduct as Secretary
of Defense has given rise to that new
phenomena, the credibility gap. On more
than one occasion, he has flouted the ex-
pressed will of Congress. Against the ad-
vice of this Nation's foremost military
experts, the Secretary has relied solely
on the F-111 to fill our bomber require-
ments. He has practically invited missile
attacks on this country by stubbornly
refusing to build an adequate anti-bal-
listic-missile defense.
Furthermore, I think that any man
who has misjudged the costs of the Viet-
nam War by $15 billion as the Secretary
did in fiscal 1966 and by $13 billion as
he did in fiscal 1967 has a right to expect
criticism of his performance. It probably
would be presumptuous of a freshman
Congressman to call for the resignation
of a Cabinet official. So, I shall merely
say that I heartily endorse any such ex-
pression on the part of my colleagues
and wish them Godspeed in their efforts.
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, as I
have done in similar cases in the past, I
shall vote for this enormous defense ap-
propriation because there really is no
alternative, as I see it. In today's world,
we must maintain the strength of our
Defense Establishment and our forces in
Vietnam must have the equipment and
supplies they need.
In the bill before us, there is no way
of determining how much of the total is
to be used in Vietnam or in the process
of bombing North Vietnam, and there-
fore it is not practicable to propose
amendments to limit or reduce these
amounts. If amendments to this effect
are offered, I shall be inclined to support
them.
I compliment the committee for the
reductions it has made in the budget re-
quests, but I am disturbed that the com-
mittee has proposed additions to the ad-
ministration's requests totaling over
$400 million, and I intend to propose an
amendment that would reduce these
add-ons.
It is imperative that, in these days of
economic strain, we conduct our affairs
in as economical a way as possible. If the
Department of Defense, having carefully
studied the matter, concludes that an ex-
penditure is not needed, I am inclined to
support that judgment.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I believe
this concludes the general debate on the
bill.
I hope that the hearings and the re-
port, which are available to all Members,
as well as the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of
today, will enable all of us to be generally
familiar with the huge operations of the
Department of Defense. I hope that that
familiarity will instill a confidence in,
and support of, the defense operations
of our Nation.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the
following sums are appropriated, out of any
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE
money in the Treasury not otherwise appro-
priated, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1968, for military functions administered
by the Department of Defenses, and for other
purposes, namely:
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask.
unanimous consent that on page 1, line
6, where the words "Department of De-
fenses" appear that the letter "s" be
deleted so that the words will read "De-
partment of Defense".
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection,
it is so ordered.
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
PRACTICE, ARMY
For the necessary expenses of construc-
tion, equipment, and maintenance of rifle
ranges, the instruction of citizens in marks-
manship, and promotion of rifle practice, in
accordance with law, including travel of
rifle teams, military personnel, and indivi-
duals attending regional, national, and inter-
national competitions, and not to exceed
$21,000. for incidental expenses of the Na-
tional Board; $428,000: Provided, That travel
expenses of civilian members of the National
Board shall be paid in accordance with the
Standardized Government Travel Regula-
tions, as amended.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. M'CARTHY
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I
offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. MCCARTHY: on
page 13, strike out line 19 and all that fol-
lows down through and including line 6 on
page 14.
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. -Chairman, this
amendment is very simple. It would
strike $428,000 for the National Board
for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. This
money is used for ammunition and the
loan of rifles to National Rifle Associa-
tion clubs. The present law requires that
groups which want this Federal aid must
join the National Rifle Association.
I offer the amendment because I do
not believe that the Government of the
United States should subsidize an orga-
nization which espouses vigilantism
within the confines of the United States.
I refer to a suggestion in the May issue
of The American Rifleman, the official
organ of the National Rifle Association,
that citizens acquire firearms to form
civilian posses in order to provide a po-
tential community stabilizer against the
threat of urban rioting.
I would like to quote briefly from this
editorial:
Mob action on a scale unprecedented in
the modern United States has ravaged com-
munity after community in recent years
. With homefront safeguards spotty and
uncertain, the armed citizen represents a
potential community stabilizer. His support
of law and order, whether as a civilian mem-
ber 9f the posse comitatus or as one of the
unorganized militia, defined as the whole-
body of able-bodied male citizens," could
prove essential.
I suggest to you that this is a prescrip-
finn for mass mayhem for taking the
H 7101
were given the job of checking out the and more importantly, in the purposes
suitability of groups that get Federal of the use, of firearms. It is a relation-
guns "because we have the expertise and ship between a private group and our
know-how." defense agencies that is bad in principal
I say that expertise and know-how did and worse in practice. It should be
not prevent them from running an edi- brought to a prompt halt by the passage
torial like the one to which I referred, or of this amendment.
from carrying on their membership rolls (Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given
the head of the lunatic-fringe Minute- permission to revise and extend his re-
men. marks.)
I suggest also that they do not need Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
the money for they are prosperous, hav- opposition to the amendment.
ing assets of almost $11 million, partly The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from
because of their tax-exempt status under Florida is recognized for 5 minutes.
section 50i as-and I quote the IRS- (Mr. SIKES asked and was given per-
"an organization exclusively for the pro- mission to revise and extend his re-
motion of social welfare." marks.)
I think we know it as a lobbying or- Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I am not
ganization. But it is not registered under sure that I understand the purposes of
the Lobbying Act. I think they have the amendment offered by the distin-
performed a disservice to this country in guished gentleman from New York. His
fighting reasonable firearm legislation. remarks were directed against the Na-
We- are going to hear about arming the tional Rifle Association, but if we look
Arabs. I suggest to you that because of at the language of the bill, it has no
the lack of effective firearms laws, we reference to the National Rifle Associ-
have permitted the arming of very mili- ation. His amendment strikes at the Na-
tant far left and far right antagonistic tional Board for the Promotion of Rifle
groups, groups like the Black Panthers Practice.
and the Minutemen. This situation rep- Possibly the amendment was inspired
resents a force for instability, especially by a story in one of the local newspapers
in the coming hot summer. that NRA is subsidized by the U.S. Treas-
Mr. Chairman, I think this whole prac- ury. This is not the case. The National
tice is at best questionable, and I cer- Rifle Association gets no subsidy from
tainly think that the record shows that the U.S. Government. Nor has it pro-
the NRA is not a proper or responsible vided arms and ammunition to either
conduit for Federal guns and ammuni- of the groups named by the distinguished
tion, and that we could save the tax- gentleman.
payers $428,000 by adopting this amend- The National Rifle Association, by
ment. helping to carry out the duties and re-
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will sponsibilities which are assigned by law
the gentleman yield? to the National Board for the Promotion
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the gen- of Rifle Practice, is actually subsidizing
tleman from New York. the U.S. Treasury. What is done repre-
Mr. BINGHAM. I would like to com- sents a service to the Government which
mend the gentleman from New York for is not paid for from Government funds.
bringing this matter to the attention of I believe the principal point we want
the Committee, and I would like to be to consider today is that we have a pro-
associated with his remarks and I shall gram which has been carried on -since
be glad to support his amendment. 1903 to train young men in the use of
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the gentle- arms in the realization that this could
man. be helpful to them and to our country
Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, will the in case of war. The clubs and the in-
gentleman yield? dividuals who participate are carefully
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the gen- screened. -
tleman from New York. Nothing is taken from the active forces
Mr. SCHEUER. I would like to com- by making arms and ammunition avail-
mend the gentleman, and I support him able for this purpose. The rifles and the
most wholeheartedly. I do this as a Mem- ammunition which are used generally
ber who has enjoyed for decades the use are obsolescent or overage, but in the
of firearms. As a young fellow I was a hands of the National Board for the Pro-
member of a National Championship motion of Rifle Practice they serve a very
Rifle Team, and earned the "Expert useful purpose. I believe this is better
Rifleman" citation of the National Rifle than making them into scrap or selling
Association. I have been a member of them as surplus into what may be irre-
rifle and pistol clubs for almost all my sponsible hands.
life. I own a wide variety of sidearms, I would like to point out that this
shotguns, and, rifles. At my home in a program has been going on since 1903
locked box I have what constitutes a when Elihu Root, as Secretary of War,
veritable arsenal of weaponry. My four sponsored the program. During that time
kids aged 7 to 15 all handle pistols, rifles, the program has worked well. The people
and shotguns, with skill, respect, and have found it useful. No one has tried
care. The NRA plays a useful educational before in my 27 years here to kill the
role in teaching Americans, myself in- program. Now, when we are at war it is
law into one's own armed hands. This eluded, how to use firearms prudently
$428,000 is only part of about $2 million and skillfully. But I am persuaded from
this organization gets annually under their recent published statements and
this kind of program. activities, that they should play no for-
This morning's issue of the Washing- mal official, governmentally sanctioned,
ton Post quotes the executive vice pres- and subsidized role, directly or indirectly,
ident of the organization as stating they in the training of our citizenry in the-use,
an inopportune time to do so. If that is
the purpose of the amendment, it simply
falls on its face, because it would
eliminate the directing force of the pro-
gram, the National Board for the Pro-
motion of Rifle Practice, and accomplish
nothing useful.
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H7.102 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, when we return to the
House, I shall ask unanimous consent
to place in the RECORD at this point a
breakdown of the funds carried here.
They include $159,000 for the civilian
personnel to operate the National Board
for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, for
example. There is also included $80,000
for the travel of. civilian teams to the
National Rifle and Pistol matches. At
the 1966 national matches, held at
Camp Perry, Ohio, 46 rifle and 56 pistol
teams, representing 49 States and Puer-
to Rico, participated. Funds for the
lease of Camp Perry, Ohio, which is the
site for the national rifle matches, are
included in the $428,000 provided for
this activity.
The material referred to follows:
The primary mission of the National Board
for the Promotion of Rifle Practice is to pro-
mote marksmanship training with military
type individual small arms among able-
bodied citizens outside the active services of
the Armed Forces, to formulate policy gov-
erning civilian marksmanship programs, and
to formulate rules and regulations governing
the National Trophy Matches.
The training program of the National
Board is conducted through civilian shooting
clubs and schools scattered throughout the
United, States. As of 30 June 1966, there were
387,947 individuals enrolled in 5,789 clubs and
schools.
The $428,000 requested for FY 1968 is not
intended to cover all the expenses of the
marksmanship program carried out by civ-
ilian clubs. The ammunition and targets fur-
nished constitute only a fraction of the year's
requirement of the average shooter. Most of
the ranges used are privately owned and
maintained and the instructors contribute
their own time as a public service. The
Board's program is a stimulant to get young
men interested in shooting with military
weapons and to maintain a corps of instruc-
tors to teach young men to shoot properly.
In return for the assistance given, the re-
cipient must agree to fire one of the U.S.
Army's qualification courses with a military
weaport and the clubs must report the re-
sults of the firing In order to remain eligible
for assistance the following year.
Funds for personnel costs in FY 1968 will
support the present personnel authorization,
22 civilian positions. The reduction of $3,000
in FY 1968 represents the savings in the
number of working days and the elimination
of overtime costs.
Funds requested for travel in FY 1968 are
$43,000 below the FY 1967 level. U.S. teams
will participate in one international shooting
match :1n FY 1968, the Pan American Games,
to be held in Winnipeg, Canada in July 1967.
The cost will be $19,000.
Target funds required in FY 1968 are esti-
mated to be $53,000, which is $18,700 less
than the amount required in FY 1967. Dur-
ing FY 1967, the Army adopted a new high-
power rifle target. In order to keep the civil-
ian marksmanship program in line with the
Army's training methods, an initial issue of
these targets was made to all clubs firing
high-power rifles. It is anticipated that the
requirement for FY 1968 will be reduced
since many clubs will have a stock of the
new target on hand.
Equipment requirements for the National
Matches, $25,000, are continued at the FY
1967 level. This item includes all of the non-
expendable equipment used at the matches,
to include range equipment, mess equip-
ment, bedding and the many miscellaneous
items necessary to support approximately
7,000 competitors and 2,900 support per-
sonnel.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I ask
for a vote on the amendment.
Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Georgia.
Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment offered by
the gentleman from New York. In op-
posing this amendment, I would like to
associate myself with the remarks of the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. SlxEsl and
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. MAHON].
The reasons given by them clearly
demonstrate that the overall national
benefits derived from this program far
exceed the $428,000 provided for in this
item of the bill.
The National Board for the Promotion
of Rifle Practice, since its establishment
in 1903, has fulfilled an important func-
tion in training servicemen and civilians
alike in the fundamentals of knowledge
and use of firearms. -
This knowledge and use of weapons
has been in the national interest and
there are few, if any, examples in which
the knowledge and proficiency thus
gained have been for any criminal ac-
tivity, anywhere, at any time.
The author of the amendment un-
doubtedly has not reviewed the 64-year
history of this board and the functions
which it has performed. If he had done
so, I am confident he would have come
to the unmistakable conclusion that it;
has been a good program, and has justi-
fied its existence and continuance over
the years.
Insofar as I have been able to learn,
the history and record of the National
Board for the Promotion of Rifle Prac-
tice does not form a basis for the stor
y
As in FY 1967, $80,000 is requested for the which appeared in the newspaper this
travel of civilian teams to the National Rifle morning. Contrary to the contents of this
and Pistol Matches. At the 1966 National newspaper story, the organization re-
Matches, held at Camp Perry, Ohio, 46 rifle ferred to therein has contributed much
and 46 pistol teams, representing 49 States more to this program than the entire
and Puerto Rico, participated in the
matcheao. amount provided for in this item of this
Funds for the lease of Camp Perry, Ohio, appropriations bill. Mr. Chairman, if any
as a site for the National Matches are con- change should be made in either the
tinued at $50,000 a year. The original lease language or the amount contained in
provided payments of $150,000 a year for the this item of the bill, the amount should
first four years (FY's 1961-1964) and $50,000 be increased to at least equal the amount
year for the remaining 21 years of the provided in fiscal year 1967.
The amount requested for badges, medals Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amend-
and trophies, $17,950, is the same amount as went offered by the gentleman from
requested in FY 1967. This itens includes all Now York and I urge that it be rejected.
marksmanship awards issued to civilians and (Mr. FLYNT asked and was given per-
all trophies, plaques and medals awarded at mission to revise and extend his re-'
the National Matches. marks.)
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. I thank the gentle-
man for yielding.
I wish to join the gentleman and others
in opposing this amendment. The Na-
tional Board for the Promotion of Rifle
Practice has promoted rifle marksman-
ship instruction over a great number of
years. It has encouraged U.S. participa-
tion in many international smallarms
competition. These funds provide for
our participation in the coming Pan
American games. It is a worthwhile
operation.
I encourage the Members to vote down
the amendment,
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. McCART11Yl.
The amendment was rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MISSILES,
ARnry
For expenses necessary for the procure-
ment, manufacture; and modification of mis-
siles, armament, ammunition, equipment, ve-
hicles, vessels, and aircraft for the Army
and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps;
purchase of not to exceed five thousand
passenger motor vehicles (including eleven
medium sedans at not to exceed $3,000 each)
for replacement only; expenses which in the
discretion of the Secretary of the Army are
necessary in providing facilities for produc-
tion of equipment and supplies for national
defense purposes,, including construction,
and the furnishing of Government-owned
facilities and equipment at privately owned
plants; and ammunition for military salutes
at institutions to which issue of weapons for
salutes is authorized; $5,475,000,000, to re-
main available until expended.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the last word.
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I take this
time to ask the distinguished chairman
of the Appropriations Committee or some
member of the subcommittee to provide
us with a estimate of the amount of
military equipment which is proposed to
be purchased abroad. I have in mind,
I would say to the distinguished gentle-
man, the proposal by this Government
to buy some $60 million to $80 million
worth of military equipment in Great
Britain.
May we have some figures, if it is
available, as to how much of the $70
billion in this bill is going to go for mili-
tary equipment purchased in foreign
countries?
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman
from Texas.
Mr. MAHON. I should like to give some
information on that subject to the gen-
tleman from Iowa.
The United States has sold over $11
billion in military equipment to our allies
in the 5-year period from fiscal year 1962
through 1966.
Mr. GROSS. I would say to the gentle-
man that I am not asking about how
much we have sold. I am asking how
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
much this Government is going to buy
in foreign countries?
Mr. MAHON. I was about to say that
we have sold $11 billion worth and we
propose to buy $325 million worth. That
is the quick answer.
Mr. GROSS. Is that the total, $325
million?
Mr. MAHON. I do not believe it would
include all items. I do not have a list of
items before me. If one calls oil military
equipment, we must remember that a lot
of oil is bought overseas.
Mr. GROSS. It was publicized in the
newspapers a few days ago that the
United States was considering the pur-
chase of 200 executive-type jet airplanes
from Great Britain. Did this come be-
fore the gentleman's committee? Does
the gentleman know anything about the
purchase of 200 jet executive-type
planes? If so, why do we buy them in
Britain and who is going to use them
when they get to this country?
Mr. MAHON. We are buying from
Canada, under this bill-and it is above
the budget estimate, by the way-a few
copies of the Caribou aircraft, in the
total sum of $12.5 million.
. Mr. GROSS. What about the execu-
tive-type planes they are talking about
buying?
Mr. MAHON. Offhand, I do not think
those would be involved here. Perhaps
some other member of the subcommittee
is able to provide some further infomma-
tion on your inquiry.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. There have been
some ideas expressed as to the possible
future procurement of aircraft of this
type, but there is nothing in this par-
ticular bill for a procurement of jet-type
executive aircraft such as has been men-
tioned by the gentleman from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. If purchased, who is
going to get these British executive-type
planes, and why does this Government
not buy Jet Stars made in this country
or some other similar type of plane made
in this country?
Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am all for keeping
it in this country. I do not believe in this
particular type of procurement being ac-
complished with foreign firms.
Mr. GROSS. I do not understand why
we are buying some $325 million worth
of military equipment from Great Brit-
ain or from any other country. We have
the capacity to produce all we need in
this country. We hear about poverty in
.this country every 15 minutes. What is
wrong with our employing more Ameri-
[r, MAH.`ON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. GROSS. I am glad to yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. MAHON. Are we not taking care
of American industry and labor in selling
$11 billion worth of military equipment
to our allies_in a 5-year period? What is
wrong with that?
Wr. GROSS. Everything in the world
is wrong with it. We are getting an awful
good lesson right now out of the Middle
East. We armed those nations and then
they started fighting and tearing each
other up. Now we are getting the word
over in the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs that we probably will be asked to
put up many millions of dollars in order
to patch things up again. That is what
is wrong with it.
Mr. MAHON. We did not sell $11 bil-
lion in military equipment to the Middle
East countries. I referred to our allies.
Mr. GROSS. How cockeyed contradic-
tory can we get in this country when we
talk about peace, spend millions of dol-
lars a year on a disarmament agency,
and then peddle $2 billion worth of arms
a year around the world? How contra-
dictory can we get?
The CHAIRMAN: The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND MIssILEs, NAVY
For construction, procurement, produc-
tion, modification, and modernization of air-
craft, missiles, equipment, including ord-
nance, spare parts, and accessories therefor;
specialized equipment; expansion of public
and private plants, including the land neces-
sary therefor, and such lands, and interests
therein, may be acquired, and construction
prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title
by the Attorney General as required by sec-
tion 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and
procurement and installation of equipment,
appliances, and machine tools in public or
private plants; $2,946,500,000, to remain
available until expended of which $208,-
800,000 shall be available only for the
Fill-B aircraft program.
ADMENTMENT OFFERED BY MR. BINCHAM
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BINGHAM: On
page 16, line 14, strike out $2,946,500,000" and
insert in lieu thereof "$2,839,800,000,".
(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr.. Chairman, my
amendment would be to eliminate the
$106.7 million that has been added on
to the request for the EA-6A aircraft. It
is an item which appears on page 4 of the
committee report under the summary of
additions recommended by the com-
mittee.
Mr. Chairman, I do want to commend
the distinguished committee for the con-
scientious job I know they have done in
making reductions in the requested ap-
propriations, but I am seriously con-
cernedat the amount of over $400 million
in add-ons. I propose this amendment as
a way of pointing up the problem.
This sum of $106.7 million was not
requested by the Defense Department
but apparently was made by the Depart-
ment of the Navy. In this era, when we
are faced with inflation and when there
are great demands from all sides for
expenditures that are necessary, we
should economize to the extent we can.
When the Defense Department has
studied the matter and has come up with
the conclusion that this request from
the Navy Department should not be met,
I believe that it would be wise and
economical for this body to go along with
the Department of Defense.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BINGHAM. I will be glad to yield
to the distinguished gentleman from
Wisconsin.
Mr. LAIRD. Does the gentleman from
New York intend to submit amendments
on all of the add-ons which we made?
Mr. BINGHAM. No, but, as I said,
I am concerned about the total amount
of add-ons.
Mr. LAIRD.This add-on for the EA-6A
is in accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices of both the House and the Senate.
It is true that the Chief of Naval Op-
erations and the Secretary of the De-
partment of the Navy appealed the deci-
sion of the Secretary of Defense. The
Secretary of Defense did not support
this particular item. But the Secretary
of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations did support it. The House Commit-
tee on Armed Services supports it, the
Senate Armed Services Committee sup-
ports it, and the conference committee
agreed to this particular add-on.
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I want
to state to the gentleman from Wisconsin
[Mr. LAIRD] that I am aware of that. I
am proposing this amendment as a way
of protesting the fact that such heavy
additions have been made to the request
submitted. This item is also the type of
expenditure which I believe has to do at
least, in part, with the intensified bomb-
ing of North Vietnam with which I and
other Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives are not in agreement. It is dif-
ficult to make out from the hearings on
this item-part 4, pages 209 to 212-
just what the facts are.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment..
(Mr. MAHON asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the Con-
gress has authorized $106 million,
through legislation sponsored by the
Committee on Armed Services, for these
EA-6A aircraft for use in the war in
Southeast Asia.
The Joint Chiefs, who have primary
responsibility in connection with the
war, have recommended these aircraft
and have stated that they are urgently
needed by the Marines in order to fight
the particular type of war in which they
are involved.
Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that
it would represent a serious blow to our
defense effort should the Congress deny
the funds provided herein for the EA-6A
aircraft.
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from New York.
Mr. PIKE. I thank the distinguished
gentleman from Texas, the chairman of
the Committee on Appropriations, very
much for yielding to me at this time.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that
I appreciate on behalf of Marine avia-
tion in general the fact that these air-
craft have been added. They are not
essentially a bombing aircraft. They are
electronics jamming aircraft. They are
designed to save American lives by jam-
ming the radars and the SAM's of the
North Vietnamese.
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H 7104 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, the
Marines need these planes very, very
badly and I commend the Armed. Serv-
ices Committee for having added them
to the authorization. I further wish that
all these planes were available at this
moment in Vietnam where they are
badly needed. This is a new plane for a
vital mission and we have! very few of
them.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Wisconsin.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the
gentleman from Texas for yielding to
me at this time.
Mr. Chairman, this is one of the most
important additions made by the com-
mittee from the strategic standpoint of
the prosecution of the war in Vietnam.
It is the most important of any that the
committee added.
Mr. Chairman, I would caution the
members of the Committee today against
voting for this amendment. This amend-
ment should be defeated. These add-ons
are necessary in order to protect the
lives of our fliers and in order to see
that the war is prosecuted on a much
safer basis from the standpoint of our
service personnel.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Florida.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, the record
of the committee hearings is full of in-
stances where witnesses have stated, one
after the other, that this is the greatest
single need in additional aircraft. This
plane is not a bomber, as has been pre-
viously pointed out. Primarily, it is an
electronics aircraft, and one which illus-
trates a state of the art in aircraft de-
sign not heretofore reached.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. BINGHAM].
The amendment was rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
SE[IPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY
For expenses necessary for the construc-
tion, acquisition, or conversion of vessels as
authorized by law, including armor and
armament thereof, plant equipment, ap-
pliances, and machine tools, and installation
thereof in public or private plants; procure-
ment of critical, long leadtime components
and designs for vessels to be constructed
or converted in the future; and expansion
of public and private plants, including land
necessary therefor, and such land, and inter-
ests therein, may be acquired and construc-
tion prosecuted thereon prior to approval of
title by the Attorney General as required
by section 355, Revised statutes, as amended;
$1,420,000,000, to remain available until ex-
pended: Provided, That none of the funds
herein provided for the construction or con-
version of any naval vessel to be constructed
in shipyards in the United States shall be
expended in foreign shipyards for the con-
struction of major components of the hull
or superstructure of such vessel.
Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr.
Chairman, I move to strike the requisite
number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might
ask a question of the distinguished
chairman of the Committee on Appro-
priations.
Mr. Chairman, the committee report
states on page 47 that the Committee on
Appropriations will expect the Defense
Department to proceed with the advance
procurement of the second fiscal year
1968 nuclear frigate, and that the com-
mittee will expect the Defense Depart-
ment to request funds for the full con-
struction of the second nuclear frigate
in the 1969 shipbuilding program.
Is that statement, Mr. Chairman, suf-
ficient to insure that the Defense De-
partment will actually build this second
fiscal year 1968 nuclear frigate?
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield to me, I would say
the answer to the question is "No." The
language is not sufficient to compel the
Department of Defense to build the ad-
ditional frigates that are provided for
in this bill. You can lead a defense offi-
cial to water, but you cannot make him
drink,, and that is the problem here. I
believe these funds will be used, and I
certainly would want to emphasize that
it is the position of the committee, and
I am sure of the House, that we should
proceed with all deliberate speed with
the construction of these ships for the
nuclear navy. I believe this is the wave
of the future in navy warfare.
Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Then,
Mr. Chairman, would it be proper to say
that it is clearly the intention of the
Committee on Appropriations and,
therefore, the intention of the House,
that they should be built?
Mr. MAHON. I say to the distinguish-
ed gentleman, who has distinguished
himself in the field of nuclear propul-
sion in the Navy, that it certainly is the
view of the committee, and I believe of
the House, that the Department of De-
fense should proceed with construction.
I commend the gentleman for his
interest.
Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. I
thank the distinguished chairman.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BYRNES OF
WISCONSIN
Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BYRNES of Wis-
consin: On page 17, line 9, before the period,
add the following: "Provided further, That
none of the funds herein provided shall be
used for the construction of any naval vessels
in foreign shipyards."
(Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chair-
man, first I do want to congratulate the
subcommittee that has had the responsi-
bility of preparing this bill and bringing
it to the House. Theirs has been a mam-
moth job, and I believe we should all ex-
press a feeling of appreciation to them
for the job they have done. Because I
offer an amendment certainly should not
be interpreted as being critical of the
work of the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I do believe here is one
area, however, that a change should be
made in the bill as it comes to us.
I would ask the members of the Com-
mittee to take the bill as reported by the
committee and read the last five or six
lines of the first paragraph on page 17
where, after making the funds available,
June 13, 1967
the $1.42 billion foe shipbuilding and
conversion, Navy, there is a proviso in
the bill:
Provided, That none of the funds herein
provided for the construction or conversion
of any naval vessel to be constructed in ship-
yards in the United States shall beexpended
in foreign shipyards for the construction of
major components of the hull or superstruc-
ture of such vessel.
We already have, therefore, a limita-
tion on the construction of all major
components of naval vessels abroad, but
the interesting thing is that there is no
restriction about having the whole ship
built abroad.
What I suggest, Mr. Chairman, is that
we should add this additional proviso
that none of the funds herein shall be
used for the construction of a naval ves-
sel in foreign yards.
The reason this comes to my attention
is the fact that there is a practical situ-
ation that has been developing and is
before us today, in a sense. This appro-
priation provides for the funding of seven
vessels called MOS, ocean mine sweepers.
Their duty is mine sweeping and mine
hunting, and they operate in support of
our amphibious forces.
It is a combat ship. It is a ship of new
design, new advance design, according to
the words of the Navy, a prototype.
The seven that are funded in this bill
are seven out of 16 that it is proposed to
be built. We have already authorized and
funded in previous years nine of this type
vessel, but none of them has yet been
contracted for or bids let.
Four were authorized for construction
in fiscal year 1966. Five were authorized
for construction in fiscal year 1967.
This bill contains seven for 1968.
But what is the plan of the Defense De-
partment? The plan is to give all 16 ships
of this new prototype and new vessel of
advanced design-that they all are to be
given to the British for British construc-
tion.
The nine that have already been
funded are for 1966 and 1967. Of course,
we cannot touch that by legislation here.
So there is nothing we can do in a sense,
I suppose, to affect their intention to go
ahead and let the contracts on those
nine.
But I suggest to this House that we
should have the responsibility of at least
having seven of the 16 constructed in
yards here so that we can maintain in
this country an expertise with regard to
the construction of this type of vessel and
so that we do not lose the know-how and
experience in building this type or class
of vessel.
In my judgment, we should not place
sole and immediate reliance upon a for-
eign source 3,000 miles away and beyond
our control. Where are we going to get
this type of ship when foreign yards
either cannot or will not `build them in
case of some future emergency?
To me, it is utter folly to put all of our
eggs in one basket and then put that
basket abroad. All I am suggesting here
is that we say to the Navy or to the De-
partment of Defense that these seven-
these seven out of 16, at least let us let
the contracts for their construction to
American yards.
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Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike out the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I am completely in
favor of the distinguished Member's
amendment to restrict expenditures un-
der this bill to American yards.
As chairman of the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, on many occa-
sions I have been told by witnesses that
it is unnecessary to restrict construction
of merchant ships to American yards be-
cause the necessary know-how to build
merchant ships during wartime would
came from the fact that Navy ships are
being built in American yards.
I must say that I am not persuaded
at all by this argument and the very fact
that an amendment such as this has be-
come necessary amply supports my mis-
givings with respect to maintenance of
an adequate shipbuilding base in the
United States.
True it is, that up to the moment only
a few isolated contracts have been given
out abroad and only a few more bids have
been sought. But, nevertheless, the intent
to build abroad is evident and I am
firmly convinced that it is wholly detri-
mental to the United States.
I am aware of the argument in favor
of building abroad-that our airplane
industry receives large orders from
abroad and that we must do something
to spend some of these profits in Britain
and elsewhere, but I feel that our ulti-
mate survival in case of war is far more
important than a balance-of-payment
matter, and that we can assure our
future only by having the necessary
skills within our immediate control.
We cannot count on Britain or Japan
to build our warships or our merchant
ships in case of an emergency. We can
only rely on our own strengths and skills,
and we must keep these skills alive.
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. GARMATZ. I am glad to yield to
the gentleman from Virginia, a member
of the Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries.
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, I com-
pletely concur in the statement just made
by the gentleman in the well, the chair-
man of the Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries Committee of the House. He is
knowledgeable in this matter and has
made a good statement.
I am also in sympathy with the intent
of the amendment just offered. For some
reason it seems to me the administration
is intent on building our ships in foreign
yards. For what reason I cannot know.
We .talk about. the balance of payments.
ut
e
Certainly this is not going to contrib
to a5olution of our balance-of-payments
problem," by -'building ships in foreign
ard"s.
We talk about keeping the employment
level high. This is taking employment
away from these people. We talk about
maintaining the state of the art. We are
be built at home. I intend to support the
amendment.
Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GARMATZ. I yield to the gentle-
man from California.
Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the
gentleman from Maryland. I have had
the privilege of serving with him on the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Com-
mittee for many years, and I subscribe
to the thought that he has submitted
When are we going to learn? Those of
us who can remember 1917 remember
that one of the things that was the pac-
ing item of that war was the buildings
of ships to supply logistically our troops
abroad. Many of us still remember the
old saying that the wooden ships we built
were built with wood so green that they
could still hear the birds singing in the
trees.
Then came World War II, and again
the pacing item was shipping to support
our foreign efforts.
Are we going to forget, or have we for-
gotten the lessons of these two wars?
I remember when a group of people
representing a foreign chamber of com-
merce came before the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries and pled
that this country abandon its merchant
marine because we had other resources,
and let them handle the sea traffic of
the world as they need no great natural
resources. What would happen to our
foreign exports if we should become de-
pendent upon foreign shipping? This is
what we are rapidly coming to. I thank
the gentleman for his very fine state-
ment.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? -
Mr. GARMATZ. I yield to the gentle-
man from Wisconsin.
Mr. LAIRD. I would like to add to
what the gentleman from Maryland said.
I think this is a reasonable amendment
which has been offered. It does not de-
mand that all 16 of these minesweepers
be built in the United States. It says that
instead of all 16 being built abroad, at
least seven of the 16-just seven-be
built in the United States so that we can
maintain this capability which could be
very important at some future time. I
agree with the gentleman from Mary-
land. I hope the chairman of the sub-
committee, the gentleman from Texas,
will accept this amendment because it
is a good amendment and it should be
accepted.
Mr. GARMATZ. I thank the gentle-
man.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment. I have be-
fore me a statement of the position of
the administration on this issue. The ef-
fect of the pending amendment is that we
deny the Navy the right to let Great
Britain compete for the construction of
certainly not helping that. Right, at this some minesweepers.
moment the Secretary of Transportation It is not proposed that these ships be
is trying to sell a maritime policy which built abroad unless the bidding abroad is
has as one of its cornerstones the build- below that proposed by shipbuilders in
ing of ships abroad. I think it is time this country.
that we stop this. I would like to read a portion of the
Implements of war, such as naval ships statement with respect to this matter:
and maritime vessels which will be used 1. The US has sold over $11 billion in mili-
and are necesary in time of war, should tary equipment to our Allies in the five year
H 7105
period, FY 62-66. As a general principle the
US must be willing to procure selected equip-
ment abroad for use by US Forces as part_ of
large scale foreign purchase programs in the
US under competitive arrangements consist-
ent always with our principal interests in
military preparedness, security of our equip-
ment and our own political and economic ob-
jectives. To eliminate ships from any such
small selective purchases abroad is to pro-
vide a special and unwarranted privilege to
one military equipment industry at the ex-
pense of others.
We do not propose to eliminate pur-
chase of some aircraft in Canada. No,
just the special purchase of this type
of ship. Now I will continue to read the
statement:
2. Specifically the UK committed itself to
purchasing over $2 billion in equipment from
the US industry over the next ten years. The
US in return committed itself to purchasing
$325 million of equipment from UK industry
on a competitive basis over the same time
period.
This is a matter of commitments
which have been made. If we do not buy
the ships, then we have to buy aircraft
or something else, because we are com-
mitted.
The United Kingdom has already con-
firmed orders for approximately $1.3 billion
and has committed itself to follow-on costs
of over $700 million over the 12-year period
of the agreement. The United States has con-
firmed $143 million was for ships, $100 million
for aerospace industry items, and the balance
in miscellaneous Army and supply items.
Based on prior consideration of the ship-
building problem by the DOD and Congress,
the United States has additionally com-
mitted itself to placing 16 minesweepers, 2
AG's and 2 salvage tugs into competition
between United Kingdom and United States
industries in addition to many other aero-
space and ground items. This competition
involves 9 MSO's for which funds have al-
ready been appropriated by the Congress,
and 7_MSO's, for which funds are in S. 666.
This would bring the total ships to be placed
into competition abroad under the United
Kingdom arrangement to $143 million if
the United Kingdom industry successfully
competes, out of a total shipbuilding appro-
priation for these three years of $6.2 billion
or less than 2.5% of the total new shipbuild-
ing program not counting the backlog of
about $7 billion in United States shipyards.
To place the shipbuilding industry in a priv-
ileged position as proposed by the Byrnes
Amendment even for this small percent
would not only be unfair to all other United
States industries but would place the DOD
in a position of being unable to carry out a
commitment entered into formally with the
United Kingdom and previously discussed
with the Congress of the United States.
I underline the word "commitment."
We are committed. Members of Congress
from districts where they produce aero-
space equipment and aircraft should get
up under this technique and offer amend-
ments to prohibit the carrying out of
these arrangements.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. MAHON
was allowed to proceed for 5 additional
minutes.)
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I will con-
tinue reading the statement:
3. The proposed amendment prohibits all
types of ships. However, the record shows
that it is the purchase of the minesweepers
which probably involves only three ship-
yards in the United States which is at issue.
These ships were selected by the U.S. Navy
for competition by United Kingdom industry
in 1965.
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While they are slightly longer than pre-
vious MSO's, there are no new basic tech-
niques involved in the hull portion-and the
US Government will furnish all of the com-
plicated equipment to be installed on the
ship from US sources. The basic changes
in hull specifications are similar to those
already incorporated into coastal mine-
sweepers being built in US shipyards. Thus
it is the opinion of the Department of De-
fense that there is no need to provide a spe-
cial privilege to the few shipyards who have
indicated an interest in competing on these
ships.
I say, as a matter of fairness to our
colleagues, if we are to do this for the
shipbuilding industry then we ought to
do it for the aerospace industry and for
other industries in the United States.
Since we have sold $11 billion worth of
military equipment abroad it seems to
me we ought to be willing to buy a small
fraction of our equipment abroad.
Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Alabama.
Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. I might
say that Admiral Fahy told our com-
mittee :
This is part of the exchange program for
the British buying the F-111 or TFX, and
our share of supporting them is to let them
bid in on MSO's and ATS's and the two AG's.
Mr. MAHON. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. And he
did say that price would be taken into
consideration.
Mr. MAHON. Of course prices will be
taken into consideration.
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Virginia.
Mr. DOWNING. I thank the gentle-
man.
Of course we all know that if this is
put out to competitive bidding the United
States will not have a very good chance,
because our costs of things here are so
much higher. They will underbid us.
It will go to Great Britain.
Mr. MAHON. But, in return for their
buying the F-111's, we have committed
ourselves to buy other items.
Mr. DOWNING. Who committed us,
on an industry that is sick? We are trying
to revive the shipbuilding industry. We
have no maritime industry. Some of our
yards are folding. Why was a commit-
ment made which would further hurt
a sick industry?
Mr. MAHON. A commitment is a com-
mitment, and a strong and powerful
nation ought to stand by its commit-
ments. Wd ought to vote down this
amendment.
Mr.:BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Wisconsin.
Mr.:BYRNES of Wisconsin. Do we have
a commitment that we will fund this in
this bill?
The gentleman is not telling us that
somebody has made a commitment that
all this has to be done, that the Congress
even has to fund the seven involved here.
That is up to the Congress, as to whether
we will authorize these seven and fund
them.
Mr. MAHON. They have been author-
ized, and this is providing the funds for
the ships.
We have committed ourselves to buy
certain amounts of material from the
British. The Navy has selected these
wooden-hull minesweepers, and we are
going to furnish the technical equipment
for them.
Why not stand by our commitments?
What is wrong with that?
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. MAHON. I yield to the gentleman
from Iowa.
Mr. GROSS. Who made the commit-
ments? -
Mr. MAHON. The U.S. Government.
Mr. GROSS. Who made the commit-
ments for the U.S. Government?
Mr. MAHON. The Department of De-
fense.
Mr. GROSS. That means Robert
Strange McNamara?
Mr. MAHON. It means the Department
of Defense, and he happened to be the
Secretary at the time.
I would hope we could at least let these
ships be completed in this country and
in Great Britain and that we will not
try to take an action which would be
equivalent to the great and proud United
States welshing on its commitments.
Mr. GROSS. Is this the same individ-
ual who closed down the shipyards?
Mr. MAHON. No one is advocating that
we close down shipyards. We may possi-
bly have too many, but no one is propos-
ing that we close them down.
Mr. GROSS. He did close them down.
The same McNamara closed them down,
Mr. MAHON. Other shipyards than
those which would be involved here.
Time marches on.
Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I
rise in support of the amendment.
I would urge the Members to give it
very serious consideration. I believe there
is more at stake than the three shipyards
which are involved.
I admit a particular interest in this
because I have one of the small shipyards
in my hometown. I know the diffictilty
that the small yard has today in compet-
ing. The yard in my district has already
lost bids to British concerns. Saying that
the American yard has a right to com-
pete with the foreign yard is just non-
sense because it is absolutely impossible
for American shipyards to compete with
British shipyards. It just cannot be done.
Now, let me tell you another reason
why I am opposed to allowing these ships
to be built in Great- Britain. The Navy
now has a new method of awarding con-
tracts on ships for the Navy. The ship-
yard in my area over the years built
many Navy ships-guided missile de-
stroyers, destroyers and destroyer es-
corts--on the Great Lakes that go up
through the St. Lawrence Seaway to the
ocean. But now the Navy, when it lets
bids for these ships, will let a bid for a
large number of ships for one yard
whereas in the past they would break
these bids up so that they could keep
a mobilization base. Now, this yard and
others on the Great Lakes and other
small yards do not get an opportunity to
compete on this Navy work. So what you
are doing is allowing the smaller yards
that can build these ships to go out of
business. You are requiring them to com-
pete with Great Britain. With the pres-
ent policy of the Navy in shipbuilding,
allowing only the very largest yards in
this country to build these Navy ships,
we are leading to the destruction of the
small yards. The small yards that have
historically had a part in the shipbuild-
ing business-and-I might say have done
a very efficient job in providing ships
to the Navy-are about to go out of busi-
ness. I do not think this is fair. I do not
think it is fair for our own Navy to have
a kind of construction program which
makes it impossible for these yards to
bid effectively and also places them in
competition with foreign yards.
Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, Mr. Chair-
man, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gen-
tleman.
Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. These 16
ships would involve around $120 million.
Mr. CEDERBERG. Let us say it is $120
million out of about $2 billion-I do not
know how much the gentleman from
Texas said was involved here, but cer-
tainly they can find some other items for
this $120 million and keep these ship-
yards in business. It would give these
smaller yards an opportunity to compete
among themselves within the United
States without having to compete with
foreign yards. It is impossible for them
to compete. If you want to put some ship-
yards in this country out of business, just
vote this amendment down and that is
exactly what you are going to do.
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the last word.
(Mr. PIKE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I think all of
us recognize the great emotional appeal
of buying anything we can get in America
and never buying anything anywhere
else. We in New York are not indifferent
to the problems of shipyards. We even
used to have a shipyard in New York, too.
We do not have a naval shipyard there
any more. It is gone. The gentleman from
Virginia, who is a very articulate spokes-
man for a very excellent shipbuilding
area has said that if this amendment
does not pass we are not going to buy
these ships in America. He says the
American yards will not have a chance.
This is another way of saying in the final
analysis that they are going to be obtain-
able cheaper if this amendment does not
pass. The ships will be procured at a
lesser cost in open competition. I do not
think that the American taxpayer is go-
ing to be outraged at the concept of
spending a little less money to buy some
of these ships.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that
anyone isgoing to be too unhappy if we
buy something of equivalent value at a
lesser price somewhere else.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I am not in favor
of doing this all over the place. I do rec-
ognize the peculiar problems of the
American shipbuilding industry. But we
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cannot buy anything ever, anywhere If we are just interested in economy you follow the argument of the gentle-
abroad, without stepping upon the toes of I am sure these ships can be built cheaper man from New York. The ships can
some American industry. In Japan. That nation can build ships probably be built much cheaper in Japan.
Mr. Chairman, there has never been a for about half of what the Western As the gentleman from Virginia has
proposal to buy anything anywhere that World can. said, and the gentleman from Maryland
did not offend someone; I do not care Of course, I realize we have to have said earlier, there is a 40-percent differ-
whether it was ships or planes or engines reciprocal trade. I know that. But my enital as far as Great Britain is con-
or tanks or fabrics or buttons or wine, you argument is that when we reciprocate cerned. The amendment asks only that
name it. we should pick an industry that is not seven of the 16 minesweepers be built in
Mr. Chairman, we do have a tremen- sick. We should pick a vibrant industry, the United States next year. This is all
dously favorable balance of trade and we one that can stand the shock of this. tied in with the TFX procurement. There
have a. tremendously favorable balance But we are picking on an industry that has been no contract from Great Britain
of commercial trade. We have a tremen- needs help. on this. There cannot be a real and final
dously favorable balance of military Mr. Chairman, I have watched the commitment made on the part of the
trade. hydraulic turbine industry dwindle in U.S. Government until the Congress ap-
Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the about 10 years' time when they had 10 propriates the money, and there has been
committee has properly pointed out how firms who were manufacturing this huge no appropriation for these seven ships
tremendously favorable this balance is. equipment, and today we have only three. that are being authorized in this bill.
We just cannot hope to sell and sell and Primarily that was because our Govern- Mr. Chairman, I ask that this amend-
sell abroad and never, never ever buy ment has been constrained to award tur- ment be agreed to.
abroad. bine contracts abroad because they can I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that this amend- get them cheaper. Therefore we have Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move
ment will be defeated. ruined an industry which can produce to strike the requisite number of words.
Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Chair- these valuables pieces of machinery, and (Mr. GROSS asked and was given
man, will the gentleman yield? as a result we have lost some of the val- permission to revise and extend his re-
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, uable know-how. I do not want to see marks.)
will the gentleman yield? that happen here. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, unlike the
Mr. PIKE. I yield to the gentleman Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in States of Maryland, Texas, and New
from Maryland. opposition to the amendment. York, the State of Iowa has not a single
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I shall not take the shipyard.
the gentleman from New York has made full 5 minutes, but simply want to point I want to see Americans employed in
a statesmanlike speech. I support his out again that the Congress has author- shipyards as well as elsewhere in our in-
position and wish to associate myself ized the action which is proposed in the dustries because the American labor has
with his remarks. bill. Acting on the authorization by Con- been and always will be the best market
Mr. PIKE. When I read it in the gress, the U.S. Government has entered for our American farm products. I want
RECORD tomorrow, I may perhaps wish into an agreement which very definitely to see American labor employed. I know
I had made it myself. Is favorable to us in that Britain will of no reason why-and at this time of all
Mr. ZION. Mr. Chairman, I move to buy many more times as much from us times, when the British are running sup-
strike the requisite number of words. than we propose to buy from them. Since plies into Haiphong to help kill Amer-
Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the our Government, acting on the author- icans in Vietnam-I see no reason why
amendment. ization by Congress, has in good faith we should go to Britain for a dime's worth
Mr. Chairman, I have in my files a entered into an agreement; to abrogate of anything. You tell me why. The chair-
newspaper clipping from Hong Kong that agreement by an amendment here man of the committee talks about billions
dated about 16 months ago, when I was today would leave us in a very bad light, of dollars of military equipment that
there. It announced a big contract for worldwide. I cannot believe the Congress we are selling around the world these
a Hong Kong shipyard to build barges wants to put our Government in the Po- days.
for the United States, apparently because' sition of having to repudiate its own Mr. MAHON. We are selling to Britain,
the States were incapable of building agreement. It would not place the U.S. if the gentleman will yield.
them themselves. Government in good light in its negotia- Mr. GROSS. What is that?
Mr. Chairman, this was an interesting tions on many important subjects Mr. MAHON. We are selling billions
contract because it provided a substan- throughout the world at this critical of dollars of military equipment to Brit-
tial profit to these Hong Kong shipbuild- time. ain.
ers. I was a little bit distressed about it Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I move to Mr. GROSS. And do you have the
at the time, and I am considerably more strike out the last word. slightest knowledge as to what they owe
distressed about it now, because through Mr. Chairman, I will not take the full us? They are our biggest debtors from
the Hong Kong Harbor goes about one- 5 minutes, but in view of the discussion World War I and right down to the pres-
half of the gross national product of Red which has just gone on, I would like to ent day? They owe us more billions of
China, without which we would not be say to the gentleman from New York dollars than any other country in the
facing all of this armament in North that I was glad to oppose the amend- world. There is not the slightest assur-
Vietnam, ment to delete the EA-6A from the bill. ance that they will pay us for anything
Mr. Chairman, if we are going to cote- Of course the F-111 aircraft involved that they get. These leeches have been
tinue to support these countries which in this matter. But there is no contract on on our back for years. Let us stop this
are stabbing us in the back in Vietnam the Part of the British Government to business of going to Britain for ships.
by giving them valuable contracts in- buy the TFX. There have been no con- If you want cheap ships, as one of my
stead of producing the items ourselves, tracts placed in the United States for colleagues said just a moment ago, go
then it is my opinion that we shall con- the TFX on behalf of the British Gov- to Japan.
,tinue to see "Vietnams" occur all over the ernment. Mr. MAHON. The Congress has au-
world. The gentleman from ' Wisconsin has thorized these ships and the law provides
Mr. Chairman, I am very much in merely asked that of the minesweepers a means for the type of action proposed
favor of the amendment and I hope that that are going to be built this next year, in this bill.
my colleagues will joint me in my effort seven of the 16 to be build in the United Mr. GROSS. The Congress does the
to see that we stop helping these coun- States-only seven of the 16, in order to authorizing, not the Secretary of De-
tries that are killing our men in Vietnam. maintain some capability here in Amer- fense. It is certainly right that the Con-
Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will ica to build this new type minesweeper. gress do the authorizing.
the gentleman yield? Mr. Chairman, I would like to just Mr. MAHON. That is right and the
Mr. ZION. I yield to the gentleman, point out that as far as the cost differ- Congress has approved the budget pro-
Mr, DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, i ential is concerned, this is tied in to a gram for these ships and has not re-
would just like to answer my friend, the great extent to labor wage rate con- stricted the program.
gentleman from New York, who was tracts in the shipbuilding industry. Mr. GROSS. Let us just make the
talking about the economics of this mat- If you wish to go to the country that start here today to cut down on those
ter. can build the ships the cheapest, then who demonstrate every day that they are
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE June 13, 1967
not in our camp. Instead of giving us
help in Vietnam the British are helping
to supply the enemy. If the British are
friends, who needs enemies?
Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Chairman, I move
to strike out the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I take this time to ask
the gentleman from Iowa what is the
basis of his statement that British ships
are supplying the sinews of war to Hanoi,
because it is my understanding that
that :is not the case.
Mr. GROSS. Does not the gentleman
know that British ships are running into
Haiphong?
Mr. JOELSON. I do not know any-
thing of that sort. I would like to know
if the gentleman hashis own State De-
partment-because I have been told by
our State Department that that is not
happening.
Mr. GROSS. Of course, that is hap-
pening.
Mr. JOELSON. That is not happen-
ing and I would like to ask the gentle-
man what he bases his statement on.
Mr. GROSS. I base my statement on
the fact that they are running ships into
Haiphong.
Mr. JOELSON. The gentleman has
never taken a trip out of this country
so I assume that he has not 'seen it. I
would like to know what information he
bases his statement on.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. JOELSON. I would like an an-
swer from the gentleman who made the
statement.
Mr. GROSS. Do I have to take a trip
to Vietnam to read a newspaper or to
read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? The
gentleman from Michigan will give you
the figures.
Mr. JOELSON. I would like to know
the newspaper that made that state-
ment.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will tell you
where it comes from.
Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman
yield?'
Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield
no further and yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman,
I move to strike out the last word.
Mr. Chairman, since the gentleman
raised his question, I have taken this
time to set the record straight. Just a
few days ago I stood in this very spot
and reported to the Members of the
House here that during the month of
May there were nine free world ships
that carried cargo tc North Vietnam,
seven of which fly the British flag. One
was from Malta and one was from
Cyprus.
Now last Thursday, if the gentleman
will take the trouble to look in the
RECORD-
Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The gentleman
declined to yield to me and I have 5
minutes and I ask or the courtesy of
being able to respond to the question the
gentleman has raised.
As I was saying, if the gentleman will
look at the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Of
Thursday last, he will see that I have in-
cluded. there a list of 829 ships that have
sailed to the port of Haiphong during the
last 2 years.
Of these 829 vessels, 210 were flying
free world flags. More than 25 percent of
all cargoes from any source whatsoever
that have gone to North Vietnam during
the last 2 years has been carried on free-
world-flag ships. What more does the
gentleman want? If you will see me later,
I will give you the name of every ship,
its tonnage, the date it was in the harbor,
and everything else.
The gentleman should know this. Of
the nine ships that went to North Viet-
nam during the month of May, one of the
ships-and I cannot tell because this is
classified-was carrying startegic cargo
to the enemy. Now, you will have to use
your own imagination as to what this
strategic cargo was, but if you will see me
after the debate is concluded, I will tell
you.
If the gentleman wantsme to yield, I
am now happy to yield.
Mr. JOELSON. Yes, I would ask you
the same question that I asked the gen-
tleman from Iowa. What is the source of
your statement that British ships are
supplying North Vietnam?
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I got this in-
formation from the Department of De-
fense, and I will take you to the safe in
my office and show you the whole list.
What more do you want?
Mr. JOELSON. All I can say is that I
do not resort to confidential information.
I have been informed publicly, as have
many other Members of Congress, in
White House briefings that free world
ships-British ships-are not supplying
North Vietnam with supplies.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I will take the
gentleman to my office with me right
now and I will show him this material. it
is classified "Secret." I cannot divulge it,
but I will give you the name of every one
of the 829 ships that has been to North
Vietnam for the last 2 years.
Mr. JOELSON. Well, if it is classified
"Secret," I am surprised that the gentle-
man would disclose it.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Wisconsin [Mr. BYRNES].
The question was taken; and on a di-
vision (demanded by Mr. BYRNES of Wis-
consin) there were-ayes 119, noes 61.
So the amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
SEC. 637. None of the funds provided herein
shall be used to pay any recipient of a grant
for the conduct of a research project an
amount equal to as much as the entire cost
of such project.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. VANrK
Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an
amendments
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. VANIK: On
page 43, line 8, insert a new section 638 as
follows:
"SEC. 638. None of the funds provided
herein shall be used to pay for the travel and
subsistence of civilians not in the employ or
service of the United States Government at..
tending national and international rifle
matches."
Renumber present section 638 and subse-
quent sections accordingly.
Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, I submit
herewith an amendment which would
strike out the appropriations for the
travel and subsistence for the civilian
components of rifle teams attending
national and international rifle compe-
titions. My amendment is directed
toward present practices under the law
which permits the participants to have
a "rifle match junket" at the expense
of the taxpayer.
Every year the National Rifle Associa-
tion utilizes Camp Perry in Ohio during
the months of August and September
involving the attendance of approxi-
mately 8,000 participants who travel to
and from Camp Perry at public expense
and who are billeted -on the camp-
grounds.
Camp Perry is owned by the State of
Ohio but it is leased and used by the De-
partment of Ohio National Guard, Army
Reserve summer training, and the na-
tional rifle and pistol matches conducted
by the Department of the Army and sup-
ported by the civilian marksmanship
program.
Earlier this year I requested the De-
partment of Defense to make available
the facilities of Camp Perry as a summer
camp for 5,000 disadvantaged young peo-
ple of central Cleveland areas. It seemed
to me that such a program would be very
helpful in removing these young people
from difficult and trying environmental
conditions in their home communities
for at least, a short period to time. The
purpose of my suggested program was to
provide a camp facility for thousands of
young people who had never been ex-
posed to the experience of camp life.
Mr. Edward J. Sheridan, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense, advised me
on May 19, 1967, that although Camp
Perry is owned by the State of Ohio, it is
used by the Department of the Army for
the national rifle and pistol matches
during the months of August and Sep-
tember.
From the standpoint of priorities, it
seems to me that the facilities of Camp
Perry would be more prudently used as a
summer camp for needy young people
than as a sharpshooters assembly ground.
It has just come to my attention that,
in addition to providing for the travel
and subsistence of 8,000 participants of
the national rifle matches at Camp Perry,
the Department of Defense spends an
additional $2.7 million to provide per-
sonnel and facilities to support the 8,000
trainees during the training period. In
addition, 3,000 active members of the
U.S. Army are assigned to Camp Perry to
take care of other needs of the training
group during this training period.
While 3,000 Army personnel are doing
training and porter work for the civilian
participants at the Camp Perry training
program, young men, 29,000 in the month
of August alone, are being drafted to do
military work in their stead.
It seems ridiculous for the taxpayers
of America to pay for the travel, billet-
ing, and ammunition expended by pri-
vate citizens involved in these rifle
matches. The National Rifle Association
justifies the utilization of public moneys
on the basis of its service as a community
stabilizer. it seems to me that we might
do an infinitely better job of stabilizing
communities of discontent through the
establishment of a summer camp pro-
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
gram for the young and the development
of training and educational programs for
the other groups.
I therefore urge that this Congress halt
its practice of providing a Government-
subsidized junket to Camp Perry and the
adjacent resort areas for the sole benefit
of private citizens who have no official
connection or obligation to the U.S. Army
or its objectives.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
(Mr, SIKES asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
[Mr. SIKES addressed the Committee.
His remarks will appear hereafter in the
Appendix.]
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentle-
man from Ohio [Mr. VANIK].
The amendment was rejected.
Mr, PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I
move to strike the requisite number of
words.
(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman,
I wish to commend the Appropriations
Committee for its forthright stand on nu-
clear propulsion for naval warships. My
responsibilities on the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy and the Armed Serv-
ices Committee have given me an excel-
lent opportunity to learn what new di-
mensions nuclear propulsion gives to
military warships. I believe that anyone
who takes the time to study the facts will
conclude that nuclear propulsion is in-
dispensable to any Navy which is to be
effective.
Before I comment on some specifics on
nuclear power in the bill before us, I want
to express my satisfaction and state my
agreement with the beautifully worded
and succinct statement on "Studies and
Analyses" in the Appropriations Commit-
tee report on page 5. I can testify to the
truth of the following excerpt from this
section in the committee's report:
There is some feeling that studies are re-
sorted to as devices to procrastinate ex-
pensively, thus deferring decision until the
point in time may be reached when a decision
is unnecessary because the original need has
disappeared.
I strongly support the committee's
statement that we must curtail the pro-
liferation of studies since so many studies
are used as excuses for not taking re-
sponsible action.
I note with pleasure the House Appro-
priations Commit'tee action discussed on
page 47 of the committee report No. 349
to fund construction of one nuclear-pow-
ered guided missile frigate-DLGN-in
fiscal year 1968 and to fund advance pro-
curement of another nuclear frigate in
fiscal year 1968. The report states:
The budget estimate proposes the amount
of $166,600,000 for the construction of two
conventionally-powered guided missile de-
stroyers (DDG). These funds were denied in
the authorization legislation and two nu-
clear-powered guided missile destroyer lead-
ers (DLGN) were substituted. The Commit-
tee recommends the appropriation of funds
for the construction of one additional DLGN
and advance procurement of another DLGN
at a total cost of $134,800,000. The bill has
been reduced by the net difference of $31,-
800,000. The Committee will expect the De-
partment to proceed with this construction
and advance procurement and to request
funds for the construction of the remaining
authorized DLGN in the fiscal year 1969 ship-
building program.
Further, Public Law 90-22, the fiscal
year 1968 defense authorization law
which the President signed on June 5,
1967, requires that:
The contracts for the construction of the
two nuclear powered guided-missile frigates
shall be entered into as soon as practicable
unless the President fully advises the Con-
gress that their construction is not in the
national interest.
With these clear statements of the will
of Congress, it should be apparent to the
Secretary of Defense that it is the man-
date of Congress that the Navy have
more nuclear-powered major fleet escorts
for its nuclear aircraft carriers.
Further, it should be clear to the Sec-
retary of Defense that work on these
nuclear-powered warships should pro-
ceed immediately, using the $20 million
appropriated by Congress last year in
Public Law 89-687 for advance procure-
ment for a fiscal year 1968 DLGN. The
Defense Department has procrastinated
long enough making ineffectual cost
"studies" as an excuse for not proceeding
with a course of action that is obvious to
all here in Congress; an area which has
been examined in depth and is supported
by the five cognizant committees of Con-
gress: The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees, and the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees have
all concluded it is necessary and desir-
able to build more nuclear-powered es-
corts for our nucler aircraft carriers,
ships that will be in our fleet into the 21st
century. The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, and the House Appropriations
Committee have further concluded it
would be wasteful to continue building
nonnuclear escorts for our nuclear air-
craft carriers, It is even worse to con-
tinue to delay building nuclear escorts
while the question is "studied" more;
while our Navy is becoming obsolete
before our very eyes.
At the conclusion of my remarks I
would like to include a brief statement
made by Senator PASTORE, chairman of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
and one made by the gentleman from
California, Congressman CHET HOLIFIELD,
vice chairman of the Committee, last
Saturday on the lesson we should learn
from the latest crisis in the Middle East.
I believe both of these gentlemen make
some very important points. It is my
pleasure to note that the bill before us
reflects this lesson.
I want to congratulate the distin-
guished members of the House Appro-
priations Committee and especially the
distinguished chairman for their clear
stand on this issue.
The statements referred to follow:
SENATOR PASTORE STRONGLY URGES NAVY To
"Go NUCLEAR"-SAYS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
SHOWS NAVY'S ACHILLES HEEL
The recent crisis in the Middle East, with
the resulting interruption of oil supplies and
the closing of the Suez Canal, clearly illus-
trates the importance of using nuclear pro-
pulsion for all capital warships of the United
States Navy, it was pointed out today by Sen-
ator John O. Pastore, Chairman of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.
Senator Pastore, who is noted for his strong
support of a nuclear Navy, stressed the im-
portance of supporting the recent Congres-
sional action of changing two conventionally
powered major fleet escort ships requested by
the Department of Defense to nuclear pow-
ered ships. Senator Pastore said:
"The recent announcement by the Secre-
tary of Defense for an emergency plan to
provide petroleum products for our military
forces in Southeast Asia, which will require
doubling the number of oil tankers for the
long trip around the Cape of Good Hope,
reemphasizes the critical importance of re-
ducing the Navy's dependence on fuel oil.
It is with no intention of criticizing past
decisions by the Secretary, but rather with
the hope that we may move forward in the
best interests of the national defense of the
United States, that I recommend the Defense
Department join with the Congress to insure
that all future capital vessels of the United
States Navy will be nuclear propelled."
Senator Pastore continued:
"With this in mind, the Defense Depart-
ment should carry out the Congressional de-
cision that the two major fleet escorts the
Department of Defense needs and asked for
this year will be nuclear powered."
Senator Pastore emphasized that he and
other members of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy have repeatedly recommended
nuclear power for all capital warships.
"The evidence based on detailed studies
and analyses made by the Joint Committee
overwhelmingly supports the need for a nu-
clear Navy-Let us eliminate this Achilles'
heel now."
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS EMPHASIZES NEED FOR Nu-
CLEAR SURFACE NAVY
(Statement by Congressman CHET HOLIFTELD,
vice chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy)
We all know about the crisis in the Mid-
dle East and of the efforts by our Govern-
ment and others to permanently end the
fighting. I wonder how many of us have
thought about some of the side aspects of
this crisis.
Two specific events come to my mind.
One is the closing of the Suez Canal, and
the second is the stoppage of oil from the
Middle East to the United States and other
Western nations.
While only a small fraction of our domes-
tic oil consumption comes from the Middle
East, news reports indicate that more than
half the petroleum products used in Viet-
nam have been coming from Persian Gulf
sources. While the United States has suffi-
cient petroleum resources to supply the needs
of our armed forces, we are now faced with
having to transport fuel from the United
States to Southeast Asia without use of the
Suez Canal as a shortcut. Diverting tankers
around the Cape of Good Hope can add sev-
eral weeks to a tanker's voyage.
On June 7 the Secretary of Defense an-
nounced he was invoking an emergency plan
to provide petroleum products for our forces
in Southeast Asia without being dependent
on the Middle East. This involves doubling
the size of the fleet of tankers which have
been used to supply our Southeast Asian
forces.
Doesn't this sound like a good case for
our Navy having nuclear power in our major
surface warships; our aircraft carriers and
their escorts?
This year again Congress has had to take
the lead in trying to modernize our Navy.
Congress changed two non-nuclear major
fleet escorts (DDG's) requested by the Sec-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE June 13, 1967
retary of Defense to nuclear powered frigates
(DLGN's).
The Suez crisis in 1958 should have shown
us the danger to our vital military supply
lines overseas. We should have seen the
"handwriting. on the wall." But apparently
we didn't learn from this experience. That
"writing" clearly showed that the United
States should go to nuclear propulsion for
its major surface ships. Yet that "writing"
has to this very day been continuously
ignored by the Department of Defense by
asking for conventional escorts rather than
nuclear escorts.
This week, with the closing of the Suez
canal, the same "writing" has again appeared
on the wall. How many n;ore times will the
Department of Defense permit this warning
to remain unheeded? Will the Secretary of
Defense now carry out the clear mandate of
Congress, or will it take a national catastro-
phe-when it is too late--for him to change
his mind?
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:
SEC. 641. This Act may be cited as the "De-
partrnent of Defense Appropriation Act,
1968".
AMENDMENT
man of the committee has done in pre-
senting all of the arguments in favor of
this expenditure that we have here. It is
staggering to the imagination to realize
that this Congress for 150 years struggled
over the appropriation in total of an
amount of money that we have disposed
of here this afternoon in 3 or 4 hours.
It makes you wonder whether these early
Congresses were actually living up to
their responsibilities.
What I have done in this amendment
I think all of you are quite aware of. I
put a restriction on the expenditure of
this money to 95 percent of the amount
in the budget estimate. The committee
has already reduced the amount of the
bill by approximately 2 percent, so what
we are actually talking about here is a
curtailment of about an additional 3
percent of the deferral of the expendi-
ture of this money.
You may ask as to where this can be
cut.
Mr. Chairman, I have a number of
suggestions which I would like to offer
which I feel are valid.
Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that
beyond the shadow of a doubt, we could
cut an additional $2 billion, which is
approximately what we are talking
about, off this bill in any number of dif-
ferent ways. One way I would suggest
would be for example that we cease the
bombing of North Vietnam.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would not be at
all surprised but what the Department
of Defense will recommend this step be
taken in the near future. But, neverthe-
less, I think it would be appropriate for
CALIFORNIA
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chair-
man, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BROWN of
California: On page 44, immediately follow-
ing line 23, insert a new section as follows:
"SEc. 642. Money appropriated in this Act
shall be available for expenditure in the fis-
cal year ending June 30, 1968, only to the
extent: that expenditure thereof shall not
result in total aggregate net expenditures of
all agencies provided for herein beyond 95
per centum of the total aggregate net ex-
penditures estimated therefor in the budget
for 19138 (H. Doc. 15)."
(M:r. BROWN of California asked and
was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chair-
man, I have some trepidation about
usurping the role of one of the more
distinguished members of the minority
in offering this amendment, but I do so
because I think it is time we recognized
that our responsibilities for economy in
Government extend not only to the
civilian agencies but to the heretofore
sacred cow of the Defense Department.
I would like to pay tribute to the distin-
guished chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations for the work he has done
here this afternoon. I very much regret
that I did not observe or was not present
for all of the debate here, because I am
sure that there would have been pointed
out the epic-making nature of this leg-
islation.
Mr. Chairman, we have before us an
appropriation bill which is the largest
appropriation bill in the history of this
country except for possibly one year dur-
ing World War II. The chairman of this
committee has lucidly presented the
arguments for the expenditure of a sum
of money equal to the total revenues of
the entire United States from the date of
its inception up to approximately World
War ]:I. The amount of money repre-
sented by this bill is equivalent to the
total gross national product of approxi-
mately one-third of the human race.
I think we have failed to recognize the
significance and the importance of this
the Congress to exercise its responsibility
in dealing with this legislation in such
a way as to put a little pressure upon the
Department of Defense to take this step.
Further, Mr. Chairman, I would sug-
gest that we could save, perhaps, one-
half billion dollars by deferring the ex-
penditure for the purpose of obtaining
information, the expenditure' which is
contained in this bill, for the antiballistic
missile system, a system which all of us
ing quite a bit of money in military aid.
The gentleman from Iowa pointed out
the fact that most of this money is
wasted. It is my opinion that we used up
quite a bit of our Defense appropriation
money in the weapons which we gave or
sold to Lebanon, to Jordan, and to some
of these other Arab countries in the last
few weeks. I am not sure that this con-
tributed to our security or to their
security.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on
the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California [Mr. BROWN].
The amendment was rejected.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Chairman, I move
that the Committee do now rise and re-
port the bill back to the House with sun-
dry amendments, with the recommenda-
tion that the amendments be agreed to
and that the bill as amended do pass.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, reported that that
Committee, having had under considera-
tion the bill (H.R. 10738) making ap-
propriations for the Department of De-
fense for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1968, and for other purposes, had di-
rected him to report the bill back to the
House with sundry amendments, with
the recommendation that the amend-
ments be agreed to and that the bill, as
amended, do pass.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I move the
previous question on the bill and all
amendments thereto to final passage.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote de-
manded on any amendment? If not, the
Chair will put them en gros.
The amendments were agreed to.
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
engrossment and third reading of the
bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, and was read the
know from many talks on this floor, is MOTION TO RECOMMIT
merely going to involve this Nation in Mr. BROWN of California. Mr.
the expenditure of another $30 billion Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
or $40 billion, with no net increase in the The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman op-
security of the country, posed to the bill?
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair- Mr. BROWN of California. I am, Mr.
man, will the gentleman yield? Speaker.
Mr. BROWN of California. Yes, I shall The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report
be happy to yield to the gentleman from
Michigan. the motion to recommit.
.
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I do not re- The Clerk read as follows:
call-and will the gentleman refresh my Mr. BROWN of California moves to recom-
memory-how many times the gentle- mit the bill. H.R. 10738 to the Committee on
man has voted for the so-called Bow on Appropriations with instruction to that
amendment, or an amendment compara- committee to report it back forthwith with
ble to that, this year or last year. m
thefollowing ediately following line 23, in ertt a new sec-
Mr. BROWN of California. Every time tion as follows:
it has been offered to a Defense bill. "SEC. 642. Money appropriated in this Act
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chair- shall be available for expenditure in the
man, if the gentleman will yield further, fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, only to the
the gentleman has never voted for it as extent that expenditure thereof shall not
result in total aggregate net expenditures of
a reduction in expenditures for any civil- all agencies provided for herein beyond 95
ian agency? per centum of the total aggregate net ex-
Mr. BROWN of California. Not to my penditures estimated therefor in the budget
knowledge. for 1968 (H. Doe. 15)."
May I suggest also another area which Mr. MAI-ION. Mr. Speaker, I move the
was hinted at by the distinguished gen- previous question on the motion to re-
tleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS], who commit.
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June 13, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
The previous question was ordered.
McFall
Poage
Snyder
The SPEAKER
Th
uesti
i
th
McMillan
Poff
Springer
.
e q
on
s on
e
Macdonald
Pollock
Stafford
motion to recommit.
,
Mass.
Pool
Staggers
' The. question was taken; and the
MacGregor
Price, Ill.
Stanton
Speaker announced that the noes ap-
Machen
Price, Tex.
Steed
peared to have it.
Madden
Mahon
Pryor
Pucinski
Steiger, Ariz.
Steiger, Wis.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak-
Mailliard
Purcell
Stephens
er, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
Marsh
Quie
Stratton
The yeas and nays were refused.
Martin
Calif.
Mathias
Quillen
Railsback
Stubblefield
Stuckey
So the motion to recommit was re-
,
Mathias, Md.
Randall
Sullivan
jected.
Matsunaga
Rarick
Taft
The SPEAKER. The question is on the
May
Rees
Talcott
passage of the bill.
Mayne
Meeds
Reid, Ill.
Reid, N.Y.
Taylor
Teague, Calif.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, on that I
Meskill
Reifel
Teague, Tex.
demand the yeas and nays
Michel
Reinecke
Tenzer
.
Miller, Calif.
Reuss
Thompson, Ga.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Miller, Ohio
Rhodes, Ariz.
Thomson, Wis.
The question was taken; and there
Mills
Minish
Rhodes, Pa.
Riegle
Tiernan
Tuck
were-yeas 407, nays 1, not voting 25, as
Mink
Rvers
Tunney
follows:
Minshall
Roberts
Udall
[Roll No. 135]
Mize
Robison
Ullman
Monagan
Rodino
Utt
YEAS---407
Montgomery
Rogers, Colo.
Van Deerlin
Abbitt
Cowger
Hagan
Moore
Rogers, Fla.
Vander Jagt
Abernethy
Cramer
Haley
Moorhead
Ronan
Vanik
Adair
Culver
Hall
Morgan
Rooney, Pa.
Vigorito
Adams
Cunningham
Halleck
Morris, N. Mex.
Rosenthal
Waggonner
Addabbo
Curtis
Halpern
Morse, Mass.
Rostenkowski
Waldie
Albert
Daddario
Hamilton
Morton
Roth
Walker
Ill.
Anderson
Daniels
Hammer-
Mosher
Roudebush
Wampler
,
Anderson
Ga.
Davis
schmidt
Moss
Roush
Watkins
,
Tenn
,
Wis
Davis
Hanley
Multer
Roybal
Watson
.
Ala.
Andrews
.
,
Dawson
Hanna
Murphy, Ill.
Rumsfeld
Watts
,
Andrews
de Is Garza
Hansen
Idaho
Murphy, N.Y.
Ruppe
Whalen
,
N. Dak.
Delaney
,
Hansen, Wash.
Myers
Ryan
Whalley
Annunzio
Dellenback
Hardy
Natcher
St Germain
White
Ashbrook
Denney
Harrison
Nedzi
Sandman
Whitener
Ashley
Dent
Harsha
Nelsen
Satterfield
Whitten
Ashmore
Derwinski
Harvey
Nichols
Saylor -
Wiggins
Aspinall
Devine
Hathaway
Nix
'
Schadeberg
Williams, Pa.
Baring
Dickinson
Hawkins
Hara, Ill.
O
'
Scherle
Wilson, Bob
Barrett
Dggs
Hays
O
Hara, Mich.
'
Scheuer
Wilson,
Bates
Dole
##iiebert
Konski
O
Schneebeif
Charles H.
Belcher
Donohue
Hechler
W. Va.
Olsen
'
Schweiker
Winn
Bell
Dorn
,
Heckler
Mass.
O
Neal, Ga.
Schwengel
Wolff
Bennett
Dowdy
,
Helstoski
O'Neill, Mass.
Scott
Wright
Berry
Downing
Henderson
Ottinger
Selden
Wyatt
Betts
Dulski
Hicks
Passman
Shipley
Wydler
Bevill
Duncan
Holifield
Patten
Shriver
Wylie
Biester
Dwyer
Holland
Pepper
Sikes
Wyman
Bingham
Eckhardt
Howard
Perkins
Sisk
Yates
Blackburn
Edmondson
Hull
Pettis
Skubitz
Zablocki
Blanton
Edwards, Ala.
Hungate
Philbin
Slack
ith
C
lif
S
Zion
Zwach
Blatnik
Edwards, Calif. Hunt
Pickle
P
k
m
,
a
.
I
th
Boggs
Edwards
La.
Hutchinson
i
e
owa
Smi
,
Boland
,
Eilberg
Ichord
Pirnie
Smith, Okla.
Bolling
Erlenborn
Irwin
NAYS-1
Bolton
Esch
Jacobs
Bow
Eshleman
Jarman
Brown, Calif.
Brademas
Evans, Colo.
Joelson
J
h
l
f
NOT VOTING-25
Branco
Bray
Everett
Evins
Tenn.
o
nson, Ca
.
i
Johnson, Pa.
Arends
Herlong
Smith, N.Y.
Brinkley
,
Fallon
Jonas
Ayres
Horton
Thompson, N.J.
Brock
Farbstein
Jones, Ala.
Battin
Hosmer
Widnall
Brooks
Fascell
Jones, Mo.
Conyers
Kelly
Williams, Miss.
Broomfield
Felghan
Jones, N.C.
Corman
Patman
Willis
Brotzman
Findley
Karsten
Dengell
Pelly
Young
Brown, Mich.
Fino
Karth
Dow
Resnick
Younger
Brown, Ohio
Fisher
Kastenmeier
Fuqua
Rooney, N.Y.
Broyhill, N.C.
Flood
Kazen
Gubser
St. Onge
Broyhill, Va.
Buchanan
Flynt
Fole
Kee
Keith
So the bill was passed.
Burke, Fla.
y
Ford, Gerald R. King, Calif.
The Clerk announced the following
Burke, Mass.
Ford, King, N.Y.
pairs.
Burleson
Burton, Calif.
William D. Kirwan
Fountain Kleppe
Mr. St. Onge with Mr. Hosmer.
Burton, Utah
Fraser Kluczynski
Mr. Dingell with Mr. Horton.
Bush
Frelinghuysen Kornegay
Mr. Thompson of New Jersey with Mr. Wid-
Button
FTr~i,ecle, Kupferman
n
nall.
Byrne, Pa.
, Pa. Kuykendall
Fulto
Mr. Dow with Mr. Gubser.
Byrnes,. Wis.
Fulton, Tenn. Kyl
Williams of Mississippi with Mr. Ayres.
Mr
C~be1X
Cahill
Galiflanakis Kyros
GJlagher Laird
.
Mrs. Kelly with Mr. Battin.
. _
Carey
Gardner Landrum
Mr. Rooney of New York with Mr. Arends.
Carer..
Ga,rmatz Langen
Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Younger.
Cases
Gathings Latta
Mr. Herlong with Mr. Pelly.
Cederberg
Gettys Leggett
Mr. Patman with Mr. Smith of New York.
Celler
Giaimo Lennon
Willis.
Corman with Mr
Mr
Chamberlain
Clancy
Gibbons Lipscomb
Gilbert Lloyd
.
.
Mr. Resnick with Mr. Conyers.
Clark
La
Gonzalez Long
Clausen,
,
.
Goodell Long, Md.
The result of the vote was announced
Don. H.
Goodling Lukens
as above recorded. A motion to recon-
Clawson, Del
Gray McCarthy
sider was laid on the table.
Cleveland
Green, Oreg. McCiory
Cohelan
Collier
Green, Pa. McClure
Griffiths McCulloch
Colmer
Gross McDade
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Conable
Grover McDonald
Conte
,
Gude Mich.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask
Corbett
Gurney McEwen
unanimous consent that all Members
H 7111
who have spoken on the Department of
Defense appropriation bill today may
have permission to revise and extend
their remarks in the body of the RECORD
and include pertinent additional mate-
rial.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I also ask
unanimous consent that all Members of
the House may have 5 legislative days
in which to revise and extend their re-
marks on the bill just passed and to in-
clude extraneous matter.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Texas?
There was no objection.
(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include extra-
neous matter.)
[Mr. PATMAN'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix.]
(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include extra-
neous matter.)
[Mr. PATMAN'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix.]
ADMINISTRATION BILL FOR ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF FED-
ERAL SAVINGS BANKS INTRO-
DUCED BY BANKING AND CUR-
RENCY CHAIRMAN WRIGHT PAT-
MAN'
(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include extra-
neous matter.)
Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, President
Johnson, in his Economic Report sub-
mitted to the Congress last January, rec-
ommended that Congress enact legisla-
tion providing for Federal charters for
mutual savings banks, "to enlarge and
strengthen our system of thrift institu-
tions." In making this recommendation,
the President referred to his previous re-
quest for such legislation contained in his
1966 Economic Report, but not acted
upon by the 89th Congress. Yesterday I
introduced this legislation for myself, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. MULTER],
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [ Mr.
BARRETT], the gentleman from Pennsyl-
vania [Mr. MOORHEAD], the gentleman
from Rhode Island [Mr. ST GERMAIN],
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZA-
LEZ], the gentleman from New Jersey
[Mr. MINISH], and the gentleman from
New York [Mr. BINGHAM]. Hearings were
held last year on similar bills, but no ac-
tion was taken by the full committee. The
present bill is very similar to the previous
bills, but incorporates provisions reflect-
ing the enactment of the Financial Insti-
tutions Supervisory Act of 1966.
Mr. Speaker, I insert at this point in
the RECORD a section-by-section analysis
of the administration's new bill to au-
thorize the establishment of Federal sav-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE - June 13, 1967
Ings banks, followed by the text of the
proposed legislation: -
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF A BILL TO
AUTHORIZE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEDERAL
SAVINGS BANKS
Section 1. Short title. The unnumbered
first section states the short title, "Federal
Savings Bank Act."
TITLE I. FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKS
Chapter I. General provisions
Section 11. Definitions and rules of con-
struction. Section 11, the first section of title
I, contains certain definitions and general
rules.
The term "mutual thrift institution"
would mean a Federal savings bank, a Fed-
eral savings and loan association, or a State-
chartered mutual savings bank, mutual sav-
ings and loan association, mutual building
and loan association, cooperative bank, or
mutual homestead association.
In turn, "thrift institution" would mean a
mutual thrift institution, a guaranty savings
bank, a stock savings and loan association, or
a stock building and loan association, and
"financial institution" would mean a thrift
institution, a commercial bank, or an insur-
ance company. By a special definitional pro-
vision in this section, the term "financial
institutions acting in a fiduciary capacity"
as used in sections 53 and 54 would include
a credit union, whether or not acting In a
fiduciary capacity.
"State" would mean any State, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and any ter-
ritory or possession of the United States,
The term "merger transaction" would mean
any transaction between or among any two
institutions, at least one of which is a Fed-
eral. savings bank, which will result in a
merger or consolidation or pursuant to which
any of such institutions, otherwise than in
the ordinary course of business, acquires any
assets of, or assumes liability to pay any de-
posits made in or share accounts of, or simi-
lar liabilities of, another of such institutions.
As used in relation to a merger transaction,
"resulting bank" or "resulting institution"
would refer to a bank or other 'institution
(whether or not newly chartered in connec-
tion with the transaction) which, after its
consummation, and as a result thereof, car-
ries on the business or any part thereof there-
tofore carried on by one or more parties to
the transaction.
Section 12. Rules and regulations. Section
12 authorizes the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board to make rules and regulations, in-
cluding definitions of terms in title I.
Section 13. Examination. This section pro-
vides for general and special examinations
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board or
Federal savings banks, and also provides that
the Board may render to any bank or officer
or director thereof such advice and comment
as it may deem appropriate with respect to
the bank's affairs.
Section 14. Reports. Section 14 provides
that the Board may require periodic and
other reports and information from Federal
savings banks.
Section 15. Accounts and accounting. The
Board would be authorized by section 15 to
prescribe, by regulation or order, accounts
and accounting systems and practices for
Federal savings banks.
Section 16. Right to amend. The right to
alter, amend, or repeal title I would be re-
served by section 16.
Chapter 2. Establishment and voluntary
liquidation.
Section 21. Information to be stated In
charter. This section makes provision for the
contents of charters for Federal savings
banks.
Section 22. Issuance of charter for new
bank. A charter for a new Federal savings
bank could be issued by the Board on the
written.. application (in such form as the
Board may prescribe) of not less than 5 ap-
plicants and upon the making of specified
determinations by the Board, including a de-
termination that there has been placed in
trust or escrow for an initial reserve such
amount, not less than $50,000, in cash or se-
curities approved by the Board as the Board
may require, in consideration of transferable
certificates to be issued by the bank in such
form, on such terms, and bearing such inter-
est or other return as the Board may approve.
Section 23. Issuance of charter for a con-
verted bank. Subsection (a) of this section
would authorize the Board to issue a charter
for a converted Federal savings bank on writ-
ten application (in form prescribed by the
Board) of the converting institution and
determination by the Board among other
things that (1) the converting institution
is a mutual thrift institution and (2), if
the converting institution is a Federal sav-
ings and loan association, the conversion has
been favored by vote of two-thirds of the
directors and two-thirds of the votes entitled
to be cast by members.
To such extent as the Board might approve
by order, and subject to such prohibitions,
restrictions, and limitations as it might pre-
scribe by regulation or written advice, a con-
verted bank could retain and service the
accounts, departments, and assets of the
converting institution.
Subsection (b) of the section provides that
the Board shall not issue a charter under
subsection (a) unless it determines that,
taking into consideration the quality of the
converting institution's assets, its reserves
and surplus, its expense ratios, and such
other factors as the Board may deem appro-
priate, and making appropriate allowances
for differences among types of financial in-
stitutions, the converting institution's his-
tory has been of a character "commensurate
with the superior standards of performnace
expected of a Federal savings bank".
Section 24. Conversion of Federal savings
banks into other institutions. Under subsec-
tion (a) of section 24 the Board, on written
application of a Federal savings bank, could
permit it to convert into, any other type of
mutual thrift institution, on a determina-
tion by the Board that (1) two-thirds of the
directors have voted in favor of the proposed
conversion, (2) the requirements of section
45 have been met, (3) the conversion will
not be in contravention of State law, and
(4) upon and after conversion the institu-
tion will be an insured institution of the
Federal Savings Insurance Corporation (i.e.,
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, whose name would be changed
to Federal Savings Insurance Corporation
by section 201) or an insured bank of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Subsection (b) of the section provides
that no Institution into which a Federal sav-
ings bank has been converted may, within
ten years after the conversion, convert into
any type of institution other than a mutual
thrift institution which is either a bank in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation or an institution insured by the
Federal Savings Insurance Corporation, re-
gardless of whether the later conversion took
place directly or through any intermediate
conversions.
Enforcement of this prohibition would be
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in
the ease of an institution having a status
as an insured institution of the Federal
Savings Insurance Corporation and by the
Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in the case of an in-
stitution having a status as an insured bank
of that corporation. On a determination that
a violation had taken place, the relevant
board, by order issued not later than two
years after any such violation, could ter-
minate such status without notice, hearing,
or other action. For the purposes of this
subsection and subsection (a) of section 26,
the terms "conversion" and "convert" would
be defined as applying to mergers, consolida-
tions, assumptions of liabilities, and reor-
ganizations, as well as conversions.
Section 25. Voluntary liquidation. A Fed-
eral savings bank could not voluntarily go
into liquidation or otherwise wind up its
affairs except in accordance with an order of
the Board issued under section 25. Upon
application by such a bank, the Board could
permit it to carry out a plan of voluntary
liquidation upon a determination by the
Board that (1) two-thirds of the bank's di-
rectors have voted in favor of the proposed
plan, (2) the requirements of section 45 have
been met, (3) there is no longer a need in
the community for the bank, or there is not
a reasonable expectation that Its continued
operation will be financially sound and suc-
cessful, and (4) the plan is fair and equi-
table and in conformity with the require-
ments of section 26.
Section 26. Distribution of assets upon
liquidation. Subsection (a) of section 26 pro-
vides that on liquidation of a Federal sav-
ings bank under section 25, or liquidation
of any institution while subject to the pro-
hibition in subsection (b) of section 24, the
net assets after the satisfaction or provision
for satisfaction, in accordance with such rules
and regulations as the Board may prescribe,
of all proper claims and demands against
the institution, including those of depositors
or shareholders, shall be distributed to the
Federal Savings Insurance Corporation. In
the case of institutions subject to subsection
(b) of section 24, the claims of depositors
or shareholders are to be limited to amounts
that would have been withdrawable by them
in the absence of any conversion (as defined
in said subsection) while the institution was
so subject.
The object of this provision is to deter
conversions of Federal savings banks to non-
mutual operation and to deter unneeded
voluntary liquidation of Federal savings
banks. Under section 24 Federal savings banks
are prohibited from converting directly at
one step into any other type of institution
except a mutual thrift institution insured
by the Federal Savings Insurance Corpora-
tion or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration. Section 26 is designed to deter, to the
extent of its provisions, the conversion of a
Federal savings bank indirectly or by succes-
sive steps into an institution other than such
an insured mutual thrift institution.
Subsection (b) of section 26 provides that
on liquidation of a Federal savings bank
otherwise than pursuant to section 25 the
net assets remaining after the satisfaction
or provision for the satisfaction, in accord-
ance with such rules and regulations as the
Board may prescribe, of all proper claims
and demands against the bank, including
those of depositors, shall be distributed to
thedepositors in accordance with such rules
and regulations as the Board may prescribe.
Section 27. Authority of Board. This sec-
tion authorizes the Board to make rules and
regulations for reorganization, liquidation,
and dissolution, merger transactions, and
conservatorships and receiverships, and to
provide by regulation or otherwise for exer-
cise during conservatorship or receivership
of functions by depositors, directors, officers,
or bodies which may select directors.
Chapter 3. Branching and merger
Section 31. Branches. Under section 31
a Federal savings bank could establish a
branch or branches with the approval of the
Board, upon a determination by the Board
that (1) there is a reasonable expectation
of the branch's financial success based on
the need for such a facility in the locality,
the bank's capitalization, financial history,
and quality of management, and such other
factors as the Board deems appropriate, (2)
its operation may foster competition and
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