MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN ROOM 117, CENTRAL BUILDING ON 31 MARCH 1950, AT 1430

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000400170038-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 31, 1950
• Content Type: MIN

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Or. Theodore Babbitt, Presiding
PrIESEET
Er. Zonis
Mr. Barnard Morrie.......................,Bepartment
Er. H.R. Penninan......... 0000000 .......,.Department
Major Boynton.. 00000 ...........Departmont
L. Abbott 0000000 ? tIel ?O ?Oflo???st. ..0?0 .4.0Departvont
Col, 000000 trolioodoo00 atpartment
Er. Stefan /bean/y..00m. 000000 .....Ajaparlment
of State
of State
of State
of the Army
of the Arpy
of the Navy
of the air Force
of the Air Force
Mr. G.A. Rolander, 3. Erergy Commission
Capt. H.P.Irighto.a..
USX...............jelnt Ghieft of Staff
. 4
Army, DOE, DOS, JCS, Navy and USAF
review(s) completed.
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7AnTigUTAL "4,12SE =MEE
tuativa .12t
(Verbatim)
DABBIIT: One very practical detail that I should like to take up
Immediately is that of the decorations on the table. Thin is the intake
end of a wire recording-tiace which had already been mounted here.
quite a job to mount it. It need not be switched on.
It is
is 25X1A
here and we can go on as we have. But I should like to put up to the
Committee the possibility that we use the wire recording device in the
future simply as a device to assist our personnel side of our office.,
in going to be absent for some time in the future and the
questien of a replacement would be greatly eased if there would be no
objection on the part of the members of this Committee to using the wire
recorder. It works the same way.,-, the remarks are taken down and
ziorited and a verbatim report will be circulated.
moms: I would like to take the .opportunity of raising the question
of whether ve want verbatim reports or edited reports. I think on at least
cto occasion an edited report might have served a useful purpose.
NEMER: At the rink of causing a split in my department, I disagree.
It seems to me that the incident that occurred would have occerred 44Peye
NICHOLS: I think we in the 4r:fly would prefer to get an edited repor40
Of course with the concurrence of those attending the conference after it
has been editede
BABBITT: naturally it would be eir6Oztod for the.qc:Olptoliooof the
minutes. By an 'edited reportl did you mean a report taken from the ver
report?
BOMB: The usual secretarial notes.
BABB/TT: Would you rather have a verbatim transcription that is edit,e1
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VEMUR: Perhaps not a summary, but a statement of decisions reached
at the meeting. If there were only two or three decisions, that could be
done in a few lines.
BABBITT: That is what Imeant by secreteriel notes. That Is, a
goneral outline of the discussion and a record of the decisions reached.
HEUER: I am not sure you need an outline of the discussion, from
that point of view e- but that, after our discussion we have arrived at
certain specific decisions, that these assignments were given to a pare
ticular sub-committee, and that this person was aoked to do these things*
ri2ilIt could be donee, "The Committee considered this point and
k i o
that point and came to the following decisions". That need not be more
nen a page.
BABBITT: Let le tet the opinions on the desiraUility of having a full
;,eanscription of the notes available, no ratter what foxret the arcuUted
venion took wheteer it be a short one page smeary based on act tren-
ne?ietion? or the seceetarial notes. How many favor the existence of a
erbetin teaneceipt of each meeting?
Najority reised hands)
3M ': flow reny would weer to have an abridgment cieculated?
Pocsony and Wackeite raised hands)
NTWAN: 7ould it be possible to ciroulate an abridgment and t'
fI treescript? I just raise that as a possibility.
BABBITT: I think if we oieculate the eole thing each time, vhieh
le (pito an operation, that maybe that would be enough. re will continue
to make tlee) full tranecrietton. Por experimental eurposee we will draw
IT a
brief account, secretarial minutes, of this meeting*
I have two -brief tnnouncemente before we an tok:, up the report. I
have spoken to the Lseiotant Dieector of our Office of Colleotion and
Dieseminetion, 6oho also runs the Reference Center and the pat Library it
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-A-L Bill 7
connection with it) about setting up a readily accessible central file of
the projects which have been requested to be sent in to the Secretary.
That is the description of the ?rejects. I am told that it will be very
easy, through a mechanism known as Telefax, I think, to reproduce and file
Ln ITAI machines the abstracts of the projects no to 250 words. They need
not go up to 250 words, but the machinery will take up to that number* This
could be done very easily for future filing with the Secretary if the Committee
members would see to it that accomnanying the project (if it is in existence,
or if it is not) they would file an abstract for a f01 description of the
Project, which would then be typed on the Telefax cards, coded and recorded,
The ultimate objective being that if any analyst in any agency thereafter
starts to work on a nroject having to do with international Communism, he
can apely to the CIA Library for a loan of all projects on that particular
phase which he is about to undertake. I know this Telefax operation slightly,
from the outside, and I know that it works vary well. Naturally you will
not 'at out any more than you put in but if everybody puts in everything
they have, we will eventually be able to push a button and get out these
abstracts of all projects bearing on the subject. As the coding mechanism
usually works you get rather more than you nee on the one thing, but you
cover the whole field adequately. It will also give you the location of
the paper of which you have the abstract, and the various copies. For
instance, you might find that there are two copies in C-2, and one in ()IR
and one in CIA. I am going to pursue that further, to see the coding
operation, to see if we can come up with something which will be of
practical value to the JIGSAW operation.
I think I should also mention the absence of the FI renresentatives
this time, end to tell you that the Direction (CIA) received a letter from
the Direction of the FBI mentioning some remarks of mine at the last meeting
and stating that In view of those remarks the FM desired to withdraw from
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the JIGSAW Committee. That letter has been answered, With a request for
reconsideration, which is still unanswered. So X cannot tell you whether
the FBI will finally and fonmalyvdthdraw from the JIGSAW Committee. or
not. I most certainly hope they do not, because they are in possession
of information which should be of great value in the study of international
Communism if it could be made available to the ether members of the Committee.
However, that matter is not deoided yet.
You have before you two reports. OM Wes circulated last week and
contains a list of first priority projects. The subject is "Reaxemendations
for Priority Program".
The other one, a much more huller document, which has just been distributed,
is on the subject of "Suggestions for Projects on Aspects of International
Communism". This is a more lengthy document and for that reason I think
it should not be discussed ir any detail today.
What we intend to do (if the Committee approves) with both of these
documents, if they are approved, is to forward them to the IAC with a report
which is yet to be written requesting full support from the agencies involved
in the production of, in the first place, the priority projects, and within
the framework of the larger list of projects.
The larger list, in spite of its size, is admittedly far from complete.
You will recall the four fields of investigation which we have discussed before.
I noticed, on page 2, that there is only one paragraph on field number I. "Prile!
ciples of Communism"; and field number III. "Activities of National and Re-
gional Communist Organizations"; has not been completed; and field number
IV. "Communism as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Police, is only sketched
out. But that, when completed. will be forwarded to the IAC, not as a list
of projects, but as background and a framework against which the most im-
portant and priority programs of this Committee are to be viewed. We shall
hope to get the opinion of the agencies on the validity of the priorities
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in the priority program, aod with that their approval of allocations for the
production?
Obviously, the Sub4ommittee'e report for the Priority Program is
before you for discussion and possible amendment In the weer of additions, sub-
tractions, or in any other way.. Is there any discussion? Ur. Newer, as
chairman of the Sub-Committee, would you like to lead off?
=WM There night be a ember of things pointed out with reference
to the Priority Program. You:will note that the Committee has not rated these
prejects, for a number of reasons. First, because it is felt that a group
or agencies rather than one agency should address itself to the problem of
doing these projects, and therefore several projects could be dome at the
same time. In looking over the projects, you will see, I think, Tate readily
that we have in a sense picked on a number of projects whioh could be done
by different departments* Thus, for example, project 112". ("Present types,
methods or selection, changing Characteristics in the leadership of the Commu-
nist parties in Southeast Asia") is obviouray a project to be done primarily
by biographical intelligence organizatione of the government. Project If',
("The pattern .of clandestine Communist activities of both legal and illegal
parties", etei) in obviously a project to be done principally by SO. We have
designated project "j", as one which obviously. Should he at least partly done
by aternal Vesearch -- if not -holly. There are a number 'Of other projects
which are of special interest to member departments of the COmnittee.
Another point that X would like to make in this connection is that
th!s Priority' Program, ae we have it here, should not be thought of as the
only ampect Of the program for immediate work in JIGSAW'S program. That is
to say, this is, in a sense, the first hatch of reports that ought to be done
in the near Altura; but almost all of them make sense only if connected with
another series of reports that should be done soon afterwards.
Thus, for example, take project ?Ilti ("Communist organisational potentials
and capabilities in the international maritime industry".) It is quite clear
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that in terms of the situation that .exists in the world today, particularly
in the Western World, but to some extent in other parts of the world ?- lette
say in Australis and to ealle extent the South Pacific ?? an understanding of
the Government of Communist potentials and oapabilitiee in the maritime industry
is an important requirement. But that ought not to be thought of as isolated
from related projects which fit together. There are five or six major stra-
tegic industries which I think all of us agree ought to be studied at one
time or another if the requirements of the American government are to be reached.
The same thing can be said about a number of others. Project life (Which
refers to Communist strategy as revealed in Communist taotles in Southeast Asia)
although obviously of great importance at this time in view of the events in
the South Pacifies is really only the first of a series that ought to be done
with reference to Communist strategy end tactics. There are a number of others
that will borne to mind immediately as you look at the report.
BABBITT: Yes. I should say that that project lb', on. the international
maritime industry, would be eoeneetod with any other etudiee of the WFTU, other
induetriesaffeoted by the TFT14 or any other Communist dominated labor organization.
referonoe to the fuller report, page 4, this particular one,
as an example, may be seen in the oontext Of these othere you suggest. It is
down here as Number 14. (0Communiat potentials arid egpabilities in the maritime
industry.") There are a number of others under the sate general substopio.
Number 13 throueh 21 is the group.. The same thing holds for the ethers. That
is the general arinoiple that Mr. Mazer is talking about.
BABBITT: %thin that framework, is there anr discussion., any additions,
or suggested deletions Zrom the nrionity list?
NICHOLS: I am a little confused at this particular stage. In the short
list we have 'Communist capabilities and Intentions for sabotage of important
facilities' in just two countries -? Franoe and Italy. I think it should be
made npnarent that the Army is interested ix' these capabilities and intentions
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in any specific area in which we might be celled upon to use our military forces.
What I want reassurance on ir that this would not restrict our field of interest.
BABBITT: Not in the slightest4
NEMER: On the contrary. That is just the point I was trying to make.
As 7011 are now saying, this suggestion of
that that must be done with others,
NICHOLS: I want that in the record.
NEMER: / feel stronely about that. This is the top part of the iceberg
the projects that we feel should be seen now, and should be done immediately.
But the iceberg can not be handled unless we do all of the other projects that
fit in immediately with this.
NICHOLS: I have no other comment.
BABBITT: We have to start somewhere. Is this as good a place as any,
shall tre say, to start?
NICHOLS: From our standpoint, that is the best place. We are primargY
interested in item W on the short list. We Suet do not want to be restricted
at a later time by having a cement made to the effect that you should have said
that a long time ago'.
PENNIMAN: /t seems to MO it would be useful if a paragraph statement
laf makes sense only if we keep in mind
of Wemzerie and
BABBITT
atements are outlined and put in.
It will be taken care of in far more than one paragraph, I
hone. If this report is accepted as a.Priority Program, as I said, it will
go forward to the IAC with a rather lengthy report as another attachment. The
JIGSAW report, which you requested me to do at the last meeting, and Which I
have not done, for reasons quite beyond my control (bacteriological of nature)
and consequently I think we could very wellkOrwomrd the whole thing in one hatch.
That is, this report as an attachment, and as a point of focus of the background
progress report of JIGSAW up to now, leading up to this, and requesting the
support of the agencies on a priority basis. It will be for more than one
paragraph of additional information. I propose to circulate the draft of that
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report to the members of the Committee at a later meeting, to ask their
approval of it before it is finalized and dispatched to the IAC. I hope that
will be very soon.
NEMER: Nr. Chairman, before the report to the IAC is finished, cir-
culated and approved, it eight be useful to continue along parallel lines
and get all of the information needed for actual allocation of these priority
jobs. That is to say, at the same time that the report is being drafted, it
is ey suggestion, and the suggestion of most of the members of the Sub-Committee,
I think, that that list be sent to each of the departments with a. request for
some indication of that department's plans in this genera connection. Let's
say, for example, that this is sent to State. I em sure that py department
will answer by indicating that we plan, within the foreseeable future, to
do project 'bait and several others, and we would be interested in having portions
of those reports allocated to State. If similar answers are received from
each of the member departments, SIGSAR can then immediately proceed to allocating
those jobs, and in fact in the report to the IAC indicate those allocations as
part of our report, so that a whole step will be taken at the same time.
BABBITT: I vented to ask the members of the Committee at this meeting
to signify officially if possible, but probably tentatively only, which projects
they thought their agencies and depertments would be interested in, producing.
I think there are very few Which would be completely within the field of responsi-
bility of only one department. But in using the term allocation, it would be
understood that that department would have general charge, but might cell upon
some other department for assistance in various phases of the work. But I
would he very glad to have some indications, on the basis of this list, of
the interest, shall we say, of the medberngencies.
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I 1 So far as SO is concerned, I VIII* that 'f' and fall within
our field of interest. So pending an approval from headquarters, I should say
that we would definitely be interested in Ifl and '1'. As a matter of facto
we are working on If' already.
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All six odbheadings of Ill?
!es, We might call on other departments for aseistangle.
BABBITT: That would be done through the normal procedure.
DEMZERs Do you feel that probably lo, could be at /east partly done, or
done he eooperation of SO?
On te, as you know, we have put out one interim study on the
subject, and we feel that more coulclbe dope, that it could be carried a little
further, perhaps by State or orts. But it it is felt that we can contribute some
more on the sullmet, we shall be glad to assist.
EEMZERI There may be a number of them that would have to be done by a
task force from several departments. The one that Colonel Niohols showed interest
in, and in fact auggested, Pa% could only be done by all of the facilities
available and certainly all of the departments cooperating.
Vhau You say 'by all of the deeartments cooperation', /quite
agree. It seems to me that the beet maehinery we have for that is the OBE, CIA
coordinating mechanism, isn't it? I am putting that but as a question. Would
it be easier to nut that daft, for instance, as an OBS project? We would not
try to do the wild's thing inside the office. Or would it be better to assign
it, for instance, to 0-2/
NIONOLS: It weed seem to no that that partionlar one, 'a', can be
contributed to by every agency almost in an equal amount, and that every agency
has an almost equal interest in it.
NEUZEN Not all writing on the same thing, but subsections of a report
of this type.
NICAOLS: The Point I am getting at is that everyone has an equal interest,
and therefbre how canyon assign a primary interest?
NEMER; You might have a task force, dividing the actual work, with
various departments taking primary responsibility for seotions.
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NICHOLS! rift a ehairman over the uhole thing.
nErazat It may' be that that is the kind of a job that is worth exploring
from the point of Vise of procedures as well as substantive value. There are a
number of different ears of doing it.
BABB/TT: That is what I wanted to bring Mg I simply suggested the CIA
machinery as the one with which I am most familiar. Nothally, if that were an
intereelly renerated OPE project, a meeting would be oailed to discuss the
outline and to alloOhte productior responsibility for 'Various sections of it.
NEMZER: qy sugfeeetion on a project of this tYpe *dull be that we have to
explore .the whole businees rather thoroughly. For example, titles are not
really sufficient in some cases to actuallI let you know what is behind the
request. In a cane like this it seems to me that the first thing a Sub-Committee
would do would be to find out troe the Army, (who sueieested it in the first
place) what they had in Mind in detail, and get otheti infornation from other
departments as to whit they think ought to he done, and as the nroject shapes
up Toomey find that one particular organizatien is better:than another in
attacking 076 kind of problem that you now sea.
PENNIVANt Does not this sugeest that there is a Continuing value in
contituine the Seb-dOmmittne, for that PUr1106? among others -- at least on
the exploratory 1eve12
BABBXTT: Yes, T think there is re right also add, informally at
least, to the Sub-Oommittee (again from the ORE point of view) one of the project
people from the Publications Diviaion, who are the ones familiar with the
machinery, and working out the terms of reference. That coed be done on an
entirely informal basis.
PUNEIUM: / raise this question also, to take it down to one that hits
directly at me, ljf, where it states "This is recommended ohly if it can be
undertaken by External Research". There are two or three things which we would
need if we were to undertake it. First of all, this world mean there had been
come kind of general outlire agreed upon so that everybody here gets hit as
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much as they can in getting ax y research done out in the universities, so
that on whatever. countries we study we wit, have approximately the same kind
of information about each of those countries, so that, at some point there can
be a comparative study made. Individual analyvis on ho countries, whidh is
at least partlYhistorical, is not worth a great deal 'Unless we sun eft it in
a pattern, so that It can be projected into other countries which have not
as yet been penetrated or have not as ea& had the Communists assume poier.
So that the External Research staff ought to have that kind of informatiOn
an outline that we could talk to people about. Secondly, and this appliedto
another problem which is really quite separate and which you may not wish to
discuss at this point, but for the actual oomparative study it would probably
mean that somebedy ought to be paid to do it. It is possible, perhaps, without
payment to get tome of the other jobs done. Jie have people doing one, or likely
to start it, so we can get some done 'for free"; but. when it comes time for
the comparative study of the methods, it means that somebody has to get this
material that has been ,enee by others and then go through sekto the job of
analysing the various countries in order to maks the comparative statement.
At this point I suggest that we may have to to out and hire somebody to do
that -- maybe a throe months job for the summer, or sOmething of that sort.
But at the moment I don't see how we can easily Gawp? having that done.
But otherwise, with those two things In Mind, I think that it would he quite
Possible
25X1A that the External Research Staff can do a great deal on it. We already
have the Eitudy on Cseehoslovekia. We have a little volume Which we
have not yet had a chance to get out, partially becauSe we cannot figure out
where you send seven copies of something that thick, without causing trouble.
How do you go about having everybody more or less di satisfied equally& In
any case, there is one on Hungary. There are others underway. As a matter of
fact, there is one underway on almost all of the satellite countries. So I
don't think there will be too much problem in placing something, or in picking
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up semething already in progreas. The final job is goirg to requite mote
ork? and it may even be that we would have to esk.sone of those who have
already done the study to add on in order to meet earns of the requirements
that might come up around the table.
EEMZER: I think it ehould be treesed in that connection that the
pay-off on that project, Ropard, (Penniman), must be the comparative study
and the pattern that emerges, We can have a library full of books on each
of these revolutions and not actually have: great benefit to the government,
unleeb the culdinating study, the comparative aspects, arid the pattern, and
the lessons to be learned from all of these are brought together in thin final
job, for which you have responsibility. It makes no sense at all to launnh
into this unless we can assure you that you will get support for that last
Joh.
PENNIMAN: The others have a certain historical value, but to be useful
it needs this final pattern thing.
BABBITT: As far as the matter of .4unds goes, I.ard reasonably sure that
between CT& and State as can find them.
NEMER: As far as the interests of State are concerned: State is
planning studies that relate to or inolude lbt, ed', let and lg04 That in to
say, OIR 14 considering snob studies and is interested it them.. I have die.,
cussed with the Biographical Division of State the possibility of ding tilt.
They are very much interested, although we have no commitment as yet.
BABBITP:
did you say you were working on t al
No, we are not. We did a report two years ago. V? are not doing
anything on the subject. Naturally, we would assistland help out anybody Who
needs our help,
NEMER: State will be interested in lot I think, bub that would again
require a number of agencies working together. State does have a very definite
Interest in tel.
BABBITT: The scope of that is.tremendous uThe mechanism of international
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Communism for control, communication with, and financing of; the national
Communist parties."
=MR: You notice that we hastened to adds "An explorative aummare.
BABBITT: I did note that.
25X1A
%slap timer Particular interest in Idt2
110tt7ptat would think so. It is bard to know how AEC would perhaps
develop that infOrmation. There is no question that thy, might be interested
in it,
PENNIMAN: This is, of course, one of the area in thloh it mould be '
extremely usefte to have the 1Z: working to assist.
. MUTT': les, it certainly would. I think poseibly OSI might to etas
to contribute something (an td9? and certain y they would ,be interested. That
is the Office of Scientific Intelligence 44 One
DIEMZERI State is of course primarilY interested in:Certain Communist
public organisations, world federations of scientific workers, on which we haVe.
done some work and are definibdy interested, and on which we mar report in the
near Mare. Obviously a oonsiderable portion of the work which would have to
be done for it could not be done by State. There again We could contribute to
a Common plot.
PEWSIMM: There again it looks like OSO might have interest in some part
of it.
25X18
1 ?1 I should think so. I feel that whoever taokles this Job will
find out that there is. great deal of ievesbieative work to be done, and that
could to charged out to 80 in connection with the preparation of the study.
BABBITT: That brings 'up the matter of collection. Even on these priority
projects, I am quite sure that a great deel of further iuformation will have to
be calleoted by all ofthe.agencies. But it seams to ma that at least at this
stage it is not .advisable to contemplate any extraordinary collection measures.
I do think however, as Ur. Nemeer suggested before the meeting, the advisability
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of getting together representatives of our collection agencies for a talk ?
poseibly attending a meeting of 31tISZ. Bub at least to Mem them here to
make sure that they understand the fall scope and the importanee of collection
requests which they may receive on these or dearer projects. I am quite sure
that many of them in the field put a fairly low ptiority on the type of request
which we consider extremely valuable, on which we need information, and infor-
mation which we need .very badly before we can go on an any of these things.
To take for example the one you mentioned Nemzer, the WFTU, the personnels,
the officere of that organization -- what their relationi are with Moscow; how
those relations are maintained; the entire oonnecting links between the
headquarters of the MU and Macaw. It should not be too difficult to get
that information, taxi yet it is very sketchy. We know very little about it
indeed. The reports we do have on it are very slow coming in, are most behind
the times, simply because a low priority has been put on somewhere along the
col/004M line.
In this connection, I feel that perhaps some sort of machinery
could be developed within JIGSAW for the exploration and possibly the solution
of such imandiate procurement problems -- another sub-committee, perhaps, that
would take tip the eituation of coverage of the WPM, which I agree with Re.
Nemzer, and you 1, Chairman, is quite the burning problem at the momenta
I think the XICSAW Committee could rake a contribution toward the coverage
? of this problem both in overt and olandeetine information if it developed
some sort of sub-committee or Orp:alliSSI which would toll the various collection
agenoles what is needed, whet kind of priority should be attacked, and *Ind
type of information should be developed.
Main: Is not the principle along the latter lines, +lab we present
them with our requirements for information, and would point out the importance
of it.
NIZZIns That wolLd include, of cc:lure?, a canvas of the situation. For
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TANI'
exemple? as IpOineee out, there are certain overt materiels that are not
readhing the government. It is a perfectlr scandalous situation' it seems
to me. There are materials being sold in bookstando around in various parts
of the world that we cannot get hold of. And of course, there is a greed deal
of materiel that should be gotten that is ea clandestine nature whieh is
extremely important. Some of us fhel that the MC is in some respeets the
most impertant Communist instrumentality outside of the Soviet Union today.
It exist in Western Europe and therefore we ought to be able to get at it
in some fashion, and we are not doing that. JIG= might first note the
problem, show some ware of getting at the problem, and become in a ammo a
source of pressure on aur collection agencies f getting that problem solved
in an adequate fashion in the future. and I though that perhaps
the first thing that might be done by a sub-Committee of JIGSAW would be to
find what materiels, and what types of materials, are reaChing our government
dealing with the VFTU, and note the gaps in the coverage, and thOn in perhaps
a meeting with the collection agency representatives either at a JIGSAW or
a sub-committee meeting, or in some other way point these out and point
out the necessity Der filling these gaps at the oarliestpossible moment.
BABBITT: tiled we not include the vreu on the high priority project
list if we are going to put all of this pressure on it? I rather think we should.
=was It is connected in a vary real sent* with lb', as Mr. Babbitt
pointed out.
BABBITT: Yes, but is is not in evidence on the listing.
POSSOM Should we be, considering whethee we shoUld include the m-
oaned q Eastern Germany as a high prioritr projeet?
Ae a procurement?
POMMY: Le a procurement.
BABBITT: Yes, poseibly. The whole problem of the information from the
Soviet sone of Germany is one that is an too familiar to all of us, I am quite
sure the difficulties we have had.
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InI am not aura whether that is part of the JICSAW work.
BOUM It certainlr has to do with the Soviet Won.
11 It is a borderline ease.
NICHOLS: It seems to MO it JO like mdlitary order of tattle.
POSSUM It in the military, or quasl-military.
N/CHOES: Ate you talking about the overt police or the clandestine
organisation?
POSSORT: The overt organisation.
NICHOLS: That seems to mete he a military order of battle. re are
not getting into the method of deploying armies, and the'nelvy in this are se?
BABBITT: tredli, it is a quasi-milthmry force.
norm: Used in direct imOlementation of Communist strategy*.
possom And not used in the conventional way or strategy.
BABBITT; In the broadest sense, there is practllly no problem facing
ns anywhere today that cannot be related back to internmbional Communism.
After all, the, whole basis ofeterything is the us...ma tension, the odd war, or
whatever asmi want to sail it, and everything we do has to be hocked into that
framoworl; of which a not inconsiderable part is the international Communist move-
ment.
=ER: It seems to me our orientation might be along these liDOO: That
the men of the Kremlin have a group of major instrumentalities. One might include
the Soviet armies. Another major Instrumentality might be Soviet eemomic power.
A third might be the Soviet government and its itstrtanerrbality in such areas as
satellite states. A fourth one might be what we call the world Communist
movement, ad an instrumentality of the Kremlin -- not inoluding the Kremlin,
but as an instrumentality of it. And we trosumably are addreseing ourselves
to that instrumentality the NvoldChnnunist movement.
NICHOLS: The atst German pollee are different then......
NEMER: In Rays that is one of the sub-unite of the Communist Party,
as we understand it,
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And there is nothing covert about the Ilaat German &ant,
POSSONI: Another thing, on page 6, "Pattern of taandeetine Commattist
activities, of legal or illegal parties, relating to: a, insurrection and
preparation for insurrecrbion." That would be in &Stern Germany or estern
C-ermarel
NI01301.5t It is nab insurrection in West Germany.
POSSONIt if it does not invade West Germ".
NIC}IOLg I Baste= Germany invades -- then it is no problem for us,
and ou have war and this paper would be out of the window,
think we are Mixing up Investigation and research. Naturally
the problem of para-militaii forces in Western Germany is in the subject of
investigation, but hether we want to include it in our research program is
an entirelly different preOoeition.
NAIZrats If you were to indicate you warrbea a study made of Communist
capabilities and intentiona Western Germany including any clandestine
military groups that Might he 'Used in Wetatern, Germany through the Communist
organization, that would, it :Jaime to me, be a plausible addition; but if we
are dealing with what araeunte to the SoViet armed **roes as such, no Matter
how important that is (and it is vitally important), it really does not come
within our scope of work.
POSSONI: The first alternative, I think, is the correct one.
NICHOLS: I cannot Visualize the re st Gerin Array -infiltrating the
Western zone.
BABBITT: That would be certainly covered under sft somewhat.
POSSONY: That is correct, yes 2f (1)2, and maybe 2f (3)2.
BABBITT: what about the 'mina
I would be disinclined to make the riTTII otiority job for a
couple of reasons. One, because there have been a number of reports written
on the 7ITIT that are available. The other reason is that in studying the
internatior_al maritime industry, it is in a -sense a study of one part of the
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17041T4 as in some of the other projects, and se can go on from there. I
do believe that the MU is a very good trial run for a collection job for
JIGSAW&
BABBITT: You would like to treat the MTV from the colle6ion side
at the presto* time
11
AM"
At the present time. And see it as a job to he done in i6e
near future, beyond lb ae.eae of the several jobs that Should falei
"W. One of the points that teet of the members of theOubOommittee have
boon stressing is the desire nit to overload this priority list* Uwe
can poseibly do it to keep it down to a mild= number.
BABBITT: I quite agree with that. I think it it is dhorter ana,e0re
clearly defined there is a greater ohmic* that we will haVe anacesa with
the success in the attempt to get manpower behind the maw projects.
There aro a number of projects where we have to do a oonilderable
amount of collection,'E and if 3raa feel that the TIPPIT is one of the most 'burning
problems7 at this time, then I would egr it ought to be in eomehew.
=MR: We wonder whether that would be, in a sense,' another project,
another taSk undertaken 'br Mug at the name time working on the priority
Program, rather then part of it.
BABB/TT: TS not that a 'contradiction in terms2
Net necessarily.i? Becaues JIGBAV is going to have a whole series
of tasks in many fields sem work along. this is only one of the jobs we
are going to be doing.
RUMP: Zea. /think we would like to say that extr licit of priorities
here sould limit the derands on all of us to those particular ones, but of
course we cannot.
DMIZERI I am speaking of the work of JIGSAW. 310SEV will not always
addreas itself to the problems of priority and allocation. There are-napy
other problems involved in the whole area of international OOMMUllidM
blems of eollection? and duplication of effort. These other problems have.-
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also to be considered by JI08Aff as a part of its normal work, and in a some
this is MOVIDP us closer to the day whenwe can attack those problems -- the
first of those problems outside the program area,
Do you think there is a possibility of Shaping point lbs in a
similar fashion as point tfl and making the maritime project one of the sub-
projects of the TIPTU?
NEMZEHT That becomeo A huge project.
'There Is no question about it, but I Wale there is a contradic-
tion if we say the ITETU is so important and -then an the other hand donut put it
on the priority list.
I dwelt feel that way, because we are all keenly aware of the
information covered, and we would occupy the position that it is not possible
at the moment to start a project on, the 1MrEr, bat we have to wait until we get
more infortnation, and the problem on the Mitts now collection.
PETIMITAII: It is true, is it not, that as far as general information 13
concerned, you have to get down to Something awfully concrete about the Mk
and you first have this oollection problem that you speak or to get out of the
way.
171112a: I should say that the nroblem of not having too many jobs enters
here lf we wanted to ineiude a MIT jab, we ought to consider then, taking
on lbl. As between therIoTti and 1b00 at this peint, I would be strongly in
favor the maritime industry first.
The maritime Industry job would be one of the class two Jobe,
while the VIM would be aptoneering kind of job like lol and Ie.
=MR: As Ur. Penniman said, there is a lot of information on the
1r7T1.T.
BABBITT: Bay I suggest we leave the VITU off the priority list and
that Ur. explore the collection situation ir with the help of any of the
members, with a view to presenting to JIMAN a report on that specific collection
situation -- what agencies are in a position to collect the type of Information
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that we want.
ffl) Yes, loan.
BABBITT: Better start the other way -- draw up a set of requirements
to be coordinated with the other agencies with a view to putting pressure on
whatever collection agency seemed to indicate being able to get that information
1251
.on a high riority basis for nosga.
I hope I can draw on the assistance of Me. Nemser, who is most
interested in this subject.
BABBITT: We are all interestedL In regard to 1j1, because of the note,
I would like to make this etaeement for the record, that it in ey understanding
that 231 can be undertaken berEaternal Research.
PENNIMAN: That is right. To this extent we can be sure of it. We
can get some studies on individual countries, because we already have some, and
we can expand those. In some cases vivre it is decided be the Sub-Committee, or
by JIGSAW, or whoever is responsible fbr that decision, it night be desirable
to go out and actually place a project with Professor Joe Blow, or something
which might involve some money, but primarily the need for money probably will
be at the cemearative level at the end. with that in mind, sure, &eternal
Research can do it.
BABBITT: Those are practical details. Bet it can he donee by Beternal
Research. There is one other point on which I am not quite clear. Colonel
Nichols, did you indicate a burning desire to undertake project 'a'?
NICHOLS: I dm afraid not. I well have to make a fee remarks, and repeat
some of those I made at the last Committee meeting. That is, that at the present
time, we cannot commit any additional eersonnele or any personnel, to the
formation and completion of a project under our terms of reference. New, however,
if this proposition is made to the IAC, and the IAC determines that the erey
will supervise this particular project, then the Amy will have to make available
the additional personnel and fends to complete it. &t the present time there is
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no personnel and to funds to complete work on a project of this nature.
BABB1TT: Of course that islalea we are going through the machinery of the
/AC -- in order to get support on as sufficiently high level as possible.
NICHOLS: That was my understanding of it, but Ur. Nemzer Opened this
with a suggestion that this Committee aloe:AG these projects tee.
E4 A
It: No -- to gather the information on allocation. /n other words,
if at our next meeting some or us come hack and eay we cift commit our agency
to undertake a particular project then an allocation would follow automatically.
In those cases where arencies cannot take mpon themselves the task of doing
certain lobe, and the problem of allocation remains, it seems to me that that
is a problem largely for JIGSAW recommending to the IAC.
NICHOLS: As far as the Army is concerned, I am afrail that will have to
be the procedure that is used, because / think that all Of you are aware of the
cut we have taken in the budget, as have all three departments in the Defense
establishment. Our personnel has been out to the bone, and we are performing,
at the present time, just current intelligence. We have no personnel to put
on a long range project such as this. Do I understand it what when you write
this report to the IAC it will explain exactly what I am driving at, and you
will get that point across?
BABBITT: Yon will have a crack at the draft.
NICHOIS: We just dont have the capability of producing, even through
we realize the value of it.
BABBITT: That, I am sure, is unforteeately true of all of the members
of this Committee, in various degrees.
NICHOLS: Is that true of the Navy?
ABBOTT: I think even more so in the case of Navy, which is no much
smaller than you are.
BABBITT: The Air Force is perhaps slightly more fortunate?
POSSONY: Considerably synallert
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MORRIS: Let's give it to ORE.
BABBITT: e' can take on some of the work but I could eot set a dead-
line on whip* we would complete it.
POSSONY: Vey I raise a question whidh jOst came up. I don't think that
it le completely necessary to have a lot of Money for Exteeeal Research in
Washington. / tilt* the main trouble in Vaehington to soee extent is to get
more or less security clearance.
BABBITT: I am afraid JIGSC will have very little infleence on the people
who give clearances.
POSSONY: There are many universities in town Who had clearances before.
As an example, I directed the study on collection of Soviet treatises,
Finally we finished one volume, and now the State Department says they are
going to help us a little.
BABB/TT: I am not familiar with that,
PENNIMAN: You should come in through the External Rebearch Staff.
POSSONY: 18 that CIA?
BABB1TT: No, it is a joint setup,
PENNIMAN: Ve just don't snend money now, because yeti can get this very
good cooperation that you talk nbout from the universities and the university
faculties. There are occasions however, if you say- Professor IXI is the key
man for this kind of a study where it becoees necessary to pull him off of
either his tnadhing job for a period of to or three months, or to pull him
off df a research project which he is on, And after all you have to have people
who will complete the prbject and the problem is to got them to finish doing
it. If ybu pal them off of something like that then yoe may need sone
assistance. This cost 8Omething and sometimes runs into big money. It is
done in State and in CIA under the }XS program, or through our own program.
The arsistance ranges from 300, to where you hire four or five graduate
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assistants to help you, to $4,000. X think that is the largest project we
have out.
NICHOLS: With regard to the matter I thought you were discuseing --
alearances it was ny opinion that T. the one you were talkie:gab:rut:,
would not involve access to any claseified material, atd that that would be
gathered from overt sources.
POSSOfff: You can make external res arch at the universities on the
basis of classified docueents.
PERNIMANt On the particular obudy1Xmolved here much of the material is
not material which has any classification.
POSSONY: We run into trouble on the ISeoret'. Te have never tried
anything beyond "Secret'.
PENNIMAN: I think it is ueuatty simpler to depend on the agency when it
goes beyond that. You ran into questions of bringing people in if they are
not it town.
VACITITZI Getting back to the priorities a minute, On 'ff, The pattern
-0e clandestine Communist activities of both legal and illegal partiee's that
is, of ceurse? just a general bit of reeeareh that could anniy I presume to
most any area Or count**, and I am wondering if we could not suggest Western
AWA
t, a fdreeunner on that particular notion.
study.
This project is conceived Of as a type study more than an area
In this study we want to develop the patterns, the methods and
techniques. It is not contemplated so much to investigate the clandestine
activitiee of the EPD in Western CermanY,,the communication service and what
not. It is contepplated to Work out the general method and teohniques, the
organizational patterns that might app2y. to any area so that the area man
who has to deal let's serq with Western Germany is better equipped to under-
stand and evaluate what gees on in Western Germany or in South Korea, or in..
Latin America.
TACKWITZ: Getting bulk to 1g', 'Basic Communist strategy in the present
period, as revealed in Communist tactics in Southeast Asia" -- I am getting
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back to Dr. Possones suggestion with reference to the Fart German military
forces that would presumably be used subversively to create insurrection. .
If Southeast Asia was important enough to put in there, oertainly Germany
is the other big target it the world in addition to Southeast4isla right
now. Let's put it this way -- it has more people guessieg.
BABBITT: I think we have a great deal more information on the
activities in Western Germany, which is far from satisfactory, but the
problem of Southeast Asia pretty well boils down to a lack of -- I won't
say only a lack of Information but a lack of work and study having been
done on that area, and certainly In that respect Germany is far better
covered, has been far better covered.
NICHOLS: On the other hand, if we are going to make a type
study, it would seam to me that France perhaps would be a much better
example to use, because all six of these things exist in Erance, which
supposedly is a free country, whereas West Germany is occupied, which would
necessarily give you a definite setup of conditions.
BABBITT: In that sense Germany is not typical; nor would V2e
Communist jattern in Germany be typical.
Igf is not so much a type study.
NEMER: No. Afl is a tyre study. 10 Is an area study, and
we hope the first of several.
PlaAl Let me put it this way, in concrete terms. We will stress
clandestine Communization methods or covert military organisations. We
will draw on the information available, whether from Eastern Germany or
Western Germany, or from Bolivia, and Whenever possible will append area
studies. For instance, the communication system between East and West
Germany. The clandestine system is pretty well documented through the
work of the Arm. We will be able to draw on that information. To a
certain extent your requirement will be Covered,
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POSSONY: In other words, there ere. In
Wester25mAnGermany, and it would be Interesting to find eit 'bat they are.
That is a problem of investigation and tot ed.iuch of research.
? BABBITT: That is under the control of the theater cObtander, Who is
abit Te, resented on this Committee.
So far as le is concerned, I think it Wes the consensus
of the Sub-Committee that information on Southeast Asia Was needed ger
the formulation of policy and for the eValuation of Problems regarding
security.
BABBITT: There is going to be a real collection problem there.
WACKPITZ: Generally speaking, this whole program here probably stem
from a certain vacuum that exists, otherwise we would not be here
today, so obviously the collection problem is something that has to be
Ottadied with relation to this program. It is something new, something
different, and I am just trying to think of our Air collection system there
as it apelles to this, and T cannot see that much would be fortheoming?
irrespective or vhat directives we sent out. We night glean a little
bit. it is something that has to be tailored to the Job.
BABBITT; Yes. The Air Force collection, I should think, woad
have really very little scope of action in most of these.
rivrItzt SO and the FBI are, of course, geared more along
that line. One of the things that might come out of this le an expansion
of the Special Operations activity, if the priority is placed high enough.
BABBITT: There is no question about that, but that we hope to get
reorientated all round the board.
Colonel Wackwits? do yeu take it that you would prefer to have
some stutly concerning Vestern Germany on the priority list? Do you
coneider that that would be a higher erica-4y than the Southeast regional
atudy2
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WAOW/TZ: Not necessarily. I am trying to get this frame of reference
of our task straightened out in my own mind. I can see that a lot of these
answers certainly would go a long mt toward answering any questions which we
might have had. I don't think it wOuld be absolutely essential to place it
on the priority list.
POMMY: / think it is more important than number '01. I have no
argument against the study, but I think it is more important to find out
what they nay do in the next year or so in Germanys I think that study of
the strategy is quite useful.
12
5X11) Of course, to' is of particularimportance In view of the fact
that the whole mechanism is controlled by the USnland we woad like to find
out how*
=MAN: To some extent there is va/idity to Dr* Possonyle comment.
That is, it is true that we knows or everyone amines -- we maybe wrong,
but one must aseume there Is control, and the fact of the control being known
the other questions here in a sande become subsidiary questions which would be
desirable to know if we could fled out; but in terms of what the American policy
is likely to be, I find it a little hard to believe that it is as important
to know of the actual findings, and so on, ac it is to know, for ?camel?
take either Western Germapy or Oranoe -e the basic strategy in those two areas.
NEMZEhs I think there in a basic misunderstanding here of that this list
is suppoeed to be. This is not a list of the questions that are most important
for Americankpolebey at this moment. This an effort to examine the field of
international Communism, and in the various corners of that field beginning
exploration and being making vital studies. These projecte don't compete
eith each other to any great extent. They are supposed to cover different
areas for different reasons. I think "a" is an obvious one from the point of
view of the work of this Committee.. If we are goine to examine and study
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international Communism we carts
should make sure that more and more le
known about how international Communism works. Certainly all of us could thirk
of many important problems that ought to be answered now for an American
policy, but I am not sure that those problems are necessarily the job of this
particular Committee. Our job is international Communism, es one of the
instrumentalities of the Kremlin. It does not seem to me te be profitable to
try to mark those rions projects in terms of priority of, let us nay, the
President. We will cet different answers from different pedple. We are not
here to give many answers to most' 1MOortant questions that You may think of.
170 are .only here to work in the broad area of international Communism, and
we are hero to suggest different projects for different aspects of that area
which need to be worked on,
PENETVANI This gives a different meaning to the word 'priority'.
NEMER: These are, in our eyes, sample priority jobs in order that we
may more along in several fields at the same time.
POSSONYt Do you mean to say that this is purely academie/
VEMZER: This is an effort to realise international COMMUtiMM as an
instrumentality of the Kremlin. There are many facets to it, and we are trying
to touch the essential problems and certain aspects of it. The reason 1 suggested
we do not attack the WPTU problem at the same time we are doing the international
maritime problem was not because 1 don't think then/71TM) not important, but
it seems to me it was part of that same corner of international Communism, and
we ought to suggest the most important ones in that corner now.
POMMY: That is priority according to importance.
BAMITT4. Yes, but the fact that is important and has bean picked, I say
lb' rather than the whole of the WPM doe not interfere with any of the
others. It does not block it off in any way.
POSSONY: / understand that.
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grit
?BABBITT: At the sat* time, Me. Nemeer, the list has been given to the
06imittee for consideration, and it the Committee should consider that 104?
for instance, Is not under aver preseure of sufficient idportance, and that
something else is -e
=MUIR: That is true, but not in terms of selecting contrasting projects
that would be done in different areas in the whae field byperhaps different
people. If the same ageney is working On three at the Oita* time, obviously
all three are not going to be done If there are different corners of inter-
national Communism that ought to be eeplored, we might work out two or three
different projects, which must not "be c6ntrasted in terms of importance,
Now, if there is a project which is imPortant of itself., regardless of what
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other projects you have here, then by ail means we certainly should explore the
necesSity of doing it. But there is no need, it seems to no, to contrast the
importance of any new one with wey we mieht have here thht wee put on for a
diffSient reason entirely.
While the Sub-Committeci worked this list out, they voted on
individeel topics, on the matter of importanCe as the individual members
considered them.
NeMZER: There is no reason why a new seggestion might not be made.
That is why we are having a meeteng now. It is entirely' proper to do it.
POSSONf: ?g1 and thl both refer to Southeast Asia.
BEIVZSR: That is right.
possostg If we have two projects on Southeast Asia, we might tonal
,have one on Germaey.
25X1A They were put together beano) they were complementary. The total
VMS a composite. I think that if the Air Force feels there should be one on
Eastern Germany, that that is a different proposition,. Let them propose a definite
project on Western Germany and then we can take it up. There is a second point
in there -- possibly connected with this.. This is just a suggestion, but as
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T understood the suggestion earlier that the Air Port* might have facilities
which isould be used, but these projects didn't repreeert pieces of work on which
they could be used, and therefore wethld be used on something else. Let's get
that soMothim.
442BR: By all means.
PaSSONY: I don't know that that ins quite the meaning, I think our
collection effort is channeled to Air Oieblema and it is r diffloult to turn
it over Into that.
VAONVITZ: The whole thing is geated up right now. No io iong ago we
were L4e or less directed, as Army was, to gat out of the political field in
various parts of the world, and to confine our reporting specifically to Air
matters. This particular tyre of resea4ch is digging down beneath the warface
where you have got to have people who have a tyre of training that at least
most of our field representatives don't iiessess. That doss net say that we don't
come microbe some information that would be beneficial. That is what I meant.
125X181 As to the other thing, the field of Western GorMany -- if they
feel it is necessary, could they state it for us, as a projeatt
Posponn It is very simple. In "g", have it read in Southeast Asia
and Gertane. Add "Germany'.
BABBITT: It is two different studies.
POSSONI: The same techniques.
125X18"?Trou dont want it conneated with Idi?
MUM: That would be all right except that that is exc1usivel7 sabotage.
VAWITZ: This happens to be on a thesis we have been trying to examine.
In other words, we are not expecting them to be so crude as to just go to war,
but, how cab they extend their power further without taking that step.
PO3S0NY: A secret war.
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1251.A] road not it be better to abate a project to hit the belts eye
on 44ii.zticular project?
.12 Using the same tording as in Igt.
you state it more prOciseily?
ITAZIOnn: VC are tbinkixer about the same thing that Ur. Nemser said:
Within the instrumentality of the world Communist apparatus, how could the
Soviets best utilize their reeources 14 order to better thefr position in
Western Gernany.
&Bain /bold you improve on thS wording of Ile?
POSSOM: That states it.
NEMER: Mr. Chairman, if the Air Pores feels stronay enough, it seems
to me we might wall simply make an additional project, put it on the list, add
it and call it, 'Basic Communist strategy in the present world, as revealed by
Communist tactics in Western aarmaWl.
N/CH0/.91 I would like to not oonedr in that particular aiggestion.
Western Germ* is ocoupied by the United States. WO have a reptesentative, a High
Commissioner from the State Departeent; We have the rest of the area under
the joint Chiefe of Staff, and a commander-in-chief, and if we get involved in
that you can deo that we will get involved in a lot of internal talk and dissension
within our forces. The responsibility for rest= Gereeny is the responsibility
of the Hie Commissioner and the commander-in-chief. All of the ceIlection
effort beteg spent in Western Germany, and which will be spent in Western
Germany, is for the benefit of the occupation of Western Germany and not for the
benefit of us who sit here.
BABBITT: I disagree with you on that, as far as the Office of the High
Commissioner is coneerned. I dorfit know about the military. Mr. Shute&
intelligence group is vary definitely accepting requirements and suggestions
from us, and working on themat is subdivided into --
PENNIMAN: Strategic and political.
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NICHOLS: Weal, then the proSeot should be assigned to them and not to us.
NAOMI X don't agree with you on that.
PRIOUNAO, 7ft question of' who was to do the evaluations mew, in an
odd way, and it got put down in a hurry that the evaluation wee not to be done
except for some strictly internal political stuff; tut in w, far as it related
to the outside, no.
BABBITT: I think that is a proper project for us to 'undertake.
NICHOLS: 1'1'111 not vote, because I have not changed ay mind.
MUM: It seems to me that this is a nomination for this lie. That
is my own feeling. lb is worthy of consideration* I feel it is an addition
that goes beyond some of our own considerations. There are many ippertant
problems that we have not put in. Ida think it can be pat in, if Committee
feels that way. Certainly we have ;motions at State that work on German,' all
of the time. In fact, we have turned out 4 report on this area very recently.
But I do think it might be worthwhile putting to a vote whether the Mil Committee
wetted it added to a list of priorities.
BOUM Would you like to discuss it further?
WACIVIVZ:: 1 might oay one thing in connection with this psalm. I am
aware of' statements that have been made 'by rather responsible individuals
(probably' some of you have heard this) that dermany is eventually going to the
Eatt or to the West, but It is going to get together. I have hoard that
statement made byTeople like Sousiriae in Paris; Marshall Tiontgomerymade it
ellen he addressed the National Vier College last year; and a few others have made
that statement people, Who have some reason to make it. So it seems to ma
it is a rather important point in the future develppmeat of Communist strategy.
BABBITT: Is it fundamentally Communist strategy, or is that Soviet foreign
strategy which is susceptible of being implementod by means other than the
Communist Parby?
17/10107ITZ: I &aft know. But I don4 see how they could do it except
within the instrumentality of the Communist Patty if they are to gain any success.
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r!!!!:]That would mean that most of the study would have to be
dedicated to the illegal work of the Communist Party in Germany, because we
are pretty well informed =what the EPD? the overt organisation, is
doing.
NEMZER: I disagree very strongly, if it means, that this is being done
in the sm. It seems to me that everything is being done with the utilisation
of the other and the SED is a complete instrumentality. That is principally
what we are talking about -- the use of this kind of machieary for doing
something in the German problem.
BABBITT: That is not the way I understand Cu submission, which was
'Basic Communist strategy in the present world, as revealed by Communist
tactics in Western Germane'.
POSSUM. I used the word tGereane, without tweaking it down, /
don't know the answer. That is one of the problems that came up and we do
want it answered.
BABBITT: You did not limit it to Western Gernany? Then the proposal
has been made by the Air Force to include this further item on 'Basic Communist
strategy in the present period, as revealed in Communist tactics in Germapyl.
Those in favor of the inclusion --
MORRIS: May I ask the Air Throe representatives if they desire this kind
of a. study because they believe there is nothing in Washington, that no job
in Washington has attempted to come up with any of the answers? I believe that
precisely this kind of 4 job is being done over in the State Department. I
think there is a short job coming out very soon --.practically that kind of a
study..
Mann: That, again, may be so. Vie donit Imaus but your mentioning it --
POMMY: That would only bear out the fact that it ought to be on the
list, that the work has been done, and that everybody ought to be hap.
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BABBITT:: Ail of thoee in favor of including thin new item on the
program will please raise their hands,
(Following raised hands: Vachwits, Peony)
PeNN/CADT: Are you intereeted in my vote, or. am I an advisor?
BABBITT: I believe you are not a member. of the Committee, but yoUr
statue is the status of a eonseltent invited to eresent your views,
LOUD ON: As a olet of order, need the Secretary vote on that?
BABBITT: The Secretary is a member. If I thought it would be a frequent
procedure I woad probably have to see whether we were voting by units or by
individuals.
Centimetre I should like to sum -up. I believe that et are ready for a
forma vote at least on the acceptance of the report or the Sdh-Committee on
Recommendations for a Priority Program'. Ie there aey ferther discussion on
that question?
PENalrAN: It seems to me in view of the discussion here this afternoon
about the question of why this was done and why that was done' that it would
be extremely useful to include a series, a criterion ve that you forestall
those .questIons as this goes forward. It may forestall a series of questions.
T think this might well be included. I dont state this as any objection, but
think it would hap..
BABBITT: Yes, I agree with that. I think they thoUld be included. That
is, the basis on which the nriority erogram was made Alp Should be included in
the report which goes forward to the le0. That will be done and vel be glebe
pitted as a next of the report before it does up.
On the question of the acceetance of the program as edbmitted hy' the
Sub-Conmetteet is it aperoved? Do you accept the report as the recommendation
of the JIGSAW Comeittee to be forwarded to the le0? Please signify by raising
hands.
(Following reload hands; All members of the Committee)
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The report is accepted. I have already outlined the procedure for the
future. A full report on the progress of JIGSAW to date, together with the
'Recommendations for Priority Program:, and a request for support of this
program on the part of the IAD agencies will be forwarded as soon as possible.
have not had a tentative acceptance of allocation for some of the projects
listed in the Priority Program.
DELMER: I think ea should say "indication of interest', because none of
Us can make even tentative commitments,
BABBITT: I accept that. That is much better -- an indication of interest
in the various projects. I note, however, that therelas been none On $c" or Id'.
NEMER: An indication of interest in "el and Cal was expressed by the Army.
The fact that we have not mentioned ORB does not mean that 0R2 is
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not interested in many of these projects.
BABBITT: We are interested in all of them,
I
This is particularly apropos of the remark about lo" and lel,
ail
BABBITT: 1 have an indication of interest by OIR in thy, ir les.
HEUER: Three is a joint interest in tc: by SO and State.
BABB/TT: For Id": OSI, AEC, and OIR.
VACKW/PZ: Air has an interest in ed'.
MUM: That is to say, an interest in production, not an interest in
having it done by others,
Yes.
In addition to State interest, ORE has considerable irterest in
tel too.
BABBITT: OIR and ORE for :el; If" is for SO; tgt, OIR; 1111, OIR.
NEMER: Call it State, because it woad be done largely by our Division
of Biographic Intelligence,
BABBITT: We will say State for 1124; /Vs, SO; 1j1, External Research Staff.
I think before the outline goes out that it should be committed to the full
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MUER; lb eeems to me it might be well worth considering; that kind of
procedure for every one ot these projects. In so far ae it beiemem a JIGSAW
project all members have a right to look at the original plan fur ib.
BABBITT: That was certainly law mina. I visualize all ?them projects
being approval by this Committee,
LONDON: Would you say that lel in wit}' le the JIGSAW field, or is it
strictly a State proposition so far?
NagatRs I oan say that State has embarked on it ? I hope. have 17
or 18 people working on it at this time.
BABBITT: If that is to be inoluded on this list and will eventually come
out as a JIGSAW approved orolest (not that State has to get approval from the
MSS Committee to put on a project) -e but if it is to be a JIGSAW approved
project, / think its outline should be submitted to the Committee.
NDMZER: I should be very glad to submit it. I might say that we are
hoping to do a porition of lb' -- the portion we are interested la -- some time
in the near future, and / should be very glad, before completing plans on that,
to submit itio the JIGSAW. But there will be a number of us interested in lbt.
BABBITT: I think any submissions should be made through the Sub-Cmmeittee.
Do you agree with that?
NFEZER: Fine. The suggestion then would be that the Sub-Committee would
make a wombat more intensive examination of throproleet and then ,resent its
recommendations for review, if necessary, to the fel Committee.
BABBITT: 1 w thinking of the Sub-Committees mechanism for attaining
additional vie= of directly interested agencies, other than those of the originator.
NEMZERt Zn that case, it might then be an order for the Sub-Committee,
or the members of the SubeCommittee to receive the plans fer the Tito project
that State is now lenbarkieg, on, cement on it and not wait for a fel meeting
of JIGSAW,
BABBITT: Yes, I think sea It would be circulated before the meeting, and
discussed before the meting. Does that seem too ponderous?
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WIAMER: Hkeept in terms of the time element. I hesitate to make am,
statement, but we have assigned a.deadline that if everything goes right again
might bring us pretty Clove to the end of the project before JIGSAW meets again.
BABBITT: Obviously the full treatment cannot be afforded that project,
if that is the case.
NeMZUle.The first point you node could be done -- we could imeellataly
contact the menters of the Sub-Cvmmittee and get their reactions to .the plans
now underway.
BABBITT: I wish you would do that. On this paper that was just circulated,*
in view a the lateness of the hour I think it rather impractical to start the
discussion on it.
EEMZER: I wonder if perhaps we might either change di add to the wording
in paragraph 27 I don't think that Mr. meant it in quite the fashion it
might he interpreted. The Sub-Coumittee didn't ea:Wally come 'to a. ?ono:auction".
The Committee is suggesting for consideration this type of periodical estimate.
,
BABBITT: There appears to be a need for it.
EWER: Well, 'conclusion' bothers me a Mae bit. Lteverthelees,
it as Muth and we will, agree.
interpret
he proposal here, of tet^Sue-Committee-is for discussion at a
future meeting ee probably the neat meeting of the JIGSAW Committee. If there
is no objection, I should like to call another meeting poesiht7 in two weeks
I don't think we are limited by anything I know of to meeting only once a month,
and I should like to get going as soon as possible on the report to the IAC.
We might, at that time consider the idea ofa J/GSAW publication.
NLEZERs Ae the Chairman, are you thinking of instructing the Seoretary to
send the Priority Program officially to the various departments and ask them
for statements on allocetions and proposals and plans so that that can be enter-
. ere,.
.41":411.1
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tained, or are you thinking of that being done thromeil the membera of this
Committee?
BABBITTt I think it should go out officially.
OMR* I believe that way. I thitik that would be hest.
B1BBT?T: If there is no further business to come before the meeting,
we will adjourn.
(The meeting adjourned at 1640
4.nowo,'
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