U-2R PURCHASE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 6, 2003
Sequence Number:
111
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 27, 1966
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 173.37 KB |
Body:
. Approver Release 2003/11/
IDEA 3177
Copy 7 of 8
2? May 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Technology, OSA
ATTENTION: (U-2R Development Phase
SUBJECT: U-2R Purchase
REFERENCE: Memorandum from Director of Reconnaissance,
CIA, to D/NRO, dated 16 Ma 1966, subject:
U-2R Purchase
1. The Deputy for Material, OSA, and I have read the
reference letter. Both of us agree that certain items should
be brought to your attention at this time.
25X1
~~ ~
2. Specifically, and for the record, the following are
problem areas that we feel should be identified at this time:
a. Per paragraph 1. of the reference memorandum:
The statement on the loss rate in this paragraph is felt
to be unrealistic for cansideration as a future planning
factor. This rate, taken from the total losses over the
past history of the U-2 project, is a straight line rate.
It does not consider the various factors needed for future
planning purposes, such as the rate of loss for training,
R&D and combat. It says, in effect, that because we have
lost so many aircraft over a period of so many years,
then we will lose aircraft at a given rate each following
year. This statement does not consider the peaks and
valleys in a nominal loss rate such as extensive training
of inexperienced pilots, or periods where experienced
pilots are performing mast of the flights. LAC, in their
special report,"U-2 Accident Analysis", dated 29 March 1966,
(IDEA 3102) has considered all of these factors in detail;
and it is therefore suggested that this document be used
for future planning factors.
b. Per paragraph 1. of reference memorandum: The
statement alluding to an unknown factor of metal fatigue
in the nine to eleven year old U-2's is felt to be a
myth. The possibility of these aircraft being affected
in this manner was completely disproves in the recent loss
of article 342. This aircraft's structure was submitted
Approved For Release 2003/11/2~PCI~F1T8B00724R000200190111-7
Eacludcd cram actama;~<
downgradiA'g aad
5X1
' _ Approvetlw6br Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68BQ,8,724R000200190111-7
T E RE T
IDEA 3177
Page 2
to exhausting examinations and the metals were found
to be well above its designed strength criteria. It
is therefore suggested that in future papers, no men-
tion be made of possible metal fatigue in present U-2's.
c. Per paragraph 8. of reference memorandum:
There is no mention of provision made for any two seat
U-2R trainers. It is our understanding that there has
been some discussion on this matter with T~AC, and that
the cost of trainer models will be slightly mare than
standard U-2R's. This office wishes, at this time, to
firmly establish an operational requirement for at least
two of the first 25 U-2R's to be configured as two-seat
trainers. These two aircraft should have sufficient con-
trols for an instructor pilot to perform his duties from
either cockpit. Justification for this requirement would
be that the training received in these two-seat models
would most likely decrease the aircraft loss rate during ''
the initial training of new pilots and will certainly be
of great benefit as an instrument for the contingency
measurement of the pilot's proficiency.
d. Per paragraph 13. of reference memorandum: The
proposal to test prototype appears to be
unrealistic because it is the understanding of this
office that all space is essentially used
up. Further, the personne o CIA and LAC) are com-
completely involved in the OXCART program, and a division
of their time in the proposed manner would certainly
detract from their performance of duties on either program.
Instead, the undersigned believes that the testing phase
of U-2R prototypes could be easily assimilated by the
Edwards North Base Detachment with minimal increase in
personnel, support equipment, and additional expense.
Deputy for Field Activities, OSA
25X1
25X1
Approved Far Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7
Approv~or Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68~724R000200190111-7
IDEA 3177
Page 3
Chief, Materiel Division
SAS/OSA bm-let (27 May 66)?~
Distrib .
1 - D/TECH/OSA
2 - MD/OSA
3 - PS/OSA
4 - D/FA/OSA
5 - SAS/OSA
6 - D/SA
7 - RB/OSA ?
$ - Chrono
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7 A
Approved For Release 2003/11/25 :CIA-RDP68B00724R00~0200190111-7
25X1
AEA-3l~'T-~8
Copy~t~3 ~%
3 lEsty 18E~6
~EAi+~U#d Fit Director
l~JECr s i~-~~t
Special ~cti~r~tties
1. ~u~gest a dec~.t~ia> bre made +~nd announced tv clear
~r~y area St tlao ffio~nt re].atia~ to +~h+~, i~ 4~fiee of
Bpe~cia~. ~tivlties, has primary ses~asibllitg ~Cwr the
D- program, i . e . ,~ Deputy ~'ar Ip~i.ntenauc~a Qr Dep~ttty ~?~r
$!J~$itrC~3 iiid DeWelflpme~xt. Traditionally product improv@--
~ata relating to a vehicle de+c2.ared operational bare been
the r+~sponsibility of Deputy far Materiel to persue. Derv
~ta~ox vehiclo systeae normally .have been the res~-neibi2ity
of Deputy #Qr 'hechaolog~r .
~. Ji~at Gunningham's announced res,pons~.b~.itq ra--
latin;~ tt~ p~tl Iing together facts on t3-^ ea~ports is dear .
~S /
P~.~''
Dsp~ttp ftlr RlfiAar#~3h and D+~tvelt~poteAt
~~tC~a~. ~Att~.Vf.t~.e8
~. Paraagos~ky :i~lBh~/~tA :~ t3 ~.p ~~)
Distribution;
! - D/~IA
~ - DID/#~A
w 1?lt~peratioasft~B,&
4 - ~1f l~aintence,/f~A
8 - ~.eting Cc~ptrv3lerlEk~A
- D/g&D
7 - D/D (Cbroaa)
/~11
25X1
Exc)pded B oro au
tOwagTadlag ant
dam? e~s~tica?-aa