THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170021-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

196 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE 911
point and count tiQlp eeldu&ic Ralaas 3 1 IA-RDP67 04446R000300170021-8
s recent orders enforcing the fund with-
measure their degree of readiness It was also
'Im
able to tell the President almost exactly how NEWSLE'T'' M BY SENATOR holding provisions of title VI of the Chil-
the Soviet strategic order of battle across the THURMOND Rights Act of 1684 provide an the proof
world-bombers and rockets and long-range . wry on the element of control sn-Ieh
submarine: -compared to our own. Probab- Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on lurks behind all Federal aid dollars,
ly never before in history has a head of state January 15, 1965, I Introduced a number' There is a good alternative for all Federal
entered a war situation so well informed of of legislative Proposals for owlalderation aid to public education, and I have intro-
the adversary's strengths and weaknesses an by the senate. Among leglenatlon to make this eitsrnattvs
was Kennedy October, n6li'1, or, for that otig these wan Senate possible. The President in suggesting the
y bill 543, which would eliminate the Fed- --ins
M4 of some Federal weirs gases, I
matter, with ao absolute a knowledge of the eral excise tax on alcohol and tobacco have thus proposed that the Federal Govern-
overwhelming vantages that lay with him products. The purpose of this proposed ment withdraw Its excise taxes on alooholia..
across the board.
le
legislati
be
n i
t f
s ar
o
verages and tobacco pdt th e
orth iii my weeklyn
Nlc
eary 9 years after the Otober affair, theews-roucs soelates
President's closest adviser on national s- letter dated January 1S, 1965, and on- Can have the full benefit of these tax sources.
ourity affairs, McGeorge Bundy. was to supply titled "Education and Tax SOUl'oeL~ In I.M. the Federal Government collected
a sirangs epilogue In an article published in Therefore, I ask unanimous consent, approximately $6 billion in taxes on alcohol
and iobaoco. Au States
the April Issue of Foreign Affairs. -M* Oo- Mr. Preaident, that this newsletter be now tax alcohol and
t
obsooo but th li
,ey aremited in their rove-
Lobar art"" Bundy concludes, '.came out printed at this point in the RECORD, eo nues here as elsewhere by the intrusion of:,.
better than President Kennedy or any of his that the purpose of this proposed legisla- the Federal Government.
he had cis base nx~ ed." de inns that Lion can be studied and considered by all In foot, l ption of tax sources by the
? as
: who are concerned with the Problem of primary
him, B Federal Government is one of the
power factors were oopeless providing additional funds for education reasons for the gradual erosion of State and
reason. would seem have stacked against
theinst local powers of government and the shift o[.
better reasonn. , AS as he closed the e books on the without further intrusion of the more and more authority to Washington.
Cuba incident, to think that matters had Government into this area Federal of activity, If the President truly is concerned about
turned out better for him than he had a which under the Constitution has been promoting more progress in education and
right to expect. For one thing, he was per. reserved for State and local governments, States rsaponaibillties--as well as presert-
Mitte odue pass, wirtt kets he on- under There being no objection, the letter tag States rights and our Federal system of
inspection that the Americans had arts de- was ordered to be Printed in the RECORD, divided Powers--then he should support this
mended. For another, he and Castro be- as follows: proposal to keep tax dollars at home so prog-
lteved that they had an American promise EDVCATsON AND Tax SOasons fens fort people can be promoted at the
not to invade Cuba so loo as the rockets appropriate level of government. He could
g (fly Sraou TsuaatoNn, U.S. Senator from also back a proposal r am cosponsorlpg to
didn't return. And, finally. the U.S. middle- South Carolina) provide a tax credit for tax
range rockets based in Turkey and Italy. in The 89th Con payer whoop"d
the NATO Interest. were dismantled and to- ~~ haeen asked by money The enp only ay feature education nexpenses of
g In thaw two pr -
ken away, as Khruahchev long had demanded, President a massive ctio pro- element larking In two
gram of dont m geneJohnson ral eral Federal to approve ao aid to education. powL L the e of control-whirwh, In
in
A F xrTING OPPORTUNITY There is little question about the impor- his education message, the president pro..
As matters turned out Cub
lance of education It is vit
fs
l t
.' -
a
a was the
asea not to der
o our people
.. the last of Khrusbchev's shoestring opera. for many reasons, foremost among thus be- Since iy
q
tions against the United States, Meanwhile, tag the paramount responsibility of self-gov- /l / STROM T!lvastotrs,
it ap
ears that th
ent G
U
i
ern
p
m
e
n
ted States Passed
reat strides have beend i
up. maen
what some observers think was a truly the individual States to increase the quality
extraordinary opportunity in the western of public education. In fact, public educe- THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM
Pacific. By early 196'9. U.S. intelligence was Lion spending by the States has tripled In
in possession of information that much of the past 12 years, Mr. COOPER, Mr. President, .last
Red China was In ferment, Tens of thou- Long ago our rounding Fathers deter- Saturday. January 18, 1965, Henry Cabot
sands of refugees were pressing against the mined that the task of public education Lodge, our eminent and distinguished
gates of Macao and Hong Kong; harvest, must be a responsibility of local govern- former Colleague, addressed the 49th Sri_
bad failed; there were public demonstra- went, They realized that.education can. nual convention of the National Asso-
Mona even rioting, by the hungry; in some trolled by a central government could be elation of Secondary School Principals in
oowmuntties the militia had refused to act used. as could a centralized police, power. to Miami on the against the people and certain detachments destroy local self-government and individ- struggle being waged in
had In fact mutinied. At this point Preset. ual liberty in the Interest of establishing a Vietnam. The address Is timely, and his
dent Chiang Kai-shek pressed Washington monarchy or dictatorship. views deserve careful attention as we
for Permission to attempt to establish a Also, the Founding Fathers recognized that consider South Vietnam and the lo..
beachhead on the mainland with his own more and better education could be obtained grains of U.B. assistance there, as well s1s
forces. The American decision was to leave for the dollar if administered by a local possible alternatives in policy. I ask
matters an they were in China. Not only was school board. Thus, the field of education unanimous consent that this addie.e
the weight of American influence thrown on was never delegated to the Federal Govern- containing important observatim& ob-
the aide of restraining Chiang. The State resment under the erved to the States, ConAtittulobut rather WBA n. the word
through third parties. that if Chiang did tamed by Ambassador Lodge In his OX-
Department was also ensuring Peiping. "education" is not to be found In the Cr- oPerience in Vietnam, be inserted In the
through third
start off. he would be on his own. It is stitutlon. Because of this clear lack of Con- RECORD.
now recognized in knowledgeable circles in stitutional authority, supporters of general There being no objection, the apaeoh
Washington, however, that a demonstration Federal ?id t Indirect on limited the Past was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
by Chiang. With US. power. on the flanks Proposed programs as follows:
and rear, would have subjected the Peiping for the purpose of getting the "oamells nose
regime to a test It was Ill equipped to meet. under the tent." Sven the national defense StezCN by 'me HONOaADL. Rxwat OM W
Firmness on the U.S. part in the Interest Clause in the Constitution has been used In LOocz, JANVA&Y 16, 1985, PbuNTsiNaaa1V
Of an ally would have brought about at least an effort to pervert the Intent of the Con$i HOTRL, MIAMI ])MACH, AT Tess 49m ANNUAL
an ebbing. perhaps even an a tution rather than seeking to amend the 0owvzrgTION or NATIONAL AssooaTtou or
menace In Asia. . LO )tLaO? Oonstltutton, BacONDART SCHOOL ParNCnaL,
By the beginning of the 1960', the Cu- szeFarr the fiscal year beginning July 1, IM. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentleman. ,aq
lave branch of the the President has requested authority to represent such a tremendous inffuepee ca
Government had both the spend approximately one-third as much as America's youth and, therefore. such a deci.
Information and the power to call Kbru- is now being *Pont for education by all the atve factor in America's destiny that it Is
ebchev^s bluff and to finish off Castro. That States. This money will go to public, pre- Indeed a privilege for me to have yoq give me
we did not do to was due In part to a want Tate, and church-supported reboots at au a hearing tonight.
of resolution, which one may hope will now levels, beginning with kindergarten sod ex- I submit some thoughts. born of be surmounted. For today the united States tending through oolfege postgraduate work. experience, about Vietnam and What say
Clearly stands at rile pinnacle of power. TITS Each year the Federal spending will go higher Will be in two parts: First, on Why Vietnam
Oommunist system stands second, a very until total Control and responsibility rustu is Important: and second, on what is the ns-
Weak suoond-weak militarily, weak soonom- In Washington With Pederal bureaucrats Lure of the problem.
Wally and Political Yectian, in its inter- cuurriiccu ummou the s and conntrnuisnteacher textbooks a" pay and I. hl , UKWANCX
Vietnam seas t
standards. Of a~tt are ythe - n& at thsaat the h"
Asie.--
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 9 f2 CONGRESSIONAL REOORD -- SENATE Januar#-19
an uses with ihYAC dQd'Aedl 2QOad1+AU53ta61Ae 7&Q"1 00Wfi447M4j6the war in south Vistaum.
pie attending 2'9W Vince from north to south, and the rat Of the free world. , Neutralism that does not include somen gam.
coed 3.000 miles from east to wart. The Because of an these eonsuigrstlOD, the at enforcement. that does not lBalude north.
Mekong River, one of the 10 lssrgeat river united States has undertaken to support V7at em, that means that Mouth VMtnasw
in the world, reaches the on in Beath Vet- the Vietnamese bdth politically and mdmm- will be alone and disarmed, is nothing some
Warn, me who holds or has tnffuenoe In Fist- tarry in an effort whist. has cost us lives end than surrender.. It should be oprawe Or
Dam can affect the future of the Philippines treasure. Vietnam just as It is opposed for aeetia. err.
th Viet nam
th b
t
4
e are "arsatratw"
o
ru
6- In
Burma with their huge rice surpluses to the wef ass not yet victe awar, mace rs as been
rubber. by sspsQieaoe. now by article 10 of the CWnses sseeosd oaf
waste and Malaysia and Indonesia with their oomptIdied. Wa has learrrvd
bhes, oil and tin to the south. Japan 1s Tsrere Is more night-flghtlrn[ by small rafts. Jail thi, 11184. which said: 'Rte two parties.
deeply concerned. Ali this affects Australia there are able province chiefs. there are man shun Insure that the zones assigwad so f be=,
and New Zealand. Vietnam thus does not at impressive abllity in the netiopad 1,aavem- do not adhere to spy milltasy afianes r
Jorge storehouses of wealth and population
can be influenced and undaaalaed.
Elatcsiaany. Vietnam has long phomed a
part In the political development the For
Last. For many centuries it wee under the
occupation or Influence of the Chinese and
was used by the Chinese sea a means of en-
forcing their hegemony over the whole of
southeast Asia. The Vietnamese did not en-
joy this experience and have traditionally
done whet they could to tiRow off Chinese
ovealordahip.
But today Vietnam should be seen as one
more instance in It long eerie, of events
which began in Tray, Turkey, and Greece
after World War U which includes the
seizure of Cmchoslovakla., which led to the
Marshall plan In Europe: which caused the
Korean war. the Maisyan emergency, the
Ruk rebellion in the Philippines, end the
Berlin Crisis. In all these widely separated
places the Communist bloc has tried to sub-
vert and to undermine the free world in
order to spread their monolithic control and.
their euppreclotfad freedom.
In opposing this Communist onslaught,
the free world has stood together tux nearly
two decades. One-manifstatlon of our cogs-
mon determination to frustrate the Commu-
nist design to conquer Europe was the crea-
tion of NATO. Elsewhere In the world we
have formed other. alliances, The United
States alone has suffered 150,000 casualties,
since the end of. World War II in this effort
to contain the.sgread of communism.'
This worldwide effort by nations of the few
worst has not been undertaken out of s
simple quisoyd defig'bt to engage In taw"
in distant places. ,Nor furs Is signify a de.
sire to establish a new colonWism or any
kind of special position. The war In Vietnam
is not only the struggle of a small ustion to
eidst, but it is also an open encounter be-
tween the doctrine that "wan of revolution."
as the Coomiuntets call them an the wave
of the fuyuue, and our belies that to the
future nations should be allewafd to dsvoko
their own destinies free from outside Intel-
Although the North Vietnamese have their
own motives for their aggrealpa. In South
Vietnam and have played the leading role,
they have atwa p been backed by the Gringos
Communists. Should their aggression be
s ucceesfuL the, Chinese Communists will
have seen positive proof that their approach
to International relations Is oorrsst.
Such an outcome might well lead the
Soviets. In their desire to ratsdn the leader-
ship of the Communist bloc, to adopt a more
belligerent stance In their relations With
the outside world. This would surely affect
the West
It would also be regarded everywhese as a
reflection of the inability or lack of will of
the free world to prevent aggression. What,
for example. Would be the reaction In Europe
If the United States were to withdraw truss
southeast Asia An the face of its commitment
The - state of public opinion In the United
States itself would also be afbeted. Should
YNstrssaa bs l"+ost,_ many vices would' be heard
urging us to effect to 'resign harm the world"
to fall back onto our "fortress America," and
to gird up our loans for a contest with
guided missiles. This too would be some-
recognition that the war is above }1l a pout-
leas matter. In which the adbefeace of the
people to the Government Is the crucial
factor.
lb an" this effort the United States has
built up an able organization In Vietnam to
a.elat the Vietnamese. Ambassador Taylor.
Ambassador Johnson, and General West-
moreland head an American organization
which has trained and helped to build the
Vietnamese Army. On the economic card
social front the United States has contrib-
uted to the building of aobocts, cdlndm and
better farms, all of which are essential to
gaining and holding the political support
that must be had to win the war. And we
try to help in every way in tratolng civil
administrators and In orating political en-
ergy in the country:.
Some have said that despite this effort the
war in Vietnam cannot be woo. Yet recent
history shows that we have bees fighting
wars of this sort -fax the past 20 years and
that the record Is creditable. We of the
free world won in. Greece, we thwarted the -
Qommualst aggression in Eurea. we won to
Malaya, we won In the Philippines. and we
can. win in Vietnam. We must persist and
we must not play into the enemy% IIwdss
by csuntiug on a quick sensational and esag
way out, -
Persistent execution of the political and
military plans which have been agreed to
will bring victory-provided outside paes-
cures do not become too great. These out-.
side pressures occur la many torox, such as
th problem of sahctdules from which Viet-
namr can be attacked and the - Vietcong
helped with impunity. Infiltration from
such sanctuaries cannot be.atlowed to defeat
the efforts the Vietnamese are laaktng. We
will not shrink from tolling such measures
as seem necessary to cope with It,. .
Another form of ^autstde.pyeuti e" Is fife
desire in sans. quarters for on international
conference here and now.. We pattus-tly do
feat appose the idea of holding international
oonferenQee as an abstract plcpcattion-tt.
they are held at the proper time, and under
the proper dncuawtimoes, but we think that
to hold is conference now 'w uld. serve no
good purpose and would asrdoa y undermine
mozate tn. South Vietnam,. Consider the
Moon":
1. Them have alraedy byes! two confer.
Owes. en southeast Asti, they ogress of which
here extb4ctory but which the Communists
Violated before the Ink. we - dry botore
holding another conference there must be
some sign that the Oos munlsrta cc hand sad
Peiping are prepared to leave their southern
nolobe s alone. -
2. Poe the South Tiotmanies to go to sl
conference now with a lame and aggressive
fifth column on 'their soli taonld amount to
s surrender. A oaalae+ussoe nob preceded bg
a verifiable Camhm niet decision to cease at-
tacking and subverting South Vietnam would
be nothing morn atlas a. esapitulation.
8. -Thee is dearly no a~re~mt between
ire and- the' is evens on the siniplaa
prabovition to lave Bola th Vietnam atone.
IL held to an stomphere of bit-
ter disagreement could only make matters
more dangerous than they already are.
So-called neutralism is another outside
pressure standing in the way of the success-
-tilities or to further an ag rasoaea a s,
This provision has been formally sppeci04
by article b of the the anal de heat m of as
Geneva Conference of 1954 In wbleb' hose
U.S.S.R., Red China, balsas, the UatiSR
Aingdari, the United States, Casabediss, node.
North and South Vietnam participated.
We must therefore Waist before tlse a iss
any discussion of a conference or d nes>krsalb
lam. that the Communists stop their agtasw.
.Ices and live up to the agreements akdsb
already exist. The minute the csssslaagbt
crass., there can be peace. At proem* thia
North Vietnamese seem only .to ondeashom&
force, and. of course. when they use lesion
they must be met with force as they Tn" In
the Gulf of 'lbnktn. They should also be
mot with the strong and united opposition
of the free world.
It seems that conflicts in far-osg places
an precisely those which have of0ost-
brought war and calamity to all of us. se m--
churls seemed tar away in 1981: the au#w
version of Ceechosslovakla by $itieer seesnot!
remote to the United States in 1038. Yet
the result was an untold outpouring cf-btsrpd
and treasure. Persistence, and unity In the
face at Communist pressure have'suooowb .
to Europe and In southeast Asia, - and ota
succeed again.
a. sense or Tun Psostzs
What you have In Vietnam to a hew kind
of $ghtlug man. He Is as distinct M the
Infantrymen or the aviator. B. Is tbe'loo-
most He's not only different front' thi ta-
t antryman she the avlatoz- -he'1d dffiss"
from a guerrilla fighter. B. dzbes ~ Mw
everybody sloe--and in those hot eo '. ,
a man ,rears a pair of pants and a to'? sod
that's what the terrorist wears. amt bleb
part of a very elaborate organlea loaf, IN is
carefully controlled. protected, and gulssrd.
He'n-. be told, for example, to go in and
ter arse some village- where the V iesm"
want to take, over. So, Monday'- idol
there will be 12 bodies an the s#sesb-a10
man, wirsnen. ehtidren. Nobody's Gone
thing--nobody's guilty-they're pert pkMW
Indiscriminately. The Idea is to craft got.
rot. 7bbn they'll kidnap the vehp ~.
cut off his head, put it an a pooh east al-
it around. Wall, by 3 o'clock in tfila-stfhor.+
noon you don't have too much asvthblw
sing 17- or 13-year-old boys - to )do
Vietcong. It' jut as simple as theft,
Now. you don't get rid at this
putting In an infantry battritoe' _
fenntry battalion comes In and it slays s'rolliq
ilea hawbver long it wants to.
.osisto disappear Into the lsvasesa = mss
and paLn lest houses of the chisel .
They the battalion moves a It. arsa'a ale:
there forgives, And the arecelyta essz-acre
again, Nothing has been aaaosnpbab & :sea
tact In many ways the sitlatlca is . apses
because a number of Innocent people bean
been killed:. You don't get add, Of the -tom.
!gust by bombing, because - yOB *s a
bomb and you kill 20 people. 10'of'.tlO[tiOR
women and ddidrom, who hate got
to afar with the suereslsha as alx ane= 7s
because t h e t e r r o r i s t Is .l ea4- ii s
Well. therefore. to it hopeless? No, it So n%
hopeless. But you've got to organise the
totality of the population-42 of the Poo,-
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 1965 Approved For F WkRiMA ' : 'I?t$P67`B 00300170021-8
"pie-to protect ti..' local village oflelala, slid
that means you get a good man in each
precinct-the arnaileet unit of government--
to be chairman. and a ga:x1 committee of
young men who have it stake In the -in-
munity, who have a fan.liy, who own a farm,
or who own a home, or who want to get
ahead in business or something-and you
form a counterterrorist precinct committed.
And then, with the help of the police---
and where there lent any police (and there
lsn't any in most places In Vietnam), you
have the Army and the local militia backing
you, You then oo5iduct a census, Jesus
Identification cards, have a curfew, and
everybody who is out aster 8 o'clock has to
expiala why, or, if he doesn't, they give him
the buatness. And thus you go through each
precinct with a tine-tooth comb.
Now, .that's how you get rid of terrorism.
And it isn't very fast, but it can be very sure.
It has worked in many places where It has
been tried-in Kuala Lumpur; In Algiers; in
the Philippines; and in the city of Saigon.
And then everybody gives the village chief
and the chief of police where there is one
some confidence that he may be going to
live, and then he in turn can interest himself
in the security of the people, aril you begin
to get an upward spiral. And then you can
bring in your doctors, and your school-
teachers, and your welldlggera, and the ani-
mal husbandry people--and all the other
people that make life worth while. :3o, that's
one part of the problem.
One of the best things that any American
has ever said about Indochina that I've read
with sold by the late Gen. Bedell Smith, who
was the U.B. repreieritative at Geneva in
1954, after the French had been defeated at
Dlenbienphu. Georges Bidault, who was
then the Prime Minister of France, told
Bedell Smith that he was thinking of reliev-
ing General Navarre because of the defeat
at Utenblenphtt. And General Bedell Smith
said, "Any second-rate general could win In
Indochina If there werb a proper political
atmosphere.- A profound remark.
Because, you sec. In this struggle there's no
front, there's no rear, there are no flanks--
and when the fighter wants to hide, he goes
into the average Vietnwmese man's home.
When he wants to rest, he goes into the
average Vietnamese man's home. When he
wants something to eat, he goes into the
average Vietnamese man's home. If he's
wounded and he wants to get taken care of,
he goes into the average Vietnamese man's
home. It he wants information 6s to what
the army Is doipg, and as to what the Arrier-
ics.na are doing, he goes into the Vietnamese
home--and the old lady, the old grand-
amother who is 85 years old, she can sit there
and we what goes on, and she can tell him
all about what she sees on the road-if she
wants to.
Well, now, the minute the everyday citizen.
living in his home in Vietnam, says to the
Vietcong, "You can't come in here to hide,
You can't come In here to sleep and rest, you
can't come in here to get food, you can't
came here to have your wounds bound up-
we aren't going to give you any informs-
tlon"-the war's over.
I was asked this question recently: "I sup-
pose when we get rid of this Instability, then
we can go ahead and win the war." I said:
When you get rid of the instability, there
isn't any war. The Instability is the prob-
Ietn."
This is an oriental country, a tropical
country. Now think of what that meats.
In the tropics, nature is rich-much, much,
richer than it is in the north. 9o, a poor
mad, living in the Mekong Delta looks at the
water of the rice paddy where the rice grows
and sees fresh water fish swimming around,
There are also ducks swimming on the sur-
face, that eat the fish. Then no place in
Vietnam Is far from the ocean. So this poor
No. 12----- 9
man can eat rice, fresh water fish, duck, and
some of the most marvelous salt water fish
in the world out of the South China' flea,
There are also coconuts and pineapples and
all manner of vegetables. Living right there,
he can, for next to nothing, have a per-
foctty marvelous diet without traveling more
than a few hundred yards.
So this oriental and tropical Vietnamese
has everything he needs close to home. But,
in addition to being oriental add tropical,
he is also often a Confucianist. This means
reverence for one's ancestors; it means great
loyalty to family and to the small local group
consisting largely of relations and near-rels,
thous. This is the loyalty which counts for
him above all-others-for which be is willing
to die.
How natural for some of these oriental,
tropical, and Confucianist Vietnamese to say
to themselves: "Why should I extend my
frontiers 500 miles and pay taxes, and have
an army, and a navy, and a diplomatic
corps, and all the trappings of a Western
nation-state, when r don't need it? It's all
right for these people in the North-they
have to, but I don't need to." And, this
would be an unanswerable argument-if It
were not for Communist China. It Is the
nearness of Communist China which means
that they must become a modern nation-
state In order to survive, In 1964 more Viet-
nainese realized this than In 1454. But it
still goes against their traditions.
Thus the concept of national government
does not mean there what It meant in the
West. And a loyalty to such groups as Roa
Hao and Coo Dal have a vitality for which
there Is no counterpart in the West.
So, what you aee there-and r think I may
have Invented a word for it-Is a strong
sense of peoplehood-and of group and fam-
ily loyalty-but not the same sense of na-
tionhood that we have. These people think
of themselves as Vietnamese, as being of a
distinct race, which they are-you don't have
to be there 5 minutes before you we that,
They think of themselves as having their
own language, which they have-their own
literautre, their own an. their own history.
They go 'way back-it's a very old civilita-
tlon, They do not want to be overwhelmed
and absorbed by the Chinese, but their
"peoplehood" often doesn't involve the same
attitude toward the flag. and the Republic,
and the nation, and all those things that in
the West we go out and die for.
These people are brave, I must have talked
with 5o of our young West Point captains,
and, believe die, there are some young men
that we can all be proud of. They're with
the Vietnamese army battalions.. They are
enthusiastic about the bravery of the Viet-
namese soldier-his oourage, his toughness,
the long-suffering quality that be has, But
his loyalty has a Vietnamese quality to It,
He Is loyal to his group, be Is loyal to his
region, he Is loyal to his unit. In our own
Western European history many years ago
them was, for example, the hike . of Bur-
gundy, and the Duke of Normandy, and the
Duke of Piciardy, and finally It was put to-
gether and became France. Well, this coun-
try is evolving from this medieval lack of
rational orgatiiratton into the 20th century.
It's making progress. But It isn't-and it
never was the same kind of country that we
have In the West, and It shouldn't be judged
that way.
In the caws of Malaya, It took 12% years
to win the struggle against the Vletoong of
Malaya. And the thing that turned the
balance against the Vietcong. was when a
political arrangement was reached between
the Malay community and the Chinese com-
munity. When that was reached, then they
were on their way. And I believe that, when
a settlement is reached between the prin-
cipal communities within Vietnam. then that
913
will be the beginning of a new day for that
country.
In conclusion: The struggle in Vietnam is
as example of Mao Tee-tung's statement
that "yotlttee to war without bloodshed and
'war Is politics with bloodshed." Thus, poll-
tics and war are opposite sides of a coin-
or, as has been said, "the two wheels, or
wings. of statecraft." Armed combat Is thus
only one-and not necessarily the most tin.
portant--segment of war,
The struggle in Vietnam is thus not a
war In the sense that World War It:?-tMt
Xorea-was a war, because total etlitagy
success In Vietnam unaccompanied by Itil!-
effort will solve the problem; the probtern iit
thus the despair of the headline writer and
of the political stump speaker or of any
kind of black and white phraseology.
Therefore,,thaee who try to make you tibias
that there is a quick solution or a simple
solution or an exclusively military solution
axe doing you as much of a disservice as art
those who tell you that there is no hope,
that we must pull out and that anothr
southeast Asian conference (added to the
two which have been already held- and dlai,
honored) will do other than turn South Viet-
nam over to the Cotn:nunista.
They also do you a disservice who deny
!
that much has been achieved, that the =Ili-
tsry program, the economic program, the
social program, the informational program
and the various technical programs have all
accomplished much-have Indeed built the
springboard of victory--and .that it Is the
political, counter-subversive. counter-tar-
roriat program which still needs special at-
tention.
It is accurate to say that a glass is halt
full of water and it is equally accurate also
to Say that a glass Is halt empty. To dwell
on the fact that we have not achieved vdo-
tory does not negate the other fact that we
have prevented defeat-and that a stalls-
mate is much better than a defeat.
It is not the American tradition to get
lsanicky whenever there is rough weather--
and to get desperate 'whenever It becomes
clear-as it does every day-that a quick
purely military victory is impossible. It we
decide only to Interest ourselves in the nice,
quiet, neat countries (which do not need
our help) and abandon all the rough, tough,
difficult places to the Communists, we will
soon and ourselves surrounded by a rough,
tough world which to aimed straight at the
destruction of the United States and 'W'hich
will make our present effort in Vietnam seem
mild Indeed. Win Or lose, the stakes tit
Vietnam are enormous. And we need not
lose.
THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL
REFORM CONTINUES
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, a recent
editorial In the Washington Post, Cant.
meeting on a study by the National Com-
mittee for an Effective Congress, re-
minds us that the need for congressional
reform continues.
The recent changes in the rules of the
other body are a recognition of this fact;
and?I am hopeful that, before logy, both
bodies will join in enacting legislation to
set up a Joint Committee on the Mod-
ernization of Congress.
I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial from the Washington Poet be
printed in the RscoRD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed In the R.rcoan,
as follows:
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Whereas the U.S. Senate in the 88th Con-
gress, 2d session, passed a bill authorizing
the construction of the initial 250,000-acre
phase of the Garrison diversion unit, and
the U.S. House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the
same session, reported out favorably and rec-
ommended for passage a bill, H.R. 1003, as
amended, authorizing the construction of the
initial phase of the Garrison diversion unit,
which report and amended bill were accept-
able to the sponsors of the reauthorizing
legislation, but said H.R. 1003 failed to re-
ceive House action because of lack of time
before sine die adjournment of the 88th
Congress: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives
of the State of North Dakota, the Senate
concurring therein: That the 39th Legislative
Assembly of the State of North Dakota here-
by expresses its unequivocal support for the
early development of the Garrison diversion
unit and fully concurs in and endorses the
presentations by Gov. William L. Guy and
other proponent witnesses at the hearings in
the 88th Congress on S. 178 and H.R. 1003,
and companion bills; and be it further
Resolved, That the 89th Congress be and
it is hereby most respectfully urged to take
early action to effect enactment of legisla-
tion authorizing the construction of the
Garrison diversion unit along the lines of S.
$4, H.R. 1718, and H.R. 237, 89th Congress;
and be it further
Resolved, That copies hereof be trans-
mitted by the secretary of state to the Mem-
bers of the North Dakota congressional dele-
-gation, the chairmen of the Senate and
House Committees on Interior and Insular
Affairs, President of the Senate, Speaker of
the House, the President of the United States,
the Secretary of the Interior, the Assistant
Secretary of the Interior for Water and Power,
and the Commissioner, Bureau of Reclama-
tion.
:ARTHUR A. LINK,
Speaker of the House.
DONNELL HONGEN,
Chief Clerk of the House.
CHARLES TIGHE,
President of the Senate.
Secretary of the Senate
EARLY AND FULL DEBATE ON
SOUTH VIETNAM IMPERATIVE
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last
Friday, January 15, 1965, the able and
distinguished senior Senator from Idaho
[Mr. CHURCH], one very well versed in the
foreign affairs of the United States,
stated:
The Senate has a responsibility in the field
of foreign affairs. We have suffered from too
much conformity of thought on the matter
of Vietnam. A dissent constructively ex-
pressed, indeed, a full-fledged debate on the
subject of Vietnam, is long overdue. At the
very least, such a debate would give the
American people a better idea of the alterna-
tives available to us. It would give the
President more elbow room, should he need
it, within which to deal with this difficult
situation in southeast Asia.
I concur wholeheartedly in Senator
CHURCH'S recognition of the need for a
full, frank, and open debate in the U.S.
-Senate-of, the situation in South Viet-
nam. The American people have a right
to demand such a debate on a subject
matter so important to their future wel-
fare and to the welfare of the Nation as
a whole.
As a matter of fact such debate has
already started.
No. 12-6
GERALD L. STAN,
.
In tile issue of the American Legion
magazine for August 1964, some of the
pro and con arguments for our present
position in South Vietnam are set forth
by the able and distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTON-
STALL] and myself. I ask unanimous
consent that those arguments under the
heading "Should U.S. Troops Be With-
drawn From Vietnam?" be printed in full
in the RECORD at the conclusion of these
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last
Sunday, January 17, 1965, in the New
York Times Magazine a similar discus-
sion of the pros and cons of our con-
tinued unilateral presence in South
Vietnam by the able and distinguished
senior Senator from Oregon [Mr.
MORSE], and the former Ambassador to
South Vietnam, Mr. Lodge, were set
forth. I ask unanimous consent that
this discussion also be printed in full in
the RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, both
of these debates in the Nation's periodi-
cals serve a most useful purpose. But the
debate on South Vietnam should be
brought to the Senate floor for here
there can be give and take which in
years past has been used so often to
focus public attention on vital issues.
And at this time there can be no more
vital issue than our future course of ac-
tion in South Vietnam.
The U.S. position in South Vietnam is
steadily deteriorating. It is deteriorating
despite the massive military and financial
aid the United States is increasingly
pouring into that country and despite the
stepup and extension of our Air Force
bombings which, although they have
been going on for some time, were re-
vealed to the American people only by
the shooting down of two of our planes.
Not only is the stability of the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam ebbing and flow-
ing from day to day, but it seems to be
losing-if indeed it ever had-the confi-
dence and support of an increasing seg-
ment of the people. 'I ask unanimous
consent that there be printed at the con-
clusion of these remarks a report by
United Press International in the New
York Times for January 18, 1965, en-
titled "Four Students Shot in Vietnam
as Rioting Sweeps Two Cities."
The PRESIDING OFFICER.
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, as
further indication of the rapidly deteri-
orating situation in South Vietnam and
the impossibility of U.S. fighting advisers
replacing South Vietnamese troops lack-
ing the will to fight, I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD a dispatch by Jack Lang-
guth in the New York limes for today,
January 19, 1965, entitled, "Thirty Per-
cent of Vietnam Draftees Desert Within
6 Weeks."
889
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in an
excellent editorial published in the Chris-
tian Science Monitor for January 18,
1965, entitled, "Delay or Diplomacy in
Vietnam," the alternatives facing the
United States are set forth clearly and
concisely. I ask unanimous consent that
this editorial be printed in the RECORD
at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
-See exhibit 5.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the
time is long overdue for the full airing on
the floor of the Senate of all the facts on
the U.S. position in South Vietnam and
for a discussion of the alternative choice
for future action open to the United
States legally, morally, militarily, and
politically.
It is my earnest hope that such a de-
bate will take place without delay and
will be participated in by as many of my
colleagues as possible.
[From American Legion
19641
Exnnirr
magazine, August
TROOPS BE WITHDRAWN FROM
VIETNAM?
YES
ERNEST GRUENING, Democrat,
of Alaska)
The war in South Vietnam is not and
never has been a U.S. war. It is and must
remain a fight to be fought and won by the
people of South Vietnam themselves.
Will to fight and will to win must come
from the spirit of the South Vietnamese.
The United States cannot instill that will
in them. For the past 14 years, U.S. military
and economic aid to South Vietnam has
totaled nearly $3 billion, but despite state-
ments of leaders of both political parties,
Vietnam continues to be rocked by internal
strife which drains the nation of its re-
sources.
The root of the present dilemma in which
the United States finds itself in South Viet-
nam lies in the aftermath of France's defeat
at Dienbienphu on May 7, 1954. Today-10
years later-the U.S. position resembles that
of France although we haven't used a quar-
ter of a million troops, yet.
Those who compare South Vietnam today
with South Korea of the 1950's make a great
mistake. South Korea had the will to fight
and to win. South Korea was a country
invaded from the north--South Vietnam is
a country divided within itself by a civil
war. More important-in Vietnam we are
alone; in Korea we were in there as part of
the United Nations effort.
Where are our allies in South Vietnam?
Over 200 Americans have been killed in
South Vietnam, as we fight alone. Prospects
are that we will continue to do so.
The theory was advanced by the late John
Foster Dulles that the United States must
keep South Vietnam strong to prevent the
fall of Cambodia and Laos to Red China
like a row of dominos. We poured aid money
into each domino, including $300 million
into Cambodia, yet it recently neutralized
itself and fell of its own accord, thereby
voiding the Dulles progression theory ad-
vanced during the Eisenhower administra-
tion.
I consider the life of one American worth
more than this.putrid mess. Let us do a
little hard rethinking. Must the United
States be expected to jump into every fracas
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 19
all over the world, to go it all alone, at- the
cost of Our youngsters' lives, to stay blindly
and stubbornly when a decade of bitter ex-
perience has shown us that expenditure of
blood and treasure has resulted In failure?
The time haq come to reverse our policy
of undertaking' to defend areas such as
South Vietnam, whose people are so reluc-
tant to fend for themselves. Let us keep
on, by all means, supplying them with arms.
Let us continue to give them the means if
they wish to use them. But not our men.
We must reassess the Dulles doctrine of
seeking to engage communism on its own
ground-12,000 miles away.
The situation in South Vietnam and else-
where in southeast Asia cries out for inter-
national solution. The problem will not be
resolved in battle but around a conference
table. The United Nations is such a confer-
ence table.
NO
(By Senator LEVERETT SALTONSTALL,Republi-
can, of Massachusetts)
The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South
.Vie tam would assure the Communists of vic-
tory there and result in a drastic defeat for
the United States-morally, politically, and
psychologically.
The issues at stake in South Vietnam reach
far beyond our minimum objective of preserv-
ing the non-Communist social order of that
country. The war in Vietnam is a struggle
for the survival of U.S. leadership in the fight
against Communist expansion, not only in
southeast Asia but throughout the world.
Those who propose U.S. withdrawal, a nego-
tiated settlement, or the neutralization of
South Vietnam as alternative solutions for
terminating the conflict there, have failed to
grasp this underlying significance of the war
and. the importance of its outcome upon the
U.S. world position.
While it may be debatable whether we were
prudent in doing so, nevertheless, the un-
alterable fact remains that the prestige of
the United States has been fully committed
to the prevention of a Communist takeover
of South Vietnam. If the United States
should fail to honor that commitment by
disengaging from South Vietnam, our default
was disastrously affect world opinion and
would surely be construed by the nations of
the world as evidence of our weakness and
vacillation in coming to grips with com-
munism.
Moreover, from the military standpoint, the
U.S. formula for advising and assisting the
South Vietnamese to resist Communist-in-
spired wars of national liberation rests in the
new concept of counterinsurgency-now un-
dergoing its acid test in the rice paddies of
the Mekong River Delta. If this defensive
concept falls in its purpose to overcome the
creeping aggressions of Communist guerrilla
warfare, the United States will have to admit
to a military defeat in being incapable of
devising effective military tactics to cope with
that type of warfare. As a consequence, an
increase in guerrilla wars can surely be an-
ticipated not only in southeast Asia but
throughout the world as communism expands
without U.S. military hindrance or resistance.
Politically, a defeat in South Vietnam will
be the catalyst for the nations of the Orient
to aline themselves with Communist China
which would, as a result of U.S. disengage-
ment, become the dominating influence of all
of Asia. Should South Vietnam fall, it is
more than likely that communism would
eventually triumph in southeast Asia through
subversion, bloodless coups, or guerrilla wars.
The neutralization of South Vietnam is
appealing in principle but it has thus far
failed in Laos. Similarly, a settlement under
United Nations auspices is attractive in prin-
ciple, but there is no assurance that the
Communists would not undermine and sub-
vert United Nations efforts in South Vietnam
as they did In the Congo.
The United States, whether rightly or
wrongly, is so involved morally, militarily and
politically, and its prestige so fully commit-
ted in South Vietnam that it cannot coun-
tenance a defeat there. Consequently, under
present conditions U.S. troops cannot be
withdrawn if we are to avoid serious inter-
national repercussions.
EXHIBIT 2
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times Magazine,
Jan. 17, 1965]
WE MUST LEAVE VIETNAM
(By WAYNE MORSE)
Ten years ago the United States embarked
upon an adventure in South Vietnam that
was just about 100 years out of date. While
Britain, France, and the Netherlands were
terminating their rule over their Asiatic
colonies, the United States began trying to
establish its own beachhead on the Asiatic
mainland.
Although present at the Geneva Conference
of 1954, which drew up the accord whereby
France withdrew from its old colony of Indo-
china, the United States refused to sign the
final agreement. So did one of the subdivi-
sions of Indiochina, South Vietnam. The
United States began a heavy program of
financial and military aid to a new Premier
In South Vietnam who, we believed, was most
likely to preserve a Western orientation.
When it came time for the 1956 election
throughout both North and South Vietnam
required by the Geneva accord, we and our
client in Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, realized it
would be won by Ho Chi Minh Is followers not
only in his own North Vietnam but in the
South as well. South Vietnam refused to
proceed with the election.
In the last decade we have explained our
policy as one of helping a free government
resist Communist subversion. But South
Vietnam never has had a free government.
In its 10 years of existence its governments
have been picked for it by the United States
and maintained by our heavy doses of eco-
nomic and military aid. -
The fraudulence of our claim has been
starkly exposed by the successive coups in
Saigon and by the piecing together of one
government after another by the American
Embassy. Leaders suspected of favoring neu-
tralism or any form of negotiation for set-
tlement of the civil war are firmly excluded
from Government ranks. The major tools
we have used in manipulating political and
military leaders have been various threats
and promises regarding our aid, which now
hovers around the level of $600 million a year
In a country of 14 million people. This sum
is exclusive of the cost of keeping 23,000
American "advisers" and large contingents
of aircraft in the country.
In fact, our official explanations of why
we are there now play down the "helping a
free government" lineand play -up American
security and American prestige as the stakes
In Vietnam. At least, the explanations are
getting closer to the truth, which is that the
United States took over this quarter of Indo-
china in 1954 when the French pulled out.
Having intruded ourselves into southeast
Asia, where we never were before, it was this
country and not the Communists who made
our prestige in Asia the issue.
Our Secretary of State often says that
"China must leave her neighbors alone."
Under this premise, our officials have vaguely
threatened to expand the war to North Viet-
nam and possibly China if we cannot win in
South Vietnam. But there are no Chinese
forces in South Vietnam nor Chinese equip-
ment in appreciable amount. Americans are
still the only foreign troops in South Viet-
nam.
Nonetheless, China has the same interest
in what goes on in the subcontinent of south-
east Asia as we have in Mexico, Cuba. and
other countries of Latin America. She will
increasingly resist having hostile govern-
ments on her borders, as do Russia and the
United States. We recognize and accept this
principle as regards Russia, but we refused to
recognize it as regards China.
This has been true even though we have
watched other Western nations ousted from
Asia and Africa by rising nationalism. It
was inevitable that once China became part
of this tide she would reassert her interest
in the governments on her borders. A re-
awakened China would assert this intern:?t
whether she were Communist or not. The
more we escalate the Vietnam conflict, the
more likely China is to intervene directly.
In South Vietnam, we invite China's ap-
prehension, but more than that, in trying to
surround China with American bases and
pro-Western states, we have to buck not only
communism but anticolonialism. One of our
many mistakes is to equate the two, es-
pecially when antiwhite feeling is directed
against the United States. Advocates of a
containment policy for China, similar to that
applied to Russia with some success in the
late 1940's and 1950's, overlook the impossi-
bility of maintaining Western strongholds in
Asia, no matter what their purpose. What
we could do in white Europe and even the
Middle East is not to be imposed upon an
Asia that is united in at least one respect-
its determination to see the white man sent
back to his own shores.
With our great wealth we can sustain the
current war effort In Vietnam indefinitely,
even if it is escalated. But it will never end
because our presence and our selection of
Saigon's rulers will always inspire rebellion.
Far from maintaining our prestige in Asia,
our present policy in Vietnam is eroding it.
The fact that we are losing despite the steady
increase in our aid, the addition of +23,000
American advisers, and complete American
air domination, has already led several Asian
nations to throw out an anchor on the
Chinese side. Of the famous dominoes that
were all supposed to fall to China if we
failed to take up the French burden in
southeast Asia, Burma and Cambodia have
already neutralized themselves. Pakistan
has made it clear that the aid she gets from
us is directed against India and not against
China, Japan and India, the largest non-
Communist nations of Asia, who might be
expected to be the most helpful to us in
Vietnam, have not associated themselves
with what we are doing there. A few days
ago India's Premier Shastri urged a new in-
ternational conference to negotiate a settle-
ment. He asked the United States not to
press for a military decision and urged that
we avoid a major military conflict.
Of all the nations touted as potential
Chinese victims, only Australia and the
Philippines have offered tangible help in
South Vietnam. The Australian contribu-
tion amounts to some 66 advisers and 3 air-
cargo planes. The Philippine offer of a
force of volunteer veterans was turned
down.
That is the extent of the local interest
and support for the American view that
we are saving all of Asia from communism
by our policy in Vietnam. Surely if one of
these so-called dominoes believed it, they
would be fighting side by side with us in
Vietnam. They are not, because they see
us having to run faster and faster just to
stay in the same place in Vietnam. They
see that the bulk of its people are too in-
different to American objectives to resist
the Vietcong. They know that sooner or
later we will have to leave and they do not
want to jeopardize their own standing in
Asia by supporting a last-minute white
intervention. -
There are many ways this country could
crawl back from the limb we crawled out
on 10 years ago. Through the Southeast
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1965 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 891
Asia Treaty Organization, the United Na-
tions or a reconvened Geneva conference
we could seek to establish an international
presence in Vietnam to stabilize and pacify
the country while it develops political in-
stitutions. Our refusal to sign the accord
of 1954 has always made suspect our claim
that we were enforcing it.
In truth, our enforcement has taken the
form of violations far more massive than
any violations by North Vietnam. Our jet
air forces and bases, our helicopter fleet,
the 23,000 U.S. military advisers are all
violations of the 1954 accord. So are they
violations of section after section of the
United Nations Charter, under which we
are pledged to seek peaceful solutions to
disputes and to lay before the U.N. those
disputes we are unable to solve peacefully
through means of our own choosing. We
have done neither in Vietnam.
A negotiated settlement in South Vietnam
is the first solution we are obliged to seek.
Of course, it would mean some guaranteed
neutralization of the country. That would
give its war-torn people the best chance they
have yet had to construct a country of their
own, something the French, the Japanese,
the French again, and now the Americans
have not given them.
If we fail to reach a negotiated settlement,
then the U.N. Charter requires the dispute
to be laid before a regional organization,
such as SEATO, or one of the U.N. bodies.
Both groups have the capacity to police the
country; both the more likely to bring it
some degree of cohesion than is the United
States with its unilateral intervention in
pursuit of our own interests.
Some Americans have busily erected an
enormous pyramid of disasters they contend
would result even from this limited Ameri-
can retrenchment. They see America as a
power in the Pacific only if we and our
friends control all its shores instead of just
its northern, eastern, and southern shores,
plus the island fringe off its western shore.
Most important, they ignore the impossibility
of creating an American foothold on that
shore in mid-20th century, communism or no
communism.
Many countries, East and West, have ac-
commodated themselves to the end of the
old order in Asia. We will, too, eventually.
The only question is how much blood and
money we will waste first trying to turn the
clock back.
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times Magazine,
Jan. 17,1965]
WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM
(By Henry Cabot Lodge)
"Pulling out of Vietnam" Is exactly the
same as "turning Vietnam over to the Com-
munists." Such a course would not be
merely imprudent, but actually extremely
dangerous.
Geographically, Vietnam stands at the hub
of a vast area of the world-southeast Asia-
an area with a population of 240 million
people extending 2,300 miles from north to
south, and 3,000 miles from east to west.
The Mekong River, one of the 10 largest
rivers in the world, reaches the sea in South
Vietnam. He who holds or has influence
in Vietnam can affect the future of the Phil-
ippines and Taiwan to the east, Thailand and
Burma with their huge rice surpluses to the
west, and Malaysia and Indonesia with their
rubber, oil, and tin to the south. Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand would in turn
be deeply concerned by the communization
of South Vietnam.
Historically, Vietnam has long played a
part in the political development of the
Far East. For many centuries it was under
the occupation or influence of the Chinese
and was used by the Chinese as a means of
enforcing their hegemony over the whole of
southeast Asia. The Vietnamese did_not en-
joy this experience and have traditionally
done what they could to throw off Chinese
overlordship. In a very real sense, there-
fore, the present struggle is one of self-
determination.
But today Vietnam should be seen as one
more instance in a long series of events
which began in Iran, Turkey, and Greece
after World War II; which include the seizure
of Czechoslovakia; which led to the Marshall
plan in Europe; which caused the Korean
war, the Malayan emergency, the Huk re-
bellion in the Philippines, and the Berlin
crisis, In all these widely separated places
the Communist bloc has tried to subvert and
to undermine the free world in order to
spread its control and its suppression of free-
dom.
In opposing this Communist onslaught, the
free world has stood together for nearly two
decades. One manifestation of our common
determination to frustrate the Communist
design to conquer Europe was the creation
of NATO. Elsewhere in the world we have
formed other alliances. The United States
alone has suffered 160,000 casualties since
the end of World War II in this effort to
contain the spread of communism.
This worldwide effort by nations of the
free world has not been undertaken out
of a simple quizotic delight in engaging in
battles in distant places. Nor does it sig-
nify a desire to establish a new colonialism
or any kind of special position. The war
in Vietnam is not only the struggle of a
small nation to exist, but it is also an open
encounter between the doctrine that "wars
of revolution," as the Communist call them,
are the wave of the future, and our belief
that in the future nations should be allowed
to develop their own destinies free from out-
side interference.
Although the North Vietnamese have their
own motives for their aggression in South
Vietnam and have played the leading role,
they have always been backed by the Chi-
nese Communists. Should their aggression
be successful, the Chinese Communists will
have seen positive proof that their ap-
proach to international relations is correct.
Such an outcome might well lead the
Soviets, in their desire to retain the leader-
ship of the Communist bloc, to adopt a more
belligerent stance in their relations with the
outside world. This would surely affect the
West.
It would also be regarded everywhere as a
reflection of the inability or lack of will of
the free world to prevent aggression. What,
for example, would be the reaction in Europe
if the United States were to withdraw from
southeast Asia in the face of the commit-
ment to assist the nations there?
The state of public opinion in the United
States itself would also be affected. Should
Vietnam be lost, many voices would be heard
urging us in effect to "resign from the world,"
fall back onto our "fortress America" and gird
up our loins for a contest with guided mis-
siles. This too would be something which
neither Europe nor the rest of the free world
could ignore.
Because of all these considerations, the
United States has undertaken to support the
Vietnamese both politically and militarily,
in an effort which has cost us lives and treas-
ure. The effort has not been in vain.
Although we are not yet victorious, we have
achieved a stalemate, which is surely much
better than defeat. On the economic and
social front the United States has contrib-
uted to the building of schools, clinics, and
better farms, all of which are essential to
gaining and holding the political support
that must be had to win the war. And we
try to help in every way in training civil ad-
ministrators and in creating political energy
in the country.
Some have said that despite this effort the
war in Vietnam cannot be won. Yet recent
history shows that we have been fighting
wars of this sort for the past 20 years and
that the record is creditable. We of the
free world won in Greece, we thwarted the
Communist aggression in Korea, we won in
Malaya, we won in the Philippines, and we
can win in Vietnam. We must persist and
we must not play into the enemy's hands
by counting on a quick, sensational, and easy
way out and then being disappointed when
it does not occur.
Persistent execution of the political and
military plans which have been agreed to
will bring victory-provided outside pres-
sures do not become too great. These out-
side pressures occur in many forms such as
the problem of sanctuaries from which Viet-
nam can be attacked and the Vietcong helped
with impunity. Infiltration from such sanc-
tuaries cannot be allowed to defeat the ef-
forts the Vietnamese are making. We will
not shrink from taking such measures as
seem necessary to cope with it.
Another form of "outside pressure" is the
desire in some quarters for an international
conference here and now. We do not op-
pose the idea of holding international con-
ferences as an abstract proposition-if they
are held at the proper time and under the
proper circumstances-but we think that to
hold a conference now would serve no good
purpose and would seriously undermine
morale in South Vietnam. Consider the
reasons:
1. There have already been two conferences
on southeast Asia (one on Vietnam and an-
other on Laos), the terms of which were
satisfactory but which the Communists
violated before the ink was dry. Before
holding another conference there must be
some sign that the Communists of Hanoi
and Peiping are prepared to let their south-
ern neighbors alone.
2. For the South Vietnamese to go to a
conference now with a large and aggressive
fifth column on their soil would amount to
a surrender. A conference not preceded by
a vertifiable Communist decision to cease
attacking and subverting South Vietnan
would be nothing more than a capitulation.
3. There is clearly no agreement between
us and the Communists on the simple prop-
osition to let South Vietnam alone. A con-
ference held in an atmosphere of bitter dis-
agreement could only make matters more
dangerous than they already are.
So-called neutralism is another outside
pressure standing in the way of the success-
ful prosecution of the war in South Viet-
nam. Neutralism that does not include
some means of enforcement, that does not
include North Vietnam, that means South
Vietnam will be alone and disarmed, is
nothing more than surrender. It should be
opposed for Vietnam just as it is opposed for
Berlin or for Germany. It takes strength
to be neutral. South Vietnam is not strong
enough today to be neutral.
In truth both Vietnams are "neutralized"
now by article 10 of the Geneva accord of
July 21, 1954, which said: "the two parties
shall insure that the zones assigned to them
do not adhere to any military alliance and
are not used for the resumption of hostil-
ities or to further an aggressive policy."
This provision was formally approved by
article 5 of the final declaration of the
Geneva Conference of 1954, which the
U.S.S.R., Red China, France, the United
Kingdom, the United States, Cambodia, Laos,
North and South Vietnam attended.
We must therefore insist before there is
any discussion of a conference or of neutral-
ism, that the Communists stop their aggres-
sion "and live up to the agreements which
already exist. The minute the onslaught
ceases, there can be peace. At present, the
North Vietnamese seem only to understand
force, and, of course, when they use force
they must be met with force, as they were
in the Gulf of Tonkin. They should also be
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met with the strong and united opposition
of the free world.
It seems that conflicts In far-off places are
precisely those which have often brought
war and calamity to all of us. Manchuria
seemed far away in 1931; the subversion of
Czechoslovakia by Hitler seemed remote to
the United States in 1938. Persistence, and
unity in the face of Communist pressure
have succeeded in Europe and in southeast
Asia, and can succeed again.
Mao Tse-tung said: "Politics is war with-
out bloodshed; war is politics with
bloodshed."
The struggle in Vietnam is not a "war" In
the sense that World War II--or Korea-was
a "war," because total military success in
Vietnam, unaccompanied by success in other
fields, will not bring victory. A many-sided
effort is needed; no single effort will solve
the problem; the problem is thus the despair
of the headline writer and the political
stomp speaker employing black-and-white
phraseology.
Therefore, those who say that there is a
quick solution or a simple solution or an
exclusively military solution are doing as
much of a disservice as are those who say
that there is no hope, that we must pull out
and that another southeast Asian conference
(added to the two which have been already
held--and dishonored) will do other than
turn South Vietnam over to the Communists.
They also do a disservice who deny that
much has been achieved, that the military
program, the economic program, the social
program, the informational program, and
the various technical programs have all
accomplished much-have indeed built the
springboard of victory-and that it is the
political, countersubversive, counterterrorist
program which still needs special attention.
It is accurate to say that a glass is half
full of water and it is also accurate to say
that the glass is half empty. To dwell on
the fact that we have not achieved victory
does not negate the other fact that we have
prevented defeat-and that a stalemate is
much better than a defeat.
It is not the American tradition to get
panicky whenever there is a little rough
weather. If we decide only to interest our-
selves in the nice, quiet, neat countries
(which do not need our help) and abandon
all the rough, tough, difficult places to the
Communists, we will soon find ourselves sur-
rounded by a rough, tough world which Is
aimed straight at the destruction of the
United States and which will make our
present effort in Vietnam seem like the
mildest of pink teas.
EXHIBIT 3
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,
Jan. 18, 1965 ]
FOUR STUDENTS SHOT IN VIETNAM AS RIOTING
SWEEPS Two CTTIEs-2,000 AT HUE DEMAND
OUSTER OF HUONG AFTER OUTBREAK OF VIO-
LENCE IN DALAT-TROOPS EVADE VIETCONG
TRAP
SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, January 17 -
Anti-Government demonstrations by student
and Buddhist groups swept the central Viet-
namese cities of Hue and Dalat today. Four
students were shot and wounded.
'['he rioting occurred as the Government
reported two new clashes with Communist
guerrillas. In one battle, a Government unit
outwitted the Vietcong and inflicted heavy
casualties as they were preparing an ambush.
At Hue, the ancient imperial capital near
the North Vietnamese border, 2,000 students,
including some Buddhists, massed outside
the radio studio and shouted demands for
the dismissal of Premier Tran Van Huong.
They were angered by reports that the four
students wounded in Dalat had died. Actu-
ally the students were being treated at a pri-
vate clinic and the nature of their wounds
was not disclosed.
In the Dalat demonstration, 500 students
paraded through the streets, forcing shops to
close. Policemen and troops set up barri-
cades to keep order, but the preventive meas-
ures shortened tempers and rocks were
thrown.
A U.S. Embassy source said there were re-
ports that a Vietnamese national policeman
in civilian clothes had fired the shots.
The demonstrators were reported to include
students from two Government-run high
schools-the Hung Dao School for boys and
the Bui Thi Xuan School for girls-and from
a Buddhist school.
In the fighting at Tayninh, near the Cam-
bodian border, meanwhile, Government forces
killed 25 Communist rebels after discovering
a Communist ambush plot.
Instead of breaking through the rebels'
roadblock, the Government troops halted and
called for reinforcements to steal behind the
Vietcong troops lining the road.
Two Government soldiers were killed and
one was wounded. A number of Vietcong
weapons were seized, including 11 rifles, 2
pistols, 2 carbines, and a radio.
In other action, Government troops using
105-mm. artillery fire, supported by Viet-
namese Air Force strikes, drove off two Viet-
cong companies 10 miles south of Binh Gia.
U.S. military spokesmen said two Govern-
ment outposts had withstood the Vietcong
assault despite casualties totaling 10 killed
and 15 wounded. The artillery fire and the
air strikes finally drove off the Communist
forces, the spokesman said.
ExHrsrr 4
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Jan. 19,
1965]
THIRTY PERCENT OF VIETNAM DRAFTEES DESERT
WrrssIN 6 WEEKS
(By Jack Langguth)
PHU BAT, SOUTH VIETNAM, January 18. -
Tram Niem, a 28-year-old potato farmer, was
recently drafted into the South Vietnamese
Army, and he does not like it.
"There has not been enough food for the
past 3 weeks," the new private said.
Although the winds were raw on the rifle
range, he was firing in his bare feet, He
had never worn shoes before his induction
and the, boots the army issued to him had
left bleeding blisters on his heels and toes.
Thirty percent of the draftees inducted
with Private Niem 6 weeks ago like the army
even less than he. They have already de-
serted.
That percentage is standard for the Dong
Da National Training Center at Phu Bai,
near Hue in central Vietnam. Some recruits
leave to attend to family problems, then
return to camp. There is no organized at-
tempt to pursue and punish the men who
do not come back.
TRAINING IS VERY HARD
Another private, Hoang Ton, the father of
two children, said he was looking forward
to leaving the army as quickly as possible.
Private Niem's thin face was alert and mo-
bile as he gave his reasons for wanting to
return to his nearby village. Private Ton's
expression was sullen. "All of the training,"
he said through an interpreter, "is very hard
for me."
Unless he also deserts, Private Ton's return
to civilian life is far off. Both volunteers
and draftees are usually held in the regular
army for the duration. In some instances,
men have been released after 3 years of serv-
ice, but a new soldier cannot count on it.
During his service a soldier's pay is ade-
quate. A private receives 1,600 piasters, al-
most $13 a month. Woodcutters in this prov-
ince learn a quarter of that.
The training that perplexes Private Ton
is based on U.S. Army manuals. It is divided
into a 5-week basic course and a 4-week
period of advanced combat training. An
added 3 weeks of training, which had been
trimmed to speed the output of recruits, will
soon be restored.
The most time for any one aspect of mili-
tary training, 50 hours, is given to teach-
ing the new soldier to use a carbine. Eight
hours is devoted to teaching him to use the
heavier M-1 rifle.
Only 12 hours in the first 5 weeks are given
over to political indoctrination
Complaints about the food here go beyond
the griping traditionally done by soldiers.
The floods south of Hue have made trans-
portation of supplies difficult and student
protest demonstrations have kept many
stores closed.
Lt. Col. Tran Heuu Tu, who commands
the Dong Da center, is allotted 15 piasters
a day, about 12 cents, to feed each trainee.
COOKING SOMETIMES EARLY
Rice and meat strips are cooked in outdoor
vats. The food is then set out on plank
tables hours ahead of time, sometimes with
plastic sheets stretched across the plates to
keep flies off. Soup is heated and served in
scrub buckets.
Australian and American advisers at the
camp do not interfere. "We're not here to
lecture them on sanitation or anything else,"
one adviser said. "We save our nudging
for those areas of tactics where we might be
able to contribute something."
Dong Da is responsible for guarding Hue
Airport ammunition dumps and a classified
American radio-research unit in the area.
Regular reconnaissance companies, back at
the center for refresher training, handle
most of the night patrols.
Although the hilly countryside Is dotted
with Communist-led Vietcong bands, the pa-
trolling is generally uneventful. When the
Communist guerrillas have ventured out in
any numbers, Government troops, with an
assist from the trainees, have driven them
back and inflicted heavy casualties.
Despite these successes, the practice has
been for Government patrols to huddle to-
gether at dusk and move only during day-
light hours when Vietcong activity was lim-
ited.
After forceful objections by the Australian
advisers, Colonel Tu this week changed the
procedure. He ordered his men to travel at
night in eight-man patrols.
The new method has not yet been per-
fected. On the first small patrol the Viet-
namese troops set out with live geese and
chicken slung over their shoulders.
While Western advisers deplore a prevail-
ing lack of aggressiveness they have found
that with proper leadership the Vietnamese
make good soldiers.
"And when leadership fails," one Austral-
ian officer said, "You hear some lovely sto-
ries about our men picking up a few Viet-
namese by the scruff of the neck and saying
'You're coming with me.' "
EXHIBIT 5
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan.
18, 1965]
DELAY OR DIPLOMACY IN VIETNAM?
Is U.S. military and diplomatic policy in
South Vietnam the haphazard, improvisatory,
Micawberish affair that it may seem when
viewed from one angle? Is Washington-as
well as Saigon-merely waiting for "some-
thing to turn up," which could point out a
new path through the jungle of American
troubles in southeast Asia?
Or are recent American actions-specid-
cally the heavy bombing raid against the
bridge at Ban Ban in Communist North Viet-
nam and the presence of atomic weapon-
bearing Polaris submarines in Asian waters-
part of a well-thought-out and complex dip-
lomatic maneuver?
We get no hint of an answer from Wash-
ington. This silence would be expected if
Washington is conducting a delicate diplo-
matic maneuver. It would also be expected
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if, unhappily, Washington did not know in
which way to move or what policy to follow.
Three choices seem to lie before. Washington
in South Vietnam today: (a) to keep on
helping South Vietnam fight to the bitter
end, with a constant stepping up of Ameri-
can military action, (b)a negotiated peace
with the Communist North, and (c) to
abandon the entire effort as quickly and as
decisively as possible.
Each of these courses is difficult. The first
is the one which has been tried, but which
does not seem to be succeeding. The third
would cause a disastrous decline in American
prestige in the area, and would raise grave
doubts all over the world as to Washington's
determination to live up to its many commit-
ments,
The middle course is the one which appears
to be receiving a wider and wider hearing in
Washington. Yet, if the present American
-policy is veering toward negotiation, why the
stepping up of the military effort? May it
not be with the intention of sitting down at
the conference table in as strong a position
as an otherwise disastrous situation will per-
mit?
If such is the case, it is understandable
why Washington must refuse to answer the
evermore insistent questions of those who
demand to be told what the United States
plans to do about southeast Asia. If the
United States is seeking to build a strong
bargaining position, through an increased
demonstration of military might, it cannot
be expected to weaken that position by talk-
ing about it.
Perhaps Washington is not following such
a delictae diplomatic maneuver. Perhaps it
is merely groping and hoping. Perhaps it is
prepared to step up its military intervention
to the point where it believes that North
Vietnam can be made to reconsider the cost
of its growing intervention in the Com-
munist rebellion in the south. We do not
know. But it is doubtful if, with the war
going as badly as it has in recent months,
the answer can be long delayed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate adjourns today, it adjourn to
meet at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
the information of the Senate, and after
discussing the matter with the distin-
guished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN],
I announce that there will be no business
transacted on tomorrow, Inauguration
Day. The Senate will move in a body, -
shortly after convening, to the Inaugura-
tion.
It is our intention after the prayer to
suggest the absence of a quorum, and,
at approximately 10:45, or thereabouts,
adjournment will take place.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT FROM
WEDNESDAY TO FRIDAY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that when the Senate adjourns to-
morrow, it stand in adjournment until
12 o'clock noon on Friday next.
The motion was agreed to.
THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION closing. So far the only help we've received
CLOSING OF LINCOLN HOSPITAL from the Federal Government is to close the
PROTESTED - veterans hospital.
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the
Veterans' Administration has deter-
mined that several VA hospitals should
be closed. The hospital at Lincoln,
Nebr., is included among those to be
eliminated.
Many of us in the Senate and in par-
ticular on the Appropriations Commit-
tee have a great appreciation for the im-
portance of eliminating unnecessary
spending. There are, however other con-
siderations in spending the taxpayer's
money. One of these is the defense of
our country, past as well as future. We
have a continuing obligation and duty
to provide adequate and necessary care
for our veterans. When any doubts
arise concerning the economy of cutting
back on those who have given of their
health and their lives, these doubts must
be resolved in favor of providing ade-
quate medical care for our ex-service-
men.
This obligation is not met by shipping
veterans off to our overcrowded and dis-
tant urban centers to spend their more
difficult days. It is not met by removing
them from their homes, the places they
have chosen to return after defending
their country. It is not met by sending
them somewhere because others have
chosen to go there or, in some cases, can
afford to go there.
Our veterans are human beings, not
units or numbers to fill beds. We must
see that they are treated as human be-
ings who have come to the defense of
their country when it needed them the
most. The national conscience can allow
no less.
The distinguished majority leader, the
Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD],
has pointed out the losses suffered by the
State of Montana in defense installa-
tions and now in defense obligations.
Lincoln, Nebr., has suffered a similar
fate. It and Miles City, Mont., are the
only cities to be hit by both the closing
of a veterans hospital and an Air Force
base, all within a few weeks. We hear
much talk about the computers which
make these decisions, but are computers
really coordinating all the factors which
must be considered? If so, their com-
munications have broken down.
When the Lincoln Air Force Base was
closed, an economic development expert
was sent by the Department of Defense
to help Lincoln overcome the impact of
the cutback. While he was busily giving
advice, the hospital closing was an-
nounced. I am told that he had to call
back in disbelief to the Veterans' Admin-
istration to confirm the announcement.
Just as the Administration neglected to
inform Members of Congress, it appar-
ently failed to inform the Department of
Defense.
The president of the Lincoln Chamber
of Commerce, Thomas Pansing, said
that a team sent out by the Federal Gov-
ernment to soften the blow of the air-
base closing told him:
The Federal Government would do every-
thing possible to ease the impact of the
Mr. Pansing summed up the feeling of
many Nebraskans when he said:
We can't afford too much more help like
this.
My fellow Nebraskans and I know that
our economy can withstand these clos-
ings. It will set us back `but we will sur-
vive. The Federal Government may well
find another activity' to conduct in
Lincoln. But that is not the question.
The question is: Will this provide the
care needed by our veterans?
I am gratified that the Veterans' Af-
fairs Subcommittee will study this
question. I ask unanimous consent that
a letter sent to the chairman of that
subcommittee, Senator YARBOROUGH, re-
questing that such a study be conducted
be printed in the RECORD at the conclu-
sion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit-1.)
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, when
the Veterans' Administration briefed
members of the Nebraska delegation on
this action, we were not satisfied that the
closing of the Lincoln Hospital was fully
justified. Additional information has
been requested from the VA on the future
medical needs of veterans in the region
served by the Lincoln facilities. It is my
hope that the Veterans' Affairs Subcom-
mittee will examine this factor in study-
ing the decision.
Let it be clear that this decision to
close these facilities is the decision of the
Veterans' Administration, the Bureau of
the Budget, and through the Bureau the
ultimate decision rests with the Johnson
administration. The sole elected official
participating in this decision is the
President.
As Members of the Senate, we did not
receive notice that these closings were
under consideration until the decision
had been made. Within a few days
after I was notified of the decision, an
announcement was made that no more
patients would be admitted to the Lin-
coln Hospital. It is my hope, therefore,
that the Veterans' Administration will
take notice of the congressional hearings
and reverse its policy of refusing admis-
sion to patients.
I am gratified at the announcement
that hearings are scheduled on the sub-
ject of the closing of all Veterans' Ad-
ministration hospitals, and I earnestly
commend to the subcommittee the merits
and facts which pertain to the proposed
closing of the hospital in Lincoln, Nebr.
EXHIBIT 1
JANUARY 18, 1965.
Hon. RALPH YARBOROUGH,
Chairman, Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee,
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
U.S. Senate
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Announced closing
of the Lincoln Veterans Hospital was received
with sharp sense of loss and disappointment
in Nebraska, as undoubtedly was the case as
to the other facilities similarly treated.
No one that we know of would be against
cuts of clearly demonstrated unnecessary
spending; but in every case, due regard
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should be accorded the objectives of the pro-
gram at issue. This is especially true of the
national commitment made to our veterans,
and the firm obligations flowing therefrom.
if any doubts appear in the balancing of
these factors, they must be resolved in favor
of the medical care which our servicemen
have earned and to which they are entitled.
It is strongly felt, as I am certain the con-
sensus shows, that the Veterans' Adminis-
tration should be put on very strict proof as
to the humane, moral, and overall wisdom of
the course it proposes.
To that end, I join with those of our
colleagues who have already called upon you
as chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Subcom-
mittee to make a thorough study and inquiry
into all these closings, and that the situation
in Lincoln and in Nebraska be given a search-
ing, scrutiny with them.
At one upon receipt of the Veterans' Ad-
ministrations announcement, my colleague
Senator CURTis and I held a conference in
my office with Dr. Linus Zink who was cour-
teously requested to be present by Mr. Driver,
Administrator of the Veterans' Administra-
tion. He furnished us some information on
which the Veterans' Administration decision
was based. Frankly, at the close of the meet-
ing, neither my colleague nor I were satisfied
that a case had been made out to justify the
announced action.
Dr. Zink agreed to transmit to us additional
information which will be sent to you for
the subcommittee records and consideration
upon its arrival. Communications and pro-
tests from Nebraskans -veterans, patients,
employees, and others-have come to me.
They are being sent to you for the record
also.
It is hoped that arrangements for hearings
will be made and announced soon, and vig-
orously pressed.
Sincerely yours,
ROMAN L. HRUSXA,
U.S. Senator, Nebraska.
Wh_
"COMMUNITY SERVICE--WE BUILD,"
KIWANIS THEME FOR 1965
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, Kiwa-
nis International has adopted for its ad-
ministrative theme for 1965, "Commu-
nity Service-We Build."
An impressive presentation of the
theme, the objectives and committee
emphases for this year is being made this
month at local Kiwanis clubs throughout
the Nation.
Mr. Robert Hasebroock, member of
Downtown Kiwanis Club of Omaha,
Nebr., has sent me a copy of the presen-
tation "as an outstanding example of
what freemen, through voluntary action,
can and will do without government
assistance."
The Kiwanis program is characterized
in this quotation from the presentation
of its 1965 theme:
There can be no building by freemen un-
less men are free. If we are to assume the
continuity of Kiwanis service, we must as-
sume the continuity of a society In which
men are free to work toward goals which they
themselves have chosen. Service clubs have
no reason for existence, even if permitted to
exist, in a society where all services are pro-
vided by the state; pervice clubs would have
no sustaining force in a society where the
state denies the existence of a Supreme Be-
ing.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the text of the theme pres-
entation printed In the RECORD.
There being no objection, the theme
presentation was ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
COMMUNITY SEavIc&--WE BUILD
They dreamed a dream.
In an age obsessed with the material, they
dreamed that man could give primacy to the
spiritual. Though nation was rising against
nation, they dreamed that man could do to
others what he would want others to do to
him. They dreamed that, in the heart of
man, apathy could be supplanted by aware-
ness-that Indifference could be transformed
into concern, and self-concern into self-
giving.
Fifty years ago-they dreamed a dream.
The merchant, the teacher-the farmer,
the banker-men of all callings-joined in
that dream, having faith in the ideal that
men working together in community service
mightchange the world.
Through the golden anniversary of Kiwanis
International, we acknowledge our debt to
those men of vision, and our awareness of
the golden legacy which they created, nur-
tured, and now lay at our feet for us to
protect, enrich, and bring to fruition. No
other group of men has received a richer
heritage than we.
But dreams can pass into nothingness, and
fade away like morning dew. Each age must
dream anew. "Each age is a dream that- is
dying or one that is coming to birth." With
gratitude, we glance behind us; with a sense
of destiny, we strive ahead, looking to the
stars and hearing God's promise to Isaiah:
"For behold, I create new heavens and a new
earth."
Change and permanence are the only cer-
tainties in our future. Change will bring
about its own enchanting miracles-new op-
portunities to serve, new resources to use,
new dreams to dream. No seer can yet set
down the course of man in the next century
or the next decade. But as change is cer-
tain, so too is permanence. The star that
led the camel caravan in the days of the Pha-
roah guides the astronaut in his orbit. The
principles which have endured through the
past 50 years of Kiwanis history will en-
dure permanently, guiding us as surely as
the Pole Star in determining the course we
shall pursue. Man can change and produce
change, but man cannot alter the eternal.
Let us then resolve to focus our sights on
the principles which have characterized our
50 years of service: faith in God, the dignity
and freedom of the individual, citizenship
responsibility, patriotism, and good will. Let
us resolve that as community service has
been the dominant philosophy under which
Kiwanians have served for 50 years, com-
munity service will be the dominant philos-
ophy of Kiwanis for the next 50 years.
Whatever changes may occur in our manner
of life or fortunes, whatever changes may
occur in our organizational structure or our
immediate objectives, community service
,can be the permanent characteristic of Ki-
wanis history.
The past, then, is our introduction to a
continuing drama. As we enter this golden
anniversary year, we draw the curtain for
act 2, playing our roles according to the
scenario provided by our forebears. Reflect-
ing our rededication to the spirit of Ki-
wanis-past, the renewal of our vows to Ki-
wanis-present, and the affirmation of our
faith in Kiwanis-future, our administrative
theme for 1965 is "Community Service-We
Build."
The golden anniversary year provides no
occasion for marking time while we celebrate
the past. The need and the opportunities
for Kiwanis service were never greater. The
1965 theme of "Community Service-We
Build" not only provides the continuity for
the mainstream of Kiwanis history; it chal-
lenges us to complete the unfinished work at
hand. Stated in another way, the theme
says: "Through services to our communities,
we will build a better world in 1965."
But where shall we build, and what shall
we build? What are our objectives for 1965?
There can be no building by freemen un-
less men are free. If we are to assume the
continuity of Kiwanis service, we must as-
sure the continuity of a society in which men
are free to work toward goals which they
themselves have chosen. Service clubs have
no reason for existence, even if permitted to
exist, in a society where all services are pro-
vided by the state; service clubs would have
no sustaining force in a society where the
state denies the existence of a Supreme Be-
ing. If the time should ever come when we
look upon man and see him as no more than
a well-fed, well-housed organism in a god-
less world, a statistic without individual
freedom or dignity, then we can be certain
that the service club movement is ancient
history. Our whole existence depends upon
the freedom of the individual to act inde-
pendently and to serve his Creator according
to the tenets of his faith, whatever that faith
may be, so the first objective for 1965 is that
we build, defend, and preserve our heritage
of freedom, our belief in God, and the dig-
nity of man in his human and spiritual re-
lationships.
Two thousand years ago, it was recorded
that a voice from Heaven spoke to shepherds
tending their flocks and said: "Glory to God
in the highest, and peace on earth to men
of good will." Whatever our religious faith
may be, none can deny that good will is es-
sential for the maintenance of peace and the
strengthening of bonds among the free na-
tions of the world. Even among- nations
which would be friendly, the seeds of dis-
trust, of envy, and of fear are always pres-
ent: this is a fact of life. But distrust, envy,
and fear can be germinated by ignorance and
nurtured by misunderstanding. It is pos-
sible, as'the people of Canada and the United
States have so dramatically demonstrated,
for men of different nations to do to others
what they would want others to do to them,
yet this would not be possible without under-
standing. We know too little about our
brothers In the other nations of the free
world; we must work purposefully in 1965
to bring about maximum contacts, maxi-
mum communication, and, in turn, maxi-
mum understanding. Our second objective
for 1965 is that we build international
understanding by demonstrating the basic
principle of the Golden Rule, using as an
example Canada-United States good will.
It is idle to speak of freedom without be-
lieving in economic freedom. Part of the
heritage of freedom is that man has the right
to own property, to operate a business, to
pursue a profession of his choice, ' and to
save, spend, or invest his earnings as he
chooses. This economic system has brought
us strength; it has brought us prosperity;
it has made independence possible. It must
be preserved from all substitutes and de-
fended against all who would weaken it. We
cannot well defend or preserve what we take
for granted, what we do not understand. It
is imperative that we ourselves and the youth
of our nations understand the fundamental
principles of a free economy. Therefore, our
third objective for 1965 is that we build an
understanding of and appreciation for the
private ownership of property by educating
ourselves and our youth in the principles
of a free capitalistic system.
Government at any level takes on the char-
acter of those who govern. Where our lead-
ers are weak, our government will be weak;
where strong, our government will be- strong.
Patronage does not insure performance; lx--
tegrity is not a necessary product of popu-
larity. Character and competence are the
hallmarks of responsible leaders. Kiwanis
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
whether you will propose that this veto be decision taken unanimously? How do you
exercised to protect our balance of payments. assess the impact on our balance of payments
Sincerely yours, in concrete terms?
WAYNE MORSE. In short, I would appreciate learning the
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I par- full story of this transaction and its im-
plications; you need not be concerned about
Dill
'
M
on
s
r.
tiCUlarly call attention to
sparing me any details.
words: Sincerely yours,
Any application by the Bank for bond
sales in our market will be reviewed on its
merits in the light of. the concrete situation
at the time-including our own balance of
of payments and the effect of any Bank bor-
rowing thereon.
Yet at the end of December the World
Bank announced that it will float a $200
million bond issue in the United States
beginning on January 18, an announce-
ment that coincided with the news that
the U.S. balance-of-payment deficit had
reached record proportions and required
a special message from the President to
the Congress regarding steps to curb it.
I trust that this special message will
report the reasons for permitting this
World Bank bond issue to proceed at
the very time when it would have the
worst possible impact upon our balance
of payments.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed at this point a letter I have
addressed to the Secretary on January
8 concerning this matter.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
JANUARY 8, 1965.
Hon. C. DOUGLAS DILLON,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY : I wish to recall my
letter to you of October 13, 1964, in which I
expressed concern over the prospbct that the
World Bank would seek to raise new capital
in the U.S. market. In your response of
October 27 you stated that the United States
should not at present prohibit "any and all
attempts by the Bank to mobilize private
funds for development through bond sales
to U.S. residents." There nevertheless was
at least an implication that the bulk of the
$300 to $400 million of new capital required
by the World Bank might be raised outside
this country. According to the New York
Times of December 29, however, the World
Bank has now announced it will float a $200
million bond issue in the United States be-
ginning on January 18.
It seems to me that the key sentence in
your October 27 letter was the following:
"Any application by the Bank for bond
sales in our market will be reviewed on its
merits in the light of the concrete situa-
tion at the time-including our own balance
of payments and the effect of any Bank bor-
rowing thereon." Frankly, I am not aware
of any measurable improvement in our bal-
ance-of-payments situation during the past
2 months; indeed, I would assume the con-
trary from the New York Times story of
December 30, 1964, by Richard E. Mooney-a
copy of which is attached. The article re-
ports that the OECD annual review of the
U.S. economy contains the advice "that more
curbs on outfiowing capital may be needed
to put the country's international payments
in better balance." Yet the proposed World
Bank bond issue appears a dramatic move in
the opposite direction.
In these circumstances, I would like very
much to know just what sort of review of
the Bank application took place within the
U.S. Government, Specifically, was approval
of the application given by the National
Advisory Council on International Mone-
tary and Financial Problems, and was the
WAYNE MORSE.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I express
my appreciation to the Senator from
Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], who has
performed yeoman service for the Sen-
ate in his constantly challenging the ad-
ministration's policies in regard to the
balance-of-payments problem.
Most respectfully I say to my Presi-
dent, "You had better take a long, hard
look at the record of your Treasury De-
partment in this field before you send up
any special message on the subject, be-
cause you are going to be confronted
with a long series of questions here in
the Senate in regard to the policies that
have been followed by the Secretary of
the Treasury, which, in my judgment, are
unfortu\iate policies, to say the least."
N U.S. ACTION IN LAOS
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I see no
other Senator who wishes to speak dur-
ing the morning hour. I ask unanimous
consent that I may proceed for an addi-
tional 3 minutes on another subject.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be printed
in the RECORD a UPI article appearing in
this morning's New York Times entitled
"U.S. Terms Raids in Laos Justified by
Red Violations."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
U.S. TERMS RAIDS IN LAOS JUSTIFIED BY RED
VIOLATIONS-SAYS COMMUNISTS DISREGARD
GENEVA ACCORDS-STRIKES To CONTINUE IF
NEEDED
WASHINGTON, January 18.-The Johnson
administration contended today that U.S.
military actions in Laos, such as the air
strike last Wednesday against a bridge, were
justified by Communist violations of the
1962 Geneva accords establishing Laotian in-
dependence and neutrality.
It also made clear that it intended to con-
tinue using U.S. military force, if necessary,
to maintain Laos against Communist incur-
sions.
The administration's position was made
known in two forms-a Presidential defense
message to Congress and a statement issued
by the State Department.
ASIAN PROGRAM UNCHANGED
In his defense message, the President re-
affirmed that "our program remains un-
changed" in southeast Asia. He said the
United States would continue to give military
and economic assistance to nations such as
Laos and South Vietnam, which are "strug-
gling against covert aggression in the form
of externally directed, undeclared guerrilla
warfare."
In Laos, he went on, the United States has
demonstrated since 1950 its commitment to
freedom, independence, and neutrality by
"strengthening the economic and military
security of that nation."
"We shall continue to support the legiti-
mate Government of that country," he de-
clared.
The President stressed that "the problem
of Laos Is the refusal of the Communist
903
forces to honor the Geneva accords in which
they entered in 1962."
The State Department "also said that the
American military actions in Laos were "en-
tirely justified" by the repeated Communist
violations of the 1962 accords.
POSITION QUESTIONED
Whether the United States still felt bound
by the 1962 accords was questioned after it
was disclosed that Americans had conducted
bombing missions against key points in the
supply routes used by the Communists from
North Vietnam Into Laos. Reconnaissance
missions were acknowledged earlier.
Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Ore-
gon, charged .last weekend that such attack
and reconnaissance missions represented a
U.S. violation of a provision of the 1962 ac-
cords. This prohibits the introduction of
foreign military troops in Laos.
When the question was raised last Friday,
it was met by silence at th4 State Depart-
ment.
Today, however, the Department was pre-
pared with a statement providing a justifi-
cation for the air missions. At the same
time it still refused to confirm that the
United States had been conducting bombing
missions against Communist targets in Laos.
The statement, given by the Department
Press Officer, Robert J. McCloskey, said:
"We continue to support the Geneva agree-
ments and the independence and neutrality
of Laos which they are intended to achieve."
Mr. McCloskey declined to say whether
U.S. assistance included the air strike
Wednesday by a squadron of U.S. fighter-
bombers against a strategic bridge near Ban
Ban in central Laos.
Mr. McCloskey did say that any "assist-
ance" had been given at the request of Prince
Souvannah Phouma, the Laotian Premier.
The Prince is understood to have de-
manded that there be no announcement
about the missions.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to
quote a paragraph or two of that article:
The Johnson administration contended to-
day that U.S. military actions in Laos, such
as the air strike last Wednesday against a
bridge, were justified by Communist viola-
tions of the 1962 Geneva accords establish-
ing Laotian independence and neutrality.
It also made clear that it intends to con-
tinue using U.S. military force, if necessary,
to maintain Laos against Communist in-
cursions.
That statement is shocking. Mr.
President, I say there is no question
about the fact that the U.S. military has
conducted these raids. There is no justi-
fication on the part of my party's ad-
ministration for concealing from the
American people this fact and no justifi-
cation for not issuing a formal official
statement that the United States is mak-
ing war in Laos and killing American
boys in that war.
Mr. President, I am shocked that such
a policy is being followed by the State
Department and the Pentagon, and that
we let the American people learn of our
warmaking activities in southeast Asia
through war correspondents. Then our
State Department and our Pentagon
attack those war correspondents. I
happen to be one who defends these war
correspondents, because time and time
again they have demonstrated that they
will not follow the propaganda line of
the State Department and the Pentagon,
for if they followed that line, they would
be nought but kept journalists on the war
front.
Mr. President, we are greatly indebted
to the fat that at least our war cor-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 19
respondents abroad insist upon putting
into practice the precious constitutional
meaning of freedom of the press. But
the article to which I have referred is
very interesting. It states further:
Whether the United States still felt bound
by 1962 accords was questioned after it was
disclosed that Americans had conducted
bombing missions against key points in the
supply routes used by the Communists from
North Vietnam into Laos.
M:r. President, Britain, France, Rus-
sia, and China are some of the other
countries that signed the treaty along
with the United States.
The treaty set up an International
Control Commission composed of India,
Poland and Canada, to investigate any
violations of the treaty and of the cease-
fire between the rival Laotian factions.
The London Observer reports that in
the British view of the treaty, it is up to
this Commission to investigate whether
there has been any breach of the treaty.
It is true that the American bombing
raid took place in territory controlled
by the Pathet Lao. Whether the Pathet
Lao would permit the Commission to in-
vestigate U.S. complaints of violations
is doubted by American authorities,
hence the resort to force of arms.
Mr. President, my opposition to war-
making policies of the United States in
Laos is the same as my opposition to the
unjustifiable killing of American boys in
South Vietnam in a warmaking policy of
our Government there.
What we ought to do is live up to our
obligations and call upon our allies to
live up to their obligations under the
United Nations treaty. Great Britain,
Canada, France, and the other signa-
tories to the United Nations Charter, in-
cluding the United States, ought to be
calling upon the United Nations to make
a report to the world in regard to the vio-
lations of the Laotian treaty by North
Vietnam, Red China, and possibly others.
But, in my judgment, there is no hope of
avoiding a massive war in Asia in the
very near future if the United States con-
tinues to take this present attitude-an
attitude which was expressed by the
American Ambassador in the United Na-
tions not so many weeks ago in that un-
fortunate speech he delivered before the
Security Council, in which he said, in ef-
fect, that the United States Intends to do
what it thinks needs to be done in south-
east Asia, and the rest of the world can
take it and like it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MoN-
RONEY in the chair). The time of the
Senator from Oregon has expired.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 2 more minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
the Senator from Oregon is recognized
for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to
say to our Ambassador to the United Na-
tions and to the President of the United
States that they are skating on thin ice.
The danger is that we are going to see
an outbreak of a massive war in Asia be-
cause of the unilateral action of the
United States in making war in South
Vietnam, in clear violation of the United
Nations Charter, in violation of the
Geneva accords of 1954, and in violation
of our long standing, professed ideals
that we are a nation that believes in sub-
stituting the rule of law for the jungle
law of military might.
We are now practicing an application
of the jungle law of military might as
a substitute for our ideals. So long as
there is any hope of avoiding that war
and helping to bring my country back
inside the framework of international
law and laying this whole threat to the
peace of the world before the United
Nations, the voice of the senior Senator
from Oregon will be raised in that cause.
I believe the time is long overdue when
the President of the United States should
proceed to make clear to the world that
the United States stands ready for a
review by the United Nations of the whole
threat to the peace of the world. The
issue of the Congo will be coming up. I
hope that the United Nations will go back
into the Congo. Yet there are forces in
the United States that would have the
United States go into the Congo on a
unilateral basis and allow the killing of
American boys there in carrying out a
unilateral American military policy. I
pray that before it is too late, we will
try to put on the spot, so to speak, our
alleged allies in the United Nations-
Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy,
and all the rest-who claim that they
believe in the substitution of peaceful
procedures for military force. Let us
ask them: "Are you willing to stand with
us in trying to work out an honorable
peace that will not result in carrying out
all the fears that are being expressed by
increasing hundreds of thousands of sin-
cere, patriotic Americans, who are rais-
ing the question: `How much longer are
we going to cai^ry out a unilateral course
of action and killing American boys in
South Vietnam, when we have not yet
exhausted peaceful procedures for the
settlement of the dispute through the
United Nations?"'
I ask unanimous consent to have print-
ed at the close of these remarks an edi-
torial from the Wall Street-Journal of
today entitled "If Vietnam Falls."
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
IF VIETMAN FALLS -
If the United States is forced out of Viet-
nam one way or another, what does it then
do about the rest of southeast Asia?
The question may never have to be an-
swered, and the U.S. Government undoubted-
ly hopes it won't have to be. Conceivably,
in some fashion totally unclear at present,
the Communist Vietcong attacks can be halt-
ed and stability at last restored in Saigon.
But since no one is putting many odds
on that possibility, It is essential to consider
the implications of failure and withdrawal.
Though the United States has no known in-
tention of suddenly up and leaving-its pub-
lic statements emphasize just the opposite-
it could be compelled to abandon the effort
for at least a couple of imaginable reasons.
One might be a military determination
that the war is unwinable even in the lim-
ited sense of getting the Reds out of South
Vietnam; certainly there is nothing to indi-
cate we are making headway after these
lengthening years of costly struggle. An-
other reason might be that the Vietnamese
would in effect ask the United States to leave,
either through their leaders of the moment
or through an evident unwillingness of the
people to go on fighting.
The South Vietnamese in general haven't
shown notable zeal for the fight anyway, and
their attitude Is understandable enough.
Not only does the conceptual distinction be-
tween communism and freedom hold com-
paratively little meaning for most of them;
they have also been in this war, with the
support first of France and then the United
States, practically since World War II.
As for the Saigon governments, if that is
what they should be called, they have been
unable to win the support of the people or
exercise stable rule; the United States, with
all its aid and influence, has been unable
to promote or maintain such a government
since the overthrow and killing of Diem in
late 1963. While the Diem regime was ob-
viously no model of abstract democracy, very
few governments are that, in Asia or any-
where else, it did manage a degree of sta-
bility.
The United States which condoned the re-
moval of Diem, is perhaps too preoccupied
with governmental modes and deportment.
If we have an important stake in southeast
Asia, our policymakers need not to be so in-
sistent that the government in Saigon be
civilian and virtuously democratic; what
should matter, from the point of view of our
interests, is that it be an effective govern-
ment able to invest citizens and soldiers with
a will to rout the Communists.
If those objectives prove unattainable
and the whole thing blows up in America's
face, it is needless to say America's interests
will have suffered severe damage. For our
part, however, we are not convinced that it
has to be catastrophic damage.
The basic U.S. Interest in southeast Asia
is not, or should not be, solely the preserva-
tion of a non-Communist South Vietnam as
though it were in a vacuum; rather, the
American concern is to keep Red China from
expanding-insofar as the United States is
reasonably capable of doing so. If that can-
not be done with regard to South Vietnam,
we still must consider the area as a whole.
In that broader context, failure in Vietnam,
if it happens, does not automatically doom
all southeast Asia. There are other, and
maybe more defendable, areas of resistance
to communism and to Red China in partic-
ular. Thailand is a large one. Malaysia,
currently more directly menanced by Indo-
nesia's pro-Communist Sukarno than by
Peiping, appears to be a firm one.
The United States does, we believe, have to
stand firm against Red Chinese imperialism.
But whether the major stand is taken at
Thailand, Malaysia, or indeed the Philippines
or Australia should be determined by the
cold considerations of a given nation's will
to fight, terrain, logistics, and all the normal
military bases for judgment. If we look only
at South Vietnam as the be-all and end-all
of our southeast Asia policy, we risk not only
profound disappointment but also perhaps
inadequate thinking and preparation for the
larger problem.
To say we might lose in South Vietnam is
not defeatism but military realism, no matter
how much it may be hoped that the country
can somehow be kept out of Communist
hands. What must be hoped most of all, in
our view, is that the officials in Washington
are paying full attention to Asian strategy
in the event they cannot hold Vietnam.
MONTANA'S "WAGONMASTER"
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as
my colleagues in the Senate are well
aware, Montana has produced a number
of distinguished sons and daughters who
have achieved fame and success outside
its borders. I am reminded of an im-
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!Ppendix
Debate on U.S. Policy on Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. GEORGE McGOVERN
Or SOUTH DAKOTA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
~uesday, January 19, 1965
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, a
continuing and in my Judgment, very
constructive debate,- on U.S. policy on
Vietnam is underway. Right now, I be-
lieve, there exists what amounts to a
deadlock _ between the state of South
Vietnam, aided to an increasing extent
by the United States, and the Vietcong
guerrillas, aided to an increasing extent
by North Vietnam. It would be difficult,
and probably impossible, for South Viet-
namese forces to win a final military vic-
tory, since there appears to be a grass
roots cooperation with the Vietcong
throughout much of the countryside. On
the other hand, it would be equally dif-
ficult for the Communist forces to
achieve a final. victory over the South
Vietnamese, with their strong U.S. mili-
tary backing. The U.S. forces are un-
doubtedly able to remain there indefi-
nitely and to prevent a Communist take-
over in that manner; yet there is raised
with increasing frequency the question
of whether we might achieve basically
the same results, over the long run, by a
negotiated settlement which would spare
the Vietnamese.people the long suffering
and economic devastation of continued
warfare. It would also avoid the con-
tinued financial drain and loss of life
now being suffered by the United States.
Few Americans favor an immediate
and unqualified pullout. I believe the
commitment we have given the leaders
of South Vietnam and the concern we
have for. the people there would make it
impossible for the United States to with-
draw Immediately. Yet it is not too soon
to discuss the terms on which a with-
drawal might ultimately be possible, and
to assess the long-term requirements for
the settlement of an issue which is basi-
cally political, not military. During the
present struggle, we should not remain
silent, with bated breath, as it were,
waiting for a sudden resolution of the
problem, which is most unlikely.
Rather, we should use, here in Congress
and throughout the country, the exist-
ing deadlock to discuss alternative poli-
cies and forms of settlement, so that the
American people, as well as the adminis-
tration, will be better equipped to take
further actipn , at , an opportune time.
Prolonging the conflict indefinitely could
only mean continued painful losses for
both sides.
In this connection, Mr. President, a
debate ver U.S. policy on Vietnam
was published in the New York Times
magazine of _ January 17. The de-
bate was between the Senator from Ore-
gon [Mr. MoesE] and Henry Cabot
Lodge, former Ambassador to South
Vietnam. Both points of view-"with-
draw now" or "fight on to victory"-
were presented clearly and cogently. I
ask unanimous consent that this presen-
tation be printed in the Appendix fol-
lowing my remarks, in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
WE MUST LEAVE VIETNAM
(By WAYNE MORSE)
Ten years ago the United States embarked
upon an adventure in South Vietnam that
was just about 100 years out of date. While
Britain, France, and the Netherlands were
terminating their rule over their Asiatic
colonies, the United States began trying to
establish its own beachhead on the Asiatic
mainland.
Although present at the Geneva confer-
ence of 1954, which drew up the accord
whereby France withdrew from its old colony,
of Indochina, the United States refused to
sign the final agreement. So did one of the
subdivisions of Indochina, South Vietnam.
The United States began a heavy program
of financial and military aid to a new Premier
in South Vietnam who, we believed, was
most likely to preserve a Western orienta-
tion. When it came time for the 1956 elec-
tion throughout both North and South Viet-
nam required by the Geneva accord, we and
our client in Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, realized
it would be won by Ho Chi Minh's followers
not only in his own North Vietnam but in the
South as well. South Vietnam refused to
proceed with the election.
In the last decade we have explained our
policy as one of helping a free government
resist Communist subversion. But South
Vietnam never has had a free government.
In its 10 years of existence its governments
have been picked for it by the United States
and maintained by our heavy doses of eco-
nomic and military aid.
The fraudulence of our, claim has been
starkly exposed by the successve coups in
Saigon and by the piecing together of one
government after another by the American
Embassy. Leaders suspected of favoring neu-
tralism or any form of negotiation for settle-
ment of the civil war are firmly excluded
from Government ranks. The major tools
we have used in manipulating political and
military leaders have been various threats
and promises regarding our aid, which now
hovers around the level of $600 million a
year in a country of 14 million people. This
sum of exclusive of the cost of keeping 23,000
American "advisers" and large contingents
of aircraft in the country.
In fact, our official explanations of why we
are there now play down the "helping a free
government" line and play up American secu-
rity and American prestige as the stakes in
Vietnam. At least, the explanations are get-
ting closer to the truth, which is that the
United States took over this quarter of In-
dochina in 1954 when the French pulled out.
Having intruded ourselves into Southeast
Asia, where we never were before, it was this
country and not the Communists who made
our prestige in Asia the issue.
Our Secretary of State often says that
"China must leave her neighbors alone." Un-
der this premise, our officials have vaguely
threatened to expand the war to North Viet-
nam and possibly China if we cannot win in
South Vietnam. But there are no Chinese
forces in South Vietnam nor Chinese equip-
ment in appreciable amount. Americans are
still the only foreign troops in South Viet-
nam.
Nonetheless, China has the same interest
in what goes on in the subcontinent of
Southeast Asia as we have in Mexico, Cuba
and other countries of Latin America. She
will increasingly resist having hostile gov-
ernments on her borders, as do Russia and
the United States. We recognize and accept
this principle as regards Russia, but we re-
fused to recognize it as regards China.
This has been true even though we have
watched other Western nations ousted from
Asia and Africa by rising nationalism. It
was inevitable that once China became part
of this tide she would reassert her interest
in the governments on her borders. A re-
awakened China would assert this interest
whether she were Communist or not. The
more we escalate the Vietnam conflict, the
more likely China is to intervene directly.
In South Vietnam we invite China's ap-
prehension, but more than that, in trying to
surround China with American bases and
pro-Western states, we have to buck not only
communism but anticolonialism. One of
our many mistakes is to equate the two,
especially when antiwhite feeling is directed
against the United States. Advocates of a
"containment" policy for China, similar to
that applied to Russia with some success
in the late 1940's and 1950's, overlook the
impossibility of maintaining Western strong-
holds in Asia, no matter what their pur-
pose. What we could do in white Europe and
even the Middle East is not to be imposed
upon an Asia that is united in at least one
respect-its determination to see the white
man sent back to his own shores.
With our great wealth we can sustain the
current war effort in Vietnam indefinitely,
even if it is escalated. But it will never end,
because our presence and our selection of
Saigon's rulers will always inspire rebellion.
Far from maintaining our prestige in Asia,
our present policy in Vietnam is eroding it.
The fact that we are losing despite the steady
increase in our aid, the addition of 23,000
American advisers, and complete American
air domination, has already led several Asian
nations to throw out an anchor on the
Chinese side. Of the famous dominoes that
were all supposed to fall to China if we
failed to take up the French burden in
southeast Asia, Burma, and Cambodia have
already neutralized themselves. Pakistan
has made it clear that the aid she gets from
us is directed against India and not against
China. Japan and India, the largest non-
Communist nations of Asia, who might be
expected to be the most helpful to us in
Vietnam, have not associated themselves
with what we are doing there. A few days
ago India's Premier Shastri urged a new in-
ternational conference to negotiate a settle-
ment. He asked the United States not to
press for a military decision and urged that
we avoid a major military conflict.
Of all the nations touted as potential
Chinese victims, only Australia and the
Philippines have offered tangible help in
South Vietnam. The Australian contribu-
tion amounts to some 66 "advisers" and three
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A206 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX January-0
air-cargo planes. The Philippine offer of a in the world, reaches the sea in South Viet- in an effort which has cost us lives and
force of volunteer veterans was turned down. nam. He who holds or has influence in Viet- treasure. The effort has not been in vain.
That Is the extent of the local interest and nam can affect the future of the Philippines Although we are not yet victorious, we
support for the American view that we are and Taiwan to the east, Thailand and Burma have achieved a stalemate, which is surely
saving all of Asia from communism by our with their huge rice surpluses to the west, much better than defeat. On the economic
policy in Vietnam. Surely if one of these and Malaysia and Indonesia with their rub- and social front the United States has con-
so-called dominoes believed it, they would be her, oil, and tin to the south. Japan, Aus- tributed to the building of schools, clinics
fighting side by side with us in Vietnam. tralia, and New Zealand would in turn be and better farms, all of which are essential
They are not, because they see us having to deeply concerned by the communization of to gaining and holding the political sup-
run faster and faster just to stay in the same South Vietnam. port that must be had to win the war. And
place in Vietnam. They see that'the bulk Historically, Vietnam has long played a we try to help in every way in training civil
of its people are too indifferent to American part in the political development of the Far administrators and in creating political en-
objectives to resist the Vietcong. They know East. For many centuries it was under the ergy in the country.
that sooner or later we will have to leave and occupation or influence of the Chinese and Some have said that despite this effort
they do not want to jeopardize their own was used by the Chinese as a means of en- the war in Vietnam cannot be won. Yet
standing in Asia by supporting a last-minute forcing their hegemony over the whole of recent history shows that we have been
white intervention. southeast Asia. The Vietnamese did not en- fighting wars of this sort for the past 20 years
There are many ways this country * could joy this experience and have traditionally and that the record is creditable. We of the
crawl back from the limb we crawled out on done what they could to throw off Chinese free world won in Greece, we thwarted the
10 years ago. Through the Southeast Asia overlordship. In a very real sense, there- Communist aggression in Korea, we won in
Treaty Organization, the United Nations or fore, the present struggle is one of self- Malaya, we won in the Philippines, and we
a reconvened Geneva Conference we could determination. can win in Vietnam. We must persist and
seek to establish an international presence in But today Vietnam should be seen as one we must not play into the enemy's hands by
Vietnam to stabilize and pacify the country more instance in a long series of events which counting on a quick, sensational and easy
while it develops political institutions. Our began in Iran, Turkey, and Greece after way out and then being disappointed when
refusal to sign the accord of 1954 has always World War II; which include the seizure of it does not occur.
made suspect our claim that we were enforc- Czechoslovakia; which led to the Marshall Persistent execution of the political and
Ing it. plan in Europe; which caused the Korean military plans which have been agreed to
In truth, our "enforcement" has taken the war, the Malayan emergency, the Huk rebel- will bring victory-provided outside pres-
form of violations far more massive than lion in the Philippines and the Berlin crisis. sures do not become too great. These outside
any violations by North Vietnam. Our jet In all these widely separated places the Com- pressures occur in many forms such as the
air forces and bases, our helicopter fleet, the munist bloc has tried to subvert and to un- problem of sanctuaries from which Vietnam
23,000 U.S. military advisers are all violations dermine the free world in order to spread can be attacked and the Vietcong helped with
impunity. Infiltration from such sanctu-
of the 1954 accord. So are they violations its control and its suppression of freedom. aries cannot be allowed to defeat the efforts
of section after section of the United Nations In n opposing this Communist onslaught, ll not
Charter, under which we are pledged to seek the free world has stood together for nearly the shrink from Vietnamese se ag are such m making. We easures wi seem taki peaceful solutions to disputes and to lay two decades. One manifestation of our com- necessary from
cope with it.
before the U.N. those disputes we are unable mon determination to frustrate the Commu- her oorm of "outside pressure" is the
to solve peacefully through means of our own nist design to conquer Europe was the cre Another
choosing. We have done neither in Vietnam. tion of NATO. Elsewhere in the world we desire h desire in some quarters r pr sintern ure here and nan aisothe
do not n l
A negotiated settlement in South Vietnam have formed other alliances. The United the idea a and now.
international cop-
Is the first solution we are obliged to seek. States alone has suffered 160,000 casualties pose holding
Of course, it would mean some guaranteed since the end of World War II in this effort ferences as an abstract proposition-if they neutralization of the country. That would to contain the spread of 'communism. are h heeld ci at t the etpr proopper er time we and think under the
that.
give its war-torn people the best chance they This worldwide effort by nations of the pr hold a rcufertanc now would serve hi no good
have yet had to construct a country of their free world has not been undertaken out of hold and would seriously
morale in South Vietnam. Consider the
the French again and now the Americans ties in distant places. Nor does it signify reasons:
have not given them, a desire to establish a new colonialism or 1. There have already been two confer-
If we fail to reach a negotiated settlement, any kind of special position. The war in ences Asia (one on Vietnam and
then the U.N. Charter requires the dispute to Vietnam is not only the struggle of a small ences o or n southeast Laos), east the terms of which were
be laid before a regional organization, such nation to exist, but it is also an open en- but which the Communists were
as SEATO, or one of the U.N. bodies. Both counter between the doctrine that "wars of satisfactory the ink wdry. Before hold-
groups have the capacity to police the coun- revolution," as the Communists call them, lated
another before the ink was the Bef be some conference both are more likely to bring it some are the wave of the future, and our belief ing that
h the Communises of must
Hanoi and
degree of cohesion than is the United States that in the future nations should be allowed sign to let their southern
with its unilateral intervention in pursuit to develop their own destinies free from out- Peiping are prepared of our own interests. side Interference. neighbors alone.
Some Americans have busily erected an Although the North Vietnamese have their 2. For the South Vietnamese to go to a
enormous pyramid of disasters they contend own motives for their aggression in South conference now with a large and aggressive
would result even from this limited Ameri- Vietnam and have played the leading role, fifth column on their soil would amount to
can retrenchment. They see America as a they have always been backed by the Chinese' a surrender. A conference not preceded by a
power in the Pacific only if we and out Communists. Should their aggression be verifiable Communist decision to cease at-
friends control all its shores instead of just successful, the Chinese Communists will have tacking and subverting South Vietnam would
its northern, eastern, and southern shores, seen positive proof that their approach to be nothing more than a capitulation.
international relations Is correct. 3. There is clearly no agreement between
Mosst im the irlan portan tt, t th ey hey ignore its the a impossibility shore, Such an outcome might well lead the So- us and the Communists on the simple prop-
of creating an American foothold on that viets, in their desire to retain the leadership ositioonfon renc to e h let etd in South atmosph Vietnam ere of alone. A
bitter
shore in mid-20th century, communism or no of the Communist bloc, to adopt a more bel- con recce h could dn opt mosp ere matters more
communism. ligerent stance in their relations with the disagreemake
outside world. This would surely affect the dangerous than they already are. ac- Many countries, East and West, have of West. So-called neutralism is another outside
order in themselves to , ev end of the old It would also be regarded everywhere as pressure standing in the way of the success-ventu onl Asia. is We how much too blood od and money mTooceyy a reflection of the inability or lack of will of ful prosecution of the war in South Vietnam,
only question uest the free world to prevent aggression. What, Neutralism that does not include some means
we will waste first trying to turn the clock for example, would be the reaction in Europe of enforcement, that does not include North
back. if the United States were to withdraw from Vietnam, that means South Vietnam will be
WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM southeast Asia in the face of its commitment alone and disarmed, is nothing more than
to assist the nations there? surrender. It should be opposed for Viet-
(By Henry Cabot Lodge) The state of public opinion in the United nam just as it is opposed for Berlin or for
"Pulling out of Vietnam" is exactly the States itself wouldalso be affected. Should Germany. It takes strength to be neutral.
same as "turning Vietnam over to the Com- Vietnam be lost, many voices would be heard South Vietnam is not strong enough today
munists." Such a course would be not mere- urging us in effect to resign from the world, to be neutral.
ly imprudent, but actually extremely dan- fall back onto our Fortress America and gird In truth both Vietnams are "neutralized"
gerous. up our loins for a contest with guided mis- now by article 10 of the Geneva accord of
Geographically, Vietnam stands at the hub siles. This too would be something which July 21, 1954, which said: "* * * the two
of a vast area of the world--southeast Asia- neither Europe nor the rest of the free world parties shall insure that the zones assigned
an area with a population of 240 million peo- could ignore. to them do not adhere to any military al-
ple extending, 2,300 miles from north to Because of all these considerations, the liance and are not used for the resumption
south, and 3,000 miles from east to west. The United States has undertaken to support the of hostilities or to further an aggressive
Mekong River, one of the 10 largest rivers Vietnamese both politically and militarily, policy."
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19
%X
O
RESSIONAL RECORD - NI?JX
A207
This provision was formally approved by geared in th
D
c
b
e
e
em
er 1964 edition of supreme court, and thence to the U.S. Su-
article 5 of the final declaration ,of the, the Tennessee Lawyer, a wholesome pro- preme Court. Now we have a Federal trial
Geneya Conference of 1954,_ which the fessional journal, an excellent article by court, superseding the State supreme court,
V.'S,S,ft,, _ Red China, France, the United Mr. Olin White, president of the Terines- as well as a State trial court. This is only
Kingdom, _Jnited States, Cambodia, Laos, one of the many indications of the rapid, and
North and South Vietnam attended,. see Bar Association. so far uncontrolled, movement toward ab-
We II?niit .therefore insist,, before there is, In his timely remarks,, Mr. White solute concentration of power in the Federal
any discussion of a conference ox of,neutral- points. out that the judiciary is suffering Government.
ism, that, the Cohn unists stop their aggres- from an uncontrolled movement toward I am also familiar with the unwritten
lion and live up to the agreements which al- concentration of power in the Central rule among lawyers not to criticize judges for
ready exist. The minute the o.pslaught Government and it is not Only a right but fear that when the criticizing lawyer appears,
ceases; there can he peace, At present, the a duty of the bar to criticize judicial in some other case, punishment will be in-
North Vietnamese, seem only to understand abuses. Believing this article to be of flicted upon him. This will not happen with
force, and, ofcourse, when they use force any good judge no matter what the difference
they must be met with force, as they were in interest to all my colleagues in Congress of opinion may be, and whatever happens,
the Gulf of Tollkia,. They should also be met and particularly those on.the Judiciary lawyers should quit whispering among them-
with the strong and united opposition of the Committee having jurisdiction over leg- selves about these matters and now speak
free world}. islation in this field, I include it in the out boldly on the subject.
It seems that conflicts in far-off places are Appendix of the RECORD. I have refrained from such direct com-
precisely those which have often brought The article follows: ments prior to the recent national elections
war and calamity to all of us. Manchuria THE PRESIDENT REPORTS for fear that some person might think my
seemed far away in 1931; the subversion of comments were politically inspired.
Czechoslovakia by Hitler seemed remote to By Olin White) Space does not permit me further com-
the United States fn, 1938, Persistence, and It has always been the view, if not a rule, ments, but I assure you that I shall have
unity in the face of Communist pressure of our profession that lawyers should refrain further comments on the subject in future
have succeeded in Europe and in southeast, from criticizing the Supreme Court of the issues.
Asia, and can succeed again. United States, and other courts.
Mao Tee-tung Said: "Politics is war with Surely this is restricted only as to the de-
htdbloodshed; war is politics with blood- gree of differences in the opinion of the bar Bank Loans to Overseas Borrowers
and in the holdings of the Supreme Court
The Struggle in Vietnam is not.a "war" in of the United States and of other courts. In
the sense that World War I1-or,Xorea-was, other words, is this an absolute protection EXTENSION OF REMARKS
a "war," because total military success in from criticism? I think not, and although A. OF
Vietnam, unaccompanied by success in other I believe that lawyers should in the ordinary WILLIS ROBERTSON
fields, will not bring victory. A many-sided administration of justice refrain from public HON. tf
effort is needed; no single off -f. -ill solve the
iti
'
I fee
cr
c
the headline writer and the political stump their decisions are extreme, then it is not IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
speaker employing black-and-white phrase- only the privilege of the bar but the duty of Tuesday, January 19, 1965
ology. the bar as leaders to speak out-to criticize-
Therefore, those who say that there is a and to seek legislative correction of such Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, solution or a simple solution or an ex- judicial abuses, if there is no other remedy connection with the vital subject of our
clusively military solution are doing as much at hand. balance of payments, which is such an
of a disservice as are those who say that there It is my opinion that it is not only high important element in our gold reserve
is no hope, that we must ,pull out and that time, but that we are somewhat late in such problems, I ask unanimous consent to
another southeast Asian conference (added criticism and action for the correction of have printed in the Appendix of the REe-
to the two which have been already held- such matters.
and dishonored) will do other than turn We have been faced in the last few years ORD a letter I have just received from Mr.
South Vietnam over to the gmmunists. with Federal decisions which not only per- Walter B. Wriston, executive vice presi-
They also do a disservice- who deny that mit but require the release of prisoners dent of the First National City Bank of
nAuch has been achieved, that the military guilty of the most heinous crimes, on so- New York, together with an excerpt from
program, the economic program, the social called technical grounds which to some, at the December 1964, Economic Letter of
program, the informational program and the least, appear to be not a ground but an ex- that bank, on the subject of commercial
various technical programs have all accom- cuse and not a technicality but a triviality. , bank term loans abroad.
plished much-have indeed built the Spring- A great many, if not all, the prisons of this I believe Mr. Wriston's letter and the that board of victor wean doh ter- s the pptlitica, country have a law library (or law books) discussion of commercial bank term
gram which still needs special attention pro- __.,tions where for prisoners habeas may corpus so work that upon a mtheiran c con-- loans will be helpful to members of the
-
It is accurate to-);ay that a glass is half- victed, sentenced, and whose sentence has Senate and the public in their considera-
full of water and it is also accurate to say been confirmed through the highest courts, tion in the near future of these important
that tl}e glass is half-empty. To dwell on may open and indeed reopen'. from time to matters.
the fact that we have not aohieyed victory time the door to release, thereby requiring There being no objection, the letter
does not negate the other fact that we ,have the attorney general and other officials to and the excerpts were ordered printed in
prevented defeat-and that a stalemate is appear and testify about matters and pro- the RE
much better than a defeat. cedure which occurred years before. CORD, as follows:
It is not the American tradition, to get The holding that the failure to take before FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK,
panicky whenever there is a little rough a committing judge promptly, and in some New York, N.Y., January 14, 1965.
weather. If we decide only to interest our- instances 71/2 hours, entitled a prisoner to Hon. A. WILLIS ROBERTSON,
selves in the nice, quiet, neat countries release, and to renew his claims is more than Chairman, Committee on Banking and Cur-
(which do not need our help) and abandon startling. rency, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
all the rough, tough, difficult places to the The number of Federal courts will have to DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There has recently
Communists, we will soon find ourselves sur- be doubled in a relatively short time to take been a good deal of talk about the rise in
rounded by a rough, tough world which is care of the hundreds of habeas corpus peti- commercial bank term loans to overseas bor-
aimed straight at the destruction of the tions that are filed, as well as appeals or rowers and the effect of these loans on the
United States and, which will make our pres- petitions interfering with the administration country's balance of payments. There has
ent effort in Vietnam seem like the mildest of the State courts-unless some laws are not, however, been enough understanding of
of pink teas,
passed to govern and restrict this subject. the fact that these loans finance our exports.
Not only do the prisoners file these but the It is no coincidence that those parts of the
courts construe the law as requiring lawyers world which have the highest volume of
to appear and even to make long journeys American commercial bank term loans also
Law Duty To Criticize to appellate courts to represent this man, are the largest buyers of American exports.
wlthpyt expense to the criminal >ln? without- These exports produce the Nation's trade
FTkStQIy OF REMARKS expense to the government, hence, at the ex-. surplus of nearly $7 billion which is so es-
_- '? pense of the lawyer. sential to the squndpeSS of_the dollar.
HON. W. E. ~BILL~ BROCK Local State courts are becoming more and I am writing to ask that you take some
more familiar with the fact that under Su- time from your busy schedule to consider
OF TENNESSEE preme Court of the United States rulings, a what the imposition of the interest equali-
prisoner or indeed any litigant may, and zation tax on commercial bank term loans
IN THE HOUSE OF, REPRESENTATIVES many do, remove themselves from the trial would do to American exports and other
Tuesdlty, January 19, 1965 court 'of a State to the trial court of the sources of revenue from abroad. We firmly
Federal court. In other words, we once had believe that the result of such a move would
Mr. BROCK. Mr. Speaker, there ap- trial in State trial court, and appeal to State be no gain for our balance of payments and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX y .19
the principal nations. These trends and de-
velopments have in turn strengthened inter-
national competition in the field of money
and banking: they have also created new
opportunities.
Within a relatively short span of time,
U.S. banks have girded themselves to play a
prominent role in world finance. With the
dollar the leading international currency,
the United States the world's largest exporter
and importer, and U.S. money and capital
markets the single most important source
of financial resources, this has been a nat-
ural evolution.
PATTERNS OF BANK LENDING
American commercial banks- engaging in
international business extend both short-
and long-term credits. According to deft-
nitions used by official statisticians, short-
term credits are those with a maturity up
to 1 year; they are frequently renewed from
year to year. Loans beyond 1 year are called
tern loans. These term loans have been
customary in domestic financing in the
United States for a quarter of a century and
have, since World War II, spread to the field
of international financing.
U.S. banks have outstanding short- and
long-term credits abroad of $9.5 billion. U.S.
exporters, importers, and industrial and
commercial firms also grant credits to their
foreign clients; these amount to $2.3 billion
at this time,
Of the short-term bank credits, about $1
billion are short term, and $3.5 billion are
largely on behalf of customers. An addi-
tional $2.5 billion of the short-term bank
a great deal of lost international business for
our country. A detailed discussion of this
subject is set out in the December issue of
this bank's Monthly Economic Letter at pages
141--143 under the heading "Commercial Bank
Term Loans Abroad " I enclose a copy and
would be glad to send you additional copies
if you wish.
Very truly yours,
'WALTER B. WRISTON.
COMMERCIAL BANK TERM LOANS ABROAD
In the world today, nations are exchanging
goods in rapidly growing volumes. Our own
exports have expanded from $15 to $25 bil-
lion in the past 10 years. Understandably,
the remarkable expansion of world trade has
required growing supplies of credit.
Commercial banks in the United States
and other principal trading nations extend
credits to their foreign correspondents and
customers. Indeed, the resources of com-
mercial banks constitute a pool of private
international liquidity that is drawn upon
by creditworthy borrowers in creditworthy
countries throughout the world.
Along with direct investment in bricks
and mortar, commercial bank credit abroad
has greatly expanded over the pa.t 15 years
as private U.S. capital has replaced U.S.
Government aid to Western Europe and
Japan-aid that had been an essential. in-
gredient during the `earlier postwar period
in reinvigorating world commerce. In re-
cent years, private financing has received
further impetus ?rom -the restoration of
meaningful currency convertibility among
Changes in U.S. banking credits abroad
[In millions of dollars]
Collec-
tions
Accept-
ances I
1955----
-----------------------
62
-
1956---------------------------
87
137
1957
-----------------
-
-
-17
255
-
------
-
1958---------------------------
-2
--43
195 9------------------------
95
-74
1960----------------------------
89
651
1961----------------------------
95
641
1962---------------------------
-14
93
1963----------------------------
146
696
1963:
January to March .___-_____-_
22
90
April to June_________________
25
341
July to September ----------_
24
--42
October to December --______
74
207
1954:
January to March --____-_____
100
138
April to June_________________
1
242
July to August______________
23
-101
Outstanding: August 1964______
956
2,840
40
93
45
213
8
-35
224
274
-171
94
94
-27
125
32
22
140
20
-207
-94
6
124
103
67
15
1, 326
credits represent bankers acceptances. After
a long period. of inactivity, these have grown
remarkably since 1950, with the encourage-
ment of the Federal Reserve System; most
acceptances are made under arrangements
that involve exports from the United States.
Loans to foreign banks and customers today
amount to about $5.7 billion, of which $2.2
billion are short term, and $3.5 billion are
term loans.
THE ANATOMY OF TERM LOANS
There is general agreement that short-
term loans by U.S. banks are indispensable
as a means of financing U.S. trade and other
international business that directly benefits
the U.S. balance of payments. Sometimes,
however, the question is raised-particularly
by those who tend to blame the U.S. balance-
of-payments deficit on private capital invest-
ments abroad-whether loans in excess of 1
year serve purposes beneficial to the U.S.
balance of payments. To assure export fi-
nancing and "normal recurring international
business," the administration's proposal and
the House-approved bill for an interest equal-
ization tax r exempted bank loans made in
the ordinary course of business as well as
all obligations maturing within 3 years.
Before the tax was enacted last September,
however, a provision was added in the Senate
giving the President standby authority to
extend the tax to bank loans with a maturity
of 1 year or more.
I The tax and its implications have been
reviewed in the April and November 1964
issues of this letter.
Changes in U.S. long-term banking credits abroad
[In millions of dollars]
Latin
America
1955
----
---
-21
240
-44
3
52
-
-------------------
1956
------------------
95
67
-27
22
11
---------
1957
--------
164
116
6
33
16
-------------------
1958
--------
20
65
28
71
-------------- .------
1959
-----------
-28
131
5
72
-----------------
1960
------------
-1
125
-28
54
---------------
1961
126
17
198
-10
-----------------------------
1962
----------------------
86
-45
30
6
-------
19631---------------------------
518
-5
-29
1963:
January to March------------
-16
-19
-30
April to June_________________
30
-28
77
July to September --___-______
-1
10
October to December I_-__--_-
-18
8
2
1964:
January to March ---_-_______
155
9
62
-6
April to June ---_.-___--______
80
-15
14
-13
July to August____________
49
28
8
14
Outstanding: August 1964-_____
1,385
1,037
333
270
>txcluding the $193 million item described in footnote 4 to the preceding table.
Its geographical distribution is as follows: Europe $5 million: Latin America $134
million; Japan $46 million; and others $8 million. The distribution of the $86 million
item has not been published.
209
411
216
292
62
729
1,099
372
703
-65
297
15
456
369
393
-30
6, 041
Long
term
230
168
335
188
183
153
336
126
4576
-36
4 178
121
4 313
231
64
130
3, 440
I Acceptances made for account of foreigners, including varying amounts of other
financing.
a Including central banks and other official institutions.
Excluding credits in foreign currencies, which amounted to $689 million in August
1964.
4 Excluding items reported by banks for the let time but representing certain credits
extended previously. Such items amounted to $86 million in the 2d and $193 million
in the, 4th quarter of 1963. Of the latter amount. $150 million represented trade
credits sold to banks by a U.S. corporation.
Source: Derived from data published in the U.S: Treasury Department Bulletin
and the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The author of this amendment; Senator
ALBERT GORE, of Tennessee, stated that it
seemed a foregone conclusion that the ex-
emption of commercial bank term loans
would be used to avoid the tax and char-
acterized it as an important loophole. In
his testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee last June, Secretary of the Treas-
ury Douglas Dillon pointed out that the
rise in long-term bank loans had started be-
fore,there was any thought of the tax and
that, in the light of detailed information
made available to the Treasury, any possible
evasion of the tax through use of bank loans'
could not be more than
total bank loans."
Changes in direction of the flow of loans
to less-developed and developed countries
have been remarkably similar to the changes
in patterns of direct investment. Until 2
or 3 years ago, the direction of the flows
had been mainly to Latin America and
Canada. In recent years, most of the term
loans have gone to Europe, particularly to
Italy during late 1963 and early 1984, and to
Japan. The shifts in the geographic dis-
tribution are summed up in the second table.
Over the past year, changes in bank credits
abroad, short as well as long-term, have been
particularly influenced by borrowings by
Japan. These have grown substantially to
support the expanding volume of Japanese
Trade and business activity. In recent
months, the rate of bank lending to Japan.
has slowed down. As noted in these pages
last month, Japan has floated sizable
amounts of bonds in European markets.
A HELPFUL rNNOVATION
The use of term loans in foreign opera-
tions is an adaptation of techniques devel-
oped in the United States for domestic lend-
ing. As is well known, term loans in the
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