HOW AND WHY WE GOT INTO VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

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CON.G i,.ESSIONAL RECORD -? SENATE
This program was attacked by American
parts makers who asserted It hurt domestic
business by 'giving a subsidy in effect for the
manufacture of parts in Canada and f there-
fore Illegal under current trade agreements.
The free trade arrangeiiients was designed to
replace it.
The independent parts suppliers, members
of the Automotive Service Industry Associa-
tlon, have also criticizes the new plan which
they say "would "deny i's free` access to the
Canadian market" since it requires auto firms
to channel as much production as economi-
cally feasible to Canada- _
Added incentives fof manuTit6turing in
Canada are'-lower lab or costs and the low
exchange rate of the Canadian dollar.
PLAN SPI',CIltISATIUN
The interlocking of regional plants, already
begun in the Detroit-Windsor area in a
limited fashion by Chrysler Corp. and the
Ford Motor Co... would generally have Cana-
'dian.plants concentrate on certain parts for
both- United States States and Canadian produc-
tion
Thus a Windsor plant now makes all the
engines for a certain Plymouth Valiant model
made in both countries: _
Through such specialization and division
of labor, Canadian trade officials here said,
Canadian auto producers: most of whom are
U.S. subsidiaries, will cut their net trade
deficit with ;the United States and become
effectively integrated.
SUPPORTED $Y TOWNSEND
Chrysler Corp. President Lynn T. Townsend
hailed the agreement as an encouraging step
toward the `full realization of the kind of
economic partnership between Canada and
the United States.
[From the Detroit Free Press]
UNITED STATES Alto CANADA AGREE To END
Mo?,T TARIFFS 0# CARS, PARTS
f,X (By Robert Boyd)
The United States and Canada agreed
Friday to forma limited "common market"
on, new automobiles and auto parts.
The. agreement, to be signed by President
Johnson and Canadian Prime, Minister Les-
ter Pearson at, 11 am?aturday at the LBJ
Rauch In Texas, will wipe out most tariffs on
automotive products between the two coun-
tries,
It takes gft'ect as soon as enabling'legisla-
tion is passed by Congress and the Canadian
Parliament. It also applies to trucks, buses,
and parts for those vehicles:
The main effect, of the agreement will be to
,permit Canadian auto p`tants to' import Amer-
scan-made cars and parts without paying
the present i71% to 25 percent duties Imposed
by Canada.
Canadian auto dealers and private citizens
will still -have to pay, duty on American-
built cars and parts. The tariff will be erased
only for auto manufacturers.
lmpst all Canadian'car makers are sub-
sidiaries of American firms.
The tariff Will be lifted only so long as the
Canadian auto plants 'continue to produce
..at existing rates or higher.
In turn, American duties of from 61/2 to
81/2 percent on Canadian-made cars and parts
will-be abolished.
American auto dealers or manufacturers
andprivate citizens will be able to buy cars
and parts duty-free from Canada.
The agreement would mean that Detroiters,
for eeanppie, could go 'to Windsor and `buy
a Canad'pay, t ,car, or auto' parts, and "not
have to ' uty to bring the- car or parts
across the etroit River.
But Windsor residents who bought a car
or parts ' in Detroit would have to pay the
regular duty to ' bring llTem-back to Windsor.
The purpose" of the 'agreement as `stated
in a text issued simulta-neously at the Texas
ranch and in WashingTon, are:
Ko create a broader market for automo-
tive-products within which the full benefits
of specialization and large-scale production
can be achieved.
"To liberalize United States and Canadian
automotive trade * * * to enable the indus-
tries of both countries to participate on a
fair and equitable basis in the expanding to-
tal market of the two countries.
"To develop conditions in which market
forces may operate effectively to attain the
most economic pattern of investment, pro-
duction, and trade."
U.S. officials said both countries would
benefit from the tariff cuts.
The officials said no estimate of jobs that
might be added to-'the Canadian auto indus-
try was available, but there were reports that
as many as 60,000 additional workers could be
employed.
And it was reported that Canadian sub-
sidiaries of U.S. auto firms had assured the
Canadian Government that they would in-
crease annual production by $250 million
over the next 3 years.
Further details of the assurances were de-
scribed as "commercial secrets."
Congress is expected to demand a full dis-
closure of the "secrets."
Canada obviously lpoks upon the agree-
ment as a spur to its auto industry, but
some U.S. officials claimed industry employ-
ment in the United States should also rise
as the total market expands.
Such thinking is based on the theory that
a large common market trading area should
permit more economical car production and
hence increase sales in both countries.
The agreement is also expected to end, or at
least soothe, the United States-Canadian con-
troversy over a "duty-remission scheme"
which has irritated U.S. auto parts makers.
This scheme involves rebates of Canadian
tariffs to Canadian auto makers who increase
their exports to the United States. It has
been termed illegal and unfair by independ-
ent V.S. parts makers who do not have man-
ufacturing outlets in Canada.
Complaints by these parts makers in Ohio,
Wisconsin, and Missouri may cause diffi-
culty in Congress when the agreement comes
up for passage.
TARIFF CUT CHEERS AUTO FIRMS, UAW
The automotive, industry-both manage-
merit and labor-Friday hailed the an-
nouncement of a United States-Canadian
treaty eliminating most tariffs on autos and
parts.
GM Board Chairman Frederic G. Donner
said his firm "will cooperate fully to imple-
ment the program and make every effort to
assure its success:" -
? Ford Board Chairman Henry Ford II Called
the agreement "ail historic event. I have
long believed that the elimination of arti-
ficial obstacles to international trade Is one
of the best ways to promote economic de-
velopment and to strengthen the ties of
friendship and understanding between na-
tions," he said.
Chrysler President Lynn A. Townsend
called the treaty "an encouraging step to-
ward the full realization of-the kind of
economic partnership between Canada and
the United States that we all know is
possible."
AMC President Roy Abernethy said the
consumers, and the economies of both "the
United States and Canada "should ultlrn-ately,
benefit from the long-range effects of pro-
grams to eliminate trade barriers between
the two countries,"
Reuther said the union was "pieased an
agreement has been worked out by the
United States and Canadian Governments to
provide for a common market in automobiles
and parts."
Windsor's two biggest auto dealers-each
yclaims to be No. 1-reacted differently to the
tariff-cutting announcement:
10-15
Burl J'anies, owner of James Chevrolets
Oldsmobile, Ltd., was elated.
"I think it's a terrific thing," he said in
his showroom at 917 Goyeau. "It will bring
additional people into the car market be-
cause of reduced prices. It will make more
two-, three-, and four-car families."
Al Sternberg, new car sales manager at
Webster Motors, a Ford dealership, saw no
such a bonanza.
"Eventually I think you'll get more for
your money on cars," he said In his office at
485 Windsor. "But I don't think prices on
most cars will come down."
Both said they are convinced Canadians
will continue buying their cars in Canada,
and Americans will continue buying theirs
In the United States.
Sternberg said the new agreement would
remove tariffs only for manufacturers and
business-an individual couldn't hop a bus
In Canada, buy a car in the United States
and drive it back home duty-free.
Canadians pay more for their cars.
Dealers said that a Chevrolet selling for
about $2,950 in Detroit costs about $3,300 in
Canada.
[From the- Kansas City Times, Jan. 16, 1965]
TARIFF ACCORD AFTER LONG FIGHT BY
MISSOURIANS
(By John R. Cauley)
WASHINGTON.-The United States-Ca-
nadian agreement which will eliminate cus-
tom duties on motor vehicles and original
parts by both countries climaxes a long and
successful fight on discrimination against
American manufacturers In which two of
the leading participants were Senator STUART
SYMINGTON, Democrat, of Missouri, and Jack
F. Whitaker, president of the Whitaker Cable
Corp., of Kansas City.
The agreement is expected to be signed to-
day at Johnson City, Tex.
"Naturally I am very grateful to the Presi-
dent for carrying this matter through to a
conclusion," SYMINGTON said last night.
"The proposed agreement should result In
holding many thousands of jobs in Missouri."
Senator SYMINGTON expressed some con-
cern that replacement parts were not in-
cluded in the agreement, but said he had
a8surance8 the matter would'be considered.
GROWTH OF FLOW
Last year Whitaker, as chairman of an in-
dustrywide committee, wrote President
Johnson that due to the Canadian tariff re-
bating plan the Canadians were shipping
motor car parts into this country at the rate
of $50 million a year-six times what they
were shipping 2 years ago.
Whitaker said the Canadian intent, which
they openly expressed, was to obtain 60,000
jobs for Canada at the expense of American
labor.
The Kansas C'itian asked the President to
order the Treasury Secretary to place count-
eravailing duties on the importation of Ca-
nadian parts.
- SYMINGTON said Whitaker brought the Ca-
nadian manipulation to his attention about
2 years ago and predicted what would happen
unless something was done.
"His prediction turned out to be only too
right," SYMINGTON said.
STUDEBAKER IS CITED
The Missouri Senator added that "when
the Studebaker Corp:, a prominent customer
of Whitaker, saw the handwriting on the
wall, it decided to move its entire assembly
operation to Canada"
SYMINGTON said he immediately took the
issue to the proper Government agencies
and later as a member of the Canadian affairs
subcommittee obtained a hearing to investi-
gate the tariff question.
American officials said last night that
the tiouble_'began in 1962 when Canada
initiated a program under which automo-
bile companies operating in Canada were
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10441 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE January 22
-allowed to have the benefit of tariff-free
treatment on certain car parts through the
technique of tariff rebates, in return for in-
creased exports of cars or parts.
This Canadian program was challenged by
Whitaker and others in the industry as being
contrary to a section of. our basic tariff act
concerned with foreign bounties or grants
on exports to the United States.
TRADE WAR SEEN
Their request for countervailing duties by
the United States as a counteraction was
not granted because, as officials explained, it
was believed this would have set in motion a
chain reactiou of retaliatory protective meas-
ures and a trade war would have developed.
Instead, the United States and Canada
began discussions in an effort to bring peace.
The result was the agreement announced
yesterday.
Officials said the tariff rebate scheme which
was at the root of most of the complaints
will be dropped by Canada, probably on
Monday. They said the replacement-parts
issue was not included because a study is
needed to determine its impact on many
small firms.
Officials said the--principal concern of the
Canadians was whether their car industry
could exist in the face of the concentration
of absentee American ownership. Officials
said because Americans and Canadians live
side by side and are big customers of each
other an agreement to end-a-potentially dis-
astrous trade war was imperative.
They said that some dislocations would
occur in the parts industry with perhaps,
some American parts factories moving to
Canada and some Canadian factories to the
United States.
In Kansas City, Jack F. Whitaker said last
night, "I think this is a major step in United
States-Canadian relationships, and if we are
capable of taking care of ourselves competi-
tively, it should work out to the best for both
countries.
Whitaker's company, which is at 13th and
Burlington Streets in North Kansas City,
supplies electrical wiring to all U.S. motor-
car makers except General Motors Corp., and
employs about 1,000 persons here.
The trade pact is especially beneficial to
Missouri, Whitaker said, because it is the
second largest assembler of motor-cars in the
United States.
"Without the agreement we would have
had to put a plant in Canada to increase
services and cut costs," Whitaker said. "It
is still iossible we may have to move part
of our operation to Canada, but not nearly
as probable as before."
YE
OW AND WHY WE GOT INTO
VIETNAM
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, even to
those of us who lived for a long time
with the problems of our involvement in
southeast Asia, the complex history of
the past 11 or 12 years there is not in our
minds in a clear and orderly fashion.
But that story has been told, clearly
and succinctly and with the history com-
piled for the understanding of every
reader, in an excellent article which ap-
peared in the December issue of the
American Legion magazine. The article
is entitled "The Long Struggle in Viet-
nam" and it" was written by Gerald L.
Steiibel.
Mr. Steibel's review of the history
makes clear how and why we got there.
He relates the manner in which our pol-
icy there is connected with what hap-
pened in the Korean war, and how our
involvement began as early as 1953 be-
fore the French were entirely out of what
was then Indochina. He discusses the
world situation as it existed, and the
elements of our own foreign policy which
dictated the measures we have taken.
Because this seems to me, Mr. Presi-
dent, perhaps the most enlightening
single summary I have seen, and the
most comprehensive, setting forth this
background of history and policy, I ask
unanimous consent that it may appear
following these introductory remarks, as
a part of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE LONG STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM
(By Gerald L. Steibel)
(In Korea we fought a huge -war to con-
tain communism on Red China's north. It
was barely over, when the French left a
vacuum for the Reds to fill, if we'd let them,
in Indochina to the south. Here, in all its
strange detail, is the complex history of our
first 11 years of meeting in Indochina the
challenge we accepted in Korea-the how
and why of our involvement in Vietnam and
Laos.)
In 1964, the United States had spent about
10 years and $3 billion defending Laos and
South Vietnam from Communist aggression;
and by ones, twos and threes, Americans in
uniform had died and were still dying there.
Yet 6 out of 10 people here at home told the
Gallup poll that they didn't know what was
going on there. Of the four who said they
did, only one had any opinion on what ought
to be done, and he was half for getting out
altogether, half for getting In further.
It is not surprising that so many people
are unsure about their grasp of the Vietnam
situation. The Indochinese Peninsula is
strange country to most Americans. Until
recent years, Indochinese world problems
were French, not American, worries. Before
the present dilemma evolved, we had no
background or tradition there.
Even the few familiar place names have
changed. The entire region has no well-
known, traditional name. It's just south-
east Asia, a land mass hanging down from
the southeast corner of China. It has a fat
upper peninsula-Indochina--where Viet-
nam and the other areas of acute present
concern are located; and a long, slim lower
part known as the Malay Peninsula. Our
maps show the divisions, and trace the name-
changes. Siam is still on the map, but now
it's Thailand. The maps show how Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam came into being out
of French Indochina. Then, in the Geneva
agreement of 1954, Vietnam - had a line
drawn straight across it-the "cease-fire line
of July 1954"-dividing it into North Viet-
nain (Communist, with the seat at Hanoi)
and South Vietnam (non-Communist, with
the capital at Saigon). The hottest problem
today arises from guerrilla and political ac-
tivity in South Vietnam, chiefly flowing from
North Vietnam, now a political arm of Red
China. Broad U.S. policy is aimed at keep-
ing communism north of the line in Vietnam,
and preventing Laos and Cambodia (as well
as Thailand, Burma, and Malaya) from fall-
ing lock, stock, and barrel into the Com-
munist orbit.
All the events in the area are actually
all of one piece, with respect to both free
world and Communist policy, but they
are complex and confusing to the man in
the street in the United States because sev-
eral different countries with different leaders,
and different Communist and other op-
position factions are involved. On top of
that, within each country old local an-
tagonisms, interests, and factions are
jockeying for position in the big battle
between East and West.
Before World War U, Laos, Vietnam, and
Cambodia had been one French colonial
area-French Indochina-for nearly a cen-
tury. In World War D: the Japanese moved
in. When they left, after loss of the war
in the Pacific, France returned, but her old
ascendancy was shaken. The Japanese had
proved that France, now weakened by the
war in Europe, need not be all powerful
there. V-J Day had hardly dawned in 1945
when the Annarnese, one of the dominant
people of Indochina, were in revolt. Other
natives throughout the provinces of Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam joined the agita-
tion, organizing and fighting- for independ-
ence. Different groups had different long-
term aims, especially the local nationalists
and Communist-organized groups. The
nationalist - groups sought permanent in-
dependence as an end; the Communists
sought independence as the first step toward
delivering the whole peninsula into the
world Communist camp. But they were
united on getting rid of France.
The Indochinese war for independence from
France was successful, culminating in the
terrible defeat of the French at Dienbienphu
in 1954. In the settlement with France
after her defeat, the three territories be-
came the new independent nations of Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam. Meanwhile, also
as a result of the post-World War II power
vacuum and the failure of U.S. policy to
maintain Chiang Kai-shek in China, all of
mainland China went Communist in 1949.
It became the seat of Communist power in
Asia, bent on making all Asia Communist.
U.S. policy stiffened against this. By the
time the French were out of Indochina, the
United States had wound up the bloodbath
of the Korean war in conjunction with the
U.N. in a major expression of its determina-
tion to block further Communist expansion
in Asia.
Very broadly, our present involvement in
the whole Indochinese area is our Korea
policy all over again, applied to the area
south of Red China as Korea applied it to
the northeast. The events in Indochina
can be compared with those in Korea as
an effort to achieve the same containment
of communism that we achieved in Korea
while avoiding, if possible, a major war
on the Korean scale of 1950-53, or greater.
The beginning of U.S. involvement
in Indochina came in 1953, even before
France was entirely out. The well-organized
Communists, aided by Red China, were hell-
bent to turn the coming independence into
Communist captivity. They were strongest
in Northern Vietnam, closest to Red China,
and in Laos where a second Communist force,
the Pathet Lao, controlled an island of terri-
tory in the northern part of the country. It
seemed that the militant and better orga-
nized Communists, with powerful outside
aid, would carry the day.
While France still held out, China and
Russia had been warned by the United
States, in September 1953, not to try to over-
run the French colonies. This, the United
States said, would have "grave consequencies
which might not be confined to Indochina."
That was a part of the late Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles' "brink of war" policy.
In 1954, President Eisenhower considered U.S.
'military intervention to save the French at
Dienbienphu. On April 8, he said the rest
of Asia "would fall like dominoes" if Indo-
china went Communist. But in the fight
against the French, the Indochinese were
together. The United States would be at-
tacking the freedom-seeking forces as well as
the Communists, so intervention to save the
French was out of the question.
The French defeat led to an international
conference in Geneva, Switzerland, called by
Britain and the U.S.S.R. Geneva agreements
signed June 21, 1954, drew the cease-fire line
across Vietnam. This line gave half of Viet-
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66TORTSSIOtTAL RECOR7 ENA'TE
rum's 126,000 square miles to tfre new Com- ,r a second stage lasted fort years, until 'la"ochina disappeared from the headlines,
munist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam"- the beginning of 1958, and it was deceptively which were taken over by the East-West
built around the powerful Vietminh armies. quiet. Convinced they could not overrun good will summit meeting at Geneva in 1955,
The Geneva agreements were supposed to pre- Laos or South Vietnam, the Communists now the Polish and Hungarian uprisings in 1956,
vent civil war and they scheduled a "perma- reverted to the slower tactics of infiltration and the first Soviet sputnik space vehicle
neat settlement" to be arrived at by "all and buildup, concentrating on Laos. With launching in 1957.
Vietnam", elections in Jul `1558. The agree- the breathing spell thus offered him in South In 1958, the Indochinese calm began to dis-
melits were to'be policed by an international Vietnam, and with substantial U.S.. economic integrate and the second stage gave way to
conunission,. but 'they had little more effect and military aid, Ngo Dinh Diem began to a third, filled with alarms and crises and
than to consolidate the Communist control vindicate the faith of his American sup- culminating in two further major U.S. deci-
,of North Vietnam, making it an interna- porters. sions 3 years later, in 1961.
tionally recognized haven out of which they To begin with, Diem received a big psycho- The first alarm went off in Laos. In No-
could laterolierate south of the line with logical lift when almost 900,000 Vietnamese vember 1957, the refurbished Pathet Lao set
political agitation and guerrilla warfare. "voted with their feet" and left the Commu- itself up as a party and pushed its way into
Though the United States did not sign the nist North to come South in a 300-day period the neutralist government of Prince Sou-
the Geneva accords. (Only a vanna Phouma. The United States, which
d b
l
id
y
prov
e
agreements, its representative, Gen. Bedel
Smith issued a statement saying it would trickle elected to go North.) This jolted Red had been giving Laos about $50 million a
not interfere with them. "popularity" claims throughout Asia, al- year, declared it was "seriously concerned"
Washington now faced Its first big de- though 900,000 new citizens added to Diem's by this event. It said that letting Commu-
cision: to back out quietly and by degrees economic problems. nists into the government was a "perilous
permit the Communists to complete their Second, he moved immediately and vigor- course" for Laos. By 1958, Washington had
conquests by political means, or to commit ously to assert his control over the army. become very worried over what the Commu-
itself to trying to maintain the freedom of That secured, he cracked down hard on reli- nists might accomplish in organizing other
the new nations. gious sects which had their own private leftwing elements for the assembly elections
Most foreign diplomats in the summer of armies, like the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. set for 1959 in Laos.
1954 gave Laos and South Vietnam no more These had long defied all efforts by the To counter the Communist weight, the
than 6 months to a year before the Commu- French to curb their power. Diem also broke United States now threw its support to an
nists would take over, and Washintgon was the power of the Binh Xuyen, a "syndicate" army-based group there headed by Gen.
very much inclined to concur. In the pro- that ran the country's commercialized vices Phoumi Nosavan. A rapid buildup of his
posed all-Vietnam elections of 1956, Com- such as narcotics and prostitution, and which forces followed, and by December 1958 they
-munist North Vietnam would come in with terrorized businessmen and peasants into were in open skirmishes with the Pathet Lao
over 17 million people to South Vietnam's submission to it. in the northeast. In February 1959, the Lao-
less than 14. million. It also had most of the Then, on October 23, 1955, Diem called a tian Government denounced the Geneva
industry, and the whole region' was in the referendum which ousted the playboy king agreements as having been robbed of mean-
middle oY Red China's own front yard. of South Vietnam, Bao Dai, and made Diem ing by the Communists. The United States
Sotxie quarters in the Eisenhower adman- chief of state. A Republic of South Vietnam approved the denunciation and prepared to
was proclaimed on October 26, with Diem as send a military mission to Laos-a move the
of the nttue French withdrawal. its president. Next year, a constitution was Chinese and Vietnamese Communists at-
They eye ate Departmen, urged re Goawa- adopted and a measure of political stability tacked as an American plot to restore ffn-
Tment s irwe by the French h not b t bee was finally achieved in the country. (The perialism to all Indochina.
saved from view that Indochina could "all-Vietnam" elections, slated for 1956, were At first, General Phoumi seemed to be
sflved the Communists, and that the simply never held.) "All-Vietnam" was by the answer Washington was looking for in
best deal obtainable would be a Red promise then really two countries, one Red, one free. Laos, perhaps a leader as good as South Viet-
to respect the neutrality established by the To the further satisfaction of his Ameri- nam's Ngo Dinh Diem. In December 1959,
Geneva accords. This was the French Gov- can allies, Diem turned his attention to his Phoumi drove the Communists out of the
ernment's position more than 4 years before shattered economy. In the next 5 years, Laotian Government. But his 50,000 U.S.-
Gen. Charles de Gaulle returned to power 140,000 landless peasants received their own trained and U.S.-backed troops proved un-
end adopted the neutralization policy as farms in a program a former U.S. Agriculture able to defeat the 18,000 Pathet Lao and their
his own policy. - Department specialist, Wolf Ladejinsky, instructors operating out of the North Viet-
Other U.S. voices' argued differently, helped design and oversee. Diem rebuilt the nam sanctuary. A new crisis in Laos rapidly
among them Senators Mike' Mant'freld transportation system; rice and rubber pro- approached.
and g John V. Kennedy, Gen. William J. Dono- duction climbed above prewar levels; and a In August 1960, Phoumi himself was ousted
van, and Francis Cardinal Spellman. "To- base for national industrial growth was by a rebel officer named Capt. Kong Le, who
ether with officials of private refugee-aid erected. School enrollments and teaching declared his loyalty to the neutralist pre-
organizations, they urged that help be given staffs were tripled and almost 3,000 medical inter, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Immedi-
to the new Premier of South Vietnam, Ngo aid stations and maternity clinics were aly, the Pathet Lao military threat erupted
Dinh 15i appointed They weeks before the opened. Into what looked like the start of a complete
Geneva a reement. The insisted that Diem, The contrast with Ho Chi Minh's Commu- takeover. In September 1960, the United
A stanch anti-Communist who had spent nist North Vietnam was painfully clear. States repeated the warning of 1953 against
many years in the United States, could save Though the Reds had inherited a much a military conquest of Laos. But this time
his beleaguered country if he were helped. larger industrial plant when Vietnam was it sent a carrier force into the South China
The administration sent some economic split, their estimated gross national product Sea, including 1,000 combat-ready Marines.
aid in August 1954, but wrestled with the was only "$70 per person 'by 1961, as against This assertion of U.S. willingness to use
larger question of permanent policy until $110 in the free south. And, while per capita its military held the Communists in check,
late in the fall. Even as Gen. J. Lawton Col- food production dropped 10 percent in the but the settlement for Laos of 1954 was hope-
Tins-prepared to go to Saigon as President north after 1956, it went up 20 percent in lessly shattered. In December, Phoumi once
Eisenhower's special representative. Wash- the south. more came back into power, but the neu-
ington was still leaning toward a pullout. Finally, the United States continued to tralists now set up their own government in
But the pro-Diem advocates finally prevailed help train and equip the South Vietnam the south, and Laos was in effect split in
and Collins was ordered to make a definite armed forces to meet the invasion from the three parts, with Phoumi's pro-Western offi-
U.$. commitmen't. north which was still believed to constitute cial government sandwiched between Com-
'the Arai commitment was small and limit- the main danger. munists and neutralists.
ed primarily to economic assistance. The ' American gratification with events in Meanwhile, South Vietnam, too, had come
United States was then setting up the next South Vietnam was tempered by the gloomier under the Communist gun, in spite of the
fallback position in Asia, pinned to the Pak- picture in Laos. From the start, the Com- 1954 cease fire. In 1958, Ho Chi Minh's radio
istan-Thailand-Malaya-Philippines arc, and munist Pathet Lao military forces violated in North Vietnam announced that the Cm-
embodied in the then new Southeast Asia the Geneva neutrality stipulations. Men munists would mount a major campaign
Treaty Organization (SEATO) established at and arms were brought in from North Viet- against the Diem regime. A virulent propa-
Manila_in September 1954. Dulles induced nam, and the Pathet Lao maintained a vir- Banda offensive tore at Diem's American "im-
$EATO to give Laos, Cambodia, and South tual state-within-a-state in Laos' northeast- perialist" sponsors, and Red guerrilla fighters
$TtetfiaW one-way guarantees against Com- ern Provinces of Samneua and Phongsaly. known as Vietcong appeared in South Viet-
r'iihnlst invasion from North Vietnam. (The Repeated appeals for help by the Royal Lao nam. They were led by tough cadres trained
Geneva, treaties forbade offering them'mem- Government to the International Control in North Vietnam and supplied with weapons
bership in tie' alliance itself.) Commission proved fruitless. The Commis- and material originating in Moscow and Pei-
Though there was little appreciation of sion, set up at Geneva to police the agree- ping, and transported through North Viet-
what really lay ahead, this hesitant commit- ments, was made up of a Communist Pole, an nam and northeastern Laos over what came
meat war 'a historic, decision for the United Indian, and a Canadian member. Neither to be called the Ho Chi Minh trail through
States., From there on, no withdrawal would the Pathet Lao nor the Polish member would the jungles.
be possible without great loss of "face." With permit it to function. The Vietcong offensive hit the Diem gov-
that, the first stage of U.S. involvement was Despite the Laotian troubles, there were no ernment at one of its most sensitive points:
f Diem and
l
l
l
i
i
y persona
ru
e o
ncreas
ng
overt major crises or decisions in the years 1955-58. the
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1048 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Janu6W 22
his brothers, particularly Ngo Dinh Nhu.
(Note that what we call the first name is
the Last.) By 1958, the Ngo Dinh family had
replaced or stripped of power most of the
old leaders. Nhu was head of a strong secu-
rity police, which had learned many lessons
from the Communists. His wife, Madame
Nhu, wielded great influence behind the
scenes, particularly in propaganda and cul-
turaa affairs. Diem's two brothers, Catholic
Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thue and Ngo Dinh
Can, controlled political power levers In the
north. Diem, a cautious and suspicious man,
trusted no one except his own family. Un-
der him they built a formidable ruling ma-
chine that brought cries of outrage from the
better educated South Vietnamese-and from
many quarters In the United States. As the
Vietcong stepped up their attacks, the stern
measures of theDiem government increased.
By June 1960, assassinations by Reds were
taking place at the rate of 2 to 10 a day. In
1 year alone, 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians
were killed and 2,500 kidnaped. Red insur-
gent organizers, many of whom had come in
with the 900,000 refugees 6 years earlier, were
persuading and forcing South Vietnamese
peasants to give them havens. Many had
family ties in the countryside and the cities,
and they exploited them to the full. A front
for the liberation of the south, inspired and
backed by Hanoi, the capital of Communist
North Vietnam, added to Diem's burdens by
calling for the departure of the Americans
and their puppet Diem.
In the South Vietnam countryside, the
Vietcong grew bolder, too. Its guerrillas at-
tacked in force, sometimes with as many as
500 men. When pursued by government
troops, they often fled into Laos or Cam-
bodia as well as North Vietnam. Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's leader, de-
nied that his country was a privileged sanc-
tuary for them, but Sihanouk was a declared
believer in the ultimate victory of the Com-
munists and in the necessity to come to
terms with them before that happened. He
neither defended nor impounded the rebels,
so to all practical Intents 'Cambodia was a
sanctuary.
The year 1961 opened with both Laos and
South Vietnam showing signs of impending
collapse. For the United States it was to
be the year of decision in southeast Asia-
and the year when it finally recognized what
its decisions really meant.
On January 6, Khrushchev made what
Secretary of Rusk later called "one of the
most important speeches on Communist
strategy of recent decades." In. it, Khru-
shchev said world nuclear wars and large-
scale "conventional" wars were too danger-
ous for the big powers to risk. But "wars of
national liberation" were different. Nam-
ing Vietnam specifically, he said, "It is a
sacred war? We recognize such wars."
The Incoming Kennedy administration
read this speech with the deepest interest,
deriving these three major clues from it:
(1) Khrushchev's split with Communist
China had now widened to the point where
he was ready,toput a virtual ban on big,
war, in defiance of Peiping's' insistence on
more risk taking; (2) the price the West-
would have to pay was more sublimited
wars of insurgency (3) the Laos-Vietnam
insurgency would get much more intense,
with both Moscow and Peiping behind it,
though disagreeing over the degree of Inten-
sity.
Khrushchev later spelled all this out in
detail for Kennedy when they met at Vienna
in June. He and the U.S. President did
agree that Laos could drag both of them into
a world war neither wanted, and that some
kind of limitation had to be placed on it.
Kennedy came home calling this a "somber"
meeting.
With the Laos situation in turmoil and
the Communists convinced the United States
would probably come in to stop a final vic-
tory, it was time for them to revert to their
classic 1954 maneuver-a new, 14-nation
Geneva conference. The Peiping, Vietnam-
ese and Laotian Reds went to it to get at
the bargaining table some of what they could
not claim in the field. The United States
went also-to stave off the old, nasty choice
of (1) a major land war in Asia or (2) a Com-
munist sweep.
The new conference met in Geneva on May
16, 1961, and wrangled for the next 15
months, while the three Laotian factions
battled in the field for positions of advantage
in the ultimate settlement. Before it could
forge new agreements, the United States
was faced with far more serious problems In
South Vietnam.
Throughout 1961, the Diem forces strove
to meet the Vietcong challenge, but by the
fall it was obvious they were failing badly,
Diem called on the United States for addi-
tional help, and President Kennedy sent Gen.
Maxwell Taylor to Indochina to review the
entire situation there.
Taylor's findings were a landmark. He re-
ported the lack of everything from proper
equipment and weapons to understanding
the nature of the war itself. In effect, Tay-
lor said the South Vietnamese were trying
to meet a skillful and effective Communist
insurgency with arms, organization, and doc-
trine designed for an altogether dif-
ferent kind of conventional war. Though
his criticisms necessarily fell most heavily on
the South Vietnamese, they implied an In-
dictment of U.S. past involvement for
the failure to see the changed nature of the
war. He recommended an immediate and
vast stepup in U.S. help, especially in the
categories of men and materiel needed for
counterinsurgency operations.
Taylor's recommendations were adopted
with little hesitation, and a flood of Amer-
ican men, money, and equipment began to
flow into Saigon, South Vietnam's capital, in
1961. In the next 2 years, U.S. personnel in-
creased from a few hundred to over 12,000.
Our spending there rapidly shot up to almost
half a million dollars a day.
The United States has now passed over the
most important watershed since the Korean
war: its acceptance of the Communist chal-
lenge of liberation war. The Communist
challenge of conventional war has been met
in Korea; the Communist challenge of nu-
clear war would be met in Cuba a year later.
In Indochina we accepted engagement on the
third level of Communist revolutionary war,
the sublimated. This was the last chance
for the United States to get out without to-
tal disaster to its international prestige. It
was not taken.
Sending 12,000 Americans to Saigon meant
that the United States would accept the con-
flict even if it stepped up to general war, and
communicated to the Reds in advance that
they could run into overwhelming force.
But the United States emphasized that It
was not taking over the war. President Ken-
nedy said, later, "It is their war [South Viet-
nam's). They are the ones who have to win
or lose It."
The State Department took pains to tell
the Communists that "the U.S. measures are
not a threat to North Vietnam but are
merely a response to the Communist assault
on South Vietnam." The measures were, in
other words, not a rollback of Communist
power, or liberation of North Vietnam from
Red rule, but a move to stop Red expansion.
Thus began our full commitment In Indo-
china. The first effects were felt in Laos in
the early spring of 1962. While the 14 na-
tions still at in Geneva dueling verbally, the
Pathet Lao once more attacked the stability
of Laos with arms, driving the government
forces westward toward the Mekong River
boundary with Thailand. At the same time,
Red guerrillas brought Thailand under
threat with attacks in northeastern Thailand,
backed by arms slipped across the Mekong
from Laos, while a free Thai radio propt.-
ganda campaign spewed out of Hanoi.
On May 15, 1962, the United States moved
5,000 troops into Thailand and made clear
they would respond if the Pathet Lao tried
to reach the Mekong. This plain threat by
the United States to make it "our war"
worked, and the Communists switched back
to the bargaining table. The long-dead-
locked Geneva Conference came to a quick
new agreement on June 12, 1962. It set up
a Lao Government which included all
three of the warring factions-Communist,
free and neutral--and, in thory, reaffirmed
Lao neutralization. In July, U.S. troops
began leaving Thailand, and Laos went back
to an uneasy truce punctuated frequently by
new clashes between the Communists and
government ned.tralist troops.
Criticism of the new U.S. commitment
grew from two directions at home. Senator
WAYNE MoasE decried our stepped-up partici-
pation and said It would lead to a head-on
clash with China. He called Diem a "tyrant"
and said that his kind of rule made victory
against the Reds impossible and that the
United States was making "a great mistake in
South Vietnam." Columnist Walter Lipp-
Mann went further, describing the original
commitment in 1954 as an error and saying
the United States should admit it and with-
draw.
From the other direction, Senator THOMAS
Donn said the commitment was not enough,
that coalition governments In any country
between free and Communist factions were
open invitations to eventual Red takeover.
Others pointed out that as long as Red power
was intact in Laos, in the form of the Pathet
Lao, it would feed the revolt In South Viet-
nam and that therefore U.S. withdrawal from
Laos would be inconsistent with its growing
involvement in South Vietnam.
Administration spokesmen admitted that
the Laos agreements are fragile at best, but
defended them as the best obtainable under
the circumstances. President Kennedy said,
"We've got a very simple policy in Vietnam
* * * we want the war to be won, the Com-
munists to be contained, and the Americans
to go home." The point, as he further em-
phasized, was that "we are not there to see
a war lost."
The dispute went to crisis point in 1963.
In May, Diem's police fired on demonstrating
Buddhists in the northern South Vietnam
city of Hue, and riots spread throughout the
country as students protested and monks
burned themselves in public. The Kennedy
administration fought off demands that the
United States abandon southeast Asia, while
bringing strong pressure on Diem to reform
his methods of rule. The dissension over
whether to back Diem or try to oust him
reached all the way into the U.S. mission in
Saigon.
Before a showdown could be reached, Diem
was overthrown and assassinated by a junta
of 16 South Vietnamese generals, on Novem-
ber 1, 1963. This got Washington off the
worst part of the hook, but the disappear-
ance of the Ngo Dinh family from power did
not solve the prime question: How could
any South Vietnamese Government long sur-
vive in a war which had no apparent end"
This was a point Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh,
who took over the junta rule of South Viet-
nam on January 30, 1964, pressed on his U.S.
allies. Throughout the spring of 1964, while
the Communists in both Laos and South
Vietnam stepped up the pace of their at-
tacks, Khanh urged on the United States the
need for carrying the fight to the enemy.
In March 1964, under President Johnson,
another 1,500 U.S. military men were sent
to Vietnam, raising the total to 16,500.
Though it was carefully explained that these
were advisers, the move unleashed specula-
tion that the war was about to be widened.
On April 26, Secretary of State Rusk made a
deliberately vague reference to military ac-
tions against North Vietnam and said, "This
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
course of action-its implications and ways
of carrying it out-has been carefully stud-
Further well-advertised American hints
that some kind of initiative against North
Vietnam was under consideration followed.
In June, top-level U.S. military and civilian
leaders 'met at 'Honolulu and new stories of
impending strikes against North Vietnam
were leaked. Next, U.S.. reconnaissance
planes appeared over Red-held territory in
Laos, and the U.S.-trained Royal Laotian Air
Force also went into action. On June 11, six
U.S,-built jets bombed the Pathet Lao base
at Khang Kay, in Laos, while the United
States denied they had U.S. pilots.
In July, the movement of 5,000 more Amer-
ican troops into South Vietnam ; was an-
nounced, and U.S. spending increases, were
projected over the $700 million level for fis-
cal year 1965. Maximum publicity was given
these facts, too.
it was now the Communists' turn to worry,
especially the North 'Vietnamese. From
China and Russia came the demand for a
new. conference of the 14 nations that signed
the, 1962 Geneva agreements. ' France, as
well as many neutrals, backed this demand,
while in_ the United States 5,000 college pro-
fessore called for a neutralized Vietnam and
pacifist groups circulated an open 'letter
from North Vietnam leader, Ho Chi Minh,
aaldng the American people to force their
Government to negotiate with him.
'Though the scale of combat had risen ap-
preciably, what had escalated enormously
was the U.S. commitment in the intangibles:
will, prestige, determination, The United
States was now fully immersed in the kind
of political-psychological-military war the
Reds had made their own specialty, in which
the intangibles were often the most impor-
tant stakes.
Late this fall, General Khanh stepped out
in favor of a civilian government under Tran
Van Huong, former Saigon mayor. Then,
after the Vietcong attacked a U.S. bomber
base, rumors were rife of sterner U.S. action.
As these words go to press the last chapter
is not written, but the struggle in Indochina
is seen as an extension of our Korea policy
to hold Red colonialism where it is in Asia
while, unlike Korea, avoiding any bigger mili-
tary commitment than is necessary. It is a
neat trick to win any struggle with the mini-
mum possible involvement. The Communists
have done it many times. In Vietnam to-
day we are witnessing our own first big at-
tempt to walk that tightrope.
1049
High among his accomplishments, cer-
tainly, rank his leadership in the affairs of
the Advertising Club, of which he was the
founder and a former president; his years
of service on the city park board, during
which he was at the forefront of the suc-
cessful drives for the erection of Memorial
Stadium and the upgrading of the city zoo;
and his successful chairmanship of the State
commission on forests and parks, which he
headed at the time of his sudden death.
This friendly, outgoing man made his pres-
ence felt in everything he undertook. The
Advertising Club in its present form is
largely his creation-and the plush, glittery
style which has made the Ad Club Award
Banquet a sellout every year, attracting the
top names in the city's political, commercial,
and civic life, is due to his verve and en-
thusiasm.
"In many ways Sam Hammerman was Mr.
Baltimore himself," Mayor McKeldin recalls.
"For he understood deeply and was an inte-
gral part of our city's aspiration, personality,
growth, and municipal pride."
In paying homage to this outstanding citi-
zen, we can do no better than to repeat
a tribute paid to him a dozen years ago
by the Jesuit priest, the Very Rev. Edward
B. Bunn, at a testimonial dinner. It was
brief and to the point: "The fulcrum of.
Sam's successful life has been his unabashed
love of mankind."
SAMUEL L. HAMMERMAN
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I rise
today to call the attention of the Senate
to the passing of an outstanding Mary-
lander and a fine American.
Samuel L. Hammerman gave the high-
est kind of service to the welfare of the
general public. As a successful business-
man, he could have rested on his many
laurels in the field of real-estate develop-
ment. But this was not the way of Sam
Hammerman. At age 70, he accepted the
responsibility of chairman of the State
Commission of Forests and Parks in
Maryland. On the day of his death, he
presided over a meeting of that group.
Under his compassionate and creative
direction, Maryland parks have grown
in their utility to people, while remain-
ing true to the highest standards of con-
servation. Sam Hammerman was a man
who bought a piece of property, spend-
ing more than $1,000 to save a tree
doomed to destruction, a tree which is
still growing.
The bill to establish a national park
on Assateague Island, of which I am a
cosponsor with my colleague, Senator
BREWSTER, IS, at least in some part, a
monument to his foresight and courage
as a creative conservationist. I am sure
that no finer tribute could be paid to this
wonderful man than the establishment
of a national park on Assateague Island.
Maryland and the Nation are truly
poorer for his passing.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD appropriate edi-
torial comment from the Baltimore
Evening Sun and the Baltimore News
American of January 20, 1965.
There beiiig no objection, the edito-
rials were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
TheUnited States refused to entertain the
conference idea, saying that it would only
serveo "ratify'the violations" of the exist-
ing treaties the Communists had committed.
The buildup went on, with South Viet-
nam's General Khanh adding new tension
when ' he declared in July that his govern-
lnent . felt free to carry the war into North
Vietnam on its own.
Amjd awelter of speculation about just
what action would be taken, a clash between
United States and North Vietnamese warships
took place in early August. Part of the new
posture of the United States now became
clear.
U.S. planes struck at North Vietnam bases,
destroyed PT boats, bases and oil facilities.
This was the first organized military blow
by the United States against Communist ter-
21tory since the Korean war. It was followed
by an immediate augmentation of U.S. forces
in southeast Asia in readiness for any coun-
ter blow of any size.
pre$dent Johnson went on the air as the
stye was beginning to assure the Commu-
nists that this "response will be limited and
fitting." He emphasized pointedly, "We still
seek no wider war." Publicity was given to
Ambassador Taylor's notification of General
Khanh that his call for an extension of the
war was against present U.S. policy. ,
For the first time in the long Indochinese
struggle, too, the two sides had exchanged
roles. It was now the Communists who had
to decide what response to make-or whether
$0 respond, at all-and the -United States
Which had the initiative. Nor would this be
the last such time, said President Johnson
.on August 8. The air and naval action in
the Gulf of Tonkin, he announced, applied
more broadly to "aggression in southeast
`Asia as a whole." This threatened the "priv-
iliged sanctuary" in North Vietnam and the
Bed-held areas of Laos, where Red forces
strikes. SAMUEL L. HAMMERMAN
To sum up where the United States stood
in the fall of 1964: The community mourns Samuel L. Ham-
The range of our responses to the Commu- merinan, who gave so much of himself to its
nist "war of liberation" had been widened- betterment.
New risks considered to be "manageable" Mr. Hammerman, Who was "a successful
were taken. -They could'le'ad to more gen- ' realtor in his business life, made contribu-
el'al war,'but the belief'was they would stay tions in so many different fields of civic en-
within the confines of.limited war, and would deavor that it is difficult to single out his
No. 15-10
[From the Baltimore (Md.) Evening Sun,
Jan. 20, 1965]
S. L. HAMMERMAN
For a leading businessman to enter public
life as a member of one or more advisory or
regulatory bodies is far from difficult; the job
often seeks out the appointee.- What can
come hard is for the businessman to reorient
his outlook, putting the public interest ahead
of the private or commercial considerations.
An example, indeed a model, of the success-
ful changeover will long be available to
Baltimoreans and Marylanders in the career
of the late S. L. Hammerman. A man whose
profession was the development of residen-
tial real estate, Mr. Hammerman went to
work, when named head successively of the
city's park board and the State's commis-
sion for forests and parks, to advance the
public's cause.
Outstanding instances of such action on
the part of Hammerman-led boards included
the defense of Druid Hill Park against an
attempt to locate the civic center there,
ardent support of the effort to bring about
Federal acquisition of the full Maryland
length of Assateague Island and, within re-
cent days, the rebuff of an executive attempt
to allow destructive strip mining on a stretch
of State parkland in western Maryland. A
gregarious man and a driving force whose
death will be mourned also at Advertising
Club banquets and in interfaith programs,
Sam Hammerman could count many achieve-
ments, and not least among them a role as
a distinct part of the flavor or color of the
city's collective personality.
WYOMING'S UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION LAW
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, the
Reader's Digest, in its January 1965 is-
Sue, presented its readers with what it
termed "a case study of unemployment-
compensation abuse-and its cure."
The article about the State of Wyo-
ming and its unemployment compensa-
tion law was a broadly embroidered one,
based on only bare threads of truth.
The Wyoming Employment Outlook, a
publication of the Employment Security
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Januai''. 22
Commission of Wyoming, gives a differ-
ent outlook on the situation. It sets the
record straight.
I ask unanimous consent that the Em-
ployment Security Commission editorial
in reply to the Reader's Digest article be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:_
READER'S DIGEST STRIKES AGAIN
The Reader's Digest has once more zeroed
in on its favorite target, the Bureau of Em-
ployment Security. In its latest issue, the
magazine has chosen Wyoming's unemploy-
ment compensation law for its attack. The
story swarms with villains (the bureaucrats)
and white knights (three special-interest
group technicians), and the fight ensues.
The technicians, according to the story, be-
came unemployment insurance experts prac-
tically overnight. They snatch a "hoop and
holler" victory from the bureaucrats by virtue
of an early morning breakfast with two mem-
bers of the State legislature. The hoop and
holler victory even with the two members
voting for the proposals, would have meant
a margin of one vote for the proposals.
The Reader's Digest intentions become
quite obvious when one reads the advertise-
ment displayed in local Wyoming papers. Its
ads are even more sensational than the story
itself. Quoting from one such ad: "Wyo-
ming tightens up on 'happy time' money.
Freeloaders were coming from as far away as
California. Anybody who refused to work
could sign up for unemployment compensa-
tion--even convicted criminals. Then the
public woke up."
The inference of the ads and the story is
that any out-of-State worker'who comes to
fill available jobs in Wyoming, does so for
the sole purpose of becoming qualified to
draw unemployment compensation from the
Wyoming fund and thus, have a "happy
time."
During the construction time of the year,
Wyoming never has enough workers within
its borders to fill all the jobs available. The
contractors know this and offer the entice-
ment of good wages and working conditions
to encourage the migration of the right kind
of worker. This is what brings these workers
into Wyoming, not the promise of a good time
at the "trough" of public, funds, as the maga-
zine suggests.
The article emphasizes the fact that some
workers can earn as little its $375 and become
eligible for "happy time" money. The article
does not mention that on this bare minimum
of wage earnings, the }benefits would have
been $10 a week for 12 weeks. Nor does it
mention that the average weekly benefit for
all claimants is only $35.
Most of these workers who come into Wyo-
ming to work on construction and other out-
side type jobs can, while they are working,
earn at least four to five times this amount
and would find it difficult to have a "happy
time" on such a reduced rate of earning.
The ad said that anybody who refused to
work could sign up for unemployment com-
pensation, This, as with many of the state-
XIEW
ments made by the magazine, has a thread amendment will be received, printed, a
nd
of truth. The law states that the commis- appropriately referred; and, without
sion cannot refuse to accept an application
for compensation from anyone. However, objection, the amendment will be printed
they must qualify for entitlement and meet in the RECORD, and Will lie on the desk,
eligibility tests. A refusal to work would re- as requested.
sult in a denial of payments of benefi s. The amendment was referred to the
In the past, many experts have taken the Committee on Public Works, as follows:
magazine to task and have exposed their On page 1, strike out lines 3 and 4 and In-
blasts at the Bureau of Employment Security sert In lieu thereof the following:
for what they are: illogical assumptions
based only on threads of truth. "CHAPTER I-APPALACHIAN REGIONAL DEVELOP-
The experts' answers were printed In pub- MENT
lications with a circulation of thousands. "Short Title
The Reader's Digest claims a circulation of "SECTION 1. This chapter may be cited as
over 25 million. By the time a rebuttal comes the 'Appalachian Regional Development Act
of 1965', and all references in this chapter t3
this Act shall be held to refer to this
chapter."
At the end of the bill add the following
new chapter:
"CHAPTER 2--REGIONAL ACTION PLANNING
"Title V-Regional Action Planning Act of
1965
"Short Title
"SEC. 501. This chapter may be cited as
the 'Regional Action Planning Act of 1965'.
"(4) region-wide development is feasible,
desirable, and urgently needed.
"(b) The Administrator may designate
not to exceed-six regions pursuant to sub-
section (a).
"(c) The Administrator shall assign an ap-
propriate department or agency of the Fed-
eral Government the responsibility for de-
veloping a Federal-regional action plan pur-
suant to this chapter for each region estab-
lished pursuant to subsection (a). Such
plan shall be developed with the participa-
tion of other Federal departments and agen-
cies which in the Administrator's opinion can
make a substantial contribution, and with
representatives from each State involved.
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out, the Lilliputian magazine is once more
trying to pin down another Bureau of Em-
ployment Security Gulliver with thin, weak
threads of truth.
AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE NATION'S DE-
PRESSED REGIONS-AMENDMENT
(AMENDMENT NO. 2)
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President. I send
be proposed by me to the bill (S. 3 to "SEC. 502. The Congress recognizes that
provide public works and economic de- many regions of the country, while abundant
velopment programs and the planning in natural resources and rich in potential,
and coordination needed to assist in the lag behind- the Nation In economic growth so
development of the Appalachian region. that the people of such regions have not
I ask that the amendment be referred to shared properly i the Nations prosperity.
Often a region's uneven past development,
the Committee on Public Works and be with historical reliance on a few basic Indus-
printed. I also ask unanimous consent tries and marginal agriculture, have failed
that the amendment be printed in the to provide the economic base vital as a pre-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion requisite for vigorous self-sustaining growth.
of my remarks. In some cases the uneven distribution of
This amendment is designed to su- productive Federal expenditures has left te-
thorize immediate planning for up to six theless, pions a c manyra area disadvantage. None-
other regions in the country with prob- State and m local any vnsme the country the
Std governments and the people
lems similar to those of Appalachia, of the region understand their problems and
The legislation would establish a Fed- have been and are prepared to work purpose-
eral Action Plan Administrator with au- fully toward their solution. It is the pur-
thority to designate regions for imme- pose of this chapter to assist such regions in
diate development planning, meeting their special problems and promot-
Up to $2.5 million for any one region ing their economic development by helping
could be used for the development of an State, and policies and programs for Federal,
Snd local efforts essential to an attack
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action plan, to be completed within 18 upon common problems through a coor-
months by Federal and State representa- dinated and concerted regional approach.
+;v-
No more than $10 million could be "SEC. 503. (a) The provisions of this chap-
spent on the total program, ter shall be administered by a Regional
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., who pre- Action Plan Administrator (hereinafter re-
pared the Appalachian legislation, told ferred to as the 'Administrator') in the
the House Public Works Committee last Executive Office of the President. The Ad-
Year that plans for other regions could ministrator shall be appointed by and with
be completed within 6 months if they the advice and consent of the Senate and
were authorized. shall be compensated at the rate provided
Only regions which meet the general for level Iv of the Federal Executive Salary
criteria established by the Senate in as- Schedule.
sage of last year's Appalachian legisla- the civil servi emandtclassification laws,tap-
tion would be eligible for action plan point and fix the compensation of such ofli-
money. To receive such planning funds, cers and employees as may be necessary to
the region must: Lag substantially be- carry out the provisions of this chapter.
hind the rest of the Nation in economic "Determination of Regions
growth; have an uneven past develop- 'SE(~. 504. (a) The Administrator shall
ment which has not permitted self- designate areas representing two or more
sustaining growth; have demonstrated contiguous States as a region for Federal-
that local people and governments are regional action planning pursuant to this
prepared for immediate planning and pee chapter upon determining that-
velopnlent; and have common problems hind d the e rest region
of f the Nation in in Its econs econ bomic
ic
which offer hope of a regional solution. growth, and its people have not shared prop-
In addition to the upper Great Lakes erly in the Nation's prosperity;
area, the standards in this bill might be "(2) such region's uneven past develop-
met by the Ozarks; the northwestern ment has failed to provide the economic base
mountain regions; the upper New Eng- that is a vital prerequisite for vigorous self-
land area; the desert high plateau corner sustaining growth;
of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Ari- people State the ra egion local ens governmentstand theirand pr oho
zona, and parts of the Deep South. lems s a and d have been and d are are prepared thto work
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and The PDT. SIDING ,-.,,,,,r-