THE MESS IN VIETNAM-II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170015-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

1965
dumped abroad, it could be brought back
Into this ceuntry at prices which would
affect our own economy. That was one
of the basic purposes behind that part
of this legislation, to prevent such a
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the real
nub as to whether the material ought to
be sold to foreign friendly countries or
NATO countries involves the U.S. bal-
ance-of-payments problem. Offers of
excess stockpile materials might induce
some countries to create a domestic
stockpile of their own.
The question would hinge on the flexi-
bility of the friendly countries with re-
gard to the price at which sales could be
made, assuming we were given full pro-
tection against the return of the mate-
rials to this market, or its utilization in
the world market in such a way as to de-
press prices, or in any other way which
would be adverse to the general economy.
The committee report, as I see it, has
made it clear that the term "fair market
value" means not less than the current
domestic market price. With respect to a
number of commodities, there are world
prices which may be less than the current
domestic market price.
At the same time I notice that the
committee has sought to give the Presi-
dent some degree of freedom of action by
its provision that the President may?
and I refer to the language on page 19,
lines 8 to 12?determine that such con-
struction?namely that "fair market
value" means the current domestic price
or above?is inconsistent with the pur-
poses of this act.
In that connection, would it be con-
sidered one of the purposes of this act
to dispose of, in a very constructive Y10,3',
surpluses which were of no use to the
United States in the stockpiling pro-
gram?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe so. For
the record, let me read briefly the pur-
poses of the bill.
First, the bill is intended to provide
more statutory guidance on the purposes
for which materials would be stockpiled.
Second, provide for disclosure to Con-
gress and the public pertinent informa-
tion on the management of the stockpiles.
Third, revise and consolidate the laws
relating to stockpile management.
Fourth, permit disposals of surplus
material without requiring congressional
action on each, while retaining for the
Congress the power to disapprove pro-
posed disposals.
Fifth, make contracts for furnishing
materials to the stockpile subject to the
Renegotiation Act of 1951, as amended.
Then there is a paragraph under the
explanation of the amendments in the
report:
The amendments are intended to allay any
concern that excess materials might be ap-
plied and sold at prices that would be dis-
ruptive of orderly markets. The authority
for the President to determine that the defi-
nition should not apply is intended to pro-
vide protection against artificial prices and
frustration of the basic purposes of the leg-
islation. This authority would also be con-
clusive when there is uncertainty or contro-
versy over the current domestic market
prices.
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terials which are world materials, of
which there is much world production.
We would hope such materials were not
sold at the world price to Europe, then
shipped back to the United States. The
Senator from New York understands
'that problem.
Mr. JAVITS. I do.
Mr. SYMINGTON. With the excep-
tion of that type of reservation, what he
has said is both and accurate and con-
structive.
We have discussed the subject of cur-
rency. I notice in the Sunday news-
papers that whereas world trade in-
creased from $48 billion in 1938 to $298
billion in 1964, since 1938 the increase in
gold has been only from $25.9 billion to
$39.9 billion.
Mr. JAVITS. There is no question
that we are being stretched on a new
"cross of gold," probably more so than
In the days of William Jennings Bryan;
and unless we apply ourselves to finding
a way in which the world credit mecha-
nism can be used without being restricted
by a completely artificial standard, we
are going to be doing many things that
are harmful. We have not yet found a
way to base credit on production and
resources, which is what we do domes-
tically, but cannot seem to accomplish
internationally. We face a great chal-
lenge. The international methods of
payment cannot be met by a series of
regressive actions which could very well
touch off a real worldwide depression or
recession.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
ator for his able contribution.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, on behalf of the copper users
of my State, I commend the Senator
from Missouri on the legislation which he
has conceived, and steered to passage.
I am glad to have supported this bill.
Several factories in New York have been
forced to curtail operations and furlough
workers because of the copper shortage.
S. 28, however, will allow all copper in
excess of national stockpile needs to be
transferred to the materials reserve in-
ventory; and it directs that materials in
that inventory, no longer needed to carry
out the purposes of the act, be sold at fair
market value. When enacted into law,
this bill will allow the sale to domestic
users of over 200,000 tons of copper?
more than enough to solve the present
problems of copper fabricators and users
all over the country. Copper-using em-
ployers will thus be able to expand their
operations, providing increased employ-
ment opportunity. The major impact
In New York State will be felt in the
Rome area.
The legislation, of course, includes ap-
propriate safeguards against precipitous
sale or other disposal of critical mate-
rials. I, was therefore, very pleased by
Senator SYMINGTON'S assurance to the
majority leader that he would take what-
ever action is necessary to insure the
speedy sale to the public of at least 100,-
000 tons of copper ingot.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
bill having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall it pass?
No. 26-10
Mr. JAVITS. What I am envisioning
Is a situation in which certain NATO
countries which hold large dollar credit
balances could be persuaded to return
some of these dollars to the United
States in exchange for excess materials
from our stockpile. To be arbitrary, let
us assume that $1 billion could be in-
volved in the purchase of excess materi-
als by a NATO country which could serve
as the basis of a stockpile within that
NATO country. It would have the ad-
vantage of relieving some of the burden
of our international payments and of
strategically establishing a stockpile in a
friendly NATO country, thus decentral-
izing the implications of the stockpile,
and also freezing it in the hands of the
country for which it would be a strategic
reserve of a material which is surplus
to us, but not to that country.
Under those circumstances, it might
very well be that the world market price
Would be inconsistent with the domestic
price of the particular material. The
President, under suitable conditions and
assuring against return of the material.
to the United States without approval of
the United States, might have to nego-
tiate a price which might be somewhat
more than that related to the world
price. There is a great amount of inter-
est involved in doing that, if it could be
done.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Based on what the
Senator from New York has said pro-
vided the material sold did not later ap-
pear for sale or use in this country, with-
out question the President could do it.
I believe also that, under the terms of
the bill, Congress would have a right to
take a look at the transaction.
Mr. JAVITS. Exactly. That is why
I was about to say that, in our legislative
Intent, it should be made clear that sec-
tion 11(d) is not completely restrictive,
because Congress could prevent a sale
from happening, and Congress has given
itself full protection. Surely it cannot
be said that there is too much freedom
of action allowed the Executive in this
bill in view of the fact that future dis-
posals will be subject to approval by the
Congress.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator has
In mind some of the conutries which
have recently been selling dollars for
gold, that they would obtain some of
these materials instead of the gold, I
surely would join with him, as I am
also sure would other Senators.
Mr. JAVITS. That is exactly what I
had in mind. I wanted to be sure when
we were giving ourselves greater freedom
of action we would not be restricting
ourselves under the bill.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able
Senator from New York. His remarks
are most constructive. What he says in
this overall connection has to do with
something many Americans are thinking
about.
Mr. JAVITS. I assure the Senator
that I will join in any effort in that di-
rection, and I know of no more effective
ally than the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Many thanks.
May I add one thought for the consider-
ation of the able Senator. We have ma-
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February 9
The bill (S. 28) was passed.
? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which the
bill was passed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I con-
gratulate the senior Senator from Mis-
souri [Mr. SYMINGTON] on the outstand-
ing service he and his committee have
rendered on the Materials Reserve and
Stockpile Act of 1965, which has just
been passed.
I am delighted that, in his colloquy
with my colleague the majority leader
[Mr. MANSFIELD], and later in his state-
ment to the senior Senator from Con-
necticut [Mr. Donn], he said he and his
committee were going to hold prompt
hearings on the copper bill that my col-
league [Mr. MANSFIELD] and others have
introduced. I congratulate the Senator
for his interest in the mining States.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sena-
tor, a great expert in the mining field,
for his kind remarks.
AID FOR THE GOLD MINING
INDUSTRY
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in
the closing remarks on the bill (S. 28)
which has just been passed, the Senator
from New York [Mr. Jsvirs] stated that
we were now being stretched on a cross
of gold.
The gold miners of the Nation have
long been stretched on the cross of gold.
Indeed they have been crucified. It is
pertinent that the issue be raised at this
time, as it has been raised before in
several sessions of the Congress, and will
be in the future, and we are engaged in
other aspects of the gold problem.
This is not a partisan matter. The
crucifixion has taken place equally under
Republican and Democratic administra-
tions. The gold miners of the Nation
have been and are subject to unique dis-
crimination?a strange paradox under
our free enterprise system.
Alone among all the industries and
activities of our society, this one indus-
try is rigidly confined by Government
fiat to a price established 30 years ago,
and is compelled to sell only to the one
agency which has imposed this strangu-
lation; namely, the Federal Government.
As a result, this once great industry
which was developed in the West in the
great States of California and Colorado,
and of course in Alaska, in South Da-
kota, and other Western ?tartes, is on
the point of being extinguished, with the
result that gold miners have been thrown
out of work, as our Nation's gold supply
steadily dwindles.
For several years, efforts have been
made to find a remedy, which has always
fallen afoul of the strange concept in
the minds of those who control the
Treasury Department--and this applies
to Secretaries of the Treasury under
both Republican and Democratic ad-
ministrations?that any attempt to aid
the gold miners would somehow have a
disastrous effect on the monetary value
of gold and on the dollar, although the
varieties of legislation which have been
introduced repeatedly, not only by me
but also by others, in order to provide a
remedy, have nothing whatever to do
with the price of gold. The sponsors of
the proposed legislation have repeatedly
and emphatically disclaimed any attempt
to tamper with the gold price and with
the stability of the dollar. These
attempts at legislation failing, efforts
have been made repeatedly to urge Sec-
retaries of the Treasury, whoever they
were, in both Republican and Demo-
cratic administrations, if they could not
subscribe to the proposed legislation, at
least to come forward with an alterna-
tive which would prevent the gold miners
from being permanently unemployed
and this once great industry from van-
ishing from the American scene.
I invite the attention of the minority
whip, the Senator from California [Mr.
KucHELl, to the fact that the gold mines
of his State have virtually ceased opera-
tion. They have also virtually ceased
operation in the State of Alaska and
some time since in the State of Colorado.
A few elsewhere are barely hanging on
but must soon close unless relief is forth-
coming.
It is unthinkable that successive ad-
ministrations cannot come forward with
a valid and reasonable proposal to pre-
vent this unique discrimination?unique
under our free enterprise system?and
permit a once great industry, important
to the economy?not important merely
as a monetary standard but important
increasingly in industry?to survive.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Alaska yield?
Mr. GRUENING. I yield with pleas-
ure to the Senator from California.
Mr. KUCHEL. I wish to avail myself
of the opportunity to indicate my en-
thusiastic approval of the interest which
the distinguished Senator from Alaska
[Mr. GRUENING] is taking in this subject.
I come from a State which is known
historically as a great gold-producing
State. Everyone knows the story of the
gold which came from the State of Cali-
fornia to the Lincoln administration in
time to save the Union from being cut
in twain.
Today, the gold mines of my State are
closed. It is a shame. It is an outrage.
I would hope that perhaps two members
of the Committee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs this year might proceed to
hold appropriate hearings on the sub-
ject.
Mr. GRUENING. I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from California [Mr.
MICHEL] who has on every occasion
been a warm supporter and advocate of
every kind of legislation that would
attempt to bring back the gold mining
industry.
I am hopeful that with his support,
and the support of others similarly in-
terested, we may be able at long last to
secure some kind of constructive atti-
tude from the Secretary of the Treasury,
whoever he may be.
I confess to feeling not too hopeful,
in view of this hitherto rigid, blind, non-
partisan, bipartisan refusal to face the
facts. However, we shall continue our
efforts, and by continuing them and re-
fusing to consider ourselves beaten, I
hope we may prevail.
VTHE MESS IN VIETNAM?II
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in
commenting yesterday on the tragic
events in South Vietnam last weekend, I
stated:
Much of the news thus far released from
South Vietnam, the Pentagon, and the White
House raises many more questions than it
answers.
News releases since then concerning
the tragic assault on our base and air-
field at Pleiku still continue to raise many
questions and make the circumstances
surrounding the attack "curiouser and
curiouser."
Some of these questions were posed in
Mr. Charles Mohr's column published in
the New York Times yesterday, which
was printed in the RECORD yesterday at
the conclusion of my remarks.
One question posed by Mr. Mohr was:
The question is, therefore, that if the Viet-
cong unit at Pleiku was?as is so often the
case?Using captured weapons, would this
sustain the argument that North Vietnam
made possible this particular attack?
Mr. Mohr also questioned the size and
intensity of the attack. He stated:
Administration sources also contend that
the size and intensity of the attack indicated
that it was a major blow carefully timed by
Hanoi. Yet reports from the field indicate
that a company?or less?of Vietcong troops
took part in the bloody but brief encounter.
According to a further report published
in today's New York Times and emanat-
ing from the Pentagon, the attacking
force numbered only 100-1 Vietcong
company.
I ask unanimous consent that this re-
port as it was published in the New York
Times this morning, entitled "U.S. Aides
Praise Pleiku Defenders," be printed in
the RECORD at the conclusion of my re--
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a
further question raised by Mr. Mohr
was?
whether South Vietnamese security troops
were ignoring long-standing American ad-
vice to increase night patrols.
According to the Times report, the?
outermost perimeter defense was 2 to 21/2
miles from the inner perimeter surrounding
the compound with barbed wire.
Where were the patrols in this outer-
most perimeter defense area?
Still another question asked by Mr.
Mohr?
is why all three attack carriers of the U.S.
7th Fleet were in the South China Sea near
the Vietnamese coast at the same time. The
usual pattern is one of dispersal, with each
carrier operating off different parts of east
Asia.
The United States has suffered one
Pearl Harbor. It cannot risk a second
and the concentration of our carriers of
the 7th Fleet in one area is an open in-
vitation to surprise enemy attack.
The final question?
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Posed by Mr. Mohr?
is how much of the responsibility for Pleiku
can be held not just to Hanoi, but to failure
to prosecute the antiguerrilla war on South
Vietnam itself in a more vigorous and suc-
ce&sful way.
It is good to know that separate in-
vestigations have been ordered by both
South Vietnamese and United States au-
thorities into why we were caught Sun-
day morning at Pleiku by surprise by
only 100 Vietcong soldiers who succeeded
in killing at least 8 American soldiers
and wounding 126.
But it should be remembered that last
October the American airfield at Bien
Hoa was similarly caught in a surprise
attack and we lost 5 jet bombers and
had 22 jet bombers damaged. At that
time also there was an investigation.
What steps were taken as a result of
that investigation to tighten security
around our bases? We have not been
told, but obviously, in the light of what
took place last Sunday morning, those
steps were not effective.
In a cogent editorial in today's New
York Times, the point is made that If?
the Pentagon is to continue to order U.S.
military personnel to Vietnam, it has the
obligation to provide them with the best
protection possible.
The editorial states:
Certainly far better security than has been
provided is possible, and has now become
absolutely essential.
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire editorial from today's New York
Times entitled "And Protecting U.S.
Forces" be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit No. 2) .
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President,
while these questions do raise serious
doubts as to our preparedness to wage
the war in Vietnam, there still remain
the overriding questions as to our policy
in waging war there in the first place.
Calling the war in Vietnam the "war
that cannot be won on the ground where
It is being fought," Mr. Walter Lipp-
mann, in his column in the Washington
Post this morning, pointed out:
We have had a very clear demonstration
of the strategic reality in Southeast Asia.
The American Army at Pleiku was unable to
protect itself against a comparatively small
guerrilla attack, against a force estimated
officially at about two squads and one pla-
toon. The American forces got no warning
of the attack from the Vietnamese people in
the nearby hamlets where the raid was pre-
pared. It got no protection from the Viet-
namese security guards.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Lippmann's column be printed in full in
the RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit No. 3).
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President,
there is danger in Vietnam. There is
danger in Vietnam to U.S. prestige in
the whole free world. And that danger
does not lie in submitting the dispute
in Vietnam to an international settle-
ment as I and others have repeatedly
urged. The danger lies in continuing a
fruitless military engagement that can-
not be won on the field of battle, but can
only be settled politically. The senseless
slaughter of U.S. fighting men in South
Vietnam should cease.
The dangers to the United States in
the continued military stalemate in
South Vietnam are pointed out this
morning in an excellent editorial in the
New York Times entitled "The Dangers
In Vietnam." I ask unanimous consent
that the entire editorial be printed in
the RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OnviCER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.,
(See exhibit No. 4)
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, cer-
tain portions of that editoral are worthy
of special note.
The editorial states:
The only sane way out is diplomatic, in-
ternational, political, economic?not mili-
tary. A solution will not be found by ex-
changing harder and harder blows. Surren-
der is out of the question and "victory" for
either side is impossible.
This is what I have been saying and
urging for several months now. We can
presume that the government at Hanoi
Is not composed of fools. They have re-
ceived the message contained in the air
strike made from our fleet Sunday.
They know that the planes from our car-
riers could have leveled Hanoi as quick-
ly as they struck at the military bases in
southern North Vietnam. They know
that they would then be overrun by the
Red Chinese ostensibly coming to their
aid and that for years thereafter they
would be dominated by Red China as
they had been for 2,000 years in the
past.
As the editorial in the New York Times
concludes:
Perhaps a new start can be made from an
untried base?that Americans, Vietnamese,
Chinese and Russians are all sensible hu-
man beings who are ready for peace in south-
east Asia, or at least willing to consider it.
There would be prices to pay, but there
would be gains as well as losses. Diplomacy
is surely not yet a lost art or a dead language.
Since all competent observers agree
that the war in South Vietnam cannot be
won militarily but only politically, let
us seek every possible means without de-
lay through every international diplo-
matic channel available to us to set those
negotiations in motion without further
delay.
EXHIBIT 1
[From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1965]
U.S. AIDES PRAISE PLEIKII DEP'ENDERE SAY
FORCES Dm GOOD JOB nv REACTING TO AT-
TACK
WASHINGTON, February 8.?Defense officials
insisted today that the defense arrangements
were good at U.S. instalfations in South
Vietnam that were attacked yesterday.
The Vietcong guerrillas killed at least 8
Americans and wounded 126 in the grenade
and mortar attack at Pleiku that precipitated
the retaliatory bombings of North Vietnam.
The Communist guerrillas, penetrating to
within 30 yards in one of the assaults, cut
the barbed wire of the inner perimeters of
a U.S. Army compound. They planted dyna-
mite charges near aircraft on a nearby air-
field.
But according to an official U.S. military
assessment, a "g?o?o4T job" was done in pro-
tecting the area. Once the attack was un-
derway, according to official reports, the
U.S. forces retaliated "within seconds" and
"With considerable professionalism and
skill."
The statements followed some congres-
sional criticism that security arrangements
at the U.S. installations had been inade-
quate.
INVESTIGATIONS ORDERED
Nevertheless, Defence officials said that
both United States and South Vietnamese
military officials had undertaken separate in-
vestigations.
The investigations were said to be similar
to one that followed the Vietcong mortar raid
on the American airfield of Bienhoa, near
Saigon, 1-st October. when 5 jet bombers
were destroyed and 22 were damaged.
The investigations at Pleiku were ordered
to analyze what happened and to determine
What, if anything, could be done to improve
military security, a Defense official who had
just returned from the scene said. He added,
however:
"The security there represents the con-
sidered judgment of very professional and
skilled officers and it's going to be difficult
to improve upon it. It is important
to tighten up, but improvements are hard to
come by."
Defense officials gave additional details of
the Pleiku attack and at the same time
emphasized the professional skin of the at-
tacking guerrillas.
ATTACK WELL COORDINATED
The attackers were well coordinated, ac-
cording to the defense report. The mortar
shelling of the compound and airfield were
timed with the cutting of the barbed wire
enclosure to start at 2 a.m., it was pointed
out.
Defense officials said they were unaware of
a report that half of the assigned South
Vietnamese guards in the area were not at
their posts. At the Pentagon it was said that
the outermost perimeter defense was 2 to 21/2
miles from the inner perimeter surrounding
the compound with barbed wire.
Inside the barbed wire line both South
Vietnamese and U.S. Army guards were sta-
tioned. At the compound a U.S. sentry was
stationed between two South Vietnamese
Army posts about 200 yards apart. This
sentry was singled out for special praise.
It was he, officials said, who heard the Viet-
cong guerrillas, challenged them and was
killed. His action alerted the troops in the
compound, most of whom were asleep in
their barracks.
But "within seconds," an investigating offi-
cer said, the American soldiers flung open
windows and began firing at the attackers.
There was "no indication of panic and no
promiscuous firing of weapons," the officer
reported.
REACTION WAS SWIFT
The reaction at both the compound and
the airfield, where 9 helicopters were de-
stroyed, 9 to 11 damaged and 6 light ob-
server planes damaged, was speedy and ef-
fective, it was reported.
The Vietcong force, which poured about 60
rounds of mortar shells into the barracks
area and selectively hit targets at the air-
field?ignoring fuel supplies?apparently was
relatively small. According to the latest re-
port, about 100 men attacked the airfield,
half of them assigned to the mortar batteries.
"A dozen or two" were seen in the barracks
area.
One Vietcong prisoner was taken, it was
said. He was described as badly wounded
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and every effort was being made to save his
life.
The size of the U.S. forces at Pleiku was
not given here. The Vietcong attack ap-
peared to be in company strength. Vietcong
companies are estimated at 100, about half
the size of a similar unit in the U.S. Army.
There is no reliable indication of Vietcong
unit strengths, officials here stressed. Only
for guidance to 'U.S. forces, the Vietcong units
are estimated as: platoon, 25 men; company,
100; battalion, 450 to '700; and regiment, 900
to 1,100. No Vietcong units stronger than
a regiment have been officially recognized.
By comparison, a U.S. Army platoon num-
bers 45, a company 200, a battalion 1,000, and
a division 15,000. Brigades are composed of
battalions and vary in strength. Any unit of
two or more divisions would comprise a corps.
South Vietnamese Army units are similarly
organized.
Exxmrr 2
[From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1966]
PROTECTING U.S. FORCES
From a military no more than from a po-
litical point of view can the successful Viet-
cong attacks against U.S. bases in South Viet-
nam, which killed or wounded 134 Americans,
be brushed away in cursory fashion.
At Pleiku, as at Bienhoa last November,
Communist guerrillas easily evaded South
Vietnamese security guards, and laid down
mortar fire on airfields and barracks. A Com-
munist patrol even penetrated the perimeter
defense and attached demolition charges to a
barracks. U.S. planes and helicopters, nicely
lined up like "sitting ducks," were destroyed
or damaged.
It is true, as Secretary McNamara said, that
it will never be possible to provide complete
security against raids and sneak attacks for
all American installations in South Vietnam.
But that statement is a useless generaliza-
tion; there is never any such thing as com-
plete security in any war.
Certainly far better security than has been
provided is possible, and has now become
absolutely essential. The Hawk missile bat-
talion, now assigned to South Vietnam,
merely complicates the problems of local se-
curity; the missiles?if they are to provide
proper antiaircraft protection to airfields?
must be widely dispersed on high ground
normally well beyond the airfields' perime-
ters. There is no use sending missiles to
South Vietnam if they are going to be blown
up by saboteurs.
? Local security for American installations
can be tremendously strengthened by as-
sumption of responsibility for local security
of installations largely staffed or used by
U.S. forces. If American-manned aircraft
are going to operate from Vietnamese bases,
the planes and their crews deserve protection.
U.S. Army engineers or Navy Seabee bat-
talions could build dispersal revetments for
parked aircraft in South Vietnam, bunkers
and shelters for personnel and sandbagged or
protected barracks.
If the Pentagon is to continue to order
U.S. military personnel to Vietnam, it has the
obligation to provide them with the best pro-
tection possible.
Emirs= 3
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 9,
1965]
TODAY AND TOMORROW--THE VIETNAMESE
AFFAIR
(By Walter Lippmann)
It is hard to believe that the raid on the
American installations in South Vietnam
was not closely related to Prime Minister
Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam. It is hard
to believe, too, that Mr. Kosygin would have
picked the day after his arrival in Hanoi to
touch off the raid. He was in no position to
help the Vietcong to carry out the raid nor
to protect North Vietnam against American
retaliation, It is most probable, therefore,
that the affair was ordered and directed by
men who intended to spoil Mr. Kosygin's
mission in southeast Asia and to interfere
with his role as a principal power in bringing
about a negotiated settlement.
Most probably, therefore, the gambit was
directed both against the Soviet Union and
the United States, which happen to have a
parallel interest in preventing a big war in
eastern Asia and of containing the expansion
of China. The administration is no doubt
right in interpreting the raid on Pleiku as a
test of American will. Had the United
States refrained from retaliating, the Chi-
nese and their supporters in Asia and else-
where would have called it a demonstration
that the United States is a paper tiger, and
that therefore the Soviet policy of peaceable
coexistence is unnecessary and absurd. The
other side of the calculation was that if the
United States reacted, as in fact it did react,
it would demonstrate that in Asia the Soviet
Union is a paper tiger unable to defend its
clients.
From the Chinese point of view the gambit
worked successfully. It showed, on the one
hand, that the Americans are highly vulner-
able on the ground in South Vietnam; it
showed on the other hand that the Soviet
Union has no power to protect east Asia
against the United States.
Much depends on what lessons are drawn
in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, and Wash-
ington from the affair.
We have had a very clear demonstration
of the strategic reality in southeast Asia.
The American Army at Pleiku was unable to
protect itself against a comparatively small
guerrilla attack, against a force estimated
officially at about two squads and one pla-
toon. The American forces got no warning
of the attack from the Vietnamese people in
the nearby hamlets where the raid was pre-
pared. It got no protection from the Viet-
namese security guards. In fact, when asked
at his Sunday press conference whether the
United States could not protect its own forces
in South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara re-
plied that he did not "believe it will ever
be possible?and I think when / say this I
reflect the views of our Joint Chiefs?to pro-
tect our forces against sneak attacks of that
kind." Sneak attacks is in this case another
name for guerrilla wail- re.
But that is only half of the lesson which
was demonstrated this past weekend. The
other part of the lesson is that the U.S. fleet,
standing a hundred miles offshore, is capable
of inflicting devastating and unrequited
damage on the Asian mainland. There was
no power in South Vietnam to protect our
own forces or to retaliate. But at sea there
exists an enormous American power which
is quite independent of our forces on the
mainland.
The peace of the world may depend on
whether all of the powers concerned take
the meaning of these lessons to heart.
For us, the meaning is that the commit-
ment to participate in the land war in South
Vietnam is an entanglement, is a hostage to
fortune, which exposes us to defeats and
humiliations. The best that the more con-
vinced believers in the commitment can say
is that if we stay there long enough and
accept the losses which they regard as toler-
able, the Chinese and North Vietnamese will
eventually grow tired and become different.
For myself, I would not count too much on
American patience being greater than
Chinese patience. It is less likely that the
American people will wish to wash their
hands of the whole business of containing
China if they do not have to lose American
soldiers week after week in a war that can-
not be won on the ground where it is being
fought.
The meaning of the affair must not be
missed in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. Let
them remember that, reduced to its funda-
mentals, the situation is that the U.S. pos-
February 9
sesses paramount sea and air power in the
far Pacific, and no one can count on such s
degree of restraint in the use of that power
that it will never be used. The United States
is not a paper tiger. That phrase reflects the
greatest delusion on which our adversaries
could possibly gamble. The truth is that
President Johnson profoundly desires to
avoid war but his power to do that is not
unlimited nor can he be counted on not to
be provoked if the provocation is continual
and cumulative.
There should be no mistake about thif
anywhere.
EXHIBIT 4
[From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1965]
THE DANGERS IN VIETNAM
The Vietnamese situation has entered a
new stage. The war will not be the same
since the Vietcong attack on Pleiku and the
reprisals against North Vietnam which con-
tinued yesterday. It seems axiomatic of this
type of warfare that it either escalates or it
stops. For the present, it is escalating and
becoming more expensive in lives and more
perilous every day.
Pleiku has once again proved, as Secretary
McNamara said, that the American forces
cannot protect themselves against this type
of sneak attack. Its sequel served notice on
Hanoi?and indirectly on Peiping and Mos-
cow?that the United States will retaliate
when Americans are attacked. The whole
affair indicates forcibly that the long-recog-
nized dynamism of the Vietnamese conflict
has risen to a dangerous level.
Secretary McNamara says that the situa-
tion has not reached a crisis; but it has done
so in the sense that the United States is
becoming less and less able to restrict the
conflict to minor proportions. The possible
choices of action or inaction are being stead-
ily whittled down. The United States is
gradually approaching a point where it either
goes on to a major engagement involving
North Vietnam and Communist China, or
it actively seeks a diplomatic solution, which
amounts to a disengagement on reasonable
and honorable terms.
President Johnson has in the past denied
that the United States has any intention
of carrying the war to North Vietnam. Yet
he considered it necessary in the past few
days to help the South Vietnamese raid
North Vietnam twice. Since it is not to be
expected that the Vietcong in South Viet-
nam will cease their attacks or their tactics,
and since Peiping and Moscow are committed
to help Hanoi, the dangers of the future are
only too obvious.
The Americans working on the Vietnamese
problem in Washington and Saigon must
often feel as if the problems have a night-
marish or fourth dimensional quality. West-
ern ideas, modes of thought, and methods
do not function as it seems that they logi-
cally should. Mortars and bombs do speak
a universal language; but they may ulti-
mately lead to the unthinkable conclusions
of a nuclear war.
The only sane way out is diplomatic, inter-
national, political, economic?not military.
A solution will not be found by exchanging
harder and harder blows. Surrender is out
of the question and victory for either side is
impossible.
Perhaps a new start can be made from an
untried base?that Americans, Vietnamese,
Chinese, and Russians are all sensible human
beings who are ready for peace in southeast
Asia, or at least willing to consider it. There
would be prices to pay, but there would be
gains as well as losses. Diplomacy is surely
not yet a lost art or a dead language,
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
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The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYD.,
INGS In the chair) . Without objection,
it is so ordered.
THE CONGRESS AND A NUCLEAR
NAVY?ARTICLE BY SENATOR
JACKSON
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, my
distinguished colleague Senator JACKSON
recently examined the case for a more
rapid development of our nuclear pow-
ered naval forces in a penetrating article
entitled "The Congress and a Nuclear
Navy." The Senator has earned a well-
deserved reputation for foresight in ques-
tions of national security and has often
been in the position of urging necessary
programs on a reluctant Defense Depart-
ment.
I recommend this article to my col-
leagues and ask unanimous consent that
It be printed at this point in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KEN-
NEDY of New York in the chair) . Is
there objection?
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From Navy magazine, October 1964]
THE CONGRESS AND A NUCLEAR NAVY ,
(By Senator HENRY M. JACHSON, chairman,
Military Applications Subcommittee of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and
Member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee)
Today the central Issue for America is this:
How can we best protect our national secu-
rity, promote our economic well-being, and
safeguard individual freedom?
In the light of history it is clear that our
vital national interests depend on a certain
imbalance of power favorable to the free
peoples?an imbalance which will persuade
those who might threaten aggression to cease
and desist
I strongly believe that America's current
military posture is basically well designed to
serve our foreign policy purposes; namely, to
create power relationships which will dis-
courage expansionist states from using force,
or threatening its use, to pursue their goals.
Essentially, our military policies and pro-
grams?together with those of our allies?
are designed to deter the use of force not by
an all-or-nothing brinkmanship, but by con-
vincing an adversary that we can and will
respond appropriately to his provocations,
whatever they may be.
SHOULD EXPLOIT SEAPOWER
Today, we have a powerful and versatile
military deterrent?and the American Gov-
ernment has acted to maintain its credibility,
by giving evidence of a will to use our
power?if necessary. In the confrontation
over Cuba, when Khrushchev found that he
might be starting something bigger than he
was ready to risk, and when he discovered
that our will was firm, he moved to get his
missiles out. In the Gulf of Tonkin, we re-
taliated quickly?but with fitting restraint?
against the unprovoked attack upon U.S.
Navy ships in international waters. We gave
clear evidence that we were no "paper tiger."
In the process, the significance of seapower
and the freedom of the seas was dramati-
cally highlighted.
By and large, the United States has done
a good job in recent years in building its
military strength. The present danger is
that we may not capitalize on certain clear
advantages which we have won. I have par-
ticularly in mind our unexcelled seapower
and our long lead in nuclear propulsion for
naval vessels. We have advantages in this
area shared by no other power. We should
exploit these advantages in order to main-
tain a clear superiority in seapower over our
adversaries.
Some of us in Congress have been con-
cerned for a long time to develop a nuclear
powered fleet as a strong support and re-
source in the conduct of American policy.
Today there are a whole series of potential
trouble spots around the world which we can
get to by way of the great waterways?if we
will make the best possible use of our oppor-
tunities. And in this era of revolutionary
change and sudden crisis time itself is a most
precious factor. A nuclear fleet is sustained
power at sea. With sufficient nuclear capa-
bility we can focus maximum naval power
in a troubled area in quick time, and stay
there as long as needed to restore stability
and lend support to those who fight for free-
dom. Such a capability could mean the dif-
ference between a successful implementation
of foreign policy objectives?or a failure.
With it we could handle several crises simul-
taneously?and in these days crises never
seem to come one at a time Or in just one
part of the world.
FLEXIBILITY AND CHOICE
Furthermore, a nuclear-powered fleet is
a multipurpose weapon?providing both a
strategic weapons system and a series of
options in dealing with limited conflicts and
the continuing problems of the cold war.
This floating security system includes the
following elements: strategic weapons?the
nuclear missile and the jet bomber; a moving
airfield; airlift for ground troops; a floating
base for Marines; and a formidable American
presence which speaks with the language
that no adversary can miss.
Such a multipurpose system offers us
needed flexibility and a choice of means in
pursuing our foreign policy purposes.
We are all aware of what our nuclear sub-
marines can do. We are already well under-
way in the transformation of our submarine
arm into a modern deterrent force. To date,
we have authorized the building of 41
Polaris submarines and 45 attack subma-
rines?all nuclear. It was appropriate that
our first emphasis should have been in this
area, for in the recent past our greatest
need was to build as rapidly as we could,
a highly invulnerable nuclear retaliatory
force one that could survive an enemy's
surprise attack, and strike back with devas-
tating effectiveness. I well remember going
to the floor of the Senate in 1967 to argue
for a greater effort and a higher priority
for the submarine missile-launching system.
As a member of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, I joined with my committee
colleagues to speed development of the
Polaris program?and we are proud of the
major contribution the Congress made in
this historic effort.
Today, Polaris has taken its place as a
formidable element in our strategic deter-
rent force, contributing to our vital lead over
the Soviet Union in nuclear strike power.
THE LEISURELY DOD
But are we moving as fast as we should
to develop a nuclear-powered surface fleet?
I believe the answer to this question is "No."
I do not believe one can justify the very
leisurely effort of the Defense Department
in building nuclear-powered surface ships.
Only three units have been completed, con-
stituting the first all nuclear-powered task
force, the carrier Enterprise, the cruiser Long
Beach, and the frigate Bainbridge. Only one
other nuclear warship is under construc-
tion?a case where Congress upgraded to
nuclear power status one of the conventional
destroyer leaders requested in the 1962 sub-
mission. The Defense Department accepted
the change, and the second nuclear-powered
destroyer leader Truxtun was laid down
June 17, 1963. However, no more nuclear
surface warships have been programed for
the future.
It is indisputable that nuclear propulsion
provides significant military advantages for
surface ships?just as it does for our sub-
marines?notably the quantum jump in
speed and mobility.
The nuclear ship can go anywhere in the
world and do its assigned job--without lo-
gistic support. There is no concern for re-
plenishing propulsion fuel.
The operational advantages in time of com-
bat are self-evident.
BETTER AND BETTER CORES
A nuclear carrier is capable of not only
sustaining its own requirements for a far
longer period than a conventional carrier,
but it can also provide support for conven-
tional escort vessels.
Our technology is rapidly improving. Since
the first nuclear aircraft carrier went to sea,
reactor fuels have been developed which
produce twice the power and last twice as
long as the fuel used by the Enterprise. Our
nuclear engineers are developing new nu-
clear fuel core designs that will provide nu-
clear energy to last the life of the ship. In
the words of Vice Adm. John T. Hayward,
former commander of the first nuclear task
force and now commander of the antisub-
marine warfare force of the Pacific Fleet;
"I have learned, often through bitter ex-
perience, that real improvements in our
hardware are only made through building
and evaluating in service. You don't even
know your true problems, much less solve
them, as long as you stay on the drawing
board. Tremendous improvement has been
made in nuclear propulsion plants in the
past decade. In order to continue making
improvements we must expand our building
program for nuclear-powered ships."
The increased cost of nuclear power is not
significant in relation to its military advan-
tages. Our Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy?after careful review?estimated that
the total lifetime cost of the nuclear carrier
with its aircraft is only about 3 percent more
than the lifetime coat of the conventional
carrier with its aircraft.
The practicability of nuclear power for
surface ships has been graphically demon-
strated by the successful operations of the
Enterprise in the Cuban crisis and by the
spectacular round-the-world cruise of his-
tory's first nuclear task force. _
A PROTOTYPE FORCE
Today we have a prototype task force?
and it has proved its worth and its reliabil-
ity. What we need next are several opera-
tional task forces. We should program them
in orderly fashion and start producing them
promptly.
In the early years, Congress found it nec-
essary to combat the reluctance within the
Defense Department to use nuclear propul-
sion for submarines. Now history seems to
be repeating itself?there is evidence of a
marked reluctance with the Defense Estab-
lishment to use nuclear power for surface
vessels.
It is no secret, of course, that faulty judg-
ments by responsible Government officials
may destroy a good project whose time has
really come. No project is so good that it
cannot be stalled or killed by overanalysis?
or by unsound analysis.
After hearing Defense Department wit-
nesses cite certain cost effectiveness com-
parisons to support their contention that the
advantages of nuclear, propulsion in surface
warships are not particularly significant, our
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy unani-
mously concluded that those Defense De-
partment studies contain a fundamental
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weakness that negates their validity. As the
unanimous, bipartisan Joint Committee re-
port of December 1963 stated:
"The comparisons cited were based on the
assumption that, in wartime, logistic sup-
port forces will be able to operate un-
hampered and without losses as they do in
peacetime. The defect in this analysis is
immediately apparent.
"We must plan for time of crisis. It is
precisely in such situations that the superior
mobility, maneuverability, and reliability of
nuclear warships will give the United States
an unequaled naval striking force. It is
fundamentally illogical and wasteful to fit
our new first-line warships with powerplants
that are, perhaps, already obsolete."
Well, Congress continues on the alert. We
cannot let the Navy get committed to a
future of planned obsolescence.
Our adversaries are acting to improve
their capabilities over, under, and on the
seas. The Soviet 'Union is seeking to gain
control of strategic waterways as part of
its long-range plan to doneinate or neutralize
vital channels of commerce from Gibraltar to
Panama to southeast Asia.
Now is the time to capitalize on the great
advantages which our lead in nuclear power
development has given us. We have the
knowhow. We have the resources. We have
the example of how handsomely our bold
action in the Polaris program has been re-
warded.
A final word: The fact that the Congress
has supplied much of the energy to build a
nuclear Navy vindicates the wisdom of the
Founding Fathers in establishing at the
heart of our system of government the prin-
ciple of congressional review?the duty of
the Legislature to subject to its tests the
judgment of those in positions of authority
In the executive branch,
SOUTH VIETNAM?ADDRESS BY
HON. WILLIAM P. BTJNDY TO
WASHINGTON, MO., CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE
Mr. SYlVIINGTON. Mr. President, in
an address delivered some 2 weeks ago to
the Washington, Mo., Chamber of Com-
merce, our distinguished Assistant Sec-
retary for Par Eastern Affairs, the Hon-
orable William P. Bundy, carefully
reviewed the historical and political
factors involved in South Vietnam and
southeast Asia. His informative re-
marks will be helpful in evaluating and
understanding the tragic course events
have taken this week in South Vietnam.
/ ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Bundy's analysis of American policy in
South Vietnam and southeast Asia be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM ANO
SOUTHEAST ASIA
I would like to speak on the topic you have
chosen?American policy in South Vietnam
and southeast Asia?totally without regard
to partisanship. That topic and the issues
it raises concern all of us, as Americans.
I shall talk, if I may, to three related sets
of questions:
I. How did we come to be in South Viet-
nam? How does what we are doing there re-
late to our wider purposes in the world, to
our specific purposes in Asia, and, in a word,
to our national interests?
II. What has been the course of events
in Vietnam that has brought us to the pres-
ent situation?
III. What are the key problems, and what
can we do to help in solving them and in
achieving our objectives?
The first question requires a look at his-
tory.
Even when the Far East was much more
distant than it is today, we Americans had
deep concern for developments there. Amer-
icans pioneered in trade and missionary ef-
fort with China and in opening up Japan to
Western influence. In 1898 we became in a
sense a colonial power in the Philippines,
but began almost at once to prepare the
way for independence and self-government
there?an independence promised by act of
Congress in 1936 and achieved on schedule
in 1946. By the 1930's, we had wide inter-
ests of many types in the Far East, though
only few direct contacts in southeast Asia
apart from the individual Americans who had
served over decades as political advisors to
the independent Kingdom of Thailand.
Events then took a snore ominous turn.
We became aware that the ambitions of
Japanese military leaders to dominate all of
Asia were a threat not only to the specific
interests of ourselves and other Western
nations, but to the peace of the whole area
and indeed of the world. China, in which
we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th
century system of foreign special privileges,
was progressively threatened and large parts
overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked
at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We
responded to aggression by conducting with
our allies a major Pacific war that cost the
United States alone 272,700 casualties and
over a hundred billion dollars.
In the end Japanese militarism was de-
feated, and the way apaprently cleared for
an Asia of free and independent national
states that would be progressively freed of
colonialism, that need threaten neither each
other nor neighboring states, and that could
tackle in their own way the eternal prob-
lems of building political and economic
structures that would satisfy the aspiration
of their peoples.
That kind of Far East was a pretty good
definition of our national interests then. It
is equally valid today. We cared about the
Far East, and we care today, because we
know that what happens there?among peo-
ples numbering 33 percent of the world's
population, with great talent, past historic
greatness, and capacity?is bound to make
a crucial difference whether there will be
the kind of world in which the common
ideals of freedom can spread, nations live and
work together without strife, and?most
basic of all?we ourselves, in the long run,
survive the kind of nation we are determined
to be. Our basic stake in the Far East is our
stake in a peaceful and secure world as dis-
tinct from a violent and chaotic one. But
there were three great flaws in the 1945 pic-
ture after the defeat of Japan.
1. In China, a civil war had been raging
since the 1920's between the Government, led
by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Com-
munist movement. After a brief and edgy
truce during the war against Japan, that civil
war was resumed in circumstances where the
Government had been gravely weakened. We
assisted that Government in every way pos-
sible. Mistakes may have been made, but in
the last analysts mainland China could not
have been saved from communism with-
out the commitment of major US. ground
and air forces to a second war on the
Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent
threat from Soviet Russia against Europe
and the Near East, we did not make?and
perhaps could not then have made?that
commitment. And there came to power on
the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Commu-
nist regime filled with hatred of the West,
with the vision of a potential dominant
role for China, but imbued above all with
a primitive Communist idealogy in its most
virulent and expansionist form.
2. In Korea, a divided country stood un-
easily, half free and half Communist. With
our military might sharply reduced after the
war, as part of what may have been an in-
evitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our
forces and reduced our economic aid before
there was in existence a strong South Korean
defensive capacity. With Soviet backing,
North Korea attacked across the 38th paral-
lel in June 1950. With the Soviets then
absent from the U.N. Security Council, the
U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and
to mount a U.N. effort to assist South Korea.
The United States played by far the greatest
outside role in a conflict that brought 157,530
US. casualties, cost us at least $18 billion in
direct expenses, and in the end, after Com-
munist China had also intervened, restored
an independent South Korea, although it
left a unified and free Korea to be worked
out in the future.
In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected
three elements:
A recognition that aggression of any sort
must be met early and head on, or it will
have to be met later and in tougher circum-
stances. We had relearned the lessons of the
1930's?Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland,
Czechoslovakia.
A recognition that a defense line in Asia,
stated in terms of an island perimeter, did
not adequately define our vital interests;
that those vital interests could be affected
by action on the mainland of Asia.
An understanding that, for the future, a
power vacuum was an invitation to aggres-
sion, that there must be local political, eco-
nomic, and military strength in being to
make aggression unprofitable, but also that
there must be a demonstrated willingness
of major external power both to assist and to
intervene if required.
3. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a
third major flaw, the difficulty of liqudating
colonial regimes and replacing them by new
and stable independent governments. The
Philippines became independent and with
our help overcame the ravages of war and
the Communist Huk rebellion. The British,
too, who had likewise prepared India and
Burma and made theniihdependent, were in
the process of doing the same in Malaya
even as they joined with the Malayans in
beating back a 12-year Communist subver-
sive effort. Indonesia was less well prepared;
it gained its independence, too, without sup-
port, but with scars that have continued to
affect the otherwise natural and healthy
development of Indonesian nationalism.
French Indochina was the toughest case.
The French had thought in terms of a slow
evolution to an eventual status within some
French union of states, a concept too lei-
surely to fit the postwar mood of Asia. And
militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen
to the leadership of dedicated Communists.
We all know the result. Even with sub-
stantial help from us, France was unable
to defeat the Communist-led nationalist
movement. Despite last-minute promises of
independence, the struggle inevitably ap-
peared as an attempt to preserve a colonial
position. By 1954, it could only have been
won, again, by a major U.S. military
commitment, and perhaps not even then.
The result was the settlement at Geneva.
The accords reached there were almost
certainly the best achievable, but they left
a situation with many seeds of future
trouble. Briefly:
1. North Vietnam was militantly Commu-
nist, and had developed during the war
against the French an army well equipped
and highly skilled in both conventional and
subversive warfare. From the start, North
Vietnam planned and expected to take over
the south and in due course Laos and Cam-
bodia, thinking that this would probably
happen by sheer decay under pressure, but
prepared to resort to other means if needed.
2. South Vietnam had no effective or popu-
lar leadership to start with, was demoralized
and unprepared for self-government, and
had only the remnants of the Vietnamese
military forces who had fought with the
French. Under the accords, external mill-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX
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_
Facing the Facts in Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARXS
HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
or .4,trroarnA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tue$day, February ?9, 1965
Mr. LIPSCO1V113. Mr. Speaker, the eyes
of the world are focused on Vietnam.
The deceitful, ruthless Communist at-
tacks on South Vietnam bases a few days
ago emphasize once again the importance
of that struggle and the lengths the
Communists will go in gaining control
over all of Vietnam and southeast Asia.
Recently, on January 26, 1965, Richard
M, Nixon discussed the Vietnam problem
with the Sales Executives' Club of New
? York. His message was most timely,
penetrating, and appropriate, and I com-
mend it to the attention of my colleagues
In the Congress.
Under leave to extend my remarks, I
submit Mr. Nixon's speech for inclusion
In the REcoao:
"FACING THE FAurs ij VIETNAM"--ADDRESS or
? RICHARD M. NIXON, SALES EXECUTIVES CLUB
OF NEW YORK, JANUARY 26, 196$
I would like to take as my tcl-t today one
of Winston Churchill's statements which
Will lead us to a discussion of what I believe
is the most important decision that Lyn-
don Johnson, the President of the United
States, and the American people will make
during theSe next 4 years.
Let Me read this statement. The time,
1938, immediately after the partition of
Czechoslovakia. Churchill, speaking in the
House of Commons, said this: "The belief
that security can be obtained by throwing
a small state to the wolves is a fatal delu-
sion."
It was true then. I think it is also true
today. And, as you might have guessed, I
am referring to another small state?not in
Europe, but in Asia?the state that is much
In the news today because of the troubles
we are having there, Vietnam.
This subject has been discussed so much
that you are, perhaps, tired of it. Cer-
tainly many Americans are very tired of
-What hag been happening to Americans?to
our Embassy, to our consulates, to our li-
braries, and to our people in Vietnam where
we are trying to help.
We get the impression that the Vietnamese
- do not want to help themselves, and so take
it out on us, It wonld be very easy to be-
come frustrated at this point, to become
defeatists, to throw up our hands or to find
out how not to handle the situation, which
is the usual ,weapon of diplomats.
But I would suggest that this week, while
tributes to _Winston Churchill are being paid
'all over the world, we should remember what
he said in 1936.
I Would like, to talk about Vietnam in
terms of American public opinion, of the
stakes that are there for Americans in the
and tj9a cbOlce ?Lija.juk _811,Quld_ zwilKe?
First, what is American _ public opinion
concerning Vietnam today? This can be
broken down into different_ _groups. The
first is the growing group that is following
the line of Senator Molts; of Oregon. They
say, let's wash our hands of the place and
get mit?bef Ore we are thrown out. Every
poll indicates that more and more Amer-
icans -are frustrated with is happen-
ing there and want us to 'get out.
The second group?also growing?perhaps
the largest in the country, seems to be rep-
resented by most of the editorial support of
the major Eastern papers. They feel that we
Must find a negotiated Solution to the.prob-
lem. We must neutralize Vietnam, on some
Sort of guaranteed basis. ?Senator Furaszcnr,
,chairman of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, is the major spokesman for this group.
Walter Lippmann is, perhaps, the major
spokesman among the Nation's columnists
and pundits.
Then, of course, there is a third group?
perhaps the smallest?which contends that
the way to end the war in Vietnam, and the
only choice for -America, is to find a way to
Win it.
There is unanimity in all of these groups
over one point: Our present course of action
in Vietnam will not do. And I want to be
very blunt about that. We are losing the
war in Vietnam, and if there is not a change
in strategy, we will be thrown out in a mat-
ter of months, certainly within a year. This
is the problem that confronts America today.
Let's see what the stakes are. What is
this battle -all about? We start with one
small state, as Winston Churchill would
have termed it. It is not a very important
state, as states go. Only 15 million people.
But, looking at those people and this state,
we find that the great majority of those
15 million people do not want to come under
Communist domination. They have heard
-from their friends in North Vietnam and
know what communism is. They have proved
that they are willing to fight to avoid becom-
ing Communists.
A great lie has been perpetrated through-
out the world, not deliberately, but perhaps
by oversight, to the effect that the South
Vietnamese will not fight for their own free-
dom. But 200,000 casualties suffered in the
battle against communism proves otherwise.
This is Vietnam, 15 million people, not
wanting to be Communists, very bravely
fighting with 60 percent of their country al-
ready under Communist domination. Look-
ing at those people and that small state, I
think that perhaps everybody in this room
would probably say it is not worth risking
a war?a big war?over those few people and
that little state.
This is only part of the stake. Let us look
at the bigger part.
What if the stake also included all of
Southeast Asia? You have heard this be-
fore, and many now tend to downgrade this
kind of analysis because they think it is too
pessimistic. But I have made four trips
through this area, two in the last year, and
these are my conclusions:
First, if Vietnam is lost, all of Southeast
Asia is lost. Look at the surrounding coun-
tries. Laos has already been lost. Cambodia
is leaning so far in the direction of commu-
nism that Vietnam could push it over the
brink. Thailand-is a country that wants to
be on our side, but it is a nation that has
always been on the winning side, and this is
the only way its independence has survived
for a thousand years. Burma is an economic
slum, with immense problems and immense
pressures, and it will go. Malaysia could not
possibly stand with its 10 million people
a1.lrrou4sied by a sea of communism.
Then there is the biggest prize in south-
east Asia, Indonesia. News about Sukarno
has not been pleasant lately, but the prize
A551
is 90 million people on the richest land in
that _MUM. area, with an immense mineral
potential which has hardly been tapped.
What will happen to Indonesia? A re-
porter from the New York Times on Jan-
uary 8 wrote from the scene: "Diplomats
think Sukarno is heading toward alinement
with Communist China. Communist suc-
cesses in Vietnam have convinced him that
_Chinese communism is the wave of the future
In Asia."
That is why the battle in Vietnam is not
just about Vietnam. It is about Indonesia,
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and all the rest.
If the Asians in that area?who have been
overrun by the Japanese and the Chinese?
get the impression, as Sukarno has, that be-
-cause of what is happening in Vietnam the
wave of the future is communism, they are
going to go Communist before the wave en-
gulfs them.
That is not all of the story. The big-
gest prize of all is, of course, Japan,
a miracle of development and the great-
est industrial power in Asia?the only coun-
try with the possible chance to counterbal-
ance China once China develops its indus-
trial might.
?The 200 million in southeast Asia, next to
the United States, form the biggest trading
area for Japan. If these people come under
Communist domination, or are influenced by
Communist control, Japan will inevitably be
pulled toward neutralism, toward even pro-
communism, in order to survive.
I remember a very graphic illustration of
this many years ago at the beginning of the
Korean war. One of our top experts on
communism, when asked if we were justi-
fied in going into Korea to save that coun-
try, said that what we have to realize is
that to the Communists the war in Korea
is not about Korea, but Japan. Of course,
be was right, because if Korea had gone
Communist at that time, when Japan was
just recovering from World War II, Korea
would be like a dagger pointed at the heart
of Japan. Japan would possibly have been
pulled toward neutralism, or even commu-
nism.
The fall of southeast Asia would produce
an even greater impact, and in summary, this
is waht is involved: The battle for Vietnam
is the battle for Asia. It affects southeast
Asia and Japan. In the long run, the Pa-
cific could become a "Red sea."
How? Look again at the map. Indonesia
stretches a thousand miles across the Pa-
cific, and is only 14 miles from the Philip-
pines. You can see what would happen if
Indonesia came under Communist domina-
tion and the Philippines were subjected to
guerrilla activities which presently exist in
Vietnam.
There are even greater stakes in what I
would call an almost mystical sense. They
are mystical in that they involve what goes
on in the Communist mind, both in Mos-
cow and in Peiping.
We've all been reading about this conflict
that began between Khrushchev and Mao,
and now seems to have been swept under the
rug for the moment. Oversimplified, this
conflict is really an argument between the
"hardliners" and "softliners" in the Com-
munist world. The "softliners" want co-
existence with the West, and don't wish to
provoke another confrontation such as we
had recently in Cuba. They want to beat
the West through economic competition.
The "hardliners"?not only those ivho
dominate China's Government, but those
now in a minority in the Soviet Govern-
ment?take a different view. They say
world communism can only gain its ultimate
objective through the continuing support of
revolution throughout the world. They be-
lieve that rather than downgrade this kind
of operation, they should step it up in Viet-
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A552 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? APPENDIX February 9
nam, in Africa, in the Near East, and in
Latin America.
In the event that Vietnam falls, or is neu-
tralized, which is the equivalent of falling,
this will be an immense vindication of the
"hardliners," who will then be able to argue
that if it worked in Vietnam, it will work
every place. They will say that the West has
no effective answer to indirect aggression.
Let us go back to our analysis of Korea.
The Korean war had to be fought, and this
war did one thing, if it accomplished nothing
else. It stopped the Communists from using
"overt aggression" to accomplish their ob-
jective of taking over a country. The prac-
tice proved too dangerous.
The war in Vietnam involves indirect ag-
gression?the taking over of a country by
revolution. Our capacity to meet indirect
aggression is what will determine whether
we get in or stay out, find a way to win, or
agree to neutralization.
But let us see if there really is an easy
way out of this dilemma. We have already
indicated that Vietnam is being lost the way
we are presently waging the war, or helping
the Vietnamese to wage it. Is there an easy
way out?
The most popular suggestion first, neu-
tralization. Sounds good; after all, Switzer-
land is neutral, Holland is neutral, Austria
Is neutral?why not Vietnam?
The same situation does not apply. When
we have a nation immediately, bordering on
an immense power complex such as Com-
munist China, neutrality, when you agree to
it, is only surrender on the installment plan.
Look at Laos. We entered into the Laotian
neutrality agreement with the 'best of inten-
tions. We thought this meant that Laos
Would be saved. But what it finally meant
is indicative of the fate of Vietnam.
Neutrality, where the Communists are con-
eerned, means three things: We get out; they
stay in; they take over.
Neutralism Will not Work, though it sounds
good as an easy way otit. It ls a good way
to inform the people of Asia that we are an
the losing side and that eventually the Com-
munists will win.
The second point of view is also popular,
and part of the "how-not-to-do-it" school.
This school of thought prevailed at the time
of the murder of Diem. In effect, it was
said that before we can have it military vic-
tory We must have political reform. Those-
subscribing to this principle find out all the
difficulties involved in winning the wax; in
Vietnam and, particularly, point out Sane-
thing that is very true?there is greatpoliti-
cal dissension in that country at the present
time. The Buddhists are tremendously
stimulated and, in many cases, controlled by
the Communists.
We had political reform, and Diem is gone.
Still a military victory eludes us. This same
school still holds that we must have politi-
cal reform before military victOry.
I couldn't disagree more *ith this kind
of thinking. We in America must learn that
America's form of democracy works well
here, although it is not a very easy system
to run. But it cannot be Imposed on peoples
With entirely different backgrounds in Asia,
Latin 'America, and many other places of the
werld.
When we proceeded on the assumption
that political reform had to come' before
Military victory, / was there in Asia soon
afterward, talking with the chief of 'state
of another country friendly to the United
States. He told me that the murder of Diem
Meant to him?and to many other Asian
leaders?just three things: It's dangerous to
. be a friend of the United States; it pays to
be a neutral; it sometimes helps to be an
enemy.
This same deadly pattern seems to be ea-
pilling some of our policy decisions in
Vietnam.
There is another easy way out. This one
sounds to Americans?particularly to the
philanthropic, good-hearted people of this
,great country of ours?as the real solution
to guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. They say to
make the people happy by providing the rice,
food, schools and all of the other things that
make for the good life. When they have all
of these things, they feel, the Communists
will not be able to take over.
I wish this were true. It would cost us
only money, and no lives.
But a conversation / had With a village
chief proves otherwise. When I asked him
what one thing he would want if he could
get it from the United States, he replied
simply that all he wanted was security. Not
a new well, more rice, a better school, more
peace corpsmen?just security. And small
wonder. In a village only a few miles away,
the Communists had torn its chief apart
only a few nights before.
We finally get back to the very difficult
decision we have to make. We must realize
there is no easy way out. We either get out,
surrender on the installment plan through
neutralization, or we find a way to win.
It is not easy to win. It is very easy to
say that if we just extend the war to the
north it will end within a matter of months.
But, this may not be the case. Most of the
military experts agree that unless we, in
effect, "qiiarantine" the war in Vietnam by
cutting off all Communist-dominated inter-
ference froiii Communist North Vietnam and
from Laos, there is no chance for the South
Vietnamese to defeat the guerrillas in South
Vietnam.
/ believe- this is the decision we should
make?"qUarantine" the War and use Ameri-
can air and sea power to cut supply lines
and destroy staging areas in North Vietnam
and Laos which now flake it possible for the
guerrillas to continue their actions.
But let itte make one thing clear: There
should be no use of atomic weapons. They
are neither necessary nor advisable. We
should use American manpower only in the
air and on the sea. The South Vietnamese
can handle the ground fighting.
Let us look at this strategy. It is a risky
one. Won't the Communist Chinese come
into the war? It would be very easy to re-
assure you that they would not come in. I
don't believe they will. On the other hand,
in making a decision to win the war in Viet-
nam we must not disccamt that risk. Now
is the time to face up to the fact that what
we are dealing with in Vietnam is Chinese
Communist aggression.
It is dangerous and foolhardy to try to
gloss over the truth as to what the war in
Vietnam really involves:
First, the war in Vietnam is not about
Vietnam but about southeast Asia.
Second, the confrontation in Vietnam is,
in the final analysis, not between the Viet-
namese and the Vietcong nor between the
United States and the Vietcong, but between
the United States and Communist China. If
Communist China were not instigating and
supporting the Vietcong, there would be no
war in Vietnam today.
Third, a U.S. defeat in Vietnam means a
Chinese Communist victory which could de-
aisle the fate of Asia for generations to come.
In summary, the risk involved in ending
the war in Vietnam by winning it is far less
than the risk involved in losing it.
Looking-for example, at Red China's posi-
tion, let us consider the reasons they might
not enter the war.
At the present time, the Soviet Union and
Red China are enernies not allies as they
were at the time of the Korean war. From
that standpoint, this is the best time to stop
Chinese aggression. The Soviet 'Union is not
now interested in the Chinese gaining suc-
cess in Asia, or any place else.
Second, without the Soviet Union, Com-
munist China is a fourth rate military
power. With the Soviet Union's logistical
support, it could be dangerously formidable.
Third, time is not on our side, but on Red
China's side. Every day that passes, the
Chinese nuclear capability increases. Five
years, ten years?we might not be able to
make a stand there, or any place else, with-
out risking a nuclear war. Now we can.
We must also recognize that the Chinese
industrial capacity at present is very small,
compared to what it will be later. Anyone
who has visited Hong Kong or Taiwan knows
what the Chinese people can do when their
remarkable personal characteristics are mo-
bilized in an industrial society. In 15 or 25
years, Red China could become one of the
great industrial powers of the world.
The question is, do we wait until then or
do we now show them that we want to live
In peace with them and with others but that
we will not tolerate direct or indirect aggres-
sion in which they impose their form of gov-
ernment upon the people of another nation
against their will.
There are risks, yes. But the risks of wait-
ing are much greater. This becomes apparent
when we look ahead and realize that if South
Vietnam is lost, and southeast Asia is lost,
and the Pacific becomes a Red Sea, we could
be confronted with a world war where the
odds against us would be far greater.
All that I have said Is somewhat pessimis-
tic, but I would like to leave one optimistic
note with you. While the military, political,
and strategic problems are immense, from
the standpoint of good news I can assure you
that the battle of ideas in Asia has been
won, and is being won, day after day.
Ten years ago, the Communists werE
arguing in South Vietnam that to go Com-
munist would mean a better way of life
This is not the case today. People all one/
Asia know that in Communist China and
North Vietnam life is not nearly as good a.5.
it is in Japan, Taiwan, or Maylasia and
Thailand, the countries that have chaser
freedom rather than communism or social-
ism. This message is sweeping that vast
area of the world.
So at a time when we have won the
ideological battle, our problem is: Can we:
now prevent the Communists from accom-
plishing through raw power what they can-
not accomplish through persuasion?
The course of action I advocate is one
that is not popular in America and would
probably not get a vote of confidence in
Congress or by a Gallup or Harris poll. i
will remind you, however, that Winston
Churchill, in 1911, took a very unpopular
stand when, seeing the buildup of the Ger-
man fleet, insisted on taking the Royal Navy
and modernizing it. But the British people
were forever grateful that he did it, because
the British fleet saved Britain in World
War I.
Before World War II, Churchill was like a
voice in the wilderness talking about
Czechoslovakia and stopping Hitler. It was
unpopular then, both in Britain and in the
United States. But, when he became Prime
Minister, the British, American, and all free
peoples were grateful that he had the vision
to see the danger. When this danger be-
came apparent to everyone, he was there t)
lead them.
In 1946, we heard of the Iron Curtain, in
an announcement by a major world states-
man that the Soviet Union, which had bee
our ally during the Second World War, was
now a potential enemy of freedom.
Nearly everydne assumes that whe a
Churchill made that speech in 1946 that it
was mer with universal acclaim. Not at all.
In America and in much of the free world,
Churchill was chided for being a wai-
monger. But, within a year came the Greek -
Turkish aid program and the Marshall plan,
and he was proved right.
I would suggest today that we have a
similarly difficult problem in southeast Asia.
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v.1-4 -11,-k, ,
CONGlitSiONAL RteOltD ? APPE rx
And. I repeat Churchill's statement: "The`
belief. that security can be obtained by
throwing a small state to the wolves is a
fatal delusion:" -
think that we in America, in this genera-
tion, are fortunate that we have the privilege
to live in a century which produced a man
like WinstonChurchill. We will be even
more fortunate if we heed his words as we
honor his memory..
?
Ifs, Including Taxes; Mark 1965 Outlook
1 OF
/tilt/4Si? Ot? H,BMARKS
,
HON 1 BRADFORD MORSt
- '
1'14 tilt Heitisk. fitringst6.4'iliWar-
_
?
.111onqay, Fellruary 8, 1965
*r". Mb t&.' Mr. Speaker, in a year-
end ecortanic review of Massachusetts
business in the Boston Herald, George
Minot covered theproblem Of the impact
Of shifts in detense'spendirig.- I-Te cold-
Merited: ' ?
.?:(here is any Serf -evtdent fact, it is that
New England will make as significant a con-
tribution fO" a world that may well be
gradually disarming as in one where military
defense neasTsarily occupies as large a role
as it does now,
' This IS a fiealthy realization Chatiiiith
a little.irnag,nat p our econoiny can r -
spend to economic changeand move on
to even 'greater achievements.
This goal Will not be achieved without
great deal of thought and preparation-,
but Mr. Minot's article is a hOpeful sign
that the'apProPfiate steps Will be taken.
I insert his article in the CM:ioatsSIONAx.
RECORD: n
_
IFS, INCLUDING TAXES, Manx 1965 OUTLbOK:
M.o...rraay Lossss CAN BE MET
(By George Minot)
Its too had these flrSt-of-the7Year buSiness
..and industrial reviewa don't mean *hat the*
say?they' are not 'reviews at all. 'If they
were, the articles in thein would be far easier
to write.'
. For New ,England lied a big year in -1964.
In almost every field you can think of?from
ind).istry to recreation and agriculture?those
who put their shoulders to the wheel came
.o.tit Well.
There were big 1464 advances in trans-
portation, in education, and in cleaning out
old area anl, inaking them new. -
Visitors 'to Boston Would hardly know the
place. The West Mid, the North. End; and
the South End?all are undergoing major
face-lifting Operations. Boston no longer
gives the impression it is living on past
glories. It is alive, going forward. -
It IS still The "hub" .of all New. England.
The prosperity Of the entire section 'depends
more on the ,prosperity of Boston than many
Massaehnsette -legislators or officials from
other Staps.., Sometimes are Willing to ad-
mit. Keret one need- hardly be told, are the
great educalional institutions, the great
ninedical.Penterat the treat ninsfcal and scien-
tific centerS.
.
_Here?and, you hesitate a minute?is the _
otttle.,"Reci ?,o?c,,,. and the nruin,s. And
the, only p ac-e-Chey Can go is ' up?to the
eminence Of.Pie ics:1 or instance.
But in a first-of?Lthe-year review you don't
want to look back on what happened or didn't
happen in 1964.
It's 1965 that intprests you now,
When you start to talk about what is going
to hapen in coming months you at once be-
gin to tread on more- dangerous ground.
There are too many of those things the ex-
perts call imponderables. For instance, there
Is. the matter of taxes.
If you look at any of the State capitals,
or if you have listened to some of the in-
augural addresses of incoming Governors
these last few weeks, you will notice that
all of them need money.
Gov. John W. King, the first Democrat
to win reelection as Governor of New Ramp-
sire on_._ a fine record he made in his first
terin, ks 'going to seek the first increase in
State taxes Since 1957. Along with most
other Governors in . this section, he sees a
ne.3.(1 for, increased aid to education, a pay
raise for many State ernifloYees; and reorgan-
ization of State departments to make them
more efficient.
The story is much the same in Vermont,
where another Democrat, Philip H. Hoff, was.
first elected 2 years ago, that State's first
Democratic Governor - in 169 years. Re-
elected in the great sweep of last November,
_Heft now, for the first time in the State's
history, has -renew Democrats in the jobs
of lieutenant governor, State secretary,
treasurer, auditor of accounts, and attorney
general. -
-Maine didn't elect a Governor last fall,
and Republican Gov. John H. Reed continues
0111.ce, but now he has a legislature solidly
controlled by Democrats: Reed is seeking
a budget of $175,418,000 to operate the State
for the next 2 years, of which almost $10
million is for supplemental appropriations.
To pay for this program Reed is seeking a
tax increase on timberlands and tobacco
end, like Governor-Xing in New Hampshire,
wants a markup in liquor prices, both these
_States being in the liquor business.
Massachusetts, perhaps more than its
neighbors to the north, needs a broader
tax base. During the campaign Governor
Volpe talked a great deal about a sales tax
which its advocates say would bring in
$125 million or more revenue. But in the
past the State legislature and the labor
leaders have hesitated to recommend this
- -,?
source of revenue,.
Each year there is talk about a State lot-
tery or legalized off-track betting. The
Money' derived from these questionable
sources hardly would be a drop in the
bucket, however, because the needs of the
State are so large.
While the New England States are search-
ing frantically for new and painless money
sources, State officials always keep in mind
the high rate of tax mortality among poli-
ticians. Taxpayers continually are demand-
ing more services; they want bigger and
better schools and highways, for instance,
but they show a tendency to vote against
candidates and elected officials who talk too
much about higher taxes to pay for these
things.
They keep in mind such facts as that in
the 5 years from 1958 to 1963, State and local
tax rates rose twice as fast as Federal taxes.
They are told that State and local taxation
is now increasing twice as fast as income, and
economists tell them that since World War II
the Federal debt has gone up only 20 percent
while State and local debt has gone up some
600 percent.
There is an optimistic side to the tax pic-
ture, because the Federal Government has
promised a "substantial" reduction in excise
taxes which make up a $11 billion package
and cover almost everything from automo-
biles to whisky. Nobody knows yet what the
people in Washington mean by "substantial,"
Or Which taxea,,,w_gi_hp, cut or when.
. Businessmen hear all I-arts' 'Of--rumors,
speculation, and informed word. And hun-
dreds of them, representing practically every
excised-taxed industry or business in the
Country, are on -record regarding the "ur-
gency" of outright elimination or at least
reduction in Federal excise taxes. Overall
reduction probably will wind up in a House-
'
-A553
-Senate conference, and a good guess would
be that the tax cut would run between $3
and $4 billion.
Thus if the tax picture is cloudy as bustnessmen look into 1965, so is the matter of
the whole economy. There are a number of
"ifs" on the horizon. There:
If there is a steel strike.
If the steel companies further raise prices.
If the Federal Reserve is forced by the bal-
ance of payments to tighten money.
If Britain devalues the pound.
If the situation in southeast Asia should
develop into a major conflict.
If the outflow of gold is stepped up drasti-
cally.
If the predicted leveling-off in business,
which many persons predict for the latter
part of the year, should develop into a down-
turn.
Most
of these things, of course, will never
come to pass. But they make the outlook
more cloudy than the easier task of looking
back through 1964. In that year, despite
some heavy layouts in individual electronic
plants and the continued shrinking of the
once-dominant textile industry, this region
still showed a gain of 34,100 jobs from the
year before, with just short of 4 million
persons employed in nonagricultural jobs.
Statistics perhaps do not mean much to in-
dividuals who either are gainfully employed
or are looking for work?anymore than do
long-range forecasts?but anybody interested
in New England business cannot help but
see that the area will gain tremendous eco-
nomic advantage through the location in
Cambridge of the huge National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's research center?,
once the political and local squabbling ceases
over just where its final site will be located.
Most of the prophets of doom who were
so noisy not many weeks ago about the pro-
jected closing of such military installations
as the Portsmouth Naval shipyard at Kittery
and arsenals at Springfield and Watertown
are quiet now.
They have made their protests to the New
England congressional delegation and re-
ceived assurances that the politicians in
Washington would see what they could do.
But the chances of any reversal are almost
negligible.
Those protesting today are the same ones
who told you that New England never, would
survive the blow of some 40 years ago when it
became evident that a considerable part of
New England's textile industry was moving
South.
This area proved capable of adjusting itself
then and attracted new industries and
changed its pattern of economy.
The defense conversion and military cut-
backs present a problem, but there is no
question that these challenges cannot be
met at all levels of the economy. And there
is no reason that good planning should not be
able to turn this problem into an opportu-
nity.
The statement has been printed many
times, but it cannot be emphasized often
enough: that New England has scientific and
technical skills unequaled in any other part
of the country, and that it has a "labor mar-
ket" the envy of other localities.
Here, small businessmen and those who
work for them have the know-how, a term
perhaps impossible to define, but something
that is recognized all over the world. No-
where is there a work force so highly and so
individually trained. Nowhere are there edu-
cational institutions that can surpass Har-
vard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Brandeis, Tufts or Northeastern.
The whole impact of the gradual change-
over in the defense and disarmament fields
is going to upset many areas in months to
come. Nevertheless, if there is any self-
evident fact, it is that New England will
make as significant a contribution to a world
that may well be gradually disarming as in
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4554 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 7----APPENDIX February 9
one where military_ defense necessarily occu-
pies as large a role as if does now.
Take a single *tappet one7.Pro?ilikt ,ix1;:t he
other day biriEv.erett WareilBMith,:president
of the Nevi, gland Cormc ,It Was tnat:of
Presque Isle, Maine.
Two or three years ego that northernMaine
community lost its nar missile. base.
Along with it, the: orinniurifEY lost 235 civil-
ian.jobs and some 1,200 mory personnel.
Instead of cbllapidng, Prestige Isle brought
,,900 new jos into the area .to replace those
which ware lost: When ths base doped.
Everybody there got behind a: drive to build
Presque Isle, into .a bigger, stronger, and more
vital area than ever before.
What this conarannity dicl others can do.
And will:
Our Responsibility to the Aged
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON, HENRY HEI,STOSXI
Or NEW ,SEEST
IN TFEE HOUSE OF REPRE8ENTATIVES
,
Tuesday:Fcbruary p 1965
Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr.. Speaker, the
anbje_ct of medical care and hospitali*-
tion Tor the aged has brought to my
office, and I assume, to many offices. a
vaat volume of 'mad. Moat of the corre-
spondence which have reeeived to date
has been from my constituents, who eX-
prested themselves in favor of a medicare
plan which would alleviate their financial
hardship in obtaining proper and ad-
eqUate medical attention.
We all know, that the elderly- citizen
does not possess the necessary funds to
properly treat is ailmentkwhich require
immediate and full attelltiOn through
qualified and trained personnel.
Among the many letters which I have
rpe1'ed%o date. there ca,me a very timely
and thotight-Provoking article which ap-
peared in the Bergen Record of Satur-
day, January 30, 19-55. Two of my con-
stituents, Mr. Prank Uhl and Mr. Murray
-Cianhaxd, have directed my attention to
the article, which I think should be
brought to the attention of this honor-
able body.
!_llierefore, under leave to extend my
.reinarks, I am Including the article which
refer to above:
GOLDEN YEARS : AGED POINT tri' MORAL ISSUE
(By Thomas Collins)
The Federal, Government recently lent
$25,000 to a cooperative in Louisiana that was
engtiged hi making fruitcakes. It was a 15-
ye5r loan, at 4 percent.
A288-year'-old retired man or woman who
has cancer 'Would like a little of that :benevo-
lence. They can't have it. If they could bor-
TOW V5,000 " they" might be :able to buy a
-cure. 'Ai le* they could buy a softening of
the 'ain and kerne cbnifort for the' time re-
zna*ring_to them. "
A couple' o'finefiths ago a severe drought
spread across the United States. Counties
began appealing td the- Federal Government
for einergency help. The U.S. Agriculture
nellartnient cine through, offering drought
aid to 900 counties in about 27 States.
Aniong other things, it offered livestock feed
at cutrate prices to livestock raisers in 24
States.
The 66-year-old retired man or woman who
is 'twined with arthritis cannot get cutrate
medicines, or doctors, or hospitals?or cut-
rata anYthing they need to save their lives
arid Stop their hurting.
If you think this column is building up to
an endorsement of Medicare you are Wrong.
If you think it is building toward the premise
that our Government will do more for a
fruitcake or a hungry hog than it will for a
pensioner in pain, you are on firmer ground.
In the drought crisis the Agriculture De-
partment went further than cutrate live-
stock feed. It offered emergency loans to
farmers in 928 counties to tide them over the
crisis.
The 66-year-old retired man or woman can-
not get from the Government an emergency
loan to tide them over a heart attack.
Tornadoes, hurricanes, and such, usually
bring forth greater benevolences than fruit
cakes or hogs. A tornado can roar through
the property of people in any region of the
United States, lifting the room, knocking
down the fences, and upsetting the privy in
the backyard * * * and amid the glorious
publicity about it all that comes in the
papers and on TV to the victims, and the
tributes paid to their courage, they can get
bovernrhent help to get back on their feet.
The 66-year-old retired man or woman
lying in lonely courage at home with a bleed-
ing storhach can get no help unless they can
pay for it. They can declare themselves
paupers and get some help. But the fruit-
cakes, the hogs, and the privy need no decla-
ration of poverty?only people.
A farmer raising one of the major crops
of the country can get from the Government
an all-risk insurance policy that provides
protection for his crops. A 66-year-old
retired man Or woinan can't get the Same
thing for their health.
A city or town can get lots of money from
the Small Business AdMinistration of the
Federal Government to develop their com-
munities and get life moving again. The
town puts up $2; the Small Business Ad-
ministration puts up $8.
The 66-year-old retired man or woman,
lying in a semi-invalid condition all across
our country and yearning to get life moving
again would like a little of that.
The things that are said here have not
been designed to say it Is right for the Fed-
eral Government to be giving away so much
Money for so many causes. Nor is it in-
tended that they give the impression that
the ailing old folks should get on the gravy
train that is passing by.
Rather, these words seek to point up the
fact that some of the hunian beings around
us are not so important as voters, and not
so important as economics.
This is one of thegrave moral issues of our
time. It is beyond the practical and the
economic. It gets into the realm of our re-
ligious beliefs, and what kind of people are
we. Politics, the medical profession, and
health insurance companies shouldn't decide
it?our moral concepts should.
Older people in this country are in urgent,
painful need of better medical considera-
tion than they are getting. Anybody who
wants to dispute this will have to come up
with something better than the 2,000 letters
a month this column is getting from the
people who do the suffering,
Supplemental Appropriations for the
Department of Agriculture
SPEECH
OF
HON. PAUL H. TODD, JR.
OF ALICIIIGAN
IN THE HOUS,E OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 8, 1965
Mr. TODD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in op-
position to the imposition of restrictions
on our conference committee. This is
not a politically wise position for a new
member from my district. However,
both I and the distinguished Congress-
man whom I succeed, the Honorable
August Johansen, were sent here to vote
according to our own best judgment after
the arguments had been properly heard.
He did not, and I shall not, do otherwise.
We are about to decide whether we re-
solve today, before proper and thorough
studies by this Congress, an issue which
Is in no way related to the urgency of the
supplemental appropriation to the CCC.
We vote on whether we abandon or con-
tinue a system of committee study which
has assisted Congress to order thought-
fully its activities.
The advantages to be gained by yield-
ing to our emotions are obvious. The re-
sponsibilities of this body lie elsewhere.
Let us properly hear the arguments on
these two unrelated issues, soon but at
another time, and decide them individ-
ually, and on their own merits.
Address by Mayor Robert F. Wagner
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LEONARD FARBSTEIN
OF NEW YORK
IN IRA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, January 26, 1965
Mr. PARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, it ?s
my privilege to submit herewith the key-
note address by Mayor Robert F. Wag-
ner, of New York, at the Gracie Mansion
Conference on Narcotics Addiction held
on February 3, 1965.
The mayor has recognized this very
serious problem and obviously is making
every effort to cope with it. I am certain
that under his expert and knowledgable
guidance great progress will be made to
eradicate this scourge. I am particu-
larly pleased to bring to the attention of
this body the accomplishment of the city
of New York in this connection.
The address follows:
KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY MAYOR ROBERT F.
WAGNER AT GRACIE MANSION CONFERENCE
ON NARCOTICS ADDICTION
I thank each and every one of you who
have come here for this Gracie Mansion Cot -
ference on Narcotics Addiction.
I hasten to explain to the literal-minded
from out of New York that the New York
Hilton Hotel is not considered to be an e.-
tension of Gracie Mansion. We hope to have
some of you at Gracie Mansion tomorrow.
Unfortunately, the limitations of space c.,t
Gracie Mansion are such that the entire
conference could not be convened or con-
tained there. Nevertheless, I hope that all
of you attending this conference will feel
that you are, indeed, meeting under the aus-
pices of the highest level of the executive
branch of the city government, That was
my intention in convening the Gracie Man-
sion Conference on Narcotics Addiction.
At this point, I want to make a keynote
statement for this conference. My hope and
expectations are that from this conference
will emerge signposts in the direction of
new programs and modifications of existing
ones; in addition, we will look for the out-
lines of a plan for greater collaboration and
concert in the conduct of the massive effort
required to deal with the narcotics problem,
and even for a mechanism for fuller and
freer, exchange of information on new devel-
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