DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI: ADDRESS THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100200003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 15, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director Frank D. Carlucci
Address The Commonwealth Club
San Francisco, California
Wednesday, November 15, 1978
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AMBASSADOR SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK: ...the Congo, Tan-
zania and Brazil, where he was Counselor for Political Affairs.
Returning to Washington in 1969, he served two years with the
Office of Economic Opportunity, one year with the Office of
Management and Budget as Deputy Director, and two years with
Health, Education and Welfare as Undersecretary. In 1974, he
returned to overseas service as U. S. Ambassador to Portugal
during the turbulent times when socialism and communism were
locked in their own wrestling match over Portugal.
Our guest has received Distinguished Service awards
from three departments -- State, HEW and Defense; an honorary
doctorate from two universities. Not only is he is a distin-
guished public servant and wrestler, he also served briefly as
an officer in the U. S. Navy, which would provide a bond of
professional interest with both the Director of the CIA and
and the President.
We are delighted to welcome a gentleman that's got
very serious and profoundly important responsibilities. Ladies
and gentlemen, may I present to you the Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, Mr. Frank C. Carlucci.
[Applause.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much,
Ambassador Black, President Javits. After that introduction,
I'm not sure whether I should give you a speech or wrestle.
I will try the former.
As I thought about the topic of the real issues facing
the CIA, a plethora of subjects lept to mind. And I tried to
distill them down to essentially four. Well, let me give them
to you directly and then go over them.
Number one, the nature of the external threat. Number
two, the challenge of the changing nature of the intelligence
business. Number three, the imperative to define the role of a
secret organization in a free society. And number four, our
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ability or inability, as it may be, to protect our vital informa-
tion; in particular, our sources and methods. Let me look at
these one at a time.
In terms of the nature of the external threat, I sup-
pose there were some of us in the early 1970s who were thinking
in terms of the changing adversary, a new kind of world order,
a different kind of relationship between the big powers. And
indeed, it is fair to say that all of us hoped that this will
come about. But there have been two events, at least, that have
occurred in the mid and late 1970s which have certainly at least
raised warning signs. First are the rather extensive and blatantly
imperialistic activities of the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxy
in Africa. This has reminded us all too clearly that communist
doctrine is a revolutionary doctrine and that it is directed at
the kind of free society that we represent. I had an opportunity
to observe this at firsthand in 1975 in Portugal.
Secondly, we have all watched the increasing resources
being devoted by the Soviet Union to its defense establishment, or,
better stated, Its offensive establishment. The United States de-
votes somewhere between five and a half to six percent of its GNP
to defense expenditures. The Soviet Union devotes more than double
that. In the past ten years, U. S. defense expenditure has actu-
ally declined in real terms. The Soviets' defense expenditure has
increased at a rate of about four or five percent per annum.
If we try to measure what they are doing in terms of
dollar value, that is how many dollars does it take to purchase
what they are doing in defense areas, we find that their effort
exceeds ours by some thirty-five to forty percent, certainly far
more than they need for their legitimate defense requirements.
Well, what does this mean in the intelligence area?
It means, first of all, that we have reached an era of strategic
parity. The United States no longer has a vast lead. Simply
stated, that means we can't afford to make any mistakes. A
couple of years back, missing out on some information on some
new alliance might not have made a difference. But today it could
make a difference both In political and military terms.
That is why we find our military commanders increasingly
placing more emphasis on intelligence, on what they call strategic
warning. Those few hours, those few days could make the critical
difference. An obscure troop movement somewhere, the movement of
some atomic weapons, the deployment of submarines, maybe a report
picked up by a strategically placed agent could reveal some intent
or some kind of new alliance.
Indeed, intelligence today could provide the critical
difference. And that, I suggest, is very real. We learned the
lesson awfully painfully in 1941 at the time of Pearl Harbor. And
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it was for that reason that the CIA was created.
Now since then, the nature of the intelligence business
has changed rather dramatically. And this brings me to my second
issue: the challenge that that change represents. Certainly we
still have to keep an eye on the strategic balance, and we have
to watch what the Warsaw Pact is doing. But that's not enough
in a complex, intriguing world. We also have to keep our eye
on regional and issue-oriented problems. A couple of years back,
it was enough just to take a look at one country and analyze that
country and say "Where is it heading?" That kind of analysis no
longer serves us very well.
Just take a look, for example, at the Horn of Africa,
Ethiopia and what's happening in the Ogaden and in Eritrea. But
you can't look at that in isolation. You have to look at what's
happening in Somalia, how does it affect the Sudan; what about
Egypt, what about the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen right
across the Gulf; how does the Cuban presence in Ethiopia relate
to the Cuban presence in Mozambique; what does this alI mean for
Angola. Indeed, you could make an analysis that would stretch
all the way from Zimbabwe up to Afghanistan.
So it's become much more complicated to look at nations
today. And it no longer serves just to have one country as your
specialty.
Secondly, we have to deal with a lot of issues today
that we didn't have to, things that were never dreamed of at the
time CIA was founded. Let's take the intention of some countries
to build nulcear weapons, a matter of intense concern to the ad-
ministration. And there are countries in the world that are doing
that, and they're doing it without trying to let anybody know about
it. And in many instances, it is only through intelligence that
we can find out.
Of course, nobody in his right mind would think of hav-
ing a SALT treaty if we didn't have the means to Implement it.
And that means will have to fall principally to our intelligence
agencies. Even such issues as the North-South dialogues have
have national security implications these days. And then we
have a couple of others that sometimes touch us in very personal
ways. The question of narcotics. The best way to stop the nar-
cotics trade is to stop it abroad. A lot of that information comes
clandestinely through intelligence.
Or terrorism. Practically the only way to stop terrorism
is to find out about it in advance, to have a penetration. For-
tunately, we've been spared a lot of that in this country. But
there is still a danger to our people abroad. And we in the in-
telligence business do try to penetrate terrorist groups, sometimes
successfully, sometimes not so successfully.
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And finally, there are the resource issues. Whoever
thought at the time that Central Intelligence was being set up
that we would be worried so much about the world's oil reserves
and what's going to happen. And whether or not you agree with
the study t h a t ' s been put out on th i s subject, I think you have to
agree that we made these studies in the interests of our national
security. And this requires very careful Intelligence collection.
Finally, there are the new techniques. And a lot has
been made about the technical systems, and indeed these systems
will be extremely helpful; indeed essential to verifying SALT.
Some people have said to me, "Well, you have the technical systems.
Why do you need the human element?" A very simple answer. The
technical system will tell you what happened yesterday and what
may even be happening today. But it can't tell you what's going
to happen tomorrow. It can't tell you what people's intent is.
And as long as we need to know the intentions, there will continue
to be a human element in the collection business.
Now, CIA for a number of years has been on the front
pages of your newspapers. There's been a lot more written than
we would like to see. It's not been the best climate in which
to conduct an intelligence operation. Some of the charges have
been sensationalist; others have been factual. But they have led
to what I believe is, by and large, a constructive debate. And
that is a debate on what the role of a secret agency in a free
society ought to be.
But Iet's try and put, first of all, some of the charges
into perspective without making any effort to defend against all
of the charges that have been made. But there is an impression
among some that the CIA intelligence community is some kind of a
rogue elephant on the loose. And let me just quote a few things.
The Church Committee itself, which conducted a far-reaching and, I
think it's far to say, not terribly friendly investigation of the
CIA, said [words unintelligible]. The Pike Committee, on the
House side, said, and I quote: "All evidence suggests that the
CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive
to instructions of the President and the assistants for national
security.',
Senator Inouye, the highly respected chairman of the
first Senate oversight committee, put it even more strongly. He
said, and I quote: "There's no question that a number of abuses
of power, mistakes in judgment and failures by the intelligence
agency have harmed the United States. In almost every instance,
the abuses that have been reviewed were the results of directions
from above, including Presidents and secretaries of State. Further,
in almost every instance, some members of both houses of Congress
assigned to give oversight were knowledgeable about the activity."
And to blame the CIA for implementing some of these poll-
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Gies is somewhat akin to blaming the Army for the landing in the
Dominican Republic, blaming Marines for the landing in Lebanon
in the mid 1950s. It was an organization that was carrying out
orders.
But be that as it may, I'm prepared to concede the
point that we have a credibility problem, or a political problem,
or both. And the best way to correct that problem is to reassure
the American people that a proper set of checks and balances have
been instituted, that the abuses that occurred in the past will
not re-occur.
And I think I can tell you in all candor that these
checks and balances do exist. And the Director and I practice
very much an open door policy. If people have dissents or grie-
vances, we're readily available. And the internal insepection
system has been strengthened, and it has a full mandate to look
into any charges.
Over and above that, the President has established by
Executive Order something called the Intelligence Oversight Board,
consisting of three distinguished Americans -- Tom Farmer, former
Governor Scranton, former Senator Gore -- which is entirely in-
dependent of the CIA. It reports directly to the President, and
it is empowered to hear any complaint of wrongdoing from any citi-
zen, anywhere, including CIA employees, without any reference to
to the Director of Central Intelligence.
And finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is
congressional oversight. The congressional oversight system has
been greatly strengthened in the past two years, both on the Senate
and the House side. I think we have constructive relationships
with our parent committees. But that doesn't mean that they don't
hesitate to criticize us, or to cut off our funds when they think
we're doing something they don't approve of. But this kind of
constructive oversight is welcomed.
Finally, we are in favor of seeking charter legislation
for the intelligence community. We think this kind of endorsement
by the people's representatives in Congress will be helpful. But
we also t h i n k that charter l eg i s l at i on ought to be just that: broad
legislation that gives us certain authorities and sets up procedures
to make sure there are no abuses of these authorities. It should
not be a form of micro management. And there are difficult issues
here. Some people say we ought to write into the charter that we
shouldn't overthrow democratic governments, and there shouldn't be
any relationship with the press, all of which sounds fine until
you get down to the question of trying to define what a democratic
government is. Or when you think about the press, does that mean
that the CIA shouldn't have a relationship with a TASS correspon-
dent? Oh, of course not. He's a communist. How about some other
countries that we may not like, but aren't communist? The question
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gets quite complex. When you start trying to legislative morality,
it becomes very difficult.
Let's take a look at terrorism. I mentioned earlier
that the best way to stop terrorism is to penetrate it. And
in several instances we've received information that has saved
lives, including lives of U. S. Ambassadors. But what do we do
when our agent in a terrorist group is ordered to go on a hit,
or maybe a bank robbery? Well, obviously, you don't authorize
him to go out and kill. But if we tell him not to, his life is
then in danger. A d i ff icu l t judgment to make; and even more
difficult to make in legislation.
I would suggest that the best way is through the nor-
mal procedures, and that is to have Congress confirm in office
executives in whom they will have the confidence to make the
difficult kind of judgment calls, and then to exercise the proper
oversight.
Now in coming to this, we have gotten ourselves into
situations where the micro management doesn't seem to make much
sense. You have a requirement, for example, that every time
that the CIA engages in anything other than pure intelligence
collection, something euphemistically called special activity
-- it used to be called a covert action -- there has to be a
presidential finding and we have to brief seven committees of
Congress, up to 140 people. It sounds fine, until the other day,
during the Moro kidnaping, we received a request for assistance
from the Italian government. They said "Could you send us a
psychiatrist who knows something about terrorism?" I said sure.
The lawyer came in and said "Huh-huh, that's not intelligence
collection. That's a specialized case. And to do that, you'll
have to get a presidential finding." The President happened to
have been visiting Brazil at that point. "And then you'll have
to brief these committees of Congress, 104 congressmen." I said
"What? To put a psychiatrist on an airplane?" The answer was
yes.
I called up the State Department and said "Do you have
a psychiatrist?" He said yes. I said "Will you please put him
on an airplane and send him to Rome?" That was that. But it
just doesn't make much sense.
Or let me give you a hypothetical example. Let's say
we have a democratic election in country "X." And a group of
generals begin to wonder about that election. They don't like
the candidates for election. And we have an agent in that country
who happens to be a general. And he comes to us and says "What
should I do? Should I side with the generals, or should I say
'Go pull off a coup?'" Well, if I understand the law, before we
give him advice, we would have to have a presidential finding and
brief nearly a dozen committees of Congress. And how long do you
think the name of that general will remain a secret? Obviously
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we're not going to give him advice.
And I simply put these kinds of issues out as the
type of thing that can be addressed and, I hope, simplified
in charter legislation.
My last issue, our ability to protect our sources and
methods, is probably the most fundamental of all. No matter how
sincere people are, it is simply axiomatic that the more people
know about something, the greater is the likelihood that it will
become public. And frankly, too many people know about what is
going on in our intelligence community today. And in fact, there
are those who make a career out of trying to expose the names of
CIA employees. There's a former CIA employee named Philip Agee
who prints in DuPont Circle, in Washington, D. C., a monthly pub-
lication called "Covert Action," which is designed, purely and
simply to expose the names of CIA people overseas and does so in
such a way that it clearly incites people to violence. And we
have some unhappy memories of that kind of thing.
Yet when we l o o k at ways to d e a l w i t h t h i s, we f i nd
that we antequated espionage laws. We have laws in this country
that make it a crime just to give out information from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture on crop futures, or to give out information
from the Department of Commerce, or information from the IRS.
But there is no such law with regard to national security. It
is only a crime if you can prove intent to harm the United States,
which is very difficult to do.
So it's no wonder that we have people who come into
the CIA, spend some time, go out and write a book, make some
money. And we find that our on l y legal remedy right now is a
civil suit; hardly adequate if we're going to maintain the in-
tegrity of our intelligence secrets.
And in fact, some of our laws wouldn't seem to help.
I mentioned Philip Agee before. Under the Privacy Act and the
Freedom of Information Act, we have three people in the CIA,
at least at the last count I made, who are spending ful ltime
supplying Information to Mr. Agee.
Now in terms of making information available to the
public, we favor it. And I think Admiral Turner spoke to this
group about it last year. Our agency puts out some hundred and
fifty finished reports on serious topics, such as economic develop-
ments in the Soviet Union, the steel industry in China, world oil
reserves. I think that serves a useful purpose, and we intend to
continue that. But at the same time, we find that we have diverted
109 man years to answering 85 Freedom of Information Act requests
a week; people writing in saying "Tell me all about the Berlin
Tunnel," one of whom was a 13 year old. It's not that I see any-
thing wrong with the Freedom of Information Act. But when it comes
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to an intelligence agency, it is virtually self-deafeating. We
spend 2.6 million dollars supplying this information, at approxi-
mately $540.00 per request, most of which goes to taking out
the national security information. So when the product emerges,
it amounts to very little, except that it's been helpful to one
or two authors.
Also as I understand the act, if the head of the KGB
were to write and say "Tell us about the KGB, what you have in
your files on the KGB," we would legally have to respond in ten
days. And if we turned down his request on security grounds, he
would have twenty days in which we have to respond -- we would
have twenty days to respond to his appeal.
Now, I suggest that we don't want to turn an agency
designed to provide our policy-makers with the best possible in-
formation to the purveyor of information to the world.
I can say that this is a matter of very serious concern
for us. The issue is very simple. Do we need an intelligence
organization? The answer is, yes. Then you have to accept the
fact that with that organization comes some secrecy. And secrecy
is not a new concept in our society. When we talk about the doctor-
patient relationship, the lawyer-client relationship, the secrecy
of grand juries, credit information, why should someone who pro-
vides information to the U. S. government be entitled to less
than that? Indeed, I find myself in agreement with our friends
in the press when they say they've got to protect their sources,
because if they can't protect their sources, they're going to lose
information. That's exactly our point.
A couple of differences. Their stand is based on a
constitutional interpretation which is still open to dispute.
Our responsibility to protect our sources is very specific in
the 1947 National Security Act. And in most cases, if they lose
their sources, they lose information. Quite frankly, in some
cases if we lose our sources, lives are at stake. So I think
it is a very serious issue.
I'm frequently asked, well, how do we stand? How do
we do vis-a-vis the adversary? And let me close on this note.
The KGB has more resources than we have. They have fewer re-
straints than we have. They operate with a pretty few hand.
They also have disadvantages. Technically, we're ahead. And
they carry around an awful lot of Ideological baggage. And the
worst way to deal with intelligence is from an ideological per-
spective. In many cases, Intelligence is bad news. And I would
not like to be the bearer of bad news to the Kremlin.
The fact is that our analytical capability is, in my
judgment, far superior to theirs. Yes, I still think we're num-
ber one, and we need to be number one. But we're going to have
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to run to stay ahead. We're going to have to work hard. We're
going to make progress, and to make that progress we're going to
need the support of groups such as this.
And I thank you very much for the opportunity to let
me make my speech here tonight.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
CHAIR: ...We have a large number of questions, which
is perhaps pointless because your response to some of them may
be understandably rather short.
...Concerning Iran, how does the CIA view the Shah's
present problems, and will he survive the current crisis? And
is the Soviet Union involved directly or indirectly?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, obviously trying to
answer those questions in a public forum is going to be very
difficult. The President has made some statements on Iran.
Certainly the problems are difficult and far-reaching. They
don't lend themselves to simple solutions. It's not the classic
case of right versus left. There are religious issues involved;
there're extremist elements on both sides involved. And there's
the question of how fast did the Shah go, or should he have gone
in modernizing the country, very complex issues. The problems
are certainly serious, and the President has made several state-
ments with regard to them. And I think I will rest on those
statements.
As concerns involvement of foreign powers, I have
no hard evidence at this point of any such involvement. One
can always speculate, but I don't think that would be very
valuable. I think the problems are principally internal pro-
blems. But I share the hope I'm sure of everyone in this room
when I say that I hope they will be successfully resolved.
CHAIR: Could the purported split between China and
Russia be a sham to throw the U. S. off balance?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: In a word, no.
[Laughter and applause.]
CHAIR: On "60 Minutes," a TV program two weeks ago,
an arms dealer claimed that Soviet small arms were of better
qua 'lity than those of the U. S. Is this true?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I think you would have to
ask an arms person, and I'm not one of those. Our job is not
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arms; our job is to collect intelligence. We see an awful lot
of Soviet equipment around the world, and much of it is very
effective. But I certainly would not consider myself qualified
to judge whether their small arms are better than ours or not.
CHAIR: What can the CIA do to counter the impression
that it is the most rigid bureaucracy in Washington, or its pro-
duct represents the lowest common denominator of several levels
of review by management?
[Laughter.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I can only say I hope
that's not the impression. Caspar Weinberger and I a couple of
years ago were in a department where we used to get accused of
that, too, HEW. I think a lot of these fellows thought that that
was the most rigid department in Washington. Now I find it's the
CIA.
The fact is that it's not -- all of Washington is a
bunch of bureaucratic problems. But let me say something as a
non-?C IA professional, but as a Foreign Service officer who has
worked with CIA people over the years; that this organization
consists of some of the most dedicated and able people that I
have ever served with. And just think about it for a minute.
Somebody who is serving overseas in positions of risk -- and
there are 35 stars on the walls of CIA, people killed in the
line of duty, some of whose names could never even be revealed;
people who work overseas quietly; in many cases, can't even tell
their families what they're doing. They accept that sacrifice,
accept difficult moral judgments that they have to work, essen-
tially because they believe in our society and they believe that
the information they are gathering is essential to protect it.
So my answer to the question is that if you have that
view, it is a distorted view.
[Applause.]
CHAIR: How far have we advanced toward pooling of
intelligence information rather than duplicating efforts -- the
Army, Navy, FBI, CIA and Treasury Departments?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: A good question. This is
one of the first issues that President Carter addressed when he
came into office. And he issued an executive order, #12036, which
set up the Director of Centeral Intelligence and a Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, which position I occupy. This gave us a
scope broader -than that of just the CIA. It gave us a responsibility
to hold the intelligence community together and to try and coordinate
better. The principal vehicle for doing this is the budget. And
the budget for intelligence organizations, no matter where they may
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be -?- the Defense Department, the State Department, somewhere
else --- go through the Director of Central Intelligence, as well
as through the respective secretaries. And by making this kind
of thorough examination, we are able to eliminate duplication
and enhance coordination.
Let me just make a comment. Generally, I share Caspar
Weinberger's view that duplication in government is so factually
bad. But in the intelligence community, the intelligence business,
it isn't always bad, because you aren't dealing with precise in-
formation. You are dealing with bits and pieces of information,
and how you analyze it can make all the difference in the world.
And we need to constantly challenge our analysts. And we need to
bring in diverse opinions.
So where it is appropriate, one of our responsibili-
ties is not just limiting duplication, but it is consciously to
encourage duplication.
CHAIR: Does the U. S. government spend enough on Cen-
tral Intelligence to keep this country adequately protected?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I recall my 0MB days.
And I think the truth is no agency head or deputy head ever feels
that he has enough. The President's got some tough calls to make
when he has to balance the budget. He's got very sound reasons
for balancing the budget. The intelligence budget, of course, is
kept secret. But I examined it in a great deal of detail. I
testified on it. And I am personally confident that we have the
resources to do the job.
As I listen to
and on the I ist, budget's
more important to address
to simply try to pour in
resources to do the job.
the critical issues
that
we face --
one [of them] -- I
think
it's more
some of the other
issues
than it is
more resources. I
think
we have the
Yes.
CHAIR: We now have time for one more question. And
before this last question is asked and answered, I wish to express
appreciation on behalf of the members of the Commonwealth Club of
California to the Honorable Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, for placing before us today the real issues
facing intelligence and the CIA. Mr. Carlucci's remarks, addressed
to a luncheon gathering in the Gold Ball Room of San Francisco's
Sheraton Palace Hotel, will also reach a far larger audience when
distributed to our membership of 14,000 and when we broadcast over
the club's many radio outlets.
At the conclusion of the response to this last question,
our meeting is adjourned.
Why is it that the British and the French are more suc-
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cessful than we in keeping a lid of secrecy on their intelligence
operations?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, if you're talking about
pure espionage and leaks, I don't know if that statement's correct,
without being too critical of our British and French colleagues.
We've all had our problems in terms of espionage.
In terms of the issues that I spoke of earlier, I think
the answer is quite simple. This country has gone through a period
of political turmoil that the British and the French have not gone
through. We've gone through a lot of soul-searching. We've had
to address some hard issues. And we have decided, as a society,
that we ought to try and define the role of an intelligence agency
in our society. Some of our colleagues in Europe think that this
is impossible. 1, for one, don't. I think it's a constructive
effort. And I think we will succeed. And I think in succeeding,
we will strengthen our Intelligence capability.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000100200003-5