REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE FRANK C. CARLUCCI DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000100180003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 80
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 2, 1980
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Remarks by
The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Intelligence
Association of Former Intelligence Officers
Tysons Corner, VA
2 October 1980
I hope those of you from the broader Intelligence Community will forgive
me if I put on my project manager's hat today and talk to you principally from
a CIA perspective. But, I think you will find my remarks will have applicability
throughout the intelligence Community.
As you all are aware the Agency is a third of a century old. Many of you
in this room pioneered its efforts and built the foundation. Many of you also
lived through the difficult days of the 70s. Today, our thoughts leap across
the 80s, which in my judgment will be an era of renewed strength and vigor for
the Intelligence Community, and for the CIA in particular. About two years ago
I talked to this convention. I admitted then that we had a lot of problems.
But looking at the other side of those problems, they really represented
opportunity.
You are aware of the dramatic changes in the climate that has taken place
and the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. Let me tell you a story
that illustrates my point. Some of you may have seen an ABC commentary done by
Brit Hume entitled "The Return of the CIA." I found a number of distortions in
that show and I told ABC so in a letter. I was asked to be interviewed for that
show and I agreed. I was filmed for well over half an hour. The bulk of the
questions were, "How did you guys to it? You were on the ropes a couple of
years ago and now you are coming back; now you seem to have an overwhelming
wave of support. What kind of trickery did you use; what kind of gimmicks?" I
tried to answer the questions in a straightforward way, talking about the
merits of the issues and why we were proposing various legislation. I answered
all the questions fairly and openly.
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Not one second of my interview was used on the film, although lots of
time was given to the critics of intelligence and the Agency. I was disturbed
at the time, but that is history now. The more I reflect on it, the less
disturbed I am. The point is we don't need to worry about those kinds of
problems. We no longer need to concern ourselves with that kind of political
attack. We do need to worry about the effectiveness of our intelligence efforts
and our capability to deal with the very serious problems of the world.
We see signs all around us of what those problems are likely to be. As
I speak there is a war raging in the Middle East between two countres whose
leaders are overtly hostile to the United States; countries where we don't even
have functioning embassies. To say the least, this makes the intelligence
tasks more difficult. Additionally, this war graphically brings home to us an
all too familiar problem -- our dependence on foreign oil reserves. Farther to
the East we watch the Soviets continue their invasion of Afghanistan. We also
are concerned about their continued support of Vietnam and that country's
attacks on Kampuchea. Closer to our own borders we see trouble in one Central
American country after another. Castro is engaging in renewed adventurism, and
we worry about the Caribbean islands and Cuban soldiers in Africa. Terrorism
is on the way up. Nuclear capability proliferates. Ten years from now what
countries are likely to have the bomb?
We as, a people tend to focus very much on our problems and think that world
affairs are a zero-sum game; they are not. The Soviet Union has problems.
Everyone in this room is aware of their declining growth rates, of rising
consumer expectations throughout the country. You are also aware that they are
wrestling with minority problems, labor shortages, declining oil production,
and their relations with China and Eastern Europe. All these problems come at
a time when the Soviet Union is at the height of its strategic power vis-a-vis
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the United States. These problems also come at -a time when there is likely to
be a transition in leadership -- a post-Stalin leadership that we really know
very little about.
We can take little comfort in the problems of the Soviet Union. To the
contrary, coupled with other trends throughout the world that I have mentioned,
they mean the 1980s will be a challenging decade, maybe even a dangerous one.
This realization is reflected in the turnabout in the intelligence budget, for
example. Obviously, I can't discuss the budget publicly, but I think we have
turned the corner with respect to resources. However, you and I know that good
intelligence requires much more than just money.
I have tried in my own thinking to break out what the principal requirements
for effective intelligence in the 80s are. First, I would list political
support and managerial direction. Second would be good people, and third would
be the ability to protect our sources and methods. Let me take each of those in
turn.
Political support. Since I have been in this job I have done a fair amount
of traveling throughout the country, speaking to a wide variety of groups.
I have never felt any public hostility toward the Agency. To the contrary, I
have sensed nothing but support and have become persuaded that the attacks on
the Agency are rather narrowly based. That public support is beginning to
manifest itself in changed attitudes on Capitol Hill. It is much easier to go
to the Congress now than it was formerly when some of you were responsible for
that chore. In Congressional hearings people are now saying, "What more can we
do to help you? What do you need?" The other day I went up for what I thought
was to be a routine budget hearing -- it had been-scheduled as a 45-minute
session. Two and a half hours later I came out of the hearing after the full
Committee had taken me on a tour of the world, from one crisis spot to another,
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asking, "What are you doing? What more can be done? What should we do?" This
is very positive. One of the most satisfying occurrences for an intelligence
organization is to have the country's political leaders use its product. I can
assure you that never in my experience has our product been in greater demand.
As they have become acquainted with our product, our political leaders have
manifested their support in very tangible ways-- sometimes in public statements
but often also in the quiet dialogue between us and the Congress on matters of
considerable importance.
On the questions of internal management direction, modesty keeps me from
going into much detail, but I will list several important problems. I think we
in the Agency have managed to pursue a very aggressive strategy on Capitol Hill
and that strategy is beginning to pay dividends. We have expanded the activities
of the Executive Committee, which started before I came into the Agency, and
now I think we have gained a'true sense of collegiality. The Executive Committee
meets in lively discussion two or three times a week. Almost all the major
policy decisions are now run through the Executive Committee. The Directorates,
I believe, have a real sense of participation. We have also strengthened the
participation of the different Directorates in the budget process, and I think
we have made strides in developing a more coherent Community budget. We are
moving for the first time to develop a modest Agency-wide planning system. We
are working hard on a better definition of goals for each of the Directorates
and for the Agency as a whole. We have also made fairly extensive modifications
in the personnel systems, which have not been without controversy. Some of you
may agree and some of you may disagree, but we do think that we have structured
a better planning and evaluation capability, and we do hope that we have
brought about a bit more equity -- not that it was inequitable before -- but
one always has to strive to improve a new system. Finally, I think we have
greatly increased cooperation with the Department of State, which is fundamental
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to our job, as you all know. We'have managed to resolve some nagging problems
which have gone on for years. Not that we have worked any magic,-but as I said
earlier, many of these things were underway when some of you were in the
Agency. We have tried to build upon them -- to strengthen our institutions.
You set high standards, but I think we are able to match them.
Let me now say a word about recruitment. The number of inquiries remains
high. Some 92,000 individuals inquired about employment in FY 1980. Of those
92,000, we hired 1,458, divided almost equally between clericals and professionals.
With such a large pool we could afford to be selective, and we hired only about
one out of a hundred. We have developed new procedures for processing applicants.
As you know we often lose good people during the long processing period. We
have now reduced the time to hiring professionals from 11 months to 2 or 3
months, and clerical hiring will be reduced to 40 days. We are keeping up the
quality. The profile of our new Career Trainees is one of people who are
bright, patriotic and dedicated. We are doing well even in the hard-to-get
categories -- minorities, engineers, computer scientists. Despite the increase
in Career Trainee hiring, the CTs score as high if not higher in their tests
than did their predecessors. Perhaps most importantly, the retention rate of
professionals at the Agency is one of the highest in government. The Agency
loses approximately 7% of its professionals annually, as compared to 13% to 15%
in the rest of the government. The Agency loses some 15% of its clericals and
the rest of government loses 35%.
But there is a problem in my judgment which has not yet hit the Agency with
its full impact. That is our ability to retain good senior managers. 1 spoke
last night to a group of businessmen. I asked them how they would run their
businesses if everyone in their firms from middle-level management up to Vice
President made the same salary, $50,000 a year -- that year after year each saw
his real income eroded. I also asked what they would do if their managers were
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subject to constant political attack -- and described as indolent and inefficient.
I further asked them how they would handle overseas problems which often
resulted in-families being uprooted, furniture lost, employees transfered on
short notice, and serious difficulty finding work for spouses. I finally
asked them what if their retirement system was one where benefits increased
faster if you retired than if you stayed on the job. I am not sure they
believed me when I indicated that this was the environment in which we worked,
but I know that you in this room are familiar with it. I greatly fear that
once the impact of all this is felt, the Agency may well begin to lose some
of its very valuable talent at the top. We have tried to address this issue by
instituting the Senior Intelligence Service which parallels the Senior Executive
Service established for the rest of the government. The only difference is
that we have included specialists as well as managers in the system. Under the
program we have designed, up to 23% of our supergrades can receive bonus
awards based on performance that will range from $20,000 a year to a low of 7%
of their salary. I think it is a very important step, not only because it
provides additional compensation but because it provides incentive. This new
program provides a management tool, and it makes all the managers look very
carefully at the whole question of performance. To assist in this we have
attempted to strengthen the performance criteria and guidelines used in evaluation.
Finally, the last ingredient in a good intelligence operation is the pro-
tection of sources and methods. We are in a profession that depends on training.
Indeed, one of the things we did just last month was to change the name of the
Office of Training to the Office of Training and Education. We must consider
ourselves past the point of mere training; we want to educate our people.
There are a number of tools of the trade -- there is analysis, work in.the
scientific area, technical work -- you are familiar with most of them. There
is one thing that cuts across all the lines, and that is the importance of
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being able to protect our information. Let's face it -- our country is becoming
known throughout the world as a country with a government that can't keep a
secret. I hear this everywhere I go. I am sure you do too, and that has begun
to hurt: us. Our critics say "prove it!" Trying to prove a negative is a very
difficult thing. Somebody that is not going to cooperate with you is not going
to tell you that they are not going to cooperate. But we have picked up enough
information to know this problem is impacting on us. Not that we are not
effective. We are still very effective. The issue is how much more effective
we could be.
The problems of protecting sources and methods, including protecting our
information and projecting the kind of image that an intelligence organization
needs to project, can in my judgment be divided into four areas: the Freedom
of Information Act, proliferation of books, the protection of identities and
the general atmosphere in which we operate. You are all familiar with the
problems we have had with the Freedom of Information Act. There have been some
4,000 requests. We spend 3 1/2 million dollars annually. Many of the requests
are on form letters obviously inspired by particular groups, and others are
probably from foreigners. We can't always identify the sender because we
cannot go beyond the request. We are not overly concerned about the workload
-- that is a secondary consideration. The issue is our ability to protect
information. Our critics say we have the exemptions that exclude us from
responding totally to a Freedom of Information request. We do, but there are
several problems with those exemptions.
First is with the sheer volume of requests, 4,000 a year, there are
bound to be some errors. Secondly, our judgment is subject to judicial review,
and our friends overseas tell us that they trust us, but there are some 400 or
so federal judges who have the final say on a release. "How do we know we can
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trust every one of those judges," they ask. We have had two cases where judges
have overruled us; one that is still pending, the other we managed to reverse
on appeal.
Another problem is what I call the mosaic problem. We do not know what
other information we release may be the final piece he needs. We held an FOIA
symposium not too long ago and a prominent journalist who writes extensively on
the Agency -- not always constructively -- said quite openly he uses FOIA
documents to get additional information. He takes the document to a former
employee and is able to get the employee to fill in the blanks that result from
Agency review.. Let me caution you against journalists who use that approach.
Indeed, I have a message to convey to this group from the Deputy Director of
Operations. Before I came here I asked the different Directorates if there
were any messages they thought I ought to bring to former employess. The DDO
said he had only one, "Please ask them not to talk to journalists."
The problem of books and authors has attracted a lot of attention. I won't
go into any detail here because I understand Dan Silver, our General Counsel, is
going to talk to you on this subject. Let me make just two comments. One is
that there are no friendly books. If a person is going to write a book, and
they have the right to write a book, they should not rationalize it by saying I
am going to do something that will help the Agency. Even the best intentioned
book raises a number of eyebrows from people who cooperate with us around the
world. I have thought and thought and thought about this problem, and I cannot
see how you can get a constructive book out of this. Secondly, we are trying
to institute procedures for review that are as equitable and as efficient as
possible. We can't always be as responsive as people would like us to be. We
are not going to censor your books; we are only interested in taking out
information that identifies sources and methods. Every time we put someone on
reviewing a book, it means we take them off some other function. That is a
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zero-sum game much like the Freedom of Information situation. People devoted
to processing FOIA requests and reviewing books are not carrying out intelligence
functions. We do what we need to, but it may be a little slower than people
would like it to be.
The third area is the problem of protecting identities of the people in
our Agency. There is no subject on which people in the Agency feel more
strongly, nor on which I feel more strongly. We must do something to solve
this problem. We have made some progress on cover arrangements. I have
testified before Congress on the strides we have made, and I have worked with
other departments and agencies. For obvious reasons I cannot discuss the
problems here, but cover is not the entire solution. There are of course some
on Capitol Hill who argue that all we need is better cover. Those of you here
in this room know that cover is bound to erode if you are going to be opera-
tionally effective. Cover is not the sole answer, and we see no reason why a
group of misguided Americans should be allowed to reveal the identities of our
people overseas for the sole purpose of disrupting the activities of the Agency
-- activities that have been duly authorized, and, indeed, supported by the
Congress. You are all familiar with the risks this puts our people under. But
it is more than the problem of risk, it relates to our overall effectiveness.
The two or three times I have testified on the subject before the Congress I
have asked, "What more do you need to act, another dead body?" I am quite
serious about this.
On the bill now under consideration, both intelligence committees voted
unanimously in favor. We also got a favorable vote out of the House Judiciary
Committee. In the Senate we ran up against some probems in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Hopefully, those can be worked out. Individual senators, particularly
John Chaffee, are very strongly supporting us. It is quite clear that if our
bill, that is the CIA/Department of Justice bill, reaches the floor in either
9
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House it will pass, and I think it is going to pass in a form acceptable to us.
However, we are up against a well orchestrated campaign misrepresenting what we
are asking for. One organization has put out a list of 18 stories and books
that they claim could not have been printed had the law we are advocating
now been in effect at the time. Our General Counsel's office. reviewed these
publications, and they could find no substance to that allegation whatsoever.
The stories could have been printed. The allegations are being picked up by
the press, and you have seen the editorials. One editorial after another talks
about the CIA stabbing the First Amendment in the back. The Department of
Justice has examined the constitutionality of the proposed bill at great
length, and they come out with a firm opinion that it is constitutional. We
did not get the identities legislation before the recess, but I can assure you
when the Congress reconvenes we are going to push harder than ever. There is
nothing higher on our priority list.
Finally, let me discuss the general atmosphere in which we operate. We
are in the age of the whistleblower and the investigative reporter. We are in
an age where documents are widely distributed throughout the government and
people, talk about openness. All are valid concepts. Investigative reporters
and whistleblowers have their role. However, one man's whistleblower is
another man's leaker. We have to create an atmosphere in which there is some
respect for legitimate national security information. The term national
security itself has been discredited for a number of years in this country, but
if we are going to survive in the 80s we had better put some content back into
I personally think we can solve all these problems in the 80s. The
political support is coming. I think we can maintain the quality of our
personnel. And, we are going to press just as hard as we can for the pro-
tection of sources and methods.
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As a non-professional I now just want to end by saying that I have been
deeply impressed and privileged to serve in the Agency with a number of talented
men and women. Some of them are here in this room. We can build on that
strength and on the contribution that all of you have made. The role an
organization like AFIO plays is important. People in the Agecy respect you --
they look to you for advice and moral support. You can also help educate the
public on the importance of intelligence and on the concomitant importance of
protecting the information that we gather. You have served your country well,
and I know I can speak for all those still in the Agency when I say we are
proud to be able to build on the traditions that you established so firmly
in the Agency and in the Intelligence Community.
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Address to Steel Shipping Container Institute
Sheraton-Carlton
Washington, D. C.
Thursday, October 2, 1980
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Marty mentioned
some of the places where I had served. Let me start out by
telling you a little story, an incident that occurred to me
when I was in the Congo in 1960. Some of you may recall
that those were rather tumultuous days In the Congo right
after the revolution there. And I had been assigned -- I
was a young officer in our embassy. And I had been assigned
to serve as an escort officer for three visiting American
senators named Gore, Hart, Neuberger. And I arranged for
the senators to have lunch at the home of the president of
the Congolese Senate, a man named Richard Gorarico. And
in those days, you very seldom saw Congolese wives. And
as we drove up to the home, Gorarico came out, and he had
a woman at his side. And not knowing who she was, I intro-
duceed her as his wife.
We went in; we were sitting down; we were having
drinks. I was interpreting. Another woman came in, shook
hands all the way around, went over and sat down nex to the
first one. And Senator Gore turned to me and said "Who's
she?" "I don't know. Maybe she's his wife." "I thought
you introduced that other woman as his wife." "I said, "I
don't know. Let me ask him." So I asked the president of
the Senate. And he said "Oh, yes. They're both my wives."
With that the interest of the American senators picked up
considerably. And he....
WOMAN: Louder. Louder, please.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I don't know If I can
turn this up. I'll try and stand a little closer to it.
WOMAN: Thank you.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: And he said, "No, now
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you must
understand that in our country, our customs are very
different than yours. For example, where I come from in the
Leopoldville district of the Congo, I'm
a big tribal chief.
And as a tribal
chief, I would normally
be entitled to five
or six wives.
But since I'm a Catholic,
I have only two."
[Laughter.]
I tell that
story because I'm
about to bridge the
cultural
gap for you.
My friends in the
Congo lived a very
different
life.
And
you in the business
world live a very
different
life
than we In government. I
think it's terribly
important
that
we try to understand each
other. I'm sure,
I know that you are frustrated with some of the silliness in
government. And so am 1, by the way. But in looking at some
of these things, I think we need to go beneath the surface
and look at the reasons behind it. And I'd like to take as
the context of my remarks, "Management in Government in the
1980s." And I hope that I can persuade you that we have some
major problems that are not just my problems, that are your
problems, as well, indeed the country's problems.
Now any analysis of what government is going to
do and the demands on It in the 1980s really has to start
with the environment in which we operate. And I would argue
that in the 1980s foreign affairs, developments around the
world are going to drive our governmental process. Just look
at your newspapers tonight. Two countries at war. The leaders
of both countries publicly state they have no use for the United
States. Well, what may happen to the United States? We don't
have a functioning embassy in either of those countries. Yes,
the flames of that war come perilously close to the Persian
Gulf. And the Persian Gulf accounts for 35% of the oil exports
to the Free World. It's something we worry about. Further east,
we have a Soviet invasion of Aghan i stan. I f anyone had any doubt
about the motives of the,Soviet Union, all they need is to look
at what happened and what is happening today in Afghanistan.
But those aren't the only trouble spots, nor the only
spots where we are highly dependent on foreign resources for
our very existence. Closer to home, Fidel Castro is engaging
in adventurism in Central America. A difficult situation.
Countries such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, very
close to our own borders; very close to Mexico, once again
a country with enormous oil reserves; the Caribbean Islands.
Whoever heard of Grenada? A communist Island for all intents
and purposes today. How many of those islands are trouble
spots?
In Southeast Asia, we take a look at Vietnam, sup-
ported by the Soviet Union, embarking on a brutal invasion of
Kampuchea, Cambodia. It can spill over into Thailand. In
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Africa, where Cuban proxies serve the purposes of the Soviet
Union, where instability reigns. And then you add to that
the increase in terrorism around the world, the problems of
nuclear proliferation. What do we do when some of these
countries get the bomb? What if Iran, let's say, had the
atomic bomb today, or, say, ten years from now, fifteen?
What implications does that have?
And then look at our principal adversary, the Soviet
Union. And foreign affairs is not a zero sum game. I've
described to you a worrisome Middle East panorama. That
doesn't mean that it's all good for the Soviet Union. Put
yourself in the shoes of the Kremlin: rising consumer ex-
pectations; declining economic growth rates; problems with
minorities; labor shortages; topping out of oil reserves,
and topping out, and probably declining oil production;
problems with China; unrest In Eastern Europe. And Poland
is a very difficult situation for them, almost, I would say,
intolerable. And all this is happening at a time when there
are two other major developments in the Soviet Union. One
is that they will be at the peak of their strategic power.
And we can argue whether it's parity or superiority, but
they'll be at the height of their strategic power at the
same time that there's a transition in leadership. And we
don't really know what the new leadership in the Soviet Union
represents.
And all of these troubles for the Soviet Union are
not neceassarily good news for us. They spell problems; they
spell risks; they spell uncertainty. And when added to the
situation around the world, I think I can euphemistically say
that the 1980s will be an age of challenge for us, an age when
we wi l l be focusing on foreign affairs.
I was absolutely appalled the other night in the
Baltimore debates when there wasn't a single question on for-
eign affairs, and I look at the problems around the world.
It seems to me the implications of what I have said
in terms of government management are basically two-fold.
One, we in this country are going to have to get some con-
tent back in term "national security." National security
does not mean cover-up. It's time we outgrew out Watergate-
Vietnam complex and recognized that you and the American public
do have a legitimate stake in national security, and this is
not some sort of fun game where we need to glorify the inves-
tigative reporter or grow weaker and to have fun at the expense
of our national security interests.
Indded, just a couple of blocks from here, Dupont
Circle, there's a group of Americans that are engaged in
publishing a newspaper dedicated totally to revealing the
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names of our CIA people overseas. We've had one killed.
Other people whose names have been in this paper have been
attacked, threatened. And they can do this with complete
impunity while we subject our intelligence organizations,
as the CIA, to Freedom of Information Act requests. We get
about 4000 requests a year. They cost you taxpayers about
$800 a request; many of them from children, form letters,
foreigners. Indeed, under the law, if the Soviet intelligence
service wrote us, we would be required to respond in ten days.
Well, we can say no, we don't have this information, we're
not going to give It to you. But what kind of a charade is
this? What kind of an intelligence operation? You can't
run an open intelligence operation.
We need to look at some of these basic problems.
This Is a whole other speech. I don't want to give it. But
let me just leave you with this thought. It's a very serious
game when you're talking about national security. And when
you're talking about the intelligence function, you are talking
about our entire defense, because it does no good to spend bil-
lions on defense if you don't know where the enemy's going to
strike. And we learned that lesson all too well, I hope, at
Pearl Harbor.
Secondly, the foreign affairs ramifications are
going to mean budget challenges to the U. S. The budget,
the foreign affairs budget and the defense budget are going
to chew up an increasing amount of the national resources,
which means that on the domestic side, relatively speaking,
there will be less money in the 1980s. And this comes at a
time when our population is somewhat older, somewhat more
conservative and somewhat more questioning of government
programs. And indeed, in my judgment, they should be. The
system of service delivery for domestic programs that was
erected in the '60s, stumbled in the '70s, is totally inade-
quate for the '80s. We're going to have to overhaul it.
Let me list for you some of the problems that I see
in our system of service delivery, federal system of service
delivery. The first problem is the budget problem. Our
federal budget is uncontrollable. Seventy-five percent of
the budget consists of entitlement programs. And what do I
mean by entitlement programs? Social Security, food stamps,
where you can walk in the door, take your money and walk out.
There's no control over those programs. And we kid ourselves
when we say there's a control over the federal budget. The
only way you can control those programs is by changing the
program. And what goes on in the Congress, in the executive
branch in terms of budget estimates frankly is nothing but a
charade.
Secondly, there's a constituent nature about programs.
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Let me tell you how a federal program develops. We as a society
begin to worry about a particular problem. You read about it
in your newspaper. Maybe it's started by journalists. Who
knows how it starts. Whether we worry about maternal and child
health, or the problem of poverty, the problem of the environ-
ment. And as a society, gradually we begin to move. We say
we've got to do something about this problem. And we all
talk to our congressmen, and we talk to people in the execu-
tive branch. The next thing we know we've got a program, put
that program out In the streets, get the money out, that'll
solve the problem.
Nobody gives any thought to the management of that
program, or how that program will relate to other programs
that might be dealing In similar areas. We have one narrow
goal in mind. The result: overlapping and duplicating pro-
grams. When I was in HEW, we had 300 different categorical
programs, many of which were overlapping. I counted some 15
that dealt with the mentally retarded, all with a different
set of factions and regulations. Indeed, Martha Griffiths,
who when she was in Congress did a study on this, found that
in ghetto areas there were as many as 18 or 20 poverty workers
working with a single family, all from different programs.
Well, I often thought if you could just take the salaries of
those poverty workers, the family would be out of poverty.
They can't relate one to another. Why? Because that con-
stituency hardens. It hardens into what has come to be
known in The Washington Post, for those of you who've lived
in Washington for a long time, as "the Iron triangle," that
link between the lobby group, the staff group on the Hill
In that particular committee and the staff in the program.
And they all have a vested interest in continuing the program.
Once you put It on the street, you can't change it.
That is very much tied in with the next problem I
would offer up, and that is the committee system on the Hill.
Federal agencies are required to report to committees. On
oversight commitment, when you get up to reporting to ten,
twenty or thirty committees, each with a vested program in-
terest, you can just imagine how that complicates your problem,
particularly with proliferation of staff on the Hill. There
were some 6500 staff people In 1960, about 38,000 in 1979,
all with their own questions and their own requirements.
And then we have the lack of clear program goals.
And a single manager can't manage. How do you deal with a
program -- I was managing one that said eliminate poverty.
How do you measure performance against that kind of a stan-
dard. I could change the definitions and the statistics all
around and prove to you that I'm doing a great job or a lousy
job as I saw fit. The congressional process, as some in this
room know better than I, is a process of compromise. And when
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you bitch about the regulations that are put out by the
bureaucrats, take a look at what's expected of the bureau-
crats. The Congress can't resolve an issue, so therefore
they compromise it, put the bills out. And the executive
branch Is asked to put the regulations out. So the bureau-
crats have to deal with the general public on an issue that
the Congress couldn't solve. Hence, the complications of the
regulation writing process.
Finally, there's the way we are organized. And you
are businessmen. How would you like to have sixty different
agencies reporting to you directly? That's the task the Pre-
sident has. And the same people, those that are arguing in
favor of more agencies, are those that are telling you you
have to cut down on the White House staff. It follows a
pattern. The programs are fragmented; the organizations are
fragmented.
I can remember a number of years ago I was up tes-
tifying on the Hill on bilingual education. And the first
question from the chairman of the committee was "Mr. Carlucci,
don't you think we ought to have an assistant secretary for
bilingual education?" And I said "Well, Madame Chairman, we
haven't decided whether we should have a program yet. Don't
you think we ought to decide on whether we should have a pro-
gram, what the goals of the program should be, and then decide
where it ought to fit in the organization?"
Several Presidents, President Nixon, President Carter,
tried reorganization of the federal government. It was blocked.
Why? Well, because you can't reorganize until you deal with the
program structure, until you deal with the constituencies, until
you make up your mind If you're going to have mission oriented
government rather than government by advocacy, which is the
antithesis of good management.
[Applause.]
So much for the structural problems. Let me go on
to some more mundane matters and talk to you about the day-
to-day problems that we as government managers face. Our
personnel system compared to the personnel systems you have:
we can't reward good performance, and we can't fire non-per-
formers. We're stuck.
Now finally the Congress and the executive are coming
to recognize this program, and there's been an effort to create
something called the Senior Executive Service this last year,
but its been a holding effort. It's been met by some hos-
tility. I think it's a promising start. We need to look at
this more. And we need to look more at productivity measures
in the federal government. We're way behind the private sector
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in productivity measures.
Our budget system Is archaic. We can only budget on
a year-to-year basis. In many cases, our limit isn't money.
In your firm, I dare say they give you money and tell you to
go out and manage. They give us money and divide it into small
pots. We have to go back to the Congress to change from pot
to pot. And then they put controls on personnel. And you'll
hear the politicians talk every day about cutting down the
number of federal personnel. Sounds good. I'll tell you
what they ought to be talking about: cutting down the ex-
penditures. I can easily, as an experienced federal manager,
control personnel and let the money go out the window. It's
a silly way to try and control government.
Then we have something called a contining resolution.
Some of you who may have been in Washington a couple of days
ago would have noted that the government was out of business
because the Congress didn't vote the money. They didn't vote
the appropriations, and they didn't say you could continue
in business. And, yes, sure it's silly, but there's a hell
of effort put into this. And then it will be next December,
November or December before we get our appropriations, before
they tell us how much we can spend for a year that ends next
October 1st. Can you spend money sensibly during that period?
Common decision points in our federal programs.
You see it in your local communities. One agency, Transpor-
tation, could make a decision at one level; another agency has
to go --- HUD -- has to back to Washington to make a decision.
There's no common decision point so that the programs can re-
late to one another. And nobody is seriously looking at that
kind of an issue.
Automatic data processing. We've got a system in
government, and it is by statute, which frustrates any effort
to Introduce ADP. Under the procurement regulations, it takes
anywhere from four to seven years to introduce new equipment,
and by then it's obsolete. And that's a problem that can touch
your everyday lives. I took a check today and I found that the
FAA's aircraft components are still using System 360 computers
that are 15 years old. A troublesome problem.
Finally, I would give you what in my judgment may
be the transcending issue In government management in the
1980s. And that was the quality of our people in government,
the question of excellence. How would you run your business
if everybody from the middle management level on up to vice
president made the same salary, in this case $50,000 a year,
if your people were constantly attacked in the press and by
politicians, characterized as indolent, inefficient, lousy
bureaucrats, if you had petty harassment -- keep your thermo-
stat at 80 degrees in the summer, shut off the hot water.
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We don't have hot water. If you serve overseas, you're subject
to threats, assassination and evacuation. If your retirement
system once you become vested paid you more if you retired
than if you stayed in. And it does. And If every four
years your whole top management changed completely, with
no Idea of what the next group of fellows is going to bring.
I ask you how long could you retain your top management
cadre.
Well, the answer's obvious that it's happening
in the federal government, and it's going to be a big pro-
blem in the 1980s. There was a survey done In the Foreign
Service, which indicated that some 48% of Foreign Service
officers are thinking of leaving; some 60% of the people at
the senior level. And the politicians like to joke about
the Civil Service. But their joke could become a self-
ful f i l l ing prophecy. The stakes are high.
I myself think we can overcome these problems.
I don't mean to paint a depressing picture.
[Laughter and applause.]
But I can't overcome them. Federal employees
can't overcome them. Only you can help cope with them.
When I first came into CIA, I had a group come
into me and say they were to change congressional attitudes
on the Hill towards the CIA. I said, "Oh, that's interesting.
How are you going to do that?" And they said "We're going to
go up and talk to our congressmen." I said "Forget it. They're
not going to pay the slightest attention to you. They're going
to pay attention to people out in their districts." And that's
what needs to happen. It's your government. You have to live
with it. I've given you a frank assessment as an insider. But
I can't do more than that. And I'm content tonight that I've
given to you, as responsible people -- and I've talked to a
number of you tonight, and I know you are -- some food for
thought to take back to your communities.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
Q: Might I ask your opinion of who leaked the
Stealth Information?
Q: What was the question?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: What's my opinion on
who leaked the Stealth information?
I 've had enough experience with leaks not to have
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an opinion. The first one that I catch I can tell you I'm
going to fire. And quite frankly, I felt so firmly about
some leaks in government the other day that I went down and
voluntarily took a lie detector test and asked my senior
staff -- my senior staff that they take a lie detector test,
and all did. And that impression is spreading that we are
a government that leaks information. We're the laughing
stock of the world. And I don't care whether it's the
Congress or the executive branch. They can throw rocks
at each other. It doesn't make any difference. We need
to get back, as I said earlier, to a concept of national
security where people don't abuse the Information that can
protect the safety of our citizens. And whoever leaked that
information performed a highly Irresponsible act, in my
judgment.
What we need -- and I would stress this point --
it is an essential responsibility throughout the government,
such as we had a number of years ago. Now I don't want to
go back to the "good old days." I'm not arguing that. But
I do think that the climate is terribly important. And while
you can't catch these people, you may be able to inspire people
not to abuse the information that they're entrusted to keep.
[Applause.]
Q: [Question Inaudible.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The question refers
back to a statement I made if we don't know what the new
leadership in the Soviet Union is like. And the question
was if you don't know, who does. And is this a serious
problem?
I was referring to a specific problem, the
problem of leadership transition in the Soviet Union.
Certainly we have intelligence information on the Soviet
Union. But as a Western power -- indeed any Western power
has very little Information on that obscure political figure
In Uzbekistan, or the Ukraine, who might suddenly rise up af-
ter the gerontocracy passes In the Soviet Union and be the
next leader. You can't -- you can't keep track in a society
that large of the vast number of potential figures. It's not
a process where you can spot a rising young politician In
the halls of Congress. You have to look at the guy who's
going to be able to wield the levers of power behind the
scenes..
But even if we did know who the individual who
might come up four or five years from now, mind you, we
don't know what his cultural and psychological background
might be. By that, we're moving through the first Stalin
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generation, the first World War II. Whether they will be
conservative, like I think the current leadership is, or
prone to take risks is very hard to tell. It's that kind
of thing that I was referring to, not particular intelligence
on the Soviet Union.
Q: A report this week in the Kiplinger Letter,
which is very responsible, I think, quoted the Russian
leaders as saying that on or before 1985, maybe 1983, they
will be In a position to knock us out militarily, and there's
a serious question of whether we'll be able to retaliate ef-
fectivel y.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, it's not appropriate
for me in a public forum -- the question is whether, in 1983,
the Soviets could knock us out militarily, or whether we can
retaliate effectively. The answer Is that there is no sim-
plistic formula for this. You can't answer that question in
those kinds of simplistic terms. There is a conflict equation
that relates to strategic forces, to conventional forces, to
what your allies might do, what the Warsaw Pact might do, what
NATO might do, what the tactical situation might do, what con-
ditions might lead to war. Those kind of predictions are of
little value.
And having said that, there is no question that
the Soviets are devoting far more resouces to defense than
we have, something like 12% of their gross national product
compared to four or five or six percent of our gross national
product. And over the course of the last ten years, they've
probably put 30% more into defense expenditures than we have.
And they' l l be at their peak period in the mid 1980s. We
have substantial destructive capability on our side. They
have substantial destructive capability on their side. One
can talk about general parity. I really would not go on any
further than that. I don't think your military analysts would
go much further than saying there's some dangerous situation
there before we move ahead.
It's quite clear that this country is going to
put more resources into defense -- MX, whatever it is. And
that won't come on stream until the late 1980s. So you can
say that there may be a difficult period in the mid 1980s.
But I think it's scare talk to say they can knock us out in
1983. I wouldn't buy that.
Q: [Question relating to U. S. support for the
Shah. Question inaudible.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well first of all, we
couldn't have kept him alive. My own judgment is that the
Shah situation was probably irreversible about mid 1978 or
'9, the late 1970s. And it's not clear to me what you could
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have done. The Shah had a unique style of rule. He did not
like to mix it up with the politicians. He wanted to be aloof
from the politicians. How you change a personality and say
"Look, you've got a political problem, you know; go down and
mix it up with the politicians." It's very difficult for
me to see how you could have done that.
One can argue about what the strategy might have
been in the later days. But I think the result was pretty
inevitable.
One can also say "Why didn't we know more about
it?" And we didn't do as bad a job as the press would have
you believe. But I'm frank to say that I think we could have
done a better job, particularly in our analysis of social
trends, the religious movement. It's somethig that we've put
increasing emphasis on since Iran. I've been personally in-
volved in It. And I hope that we' I I do a better job.
But an intelligence organization Is not in the
business of predicting coups, although we also have a good
grasp of trends. And what we need to do Is put more emphasis
on social trends in different countries.
I'II take a question back there.
Q: You're a bright, educated, articulate human
being.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Thank you.
Q: You apparently would be a success in the pri-
vate sector. Some of the conditions you described, which are
getting worse -- all right -- would lead many to leave. What
motivates you to stay with it?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I came out of a sense
of idealism, to be quite honest with you. And I felt through
the years a sense of accomplishment. But to be equally honest,
I think it's becoming harder and harder in government, parti-
cularly in the last four or five years, to get from here to
there.
We've structured a system where we can talk about
waste and fraud, you talk about inspectors and you talk
about oversight, and we glorify people engaged in those
functions, but we don't pay much attention to the guy who
does the job. And the guy who does his job finds himself
surrounded by ten over-the-shoulder watchers, many of whom
are necessary. All these are required to function. What
I'm saying is we have to have a proper balance -- over-the-
shoulder watchers, regulations, statutes, congressional
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committees. People are losing that sense of accomplishment.
And for most people in government I know the monetary re-
ward doesn't mean a lot. We don't like to see our real
incomes go down at the rate of 10 or 12% a year, and that's
pretty frustrating. But more important is that sense of
accomplishment. And It's getting harder and harder to
get that psychic reward in government.
Now whatever administration comes In -- I don't
care whether it's Republican or Democrat -- I think sooner
or later is going to have to cope with that problem.
Yes, sir?
Q: Mr. Carlucci, going back to your original
point about Intelligence, there's a book on the Best Seller
list today called Spike, and I'm sure you've heard of it.
I don't know how many people in the audience have read It.
It's a novel, and because it's a novel it doesn't always
name names and Identify Individuals. But It does a very
interesting job in pointing out In a rather veiled way
certain institutions here in Washington, including the
State Department, including a couple of foundations,
with references to various publications that, taken all
together, show a really threatening, fearful picture of
the penetration of American institutions, political, busi-
ness, legislative, presidential by the Soviet KGB.
Again, remembering it's a novel, fiction, and
that the authors, who incidentally are highly reputable
correspondents, one for Newsweek, one for the London Times,
and have been so for many years, and presumably have used
their expertise to build this fiction. My question: how
much effect and what is the attitude in the Intelligence
community toward this novel? The name of it is Spike.
Those of you who haven't read it, you may wish to look into
it. And I'm not the press agent....
[Laughter.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I happen to be a good
friend of one of the authors, Arnaud deBorchgrave, and I
have a lot of respect for him. And I think he's pointed up
a very real threat to our country. At the same time, I
wouldn't want 'to leave you the impression that the KGB
Is pervasive, that we have a bunch of moles running around
In the CIA; the White House Is penetrated, and the press Is
penetrated.
The institutions are, in my judgment, susceptible.
And that is the lesson, It seems to me, to be drawn from the
novel, that we have to worry about these kinds of problems.
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I t gets back to something that I s a i d i n my opening remarks.
We have to worry about national security. We're so obsessed
with whether the CIA and the FBI are violating our rights
that we sometimes ignore the vulnerabilities of our society
to the highly effective and efficient KGB. Sure, they use
disinformation. If we were to engage In disinformation, the
CIA, under congressional statute, we would have to have a
meeting of the NSC, a presidential finding, and brief eight
committees of Congress. That's 300 members of Congress,
telling them about any kind of disinformation effort. That
statute is now being changed. I think by the end of this
week it will be reduced to two committees, because even the
Congress recognizes the problem exists.
But there was considerable feeling in this country
in the late '70s that we couldn't engage In disinformation,
because there would be feedback in the U. S. press, and this
would be deceptive to the U. S. public. So the prophylactic,
the remedy may have prevented us from doing anything effective
against a very substantial adversary.
At the same time, I would not argue that we should
weaken our own institutions for the sake of imitating the KGB-
I think we have to be very judicious in what we do in this
area.
But Intelligence -- to answer your direct question,
the Intel l igence community -- we get so many books that we
don't react to one or another. But I think it's overdrawn,
but It's a threat that we all worry about.
You've had your hand up.
Q: Yeah. I'd like to know when you all are going
to do something about these so-called Americans that are
disseminating information about CIA throughout the world.
I think It's about time that you all take some actions
that have been attributed to you in the past.
[Laughter.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I have taken a lot of
actions. And I have personally testified, I would say, at
four or five times on the Hill on this subject in open and
closed sessions. I have said that the failure of the Congress
to act is outrageous. I have said pointblank "What do you
need? One more dead body, or are you going to act?" And
that's what we're liable to have Is one more dead body.
It Is not a joking matter. And these people, in
my judgment, are traitors. They are seeking to destroy an
institution which has been authorized by the executive, by
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the Congress. And they make no bones about It. And they
do so under the guise of First Amendment rights. And they
get substantial support, I must say, from the press, which,
in my judgment, has distorted the issue. We're not proposing
anything unconstitutional, but we are proposing that a pattern
of activity with the intent to impede or impair -- revealing
names with the Intent to impede or impair intelligence opera-
tions of the U. S. government should be illegal. And we got
that bill through three committees of Congress. It's now in
the fourth committee. I'm doing everything we can -- we are
doing everything we can to deal with this problem within the
U. S. constitutional structure.
MAN: Don't worry about that.
[Laughter.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I'll take one more right
Q: How can we help? How can we fund something like
this? We believe. You're in a very favorable group here. How
can we -- what can we do?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I leave that question to
your expert here. Let him take it from here. I've got certain
laws that I can't transgress.
Q: I think my question follows up on that. You
know, we don't have [portion of question inaudible]. But
what is your recommendation on what we do? What action can
we take? We vote. We donate a little money....
[Rest of question inaudible.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I've got to beg off on
that question, because I am a civil servant, a presidential
appointee, and I can't really tell you how to carry out what-
ever lobbying activity you might want to carry out.
[Laughter.]
And I defer to your experts. And on that note,
I say no more.
[Applause.]
[End of Q&A session.]
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI
Interviewed by A13C News correspondent Brit Hume
IV
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 ~~
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS--STAFF
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCC I
Interviewed by ABC News correspondent Brit Hume
G E- F + Cam= A- T- ( c= C? u n S
ciu
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MAN: May 22nd, 1980. Headquarters Building, DCI Con-
ference Room. Brit Hume, ABC TV, interviews DDCI Carlucci for
a special ABC is producing for the nightly news in two segments
on CIA and the charters.
BRIT HUME: Okay. Are you a I I settled now? All right.
I would just Iike to ask -- a lot of things seemed to be
about to happen a few years ago. Major reforms seemed inevitable.
New charter legislation for this agency seemed to be practically
sure of passage. And here we are four years or more later and
those things have not come to pass. Can you tell me why?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Well Brit, I think I
disagree a hit with your thesis.
[Off-mike comments.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Brit, I think I disagree
a bit with your thesis. It seems to me that a lot of significant
changes have taken place in the past four years. The President
has issued an executive order regulating the activities of in-
telligence agencies. And as you know, an executive order has the
force of law. An Intelligence Oversight Board has been established.
Intelligence oversight committees have been established on the Hill,
select committees, very capable committees in both the Senate and
th`e House. And finally, the agency has taken a number of steps
to strengthen its internal management control. We've built up
our Office of Inspections; built up our audit system; built up
our general system of accountability; and built up our system,
internal system of reporting to the President and cooperating with
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other agencies who have an interest in intelligence activities.
HUME: Well, what I meant to say -- I didn't really sug-
gest that nothing has changed, nor did I mean to suggest that the
agency had not changed. What I was trying to get at was that there
seems to be a kind of a pol itical cl irnate in which legislation of
a major kind affecting the agency and changing the agency by that
course seemed inevitable as a result of circumstances and in terms
of the atmosphere that had been created. And no such major legis-
lation has been forthcoming. And there are now very many people
who don't believe that it should and believe indeed that, if any-
thing, the restrictive measures that have been taken by law, some
of them, should be lifted. And what I was really trying to get
you to address yourself to is the question of what has brought
about that change in public and, I think, in congressional atti-
tude?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARCLUCCI: Well, I don't know that
I'm really qualified to talk about congressional attitudes and
public attitudes. We have tried to conduct the agency in a re-
sponsible manner, in a way that will help to instill confidence
in the agency and confidence in the very many dedicated people
that perform very difficult tasks here and overseas. We in the
agency favored major charter legislation which would lay down the
ground rules for our activities so that our people, who do take
risks in the interests of their country, would know exactly where
they stand.
If you go back to the Pike Committee hearings and the
statements by Senator Inouye, the highly respected first Chairman
of the Senate Oversight Committee, you find that the criticism of
the agency was that, if anything, it was too responsive to direction
from above, including Presidents. If that's the case, then a statu-
tory base can only be helpful to our people in telling them where
they stand.
Hence, we were pushing very hard for charter legislation,
And we're disappointed that it has not come to pass in this session.
FLUME: Now there are some measures that in lieu of, or in-.
addition to charter legislation that you and others have urged. One
of them, for example, has to do with making it a crime to disclose
the identities of agents....
HUME: ...not only applying to those who release the in-
formation, but, in one form of the legislation, to those who make
use of it. And I gather that you and others feel quite strongly
about the need for that. Could you elaborate on that?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Certainly we do. We see no
social value whatsoever in revealing the names of CIA personnel
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overseas or in the names of agents. We don't think this helps the
oversight process. It doesn't make us any more accountable. The
Congress, our oversight committees are the proper forums in which
we can be held accountable.
This kind of activity is only directed at destroying the
agency's effectiveness, and, indeed, it can be fairly said that it
puts the lives of some of our people in jeopardy. Nobody wants to
deal with a CIA officer whose name appears on the front pages of
the newspapers. 'The essence of the intelligence business is the
ability to protect the information that you get and your ability
to protect the identity of people who give it to you. And nobody
is going to have any confidence in our ability to protect them
if our names appear in the newspapers.
Hence, we do feel quite strongly about this.
HUME: Now, I gather that there's also a considerable
feeling that you should have an exemption from the Freedom of
Information Act.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We have asked for a partial
exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. We would not
exempt ourselves from first person requests, so to speak. That
is to s a y , if you want to know what is in your f i l e, we would
continue to be responsive. We would also continue to make our
finished product subject to the Freedom of Information process.
What we are seeking exemption for is the names of our
sources and our methods, that highly sensitive information, which,
once again, serves no real purpose in the public domain and, if
revealed, undermines the very effectiveness of the agency.
The Freedom of Information Act has come to be viewed
as somewhat of a symbol of the U. S. government's inability to
protect the information given to it in confidence'. We think we
have to deal on a partial basis in a responsible way with that
problem.
HUME: When you say it's one of the symbols, would you
explain what you mean by that?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCC1: It is generally perceived
around the world that the United States government cannot protect
the information that is entrusted to it. And much of that in-
ability is attributed to the Freedom of Information Act.
Now granted, there are certain provisions in the Freedom
of Information Act that enable us to withhold classified informa-
tion. But it's very difficult to convince somebody, say, in a
communist area who sees volumes of material coming out under the
label of Freedom of Information Act, that something he gives us
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that might be traceable to him won't also come out under that
act. This is particularly the case since, as you know, our
decisions are subject to judicial review. And while other ser-
vices and our agents can have confidence in us, they can't --
nobody can predict what one of 400 federal judges might decide
with regard to Freedom of Information lawsuits.
HUM E: So what you're saying is, in effect, that while
the Freedom of Information Act, as it's written, does not actually
enable anybody to get ahold of the identities of sources or to
disclose other classified information, that it is perceived --
that it is so perceived around the world by people in communist
countries or elsewhere?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: It is so perceived around
the world. I don't know if people have actually gotten ahold
of sensitive information through the Freedom of Information Act,
because obviously they're not going to let us know if they do.
Also, there is a fairly standard technique in the counterintelli-
gence business of putting together bits and pieces of information.
We can't go beyond the request. That is to say, we can't ask who
the requester is or what his motive is. Therefore, we don't know
if that little piece of information that we give out is the final
to the mosaic that could enable someone to track down a source of
our information.
So I really can't answer your question.
HUME: Now, is it your view -- I gather that one of the
things that the agency would like as well would be to limit the
number of committees to which it must report in Congress and to
which it must make disclosures of its activities. Why?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, first of all because
we feel that our two select committees are doing a very effective
job. Just two hours ago I came off of a hearing with the Senate
committee, where they went over a range of issues. Those are
carefully picked committees, highly responsible congressmen and
senators. They are congressmen and senators who serve on other
committees, including the Foreign Relations Committees, including
the Appropriations Committees. We think it's appropriate that we
keep them informed. And they can inform their colleagues, as ap-
propriate.
For us to be required to go to some seven committees.on
covert action operations, that is clandestine operations designed
to influence events around the world, violates one of the basic
principles of security. I'm not saying that the Congress leaks.
Certainly leaks come out of the executive branch and the Congress.
Our objective should be to cut down the access to information to
the smallest number of people who need to know. And the Congress
has decided that the select committees are the appropriate bodies
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to exercise oversight.
HUME: Yeah, but the Congress is still -- you're still
faced with the situation where you still have to report to all of
these committees.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Yes, we do currently.
HUME: Do you contend that the number of committees to
which you have had to report on these activities has, in fact,
resulted in leaks?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I contend that it.is un-
necessary to report to seven committees, since these committees
are represented on the select committees. And I contend that it
is in violation of good security practice. I'm not levelling ac-
cusations of leaks at the Congress or the executive branch. Leaks
come from everywhere within our government. I think that's a rather
sterile argument. I think we need to cut down on access to informa-
tion generally, intelligence information generally in the executive
branch and within the Congress, consistent with the need for effec-
tive oversight.
HUME: Now, is that also partly the result of your con-
cern with this worldwide perception of this agency and its....?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Perception is indeed a problem.
I indicated the concern for good security practice. But the intel-
ligence world is largely a world of perceptions. Whether a person
gives you information or not depends on how he perceives your ability
to protect that information, not how you perceive it. It's important
to bear that in mind.
So we need to deal with these perceptions if we're going
to continue to be an effective organization.
HUME: There seems no doubt that the case that you have
advanced for the [words inaudible], quite apart from the issue of
the charter, has been persuasive to a great people on Capitol Hill,
and elsewhere as well. Why do you think that is?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I would like to think
that our arguments have merit. I myself have testified a number
of times on these issues. And I think we have created some under-
standing of our problems.
HUME: Obviously you're quite right. These arguments
I'm sure, do have merit. What I'd really like to get to -- let's
compare 1976, or mid 1975. I think that the same arguments could
have been ad-vanced then. I think you'll agree that they might have
been differently received, even by the same people. So what I really
wanted to get at was the question that something has changed. What
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has changed?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I think the main thing
that has changed has been the existence of an oversight mechanism
on the Hill. As the committees have looked at the agency, as they
have scrutinized our activities, as they have made suggestions, as
they have altered appropriations, they have found that we have been
responsive to their desires, by and large. We don't always agree,
but where we disagree, it's been a healthy disagreement. I think
they've come to appreciate that the agency does consist of people
who are dedicated to the principles of this country. And I would
hope that they would perceive that the agency is being led in a
responsible way.
And not only do we deal with our own oversight commit-
tees, but, of course, we testify before appropriations committees;
we appear before foreign relations committees, and we appear before
a number of other committees on the Hill. I think it's also fair
to say, of course, that the current international climate has created
a greater awareness of the importance of the intelligence function.
And people want to see that -Function carried out in an efficient, as
Well as a responsible way.
HUME: Do you think that the question of perceptions
that you raise, the threat of disclosure that you must make in
terms of the number of committees on the Hill and the existence
of the Freedom of Information Act here affecting your organization
has had a measurable impact on the work product of the agency?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Let me say this. I believe
that we are still the most effective intelligence organization in
the world. We are doing our job. That's not to say we don't make
mistakes. Everybody makes mistakes, and we try to correct our mis-
takes and do better the next time. But we are indeed effective.
How much more information we could collect if we did
not have these problems is anybody's guess. Somebody does not
come to you and say "I won't cooperate with you because you have
a Freedom of Information Act." He just decides that he won't, he
or she won't have any contact with you. But we have had enough
cases where people have expressed concern, including other intel-
ligence services, to make us very aware that this perception is not
allowing us to be as effective as we might otherwise be.
[Off-mike discussion.]
HUME: There. are those who feel that part of what's at
work here in the agency's urging that these restrictions be lifted
is -- part of what's at work is a desire to diminish the amount of
accountability that you have to have, that really it would simplify
your life. Do you agree that that's a factor?
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No. No, I would not agree.
We want better accountability. We think that accountability can be
achieved. through the oversight mechanism on the Hill, through the
Intelligence Oversight Board, which consists of three distinguished
Americans and has total access to all of our activities. But we
believe that there are some measures that are called accountability
measures, but which really aren't accountability measures. There's
no way that the intelligence organization can be made accountable,
for example, through 4000 Freedom of Information requests. Those
requests come from a select group of people. They are not broadly
based. A number of them come from foreigners. We think that proper
accountability is the issue, not the shotgun approach to accounta-
bility.
HUME: I'd like to raise a personal case, not because it
matters to me, but because I happen to know about it. A Freedom
of Information Act lawsuit, to which I was not a party, disclosed
that I was one of several Americans who was the target of a covert
domestic spying operation back in 1972. If that suit had not been
been filed -- and I didn't file it and was not a party to it -- I
wouldn't know about that.
Do you think it's desirable that I know about that? And
what would you -- how would you deal with a situation Iike that?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I certainly think it's
desirable that this agency not be involved in so-called spying on
Americans. But I think there are times when it may be necessary
to collect some intelligence information on Americans, but there
ought to be controls. Such controls were built in to the charter
legislation that we were supporting.
Don't forget the period that we're talking about was
the period that preceded the creation of oversight committees on
the Hill. My understanding -- and I wasn't here at the time --
is that most of the abuses that were attributed to the agency were
developed by the-agency's own inspection mechanism and with I
think ane major exception, very few -- with one major exception,
were not uncovered through the Freedom of Information Act. But
in any event, the important point is that we do have a different
oversight mechanism now. And for whatever value the Freedom of
Information Act might have served as an oversight mechanism, we now
have something in place that's more effective.
HUME: Are you suggesting that if something like this
were to happen in the future, that I could expect the House and
Senate Intelligence Committee to tell me about it?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh,.i think you could expect
them to find out about it and put a stop to it. I certainly think....
HUME: What about -- what about a citizen, a citizen abroad
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or a citizen in this country? How would he know about it? How
would....
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, bear in mind....
HUME: Or should he know?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: No, but bear in mind....
HUME: Maybe he shouldn't know.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Bear in mind what I said ear-
lier, that we are not seeking exemption from first person Freedom
of Information Act requests.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That is to say, if you want
to know what's in your f i l e, under our formulation, you would
still be entitled to receive it.
FLUME: I know, but if you happen to know that there is
a file. I had no idea. I had no way of knowing. I don't make
this into an argument. I thinl~7o,-i the only point I'm making is
that, is there not something to^ be said for the idea that the
Freedom of Information Act does indeed act as a check of a sort
in that things can -- things can end up becoming discovered by
citizens indirectly that they would not otherwise have any way of
knowing.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, if you want to write in
and say "Let me know what's in my f i l e," we have to respond.
HUME: I understand that. That really doesn't answer my
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Then I'm not sure I understand
your question.
HUME: Well, I'm simply saying that, does not the exis-
tence of the Freedom of Information Act and its processes indirectly
serve the purpose of letting the people know what may be happening
with regard to them that they would not otherwise know or even know
to ask?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we agree that that desire
ought to be accommodated to the extent that it does not interfere
with our ability to protect our sources and methods. Again, let
me emphasize that we're not seeking a total exemption from the
Freedom of Information Act. We want to make as much information
available to the public as we can. Indeed, we put out approximate-
ly 150 unclassified publications a year. We think this is healthy.
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All we are seeking to do is protect that information which needs to
be protected by the very nature of the intelligence business.
HUME: Now do you endorse the proposal that would make
it illegal not only for the identities of the individuals work-
ing for the agency to be disclosed, but also would come down as
well on those who use that information, even the news media?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, where the information
is legitimately classified and the person knows that it's clas-
sified, we would favor making that a criminal offense where it
pertains to the identities of CIA poop le and our agents overseas,
Once again, we see now useful purpose in revealing the names of
our people.
HUME: You don't have a problem with that in the First
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: WeII, this has been looked at
extensively by the Justice Department. And it's basically their
formulation. Certainly there are First Amendment issues involved
in any legislation of that sort, and we're very conscious of it.
And we tried to frame it so that we did not interfere with First
Amendment rights.
HUME: Well, you've said much here, and others would
certainly concur with what you say, to the effect that the agency
has done a good job within its own house of trying to set about to
correct some abuses that may have existed in the past. Would it be
your view that the agency today, as an intelligence agency, is func-
tioning more or Iess effectively than it did prior to whatever day
you'd begin the time of the great revelations?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I wasn't here at the
time, Brit, so it's very hard for me to comment. My general im-
pression is that we are functioning as effectively as we have ever
functioned in our history. I think this is a good organization.
We're getting good intelligence. But as I said earlier, you can
always get more; you can always do the job better. And what we
are seeking to do is to get the necessary tools to do the job
better.
HUME: Would you -- there has -- there is almost a slogan
that has emerged in connection with the discussions over what should
be done regarding the agency that goes something Iike "unleash the
CIA," "unshackle the CIA." How do you regard that? Do you have
mixed feelings about that?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We don't. look upon ourselves
in canine terms, and we don't look upon the measures we are seeking
as unleashing us. We simply like to be -- we want to be able to
carry out our responsibilities in an effective way, a wayt in which
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we're also accountable.
[Momentary break in recording; end of Side 1.1
HUME: How do you feel about all of these cries -- and
they're quite widely heard -- that the CIA ought to be unshackled
or unleashed? And obviously these are people who are sympathetic
to your cause. How do you regard this, all this hue and cry?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know if there's
a hue and cry. But we don't favor an extremist approach one way
or another. What we favor is doing our job efficiently, effectively
and in an accountable way. And we think we can strike a balance
between effectiveness and the necessary guarantees for civil liber-
ties. We think a charter would do this. And we continue to favor
an intelligence charter.
HUME: I think that that probably covers the territory,
unless there's something that I don't doubt that you'd like to
comment on that I may have missed.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: You covered the waterfront.
HUME: I've occasionally asked that of people and had
them then say that's the only truly relevant thing that has been
said, because I've not been smart enough to ask the right questions.
So that was a very good interview indeed. If you can
stay with us just for a second.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Sure. This will go with it?
MAN: How long is each piece going to run, do you think?
HUME: I don't really know, but we'll have more than the
ordinary minute and a half.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: What -- you know, what I find'
interesting is your perception about a -- you described it as a clamor.
And I look at Herb Hetu's press clips, and the clamor still seems to
be in the other direction.
MAN: Editorial clamor.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The editorial clamor. And I
just wonder how representative the press is of the people.
HUME: Well, I came in -- part of my perception stems from
being out on the road with George Bush for two months and noting the
response to his calls for strengthening the CIA. And he's not talk-
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ing about more accountability. Which is not to say that George Bush
is an opponent of accountability, What I mean by that is that what
he --- the direction of his remarks is clearly toward making the
CIA, the agency more at liberty to do what it feels it must and
maybe to have fewer reports about it. And boy, I mean that never
fa i I s to yet applause. That's clearly a -- and certainly --
Terry, you haven't....
[Off-mike comments.]
It certainly is a different set of circumstances than
you faced four or five years ago, I mean to the extent George Bush
hasn't won this race for the nomination, but he hasn't done so badly
compared to some pretty formidable competitors that he had. And it
hasn't hurt him at all that he spent a year here and is thought to
have done well here. And that's something that he cites with tre-
mendous pride. And a few years ago, that would have been probably
a matter that would have caused him trouble politically.
So something has happened politically. Clearly something
has happened. Now you make the point that it's become clear on
Capitol Hill that you all are more accountable and a more respon-
sible agency. And I don't doubt that that's so, and I don't doubt
that that perception exists on Capitol Hill. But really there's
a broader climate than that in this world.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, you know, I did indicate
on tape that the world situation, I think, has had an effect. But
there's also something that I'm not in a position to talk about,
but you are, and that's the more conservative mood in this country
that's illustrated by the Reagan campaign, and I think everybody
generally acknowledges it. I think it probably has some bearing
on it. It's hard to measure.
HUME: Yeah, I think it's fair to suggest that the public
would think that, "Boy, that CIA, they might have been some rough-
necks in the old days, but they would have fixed the Ayatollah's
wagon."
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That's a simplistic approach.
HUME: Oh, no doubt. But I think that's probably --
they would like some way they could settle the ash (?) of the
ayatollahs of the world.
[End of recording.]
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Federal Executive Institute's Executive Development Day Dinner
An Address by Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
Washington, D. C.
Thursday, March 27, 1980
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CHAIR: Thank you very much, Ron.
I'd like to use two themes tonight in introducing
our distinguished guest and our speaker, Frank C. Carlucci.
The two themes are versatility and humanness. And in my mind,
they apply both to Frank and to the subject of his talk tonight,
which is called "Federal Career Management in the 1980s," for,
indeed, management in the 1980s I think will require a great
deal of versatility and a great deal of humanness.
First, as to the versatility of our speaker, and he
has an amazing breadth and depth of experience, as you will
readily acknowledge, I think, as I read off some of the posi-
tions that he's held. Frank was sworn in as Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence on February 10, 1978. He's a native of
Scranton, Pennsylvania and graduated from Princeton in 1952.
He was a lieutenant, JG, in the Navy from '52 to '54, attended
Harvard Graduate School of Business and then spent a year with
the Jansen Corporation in Portland, Oregon.
Frank joined the Foreign Service in 1956. He was
assigned a position as vice consul and economic officer in
Johannesburg, South Africa, where he served from '57 to '59,
followed by a tour of duty in Kinshasa, Congo, where he was
later officer in charge for Congolese political affairs. [In]
164-165, he was consul-general in Zanzibar, and from '65 to
'69, the longest time he apparently spent in one place, it
seems like, he was counselor for political affairs in Rio de
Janeiro, in Brazil.
Frank had been given a special appointment upon the
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completion of his tour in Brazil to go back to school, but half-
way through that process got co-opted by a fellow named Don
Rumsfeld to join him at the fledgling Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, at OEO, where Frank then served as Assistant Director
for Operations. And then between January and September of 1971,
Frank served as Director of OEO.
In '71, he was then appointed as Associated Director
at OMB and later moved to the Deputy Director slot at OMB. From
'72 to '74, he served as Undersecretary in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, and then under Mr. Ford was appointed by Pre-
sident Ford as Ambassador to Portugal in December, 1974 and served
in that position for three years.
Frank is somewhat unique in that he really is a very
distinguished minister in the Foreign Service of the highest rank,
and yet has held several other positions in the service we're more
familiar with. He received many awards -- State Department Superior
Service Award and Superior Honor Award, HEW Distinsuished Service
Award, Defense Department Distinguished Civilian Service Award;
holds two honorary doctorates from Wilkes College and Kings College.
So much for his versatility, though there's a lot behind
each of these activities I think which most of you would appreciate.
I'd like to talk a little bit about Frank Carlucci, the person. And
I did a little checking from people who know him, and believe me,
it's quite interesting to investigate someone from an investigative
agency, or at least attempt to investigate someone from that type
of agency. But I kept hearing phrases from the people I talked to
about him, such as "I would work for Frank Carlucci any time, be-
cause I know I can trust him." "He's very people-oriented; you
know where you stand with Frank Carlucci; he calls them as he
sees them" kept coming up. All of these are cliches, perhaps,
but all were said sincerely and all were said quite often about
th i s man .
On another side of his humanness, he suffered a severe
loss within the past week. His stepmother who reared him from
young manhood died. And I know this has been very heavy on his
mind, yet he has properly attended to those personal affairs while
still meeting his heavy commitments here in Washington, on the Hill,
and certainly with us tonight. Our deepest sympathies from all in
this room are with you, Frank.
Frank's daughter, Karen, will graduate from Boston
University this spring, and he has a son, Frank, who is in a prep
school, Wyoming Seminary in Pennsylvania. And I will acknowledge
what is very apparent. Marcia Carlucci, Frank's beautiful wife,
is expecting an Easter child, on April 6th. Marcia and Frank,
you have our best wishes for a successful birth.
[Applause.]
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-3-
So I take great pride in presenting to our dear friends
and alumni here Frank Carlucci.
[Applause.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much,
Ralph, for that kind introduction. It sounds like we'll have
to tighten up a bit on security at the CIA, though.
It's a pleasure for me to be with you tonight. And
let me say at the outset that the views I will express to you
are purely my own. They do not represent those of the adminis-
tration, and they certainly do not represent those of the CIA.
There is gathered in this room what can truly be termed
a natural resource, a natural resource that is too often maligned,
that is seldom recognized for its achievements and, if I read you
correctly, which is concerned about the future of management in
government. Those of you in this room have been prepared well
for your responsibilities through your experience at FEI, and I
congratulate FEI on its achievements to date, and it has my best
wishes for the future.
Tonight I would like to chat with you a bit about man-
agement in the 1980s, the trends, the opportunities that I see for
us to do a better job, and, lastly, some of the incentives and dis-
incentives with which we will be confronted. But let me say at the
outset that I have found federal service a challenging career, a
satisfying experience, as I look back at my own past, just the
thrill of touring a Headstart center or looking at the accomplish-
ments of a vocational rehabilitation program, or participating in
the birth of democracy in a country like Portugal. And there are
the humorous moments too. I can remember in my days at OEO when
I went to the chairman of my appropriations committee and tried
to convince him that his community action agency should be cut
back just like everybody else's because it was a matter of prin-
ciple. He looked at me straight in the eye and he said "Young
man, there comes a time in every man's life when he must learn
to rise above principle."
[Laughter.]
That community action agency was not cut back.
Or I recall. the fun experience I had as a young For-
eign Service officer assigned to Zaire, then the Congo, shortly
after the 1960 revolution. We had a visit from three United
States senators, Senators Gore, Hart and Neuberger. And I was
the escort officer. And I had arranged for the President of the
Congolese Senate to invite them to lunch. The man's name was
Victor Kumereko. And as we came up to his house, Kumereko came
out and he had a woman with him. And you very seldom saw Con-
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golese wives in those days. And not knowing who the woman was,
I introduced her as his wife.
We went in. We were having cocktails; I was inter-
preting. Another woman came in, shook hands all the way around
and went over and sat down next to the first woman. Senator
Gore turned to me and said "Who's she?" And I said "I don't
know. Maybe she's his wife." He said "Well, I thought you
introduced that other woman as his wife." "Well, let me ask
him." And he said "Oh, yes, both of them are my wives." Well
with that, the interest of the American senators picked up con-
siderly. And Kumereko said "No, no, no, you mustn't get excited
about this. You must understand that over here in the Congo, we
have a different culture than yours. For example, where I come
from, the Leopoldville district of the Congo, I'm a big tribal
chief. And as a tribal chief, I would normally be entitled to
five or six wives. But since I'm a Catholic, I have only two."
[Laughter and applause.]
To me one of the most satisfying aspects of government
service is that we are on the cutting edge of change. We are
serving our fellow man. And daggone it, we're doing it well.
There are able people in government. The federal government
does have good managers, and it needs to keep them. And when we
look forward to the challenges that you, as managers, will face
in the 1980s, it seems to me we have to look first at the shape of
the world and then at some of the developments that will take place
in our own country.
In terms of the Soviet Union, there's no question that
they have been putting more resources into their national defense
than we have. Our attitude is changing. But somewhere in the mid
1980s, there's going to be a problem era. And about the same time
the Soviet Union is going to be faced with internal difficulties:
a declining growth rate, rising consumer expectations, topping
out of oil production and a change of leadership. At the same
time, areas like the Middle East will continue to be trouble
spots. As long as we're dependent on foreign oil, energy will
be a problem. More countries will develop a nuclear capability.
Conventional arms will become available more readily. Regional
wars are more likely to spark larger conflagrations.
In addition, I see continued Soviet and Cuban expansion-
ism, such as we have witnessed in the past couple of years in Africa,
and more recently in Central America and the eastern Caribbean. In
short, it's going to be a troubled world. And that kind of world
is going to call for more resources and attention. And those re-
sources and attention will come at a time of tight budgets.
On the domestic side, there are certain demographic trends
that are familiar to all of us. The postwar baby boom is now reach-
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ing the adult years. Our population is becoming older. That means
more services for the elderly. But if the past is any guide, it
also means a more conservative body politic. That is to say, a
body politic that is perhaps more apathetic about government
programs, that is looking for less, not more government. At
the same time, such a body politic offers opportunity for the
special interest groups and the single issue candidates. And
we've seen a lot of that in the past year. But at the same time,
the budget backlash that we're seeing now, in my judgment, is go-
ing to force some kind of a showdown between the special interest
groups and those who advocate mission oriented government.
And for those of you in this room who are interested
in management, the choice, it seems to me, is clear. You must
come down on the side of mission oriented government. Sure,
we'll hear the same cliches -- the problem with government is
too many people, too much red tape, too much paperwork. But
you and I know that these are symptoms, not the root cause.
All the Leach amendments, the Bumpers' amendments, all the
paperwork commissions in the world won't solve the fundamental
problem.
The real problem is single purpose legislation that
creates a program directed toward a specific goal without regard
to how that program will fit into the overall mission of govern-
ment or a particular agency, or even how you can measure the
progress of that program against a specific set of goals. And
I would suggest to you that that debate between special interests
and broad mission management will be the single most important
management issue of the '80s. And it can only be coped with by
an intensive review between the executive branch and the Congress
of each legislative program, one by one, to look at the overlaps,
to look at the competitive features, and to look at what kind of
an organizational structure needs to be established.
Let's face it. Up to now we've had government by advo-
cacy. And government by advocacy tends to thwart good management.
We've lived with it so far, but in a tight budget era it becomes
a very expensive luxury. Just take a look at some of the organi-
zational structures throughout government. Most of them are
constituency based. How many departments are set up in the
interests of an overall mission or efficiency? Most of them
have been set up as a shell to house the single purpose programs?
And any effort to create links between those programs automati-
cally meets with resistance from the interest groups. Take HEW
when I was there. HEW, of course, no longer exists as such. But
there were some 300 different programs, all with their own sets
of rules, regulations and standards. I can recall at one time
counting some fifteen different programs that dealt with the
mentally retarded, none of them related to one another. And
because of legislative constraints, there was very little that
we could do to link them. And with all due respect to those of
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you here who might be deputy assistant secretaries, count the
number of deputy assistant secretaries in the various departments
and look how they've proliferated recently. And I would submit
that many of them are there to serve a particular constituency.
But what does that do to your management span of control? No
private corporation in the world would function with such a top-
heavy structure.
There is, in fact, a tendency to leap to the organiza-
tional solution every time we face a problem. I can recall a
number of years ago testifying on the bilingual education pro-
gram when that program was at its inception. And the very first
question from the chairman of the committee was "Mr. Carlucci,
don't you think we ought to have an assistant secretary for bi-
lingual education?" I allowed as how I thought we ought to decide
whether we should have a program first and what that program ought
to look like and then try to decide how the program could fit into
an organizational structure.
Now some people say "0h, what's the difference? How
does it hurt?" Just wonder through a ghetto and talk to the people
in the social area and you'll see. I've talked to people who've
had as many as 18 to 20 case workers working with them, all from
a different program. I often thought when I was in OEO that if
we could just take the salaries of those case workers, we could
get the people out of poverty. And this was amply documented by
Congressman Griffiths' studies. In fact, we've now moved to a
concept of multi-purpose service centers, so the people at the
local level can tell the poor people what programs might be
available to them. Rationality would tell you that the best
thing to do would be to straighten them out at the federal level
first.
Another aspect of federal management that will be ter-
ribly important to us in the 1980s is congressional oversight.
Now congressional oversight is absolutely fundamental to the
functioning of our democratic system. And it's constructive.
I've had numerous sessions on the Hill where good programs have
developed, where good ideas have come out. And we welcome this
kind of oversight. But I question whether we've overdone a good
thing. When an agency, as many of your agencies do, have to re-
port to 10, 20, or even 30 different committees on the Hill, that
makes it impossible to establish a single mission. These commit-
tees impose conflicting demands. And with the proliferation of
committee staffs -- there were some 6500 congressional staff members
in 1960; there're some 38,000 today -- we get numberous and often
conflicting demands on us.
But perhaps more significant is the tendency of individual
oversight committees to defend their programs, and in so defending
them to get into the business of micromanagement. I can recall
again when I was in HEW receiving a telephone call from the Hill
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telling me to promote John Doe from GS-16 to GS-17 because he
headed a program somebody liked. I explained how John Doe wasn't
really eligible for promotion at that time; didn't seem to me to
make sense; it was inequitable. And the answer was promote him
or we'll make you do it in legislation. I said I wouldn't, tnat
today that man is a statutory GS-17.
In another case, a committee on the Hill didn't like
the manager of a particular HEW program, so they took the entire
program and moved it out from under him to another part of HEW.
And I would submit that that's the kind of oversight that we can
usefully do without.
The problem, as I see it, is that there is no single
committee, in most cases, that has overall responsibility for
the larger government agencies. Hence, no one is interested in
management. And any effort to pull together the programs and to
make them relate to each other meets with automatic resistance.
Just look at what happened to the rather massive domes-
tic reorganization proposals that were sent forward to the Congress
in '1970. They went through extensive hearings before the Govern-
ment Operations Committee, a skeptical committee. That committee
became convinced that they had merit and voted the first depart-
ment out by a considerable majority. But then the special interest
groups got to the congressional committee chairman, and the whole
program was killed in the Rules Committee. Once again, the special
interests had triumphed.
Now I think there are signs for optimism on this score.
There is a great realization on the Hill that management is impor-
tant to program effectiveness. I think there's a realization that
there are too many committees. I think there's a realization that
a planning process is important. I think this is one of the issues
we're going to have to address very seriously in the '80s. And
I would foresee here a much stronger role both in the executive
branch and on the Hill for the Office of Management and Budget.
In terms of internal management, it seems to me there
will be several areas of emphasis in the 1980s. The first re-
quirement on all of us will be to attract and motivate good people,
people who can be innovative, because -- and I know it's a cliche
at this point, but it's a fact as well -- we are going to have to
do more with Iess.
And closely allied to this will be the goal-setting pro-
cess. I think that's going to receive more attention in the
1980s. It needn't be a complicated affair. There have been many
agencies that have tried goal-setting programs, and they've failed
for lack of employee acceptance. I would suggest that it's nothing
more than a simple dialogue where we try to be specific in terms
of what we want our subordinates to do. And it seems to me that
the Senior Executive Service provides a great opportunity here
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for all of us, where we can link the goals of the individual to
the goals of the unit and provide a reward which is commensurate
with achievement.
I think we're going to have to spend more attention,
more time on the labor-management relations area. A lot of pro-
gress has been made there in the 1970s, but I think we still lag
behind the private sector. I would see us dealing much more with
some of the fundamental issues rather than what are basically the
fringe issues that we've been dealing with to date.
I think sooner or later the domestic programs of the
federal government are going to have to address in a serious
manner the question of centralization versus decentralization.
I have a bias. I don't think most of the domestic pro-
grams can be run successfully out of Washington. But if we do
decentralize, we must be careful to put the authority for co-
operating programs in the same localities.
In 1972, I was sent up to the Agnes disaster area to
pull together the various federal programs, and I had absolute
authority, my management over every federal program. And I
very quickly perceived that the basic problem was that one
program manager could make a decision on the scene, another had
to go to Philadelphia, and a third had to go to Washington.
And only by centralizing the decision-making myself could I
coordinate the programs. That was fine for a disaster. But a
disaster is nothing more than telescoping regular federal aid
into a short time-frame. And this kind of problem continues
to plague our domestic programs.
As we decentralize, it seems to me we're going to have
to do a better job of coordinating the state and local government.
I can remember when I first got into the domestic side of govern-
ment, that the feds tended to look down their noses at state and
local government. We've overcome that now. I think the relation-
ship is improved, it's by and large constructive, but we're going
to have to continue to build on that existing relationship if
we're going to make the whole structure work properly.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the question
of technology. Technology is reaching the office. Are you as
managers prepared for it? Will you be burnt, or have you been
burnt by some major investment in ADP?
Pretty soon we'll have a paperless office. And with
the advent of many computers you're going to have to face some
pretty difficult decisions. You want a central or a distributed
system? Perhaps most importantly, do you have a management
process to make those decisions, one which involves the very
top levels of your agency?
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And while on the subject of ADP, let me just mention
one concern that I have in passing. We have in our agencies,
large data bases that have been created for one specific pur-
pose. As we tend to become more automated, there will be a
desire on the part of many to link these data bases. Watch out.
I think we as the public servants have a real responsibility to
watch for invasion of privacy. And when those data bases are
linked, we want to be certain that it is done with the explicit
knowledge and authorization of all the responsible authorities.
Finally, in terms of incentives and disincentives,
we're going to have to pay a lot of attention in the 1980s to
retaining good managers in government. And I have an overriding
concern. I think we're beginning to lose our good managers
for several reasons.
Very few of us came into government for money, but
neither did we come in to see our real incomes go down -- it is
agreed that they've been going down -- at the same time, as our
pensions continue to rise. It's a strange system of incentives
that no private company would ever tolerate. Nor did we come
into government seeking praise. We expect a certain amount of
criticism. But I sense that that criticism has become more
prejorative in recent years.
There's an increasing tendency on the part of politicians
to blame the ills of the country on the civil service. I think
we all accept the need for rules on ethics in government, but
I for one, quite frankly, do not like the tone of the ethics
in government act -- perfectly willing to fill out the forms
-- but I don't think I should have to demonstrate my honesty
at this point. And I think a lot of people feel the same way
in government.
But all of these are problems that we could cope with
readily, it seems to me, if we maintain the same sense of accom-
plishment that you and I had when we first came into government.
But I sense that some of that may be slipping away from us. There
are too many people in government today who have the veto, legis-
lative oversight, investigative reporters, whistleblowers, inspectors.
All those are desirable things. Indeed, I fought very hard in
1972 to create an inspection unit in HEW and I was stopped by the
Congress. We all need them. But here too, we need to raise a
warning flag.
Are we the pendulum swinging too far the other
way? Do we have more of a premium on catching somebody who's
done something wrong than in getting the job done? And it
would seem to me that as we approach the 1980s we need to take
a serious look at that balance.
Hence, my conclusion is that the 1980s will be com-
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plex years, there will be major problems, major challenges. But
there will also be very significant opportunities.
What is needed most is a clear and loud voice for good
management in government. A voice that speaks not in simplistic
terms but that lays out the real issues and proposes solutions
that people can understand.
You are all capable executives. You have heavy re-
sponsibilities. And I commend you on your efforts to improve.
But you also have another responsibility, and that is to educate
the public on the problems of management in government.
Those of us in government have the largest and most
difficult Board of Directors of any company in the country.
But we need to work with them, we need to educate them.
I am confident that you can measure up to the challenges
ahead. The country may not always express it well, but I know
it is counting on you.
Thank you and good luck.
[Applause]
CHAIR: I'm reminded of the story when three umpires were
talking. One umpire says, "I calls 'em as I sees 'em." The other
umpire said, "I calls 'em as they are." And the last umpire said,
"They ain't nothin' 'til I call 'em."
[Laughter]
CHAIR: And I think Frank, you've called them tonight.
And I think more than anything else, I think he's challenged all
of you and me to look at the '80s, to look at the challenges,
and to call 'em. Because we as managers, we as executives,
have to call 'em in our own ballpark. And they may be different
in CIA than they are at FEI, and the challenges may be similar
or we may see 'em differently, but they ain't nothin' 'til we
call 'em.
And I want to thank you, Frank, and I want to thank
you, Marsha, and I want to thank all of you.
Good night.
[Applause]
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
The Presidential Classroom: Address and Q&A
Marriott-Twin Bridges
Monday, February 25, 1980
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ANGIE WHITAKER: It is my pleasure this morning
to introduce a very distinguished speaker who's going to
discuss the presidency and its relationship to the Central
Intelligence Agency.
A native of Pennsylvania, he received his BA de-
gree from Princeton and his MBA from Harvard. After a year
in the private sector, he joined the Foreign Service and
served in a variety of positions. He was the vice consul
and economic officer in South Africa. He spent some time
in the Congo, in Rio de Janeiro. And then in 1970, he came
back to the United States where he was the Assistant Direc-
tor for Operations of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
In '71, he became the Associate Director and then Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. From there
he went to Health, Education and Welfare, where he was the
Undersecretary. In 1977, he was the United States Ambassador
to Portugal. Since 1978, he has served as the Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency. And we are just very
honored and very pleased to have with us this morning Mr.
Frank Carlucci.
[Applause.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much,
Mrs. Whitaker. It's a pleasure to be with you and to start
this week of the foreign corridors of power in Washington,
and specifically how the presidency functions.
Since you've asked me to kick off this session, I've
automatically made the link between information and power. I
assume that most of you have heard that, in Washington, informa-
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tion is power. But I would submit that information is powerful
only if it is properly used. That is to say, used at the ap-
propriate time by the appropriate person. And of course, the
principal person in our government who needs information for
decision-making is the President.
But I would also submit that if information is
prematurely released or improperly released, it does not
represent power. Indeed, it represents the dissipation of
power.
Let me try and illustrate the point by two examples.
In the intelligence business they tell the story of two men
who were stranded on a desert island. And a helicopter came
over, flew down low; the pilot leaned out and shouted to the
men "You're lost." With that, the pilot ascended back up and
disappeared over the horizon. One man turned to the other and
he said "That pilot was an intelligence officer." The second
says "Why? How do you know?" "First of all, because his in-
formation was right on, totally accurate. And secondly, because
it was totally useless."
To take a more serious example, I guess I was about
the age of most of you in this room. I can recall on December
7th, 1941 hearing on the radio about the attack, the Japanese
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. And as the historians look at
that fact, they find that there were bits and pieces of infor-
mation; information about the movement of the Japanese fleet.
Not conclusive, but just that the Japanese fleet had myster-
iously disappeared. There were some signals that were picked
up, rather mysterious signals, that normally would have aroused
suspicion. There was some diplomatic activity that, had it
been analyzed, would have given rise to certain questions.
There was nobody to pull it alI together and to present it
to the President. Indeed, there was a last minute trip to
the President's Office where some of these questions were
raised. But by then it was too late, and we all know the
tragic results.
As a consequence, our country decided that an
organization was needed to pull together intelligence in-
formation and to present it to the President. Hence, the
Central Intelligence Agency was created. And in the early
years, Presidents were principally interested in military
development, strategic balances -- how do we relate to the
Soviet Union, analyzing other people's missile capabilities.
But gradually we were not into policies just I Ike the military
affairs. The application of your might, that is to say your
diplomatic leverage, can be significantly enhanced if you have
a better idea of which your adversary's capabilities are and,
more importantly, what his plans are. And it's this function
that has become so important in our government structure today.
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It's really not the spy function, which the newspapers IIke to
write about, although those of us out at Langley do some of
that. It is principally the process of pulling together bits
and pieces of information and presenting those pieces of in-
formation in evaluated form to policy-makers which makes the
so-called intelligence function so critically important. And
when you hear about Langley and the Central Intelligence Agency
later on this week, bear in mind the organization probably re-
sembles a small university more than anything else. We might
have engineers looking at Soviet missile systems. We might
have agronomists analyzing Soviet grain production; economists
looking at the question of what is happening to the price of
gold; petroleum experts analyzing what's happening in the
petroleum market, as well as political experts dealing with
various countries, the things that you read about every day
in your newspapers, such as Iran and Afghanistan. And it's
their job to assemble the existing pieces of information and
to present it in a comprehensive form to the President and
other policy-makers.
Now how do we do that? Every day the President
has on his desk at the beginning of the day a daily intelli-
gence bulletin, which reads very much like the short newspaper
-- we try to make it as readable as possible -- that gives him
the overnight developments around the world. We also try to
put in little pieces from time to time. We might take a given
country and analyze trends in that country. Or we might analyze
developments, say, in NATO or the Warsaw Pact. And we find that
the President reads a particular bulletin avidly. In fact, he
frequently sends notes back saying this is good; this is bad.
On occasion he's even been known to correct our grammar.
We also send the intelligence bulletin to other
senior policy-making officials, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser; when
appropriate, people like the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Energy so that they can be kept abreast of the
latest developments.
In addition to sending the material in written form,
we hold periodic briefings. Once every two weeks, the Director
or, in his absence, I spend an amount of time with the President
where we talk to him on any subject of our choosing. The Pre-
sident doesn't know the subject in advance. We pick it. We
provide him with a briefing book so he can follow the briefing
with charts, maps, whatever we think might be appropriate. We
find that the President pays a great deal of attention to these
briefings. I find it dangerous, because he's got a much better
memory than I have, and he'll pick us up on something and say
"Well, I thought you told me a year ago that this development
was heading in another direction." So he really does retain
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the information we provide him.
We also play a role in the National Security Council
debates, National Security Council meetings. Frequently we
will be asked to lead off with an intelligence assessment;
that is to say, what is the information the U. S. government
has on a particular situation overseas. Once that information
is on the table, it may be challenged by some other organiza-
tion. But at least we will have furnished the basic data for
the policy-makers as they go about examining their options.
Now most people don't realize it, but information
in the U. S. government doesn't only go to the President.
Much of the information that we provide the President is
also shared with the Congress. There's a daily intelligence
bulletin that goes up to select committees on the Hill, the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee, the
Armed Services Committee. In addition, we provide numerous
briefings for individual congressmen or different committees.
We probably provide as many as ten or fifteen briefings a week
on the Hill. So that when the administration has a debate with
the Congress over policy measures, we're all proceeding from the
same data base.
Just a word about where our information comes from.
I don't want to get into too much detail because you'll set
some of this later on this week. But our analysts look at a
variety of sources. They look at open sources, just like you
might in going to the library. They look at Foreign Service
reporting, reporting from our embassies and consulates over-
seas. And they look at clandestine reporting; that is to say,
reporting which comes from our espionage network overseas. And
they look at information which comes from our technical systems.
Now you've heard a lot about our technical systems,
and indeed they're very good systems. But they have their limi-
tations. A technical system can tell you what our adversary
has done, or what he may be doing right now, if you're lucky
and happen to catch him doing that. But it really can't tell
you what his plans are. And for learning about somebody's
plans, which is the most important information the President
can have, we will have to continue to depend on our human
sources.
Human source collection, collection of intelligence
by agents will continue to be a very important responsibility
of the U. S. government, particularly of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Now this is not some mysterious process. It
is really a process of building confidence between individuals.
That is to say, someone in another society who for one reason
or another is willing to provide information to the U. S.
government, and someone in our organization who can work with
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him in gathering that information and supplying it back to the
United States government.
There are some differences in establishing what is
in effect a contractual relationship between doing this over-
seas and the normal contractual relationships you would find
in the United States. One difference, of course, is that
there is generally an ideological characteristic to it.
That is to say, most people overseas who are willing to
provide information to the U. S. government don't do so
for money. Some of them do. But by and large, they do it
for personal reasons of one sort or another. Frequently,
ideological reasons--disillusion with the society in which
they are living.
Secondly, in so doing, they may be breaking the laws
of their country. Not our laws, but the laws of their own
country. Thirdly, many of the people we're dealing with risk
their lives or their liberty in dealing with us. So they in-
sist on confidentiality. Nobody, say, in Cuba or Eastern
Europe is going to provide information if they think they're
going to read about it on the front pages of the newspapers.
And this, quite frankly, is one of the most serious problems
our government faces today. We are known around the world as
a government that is not capable of keeping a secret. And this
is a very severe handicap to the President. He can't select the
timing for his policy alternatives, the information that is pro-
vided to him cannot be kept confidential until he decides how
it can best be used, then his effectiveness as a world leader
is seriously undermined.
Now we believe there're a number of reasons why the
U. S. government is perceived as a government that can't keep
a secret. You just mentioned a couple of them. There are
former CIA people who are writing books. There are former
CIA people and others engaged in an operation designed to
reveal the names of CIA personnel and CIA agents overseas.
And we seem to be powerless to stop that. There are problems
created by the Freedom of Information Act, which entitles
anybody in the world to write to the CIA and request informa-
tion. That is to say, even the Soviet KGB could write us and
ask for information, and under this law we would be required
to respond within ten days. We wouldn't necessarily have to
give out the information, but we would have to search our
files. That creates a very serious problem for us.
We have gone to the Congress and asked them -- the
President has gone to the Congress and asked them to help us
resolve these problems. He asked them to do it in the context
of what we call charter legislation, broad legislation that
would lay the underpinning for an effective intelligence or-
ganization, that would legislate the necessary checks and
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balances to guarantee that there're no infringements of civil
liberties by an intelligence organization, but, at the same
time, would give us the tools that we need to provide the
President with the information that he needs.
Let me close by just saying a word about where we
stand intelligence-wise vis-a-vis our adversary. We, in my
judgment, are stiII -- we still have the finest intelligence
organization in the world. There's no question that the Soviets
put far more money, far more resources into the intelIigence area.
But going back to my initial comment, one of the main functions
of intelligence is taking the information to the President. And
much of that information is bad news. And we have no problems
whatsoever in bringing bad news to President Carter. He takes
it rather well. But I wouldn't like to be the intelligence
officer in the Soviet Union who has to bring bad news to the
Kremlin. In fact, there are all kinds of indications that their
intelligence is skewed by their ideology.
My judgment is that we are the finest intelligence
organization in the world. We will continue to provide some
of the best information in the world to the President. But we
are hopef u I that we can work out some of the prob I ems that I
have mentioned with the Congress and in the course of the de-
bates that are now underway.
[Applause.]
WHITAKER: Mr. Carlucci will take questions now.
And I want all of you to think about keying your questions i n
on remarks that he made this morning, because we will be going
to the CIA later in the week where you'll have an opportunity
to ask questions that maybe deal more with the structure and
organization of CIA. And I would also ask you to limit your
questions to one question, no one, two, three, four-part ques-
tion, because Mr. Carlucci has to leave right at 10:00. He has
a 10:15 meeting.
So we're ready to take questions now.
[End of Side 1.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: ...provided information
which indicated that the Shah was facing serious problems. This
information was provided, oh, about a year in advance. It accom-
panied the erosion of the Shah's position in our reporting to the
President.
But I think it is fair to say at the same time that
nobody, either the CIA nor anybody else in this country or any
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other country that I'm aware of foresaw the dimensions of the
upheaval in Iran. Nobody forecast the total social revolution
that would be led by a then 79-year old cleric.
This fact that we did not forecast the dimensions of
the revolution has led us to re-examine some of the reporting
that we do from overseas and to place more emphasis on analysis
of societal trends, less emphasis on the purely political. Now,
societal trends are much more difficult to collect against and
to analyze. They're much more unpredictable. But we have sent
out instructions to our Foreign Service folk and to our intel-
ligence collectors around the world asking them to give more
emphasis to these factors.
In terms of the second part of your question: "If the
President knew about the erosion of the situation, what action
was taken?" Frequently, action is taken which cannot be dis-
cussed in public. Moreover, you can't always affect the course
of world events as much as we would like. When you get a social
revolution underway, that's a process that has Its own dynamic,
and the U. S. government can't just step in and say "Stop" and
expect it to stop. Indeed, there are many situations where it
would be totally counterproductive for the U. S. government to
try and emphasize its influence. I'm not saying that that was
the situation in Iran. But there certainly were a lot of diplo-
matic actions that were taken in the final months of the Shah's
rule.
Q: My name is Tammy Morton.
I'm from Michigan.
Mr. Carlucci, you talked about the United States losing
confidence with many nations throughout the world. And I would
like to ask you, what are some ways that we could try and regain
the confidence of these countries? And would one of those actions
be sort of the, quote, "unleashing" of the CIA that, you know; the
Congress is considering that legislation right now?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I think it's fair toy
say that a number of countries around the world have been puzz`IEd
by developments in the United States over the past five or six
years. And those of us who lived here and lived through the
trauma of Vietnam, Watergate understand this. We understand
the desire of the Congress to exercise more authority. At the
same time, though, the Congress has taken unto itself what is
essentially an executive role in many areas, and it's very dif-
ficult for 535 members of Congress to conduct foreign policy,
for example.
So we need to examine the balance of power against or
between the Congress and the executive branch and we need to
speak more with one voice overseas.
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As far as the CIA is concerned, we would prefer not
to be referred to in canine terms. The press talks about un-
leashing us. And we're more concerned -- we're not concerned
about leashes as much as we are concerned about the misguided
applications of certain laws or the absence of laws that would
enable us to deal with misguided people who for no conceivable
social purpose are revealing the names of CIA personnel over-
seas, thereby putting their lives in danger, at a maximum, and,
at a minimum, impacting on their effectiveness. Because, after
all,'no one wants to deal clandestinely and provide information
clandestinely to someone whose name is in the newspapers every
day.
So we are asking the Congress to take a look at this
problem. We are asking the Congress to relieve us of some of
the burden, not all of the burden, of the Freedom of Information
Act, which is antithetical to the concept of a good intelligence
organization, which must function in secrecy. We think that we
need oversight, and the Congress is now exercising that over-
sight, and the Freedom of Information is a poor vehicle for
oversight.
Finally, we think we need to cut down on the number
of committees to which covert action operations are reported.
At present, if we are to engage in a covert action operation,
that is to say try and influence events of a foreign country in
a clandestine fashion, we're obliged to brief eight committees
of Congress. Now that's two hundred members of Congress. That's
almost a contradiction in terms, because once you brief 200 people
on anything, it is no longer covert. What we are saying is that
should be cut down to two committees, which is the normal over-
sight mechanism for any government agency.
We think this would enhance our effectiveness. But
we in the CIA don't pretend to be a substitute for U. S. foreign
policy? Indeed, it would be a very serious mistake if we were
to try and conduct an independent foreign policy. Your question
was, in a sense, a foreign policy question. And I think it's
answered by the strength of the tone of the President's State
of the Union Message.
Q: Steve Rains from Illinois.
Mr. Carlucci, do you feel like Congress in any way
hinders the effectiveness of your organization?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: As I've indicated, I think
the number of committees to which we must report covert action
operations does deprive the President of a legitimate foreign
policy tool.
Let me emphasize this point. The President has de-
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cided that the country should be able to conduct covert action
operations. The Congress has agreed. So there's no problem
about conducting these operations. But we have created a struc-
ture on the Hill which makes it highly likely that information
on these operations would leak.
The Congress is very sympathetic to this problem.
They have indicated to us an intent to cut down on the number
of committees. They have also expressed a willingness to look
seriously at the problems we have explained to them in connection
with the Freedom of Information Act, and there are a number of
bills that have been introduced on the Hill to deal with the
activities of those who would disclose the names of our people
overseas.
So the answer to your question is that there are some
legislative provisions which either impede our effectiveness or
the absence of which make it difficult for us to function effec-
tively. But the Congress is now taking note of these problems
and is moving to provide us with some legislative relief.
Q: I'm David Bristol from Kentucky. And I'm just
wondering. Why does the CIA have agents working in the United
States when the charter of the CIA specifically states that the
CIA can only work outside the boundaries of the United States?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we don't have agents,
in that sense, working in the United States.
Let me clarify some definitions here, because everybody,
including the press and the public, is confused on this point.
The FBI refers to its personnel as agents. We do not refer to
our personnel as agents. For us, an agent is a foreigner who is
providing information to us. Our personnel who work with these
foreigners are called case officers. So I assume you were re-
ferring to CIA personnel.
Yes, we do have CIA personnel here in the United
States for several purposes. One, of course, is that we
have to recruit here in the United States. That is to say,
we look for people who want to join the CIA, and we have to
conduct security investigations on them.
Secondly, there are a number of foreigners here in
the United States, and we try to enter into contact with those
foreigners to see whether they would be willing to cooperate with
us once they return overseas. But we do not conduct espionage
operations against Americans, and we do not target on Americans.
There are safeguards built into an executive order for American
citizens. When we do, in the case of an emergency, have to tar-
get against an American, we have to go through a procedure which
requires the Attorney General's approval.
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So the answer to your question, as I understand it,
is we aren't operating in the United States.
Q: Mr. Carlucci, my name is Lelia Kaufman, and I'm
from Berlin, Germany.
My question pertains to SALT II. Does the CIA have
advanced enough visual technology, a complicated enough espionage
system to detect any Soviet violation of the SALT II treaty were
it to be ratified?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: That's a very complicated
question that has been debated at great length on the Hill. The
straight answer to your question, as you have phrased it, is,
no, we do not have a capability to detect any violation. But
when you look at something as complicated as the SALT treaty,
you have to look at probability and you have to look at time
frames, and you have to say if this provision is violated, what
are your probabilities of catching that violation over time frame
"X," over time frame "Y." That is to say, what is our competence
level in monitoring the treaty.
Much of the information we've gathered. And the means
of gathering it, of course, is confidential. And we have debated
with the Senate at great length the adequacy of our monitoring
capability. We've gone over it provision by provision and said
"Here is the degree of competence with which we could monitor
this treaty."
I think the answer to your question lies in the fact
that the Senate, after exhaustive hearings on this subject, con-
cluded that verification is not a major issue. That is to say,
their judgment, which is essentially a political judgment we're
not qualified to make -- their judgment was that the United States
has adequate capability to monitor it.
Q: ...And I'd like to know if a foreign person gave
information to the CIA, and in the process risked his own life
by breaking the laws of his own country, would the CIA provide
some form of protection for him and, if so, how?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, the most important
form of protection that you can provide someone like that is
to protect the information he gives you and to protect his
identity. And we try to do that in our organization by not re-
ferring to people by their true names or by having a complicated
security system, a decentralized security system where only the
people who have a need to know have access to the information
our friend would provide or have access to his name. And this
is at the heart of the issue that we're debating with the Con-
gress, because we know that if the information that our friend
gives us or his identity is spread too far in the United States
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government, if it goes to too many people on the Hill, or in-
deed if his identity goes to anybody on the Hill, that he will
conclude it's not worth cooperating with us. And the fact is
that a number of people have concluded that the risks are too
high for them to cooperate with us.
So the efforts we are making to cut down on dissemin-
ation of information represents the best kind of protection that
we think we could give to our sources.
Now, in the case you've cited, if someone's life is
in danger, they are in what we call a denied area, say Eastern
Europe or the Soviet Union, and they wish to defect, we have
means of helping them. We have means of helping them after
they get into this country, helping them to establish a new
life.
Q: I'm Julie Smoods from Washington, Indiana. And
I'd like to know why did it take so long to discover the in-
creasing troops of the Soviets in Cuba.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: You have to make a dis-
tinction. You have to understand what was discovered. Soviet
troops in Cuba is not what was discovered. What was discovered
was the existence of a separate Soviet organizational entity,
the Soviet brigade. We have known for a n umber of years that
there have been Soviet troops in Cuba. We've known approximate-
ly their numbers. But what we didn't have was the breakdown
that told us "Here is a separate brigade with an identifiable
combat capability. Most of the Soviets In Cuba, we assume,
were training, were there for training purposes.
In fact, this kind of thing is very difficult to
discover, because nobody can come out and tell you about this.
The Soviets take obvious measures to protect this kind of in-
formation. And rather than an intelligence failure, this, in
fact, was a significant intelligence breakthrough, the fact
that it was discovered.
So we really have no apologies to amkle on that
score. Indeed, we think the analytical work that went into
determining the existence of this separate organizational
entity was some of the best in the Intel I igence community.
Q: My name is Vicky Eshbe. I'm from Ohio.
You mentioned analyzation several times. And I
was wondering. As you form opinions, have you ever been
horribly wrong or have you ever missed information?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Sure. Any organization
that evaluates information is going to make errors, particu-
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larly when you're dealing with the intangibles that we have
to deal with in world affairs, the intentions of the leaders
in the Kremlin. That's a subject of considerable speculation.
So there has to be speculation because the Soviet Union con-
ducts its policy-making in great secrecy. The intentions of
Third World leaders. We don't have access to many of their
inner councils. In some cases we might; in some cases, we
don't.
As we look at the information we receive, we try
to evaluate it as best we can. I would say our percentage of
error is relatively low, but certainly we make errors. Our
accuracy, once again, is a function of two things. It's a
function of the quality of people we have doing the analysis,
and It's a function of our collection capability. And our
collection capability, once again, gets back to the basic
factors that I've mentioned. And that is to say, our ability
to maintain a confidence and to protect the information that
people give us and to protect the identities of people who
cooperate with us.
Q: Concerning the Freedom of Information Act,
exactly what categories of information can and cannot be
given out in detail?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: A good question. The
Freedom of Information Act has nine exemptions to it. The
first exemption says that no agency needs to give out informa-
tion that is legitimately classified, but it must review the
information to make sure that the classification is proper.
The third exemption allows us to exempt material
under our own statute, which authorizes the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence to protect sources and methods. What this
means, though, is that we must review the material requested
with an eye toward release. That is to say, if you send us
a letter asking for all the material signed by Frank Carlucci,
we have to pull out all that material and review it with the
presumption being that it will be released. That is to say,
the burden of proof is on us to demonstrate that it should
not be released, that it is properly classified.
I f we so determine, if we determine that it is
properly classified, you are then entitled to sue us. And
the judge comes in and substitutes his judgment for ours.
And there are some 500 district judges. So the case could
go to any one of these judges.
There are several problems that arise. When you
are looking at potential agent in a denied area who's risking
his life and you say "Don't worry, we have these exemptions
from the Freedom of Information Act. But I must tell you
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that the information you give us wi l l be collated, wi l l be
pulled together in a file that will be sent around the agency
and then reviewed line by line to see whether it can be re-
leased. And if we say no, it's possible the judge will say
yes." His reaction, or her reaction, is likely to be "Thanks
a lot, but I'd just as soon not take that risk."
So we have told the Congress we need relief from
searching our most sensitive files, not all our files. It
would leave our finished production subject to the Freedom of
Information process. We would continue to respond to first
person requests. That is to say, if you were to write us and
say what's in my file, we would continue to respond to that.
But those files that deal with sources and methods,
the most sensitive information, we would exempt.
YOUNG WOMAN: Thank you.
Q: My name is Anne Henry, and I'm from New York.
I realize that concentration on secrecy powers in
the executive branch can be justified by practicality. You
know, fewer people informed of certain things. But I'm wonder-
ing what is generally cited as the constitutional basis for
the executive's power of secrecy.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: The separation of powers
is what is cited as the constitutional provision; that is that
the President has a separate constitutional responsibility to
carry out foreign policy. And inherent in that responsibility
Is his authority to receive information on a classified basis
from his own subordinates. And there are executive orders.
There is an executive order which lays out the standards
for the classification of information.
Let me go one step beyond your question, though,
and say that nobody in the intelligence business, certainly
not the President, is seeking exemptions from legislative
oversight. The President has a policy-making responsibility,
but the Congress has the responsibility to exercise oversight;
that is to say, to insure that the executive is carrying out
the law in the manner intended by the Congress. We report to
select committees, a select committee in the Senate, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, and a House Permanent Select Comm it-
tee on Intelligence. And we provide them with virtually all
of our information -- our budget books are complete; they're
replete with information -- so that they can make the judgment
whether the Central Intelligence Agency has carried out the
intent of congressional legislation.
But that is very different from the President's policy-
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making responsibilities and is inherent authority to receive
confidential advice.
Q: Fred Smerck from Buffalo Grove, Illinois.
Mr. Carlucci, over a period of time, the CIA enjoyed
a vast period of freedom. Then the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was
passed to limit its power. It states that the President must
approve all CIA movements and eight House and Senate commit-
tees consisting of 200 people must be informed shortly before
or after the movement.
Do you think that -- the CIA wants to stop this. Do
you think this will give the CIA too much power and freedom?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: A couple of points of
clarification. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment applies only to
those activities which are not solely for the purpose of in-
telligence collection. Turned around, those are known as
special activities; that is, covert activity, activities by
the CIA to try and influence events in other countries and to
do so clandestinely. Such determinations are only made after
a meeting of the National Security Council and a presidential
find ing.
We are required under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to
brief eight committees of Congress. We are asking not that
we be relieved from the burden of briefing Congress, but that
the eight committees be cut down to two committees, which is
the normal oversight process, because, as I indicated earlier,
eight committees learning about a covert action is almost a
contradiction in terms. It's very difficult for it to remain
covert, and I think the Congress is sympathetic towards a
change in that.
Q : Mr. Car l ucc i , my name i s George Braddock, and
I'm from Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
You mentioned that the CIA was established to
prevent another surprise attack on the United States, such
as Pearl Harbor, and that you brief the President each day
on the happenings of the various countries in the world. And
I'd like to know why the CIA does not feel it necessary to
brief the President on its findings in regards to many UFO
sightings. After all, it's possible that they are invaders
from another galaxy.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, the responsibility
for looking into UFOs rests with the Air Force and not with
the CIA. So I would respectfully refer your question to the
Air Force.
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BRADDOCK: Thank you.
Q: Mr. Carlucci, my name is Paul Elkins from
Mississippi.
How does the power of the media affect the CIA?
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, there is a natural
tension between the media and any organization that must func-
tion clandestinely in order to be effective. But we, in seeking
to enhance our effectiveness through additional legislation, do
not take issue at all with the media's responsibility to report
information that comes into its hands. Indeed, we think the
basic responsibility rests with government employees not to
reveal information which should be retained in confidentiality.
In fact, we have something in common with the media.
They like very much to criticize us for wanting to protect our
sources and methods. But they, in turn, are fighting tooth
and n a i l to protect their sources and methods. How many jour-
nalists do you see that want to reveal their sources? Indeed,
a couple have gone to jail to avoid revealing their sources.
So we are saying "Why should anyone who gives infor-
mation to the U. S. government be entitled to less protection
than someone who gives information to a journalist?
Q: Yes, Mr. Carlucci. My name Is Wayne Block, and
I'm from Pennsylvania.
What is it that has caused what seems to be a de-
crease in the CIA's ability to gain important international
information? For example, the situations we now face in Iran
and Afghanistan which the agency could have helped to prevent.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, when you say the
agency could have helped to prevent the situations, the agency
function is to provide intelligence, provide information on
situations that may develop or situations which are developing
It is the President and the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense's responsibility to take actions to deal with those
situations.
If the President so determines, he can call on the
CIA to engage in covert action. But the fundamental policy
responsibility, the responsibility for recommending policy
rests with the State Department.
We, as I've indicated, provide the best information,
in my judgment, of any intelligence organization in the world.
Nevertheless, we are faced with serious problems in protecting
the information that others give to us. But my judgment is
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that we could be substantially more effective when we obtain
the necessary relief from the Congress.
[End of recording.]
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? C r.. Ali C?~ ~U_
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE EIGHTIES
AN ADDRESS BY FRANK C. CARLUCCI
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT ASPA, NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA CHAPTER, 18 JANUARY 1980
I. INTRODUCTION
Thank you very much Brad. Members of the National Capital Area
Chapter of ASPA,.I am delighted to be with you today. I feel very
comfortable with this group. I see many of my old colleagues here, and
I am particularly glad to be at the same table with. my old friend Brad,
and with Dona, who I know has done so much to move your Chapter forward
and will continue to do so as your President next year.
When Dona suggested that I speak to you on government management
in the 1980s; I had some reservations because I have really been away
from the domestic management area for some time. I am not sure that
what I have to say to you is relevant.
You know, in the intelligence business they tell a story of three
men who were stranded on a desert island. A helicopter came over,
flew down low, and the pilot leaned out and shouted out to them "You're
lost." Then the pilot went back up and disappeared over the horizon.
One man turned to the other and said, "You know, that chap is an intelli-
gence officer."
,The other man asked "How do you know?"
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"First of all his information was dead on. Second, because it
was totally useless."
I hope that what I have to say to you today will be of some use.
Let me add a disclaimer at the outset. I will be speaking only
for myself. In fact, in many instances I have no idea whether or not
the views I express to you correspond with the views of the Administration.
II. DEMANDS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE*80s
Government management does not exist in a vacuum. Any examination
of management issues in the 80s must start with an.analysis of the
future landscape. As we try to project ourselves into that future. and
think of what management in government might look like in the 1980s,
we have tQ start with the demands that are likely to be imposed on us.
This in turn is a reflection of the state of the world and the outlook
for domestic affairs. Despite being in CIA, my crystal ball is not
any better than yours. However, it seems to me that some broad trends
are discernible.
First, in the foreign affairs area; I see the 80s as a period of
increasing complexity and difficulty in managing our relations with
the Soviets. In.:view of the momentum they have built up in defense
expenditures, at some point in the early 80s they will reach approxi-
mate strategic parity. Depending on how fast we react,. we could
regain the lead towards the end of the 1980s, but there will be an
interim danger period.
On th.e other side of that coin is the fact that Russia will also
have to wrestle with many serious issues. The Soviet Union is faced
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with problems of large minority populations, a large proportion of whom
are Muslims; they are faced with rising consumer expectations and a
declining economic growth rate; they are faced with the possibility of
unrest in Eastern Europe and the entire periphery of their empire.
In all likelihood their oil production will decrease in the 1980s.
Added to all of this will be a period of transition in leadership.
Thus, Russia is faced, as we will be, with serious economic, political,
social, and security issues in the 80s on a scale and at a pace that
neither of us have had to face in the past..
Similarly, in the Third World, I would expect some of the current
complex trends to continue. We will have to get used to a certain
amount of continuing anti-Americanism around the world. The Middle
'East will remain an area of great instability. The point has recently
been driven home that what happens in that area can have a very direct
effect on our lives. This will continue to be so as long as we are so
dependent on imported oil. I see very little chance that we can sig-
nificantly reduce that dependency in the 1980s. Energy will be the
key issue of the 80s.
I also see continuing Soviet and Cuban expansionism. This will be
accompanied by increasing determination on our part to deal with it in
a more steadfast way.
In terms of government, programs, the above means that the defense
and intelligence share of the. budget will grow as international affairs
lay much more of a claim against budgetary resources than we have
been accustomed to seeing in the 1970s. At the same time, I question
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whether the budget itself will continue to grow at the pace which it
grew in the 60s. This means the day of rapidly expanding social
programs is over.
I would like to forecast some other trends and their effect.
Domestically, the post-war babies are now reaching their adult, working
stage, and the population itself is getting older. This means, of
course, more social, medical, and economic services for the elderly.
Transferred into political terms, if history is any guide, this also
means we will have a larger conservative voting public. You will
have a public ,that will be looking for less government, one that is
likely to be more apathetic on some of the social issues than the
younger public of the 60s and 70s. This, in turn, means it will also
be more vulnerable than ever to the single-mission interest groups
that are generally recognized to have a harmful effect on our govern-
mental processes.
From these broad trends I draw several conclusions. Pressures
on budgets and staffs will continue. National security will claim
more of a pot that won't increase as fast as in the past. We will
have to do more, but with less. This means more emphasis on such
things as productivity and personnel management, in short, higher.
priority attention to our people resources.
Secondly, I see an intensification of the conflict between the
special interest groups and those that are interested in overall
program goals,'those that are interested in better management in the
broad sense of the term. I see people beginning to question the concept
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of government by advocacy. At the same time, I see political figures.
continuing to raise familiar issues: too many people in government,
too much paperwork and red tape, too many regulations, and too much
general government interference in our lives.
Now, you and I know that these are symptoms of the problems, not
the. problems. And despite all attempts including paperwork commissions,
Leach Amendments, and Bumpers Amendments, we are not going to solve
these problems until the Executive and the Congress get together in an
intensive review of the legislation that creates the resource demands.
Such a review-would have to start with programs themselves--their
purposes, design, cost, and organization--and then move on to the culling
out process. I am optimistic such a review will take place.
III. OTHER MAJOR ISSUES
We will also have to take into consideration questions of government
organization, congressional oversight, and public personnel policy. Let's
look. at those for a minute. It is quite clear that the organizational
structure of our government is constituency-based. That is to say, it
is neither designed to promote an over-all mission, nor for efficiency.
It is designed to promote single-purpose programs. And generally speaking
we have very few mechanisms to link these programs. There continues to-
be what I .would term a tendency to leap to organizational solutions for
problems. OEO, where Brad and I have some experience, is an example
of creating an organization and then worrying about the program after
you have the organization. I can remember testifying, several years ago
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on the bi-lingual education program when that program was just at its
inception. The first question by the chairman was, "Mr. Carlucci,
don't you think we ought to have an Assistant Secretary for bi-lingual
education?" I responded, "No, it seems to me we ought to try and
determine first if we want a program, and then if we want a program,
what the design of that program should be, and from there try to figure
out, where it would fit within the organization."
As just one test count the Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant
Secretaries in the departments you are with. When I was in HEW, I
engaged in a campaign to reduce the number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries.
I really didnt.t know what I was getting into. The resistance was tremendous.
These boxes create obvious management span-of-control problems. But
more than that, they usually represent advocacy by a particular group.
How does this translate at the local level? It translates into the
kind of program duplication that was so fully documented by former Con-
gresswoman Martha Griffiths' excellent studies. She pointed out that
in poverty areas you would find as many as 18 or 20 caseworkers working
on a single family. Indeed, I, myself, have had that experience, talking
to families and listening to the problems they face, just trying to
determine which federal program they ought to relate to. I have often
thought that if we could just take the salaries of the people working
on the family and give them to the family we would get them off the
welfare lines.
In most cases these problems don't result from ill-willed bureaucrats,
they result from a misguided organizational structure which in turn comes
from the pressures of single-issue politics.
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Nothing will be more important to the functioning of effective
management in federal government in the 1980s than the question of the
evolution of congressional oversight. We all agree that congressional
oversight is needed. Indeed, it is a fundamental part of our democratic
process. I, in my career, have had many, many constructive sessions
with the Congress, and a number of good ideas and fine programs have
come out of these sessions. But you can overdo a good thing. And it
is impossible for a department to function efficiently when it has ten,
twelve, or in some cases, as in Energy, as many as thirty congressional
committees involved. If you just look at the way the staffs of those
committees and those of individual Congressmen have burgeoned, you can
see the effect it has on the management of government, where they are
often torn by conflicting pressures from the Hill, or where they are
faced with the tendency for the Congress to get involved in excessive
detail .
I can remember one time when I was at HEW I got a phone call.
I can't remember whether it was a Congressman or a staff member. He
said we want John Doe promoted. I explained why John Doe didn't really
deserve promotion, why the job he was in was properly graded and clas-
sified. The answer was "We don't care, we are interested in that program
and we want it and him promoted. Either you promote him or we will do
it in statute." I said I wouldn't. Well, that man is now in a statutory
job.
Or the incident that we had in HEW when a congressional committee
didn'tlike the.manager of a particular program. They transferred the
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program through legislation from one part of HEV to another. That is
the kind of oversight that we could usefully do without. Now, we see
a tendency of Congress'to get increasingly into the regulation writing
business. We are acutely aware, particularly in recent weeks, of the
fact that the President's flexibility in foreign affairs has been
dramatically reduced over the past few years by legislation. We are
also aware of some pieces of legislation that seem to be self-defeating.
We can all think of examples in our organizations.
Two come to mind as far as the CIA is concerned. One is an amend-
ment called the. Hughes-Ryan Amendment. Now, both the Congress and the
Executive Branch have decided that the U.S. Government should have what
is, called covert action capability. That is to say, that we ought to
have the capability to influence events in other countries in a covert
way. So that aspect is not even debatable. The statute says that to
conduct these operations, we need a Presidential finding. Then we must
brief eight committees of Congress. That is 200 members of Congress.
Congress isn't the only branch of government that leaks, of course, but
to brief 200 members of Congress on covert action is a contradiction in
terms.
Or, take the Freedom of Information Act. It was applied to our
i.ntell.igence organizations over President Ford's veto. This, too., is
a contradiction. An intelligence organization builds its effectiveness
on confidentiality. You have to be able to assure the people that.are
providing you information that the information will be protected. Now,
technically it can be protected under the Freedom of Information Act.
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but try to convince somebody--say an Eastern European--that he is going
to be protected when he sees information rolling out of the U.S. presses
released under the Freedom of Information Act. Indeed, with some 4,000
Freedom of Information requests a year we seem to have transformed the
confidential intelligence agencies into the purveyor of information to
the world. Some of these are from foreigners. We had one from the Polish
Embassy, for example. Indeed, if the KGB were to write us, we would
be required by the law to respond within 10 days.
Recent actions by Ayatollah Khomeini and the Soviets have helped
us out a bit. They have focused congressional interest and Congress
has indicated they will take a serious look at these two measures and,
I hope, provide some relief. I would also hope that the sense of national
purpose that i.s growing in the United States today as a result of some
of the foreign problems we face will extend over into the domestic area_
and we will have a serious review of some of the legislation that makes
good management in government very difficult of achievement.
Some have suggested that this could be done through a management
committee on the Hill. That is an interesting idea, but I don't think
we need another committee. I would suggest that one solution would be
to have 0MB play a stronger role in management issues both in the
Executive Branch and on the Hill.
V. FUTURE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ISSUES
There are a number of public management or public administration
issues that I foresee affecting all of you. I would like to discuss
the major ones.
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40&yShave to
get much more deeply into the whole question of automated data processing
management.. As the cost of hardware for computers goes down and the
cost of software goes up, we are going to find that the attention of top
management is going to be absolutely necessary. There are.many data bases
being planned and constructed in the lower levels of our organizations
that we don't even know of, much less have control over. I hope that in
the 80s the policies that we follow with regard to data processing would
enhance our ability to use computers as a management tool, rather than
impede that ability as they seem to do now.
Secondly, I see more emphasis on goal setting and weighing performance
against those ,goals. I am not talking about some new theory of administration
when talking about this concept. This has been tried, with both success
and failure, but like a lot of good ideas It aborted in many cases because
it was imposed on a large scale before building employee confidence. I do
think the very concept of being forced to think specifically of what we
expect of our employees and to weigh. their performance against these expec-
tations expressed in concrete terms will become more important in the 80s.
Also in the 1980s more attention will be. given to working jointly
with employees on management issues. Unions will become much more
active. More collective bargining, mainly on employee benefit matters--
such programs as day care for working families--are going to be vanguard
issues in the 80s, more than they have been in the past.
I also foresee a revision of regional structure in our agencies.
My views on decentralization are very well known, at least to most of
the people at the head table, so I won't go into them here. However, it
does seem to me that it is impossible to run programs effectively in the
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localities of..our country if the decisions are being made either in
Washington or in widely diffused geographic points. This was the
biggest lesson out of Hurricane Agnes in. Pennsylvania. When I went
up there to try to coordinate federal assistance I found that one
decision would be made in Wilkes Barre, another had to be made in
Philadelphia, and a third had to go to Washington. There was no way
we could get the programs together as long as we couldn't get all the
decisionmakers in one room.
Similarly;, I think we are going to find ourselves looking much
more closely.aat our relations with state and local governments. I can
remember the tenor of the 1960s, when the feds were a bit supercilious
in their approach to state and local governments. We are getting away
from that now. We understand that there must be full cooperation between
federal and state and local governments to make the programs we are
interested in work effectively.
VI. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
Finally, I would expect, and indeed would hope, that the 1980s
would see more attention given to the incentives to maintain and attract
good management ability. I have an overriding concern. I think we are
on the verge of losing many of our best managers. And that will impact
very severely on efficiency. I don't need to tell you in this room the
reasons. Very few of you came into government to make money. But we
didn't expect to see our real salaries going down every year. Compare
this to pensions that are tied to the cost of living. How many of
you have heard people say "I just cannot afford to stay in government"?
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There is no private company in this country that would manage along
those lines.
Secondly, we didn't come into the government to be praised. Most
of us came in for idealistic reasons. And we are used to criticism.
But it seems to me the tone of criticism has become more nasty. Take
the Ethics in Government Act, for example. I have no personal objection
to filling out an Ethics in Government form. Indeed, everything I own
has been laid out five or six times before the Congress. But I do have
an objection to the tone of the form. The whole approach seems to be
that we have-to prove we are not crooks.
I see all these discomforts as bearable, indeed, we could shrug
them off if we had the same sense of accomplishment that many of us
had when we first came into government. But that is becoming increasingly
difficult. In getting from here to a program goal, all too often there
are too many people who have vetos. Whistleblowers, investigative
reporters, congressional investigations, oversight, and inspectors are
all valuable parts of the process. Indeed, I tried very hard in 1972
to build a major inspection unit in NEW, but it was stopped by the
Congress. Now they have turned around and all these functions are
glorified. Let's not take it to excess. Let's not have more people
looking for government mistakes than people who are trying to move a
program forward. There has to be a balance between the program managers
and those who must oversee them, those who exercise the checks and
balances. We can have oversight and still move our programs forward.
But in the 1980s we are going to have to look very carefully at whether
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we haven't upset that balance. Bear in mind that it is not just the
senior managers who will be impacted. The question of personnel moti-
vation is going to affect the young people who are coming into govern-
ment, who are looking upward at where they are going to be in future
years. I think.we are still maintaining quality at the junior levels,
but we need to give attention to these problems if we want that quality
to remain.
VII. A THEME FOR -ASPA
It seems to me that this latter theme, quality in government,
would be a good issue for ASPA to take on in the 1980s. You could
inform the public, Congress, and other political leaders of the need
to maintain first-rate employees in government. It will be a difficult
chore to turn the currently destructive dialogue into a constructive
one. But I think it can be done. There are tens of thousands of people
across this country who have experience in government, who appreciate
the quality and dedication of those who serve, and who want to be as
helpful as they can. Sure it is a challenge. But most of us are here
because we want a challenge and because we are interested in good govern-
ment. What we as civil servants do today will have a distinct bearing
on whether at the end of the 1980s we will leave our federal government
at least a little better off than it was at the beginning of the 1980s..
There, is no way to go but forward.
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