SITUATION ESTIMATE FOR PROJECT CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1961 AND 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 62
• Publication Date: March 14, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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T 0 P S E C R E T
SITtAATION ESTIMATE
FOR
PROTECT CHALICE
FISCAL YEARS 1961 and 1962
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
r J DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS W c
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
RUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ___ REVIEWER:
CBAL-091A
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T O P S E C R E T
Introduction
1. Purpose
2. Background and History
II Intelligence Requirements
1. Target Selection
2. Task
3. Targets
4. Corollary Tasks
III Concept of Operations
1. Employment
2. Mission and Mission Planning
3. Utilization
4. Primary Mission Capabilities
5? Maintenance and Support
6. Control
7. Sortie Rate
8. Support
IV Relationship to Other Forces
1.
2. Hostilities
3? Hostilities
V Enclosures
1. Life Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights
2. Utilization of Bases
3. Aircraft and Equipment Assignment
4. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours
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T 0 P S E C R E T
I INTRODUCTION
1. PURPOSE
a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of.
project operations during the FY 1961-62 time period. Due to current
events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document
will be utilized as.a_com mon reference and/or departure point for all
concerned consistent with the above.,
b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the
beai:s for justification -of the budget . As such it:; will be reviewed and
revised as necessary and no later than 1 June 1961`in order that it
c again become the basis for
budgeting and long range p]1anaing for
F .'1962 and 1963: This to include gperational effectiveness4 the forma
2## on of policy, tactics 'and techniques, and the determination of
operational and R & D requirements..
;_ ... c) in addition, revisions Wbe made consistent with; the latest
technological advancements, the current political and economic situation,..
asp new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the national
socurity, in order to provide .timer and effective guidance 'or any
follow-on program.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
a) At the time the Soviet Un cn and its satellites denied normal
aOceso to its territory, the need fcr a method to collect all kinds of
intelligence became readily apparent and the requirement. was of the highest:
priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Union indicated
the-need for prompt abd aggressive action in order to obtain a capability"'
which would satisfy the intelligence. requirements.
b) At the request of the highest executive branch of the Government
various studies were performed by the most capable scientific groups in
the country All of the studies 'validated the requirements,' emphasized
the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recommended the utilization,
oP airborne platforms.
c) To provide the capability for relatively safe overflights, the
Ickheed U-2 was developed, in 19'"55. Built into the U-2 was an altitude
capability of approximately 70,000 feet which, at that time, was considered
a* st'certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically,
interfere.- Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could
not. intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, they
might have a limited capability of tracking the U-2 with radar. This
assumption later proved to'be correct except for the overly optimistic
anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited". Soviet
ability to detect and track the U-2 on penetration and during virtually
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its entire flight in denied territory was conclusively established early
in the program and has continued to be the case to the present time
It is reasonable to assume: that Soviet capability to inter-
cept the.U-2 will increase during,. the period under discussion. However,
it is believed that with careful flight planning and target. selection,
the use of dispersal and deployment bases for deception, minimum time
on the ground, at pre and post-strike.bases, and other tactics designed
to decrease operational hazards, the~U-2 will continue to possess a
significant overflight utility during-at least a portion of this period.*
d) Diplomatic protests. which the USSR has made as a result of the
AQUATO1E operations in the summer of 1956 and again in early 1958 make
it inerative that Project CHALICE. operations be conducted in such a
manner as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest
of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was consid-
ered to have been the primary motivation for the USSR protest. This
view continues valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a
flight which, although it did not violate a third country, did fly into
its radar screen with the resultant possibility that the third country
had knowledge that a penetration of the USSR had been made. In the
period between the 1956 and 1958 protests...a total of 20, penetrations
were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplomatic protest
from any source. In no instance, however, was the USSR and a satellite
country penetrated on the same mission. Recorded reaction to these
flights indicates that the violated countries were, in most instances,
aware at the very least that a prohibitive flight was being made. it
was further assumed that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal
evidence of overflight by U.S. aircraft as it had for both the 1956 and
1958 protests. It should be noted that the 1958 protest was not made
*A separate attacrhment to this report entitled "Life Expectancy of the
U-2 on Overflights" purposely has been omitted from general distribution
because of its special classification. This attachment is available in
the Intelligence Section on a "need to know" basis.
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public. The resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the
physical capability to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplo-
matic measures. In both protest cases, high U. S. political authority
directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. The-reaction--
to the Soviet diplomatic action will probably continue throughout this
period and will be taken into consideration for planning aril when
submitting proposed overflights for political approval.
e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bases
in combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3
5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin,
termination, etc., and thereby. degrade and/or weaken an official
protest. This would also allow for more plausible U.S. denial.
II YNT ILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
1. TARGET SELECTION
Intelligence Requirements for penetration flights by Project
CHALICE have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
which is composed of representatives of the Argr, Navy, Air Force,
Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Require-
ments encompass the fields of photographic intelligence electronics
intelli enee
Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of
a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for
reliable information on the present and future Soviet capabilities
for such an attack. Such information is also critical to our national
defense policy and planning. During the past four years CHALICE
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coverage has been by far the most lucrative source of reliable
information on Which we have based our estimates of the Soviet
capabilities for nuclear attack. At the present time, there is an
urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas
known to be, or suspected to'be, associated with the three major
elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability).
a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the
status of the Soviet ICBM program, an inherent threat of overriding
magnitude. Studies over the past two years by the U.S. Intelligence
Community have concluded that CHALICE provides the only available
means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on an immediate
basis the required intelligence on the deployment of Soviet ICBMs.
Certain rail lines which lend themselves to rail launch or logistic
support for fixed sites and test sites are prime search-areas for
this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deploy-
ment question by recent evidence of ICBM series production.
Coverage Of the most suspect production facilities may help to,
confirm this.*
b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE
coverage which are also critical to national security are set forth
in the following paragraphs.
(1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic
missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear
powered or conventional. Our need, is to determine the
possible modification of existing craft, construction of
new ballistic missile submarines; and employment of both.
CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of answering
the questions. on production, characteristics, and employment
of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles.
(2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recog-
nized as a fact, although this capability is less critical
to the United States than the ICBM. It constitutes an
immediate and continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage
offers the beat known means to answer the question of what
is the deployment concept and should assist with information
on the capability of these weapons as well as their production.
*The Joint Priorities Committee agreed that the most critical question
vas guided missiles, though they did not seem to feel it necessary to
distinguish between IRBM and ICBM. Further, they rate research and
development and production as much higher than deployment at this time
since evidence on these would permit a judgment of whether there was
indeed a threat in existence; current thinking does not put deploy-
ment as probable in the case of the ICBM.
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3. T-A.22 the
Photographic and electronic, objectives (targets) v are
needs outlined above are set forth in separa
constantly vender review and revision by the Ad Hoc Requirements
Committee.
COROLLARY TASK
?~ucts also can be anticipated as a
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Valuable intelligence y P herein discussed.
result of the coverage of the primary systems details of
to can be expected to yield significant
Route
Soviet air iastal.tions, transportation systems, industrial
ti and other economic and
than the information we arrtici to on
facilities. IRBM and ICBM installs' ranee only sli les
military targets which could be of a sigaifi ob ectives.
L This increase in F~-- ledge firmer ase or operational plans that involve employment of our
nuclear strike force. It should also be noted that exercise of the
CHALICE capability over otherwise bargely inaccessible areas of the
USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely
UUjM0Vn but highly significant nature. As a specific byproduct,
CHALICE photography yields terrain information from wthiion Bach accurate
prediction
radar navigation and target charts, and radar
can be constructed. It is also anticipated that this photography
will permit resolution of invaluable precise geodetic data which is
so essential to the successful destruction of eneaf targets by
guided missiles.
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III CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
--1.--EMPL' OIMMT
a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability bii.lt
into the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained
in the form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and
above all,. airborne. collection equipment. In order for Project
CHALICE to have me.,dmim capability, permanent overseas bases will be .
maintained in Europe at Adana, Turkey, and in the Far East at Atsugi,
Japan.
b) In addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary
to carry on continuing research and development, and, for further
perfection of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow-
on aircraft will not be available for approximately 12 to 18 months every
appropriate action will be taken to product-improve the existing capa-
bility as pertains to aircraft performance. Primary mission capabilities
product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight
reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the
end product. In order to offset "end product" degradation due to
increased performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing .
.and/or develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that
the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained.
Therefore, the facilities presently in use at Edwards AFB (north base)
will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-2.
c) The support of the facilities win be required
for the entire period. Increased acts y e to e follow-on program
and product improvement of CHALICE will have to be provided for.
d) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic staging
and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. (Encl #2)
2. MISSION AI ]) MISSION PLANNING
a) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the
National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are
stated:
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1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon-
naissance (Photo and Elint) of the USSR and the USSR satellite
countries in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence
consistent with the provisions mentioned in Section II
"Intelligence Requirements".
2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon-
naissance (Photo and Elint) on a world-wide basis in order to
obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and
advance the national policies and interests of the U.S. as
well as safeguard the security of the U.S.
b) To fulfil the above requirements the "operational Concept"
will take cognizance of the latest political considerations and
intelligence requirements as outlined by the ARC. The concept which
has evolved from experience, and which will be followed during the
period will feature careful selection of highest priority objectives
and prudent application of all planning factors to minimize the probability
of protest. During the period we have programmed a maximum of 35
photo-overflights. (20/1961-15/1962) However, a number which will
actually be accomplished will be dependent upon executive approval.
c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases
are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory
allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these
bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, extensive
use"of staging bases will be required. In addition, it can be assumed
that these bases are possibly under visual surveillance. All of which
points out the need for greater deception and mobility during this period.
It is planned that future Project CHALICE missions will be directed
against areas in which the Soviets have the least radar tracking
capability and in such a manner as to create maximum. difficulty for positive
tracking. Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest
priority target coverage requirements. In addition, every effort will.
be made to avoid the involveim t: of third countries (specifically, Soviet
Satellite Nations) either by . -Irflying them on penetration or withdrawal
from the USSR, or by permitting them to become knowledgeable, through
their radar defenses, that such a penetration is being made. In all
operational planning and execution, the safety of the aircraft will be of
primary consideration.
3. UTILIZATION
a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the
results obtained will be useful in the event that the bases and/or
areas flown over are denied to the U.S. in the future.
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b) Training will include the exercise of mobility plans utilizing
airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment bases.
Training exercises will be accomplished on the fast move concept with
mini== U-2 ground time at ady of the bases utilized.
c) The ,U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish
peripheral electronic and photographic reconnaissance. The advantages
in terms of training, econoiy, availability of a timely operational
capability, have been demonstrated during the past years in such-areas
as the Mtddle East, Indonesia, Indo-China and the Baltic. It is felt
that we stand to lose more than we would gain by not'doing so. The
relative value of the exercise we give the Russian radars does not
outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so.
The Russian radar operators are known to be proficient and the quali-
tative technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the
above-mentioned flights - per se - would not induce greater Russian
technological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt
that ma,dmum utilization of the U-2 should be planned throughout the
estimated operational life of the U-2 rather than wait for primary
mission political approval that may never come. In addition, it is
felt that knowledge of continued and current successful operations by
higher level would be conducive to obtaining political approval.
5. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT
a) In order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and
equipment, the concept of contractor mainteDance will be continued.
In addition, processing of overflight photography by EK will be
continued to insure maximum intelligence exploitation. (Personnel
strength will remain as stipulated in current T0's, with possibly
minor adjustments.)
6. CONTROL
a) The concept. of overflights (and certain other missions) being
controlled by Headquarters will be continued to insure efficient target
coverage and compatibility of operations with national policy.
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T 0 P S E C R E T
8.---SUPPORT - -
7. SORTIE RATE
a) Estimated sortie rate and flying hours by type of mission will
be as indicated in Enclosure 4. Approximately 4076 flying hours will
be required to acconplish 1057 sorties in FY 61 and 3800 flying hours
to aeconplish 968 sorties in FY 62.
a) Support will be required from the following echelons as
indicated. This support will be in accordance with current directives
and agreements.
1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, como logis-
tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison
matters. AFCIG-5 Will be the channel for support to all sabor-
dinate headquarters.
2) Theater Co=anders for air base facilities, logistic
support, airlift requirements and for special liaison.
3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities,
personnel, logistics support and liaison matters.
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5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for Weather support.
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8) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to
operate from certain foreign countries.
IV RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES
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2. Pre-HOSTILITIES PERIOD
a) if international relationships deteriorate to a point where
hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct
penetration and peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a msminum
rate 'which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can support.
Although the.ndlitary services have photographic and ELINT collection
capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE
are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply
and with,.0onparative physical immunity.
b) During this period it will be essential that the mud