WARSAW PACT AIR POWER: CAPABILITIES FOR REINFORCEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

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Intelligence Report
Warsaw Pact Air Power: Capabilities for Reinforcement
of Tactical Air Forces in Central Europe
Top Secret
SR I R 75-2
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January 1975
Copy
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Warsaw Pact Air Power: Capabilities
for Reinforcement of Tactical Air Forces
in Central Europe
Principal Conclusions
The offensive wartime role the Warsaw Pact assigns itE tactical air forces in
Central Europe is predicated on their early, rapid reinforcement from bases in the
western USSR. Pact commanders are apparently counting on the timely infusion of
Soviet air strength to carry out massive, coordinated air attacks during the initial
phases of a conventional conflict in Europe. These strikes would be targeted
primarily against NATO's air forces and tactical nuclear assets.
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The Pact probably would be able to conduct a large-scale tactical air reinforce-
ment operation with sufficient rapidity to meet its overall force requirements for
offensive air operations against the NATO Central Region.
-- There evidently is an adequate number of airfields and sufficient
stocks of aviation POL and munitions prepositioned in the forward
area to sustain combat operations by all Pact tactical aircraft-
including reinforcements-until additional logistic support arrives
from the USSR.
The Soviet air force probably could deploy several hundred tactical
aircraft along with attendant ground personnel and equipment from
the western USSR to the forward area in one to three days,
depending on the amount of air transport support allocated to the air
reinforcement effort. This does not take into consideration the
potential effects of incalculables such as adverse weather, com-
munications or equipment malfunctions, air traffic congestion, or
military counteractions by NATO.
The necessity, for immediate, large-scale air reinforcement prior to or during the
initial phases of hostilities in Europe could be reduced over the next several years by
the introduction into Pact tactical air forces of newer aircraft with improved range
and payload capabilities.
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Warsaw Pact Air Power: Capabilities
for Reinforcement of Tactical Air Forces
in Central Europe
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
January 1975
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
I Ithe
Warsaw Pact has c.?vise plans or massive offensive
air operations against the NATO Central Region during
the initial phases of a conventional conflict in
Europe. Force requirements for such operations could
commit the Pact, prior to the onset of hostilities,
to a large-scale reinfor;.:.ment of its tactical air
forces in the forward area with aircraft from the
western USSR. Continued recuirements for air support
during the ensuing phases of a conflict almost cer-
tainly would necessitate the deployment of additional
combat aircraft into 13astern Europe.
This report outlines what is known of Pact plans
for tactical air reinforcement in Central Europe and
assesses overall Soviet capabilities to conduct a
large-scale air reinforcement opera.t:ion.
A summary of this report begins on page 28.
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Contents
Page
Pact Concepts for Air Warfare in Europe
and Reinforcement Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Reinforcement From Baltic Military
District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Reinforcement From Belorussian Military
District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Reinforcement From Carpathian Military
District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Deployment Within the Forward Area . . . . . 10
Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Logistic Support for Frontal Aviation in
Central Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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Airfield Availability 14
POL and Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Aircraft Shelters . 16
Conducting the Reinforcement . . . . . . . . . . 17
Elements and Timing of movement . . . . . . . 17
Role of Air Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Advance Support Element . . . . . 18
Second-Echelon Support Element . . . . . 21
Air Army and Division Headquarters . . . 22
Total Airlift Requirements . . . . . . . . . 23
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Assessment of Air Transport Resources
and Postulated Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Potential Effect of Pact Tactical Air
Modernization on Reinforcement Plans . . . . . . 27
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Illustrations
Time vs Aircraft Requirements for Transport
of Aix Units from USSR to Main and Unoccupied
Bases in Eastern Europe (Chart) . . . . . . . . 24
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Western USSR (Map) . . . . . . . . . . . . appended
Warsaw Pact: Baca Airfields and Aviation
Units in Central Europe and the
Tables
Potential Strength of Warsaw Pact Frontal
Aviation Opposite NATO Central Region
After Reinforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Transport Support Requirements for
Movement of a Frontal Aviation Regiment . . . . 20
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Pact Concepts for Air Warfare in Europe
and Reinforcement Plan
The current structure and equipment of the Warsaw
Pact's tactical air forces--known as "Frontal Avia-
tion"--still reflect Pact doctrinal concepts of the
late fifties and early sixties that war with NATO
would begin with or immediately escalate to nuclear
conflict. Within this doctrinal framework, Frontal
Aviation was equipped with short-range, low-payload
aircraft for air defense and reconnaissance opera-
tions over the battlefield and for delivery of nuclear
strikes in the zone of operations of the front.*
Such missions would be augmented by the tactical mis-
siles and rockets of the ground forces. The main
strategic nuclear strike forces were the MRBMs, IRBMs,
and medium bombers based in the USSR.
With NATO's acceptance of the US doctrine of
flexible response in the mid-sixties, Soviet planners
began to alter their concept of the nature of a future
war with NATO. The Pact came to recognize that such
a conflict could begin with an indeterminate but
limited period of conventional warfare. The duration
of the conventional phase would probably be decided
by NATO's degree of success in conducting nonnuclear
forward defense.
The conventiona-1 capabilities of the Pact tactical
air forces have not yet been fully upgraded to conform
with this change in doctrine,-however. Pact planners
have had to develop interim plans for the employment
of their existing tactical aircraft in conventional
offensive operations until aircraft with improved
conventional capabilities became available in suffi-
cient numbers. in the late seventies.
* In Wa:.saw Pact terminology a front is a formation usually
consisting of several field armies and a tactical air army,
plus combat and service support units.
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These interim lansj
call olive and coordinated
unearerwi0e attacks against NATO with conventional
ordnance by Pact Frontal Aviation and elements of the
Soviet medium bomber force at the onset of hostilities.
The primary objective of these attacks is the destruc-
tion of NATO's nuclear-capable forces.
There is no direct evidence indicating the number
of tactical aircraft that the Pact believes will be
required to conduct its air operations It may
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that as many as 2,200 combat aircraft** could be
operating from bases in the forward area. (See map
appended.) These fighters, fighter-bombers, and
light bombers must perform a dual role: fly combined
conventional operations with medium bombers from the
USSR and make up an adequate nuclear-armed reserve
force, should nuclear strikes become necessary.
Soviet Frontal Aviation in East Germany; Poland,
and Czechoslovakia currently comprises some 980
combat aircraft.*** (See table at right.) The Polish,
Czechoslovak, and East German tactical air forces add
about 655 combat aircraft--for a total of around 1,635
tactical combat aircraft sr.ationed in Eastern Europe
opposite the NATO Central Region. In some contin-
gencies, therefore, as many as 565 additional combat
aircraft would be needed to satisfy Pact force re-
quirements for the initial strikes in a conventional
air war against NATO. Continued air support in later
phases of the conflict almost certainly would require
additional reinforcement.
Does not include combat-capable trainers or aircraft with a
primary mission of reconnaissance.
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Potential Strength of Warsaw Pact
Frontal Aviation Opposite NATO Central Region
After Reinforcement*
In forward area Available
East Germany and Non- reinforce Total
Western Poland Soviet Soviet Total ments aircraft
Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany: 650
Northern Group
of Forces: 250
East German Tac-
tical Air Forces: 35
Polish Tactical
Air Forces: 355
From Baltic
Military District: 225
From Belorussian
Military District: 240
Total available
Czechoslovakia
Soviet Central
Group of Forces
Czechoslovak Tac-
tical Air Forces
From Carpathian
Military Distric-c
Total available
Totals**
1,290
1,755
980 655 1,635 770
650
2,405
* There are some 755 additional combat aircraft in the national air defepse
forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany that probably would sup-
port the Pa-;t tactical air forces during the initial period of hostilities.
They may fey close escort for transiting Soviet bombers, but they more
likely would defend the Soviet bomber forces--and the ground forces--by
ennaginc, NATO aircraft operating over Pact territory.
** Figures do not include reconnaissance aircraft and combat-capable trainers.
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Pact forces engaged in Central Europe. These Soviet
air armies have a total of about 770 combat aircraft
--320 fighters, 285 fighter-bombers and 165 light
bombers.
the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
Districts are earmarked for early reinforcement of
]Soviet tactical air forces in
in time o war, the concentrations o tactical air
forces in the forward area would generally correspond
to the locations of the major ground force formations
in East Germany and western Czechoslovakia.
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os aircra from the western USSR
probably would move into the forward area well in
advance of reinforcing ground forces, and would be
available for initial air operations.
Reinforcement From Baltic Military District
25X1 Imost, if not
a II, o the tactical aircra in the Baltic Military
District of the USSR are probably earmarked for em-
ployment against NATO forces opposite East Germany.
Little is known, however, about the specific alloca-
tions of the reinforcing units within this opera-
tional area.
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Reinforcement From Belorussian Military District
The limited combat radius of Pact tactical air-
craft, particularly when loaded with conventional
ordnance, suggests that most aircraft from Belorussia
will deploy directly to East Germany in order to
reduce the flying distances to NATO targets.
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Reinforcement From Carpathian Military District
After the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 25X1
in 1968, ground and air forces from the Carpathian
Military District were permanently stationed in Czecho-
slovakia. These forces may serve as.an advance ele-
ment of the Carpathian Front
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Overall, Frontal Aviation forces available for
operations in the Pact's southernmost front opposite
the NATO Central Region would almost certainly be
composed of the 345 combat aircraft in Czechoslovak
and Soviet units presently in Czechoslovakia, plus
reinforcement combat aircraft from the Carpathian
Military District.
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Deployment Within the Forward Area
Pact Frontal Aviation forces available for use
opposite central and northern East Germany probably
would include Polish Frontal Aviation and the tacti-
cal air army subordinate to the Soviet Northern Group
of Forces in Poland.
Other redeployments by Frontal Aviation forces
probably would include the movement of units from
eastern Czechoslovakia to base airfields nearer the
West German border. Some other Pact units in Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany, particularly the short-
range fighter-bomber regiments, probably would also
move to base airfields as close to the West German
border as possible.
schedule* or the initiation of hostilities.
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Timing
Available intelligence provides little clear evi-
dence on the planned timing of Soviet tactical air
reinforcement with respect to the national mobilization
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ovie s probably would not initiate reinforcement more
than a day or two before the anticipated beginning of
hostilities, regardless of the national mobilization
date. Because Frontal Aviation units in the western
USSR are maintained at or near their authorized war-
time personnel and equipment strengths, almost no
mobilization would be required to bring these forces
to combat readiness. Theoretically, the Soviets could
reinforce their tactical air forces opposite central
NATO with units from the western USSR at any time
prior to or after national mobilization began.
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The Soviets probably would consider the highly
visible movement of combat aircraft and logistic
support from the USSR into the forward area as risk-
ing a serious provocation to NATO. Moreover, the
more time that elapsed between air reinforcement and
the beginning of hostilities, the longer NATO intel-
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ligence would have for locating and targeting the
reinforcing Soviet air units. This disad:ciitage
might be somewhat offset by the additional opera-
tional preparedness afforded Soviet reinforcing
units before their first combat sortie.
Logistic Support for Frontal
Aviation in Central Europe
The availability of airfields, POL, and munitions
in the forward deployment areas is one of the most
critical factors affecting Soviet capabilities to
quickly reinforce the Frontal Aviation forces in Cen-
tral Europe. Several hundred aircraft could begin
arriving in the forward area within hours after the
decision to reinforce had been made. There would
have to be a sufficient number of airfields to receive
these aircraft and enough POL and munitions preposi-
tioned in Eastern Europe to sustain full combat opera-
tions by all air forces in the area until other
logistic support arrived from the USSR.
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Pact planners must base their tactical aircraft
close to the anticipated line of contact because of
the relatively limited operational range of most
models currently in use by Pact Frontal Aviation.
The types and numbers of Pact Frontal Aviation
regiments that probably would be located in East
Germany, Western Poland, and Czechoslovakia before
and after reinforcement are:
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Before
rein-
In East Germany and Western Poland forcem
After
rein-
ent forcement
-- Fighter
-bomber r
egiments 10
19
-- Fighter
reconn
and figh
aissance
ter-
regiments 13
1/3
231/3
-- Light b
reconn
omber and
aissance
light-bomber-
regiments 3
2/3
9 2/3
27
52
Fighter
-bomber r
egiments 4
7
Fighter
reconn
and figh
aissance
ter-
regiments 7
11 2/3
Light b
reconn
omber and
aissance
light-bomber-
regiments 0
31/3
11
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Airfield Availability
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There are 133 base airfielL.0--those airfields
with at least 6,000 feet of permanent runway--in
the forward area opposite the NATO Central Region
that could be employed by Frontal Aviation units.
I
the 101 base airfields in East Germany and Poland
could accommodate 40 of the 52 Frontal Aviation units
thlt are believed to be intended for commitment to
thi_ area. In Czechoslovakia there are 32 base air-
fields. At least 17 of the 20 Frontal Aviation units
that probably would be located in Czechoslovakia
could be based at airfields meeting Pact doctrinal
criteria. Overall, about 80 percent of all Frontal
Aviation regiments that could be expected to be
operating from East Germany, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia after air reinforcement could be based
according to Pact doctrine. The remaining units
could be located at other base airfields no farther
than 160 nm from the West German border, or at tempo-
rary airfields.*
The high percentage of units that could be based
in compliance with Pact doctrine indicates that air
operations by tactical aircraft against targets
in the NATO Central Region almost certainly would not
be restricted because of an insufficient number of
airfields.
* There are some 75 temporary--grass or graded earth--airfields
in the forward area that are capable of su ortin limited
operations by Pact tactical aircraft.
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I I Inclement weather would severely reduce the
usability of these airfields.
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POL and Munitions
The total amount of aviati_ n POL and munitions
available in East Germany has ',aen estimated, and it
is ;a,ilikely that significant stockpiles of aviation
POL and munitions in East Germany remain unidentified.
A comparison of the projected expenditure rates with
the amounts of POL and munitions estimated to be cur-
rently stored in East Germany indicates that during
the initial period of war, Pact tactical sir forces
in Central Europe--including reinforcements--would
not he restricted by insufficient POL and munitions
stocks.*
Airfields and aviation depots in East Germany
probably contain sufficient amounts of aviation fuel
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to maintain the tactical aircraft assigned there
(including reinforcements) for approximately 30 days,
and enough air-to-air missiles to supply Pact inter-
ceptors in East Germany for about 2 weeks. Stocks of
conventional munitions in East Germany probably are
sufficient to supply attack aircraft in the area for
a period in excess of 2 months. Additional logistic
support for Frontal Aviation units in East Germany
almost certainly would have started arriving from
the USSR within these time periods.
Aircraft Shelters
There are about 1,125 aircraft shelters at Frontal
Aviation bases in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslo-
vakia within 160 nm of the West German border. These
shelters protect about 75 percent of the Soviet and
50 percent of the East European tactical aircraft
stationed in the area in peacetime from destruction
by conventional weapons. The East Europeans are still
constructing shelters and the percentage of forward
based aircraft so protected will increase over the
next few years.
A decision not to build additional shelters in
Eastern Europe to protect Soviet reinforcement air-
craft probably resulted, inter alia, from conside=r-
ation of cost, as well as an awareness that ongoing
Soviet force modernization plans could reduce the
necessity for immediate tactical air reinforcement
during a war in Europe (see discussion on page 27).
In any case, with pr'?er dispersal and camouflaging,
the absence of shelters for reinforcement aircraft
deployed to the forward area during the interim
period sr.-ould not affect significantly the ability
of Pact tactical air forces to mount initial of-
fensive air operations.
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Conducting the Reinforcement
Because stocks of aviation POL and ordnance al-
ready located in the forward area apparently are suf-
ficient to sustain Pact air operations for several
weeks, the rate of movement of reinforcing Frontal
Aviation units from the western USSR into Eastern
Europe would depend piimarily on Soviet capabilities
to move the ground personnel and support equipment.
Movement of the combat aircraft themselves should
pose no serious problems.
This analysis considers only the theoretical
capabilities and probable procedures whereby the
Soviets would move tactical air units from the
western USSR to Eastern Europe. No effort was made
to assess the j.otential effects of adverse weather,
communications or equipment malfunctions, air-traffic
congestion, or military counteractions by NATO.
Elements and Timing of Movement
Support personnel and equipment of a Soviet air
regiment deploying from the western USSR to an air-
field in Eastern Europe probably would move in three
parts: an advance element, a second-echelon element,
and a rear element. The rear element is not discussed
at length in this paper because it probably would
proceed by rail or road to the deployment airfield
and may not be in place to support the air regiment's
initial operations. It would consist mainly of the
regiment's larger or non-air-transportable support
vehicles, major maintenance and repair equipment and
supplies, and technical and support personnel not
needed for the advance and second-echelon support
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elements. Additional aviation POL and ordnance prob-
ably would also be moved by this support echelon.
The personnel for both the advance and second-
echelon elements probably would be drawn mainly from
the home base's air technical battalion and from the
technical sections of the air regiment. Some support
may also be provided by support elements at or near
the base to which the air regiment is to deploy. For
e::ample, the nearest air technical battalion might be
available to deliver fuel for the incoming aircraft
if the air regiment's own support personnel or ve-
hicles had not yet arrived.
Role of Air Transport
Although Soviet-based support elements probably
are similar in composition to those based in Eastern
Europe, more emphasis is placed on air transport
because of the greater distances involved. If there
were no urgency to the buildup in Central Europe, the
reinforcement of Frontal Aviation could be entirely
supported.by rail or road tran:,jort. Since, however,
the Soviets anticipate that a full-scale buildup
would only be triggered by a rapidly deteriorating
international political climate, they estimate that
the time element would be critical in any mobiliza-
tion and forward movement situation.
Only the use of air transport could reduce the
preparation time required, and the Soviets evidently
intend to rely heavily on air transport to support
reinforcement of the air and ground forces in Eastern
Europe.I
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Advance Support Element. The function of the
advance support element is to move rapidly to the
deployment airfield and prepare it for incoming
combat aircraft. It then readies these aircraft
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The most critical factor determining the amount
of ground support equipment that must be moved with
the advance element--as well as subsequent support
elements--is whether the Soviet air regiment deploys
to a "main" base or an "unoccupied" base. In this
paper, an unoccupied base is defined as having a per-
manent, jet-capable runway and parking space, but
little or none of the permanent facilities, equipment,
or personnel usually found at main operating bases.
where Pact military air units are located. About
one-third of the base airfields in East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia are unoccupied.
The Soviets probably would equip the advance
support element deploying to a main operating base
with some special tools and ground support equipment
as a token backup to the deployment base facilities.
Enough items to provide minimal servicing for one
flight of three or four aircraft might be provided.
This equipment probably includes ground power units
for starting the aircraft, emergency sources of com-
pressed air and oxygen, tools for assembly and dis-
assembly of aircraft components, and stands, ladders,
jacks, tow-bars, and dollies for servicing and arming
the aircraft. A few utility vehicles may also be
taken along. Most of these items are air-transport-
able and are available in several types. To save
weight and space the Soviets might choose the smallest
models such as those which are skid- or cart-mounted.
For airlift calculation purposes it is estimated
that about 20 major items of ground support equipment
might be transported by an advance support element
deploying to another main base airfield. Five AN-12s
would be required to lift this equipment.
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Transport Support Requiremerts for
Movement of Frontal Aviation Regiments
Advance Support
Element
200 personnel with
tool kits and
small spare parts
Ground support
equipment
Transport flights
required to move
Transport flights required all 23 regiments
to movea single regiment: in western USSR
To "main" To "unoccupied" to main/unoccupied
base base bases
3 AN-12 or 3 AN-12 or 6'-i AN-12 or
IL-18 IL-18 IL-18
5 AN-12 17 AN-12 115/391 AN-12
20 184/460
Second-Echelon
Support Element
300 personnel with
tool kits and
small spare parts 4 AN-12 or 4 AN-12 or 92 AF-12 or
IL-18 IL-18 IL-18
Ground support
equipment 3 AN-12
Total 15
8 AN-12 69/184 AN-12
12 161/276
32 345/736
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The ground support equipment of an advance element
of an air regiment moving to an unoccupied base would
be similar to, but in greater quantities than, that
carried to a main airfield. An estimated 50 major
items might be airlifted. More of the regiment's air-
craft starting units, for example, probably would be
taken along. Also, a greater variety of spare items,
possibly including engines and tires, could be pro-
vided to ensure that the deployed unit maintains the
necessary sortie levels without excessive dependence
on depots in the deployment area. Staff and communi-
cations equipment to control the combat aircraft op-
erations could also be flown in, as well as general
items such as rations and medical supplies.
A total of 17 AN-12s would be needed to carry
the estimated minimum required ground support equip-
ment of the advance element of most air regiments
deploying to an unoccupied base. Although the Soviets
probably would send as much of the ground support
equipment with the advance element as possible, some
items may be needed at the home base to ensure the
takeoff of all combat aircraft for the deployment
airfield. This materiel would move forward with-the
second echelon rather than with-the advance element.
Second-Echelon Support Element. The function of
the second-echelon support element is to ensure, in
conjunction with the advance element, that planned
sortie rates are maintained for the first few days
of operations. The second-echelon element would nor-
mally deploy after the departure of the combat air-
craft from the home base and prior to the unit's first
combat mission from the deployment base. If timing
were not critical, or if the distance to the deploy-
ment base were relatively short, at least part of the
second echelon probably would be included in the rear
? support element and moved by rail or road
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s e however, the second echelon might not neces-
sarily be at the deployment airfield in time to
assist in preparation for the first few missions.
If, for example, there were little preparation time
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prior to hostilities, the combat aircraft might de-
ploy before air transport became available or before
the second echelon could be readied for the move.
The combat aircraft already at the deployment field
might quickly refuel and take off for their first
sorties before the second support echelon arrived.
The second-echelon support element probably would
consist of up to 300 persons, including most of the
remaining technicians and mechanics from the squadron
and regimental sections, specialists from the air
technical battalion, and the headquarters staff. Four
AN-12 or IL-18 transports could airlift these person-
nel to Eastern Europe.
As with the advance support element, the amount
of ground support equipment moved with the second-
echelon element would depend on whether the air regi-
ment were moving to a main or unoccupied airfield.
An additional 20 major items of equipment, requiring
three AN-12s, might be moved to a main base. Some 35
additional items, requiring eight AN-12s, might be
moved to an unoccupied airfield. One or two addi-
tional AN-12s probably would be needed by light bomber
regiments equipped with twin-engine aircraft because
of the greater number of spare engines.
Air Army and Division Headquarters. A priority
requirement probably would also exist to airlift the
command and staff elements of the air army and combat
air division headquarters in the three western mili-
tary districts, along with specialists from the
various components of these commands. Up to half the
personnel from a single air army headquarters and its
division headquarters deploying from the western USSR,
along with special equipment, might be airlifted by
about 30 light transports such as the LI-2 Cab or IL-14
Crate. As with the combat regiments, the higher head-
quarters personnel probably would deploy in at least
two elements.
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Total Airlift Requirements
As shown in the table (page 20), some 350 round-
trip airlifts by transport aircraft would be required
if all 23 air regiments in the Baltic, Belorussian,
and Carpathian Military Districts deployed to com-
patible main airfields. This number would include
about 185 flights to transport the advance support
elements and about 165 flights for the second-echelon
elements..
In all, about 25 percent of the ground support
equipment and 50 percent of the personnel in these
units could be airlifted by this number of missions.
As individual transport aircraft completed their task
of helping to move tactical air units they could be
assigned to support other military forces. Some of
the transports, however, probably would continue to
support the air forces by providing follow-on logistics
airlift.
If all 23 air regiments in the western military
districts deployed to unoccupied bases, about 740
round-trip flights by transport aircraft would be
required. Some 460 of these flights would be needed
for the advance support elements alone if all, or
nearly all, of their ground support equipment and
supplies were to arrive shortly afterwards. The re-
maining 280 missions would be needed to move the
second-echelon support elements. Some 50 percent of
the personnel and ground support equipment in the
reinforcement units could be airlifted to unoccupied
bases by this number of transport flights.
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Assessment of Air Transport Resources,
and Postulated Allocation
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Time vs Aircraft Requirements
for Transport of Air Units From USSR to Main
and Unoccupied Bases in Eastern Europe
Flights to Main Bases Flights to "Unoccupied" Bases
(350 Missions) (740 Missions)
12 hour/day utilization
(2 missions/day)
18 hour/day utilization
(3 missions/day)
I I I I I I I
100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Transport Aircraft Required
This chart depicts the theoretical minimum times required to transport reinforcing
Frontal Aviation units from the western USSR to East Germany. It is based on the
following assumptions:
? The reinforcing units are completely ready to move
? Loading of each transport sortie requires 2 hours
Average flight time from the Western USSR to Germany is 1.5 hours
? Unloading and turnaround at forward bases takes one hour
*Total mission time for each transport two-way sortie is six hours
Because the Soviets would choose to employ some mixture of "main" and
"unoccupied" bases for reinforcing air units, the number of transport missions
required should be between 350 and 740-in the ahededirea;on the graph.
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the requirements for transport missions with the time
required for movement suggests that between 100 and
300 aircraft could be earmarked for the task.
As shown in the chart (at left), fewer than 150
transport aircraft would be required if two days or
more were allowed for comrleting the movement of first
and second echelons because each aircraft could com-
plete several transport missions. (Theoretically, one
aircraft would suffice if six months were allowed for
the movement.) The number of transports required
would increase greatly if compression of the initial
move to a day or less were attempted. About 100 to
300 transports could complete the forward movement
from the western military districts in 12 to 36 hours,
depending on the utilization rate of the Soviet trans-
port aircraft and the number of unoccupied bases that
reinforcing units move to.
As noted above, these postulated requirements and
allocations of transport aircraft necessarily are min-
imum estimates, and do not take cognizance of unfore-
seeable developments which could reduce the speed and
efficiency of a large-scale airlift operation.
Nonetheless, given a few hours prior notice, it
is estimated that the Soviets probably would be able
to reinforce their tactical air forces in Eastern
Europe rapidly enough to meet their force require-
ments for the conduct of planned offensive air oper-
ations against the NATO Central Region.
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Potential Effect of Pact Tactical
Air Modernization on Reinforcement Plans
By the end of the decade, ongoing programs to
equip Frontal Aviation with more advanced aircraft
could lead to a modification of Pact plans regarding
the timing and scale of tactical air reinforcement
in Central Europe. The need for massive reinforce-
ment prior to or immediately after the initiation of
hostilities derives from the short-range, low-payload
capabilities of most Pact tactical aircraft.
Once sizable numbers of MIG-23 Floggers, SU-17
Fitters, and SU-19 Fencers--with improved range and
payload characteristics--have replaced older models
in the forward area and western USSR, however, there
could be a decline in the overall number of Pact
aircraft required to conduct the initial strikes of
a large-scale air offensive against NATO. Concomi-
tantly, there would be an increase in the ability of
Soviet tactical air units in the western USSR to
participate in these initial air operations from
their home bases. Both developments could reduce the
necessity for immediate large-scale Soviet air rein-
forcement in a European war as well as provide in-
creased Pact flexibility for the use of its air
power against NATO.
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Summary
The offensive wartime role the Warsaw Pact assigns
its tactical air forces in Central Europe is predicated ?
upon their earl rapid reinforcement from bases in the
western USSR* la 25X1
maximum air o ensive is panne or the irs ew days
of a conventional conflict. Medium bombers of Soviet
Long Range Aviation, supported by Frontal Aviation
units based in Eastern Europe, would strike NATO air-
fields, missile launch sites, and command and logistics
centers. Their primary objective remains the destruc-
tion of NATO's nuclear-capable forces. They would
also attempt to cripple as early as possible the sub-
stantial conventional capabilities of NATO's tactical
air forces.
Frontal Aviation in East-Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia is currently composed of about 1,600
tactical combat aircraft, excluding reconnaissance
and trainer aircraft. 25X1
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ULMILUdr- aircraft might be required for the initial
strikes.in a conventional war against the NATO Cen-
tral Region, some 600 aircraft from the western
USSR--the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Mili-
tary Districts--may have to reinforce those already
based in Eastern Europe. Requirements for continued
air operations in later phases of a conflict would
almost certainly demand that the engaged Frontal
Aviation elements receive massive reinforcement.
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Reinforcement Plan
There are a total of about 770 primary combat
aircraft in the Baltic, Belorussian and Carpathian
Military Districts
a per
od of tension would precede the beginning
of any war in Europe, and they probably would not
begin air reinforcement from the western USSR until
shortly--perhaps two days--before largr:-scale hos-
tilities were expected.. The Soviets probably realize
or reinforcement of Pact air
orces in Central Europe. Soviet planning assumes LI
that
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that a massive movement of air forces into Eastern
Europe would be provocative to NATO, hastening NATO
mobilization and inviting NATO preemption. Also, the
more time that elapsed between air reinfcrcement and
the beginning of hostilities, the longer NATO intel-
ligence would have for locating and targeting the
reinforcing Soviet air units.
air rein orcemen s rom a wes ern
U R wou generally be allocated as follows:
-- Frontal Aviation aircraft from the Baltic
and Belorussian Military Districts are ear-
marked for use against NATO forces opposite
East Germany. Most, if not all, of the air
units located in these two military districts
probably would deploy directly into East Ger.--
many because of their limited combat radii,
particularly when carrying conventional
ordnance. A total o: some 1,755 primary
combat aircraft could comprise Pact Frontal
Aviation forces in East Germany after
reinforcement.
Frontal Aviation aircraft fr"m the Carpathian
Military District evidently are intended to
reinforce Soviet and Czechoslovak air units
currently located in Czechoslovakia opposite
southern West Germany. In all, a total of
some 650 primary combat aircraft could be
located in this area after reinforcement.
Logistic Support
The availability of airfields and aviation POL
and ordnance in the forward deployment areas is the
most critical factor affecting Soviet capabilities
to reinforce Frontal Aviation forces in Central
Europe. Several hundred additional combat aircraft
could begin arriving in the forward area within hours
after the decision to reinforce has been made. There
must be a sufficient number of airfields to receive
these aircraft and enough aviation POL and munitions
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prepositioned in Eastern Europe to sustain full combat
operations by all air forces in the area until other
logistic support arrives from the USSR.
Airfields: Comparison of estimated Pact re-
quirements for airfields in the forward area
after reinforcement and the number of airfields
available there indicates that air operations
by Pact tactical aircraft opposite the NATO
Central Region almost certainly would not be
restricted because of insufficient airfields.
POL and Munitions: Comparison of the estimated
POL and munitions expenditure rates of Pact
tactical aircraft which probably would be based
in the forward area with the amounts of these
supplies believed to be currently stored there
indicates that, during the initial period of
war, Pact air forces in Central Europe almost
certainly would have sufficient stocks (one to
two months) available for full-scale operations
until additional logistical support begins
arriving from the USSR--probably within a few
days.
Conducting the Reinforcement
Because there are evidently sufficient quantities
of aviation POL and ordnance in the forward area to
sustain Pact air operations for at least one to two
months, the rapid movement of reinforcing Soviet air
units into East Germany or Czechoslovakia would depend
primarily on Soviet capabilities to move their support
personnel and equipment.
A sufficient number of qualified personnel and
quantities of supplies and equipment would have to be
moved to the forward deployment airfields to receive
the incoming air regiments and ready them for combat.
The major factor determining the amount of personnel
and equipment required would be whether the Soviet
air regiments deploy to "main" bases or "unoccupied"
bases. Soviet or East European air force units are
normally already located at main base airfields in
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the forward area. Unoccupied base airfields are
those which have a usable runway and parking space
but none of the permanent facilities, equipment,
supplies, and personnel usually found at main op-
erating bases. A Soviet air regiment deploying to
an unoccupied base would therefore require a greater
degree of support from its own resources in the
western USSR than a regiment moved to a main base.
Available evidence indicates that the Soviets in-
tend to rely heavily on their air transport capabil-
ities to support the reinforcment of air and ground
forces in Central Europe. Some 350 flights from the
USSR by transport aircraft would be required to sup-
port the movement of all 23 Frontal Aviation units in
the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Dis-
tricts to "main" operating bases in the forward area.
Some 740 transport flights from the USSR would be
needed if all units deployed to "unoccupied" bases.
An estimated 100 to 300 medium transport aircraft--
each flying two or more round-trip flights during a
period of one to three days--probably could be made
available to support the air reinforcement effort.
Light transport aircraft, such as the IL-14 or LI-2,
could be made available to transport the air army and
air division headquarters staffs. These allocations
probably would not overtax Soviet airlift capacity
and, given a few hours prior notice, probably would
allow the reinforcement to be completed rapidly enough
to meet Pact force requirements for the conduct of
planned offensive air operations against the NATO
Central Region.
By the end of the decade ongoing programs to
equip Frontal Aviation with more advanced aircraft
could lead to a modification of Pact plans regarding
the timing and scale of air reinforcement in Central
Europe. The introduction into Frontal Aviation of
aircraft with greater range and payload capabilities
could reduce the overall number of aircraft required
to conduct the initial strikes in an air offensive
against NATO as well as permit air units,in the
western USSR to par-,~,:icipate in these strikes from
their home 'gases.
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 WARSAW PACT:
Base Airfields and Aviation Units in
Central Europe and the Western U.S.S.R.
^ Frontal Aviation Bases in western MOs
? East European Air Force Bases
A Soviet Air Force Bases
o Unoccupied Airfields
NORTH SEA