WARSAW PACT AIR POWER: CAPABILITIES FOR REINFORCEMENT OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000700080003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1975
• Content Type: IR

I ~ 7~~FQI?Release 20DQ103f06 :CIA?RpP86700608R000700080003~/ ~ F D/R
Air,~Power~~ Capa: fir;: Reinf orcement
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Intelligence Report
No Foreign Dissenr
Warsaw Pact Air Power: Capabilities forReinforcement
of Tactical Air Forces in Central Europe
SR I R 75-2-S
March 1975
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Jnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 014359
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? SB(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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No Foreign Dissem -
Warsaw Pact Air Power: Capabilities
for Reinforcement of Tactical Air Forces
in Central Europe
Principal Conclusions
The offensive wartime role the Warsaw Pact assigns its tactical air forces in
Central Europe is predicated on their early, rapid reinforcement from bases in the
western USSR. Pact commanders are apparently counting on the timely infusion of
Soviet air strength to carry out massive, coordinated air attacks during the initial
phases of a conventional conflict in Europe. These strikes would be targeted
primarily against NATO's air forces and tactical nuclear assets.
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force requirements
for some air operations exceed the number of aircraft located in
Central Europe in peacetime, indicating that the Pact probably
would reinforce its tactical air forces prior to and during hostilities.
The Pact probably would be able to conduct alarge-scale tactical air reinforce-
ment operation with sufficient rapidity to meet its overall force requirements for
offensive air operations against the NATO Central Region.
There evidently is an adequate number of airfields and sufficient
stocks of aviation POL and munitions prepositioned in the forward
area to sustain combat operations by all Pact tactical aircraft-
including reinforcements-until additional logistic support arrives
from the USSR.
The Soviet air force probably could deploy several hundred tactical
aircraft along with attendant ground personnel and equipment from
the western USSR to the forward area in one to three days,
depending on the amount of air transport support allocated to the air
reinforcement effort. This does not take into consideration the
potential effects of incalculables such as adverse weather, com-
munications or equipment malfunctions, air traffic congestion, or
military counteractions by NATO.
The necessity for immediate, large-scale air reinforcement prior to or during the
initial phases of hostilities in Europe could be reduced over the next several years by
the introduction into Pact tactical air forces of newer aircraft with improved range
and payload capabilities.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1975
Warsaw Pact Air Power: Capabilities
for Reinforcement of Tactical Air Forces
in Central Europe
Diverse intelligence sources indicate that the
Warsaw Pact has devised plans for massive offensive
air operations against the NATO Central Region during
the initial phases of a conventional conflict in
Europe. Force requirements for such operations coul d
commit the Pact, prior to the onset of host~.ilities,
to a large-scale reinforcement of its tactical air
forces in the forward area with aircraft f~r-om the
western USSR. Continued requirements for ;sir suppor t
during the ensuing phases of a conflict a'l:nost cer-
tainly would necessitate the deployment o` additiona 1
combat aircraft into Eastern Europe.
This report outlines what is known of Pact plans
for tactical air reinforcement in Central Europe and
assesses overall Soviet capabilities to conduct a
large-scale air reinforcement operation
A summary of this report begins on page 28.
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Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome.
They may be directed to the Theater Forces
Division, Office of Strategic Research, code 143, extension 54Z 0.
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Contents
Page
Pact Concepts for Air Warfare in Europe
and Reinforcement Plan
Reinforcement From Baltic Military
District
5
g
Reinforcement From Belorussian Military
District
9
Reinforcement From Carpathian Military
District
9
Deploymen~c Within the Forward Area
10
Timing .
11
Logistic Support for Frontal Aviation in
Central Europe
12
Basing Doctrine and Airfield Requirements
12
Airfield Availability
14
POL and Munitions
15
Aircraft Shelters
16
Conducting the Reinforcement
17
Elements and Timing of Movement
17
Role of Air Transport
18
Advance Support Element
18
Second-Echelon Support Element ~
21
Air Army and Division Headquarters
22
Total Airlift Requirements
23
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Assessment of Air Transport Resources
and Postulated Allocation
23
Potential Effect of Pact Tactical Air
Modernization on Reinforcement Plans
27
Summary
28
Illustrations
'F3.me vs Aircraft Requirements for Transport
of Air Units from USSR to Nlain and Unoccupied
Bases in Eastern Europe (Chart)
24
Soviet Air Transport Resources for Tacti~:al
Air Reinforcement (Photographs)
26
Warsaw Pact: Base Airfields and Aviation
Units in Central Europe and the
Western USSR (Map) appended
Tables
Potential Strength of Warsaw Pact Frontal
Aviation Opposite NATO Central Region
After Reinforcement
7
Transport Suppoz~t Requirements for
Movement ~f a Frontal Aviation Regiment
20
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Pact. Concepts for Air Warfare in Europe
and Reinforcement Plan
The current structure and equipment of the Warsaw
Pact's tactical air forces--known as "Frontal Avia-
tion"--still reflect Pact doctrinal concepts of the
late fifties and early sixties that war with NATO
would begin with or immediately escalate to nuclear
conflict. Within this doctrinal framework, Frontal
Aviation was equipped with short-range, low-payload
aircraft for air defense and reconnaissance opera-
tions over the battlefield and for delivery of nuclear
strikes in the zone of operations of the front.*
Such missions would be augmented by the tactical mis-
siles and rockets of the ground forces. The main
strategic nuclear strike forces were the MRBMs, IRBMs,
and medium bombers based in the USSR.
With NATO's acceptance of the US doctrine of
flexible response in the mid-sixties, Soviet planners
began to alter their concept of the nature of a future
war with NATO. The Pact came to recognize that such
a conflict could begin with an indeterminate but
limited period of conventional warfare. The duration
of the conventional phase would probably be decided
by NATO's degree of success in conducting nonnuclear
forward defense.
The conventional capabilities of the Pact tactical
air forces have not yet been fully upgraded to conform
with this change in doctrine, however. Pact planners
have had to develop interim plans for the employment
of their existing tactical aircraft in conventional
offensive operations until aircraft with improved
conventional capabilities became available in suffi-
cient numbers in the late seventies.
* In Warsaw Pact terminology a front is a formation usually
consisting of several field armies and a tactical air army,
plus combat and service support units.
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These interim Tans 25X1D
* call for massive and coor mated
theaterwide attacks against NATO with conventional
ordnance by Pact Frontal Aviation and elements of the
Soviet medium bomber force at the onset of hostilities.
The primary objective of these attacks is the destruc-
tion of NATO's nuclear-capable forces.
There is no direct evidence indicating the number
of tactical aircraft that the Pact believes will be
required to conduct its air operations plans. It may
~e inferred however,
that as many as 2,200 combat aircraft** could be
operating from bases in the forward area. (see map
appended.) These fighters, fighter-bombers, and
light bombers must perform a dual role: fly combined
conventional operations with medium bombers from the
USSR and make up an adequate nuclear-armed reserve
force, should nuclear strikes become necessary.
Soviet Frontal Aviation in East Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia currently comprises some 980
combat aircraft.*** (see table at right.) The Polish,
Czec~ioslovak, and East German tactical air forces add
about 655 combat aircraf t--for a total of around 1,635
tactical combat aircraft stationed in Ea~~~_rn Europe
opposite the NATO Central Region. In some contin-
gencies, therefore, as many as 565 additional combat
aircraft would be needed to satisfy Pact force re-
quirements for the initial strikes in a conventional
air war against NATO. Continued air support in later
phases of the conflict almost certainly would require
additional reinforcement.
* See Warsaw Pact Air Power: Concepts for Conventional Air
Operations Against NATO, SR IR 72-17-S, October 1972 (S/NFD-
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** Does not include combat-capable trainers or aircraft with a
primary mission of reconnaissance.
*** For a more complete discussion of the posture of Warsaw
Pact Frontal Aviation opposite NATO see Warsaw Pact Ai:? PotJer:
Forces for Use in Central Europe, SR IR 74-1, December 1973
25X1 X7 (S/NFD
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Potential Strength of Warsaw Pact
Frontal Aviation Opposite NATO Central Region
After Reinforcement*
East Germany and
Western Poland
Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany: 650
Northern Group
of Forces:
East German Tac-
tical Air Forces: 35
Polish Tactical
Air Forces:
In forward area Available
Non- reinforce- Total
Soviet Soviet Total ments ,aircraf t
1,290
From Baltic
Military District: 225
FYom Belorussian
Military Districi:: 240
Total available
Czechoslovakia
Soviet Central
Group of Forces
Czechoslovak Tac-
tical Air Forces
From Carpathian
Military District
Totals** 980 655 1,635 770 2,405
* There are some 755 additional combat aircraft in the national air defense
forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany that probably would sup-
port the Pact tactical air forces during the initial period of hostilities.
They may fly close escort for transiting Soviet bombers, but they more
likely would defend the Soviet bomber forces--and the ground forces--by
engaging NATO aircraft operating over Pact terri'?:ory.
** Figures do not include reconnaissance aircraft .,end combat-capable trainers.
1,755
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Soviet tactical air forces in
the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
Districts are earmarked for early reinforcement of
Pact forces engaged in Central Europe. These Soviet
air armies have a total of about 770 combat aircraft
--320 fighters, 285 fighter-bombers and 165 light
bombers.
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in i e o war, e concen ra ions o tactica air
forces in the forward area would generally correspond
to the locations of the major ground force formations
in East Germany and western Czechoslovakia. And tac-
tical air units would bE under the operational control
of the Soviet General Staff or the Soviet Air Forces
headquarters. Most aircraft from the western USSR
probably would move into the forward area well in
advance of reinforcing ground forces, and would be
available for initial air operations.
Reinforcement From Baltic Military District
most, if not
all, of the tactical aircraft in the Baltic Military
District of the USSR are probably earmarked for em-
pJ^Iment against NATO forces opposite East Germany.
Little is known, however, about the specific alloca-
tions of the reinforcing units within this opera-
tional area.
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Reinfarrcement From Belorussian Military District
reduce the flying distances to NATO targets.
will deploy directly to East Germany in orde
The limited combat radius of Pact tactical air-
craft, particularly when loaded with conventional
~~rdnance, suggests that most aircraft from Belorussia
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Reinforcement From Carpathian Military District
After the Warsaw Part invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968, ground and air forces from the Carpathian
Military District were permanerr~~Cl~tationed in Czecho-
slovakia. These forces may se as an advance ele-
ment of the Carpathian Front. 25X1C
additional air units from t e Car-
pathian Military District would begin arriving in
Czechoslovakia almost immediately of ter the start of
mobilization--presumably to support conventional air
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operations.
Overall, Frontal Aviation forces available for
operations in the Pact's southernmost front opposite
the NATO Central Region would almost certainly be
composed of the 345 combat aircraft in Czechoslovak
anc; Soviet units presently in Czechoslovakia, plus
reinforcement combat aircraft from the Carpathian
Military District.
Deployment Within the Forward Area
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Pact Frontal Aviation forces available for use
opposite central and northern East Germany probably
would include Polish Frontal Aviation and the tacti-
cal air army subordinate to the Soviet Northern Group 25X1D
of Forces in Poland.
vancina westward along=r the Baltic and North Sea coasts.
Polish
military forces would be the backbone of a front ad-
Other redeployments by Frontal Aviation forces
probably would include the movement of units from
eastern Czechoslovakia to base airfields nearer the
West German border. Some other Pact units in Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany, particularly the short-
range fighter-bomber regiments, probably would also
move to base airfields as close to the West Germar_
border as possible.
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'maiming
Available intelligence provides little clear evi-
dence on the pl~.zned timing of Soviet tactical air
reinforcement with respect to the national mobiliza-
tion schedule* or the initiation of hostilities. The
nature of the air reinforcement operation and the
peacetime posture of Soviet tactical air forces sug-
gest that the Soviets probably would not initiate
reinforcement more than a day or two before the an-
ticipated beginning of hostilities, regai~lless of the
national mobilization date. Because Frontal Aviation
units in the western USSR are maintained at or near
their authorized wartime personnel and equipment
strengths, almost no mobilization would be required
to bring these forces to combat readiness. Theoreti-
cally, the Soviets could reinforce their tactical air
forces opposite central NATO with units from the
western USSR at any time prior to or after national
mobilization began.
If the USSR were to attempt a clandestine mobili-
zation to a war footing, air reinforcement probably
would be planned as one of the last acts prior to the
anticipated outbreak of warfare. It would be extremely
difficult for the Soviets to fly several hundred air-
craft into the forward area without their detection
arge-scale movements by air uni s a ready located in 25X1D
Eastern Europe might also provide indications to NATO
that the Pact was preparing for war.
The Soviets probably would consider the highly
visible movement of combat aircraft and logistic
support from the USSR into the forward area as risk-
ing a serious provocation to NATO. Moreover, the
more time that elapszd between air reinforcement and
the beginning or hostilities, the longer NATO intel-
* For an analysis of Pact mobilization procedures see Warsaw
Pact Mobilization Plans and the Transit?t,on to a War footing,
SR IR 74-2-5, January 1974 (S).
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ligence would have for locating and targeting the
reinforcing Soviet air units. This disadvantage
might be somewhat offset by the additional opera-
tional preparedness afforded Soviet reinforcing
units before their first combat sortie.
Logistic Support for Frontal
Aviation in Central Europe
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The availability of airfields, POL, and munitions
in the forward deployment areas is one of the most
critical factors affecting Soviet capabilities to
quickly reinforce the Frontal Aviation forces in Cen-
tral Europe. Several hundred aircraft could begin
arriving in the forward area within hours after the
decision to reinforce had been made. There would
have to be a sufficient number of airfields to receive
these aircraft and enough POL and munitions preposi-
tioned in Eastern Europe to sustain full combat opera-
tions by all air forces in the area until other
logistic support arrived from the USSR.
Basing Doctrine and Airfield R?quirements
Pact planners consider
the following basing criteria to be essential for the
support of modern air combat operations in the forward
area:
for fighter-bomber regiments, one base air-
field per regiment located no farther than
55 nm from the West German border
-- for fighter regiments and reconnaissance
regiments equipped with fighter aircraft,
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one base airfield per regiment located no
farther than 80 nm from the West German
border
-- for light bomber regiments and reconnaissance
regiments equipped with light bomber aircraft,
two base airfields per regiment located no
farther than 160 nm from the West German
border.
Pact planners must base their tactical aircraft
close to the anticipated line of contact because of
the relatively limited operational range of most
models currently in use by Pact Frontal Aviation.
The types and numbers of Pact Frontal Aviatio~i
regiments that probably would be located in East
Germany, Western Poland, and Czechoslovakia before
and after reinforcement are:
Before
In East Germany and Western Poland forcement
After
forcement
-- Fighter-bomber regiments 10
19
-- Fighter and fighter-
reconnaissance regiments 131/3
231/3
-- Light bomber and light-bomber-
reconnaissance regiments 32/3
9 ?/3
27
52
In Czechoslovakia
--
Fighter-bomber regiments 4
7
--
Fighter and fighter-
reconnaissance
regiments
7
11 2/3
--
Light bomber and
light-bomber-
reconnaissance
regiments
0
31/3
11
22
Total
38
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The Frontal Aviation Reyitnent
The basic oryanizational unit of Frontal Aviatioi
is the air regiment. A typical regiment consists of
headquarters staff, three subordinate combat squad
cons of 10 to 14 aircraft each, a liar. maintenance
squadron, and other service elements such as armorer'.
and missile technicians. One air regiment is normally
located at a base airfield, Attached to each base air
field is what the Soviets call an "Air Technical Bat
talion." This large unit provides airfield support
services such as snow removal, transportation, aii
traffic control, security, housing, and ordnance ane
POL storage, In all there are about 1,000 men in t
typical air regiment, its air technical battalion, anc
other direct support units.
Pact sources and exercises indicate that reinforce
meat deploymenrs into the forward area probably
will be conducted on a regimental basis. That Is,
individual regiments will deploy intact as regiments.
Frontal Aviation forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and
Carpathian Military Districts are organized into tht
equivalent of 73 regiments at 20 airfields, During a
reinforcement effort, therefore, as many as 2?
distinct groups of aircraft, men, and supportint
equipment could be moving into the forward area
within a few clays.
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Airfield Availability
There are 133 base airfields--those airfields
with at least 6,000 feet of permanent runway--in
the forward area opposite the NATO Central Region
that could be employed by Frontal Aviation units.
In strict accordance with Pact basing criteria
the 101 base airfields in East Germany and Poland
could accommodate 40 of the 52 Frontal Aviation units
that are believed to be intended for commitment to
this area. In Czechoslovakia there are 32 base air-
fields. At least 17 of the 20 Frontal Aviation units
that probably would be located in Czechoslovakia
could be based at airfields meeting Pact doctrinal
criteria. Overall, about 80 percent of all Frontal
Aviation regiments that could be expected to be
operating from East Germany, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia after air reinforcement could be based
according to Pact doctrine. The remaining units
could be located at other base airfields no far~-.her
than 160 nm from the West German border, or at tempo-
rary airfields.
The high percentage of units that could be based
in compliance with Pact doctri~ie indicates that air
operations by tactical aircraft against targets
in the NATO Central Region almost certainly would not
be restricted because of an insufficient number of
airfields.
The extent to which Pact planners will actually
be capable of adhering to their basing doctrine is
difficult to assess.
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* There are some 75 temporary--grass or graded earth--airfields
in the forward area that are capable of supporting limited
operations by Pact tactical aircraft. 25X1 C
- temporary airfield can be used by a* most two
squadrons--24 aircraft--for only one or two sorties in a
24-hour period. Inclement weather. would severely reduce the
usability of these airfields.
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PGL and Munitions
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du e ini is perio of hostilities tactical air-
craf t would be required to maintain their maximum ex-
pected sortie rates--approximately 3 per day for
fighter-bomber aircraft, and about 2 per day for light
bombers--for about three days. After this 3-day
period a number of f actors--attrition, personnel
fatigue, and diminishing POL and munitions stocks--
would necessitate a reduction to about 1.5 sorties
per day for all tactical aircraft.
The total amount of aviation POL and munitions
available in East Germany has been estimated, and it
is unlikely that significant stockpiles of aviation
POL and munitions in Last Germany remain unidentified.
A comparison of the projected expenditure rates with
the amounts of POL and munitions estimated to be cur-
rently stored in East Germany indicates .._.at during
the initial period of war, Pact tactical air forces
in Central Europe--including reinforcements--would
not be restricted by insufficient POL and munitions
stocks.*
Airfields and aviation depots in East Germany
probably contain s~;fficient amounts of aviation fuel
* For a more detailed analysis of Soviet logistic capabilities
in East Germany see Logistic Posture of Soviet Forces in cast
Gerrnanr~, SR IR 73-10-S, September 1973 (S) .
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to maintain th~~ tactical aircraft assigned there
(including reinforcements) for approximately 30 days,
and enough air-to-air missiles to supply Pact inter-
ceptors in East Germany for about 2 weeks. Stocks of
conventional munitio~is in East Germany probably are
sufficient to supply attack aircraft :'.n the area for
a period in excess of 2 months. Additional logistic
support for Frontal Aviation units in East Germany
almost certainly would have started arriving from
the USSR within these time periods.
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n the basis of_ the limited informati nn a~~a; i ar,i o
11~WC~e~, iL is assumea that the supply of aviation POL
and munitions stored in these areas, in relation to
anticipated need, approximates that in East Germany.
Aircraft Shelters
There are about 1,125 aircraft shelters at Frontal
Aviation bases in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslo-
vakia within 160 nm of the West German border. These
shelters protect about 75 percent of the Soviet and
50 percent of the East European tactical aircraft
stationed in the area in peacetime from destruction
by conventional weapons. The East Europeans are still
constructing shelters and the percentage of forward
based aircraft so protected will increase over the
next few years.
A decision not to build additional shelters in
Eastern Europe to protect Soviet reinforcement air-
craft probably resulted, inter alia, from consider-
ation of cost, as well as an awareness that ongoing
Soviet force modernization plans could reduce the
necessity for immediate tactical air reinforcemer:t
during a war in Europe (see discussion on page 27).
In any case, with proper dispersal and camouflaging,
the absence of shelters for reinforcement aircraft
deployed to the forward area during the interim
period should not affect significantly the ability
of Pact tactical air forces to mount initial of-
fensive air operations.
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Conducting the Reinforcement
Because stocks of aviation POL and ordnance al-
ready located in the forward area apparently are suf-
ficient to sustain Pact air operations for several
weeks, the rate of movement of reinforcing Frontal
Aviation units from the western USSR into Eastern
Europe would depend primarily on Soviet capabilities
to move the ground personnel and support equipment.
Movement of the combat aircraft themselves should
pose no serious problems.
This analysis considers only the theoretical
capabilities and probable procedures whereby the
Soviets would move tactical air units from the
western USSR to Eastern Europe. No effort was made
to assess the potential efzects of adverse weather,
communications or equipment malfunctions, air-traffic
congestion, or military counteractions by NATO.
Elements and Timing of Movement
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Support personnel and equipment of a Soviet air
regiment deploying from the western USSR to an air-
field in Eastern Europe probably would move in three
parts: an advance element, a second-echelon element,
and a rear element. The rear element is not discussed
at length in this paper because it probably would
proceed by rail or road to the deployment airfield
and may not be in place to support the air regiment's
initial operations. It would consist mainly of the
regiment's larger or non-air-transportable support
vehicles, major maintenance and repair equipment and
supplies, and technical and support personnel not
needed for the advance and second-echelon support
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elements. Additional aviation POL and ordna:~ce prob-
ably would also be mo~~~d by this support echelon.
The personnel for both the advance and second-
echelon elements probably would be drawn mainly from
the home base's air techn~_cal battalion and from the
technical sections of the air regiment. Some support
may also be provided by support elements at: or near
the base tc ~-hich the air regiment is to deploy. For
example, the nearest air technical battalion might be
available to deliver fuel for the incoming aircraf t
if the air regiment's own support personnel or ve-
hicles had not ye` arrive~~.
Role of Air Transport
Although Soviet-based support elemen;~ probably
are similar in composition to those based in Eastern
Europe, more emphasis is placed on air transport
because of the greater distances involved. If there
were no urgency to the buildup in Central Europe, the
reinforc~::ment of Frontal Aviation could be entirely
suppor':ed by rail or read transport. Since, however,
the Soviets anticipate that a full-scale buildup
would only be triggered by a rapidly deteriorating
international political climate, they estimate that
the time element would be critical in any mobiliza-
tion and forward movement situation.
Only the use of air transport could reduce the
preparation time required, and the Soviets evidently
intend to rely heavily on air transport to support
reinforcement of the air and ground forces in Eastern
Europe. This intent seems confirmed by their now
routine use of air transport for the rotation of
troops and air personnel between Eastern Europe and
the USSR and their recent reliance on extensive air-
lifts to resupply the Arabs during and after the
Middle East war in 1973.
Advance Support Element. The function of the
advance support element is to move rapidly to the
deployment airfield and prepare it for incoming
combat aircraft. It then readies these aircraft
within hours for combat operations. East European
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deployment practices indicate that the advance sup-
p~rt ele~ne:it of a Soviet regiment deploying to Eastern
Europe would consist of about 200 persons from the
headquarters staff, the squadron and regimental main-
tenance sections, and the air technical battalion.
The mechanics and technicians woulr' be equipped with
individual tool kits and instruments and have an
emergency stock ~f spare parts for each combat air-
craf t. Three AN-12 or IL-18 aircraft could transport
these personnel. (See table, next page.}
The most critical factor determining the amount
of ground support equipment that must be moved with
the advance element--as well as subsequent support
elements--i~ whether the Soviet air regiment deploys
to a "main" base or an "unoccupied" base. In this
paper, an unoccupied base is defined as having a per-
manent, jet?-capable runway and. parking space, but
little or none of the permanent facilities, equipment,
or personnel usually found at main operating bases
where Pact military air units are located. About
one-third of the base airfields in East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia are unoccupied.
The Soviets probably would equip the advance
support element deploying to a main operating base
with some special tools and ground support equipment
as a token backup to the deployment base facilities.
Enough. items to provide minimal servicing for one
flight of three or four aircraft might be provided.
This equipment probably includes ground power units
for starting the aircraft, emergency sources of com-
pressed air and oxygen, tools for assembly and ~3is-
assembly of aircraft components, and stands, ladders,
jacks, tow-bars, and dollies for servicing and Firming
the aircraft. A few utility vehicles may also be
taken along. Most of these items are air-trans-:~xt-
able and are available in several types. To sane
weight and space the Soviets might choose the smallest
models such as those which are skid- or cart-mounted.
I'or airlift calculation purposes it is estimated
that about 20 major items of ground support equipment
might be transported by an advance support element
deploying to another main base airfield. Five AN-12s
would be required to lift this equipment.
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Transport Support Requirements for
P4ovement of Frontal Aviation Regiments
Advance Support
Element
200 personnel with
Transport flights
required to move
Transport flights req~iired all 23 regiments
to move a single regiment: in western USSR
To "main" To "unoccupied" to main/unoccupied
base base bases
tool kits and
small spare parts
3 AN-12 or
3 AN-12 or
69 AN-12 or
IL-18
IL-18
IL-18
Ground support
equipment
Second-Echelon
Support Element
300 personnel with
5 A.N-12 17 AN-12 115/391 AN-12
8 20 184/460
tool kits ar.:t
small spare parts
4 AN-12 or
4 AN-12 or
IL-18
IL-18
Ground support
equipment
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92 AN-12 or
IL-18
3 AN-12 8 AN-i2 69f184 AN-12
7 12 161/276
15 32 345/736
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The ground support equipment of an advance element
of an air regiment moving to an unoccupied base would
be similar to, but in greater quantities than, that
carried to a main airfield. An estimated 50 major
items might be airlifted. More of the regiment's air-
craft starting units, for example, probably would be
taken along. Also, a greater variety of spare items,
possibly including engines and tires, could be pro-
vided to ensure that: the deployed unit maintains tre
necessary sortie levels without excessive dependence
on depots in the deployment area. Staff and communi-
cations equipment to control the combat aircraft op-
erations could also be flown in, as well as general
items such as rations and medical supplies.
A total of 17 AN-12s would be needed to carry
the estimated minimum required ground support equip-
ment of the advance element of most air regiments
deploying to an unoccupied base. Although the Soviets
probably would send as much of the ground support
equipment with the advance element as possible, some
items may be needed at the home base to ensure the
takeoff of all combat aircraft for the deployment
airfield. This materiel would move forward with the
second echelon rather than with the advance element.
Second-Echelon Support Element. The function of
the second-echelon support element is to ensure, in
conjunction with the advance eJ~ment, that planned
sortie rates are maintained for the first few days
of operations. The second-echelon element would nor-
mally deploy of ter the departure of the combat air-
craft from the home base and prior to the unit's first
combat mission from the deployment base. If timing
were not critical, or if the distance to the deploy-
ment base were relatively short, at least part of the
second echelon probably would be included in the rear
support element and moved by rail or road, as noted
in Ea:~t European deployment examples. Even if air-
lifted, however, the se:.~ond echelon might not neces-
sarily be at the deplo~~ment airfield in time to
assist in preparation for the first few missions.
If, for example, there were little preparation time
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prior to hostilities, the combat aircraft might de-
ploy before air transport became available or before
the second echelon could be readied for the move.
The combat aircraft already at the deployment field
might quickly refuel and take off for their first
sorties before the second support echelon arrived.
The second-echelon support element probably would
consist of up to 300 pE:rsons, .including most of the
remaining technicians and mechanics from the squadron
and regimental s:~ctions, specialists from the air
technical battalion, and the headquarters staff. Four
AN-:12 or IL-18 transports could airlift these person-
nel to Eastern Europe.
As with the advance support element, the amount
of ground support equipment moved with the second-
echelon element would depend on whether the air regi-
ment were moving to a main or unoccupied airfield.
An additional 20 major items of equipment, requiring
three AN-12s, might be moved to a main base. Some 35
additional items, requiring eight AN-12s, might be
moved to an unoccupied airfield. One or two addi-
tional AN-12s probably would be needed by light bomber
regiments equipped with twin-engine aircraft because
of the greater number of spare engines.
Air Army and Division Headquarters. A priority
requirement probably would also exist to airlift the
command and staff elements of the air army and combat
air division headquarters in the three western mili-
tary districts, along with specialists from the
various components of these commands. Up to half the
personnel from a single air army headquarters and its
division headquarters deploying from the western USSR,
along with special equipment, might be airlifted by
about 30 light transports such as the LI-2 Cab or IL-14
Crate. As with the combat regiments, the higher head-
quarters personnel probably would deploy in at least
two elements.
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Total Airlift Requirements
As shown in the table (page 20), some 350 round-
trip airlifts by transport aircraft would be required
if all 23 air regiments in the Baltic, Belorussian,
and Carpathian Military Districts deployed to ~om-
patible main airfields. This number would include
about 185 flights to transport the advance support
elements anc? about 165 flights for the second-echelon
elements.
In all, about 25 percent of the ground support
equipment and 50 percent of the personnel in these
units could be airlifted by this number of missions.
As individual transport aircraft completed their task
of helping to move tactical air units they could be
assigned to support other military forces. Some of
the transports, however, probably would continue to
support the air forces by providing follow-on logistics
airlift.
If all 23 air regiments in the western military
districts deployed to unoccupied bases, about 740
round-trip flights by transport aircraft would be
required. Some 460 of these flights would be needed
for the advance support elements alone if all, or
nearly all, of their ground support equipment and
supplies were to arrive shortly afterwards. The re-
maining 280 missions would be needed to move the
second-echelon support elements. Some 50 percent of
the personnel and ground support equipment in the
reinforcement units could be airlifted to unoccupied
bases by this number of transport flights.
Assessment of Air Transport Resources,
There is no direct evidence on how many transport
aircraft would be committed to the movement of Frontal
Aviation reinforcements. Nonetheless, correlation of
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Time vs Aircraft Requirements
for Transport of Air Units From USSR to Main
and Unoccupied Bases in Eastern Europe
Flights to Main Bases
(350 Missionsi
Flights to "Unoccupied" Bases
1740 Missions)
12 hour/day utilization
12 missions/day)
- - - - - - 18 hour/day utilization
(3 missions/day)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Transport Aircraft Required
This chart depicts the theoretical minimum times required to transport reinforcing
Frontal Aviation units from the western USSR to East Germany. It is based on the
following assumptions:
?The reinforcing units are completely ready to move
? Loading of each transport sortie requires 2 hours
?Average flight time from the Western USSR to Germany is 1.5 hours
? Unloading and turnaround at forward bases takes one hour
?Total mission time for each transport two-way sortie is six hours
Because the Soviets would choose to employ some mixture of "main" and
"unoccupied" bases for reinforcing air units, the number of transport missions
required should be between 350 and 740-in the shaded area on the graph.
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the requirements for transport missions with the time
required for movement suggests that between 100 and
300 aircraft could be earmarked for the task.
As shown in the chart (a left), fewer than i50
transport aircraft would be required if two days or
more were allowed for completing the movement of first
and second echelons because each aircraft could com-
plete several transport missions. (Theoretically, one
aircraft would suffice if six months were allowed for
the movement.) The dumber of transports required
would increase greatly if compression of the initial
move to a day or less were attempted. About 100 to
300 transports could complete the forward mo~~ement
from the western military districts in 12 to 36 hours,
depending on the utilization rate of the Soviet trans-
port aircraft and the number of unoccupied bases that
reinforcing units move to.
Dedication of this number of transport aircraft
over a period of one to three days probably would not
severely tax total Soviet airlift capacity. Soviet
air transport resources which could be allocated to
support the reinforcement of tactical air forces in
the forward area include between 40 and 50 aircraft
assigned to the tactical air armies of the Baltic,
Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts, 750
to Military Transport Aviation (VTA), and 1,200 to
the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MGA). The medium
transports assigned ~to VTA and MGA would provide the
greatest amount of airlift for the move.
As noted above, these postulated requirements and
a:ilocations of transport aircraft necessarily are min-
imum estimates, and do not take cognizance of unfore-
seeable developments which could reduce the speed and
efficiency of a large-scale airlift operation.
Nonetheless, given a few Hours prior notice, it
is estimated that the Soviets probably would be able
to reinforce their tactical air forces in Eastern
Europe rapidly enough to meet their force require-
ments for the conduct of planned offensive air oper-
ations against the NATO Central Region.
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Soviet Air Transport Resources
for Tactical Air Reinforcement
Ministry of Civil Aviation (MGA)
Soviet Civil Aviation, which serves as a reserve force (or
VTA, probably would be used extensively for military airlih
missions in wartime. Use of civil passenger aircraft for sup-
port of military forces has been demonstrated during troop
rotations in Eastern Europe and the recent Middle East re-
supply and evacuation operation. There are about 1200
large passenger and cargo aircrah, such as the IL-18, in this
force.
Military Transport Aviation
Soviet Military Transport Aviation (UTA) provides the main
intertheater and long range airlih capability for the Soviet
armed farces and the national government. Equipped with
some 700 AN-12 medium assault and 50AN-22 Cock
heavy cargo transports, one of VTA's primary missions is
to lih airborne troops. It is also used extensively to support
other military forces, including Frontal Aviation.
Air Transports Assigned to the Three
Tactical Air Armies in the Western USSR
Some transport aircrah-almost certainly no more than 50-are
assigned to tactical air units in the Baltic, Belorussian, and
Carpathian Military Districts. They consist almost entirely of
LI.2 and IL-14 light transports (the tactical air army in the
Carpathian Military District also has two AN?8 medium trans?
ports.) The transports in each of the Military Districts are
organized into asquadron-size or smaller organization provid-
ing general support for the district.
In addition to light and medium transports there are 25 or so
small utility transports-mainly AN-14 Clod and a few AN-2
Colt-in the three western USSR tactical air armies. These
could be used to carry key personnel and crew members as
well es to perform other administrative or liaison tasks.
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Potential Effect of Pact Tactical
Air Modernization on Reinforcement Plans
By the end of the decade, ongoing programs to
equip Frontal Aviation with more advanced aircraft
could lead ~o a modification of Pact plans regarding
the timing and scale of tactical air reinforcement
in Central Europe. The need for massive reinforce-
ment prior to or immediately after the initiation of
hostilities derives from the short-range, low-payload
capabilities of most Pact tactical aircraf t.
Once sizable numbers of MIG-23 Floggers, SU-17
Fitters, and SU-19 Fencers--with improved range and
payload characteristics--have replaced older models
in the forward area and western USSR, however, there
could be a decline in the overall number of Pact
aircraft required to conduct the initial strikes of
a large-scale air offensive against NATO. Concomi-
tantly, there would be an increase in the ability of
Soviet tactical air units in the western USSR to
participate in these initial air operations from
their home bases. Both developments could reduce the
necessity for immediate large-scale Soviet air rein-
forcement in a European war as well as provide in-
creased Pact flexibility for the use of its air
power against NATO.
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Summary
25X1 B
25X1 B
The offensive wartime role the Warsaw Pact assigns
its tactical air forces in Central Europe is predicated
upon their early rapid rei~.sorc~ment from bases in the
western USSR. a 25X1C
maximum air offensive is planned for the first few days
of a conventional conflict. Medium bombers of Soviet
Long Range Aviation, supported by Frontal Aviation
units based in Eastern Europe, would strike NATO air-
fields, missile launch sites, and command and logistics
centers. Their primary objective remains the destruc-
tion of NATO's nuclear-capable forces. They would
also attempt to cripple as early as possibl~~ the sub-
stantial conventional capabilities of NATO's tactical
air forces .
Frontal Aviation in East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia is currently composed of about 1,600
tactical combat aircraft, excluding reconnaissance
and trainer aircraft. Because 25X16
as many as 2,200
combat aircraft might be required for the initial
strikes in a conventional war against the NATO Cen-
tral Region, some 600 aircraft from the western
USSR--the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Mili-
tary Districts--may have to reinforce those already
based in Eastern Europe. Requirements for continued
air operations in later phases of a conflict would
almost certainly demand that the engaged Frontal
Aviation elements receive massive reinforcement.
Reinforcement Plan
There are a total of about 770 primary combat
aircraft in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian
Military Districts which
- are intended far reinforcement of Pact air
forces in Central Europe. Soviet planning assumes
that a period of tension would precede the beginning
of any war in Europe, and they probably would not
begin air reinforcement from the western USSR until
shortly--perhaps two days--before large-scale hos-
tilities were expected. The Soviets probably realize
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that a massive movement of air forces into Eastern
Europe would be provocative to NATO, hastening NATO
mobilization and inviting NATO preemption. Also, the
more time that elapsed between air reinforcement and
the beginning of hostilities, the longer NATO intel-
ligence would have for locating and targeting the
reinforcing Soviet air units.
25X16 air reinforcements from the western
USSR would generally be allocated as follows:
Frontal Aviation aircraft from the Baltic
and Belorussian MiZitarz~ Districts are ear-
marked for use against NATO forces opposite
East Germany. Most, if not all, of the air
units located in these two military districts
probably would deploy directly into East Ger-
many because of their limited combat radii,
particularly when carrying conventional
ordnance. A total of some 1,755 primary
combat aircraft could comprise Pact Frontal
Aviation forces in East Germany after
reinforcement.
Frontal Aviation aircraft from the Carpathian
l9iZitarz~ District evidently are intended to
reinforce Soviet and Czechoslovak air units
currently located in Czechoslovakia opposite
southern West Germany. In all, a total of
some 650 primary combat aircraft could be
located in this area after reinforcement.
Logistic Support
The availability of airfields and aviation POL
and ordnance in the forward deployment areas is the
most critical factor affecting Soviet capabilities
to reinforce Frontal Aviation forces in Central
Europe. Several hundred additional combat aircraft
could begin arriving in the forward area within hours
after the decision to reinforce has been made. There
must be a sufficient number of airfields to receive
these aircraft and enough aviation POL and munitions
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prepositioned in Eastern Europe to sustain full combat
operations by all air forces in the area until other
logistic support arrives from the USSR.
-- Airfields: Comparison of estimated Pact re-
quirements for airfields in the forward area
after reinforcement and the number of airfields
available there indicates that air operations
by Pact tactical aircraft opposite the NATO
Central Region almost certainly would not be
restricted because or insufficient airfields.
-- POL and Munitions: Comparison of the estimated
POL and munitions expenditure rates of Pact
tactical aircraft which probably would be based
in the forward area with the amounts of these
supplies believed to be currently stored there
indicates that, during the initial period of
war, Pact air forces in Central Europe almost
certainly would have sufficient stocks (one to
two months) available for full-scale operations
until additional logistical support begins
arriving from the USSR--probably within a few
days.
Conducting the Reinforcement
Because there are evidently sufficient quantities
of aviation POL and ordnance in the forward area to
sustain Pact air operations for at least one to two
months, the rapid movement of reinforcing Soviet air
units into East Germany or Czechoslovakia would depend
primarily on Soviet capabilities to move their support
personnel and equipment.
A sufficient number of qualified personnel and
quantities of supplies and equipment would have to be
moved to the forward deployment airfields to receive
the incoming air regiments and ready them for combat.
The major factor determining the amount of personnel
and equipment required would be whether the Soviet
air regiments deploy to "main" bases or "unoccupied"
bases. Soviet or East European air force units are
normally already located at main base airfields in
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the forward area. Unoccupied base airfields are
those which have a usable runway and parking space
but none of the permanent facilities, equipment,
supplies, and personnel usually found at main op-
erating bases. A Soviet a.ir regiment deploying to
an unoccupied base would therefore require a greater
degree of support from its own resources in the
western USSR than a regiment moved to a main base.
Available evidence indicates that the Soviets in-
tend to rely heavily on their air transport capabil-
ities to support the reinforcment of air and ground
forces in Central Europe. Some 350 flights from the
USSR by transport aircraft would be required to sup-
port the movement of all 23 Frontal Aviation units in
the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Dis-
tricts to "main" operating bases in the forward area.
Nome 740 transport flights from the USSR would be
needed if all units deployed to "unoccupied" bases.
An estimated 100 to 300 medium transport aircraft--
each flying two or more round-trip flights during a
period of one to three days--probably could be made
available to support the air reinforcement effort.
Light transport aircraf t, such as the IL-14 or LI-2,
could be made available to transport the air army and
air division headquarters staffs. These allocations
probably would not overtax Soviet airlift capacity
and, given a few hours prior notice, probably would
allow the reinforcement to be completed rapidly enough
to meet Pact force requirements for the conduct of
planned offensive air operations against the NATO
Central Region.
By the end of the decade ongoing programs to
equip Frontal Aviation with more advanced aircraf t
could lead to a modification of Pact plans regarding
the timinc1 and scale of air reinforcement in Central
Europe. The introduction into Frontal Aviation of
aircraft. with greater range and payload capabilities
could reduce the overall number of aircraft required
to conduit the initial strikes in an air offensive
against NATO as well as permit air units in the
western USSR to participate in these strikes from
their home bases.
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Related Publications of
The Office of Strategic Research
SR IR 74-2-5 Warsaw Pact Mobilization Plans
January 1974 and the Transition to a War
Footing (S)
SR IR 74-1 Warsaw Pact Air Power: forces for
December 1973 Use in Central Euro e S NFD -
25X1X7
SR IR 73-10-5 Logistic Posture of Soviet Forces
September 1973 in East Cermang (S)
SR IR 72-17-S Warsaw Pact Air Power: Concepts
October 1972 for Conventional Air Gperations
25X1X7 A ainst NATO (S NFD -
25X1X7
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 NORTH SEA
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