CONSOLIDATED INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE INFORMATION SYSTEM (CIRIS) CY 72 DATA CALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00612R000200020030-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 12, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Consolidated Intelligence Resource Information System (CIRIS) Cy 72
Data Call (U)
1. (U) This memorandum responds to your questions of 2 April concerning
the pros and cons for DIA of issuing a Cy 72 CIRIS data call.
2. (U) CIRIS was designed to present the cost of intelligence resources
in relation to their targeted objectives. It does not deal quantitatively
with "value" or "effectiveness." CIRIS does, however, express how re-
sources are applied in a quantitative sense. It can respond to a variety
of needs of program managers and senior management eoheiona, Thug, CIRIS
is important to any analytic effort within DIA which fi.ttemptig to relate
intelligence costs to targets.
3. (U) In addition, an attempt has been made to better relate CIRIS
targets to intelligence priorities and objectives included in Annex A,
JSOP. This will make it possible to relate CIRIS costs directly to
JSOP priorities and objectives. A powerful management tool could result,
which will be of considerable use to you in making resouce recommendations
in connection with Defense intelligence.
4+. (U) To date, CIRIS target-oriented data has proven to be useful in
two DIA analytic efforts. The first is the yearly-CDIP Review Study under
way in DP. In this program, CIRIS target-oriented displays are of con-
siderable value both from the performance and fiscal aspects. Enclosure 1
is an elaboration of the impact of CIRIS on this study and the anticipated
effect of having no data call this year. The second effort has taken place
within DC, where CIRIS data has been used in development of the Master
Collection and Processing Plan. Enclosure 2 is a discussion of the useful-
ness of CIRIS in this effort. CIRIS data is also used occasionally in
normal program review within DP. It is anticipated that the target-oriented
CIRIS data base will receive more extensive use in the future as greater
effort is made to carry out analytic studies of high-cost problems and
relate them to overall priorities.
5. (U) The advantages of CIRIS to DIA are as follows:
a. It is the only data system in use today which identifies how
much is being spent by target. Thus, the CIRIS data is important if we
are to analyze the application of resources against intelligence targets,
objectives, and priorities on"a boD-wide basis and consider alternate
courses of action.
b. Elements at all levels of Defense intelligence are accustomed to
using this system of reporting, which has evolved over five years of trial
and error.
c. CIRIS data will enable DIA to assemble GDIP fact books easily.
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d. DCI computers containing FYDP-based CIRIS data have been adapted to
make rapid comparisons by cost category of resource changes from year to
year. In addition, these computers can provide a rapid worldwide account
of allocation of intelligence resources. Examples of such information are
at Enclosures 3 and 4. Where time is essential, CIRIS is the only mechanism
that can provide information with a minimum of delay.
c. CI.RIG is available to serve as an important element of an intel-
liF?ence management information system. If it is abandoned, efforts in this
direction will have to start from scratch.
6. (U) The disadvantages of CIRIS to DIA are as follows:
a. It is somewhat costly. A recent study indicated that a full CIRIS
data call cost DIA approximately $27,800, and a short call $190. In CY 71
there was one of each type call.
b. It is recognized that a CIRIS data call will provide considerable
visibility of DoD intelligence resources to the DCI, especially in the
area of production. In addition, data on CIA and State Department efforts
may not always be available to Defense, nor do we understand fully how
objective the preparation of NSA CIRIS submissions may be. But, attempts
to secure this information can be made through bilateral agreement or through
DCI. The conceivable lack of a reciprocal exchange of information could
lead to unfair comparisons of intelligence community resources to the
detriment of DIA, and perhaps even to the imposition of additional fiscal
constraints.
c. CIRIS may result in the DCI's placing primary emphasis on strategic
intelligence resources, which are of paramount interest to him. While GDIP
tactical intelligence resources may receive greater high-level exposure through
CIRIS, their vital importance to Defense intelligence and the command and
control structure may be discounted.
7. (U) The recent DCI study on US intelligence production resources you
referred to in your 2 April note is a reformatting and statistical summary,
with narrative, of CIRIS data for FY 71. It identifies the production
resources of the DoD, CIA, and State and shows the targets against which
they are arrayed. Although it provides much interesting information, it is
not an analytic study which addresses a specific problem, considers alternate
courses of action, and makes"a'policy recommendation. It cannot, therefore,
be said to reflect fully the management potential of the CIRIS system.
8. (U) Although the CIRIS system can have a potentially adverse impact
on Defense intelligence, it may also bring beneficial results if the data
are effectively used by DIA. CIRIS is the key to efficient DIA analysis
of DoD-wide intelligence activities and recommendations concerning the use
or resources. Even though it is too late for the 1972 CIRIS data call to have
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an impact on this year's GDIP review, failure to issue the call will impede
analyses under way within DIA and retard progress in developing a useful
management information system. As an alternative, the DoD data call for
FY 72 could be canceled and consideration given to a refinement of the
system for next year that would show a more equitable display of community-
wide resources. The best course of action, however, a ears to be DIA
participation in CIRIS -FY-T2-;-
9. (U) This memorandum has been coordinated with DC and CC.
4 Enclosures
1. The GDIP Review Study (C)
2. The Defense Intelligence Master
Collection and Processing Plan (S)
3. CIRIS Data Displays (S)
4. CIRIS Display of Resource Data
Allocation (S)
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CONFIDENTIAL
The CDIP Review Study
1. (C) DP-3D has been tasked to produce a yearly CDIP Review Study. Its results are aimed
at the budget year, and analysis is to be available in time for use during the summer's budget
review schedule.
2. (C) The Special Studies Branch has found the FY 71 CIRIS target oriented displays to be
of considerable value both from the performance and fiscal aspects of this study. In these
directions, the FY 71 CIRIS is making two important contributions. First, CIRIS is the only
available authoritative source in which to find a common description of how the forces of
each FYDP program element are substantively allocated within the Positive Intelligence Mission.
Knowledge of the FY 72 CDIP-wide force allocation available in the FY 71 CIRIS has enabled
DP-3D (with the help of DE, DI, and DT analysts) to design a performance-oriented data base
directed at the level of the FYDP program elements. Second, the fiscal displays which
accompany the force allocations are also of value, but in ah-implicit sense. The dollar distri-
butions shown are not used "per se," but are converted to program element "tasking ratios."
These ratios have recently been used to target orient the FY 74 fiscal guidance TOAs.
3. (C) CIRIS is helping DP-3D produce a performance and cost data base applicable to the
FY 74 budget year. The analyses of these data are expected to be useful to DIA relative to
this summer's PIM issues. The loss of the FY 72 CIRIS will not affect this year's CDIP
Review Study because of the lengthy delay already imposed. The impact will be in the
forthcoming year. The magnitude will be a function of the extent to which the force allocation
and the program element "tasking ratios" developed from the FY 71 CIRIS decay over time.
A yearly CIRIS target-oriented data call (or some variant thereof) would certainly be the
preferred method of update. If this were not feasible and DR chose to continue the CDIP
Review Study, DIA would need to actively coordinate with all other program managers,
including DASD(I), to obtain the force allocation and information on which to base revised
tasking ratios. The exact degree to which this alternative would affect the timeliness of study
output needs further examination. However, since the resources assigned to this project are
already thinly spread, the absence of ready-made data such as available from CIRIS is expected
to impose a serious restraint.
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The Defense Intelligence Master Collection and Processing Plan
1. (S) At the direction of the command element and in order to improve the management
of collection and processing resources, the Defense Intelligence Master Collection and Pro-
cessing Plan (MCPP) has been developed by DC-3. This plan provides basic direction and
guidance for the planning, programming, coordination, management, and tasking of DoD
intelligence collection and processing resources and those national-level intelligence
resources for which the Secretary of Defense is executive agent.
2. (S) The MCPP identifies the intelligence objective in Part I, Annex A, JSOP, Essential
Elements of Information, and gaps against which collection and processing resources are
directed and relates resources to them. It outlines the general parameters of the system
within which intelligence collection and processing activities under DoD cognizance are
conducted, including the manner in which these activities are tasked against intelligence
objectives.
3. (S) The cornerstone of the MCPP is the Defense intelligence objectives. The first step in
utilizing these objectives for program planning and resource allocation purposes is the
determination of the present application of DoD intelligence resources to the intelligence
objectives. CIRIS is the only system providing consolidated data on collection resources
which shows their application and programmed costs against well-defined countries/area-
subject targets. It is being used as the basic source of program data for the MCPP. CIRIS
data is also used as the statistical data base for use in the evaluation of collection resources.
It makes it possible to weigh individual resources against each other in terms of performance
and cost effectiveness based on contribution to accomplishment of intelligence objectives/
targets.
4. (S) The MCPP further utilizes CIRIS data by displaying geographically the current
tasking of all DoD collection and surveillance resources (processing resources to be added)
in terms of magnitude of effort from a cost standpoint against each DoD intelligence
objective in matrix form for each major DoD program (GDIP, CCP, and Air Force Special
Activities).
5. (S) The only minor limitations to total compatibility between CIRIS data and the MCPP
is that CIRIS subject targets still differ slightly from JSOP intelligence objectives, and CIRIS
data is not broken down in all cases to individual countries as are the objectives and priorities
in the JSOP.
6. (S) While CIRIS in its present configuration does not meet all DC requirements for a basic
information source, its data becomes a vital part of theMCPP. Without some form of CIRIS
data, the MCPP will lose much of its effectiveness as a resource management tool.
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