MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ON THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARD US-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B00100R000100090011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 20, 1978
• Content Type: MF

30R0001000900-1`1`=5--.=~ -4
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE f Executive Heq?s?ry
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
20 November 1978
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Director, National Foreig
Assessment Center
National Intelligence Officer for China
Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski on the
Chinese Attitude Toward US-Vietnamese
Relations
1. Action Requested: That you forward the attached
memorandum to Dr. Brzezinski on 20 November.
2. Background: Dr. Brzezinski asked you for a memo
by CIA on Chi nese reaction to any improvement in US-Vietna-
mese relations including normalization of US/SRV relations.
He asked for this by early this week. This memo is in re-
sponse to that request.
3. Recommendation: That you sign this memorandum.
Attachment:
Memorandum
cc: DDCI
APPROVED:
c 71 /h - .
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CL BY 57050
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IMF,
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
20 November 1978
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Assessment Center
Director, National Foreign
National Intelligence Officer for China
Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski on the
Chinese Attitude Toward US-Vietnamese
Relations
1. Action Requested: That you forward the attached
memorandum to Dr. Brzezinski on 20 November.
2. Background: Dr. Brzezinski asked you for a memo
by CIA on Chinese reaction to any improvement in US-Vietna-
mese relations including normalization of US/SRV relations.
He asked for this by early this week. This memo is in re-
sponse to that request.
3. Recommendation: That you sign this memorandum.
25X1A
Attachment:
Memorandum
cc: DDCI
APPROVED:
,4zf1. Eie 7,'- &,72 DCI Date
DCI Date
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
NIO/CH-JRLilley:fmt
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
'1 - DDCI, w/att.
1 - D/NFAC, w/att.
1 - D/ORPA, w/att.
1 - ORPA/CH, w/att.
2 - NIO/CH, w/att.
1 - NFAC Reg., w/att.
ational Intelligence Officer for China
Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski on the
Chinese Attitude Toward US-Vietnamese
Relations
18 November 1978
SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON
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 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INT"r~
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C,
Office of the Director
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Chinese Attitude Towards
US-Vietnamese Relations
X
1. Recent comments by top-Chinese officials indicate
that Peking's opposition to the normalization or improvement
of relations between the US and Vietnam is growing. From
the end-of the Indochina war until early this year, the
Chinese appeared to support US-Vietnamese normalization in
the hope that it would counter growing Soviet influence in
Hanoi. As the dispute between China and Vietnam escalated
this'summer, however, some Chinese officials began to convey
different signals. Since last August; comments on US-Viet-
namese normalization have been generally negative. This
shift over time in China's position. clearly reflects Peking's
growing belief that Hanoi had embarked on a course totally
opposed to Peking's. Vietnam's entry into CEMA, its military
actions in Kampuchea, the dispute over ethnic Chinese in
Vietnam and finally the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friend-
ship and cooperation are the outstanding benchmarks. If
there had been any doubts in Peking that Vietnam's ties
were strengthening. with the USSR, the'treaty dispelled
them. Shortly after the treaty was signed, China's news
agency took the unusual step of publishing Li Hsien-nien's
attacks on Vietnam during talks with American guests. The
citation of Li's comments at this time was probably intended
to convey Chinese displeasure over the possibility of nor-
malization. On 3 November, Li had also raised the subject
of-'normalization in a conversation with Secretary Schlesinger.
He recited in an irritated fashion China's belief that it is
no use trying to draw Vietnam economically or politically
away from the USSR.
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2. -S o Pr 'ao-ping told
that US-Viet
normalization is "not a big problem at all" and that it is
"inevitable" because "it is the right thing to do." Having
conceded this point, however, Teng went on to speak force-
fully against the argument that US influence in Hanoi might
offset Soviet influence there: "It is delusory to think
that the establishment of diplomatic relations will extract
Vietnam from the influence of the Soviet Union, and it would
be impossible for the US to use economic aid to Vietnam to
lure Vietnam away from the Soviet Union."
3. Chinese officials in fact have returned to the
theme of US economic assistance to Vietnam almost every time
they have discussed the question of US-Vietnam normalization.
Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien also recently argued vehemently
against US economic aid, asserting that it would relieve the
Soviet Union of a "great burden" while having no effect on
Vietnam's close ties to the USSR.
4. When China's officials speak of economic assistance,
they consistently cite their own record of aid to Hanoi and
claim that even their "$20 billion" was not enough to check
Hanoi's gravitation to Moscow. The fact that they link eco-
nomic assistance with their own experience in Vietnam springs
from concern that western economic assistance to Vietnam will
be at cross-purposes with China's own termination of aid to
Vietnam. The Chinese prefer to let the Vietnamese stew in
their Soviet iuice.
Chinese policy is to
____e 7=_nam into -_-_-----a_ _ ante on the USSR and then
trust that -- as in the cases of China, Egypt and the Sudan --
frictions between Hanoi and Moscow will inevitably develop
over the next eight or ten years, after which China will
again attempt to build influence in-Vietnam. Aid to Vietnam.,
"would be like assisting the Soviet Union in
omina ing Asia."
S. Despite Secretary Vance's 3 November press confer-
ence announcement that there are some indications Vietnam
.may drop the economic preconditions to normalization, Chinese
-officials continue to associate normalization with aid. The
vague fashion in which the Chinese have referred to aid sug-
gests concern that normalization would bring other economic
benefits to Vietnam beyond conventional economic assistance,
such as increased trade and greater access to technology.
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6. In aition to complicating its campaign against
Vietnam, Peking also is disturbed that normalized US-Vietnam
ties would be viewed as taking sides against Kampuchea.
Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien have recently linked the
question of US relations with Vietnam to the American attitude
toward Kampuchea. Teng said: "During my visit to Japan, I
proposed that Japan improve its relations with Kampuchea.
The US does not understand the problem. Zt only looks at
Kampuchea's past. I have talked with the Americans, and pro-
posed that the US provide moral support to Kampuchea." Teng
then directly proceeded to discuss the question of US-Vietnamese
normalization. Similarly, Li Hsien-nien told an American group.
last week that he hoped the "US would not continue to make an
issue of the so-called human rights question as that would
provide a further handicap to Phnom Penh" in its fight against
the more powerful Vietnamese.
7. Peking is in no position to attack US-Vietnam normaliza-
tion in principle and in fact has carefully.avoided taking such
a position. Outright or formal objection would stand in stark
contrast to earlier expressions of support for normal relations
between the two countries and would contradict Peking's
"principled" support for diplomatic relations among all countries.
9. Disappointment over US normalization with Vietnam at
this time could provide ammunition to those in China who might
eventually oppose China's opening to 'the US. We nevertheless have
no evidence that serious opposition to this policy has developed,
and in fact China's compelling interest in economic,
scientific and technological links to the US would impose
limits on any negative Chinese reaction. In short, we believe
the bilateral relationship would continue to move ahead. Buts
US recognition of Vietnam clearly would chill the climate of
the relationship and would be seen in Peking as inconsistent
with the development of a cooperative, strategic link between.
China and the US.
9. In this latter regard, the timing of any US move to
recognize Vietnam would be instrumental in determining the depth.
of Chinese displeasure. US-Vietnam normalization in the
immediate aftermath of the recently concluded treaty between
.Vietnam and Moscow, and amidst indications of a new round of.
Vietnamese military action in Kampuchea would almost certainly
be construed by Peking at best as US indifference to fundamental
Chinese interests and policies in Southeast Asia. In the event
that the situation in Indo-China finds its own level and the
3
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threat to the Kampuchean regime lessens in Chinese eyes,
Peking may find it less difficult to swallow US-Vietnamese
normalization. On the other hand, if the situation in Indo-
China worsens dramatically in the next months, Peking's
opposition to normalized US-Vietnam relations can be expected
to intensify.
/s/ Stansfield Turner
STANSFIELII TURNER
SEC RETJNOFORN/ORCON
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Signed by DCI on 21 Nov 78 - Delivered to
Brzezinski by DCI on same date.
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