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CIA-RDP82S00697R000900030005-3
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T
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Belgrade has long supported the unilateral declaration of mafttime
claims by individual nations (ie extension to 200 miles). SOH
In essence, this arises from iEng~ wlmtx*sxpthe neces?ity
develiping
to support those Latin AmOrican(and other)/countries associated with
,Yugoslavia in the nonaligned movement. X
Located on the Adriatic, Belgrade has also been most concerned with
countering any possible threat (from A'bania and/or Italy) which might
Yugoslavai's maritime
restrict/access to the Mediterranean.
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
A. 5UMh'ARY
September 1974
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ILLEGIB
Yugoslavia -- a largely shelf-locked and potentially zone-locked
coastal state bordering on a semienclosed sea -- is a leading force among
the lesser developed countries (LDCs) and nonalined nations. Its principal
law of the sea concern is to ensure continued jurisdiction over its
share of the Adriatic continental shelf and deeper seabed as set forth in
its 1968 shelf treaty with Italy. Another major LOS goal is acceptance of
a strong international authority to control deep seabed mining, with
preferential treatment for the LDCs, including provisions for the
transfer of technology. Yugoslavia maintains that each state has the
right to decide the breadth of its territorial sea, but envisages inter-
national acceptance of a 12-mile territorial sea, provided the coastal
state is given exclusive jurisdiction over the renewable and nonrenew-
able resources in an adjacent zone extending 188 miles* beyond the
territorial sea limit. As to the straits issue, it is unlikely that
Yugoslavia will support any regime susceptible to abuse through subjective
interpretations by straits states. In the area of national jurisdiction,
the coastal state should have full control over scientific research and
the right to set pollution control standards.
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING LOS POLICY
Special Geographic Features
Yugoslavia is located in Eastern Europe on the semienclosed
Adriatic Sea. The Adriatic, connected by the 40-mile-wide Strait of
Otranto to the semienclosed Mediterranean, has a rr.7ximum width of
112 0 miles and depths of generally less than 200 meters. The strait,
Yugoslavia's only access to the seas beyond the Adriaticnis bordered
by Italy and Albania.
*Distances and areas throughout this study are in nautical miles
unless specified otherwise.
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Yugoslavia's mainland coastline is 945 statute miles long with
another 1,500 statute miles of coastline on offshore islands. The
country is largely shelf-locked as its continental shelf abuts on the
Italian shelf except in a small area off southern Yugoslavia where the
shelf edge lies less than 5 to about 25 miles offshore at a depth of
about 200 meters and the seabed beyond descends to a depth of almost
1,300 meters. The continental margin extends southward and terminates
in the Ionian Sea.
Uses of the Sea
Mineral Resources -- Yugoslavia has
proven recoverable reserves
of oil and natural gas onshore but still imports oil from the Persian
Gulf and the USSR to meet its needs. Since 1973 there has been
exploratory drilling for oil and natural gas on the offlying Yugoslav
and in the Adriatic seabed. Foreign companies, two U.S. and one French,
have carried out the exploration in conjunction with Yugoslavia's power
companies. As of early 1974 no oil or gas deposits have been found on
the islands or offshore.
Onshore, Yugoslavia has large deposits of metallic and non-metallic
minerals. It is the leading European producer of antimony and chromium,
third in bauxite, fourth in lead and sixth in zinc. Iron, copper, brown
coal and non-metallic minerals such as calcium are found in exploitable
quantities.
Living Resources -- Yugoslavia has the smallest per capita fish
consumption in Europe (2.3 kg. annually). Of the approximately 40,000
metric tons of fish caught annually, about 6101) is of marine origin. The
catch is exclusively from the Adriatic and largely for export. In recent
years, Yugoslavia has imported large quantities of shellfish from Japan.
As of the present there are no distant fisheries interests. However,
an agreement was signed with Poland in March 1974 for a joint deep-sea
operation in the Atlantic. The estimated catch for 1980 is 150,800
metric tons, presumably for export.
Marine Transportation -- Ranking 17th among the maritime nations of
the world, Yugoslavia's merchant marine plays an important
role in the national economy. Since 1966, however, the Yugoslav
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merchant marine has carried increasingly less of the sea5orne trade.
Difficulties in financing and wages have made it impossible to keep
pace with the changes necessary for efficient operation. Of the total
98
seaborne foreign trade, 45)0' is carried by the domestic fleet (1 snips
of 1,000 GRT in 1971).
The Navy -- Yugoslavia's navy is small. It is not designed to operate
outside the Adriatic but is primarily a coastal and riverine patrol
force.
Resorts and Recreation -- Tourism, especially on the Dalmatian
coast, is an important aspect of the Yugoslav economy. Investment in
tourist facilities, including transportation improvements, accounted
rease~,# 1
The number of tourists inc
for 7% of the GNP in 1972.
t
c
{
U:.~1 V''^.7+.~ ~ , 4 1 ~ 1 4i. { l 4~?/'.,, , !' ~ t l_. i
. ?~ Kf t J? A-- wcc?reas-ed- TM W( ne lea ; Ft*
? ti rebut c1 `tZi ?t he.~ro amity' OVYugosl avia_1.o .f)e roubled vliddl: --Ea,;t
him +--p-re-Arab-Yugosi,av -stand
Political and Other Factors
The government of Yugoslavia is a communist, decentralized .federal
system characterized by worker self-management. There are no govern-
ment offices at the national level dealing specifically with LOS
issues except the foreign secretariat. Each of the six republics
.ii.a.ve a fisheries office, but only three (Slovenia, Croatia and
'Montenegro) are involved in marine fisheries. Internal tensions arising
from the country's diverse political, ethnic, cultural and religious
heritage, as well as striking differences in regional levels of economic
development make for?difficulty in establishing a unified LOS policy
agreeable to all republics. Order is kept within the national political
system through the power and personality of President Josip Broz Tito,
now 82. Should he suddenly depart the Yugoslav political scene, it is
expected that there would be internal political change but no major
shifts in Yugoslavia's positions on international issues, including
LOS.
Of primary importance to Yugoslavia is its image as a leader among
8
the nonai l ed nations. Ili th a GNP of 1 ,1 iO per capita , i t favors the
LOS positions of many other LDCs. It has, for examplesupported the
200-mile territorial sea advocated by Peru "on moral grounds;" Yugoslavia
cannot possibly extend its territorial sea beyond about 60 miles. It
ILLEGIB
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was a coordinator of working groups at the 1973 conference of nonali-ned
states in Algiers which decided that sharing of deep seabed resources is
essential to the development of the LDCs.
Yugoslavia's foreign policy has been described by President Tito as
"active peaceful coexistence." In addition to seeking good working
relations with individual countries in both the Soviet and Western blocs,
as well as Writ;) the nonali~.ned nations, this policy includes taking
initiatives on world issues, both unilaterally and in conjunction with
other nonali-,,ed countries. The sharp break with the Soviet Union in 1943
has not been forgotten, and Yugoslavia resents any efforts to pressure
it into espousing a Soviet point of vier. When threatened from the Soviet side,
Yugoslavia improves relations with the '.lest, particularly the United
States. When relations with the Soviet Union are good, criticism of the
United States is increased. Because both the Soviet Union and the United
States and their allies are of considerable importance to Yugoslavia's
economic development, Yugoslavia must perform a balancing act to
extract the maximum gain from both sides.
Yugoslavia is actively cultivating cordial relations and cooperation
with the states of the Middle East, especially the oil exporting
countries. Relations with Albania have improved since the exchange of
ambassadors in February 1971. Relations with Greece ~r"e' bin strained
..other .things resulted in
s if. ce the military gg coup in 1967 -A,*.. mwq
,the-..abrogationof -a border, treaty. ,bet~'reen the two countries-.-in, the
Macedonia area= ^ ar?a-s^~-F?'f~ ce&oni?a also have-comp Iic. ated__
There have been a number of fishing disputes
with Italy -- the only state to fish within Yugoslav waters -- since
when an Italy-Yugoslavia fishing agreement was allowed to lapse.
1971
,
Yugoslavia is concerned about the proximity of Italian ',rarships`4in
the northern Adriatic.
Concern over the presence of the navies of both the United States
and the USSR in the Mediterranean and the implications for its security
may influence Yugoslavia to opt for a straits regime that encompases
limited access to warships.
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a. ?, a E :
C. LA'.4 OF Tlir: SEA, POLICY
Terri_torial Sea
Currently Yugoslavia has a 10-mile territorial sea and a 2-mile
contiguous zone, extending from the territorial sea, for exclusive
fisheries.
Yugoslavia has
L
',could be fair
A
satisfactory to
should have the
on the basis of
noted that a plurality of territorial sea regimes
Solv'~ic,: zv ~.E?? `?i?i,.,Lt,ria~ S?a is>v~' ~~.2tJS2
4+T---" there is no one width ;which would be
all states of
the w,iorl ci, and each state
A
right to decide the width of its territorial
its economic and security needs. In keeping with
these pronouncements, Yugoslavia announced its support on "moral
grounds" for the Peruvian proposal for a 200-mile territorial sea.
However, it recognizes that the LOS negotiations probably will
produce international acceptance of a 12-mile territorial sea and
an economic zone measured from the territorial sea baseline out to
200 miles.
Archipelagos
Yugoslavia has not been directly involved in the issue of
archipelagos but has stated that it would like to see archipelagic
waters "closely defined". It has not made a statement of support for
any of the archipelago proposals.
Straits
The dominant characteristic of the Yugoslav position on the straits
issue is its indefinitness. During the Seabed J'ommittee meetings the
Yugoslav delegation spoke in favor of an "innocent passage" regime
in that it would adequately protect the rights of the coastal states
and the needs of international navigation. However, they did not
define their meaning of innocent passage. The head of the delegation
to the LOS Conference in Caracas, Dr. Vratusa, used the term "unimpeded
passage" to describe the Yugoslav policy at the Conference, though again
no definitive meaning was given for the term.
T ---e-f- location 11,finat- Yugoslavia probable policy. All
of its seaborne trade beyond the Adriatic must pass through the Strait
of Otranto which is not narrow enough to be,overlapped by 12-mile
;- r T
?i s
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territori~a1 seas. ?Its seaborne trade beyond the Mediterranean Sea,
ho';iever, must pass through the Strait of Gi bral ter, which has a
minimum width of 7.7 miles. Some of this trade is in oil from the
Persian Gulf, carried on supertankers. As the pollution hazard of
these vessels has been recognized, it is possible that, under a
loosely defined innocent passage regime, they could be prevented from
transiting straits such as Gibraltar. Yugoslavia, therefore, is not
likely to agree to?any straits regime that does not include specific
and objective criteria of "innocence".
Continental Shelf
Yugoslavia is a party to the 1958 Continental Shelf convention and
voted in favor of the U' resolution on Permanent Sovfereignty of
Coastal States over Natural Resources. In addition, bilateral agreement
in force with Italy provides for the division of the continental shelf
of the Adriatic. This 1963 treaty established a boundary line that is,
at a maximum, 57 miles from Yugoslavia. The southern part of the
boundary extends beyond the shelf proper, terminating at a depth of
abouth 1,200 meters at a point eqidistant from Italy, Albania and
Yugoslavia.
ILLEGIB
Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea
Yugoslavia advocates the establishment of a 200-mile economic
resources zone under national jurisdiction. `Within its zone each
coastal state would have the sovereign right to dispose of the
living and mineral resources, to control pollution and to conduct,
authorize and regulate scientific research. There would be freedom of overflight
and the right of "unimpeded passage" seaward of the outer limit of the
territorial sea.
Fisheries
The Yugoslavs s advocate national and a4- international fisheries
regimes. They feel that there should be an economic zone or patrimonial
sea within 200 miles of the coastal state. Within this area each coastal
state should have the absolute right to control the exploitation of
living resources, whether or not the coastal state chases to exploit
them. For the area outside national jurisdiction, control of resources
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should be in the hands of an international authority.
Yugoslavia is a party to the Geneva Fisheries Convention of
1952 and is a signatory of the 11editerranean Fisheries Council. It
had a bilateral agreement with Italy concerning fisheries in the
Adriatic. Allowed to lapse in 1971 the agreement has not been renewed, with
the result that there has been some conflict between Yugoslav patrols
and Italian fi shl9rmen .
peep Seabed
Yugoslavy representatives to LOS meetings have stressed that
the seabed outside the area of national jurisdiction is the common
heritage of mankind and that the resources should be exploited for the
common benefit, especially for the benefit of the LOCs. They believe
there should be a strong international organization to control the
exploration and exploitation as unlimited freedom to explore and exploit
the resources of the deep seabed can only benefit the developed states
having the necessary technology, thereby further widening the gap between
the developed and developing states.
Until it is possible for all states to share in the benefits,
Yugoslavia advocates a ban . on. all 'commercial expl of tat i on of deep
seabed minerals. It voted in favor of the 1959 Moratorium on exploita-
tion of the deep seabed resources and also the 1971 declaration of
principles governing the seabed. Concerned over the number of states
ignoring the previous U`I resolutions, Yugoslavia and 12 other states
submitted a draft decision to the Seabed Committee in 1972 reaffirming
the 1969 and 1971 resolutionsI(see Annex) Accordingly, all states are
asked to refrain from commercial exploitation of the seabed resources
until an international authority can be established. The draft decision
also reaffirms nonrecognition of past, present, or future claims on any
part of the deep seabed prior to the establishment of an international
authority. Yugoslavia maintains that under no circumstances should the
international authority become merely a licensing and registering bureau.
r
It should have broad p rogatives with the power to control exploration
and exploitation of the international area. The international authority
would have the exclusive right to exploit the deep seabed either directly
or through a second part(. The authority should be set up along the
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the same lines as the WI with a general asserbly, a council and a
secretariat. It should act on behalf of the international community
and be empowered to direct operations, pass decisions and participate
in all resource activities.
h
The Yugoslav delegation has been very specific in its viien;r that each
state should be represented equally in the international organization.
There should be no weighted voting on the basis of developmen tnor
a
should there be a veto power.
Benefit sharing is renarded by Yugoslavia and r^any of the LDCs as an
issue of prime :importance. They feel that the mere sharing of profits
will continue the dependence of the LDCs an the developed states.
Benefit sharing should include provisions for the transfer of technology.
This would include sharing of all data from exploration, as well as the
establishment of training centers within the LDCs to aid in A -,training
of their personnel to gather and interpret data. There should be
bureaus under the control of the international machinery to aid! in the
dissemination of technical information. The international authority also
should be in control of all living rescurces found in the seabed area
outside national jurisdictions.
Landlocked States
Yugoslavia is a party to the Landlocked States Convention and
advocates that the LOS Convention contain some general principles
recognizing the right of landlocked states. It favors bilateral
arrangements to allow the geographically disadvantaged states access to
the sea resources.'
Marine Pollution
Yugoslavia believes that the most important aspect of the marine
pollution issue is the control of pollution within the area of national
jurisdiction. It maintains that it should be the right of ea-; state to
set standards to protect its own interests. Any international standards
relating to the areas within national jurisdictions should be in harmony
with the coastal state standards.
Yugoslavia's concern over the threat of nuclear pollution is expressed
in the bilateral agreement made with the United States in 1967. The
agreement provided that the United States would take responsibility for
any damage caused by the NS Savannah while in Yugoslav territorial waters.
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Yugoslavia became a party to the IMCO Convention in Jenuary 1950 and
attended the 1973 meeting in London/ as an observer. At that session an
international conventionto prevent the dumping of oil at sea.
Scientific Research
Yugoslavia believes complete freedom; of scientific research is
only beneficial to the richest and most powerful states having the technology
to conduct such research. To further this freedom and give it leG3al standing
would be to permit further exploitation of the developing world. The
Yugoslavs charge that it is difficult to determine what is pure
scientific research and what is research for purposes of economic
exploitation. Consequently, they support coastal state full control
over any scientific research conducted in the area under its jurisdiction,
as well as the right of the coastal state to participate in the research
and share in all the information that is gathered. In August 1973
Yugoslavia cosponsored a draft article in Subcommittee III along with
14 other states calling for the explicit consent of the coastal state
before research can be conducted in the area of national jurisdiction (see
Annex).
Yugoslavia, a party to the Convention on the International Hydrographic
Organization, has stated that there should be international cooperation and
consideration of the needs and interests of the LDCs in the adoption of
a scientific research regime. Any research that is carried on in the area beyond
national jurisdiction should be under the control of the international
authority.
Regional Arrangements
International recognition of regional arrangements is an issue of
great importance to Yugoslavia. On 16 August 1973, Yugoslavia submitted
a draft article to Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee calling
for the right of states to negotiate regional arrangements on any LOS
matter (see Annex), including economic and environmental issues,
provisions for scientific research and transfer of technology. These
would be binding on the partners to the agreement and automatically
recognized on the international level. Yugoslavia feels that such
a proposal would serve the legitimate interests of all states and would
be beneficial for efficient management of the areas within coastal
ILLEGIB
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state jurisdiction. It would be of exceptional significance to
Geographically disadvantagad' states
~; i ic1tL }t4~- 1-}Fn=ice }~-
+~- a 200-1111 i e economic resource zone. Yugoslavia hopes to
A
protect the continental shelf arrangement made with Italy in 1768.
Peaceful Uses of The Sea
Yugoslavia is a party to the Nuclear Test ,,an Treaty but not to the
Seabed Arms Limitation Treaty. I t voted in favor of the UN resolution
on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
N. KEY POLICY LOS ' EGOTI,ATORS AND 1D I ISEPS
Yugoslavia's ciovern gent is a complex system of federal decentralization.
The constitution desi cnates the five-chamber legislature -- the Federal
Assembly -- as the supreme organ of pol itical power and sal f-management.
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), described simply as the
country's leading force and ideological guide, is the true locus of
power. Although theoretically subordinate to the Federal Assembly, the
Presidency, occupied for life by Josip Broz Tito, and the Federal
Executive Council are accorded relatively broad powers.
In order to avoid a crisis of succession, Tito, nolr 82, has established
collective executive bodies in both the novernrrent
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