POLITICAL - COMMUNIST PARTY, PKI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700220251-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 251
• Publication Date: May 5, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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""" " s1-uc
MAR 1952
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CLASSIFICATION
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25X1 COUNTRY In
itical - Communist party, pKI
HOW
PUBLISHED Monthly periodical
WHERE
PUBLISHED Djakarta
DATE
PUBLISHED Aug/Sep 1951
DATE DIST. 5 /nAl 1953
NO. OF PAGES 9
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
INDONESLIN ca4MuNIST PARTY'S EXPLANATION
CF t?!ADIUN IIdCIDERT OF SEPrF-M ER 19 7
fc-omment This report gives the Communist explanation of the
Madiun incident of September 1948, written by Miradsi and published
in the Bintang Merah, official publication of the Pha (Partai Komunis
Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party).
btiradsi's explanation termed the incident the "Madiun Provocatiory"
and said that it was the climax of a series of incidents planned by
Indonesian reactionaries and imperialists to provoke the PKI and
its allied organizations to an armed clash. The explanation, giving
much detail from the PKI viewpoint, on the events leading up to the
Madiun incident, follews_7
"Bintang merah" Introduction
The Madiun provocation began on 19 September 1948. This provocation was the'
climax of imperialist attempts to destroy the Indonesian Democratic Republic, and
the beginning of a national tragedy. Yet, it also gave courage and solidarity
to an oppressed people in their fight against the white terror.
The patriots who fell victims to the Madiun provocation did not hesitate to
fight on the side of the people and the friends of the party. They implemented
the revolutionary teaching that when revolt against reactionary oppression begins,
Communists mutt not waver, despite unfavorable signs, but must take the side of
the majority of the people.
Climax of Series of Imperialist - Inspired Provocations
To understand that the Madiun provocation was the climax of a series of
provocations, the forces which played a part in the Indonesian revolution and
in the Madiun provocation must be studied.
CLASSIFICATION Riem_D?-
STATE _ NAW NSRR DISTRISUTI
ARMY AIR
FR
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The Indonesian revolution of August l945was staged by revolutionary groups
which, due to their weakness and lack of understanding, were infiltrated from the
start by pro-Dutch'and pro-Japanese elements. From the beginning of this revolu?.
tion, there were open and sometimes secret clashes between the revolutionaries
and these Dutch and Japanese agents. When these clashes became more frequent and
could no longer be concealed, the imperialist countries began to intervene more
actively in Indonesian affairs, especially after the secret meeting of Dr Sukiman
ff Indonesi] and Graham from the Three Nations -Commission ff the UN7.
On 23 January 1948, cooperation between ~oinestic and foreign reactionaries
succeeded in causing the democratic cabinet of the late Amir Sjariffudin to
collapse. With the fall of this cabinet and the formation of the Hatta Cabinet,
which preferred secret diplomacy and negotiated confidentially with van Mook, the
reactionaries gained in their attempt to stem the tide toward a People's De-
mocracy and the influence of the Communists. The participation of foreigners in
the politics of the Indonesian Republic sharpened the domestic clashes and dragged
the republic closer to the politics of the imperialist countries.
Among the demonstrations which Indonesians, staged against these activities
were those of 100,000 people in Madiun, 75,000 in Magetan, 50,000 in Ngawi, and
50,000 in Ponorogo.
The action of the people in rejecting the Hatta Cabinet because of exclusion
of the FDR (Front Demokrasi Rakjat, People's Democratic Front), was ignored. The
government then took steps to forbid demonstrations without government permit,
introduced censorship, forbade labor offices to consider data from other than govern-
ment sources, and otherwise violated democratic rights. All these measures were
enforced without their having been passed by the Dewan P.rwakilan Rakjat (People's
Representative Council),.
In mid-February 1948, the Hatta Cabinet issued a rationalization and recon-
struction plan for the armed forces which actually aimed at the following:
1. Removal of'revolutionary and progressive elements from the military,
an important step in making the army into a loyal instrument for the suppression
of the people's movement.
2. Placement of as many antidemocratic officers as possible in the leader-
ship of the armed forces, especially officers acceptable to the Dutch. This was
an important move to facilitate military negotiations with the Dutch and to
absorb en masse the fede,a1 (colonial) army into the armed forces of the United
Staten of Indonesia.
Implementation of "Red-Drive Proposals"
Imperialist circles were still not satisfied with the policy of ration-
alization and reconstruction, because they considered it too slow. Therefore,
they quickly adopted the rude tactics previously used in Europe, China, Burma,
India, and other places, of directly meddling in the internal affairs of
Indonesia.
On 21 July 1948, a conference was arranged at Sarangan attended by repre-
sentatives of the Three-Nations Commission, with Sukarno, Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman,
Moh. Rum, and Sukamto as hosts. It was usual for the Hatta Cabinet tc negotiate
with foreign representatives in secret. Instances of this were the secret
Hatta-van Mook and Hatta-Stikker meetings. The secret Sarangan conference
gave birth to an evil agreement called the "Red-Drive Proposals." As has already
been seen, the tern "Red" is not only given to Communists, but to all anti-
imperialists elements.
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RWSTRiEY'ED?
The "Red-Drive Proposals" were carried out by various kinds of provocations.
Every unpleasant incident in Indonesia was attributed to the FDR or to the PKI.
As a provocation, the army forcibly occupied the offices of Pesindo (Pemuda
Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Youth Movement), the Partai Sosialis
(Socialist Party), and Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh Perkeburan Republik Indonesia,
Trade Union of Indonesian Estate Workers) in Sragen, Ngandjuk, and Tulungagung.
The strike at Delanggu, demanding a slight improvement in the living conditions
of the workers, was brutally suppressed by the use of arms. A mobile brigade
unit under the leadership of Asmaun, a Partai Sccialis member in Bodjonegoro,
was disarmed, and Asmaun was transferred to Jogjakarta.. The government sent
R. Sukamto, chief of the Indonesian police, to the US.
In Djakarta, R. Sumarto, deputy chief of police of the Republic of Indonesia
informed the Dutch that there would be a mopping-up operation against the red
elements in the interior of the republic and that the P:?tch should not be alarmed
by any clash in that area. For the mopping-up operation, the police sought the
aid of General Sudirm.an, who refused the request. Sudirman proposed that the
operations should not be directed solely against leftists, but should be of a
general character. Rumors of the operation were increased by Sultan Buwono, who
stated at a meeting that a mopping-up operation against Red elements was to be
carried out, and that, if necessary, a general clean-up would be ordered as a
radical measure.
The trade unions were divided among the Serekat Buruh Islam Indonesia
(Indonesian Moslem Workers Union), the Serekat Buruh Nasional (National Trade
Union), the Serekat Buruh Mdedeka (Independent Trade Union), and the Serekat
Buruh Merah Putih (Red and White Trade Union). The regional Dewan Pimpinan
Pemuda (Council of Youth Leadership) was purposely conf.,ed by the formation
of the Gerakan Membangun (Construction hovement) ana the Patuh Rakjat (People's
Guard) which were financed by the government and led by civil service employees.
Both the Gerakar. Membangun and the Fatuh Rakjat are faithful copies of the New
Life Movement of the Japanese occupation era.
These provocative and counterrevolutionary actions by the government were
universally opposed. In East Java, 20,000 youths demonstrated against the
rationalization and reconstruction plan which was based on the unjust Presi-
dential Decree No 13. On National Awarenir.g Day, 20 May 1?48, 5,000 soldiers
of the 4th Division of the Panembahan 3enopati Unit in Surakarta staged a
demonstration rejecting the plan. The government did not heed the soldier's
demonstration and stubbornly continued its oounterrevolutionary tactics.
On the night of 3 July 1948, Colonel Sutarto, 'o"';rdant of the Division, who was loved by all his troops, was murderea in a cowardly manner
by a shot in the back. Sutarto was a revolutionary. Turing the Lutes period,
he was a member of Suluh Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian. Youth Torch), and
during the Japanese occupation became Jhodantyo Peta Daidan /an officer in
the Japanese-sponsored Indonesian array' at Wonogiri, and took an active part
in the underground movement against tie Japanese. With the proclamation of
Indonesian independence, he organized the Angkatan Muds. Tentara (Young
Army Forces), which later became the 14th Division. Sutarto was a loyal member
of the people's democratic movement, and a great sympathizer of the Pia. Luring
the first Dutch police action, he personally led his troops on the Semarang
front.
The murder of Colonel Sutarto cannot be separated from the reactionary
efforts to remove democratic elements from the army under the cloak of
rationalization. This was merely rationalization in a different for:.:. Although
the murderer was caught, no investigations were made, and he was released by
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the Attorney General with the explanation that, legally, he could not be prose-
cuted. The most vicious and evil thing of all was that it was then rumored
about that Sutarto's murderer was, himself, a member of the FDR. However, the
people did not believe this lie, which was an evil, imperialist tactic.
On 5 August 1948, Dr Murwardi, who belonged to the Barisan Banteng (Banteng
Troops) and the GRR in Surakarta, was called on by President Sukarno to report
on the FDR, especially concerning its strength. The dollars from the US
Consultation Bureau Lai) in Bangkok began circulating and it was stated that
Dr Murwardi received 3 million Indonesia Republican rupiahs to stage a military
incident to give the government an excuse to remove those persons who genuinely
loved national freedom.
Government Merde'ra Operation in Surakarta
On 1 September 1948, the government started its "merdeka" operation in
Surakarta under the leadership of: Lieutenant Colonel Wagiman, ex-communications
chief of the 4th Division; Alir Hartojo, a former Barisan Pelopor Republik
Indonesia (Indonesia Republic Storm Troops) investigator who had become a govern-
ment investigator; Major Akil, head investigator of the Siliwangi Di"ision;
Major Lukas from the Siliwangi Battalion; and Major Ach:nadi from the O LT not
identified? City Defense Battalion.
The "merdeka" action was started in 3urakarta with the kidnaping of Slamet
Widjaja and Pardio, both members of the Surakarta PKI. Slamet Widjaja was
secretary of the Surakarta FDR. It was said that the kidnaping was done by
unruly groups. However, it became apparent that the groups were not very
unruly when Widjaja and Pardio were put in the goverr_ro.,4L concentration camp
in Jogjakarta.
On 7 September 1948, the 4th Division Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Suadi,
assigned Major Asmara Sugeng, Captain Sutarto, Captain Suprapto, Captain Supardi,
and Captain Suradi to investigate these kidnapings, but all five officers failed
to return. Only their bicycles were found in :Irambatan, at the Lukas Company
Headquarters of the Siliwangi Division. On 8 September 1948, Lieutenant Colonel
Suharman of the TPII, also assigned to investigate the kidnapings, disappeared.
On 9 September, it was revealed that Suharman had been taken to the Siliwangi
headquarters at Tasikmadu and imprisoned together with Widjaja and Fardio. On
19 September, the three prisoners were transferred to Staff I of the Siliwangi
Division at Kletjo; and, on 24 September, they were transferred to the Wirogunan
jail in Jogjakarta.
It was even rumored that the five officers were murdered :after being kid-
naped. Lieutenant Colonel Suadi went to Jogjakarta for an explanation of the
government's attitude, but the central overnment pretended to know nothing
of the situation.
On 9 September, General Sudirman ;;ave Lieutenant Colonel Suadi pFrmission
to take action again:;t the unrest it..,ura}:arta. On the strength of t:nis, on
10 September, an ultimatum was insued to the Siliwani Battalion.
The Suraka--tn sector commandant N{,, !or Slrtmet Rijadi with one company and
help from two ALRI battalions, ci:cul?ted he ultimatum demanding that if the
five prisoners were not released u; l3C hours on 13 September, an attack would
be started. There was no answer to the ultimatum and, at the stated time, a
clash ensued between the Siliwangi troops, known at that time as the Hatta
government's favorites, and the 4th Division and an ALFI battalion. The
ALRI battalion commander, Sutarno, fell at the start of the engagement. The
fight continued with bitterness until ICOO hours of the same day, when General
Sudirman ordered a cease-fire. This cease-_'ire order had been jointly agreed
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upon by General Sudirman, the Defense Minister, someone from the military court,
Resident Sudiro, and others. The cease-fire 'as honored by the Panembahan
Senopati Division but the Slliwangi Division commandant quietly ordered all
Siliwangi troops around Surakarta to move into the city and occupy it.
At 1800 hours on 15 September, when it had become clear that the Siliwangi
troops had not honored the cease-fire order, the Panembahan Senopat' and ALRI
troops moved to attack the Siliwangi Division. The violation of the cease-fire
order by the Siliwangi troops was held by the government 'o be in order, while
Suadi and all his troops were branded as the troublemakers. The government
announced this by radio and leaflets, urging the people to help the Siliwangi
troops who were following government, orders.
On 16 September, Pesindo headquarters on Djalan Si::gasaren was attacked
by Siliwangi troops, using the disguise of the Bari n ',anteng. Mopping-up
operations and execution without due process of the law were the order of the
day. The Surakarta territory became a battleground.
The situation became da:.gerous and moused other TNI units outside Surakarta,
which were sympathetic to the Panembahan Senopati Division. However, Comrades
Musso and lunar who were on tour at the time of the Srambatan incident explaining
the plans for mergir the PKI the Partai `'nsialis,and the FBI (Partai Buruh
Indonesia, Indonesian Labor Fart). when asked their opinions by army officers at
Tjepu, urged that the military incident. be localized to Surakarta.
Therefore, it is clear from the above that the Madiun provocation was
actually the culmination of repeated provocations by the imperialist forces which
were aimed at the destruction of the forces of the uW.i-.w uerialistic national
revolution. It was only by such provocation that the Round-Table Conference
Agreement could function smoothly. The value of such incidents to the imperi-
alist forces can be seen by the fact that L^.uuediately after the Madiur. provocation,
the Netherlands government, after consulting with US Secretary Marshall, offered
the aid of the Netherlands Army to the Sukarno-Hatter government.
Incidents Leading up to Madlun Provocation
In August l9)48, the PEI, under the leadership of Comrade Musso, made impor-
tant corrections in Pi?I policies and organization. These corrections were com-
bined into u resolution called the D,;a1an Baru untuk Republik Indonesia (New
Road for the Republic of Indonesia). Tue efforts of every P1Ci member were then
focused on the merger of the PKI with the Fartai Sosialis and the 151. All
three parties, were based on the same foundations of X.arxism-Lenir Ism, and
worked together with the FDR. This merger was to have been effected in October
1948. The merger and the correction of F.'1 policy were much feared by the
reactionaries who were looking for ways of destroying this revolutionary
strength.
Such units as the Siliwa:;gi units and the Mobile Police Brigade of Mohammed
Jasin were used to destroy the revolutionary movemeul- in Madiur.. Robberies were.
purposely staged in the Madiun area by provocateurs under the name of the SR
(Serikat Rak,jat, United People) or the P?:I. Provocateurs systematically infil-
trated the people's organizations, and whenever a robbery took pace, the local
PKI or SR leadership was immediately 'arrested and mistreated, later to be released
because of lack of evidence
It is also no larger a secret that the military governor, Gatot Subroto,
asked Premier Hatta to authorize him to take action against Sumarsono, an FDR
leader in Madiun and Chairman of the Executive Body of the Badan Kongres Pemuda
Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Congress Organization). There were no
reasons accompanying this action.
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The situation became more tense when troops of the Siliwangi Division and
the Mobile Police Brigade sent arrogant patrols marching through the streets of
Madiun to frighten the people. The sugar mills in the Madiun area were occupied
by Siliwangi troops who staged drills without notifying the population or other
TNI troops in the area. This activity, which almost resulted in a fight between
Brigade 29 and Siliwangi troops, was the usual way that Siliwangi troops provoked
an incident. Sugar factory workers were often beaten up without reason. A rail-
road workct w shot dead and workers of the Madiun City Corporation, who were
organized in Sebda 'Serikat Buruh Daerah Autonoom, Union of Employees of the
Autonomour Area) were beaten for no apparent reason.
Protesting these cruelties, the city corporation workers, and later Sebda,
under the leadership of Sobsi, went on strike. The workers won the strike and
the Mobile Police Brigade asked for forgiveness.
These minor incidents increased until finally, on 18 September, the Mobile
Police Brigade and the Siliwangi Brigade were disarmed. There was comparatively
no resistance to this action, but on 19 September, several small military inci-
dents occurred as a result of the government's making distinctions between one
group of TNI troops and another in giving guarantees and authority. These small
incidents later flared into. the great tragedy fof the Madiun provocation. There-
fore, this is proof that thetladiun incident was not incited by the Pra and that
it absolutely was not an attempted coup d'etat, as was falsely alleged by domestic
and foreign reactionaries.
Refutation of Charges in Sukarno's Speech, 1:, September 1948
The people and soldiers who had been consistently aa,ti-imperialist were
finally forced to defend themselves as ,, result of President Sukarno's speech on
the night of 19 September 1948. In his speech the president ordered a general
armed attack, and the arrest and brutal ,.laughter of those branded troublemakers.
The defense was strengthened by the orani:ation of the people's foices and the
formation of a national front tover::.'nent for the Madiun territory, which was
later joined by other territories in Fast and Central Java.
In his speech of 19 .September, Fre;;ident Sukarno quoted a fabricated FDR
program. The FDR propaganda plans for the regional secretaries were always sent
through the Jogjakarta post office and therefore the government knew of them
very early. There was absolutely no secre'cy about them. If it were true that
the FDR program was the one that was quoted by ;;ukarno, the Justice Department
should have taken steps earlier, and the police should have acted against the
FDR. \c added proof of FDR innocence was the fact that t e falsity of the
program war, published in several newspapers by the FDR secretariat, and the
central FDR secretariat also notified the police about the matter long before
the Madiun provocation. Yet the police did nothing, In Surakarta, the FDR
secretariat complained to the police al-.out the publication of the false pro-
gram in the Jurakarta daily Murba. Yet, the police did nothing to punish the
falsifiers there. 11
Based or the President's Secret Cider No 1, Year '948, arrests and cruel
killings were carried our. This was because bukarno was not the prime
minister, and a:CCOr,3in;; to the CouoLir,ution, tie had no right; t:) order arrests.
Therefore, it is Cl,.,L wl:U was tae sic -
To have made Sukarno's action legs L, it would have been necessary to have'
definite proof that at the specific time of these accusations, the night or
19 September 1910"y a Soviet government had been set up in. idadiuri.
The unreasonableness or this can be seen in the following disarmament
announcement which was made mused lately.
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