LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82S00205R000100010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 22, 1965
• Content Type: STUDY

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THE PROBLEM 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 10
I. GENERAL 10
II. SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND
THE POPULATION' UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM 13
Internal Organization 13
Sources of Funds and Supplies 14
Critical Items of Supply 18
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas for Supplies 22
III. LAND INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM 21i
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved 24
Types of Supplies Moved 29
Organizational Control 29
Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points 31
IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES 33
Supply Routes, Embarkation Areas, and Debarkation Areas 33
Organizational Control and Estimated Inventory of
Infiltration Ships 35
Forms of Sea Transportation Used 38
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved 38
V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA 40
Modes of Transport and Routes Used
Organizational Control
Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory
Cambodian Government Collusion
VI. INITIAL SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARY HANDLERS OF EXTERNALLY
PROVIDED SUPPLIES
4o
13
44
45
48
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ANNEX A. BLOC-SUPPLIED AND.. LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION PROBABLY HELD BY THE VIET CONG MAIN FORCE
UNITS, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
ANNEX B. COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED BY OBSERVERS ON 55
SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS, DECEMBER 1964-
JUNE 1965
ANNEX C. METHODS OF PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTING SUPPLIES 56
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22 September 1965
SUBJECT: LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
THE PROBLEM
The object of this study is to assess the nature and amount of the
support being provided to the Communist military forces and the popula-
tion under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in
which supplies are provided both from inside and from outside South
Vietnam by land and by water. This study does not examine the problem
of personnel infiltration.
A. The generally rugged terrain and dense vegetation along the
long land border of South Vietnam offer an excellent environment for
Communist infiltration into the country. The Communists, therefore,
have made good use of a variety of land routes to infiltrate supplies
into South Vietnam to support and maintain the insurgency movement.
Substantial amounts of goods have also been brought in by sea, the long
indented coastline and the great variety of small craft making control
of seaborne infiltration quite difficult. (Paras. l-4))
B. The People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party of South Vietnam
is responsible for the complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong
war effort and of providing the bulk of the essential, non-military goods
required. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the basic
economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of almost all
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internally and some externally provided supplies. As the principal unit
in the internal Viet Cong logistic network, the Finance and Economic
Section works closely with the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong
military organization and with the various organizations of the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). The Viet Cong have
developed a complex system of economic operations, including taxation,
self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations,
all of which are devoted to the goal of transferring financial and mate-
rial resources from the South Vietnamese people to the Viet Cong military
effort. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most im-
portant source of financial and. material support which the Viet Cong have
developed. Agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes
are imposed on a wide scale throughout Viet Cong-controlled areas of the
country. (Paras. 5-l1)
C. The Viet Cong are dependent on the countryside and on the rural
population for most of their food supplies. In areas where food is not
plentiful, Viet Cong food production. units engage directly in agricul-
tural activity. Because of the mild weather conditions clothing is not
a major problem and Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile
products are not extensive. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably
effective for the present level of fighting. Medical supplies are pur-
chased on the open market in South Vietnam, captured from South Vietnamese
government stocks, or procured from various Communist and Free World
countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Viet Cong requirements for
POL products are almost entirely filled by internal seizure or purchase.
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Viet Cong requirements for construction materials are not known although
most simple construction in base areas can be accomplished by the use of
locally available materials. The quantit?$ of weapons, explosives, and
ammunition available to the Viet Cong are unknown, but it is quite clear
that significant quantities of Communist Bloc weapons and Chinese Commu-
nist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into the country.
The effort of the Viet Cong to standardize on Communist Bloc type wea-
pons in their main force units is indicative of a considerable degree of
confidence in the logistic support which they are receiving from foreign
sources. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the
production of ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than on the
production of rifles and more complicated weapons. The largest single
source of telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong is made up
of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from South Vietnamese army
units. (Paras. 12-19)
D. The logistical system of the Viet Cong centers around the so-
called base areas which serve not only as logistical support axeas but
also as centers for political, economic, and military action. The pre-
sent Viet Cong system of the dispersion of supplies, however, renders
effective attack and destruction by central government military forces
very difficult. On the other hand, this fragmentation of storage areas
is a basic restraint on the initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions
that require a sizeable prior concentration of supplies. Another major
problem for the Viet Cong, as well as for the central government, has been
the transport of large quantities of any commodity without disruption.
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(Paras. 20-21)
E. The overland supply of weapons, ammunition, and other military
supplies from North Vietnam apparently takes place over two major land
routes through Laos. Both of these routes end in a series of seasonal
roads and trails leading to forward supply points from which supplies
are moved across the South Vietnamese border principally by means of
porters and bicycles. The main link in the higher capacity route is
route 23 which is a seasonal road that permits trucks to move from the
Vinh area of North Vietnam to the Ban Dong area of Laos. From December
196+ through May 1965, when the road was truckabie, - the. level
of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks per day each of
which carried an estimated 2 tons. After excluding the tonnage required
by the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos about 2 tons per
day on an annual basis probably were available to be sent to Communist
forces in South Vietnam or to be stockpiled in Laos to support a higher
level of activity in that area. The lower capacity supply route from
North Vietnam involves a truck movement south from Vinh to the area of
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) near the Laotian border from where sup-
plies are carried by coolies to the Ban Dong area. (Paras. 22-25)
F. From Ban Dong supplies are trucked south on route 92 for a dis-
tance of 80 miles to the Se Kong River, about 20 miles east of Saravane.
Before reaching this point, however, some supplies move from route 92 onto
3 eastbound routes, at least one of which, route 922, is seasonally motor-
able for light vehicular traffic to a point about 5 miles from the border
of South Vietnam. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are
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moved south in native craft on the Se Kong River or along a trail adjacent
to the river to route 165 which is seasonally truckable and extends east-
ward to the South Vietnamese border through a possible maneuver and train-
ing area. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 during
the 1965 dry season is unknown, but over and above the amounts moving to
the east from route 92 approximately 1 ton per day on an annual basis
presumably was available to be moved forward from the end of route 92 to
Communist forces located further south in Laos or along route 165 toward
the South Vietnamese border. On the basis of all the evidence available
it is estimated that a total of 1 to 3 tons of supplies per day is cur-
rently moving into South Vietnam over the land infiltration routes.
(Paras. 26-29)
G. The trucks moving south on routes 23 and 92 and the porters
coming over the trails from the DMZ carried such items as ammunition,
explosives, gasoline, clothing, food, medical supplies, and unidentified
cargo. It is not known how far into South Vietnam some of these supplies
are carried. The infiltration routes through Laos apparently are under
North Vietnamese control, but within South Vietnam control shifts to Mili-
tary Region V Headquarters of the Viet Cong. The porters on the trails
in Laos are under control of the 70th or 71st Transportation Regiments
(TR) and of the 72nd TR after crossing the border. As of mid-196+ about
3,000 men were supposedly maintaining the transportation corridor through
Laos and another 1,700 or more were maintaining the route in the northern
part of South Vietnam. The extent to which this porter system is func-
tioning at present and the methods and number of men being used are not
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known. However, the entire Laotian borderc.adjoining the South Vietnamese
provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum is interlaced
with trails, many of which are probably being used. Pinpointing specific
border crossing points is almost impossible, however, due to lack of infor-
mation. (Paeas. 30-34)
H. During 1957-64,large quantities of supplies apparently were
infiltrated into South Vietnam by sea, principally to build stockpiles
and to supply forces in the southern and coastal areas of the country.
During 1963-64, both the scope of operations and the resources allocated
to seaborne infiltration increased considerably. Although most seaborne
infiltration operations originate in North Vietnam, there is evidence
that a number of operations originate at points along the coast of Cambodia,
and possibly also at points in Communist China. The information avail-
able indicates that seaborne infiltration of supplies has occurred pri-
marily in the southern half of South Vietnam from about the 11th Parallel
on the east coast around the cape to the Cambodian border. Some infil-
tration has also taken place into the four northern provinces of South
Vietnam. (Paras. 35-38)
I. Since 1957 at least five major North Vietnamese organizations
have reportedly been closely associated with seaborne infiltration of sup-
plies into South Vietnam. The most important of these is Group 125, which
is believed to be subordinate to the North Vietnamese Naval High Command.
Other organizatio
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such as the 103rd Transport Battalion (640 men and 48 junks), may also be
engaged in sea infiltration,
(Paras. 39-41)
J. Almost all types of ships and small craft have been used in infil-
trating supplies into South Vietnam, including small wooden junks and
sampans, steel-hulled ships, and coastal and oceangoing freighters. The
types of military supplies entering South Vietnam by sea have included
weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies. Although the
amounts infiltrated in the past or being infiltrated at present cannot
be determined, the lack of recent contact with infiltration boats may
indicate that a lower level of sea infiltration is taking place at present
than in past yeaxs. (Paras. 42-43)
K. Most of the supplies that enter South Vietnam by land and water
from Cambodia consist of materials that can be purchased in the open
market. These supplies are moved into South Vietnam by sea from Cambo-
dian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam or to the west coast of South
Vietnam; by sampan or junk on the inland waterways; and by porters and
vehicles on the motorable roads that approach or cross the South Vietnamese
border. There is also a subtantial open but illegal barter trade be-
tween South Vietnam and Cambodia, especially in the Mekong delta. Al-
though many points along the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam
have been mentioned in reference to Viet Cong border crossings, the rela-
tive importance of each area, route, or mode of transport cannot be
determined with certainty from available information. However, the use
of inland water transport to cross the border in the southern and delta
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area seems to be much more important than it is from the northeastern
part of Cambodia into central South Vietnam. The Mekong-Bassac River
complex particularly until 1964 was one of the major means of moving
supplies across the border. The land routes provide access at many
points along the Cambodian border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or
purchasing agents to obtain necessary supplies. Motorable routes pos-
sibly used for this purpose include at least 6 roads that cross the
border between Quang Duc Province and the Gulf of Siam. There is some
evidence to indicate that before crossing the border porters fan out
from the roads onto the complex of trails to portage their loads. In
other cases agents mingle with the local traffic that crosses the border
by vehicle or on foot. Little is known about the organizations that con-
trol the infiltration of supplies from Cambodia. (Paras Lt--48)
L. Although Viet Cong units continue to operate with relative free-
dom on both sides of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, there is no conclu-
sive evidence that permanent Viet Cong bases have been established in
Cambodian territory. Although there is very little proof of Cambodian
government collusion with the Viet Cong at the top level, there is some
evidence of both passive and active collusion at the local level. Beyond
a recent gift of medical supplies, there is no hard evidence that the
central Cambodian government is actively providing logistic support to
the Viet Cong. There is no conclusive evidence that Communist aims being
brought in openly through Sihanoukville are intended for other than the
Cambodian armed forces. Actually it is difficult to estimate reliably the
extent to which Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active
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Cambodian cooperation, passive "laissez faire," or simply the inability
of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers.
(Paras. 49-54)
M. The initial sources of externally provided supplies are princi-
pally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France,
and the US. The countries through which most of these supplies pass
immediately before infiltration into South Vietnam are most likely North
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South
Vietnamese coast from other Bloc countries are possible. Supplies that
are moved via North Vietnam most likely are transported by rail through
Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam. Although it is possible
that war material is moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such ship-
ments have been detected. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong
that move from Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commerical
channels and principally aboard Free world ships. Very few ships from
Communist countries call at Sihanoukville. The total tonnage they de-
liver is relatively small and the bulk of it consists of non-military
supplies. Since 1963 there have been only about 10 Communist military
deliveries to Cambodia. Most of this equipment was used to rearm Cambo-
dian military units. (Paras. 55-59)
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1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environ-
ment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas and for clan-
destine movement within the country. South Vietnam is composed of the
Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland, and a highland region. (See map at
Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with about 2,500 miles of navigable
canals, rivers, and streams and more than one-half of the area is flooded
each summer and autumn. Most of this area is densely populated, and
local water traffic is heavy. Patrolling this expanse of water, even if
only at the border and along the coast, is an enormous task. Elsewhere,
particularly in the rugged northern mountains, the country is relatively
undeveloped, settlements are sparse, and transportation is poor.
2. The coastal lowland extending northward from the delta plain
varies in width from 5 to 30 miles. In some places spurs of the highlands
encroach on the lowlands and serve as potential avenues of ingress to the
interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to the sea, many sheltered
landing areas are found between the promontories and the steep rocky
islands offshore. Between the coastal lowlands and the Mekong Valley
lies the highland region, which extends from just northeast of the Mekong
Delta northward into North Vietnam. North of about the l-I.th parallel the
highlands consist mainly of steep mountain ridges with intervening deep,
narrow valleys. The southern part of the highlands, however, is a complex
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of mountain ranges and scattered plateaus. The mountains, with some
peaks above 8,000 feet, and the deeply incised parts of the plateaus make
surface transportation difficult.
3. The land boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900 miles,
all of which adjoin Communist-controlled or unfriendly territory. On the
east and south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country fronts
on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with Cambodia
extends about 600 miles northeastward from the Gulf of Siam, about 460
miles of which is in the delta area and is crossed by numerous rivers
and streams that are used as infiltration routes. The remainder of the
boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and the hilly-to-moun-
tainous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established vehicular roads
cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and in the forested plains
north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong use trails to cross the border in
numerous places. The entire border with Cambodia is an area of tension
because of constant border clashes between the forces of both countries.
The boundary with Laos continues generally northward for about 300 miles
along the crest of the Annam Mountains. Passage across this boundary is
generally tortuous; the best trail crossings and the ones apparently used
most by the Viet Cong are in the northernmost part, where the border is
hilly rather than mountainous. The demarcation line between North and
South Vietnam, about 50 miles long, descends the eastern slope of the Annam
Mountains and crosses hills and a narrow coastal plain to the South China
Sea. The demilitarized zone extends 3 miles on each side of the demarca-
a
tion line. An inoperable railroad and road cross this line, but normal
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traffic on these routes has been stopped by military outposts on both
4. The full extent to which the Communists take advantage of the
opportunities for penetration of these land and sea boundaries is unknown,
but apparently all possible routes have been used to some extent in the
past. The available information indicates that at present certain parts
of the borders probably are more significant than others for infiltration
purposes and that regular supply lines have been established over which
clandestine-supplies are obtained. The importance of the infiltration
problem has been emphasized during 1964-65 by the increase in the tempo
of Viet Cong operations in the northern area as well as in the delta and
by the use of new types of weapons and ammunition not produced or reloaded
in South Vietnam.
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II. SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND THE
POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Internal Organization
5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam is responsible
for the complex task of providing funds for the revolutionary war effort
and of providing the bulk of the essential, non-military goods for the
Viet Cong organization. Operating through a vertical series of Party
committees which exist on almost all geographical levels from village to
the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), the Party has attempted to
develop internal sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A
wide array of front, party, and military elements - under the over-all
direction of the Party - implement the principal tasks of production,
acquisition, and transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic
Section of the Party, the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong mili-
tary organization, and the various NFLSV units are the principal instru-
mentalities in these tasks. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party
is the basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of
almost all internally and some externally provided supplies. At the pro-
vince level and above, each Finance and Economic Section is headed by a
policy level party cadre and includes the chief of the Rear Services
Section of the Viet Cong main force units. It is the responsibility of
the vaxious finance and economic units to supervise the economy of Viet
Cong-controlled areas, to acquire the money and goods required by the
Viet Cong, and to implement economic programs designed to strengthen
Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the economy of South Vietnam.
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6. As the principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics net-
work, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear S`ervic.es
Section of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV organ-
izations. This relationship with the Reax Services Section provides the
Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military units
with required goods and for calling upon the military for assistance in
meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the NFLSV
organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies upon these organ-
izations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the Party,
and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian popula-
tion by supplying the necessary goods.
Sources of Funds and Supplies
7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient with regard
to almost all non-military supplies. They have developed a complex system
of economic operations devoted clearly toward the goal of transferring
financial and material resources from the South Vietnamese people to the
Viet Cong military effort. Taxation, self-initiated economic activities,
seizure, and clandestine operations appear to be the principal internal
means of obtaining financial and material support for the Viet Cong.
8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most impor-
tant source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong. It has
been estimated that the Viet Cong collect from $30 million to $60 million
per year in all of South Vietnam. There is insufficient evidence to
estimate actual tax collections in cash and in kind, but it is known that
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the Viet Cong impose agricultural, plantation, transportation, and busi-
ness taxes on a wide scale throughout the country. Although tax payments
are probably the major source of local currency, bond drives, monetary
issues, and clandestine fund drives also represent significant sources of
local currency. There is no specific evidence of a Viet Cong shortage of
funds, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports that the Viet Cong
are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of administering additional
areas that may come under their control.
9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source of
Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong employed
progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as many as 25
separate rates in the Mekong delta region along. If these rates had been
applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled areas of the
delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to nearly 90,000 short
tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements in the delta or
even on a national basis. l/ Since equivalent Viet Cong tax rates are
applied to other agricultural production in the delta, it is estimated
that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of their nationwide food needs
in the delta alone. In the central part of the country agricultural tax
collections cannot be calculated because the tax has not been applied as
systematically or as comprehensively as in the Mekong delta area.
1 Based on the estimated shortfall of deliveries of rice to Saigon,
Viet Cong tax collection of rice alone would have exceeded substantially
the above estimate. There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong
may be smuggling rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or other-
wise generate funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually
disposed of through Cambodia is not known.
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However, there is little doubt that even in this area the agricultural
tax supplies a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice, salt,
manioc, fish, and other foodstuffs. In addition,~.in this;a,rea.the Viet
Cong often purchase, or confiscate rice and salt.
10. Plantation taxes also account for a significant portion of Viet
Cong tax receipts. The proximity of the rubber plantations to war zones
C and D (see nap, at Annex) provides a reliable means of supply for
Viet Cong forces in these areas. Since the plantations possess large
stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other supplies and have long been
vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure, the plantations probably are
a significant source of critical supplies for the Viet Cong.
the annual plantation tax is approximately
1,000 piasters (
13.70) per hectare or a total of about $1 million for
the exploitable area of 75,000 hectares. Wage taxes on plantation workers
and Viet Cong demands for labor service for transportation are also
known to exist on a wide scale. Most of the internal transport of the
country, both personal and commercial, is also taxed by the Viet Cong, al-
though it is impossible to estimate total receipts in cash and kind from
this source. Taxes are also imposed on business establishments and com-
mercial activities. Small rice and sugar mills are taxed in areas out-
side of the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters, char-
coal kilns, and sawmills, because of their location, are easy prey for the
Viet Cong. Import and export taxes are levied against trade between
Viet Cong and central government-controlled areas in order to provide
revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the Viet Cong.
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Thus, the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing supplies into
Viet Cong-controlled areas is not taxed at all by the Viet Cong, but the
export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.
11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources avail-
able to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial operations
such as bond drives, monetary issues, and the use of credit cooperatives,
additional economic activities have been initiated to support Viet Cong
military personnel and the civilian population under Viet Cong control.
For example, major efforts at the self-production of foodstuffs, especially
rice and manioc, have been made in the central highlands. Clothing pro-
duction units have been established as subordinate elements of the Rear
Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization. Simple manufac-
turing units, which produce farm implements for the civilian population,
also produce military goods such as mines, grenades,, and rifles. Where
materials are not ordinarily available through other means they are often
seized outright, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
seizure through force and enforced tax collections. However, the Viet
Cong do accumulate significant supplies as war booty, including medicines,
communications equipment, foodstuffs, and military equipment. Clandestine
front operations in areas controlled by the government of South Vietnam
and involvement of legitimate enterprises in Viet Cong procurement opera-
tions are considered to be common in many provinces. These operations
do not provide revenue, but these organizations act as procurement agencies
to obtain essential supplies for the Viet Cong from areas controlled by
the central government. Medicines, cloth, and foodstuffs are supplied
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by these clandestine operations. The quantity of goods acquired by this
means or the value of the funds expended cannot be determined.
Critical Items of Supply
12. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong are dependent on the country-
side and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong
taxation policy permits payment in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other
food items. In areas where food is not plentiful, Viet Cong food pro-
duction units engage directly in agricultural activity. In the moun-
tainous areas particularly, the Viet Cong spend a considerable number
of man-days per year in the production of food. Prior to June 1963, the
Viet Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by
COSVN to provide their own subsistence for a period
f i- months per year,
with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnished by COSVN. From
June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100 percent
of their own subsistence. Since June 1964, combat units have provided
50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent. Some re-
ports have indicated that the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) battalions
operating in the northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice
supplies from external sources.
13. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile prod-
ucts such as hammocks and mosquito nets are not extensive. Because of
the mild weather conditions clothing especially is not a major problem.
A number of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki uni-
forms, underwear, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and hammocks
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are produced in North Vietnam. For the most part these items have been
issued to infiltrators who generally carry an individual supply of two
uniforms, knapsack, hammock, and mosquito net when entering the country.
Clothing production units also exist as elements of the Rear Seryices
Section of the Viet Cong military organization. In addition the Viet
Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase and externally from
Cambodian sources.
14. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the
present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers are
located within South Vietnam and probably have.been'located.temporarily
in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of these medi-
cal facilities have been identified, some of which are reported to be
well-staffed and supplied even with such sophisticated equipment as x-ray
machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs. One major source of
medical supplies is the open market in South Vietnam. With the exception
of opiates and barbiturates most drugs can be purchased without diffi-
culty in pharmacies in the larger cities. Another major source consists
of captured South Vietnamese medical supplies. Some Viet Cong military
operations have been specifically directed toward obtaining these sup-
plies from hamlets and supply convoys. Finally, medical supplies are pro-
cured from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia
and North Vietnam.
15. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in building up
its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of penicillin
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and blood plasma - both of which are widely used in treating battle
casualties - have risen sharply in 1965 and appear to be well in excess
of normal requirements. Although other Communist countries have been
the predominant suppliers of most pharmaceuticals, Japan has provided
virtually all the blood plasma imported by North Vietnam. The actual
quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped from North Vietnam to the
Viet Cong is not known, but it is believed to be adequate for their
needs. In addition to equipping the PAVN forces now fighting in South
Vietnam, the North Vietnamese reportedly have used infiltrators to
carry small packets of medical supplies containing such items as peni-
cillin, sulfa drugs, and quinine derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because
of the relative ease; of transporting large quantities of pharmaceuticals,
it would be possible for North Vietnam to deliver substnatial quantities
of medical supplies by small coastal vessels and over the land infiltra-
tion routes. Once in South Vietnam these supplies would presumably be
stored in central, areas near base hospitals. However, there are no known
large stockpiles of medical supplies.
16. Viet Cong requirements for POL products are probably quite small.
They have few organic vehicles or self-propelled vessels but do need fuel
for power generators and other power driven equipment. Taxation of the
contents of petroleum tank trucks, outright seizure of petroleum supplies,
and discreet purchase from local gasoline stations throughout the country
are known methods of acquisition from internal sources.
17. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials are
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unknown. Simple construction in base areas can probably be accomplished
by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber. Although the
Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying supplies of cement,
their access to other internal and external sources of construction mate-
rials is not known.
18. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and ammunition has
been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried or left behind by
retreating government forces in South Vietnam or Laos; supplies infiltrated
primarily through North Vietnam and Cambodia; captured supplies; and lo-
cally-produced supplies. The available quantities of these weapons,
explosives, and ammunition are unknown, but it is evident that significant
quantities of Communi t;Bloc weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these
weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam for use by the Viet Cong.
This flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has enabled the Viet Cong
to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within priority units.
Non-standard weapons and those of world War II vintage are being passed
on to the guerrillas and other armed militia units. The effort of the Viet
Cong to standardize on Communist Bloc type weapons in their main force
units is indicative of a considerable degree of confidence in the logistic
support which they are receiving from foreign sources. Although the Viet
Cong have placed a great deal of emphasis on the capture of weapons and
ammunition in the past, this emphasis may decrease as their main force
units become increasingly equipped with the new family of Bloc weapons.
The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the production
of ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than on the production of
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rifles and more complicated weapons. The majority of the Viet Cong
production facilities are located south and west of Saigon. Annex A con-
tains a list, by country of origin, of Bloc-supplied and locally-produced
weapons and ammunition probably held by the Viet Cong main force units.
19. The largest single source of telecommunications equipment used
by the Viet Cong is made up of US-manufactured tactical radio sets cap-
tured from South Vietnamese army units.
The types of radio equipment captured range from hand-
held, low power transceivers to relatively large, vehicle-mounted trans-
mitters having power ratings of from x;00 to 400 watts. This captured
equipment has been augmented to a limited extent by comparable equipment
of Soviet and Communist Chinese manufacture supplied from North Vietnam.
Such supply, however, is not believed to be essential to Viet Cong opera-
tions.
Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas for Supplies
20. The ability of the Viet Cong to meet the requirements of their
military forces and the civilian population under their control has been
hampered by the threat of central government military action, the diffi-
culties of internal transport, and the central government restrictions
imposed on normal commerce. The influx of an estimated 500,000 refugees
into areas of central South Vietnam controlled by the central government
reflects, in part, the inability of the Viet Cong to guarantee supplies
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to the civilian population. Although this displacement of the rural pop-
ulation has reduced the demand on the Viet Cong supply system, it has
also reduced agricultural production and impaired the ability of the
Viet Cong to procure food and other goods locally. A major problem for
the Viet Cong, as well as for the central government, has been the trans-
port of large quantities of any commodity without disruption. The Viet
Cong are believed to have only limited access to transport vehicles which
can be used only at night or after considerable effort at deception.
Although transport by boat in the delta and coastal areas is employed by
the Viet Cong, the use of porters is probably the principal means used to
ensure the movement of essential supplies in the central highlands.
21. The logistical system of the Viet Cong centers around the so-
called base areas which serve not only as logistical support areas but
also as centers for political, economic, and military action. The pre-
sent Viet Cong system of the dispersion of supplies, however, renders
effective attack and destruction by central government military forces very
difficult. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands were
significantly smaller than at present, food depots were limited to a maxi-
mum of 5 tons because of the threat of central government military action.
Although the size of these depots has probably been increased because of
the additional troop concentrations in central South Vietnam, the fragmen-
tation of storage areas is a basic restraint on the initiation of large-
scale Viet Cong actions that require a sizeable prior concentration of
supplies. See the map at Annex for the location of war zones, storage
areas, and redistribution corridors to the Viet Cong forces operating
within South Vietnam.
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III. LAND INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved
22. There is a scarcity of information on the overland supply of
weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam to
the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It appears, however, that two
major land routes from North Vietnam into Laos serve as a means of trans-
porting supplies. Both of these routes end in a series of seasonal
roads and trails leading to forward supply points. From these points in
Laos supplies are moved across the South Vietnamese border by means of
porters, bicycles, ox carts, or pack animals.
23. The higher capacity route is a road that in part is useable in
the dry season only. It is used from about mid-December through May or
June to supply the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos and the
Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in
stages along routes IA and 15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos, and then
south on routes 12 and 23 to supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9.
Some supplies moving along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at the
junction of routes 9 and 92 and then move down route 92 toward the South
Vietnamese border. Although route 23 is a significant part of this sup-
ply line, it is a seasonal road on which truck traffic can hardly move
from about June through November each year due to ground saturation
caused by the southwest monsoons.
2
route 23 close to route 9 has indicated that many convoys
the way from route 23 to route 9 and that there is a lower
in this area than along the northern part of route 23.
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2)-. Before the completion of route 23 in .1962, supplies for the
Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During January-June
1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed moving south on
route 23. Although most of these trucks carried troops and supplies for
the southern part of Laos, some of the supplies may have been portered
over the trails into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Again in
196+ the convoys moved during the dry season.
During the 1965 dry season bombing and armed reconnaissance missions re-
duced the estimated capacity of route 23 from 400 tons each way per day
to 100 tons. These aerial attacks probably did not reduce the actual
traffic moving to a level below that planned or needed by the Communist
forces, however.
\it is possible to estimate
that the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks per
day. (See Annex B) It is believed that these trucks carried about 2 tons
each and that the road was probably truckable for a total of about 180
days during the dry season. Although the bombing and aerial reconnaissance
did not reduce the total amount of traffic moving south, it did slow down
the movement and force some portaging of supplies. This level of activity
is estimated to have been capable of moving about 34+ tons of military
supplies into the area per day. The approximately 8,000 Communist
troops in the southern part of Laos needed 30 of the 34+ tons received per
day during the dry season (15 tons for daily consumption and 15 tons for
stockpiling in anticipation of the halt in traffic during the rainy season).
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Thus there could have been an excess of 4 tons per day delivered to the
area during the 1965 dry season. On an average annual basis this tonnage
would represent about 2 tons per day available to be sent to the Communist
forces in South Vietnam or to be stockpiled in Laos to support a higher
level of Communist activity in that area.
25. The lower capacity supply route from North Vietnam is the older
of the two land infiltration routes. It involves a truck movement south
from Vinh to the area of theDemilitarized Zone (DMZ) near the Laotian
border. From there supplies are carried by coolies to the Ban Dong area
in Laos at the junction of routes 9 and 92 where they may be loaded on
trucks for further movement south. Other groups of coolies may operate
independently of the route 23/9/92 supply line. There have been sporadic
grou
s o 100
0
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p
3
0 coolies carrying
supplies south toward Ban Dong. There have not been enough of these re-
ports, however, to estimate with confidence the amount of supplies moving
by this means. These porter movements apparently take place during the
wet season, possibly indicating that the trails are used for the most
part when trucks cannot move on route 23.
26. Route 92 is the beginning of a supply network that supports
Communist activities in the southeastern area of the Laotian Panhandle
and across the border into South Vietnam. Route 92 extends south from
Ban Dong on route 9 for a distance of about 80 miles and ends at the Se
Kong River, about 20 miles east of Saravane. Although the northern
section has a possible limited all-season capability, the southern part
is truckable only in the dry season. oute 92
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and adjacent areas has identified at least two primary military supply
installations near Ban Bac. Route 92 also serves as a feeder route to
suspected military supply dumps located along 3 eastbound routes, at
least one of th ich is an important
routes are 921, 922,and 923.
supply route to South Vietnam. These
that sections of these routes may be seasonally motorable for light veh i-
cular traffic. 31
indicated that vehicular activity had occurred on route 922 from its
junction with route 92 to a point about 15 miles east where route 922
divides into two segments. Each of these 1 to 2 mile segments also showed
evidence of recent vehicular activity. Thus it appears thatIn the dry
season supplies can be transported by truck all the way from North
Vietnam to a point only about 5 miles from the border of South Vietnam.
27. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are moved south
in native craft on the Se Kong River to route 165 which extends eastward
to the South Vietnamese border through a possible maneuver and training
area. Route 165 is also connected to route 16 by a short unnumbered road.
Ifi this area an improved trail generally parallels the Se Kong River and
connects the southern terminus of route 92 with route 165.
the northern section of this trail was being upgraded
into a road at the end of the 1965 dry season. It is likely that the
entire trail along the river will be upgraded after the present wet season.
When this work is completed the Communis-i will have a second fair-weather
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truckable route from:raie 92 to the South Vietnamese border.
28. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 during
the 1965 dry season cannot be estimated because traffic on the road has
been observed only near its southern end.
some trucks leave route 92 north of the observers and move
supplies toward the South Vietnamese border on routes, such as 922,
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which are at least seasonally motorable for light vehicular traffic.
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truck traffic moving near the southern end
of route 92. From 1 February through 5 June, the period that the road
was truckable, the level of traffic averaged. about 1.5 trucks moving south
per day (See Annex B) If it is estimated that these trucks carried about
2 tons each, a total of about 375 tons could have been moved south during
the dry season. On an annual basis this quantity amounts to a daily
average of slightly more than 1 ton that presumably was available to be
moved forward from the end of route 92 to Communist forces located further
south in Laos, to the possible training and maneuver area along route 165,
or over the border into South Vietnam.
29. Based on the above analyses of the possible volumes of tonnage
available for movement over routes 92, 922, and 165 and the fact that some
movement takes place directly over the trails from the western end of
the DMZ, it is estimated that a total of from 1 to 3 tons of supplies per
day is currently moving into South Vietnam over the land infiltration
routes.
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Types of Supplies Moved
30. The trucks that moved south on route 23 during the 1965 dry sea-
son carried such items as ammunition for small arms, mortars, and recoil-
less rifles; explosives; gasoline; clothing; and foodstuffs such as rice,
salt, flour, dried meat, and dried fish. The northbound trucks reportedly
carried ,lumber, bamboo, and salvage items such as empty gasoline drums and
tires. The contents of about half of the trucks moving near the southern
end of route 92 was not observed., but almost 30 percent reportedly carried
boxes, 15 percent a combination of arms, ammunition, and food, and the re-
mainder sacks with unidentified cargo. About a third of the trucks moving
north reportedly were empty. Many of the porters coming over the trails
from near the western end of the DMZ to route 92 or directly to points
along the border of South Vietnam are reported to have carried weapons,
ammunition, equipment, medical supplies and foodstuffs. It is not known
how far into South Vietnam some d' these supplies are carried, but it is
only logical to assume that at least the food carried over the trails would
not be moved beyond the mountainous border area.
Organizational Control
31. The infiltration routes through Laos apparently are under North
Vietnamese control, but within South Vietnam control shifts to Military
Region V Headquarters. indicate that as of
mid-1964 the 70th Transportation Regiment (TR) and possibly a 71st TR
control the porters and infiltrators on the trails through Laos. The 70th
TR was said to be a part of the 559th Transportation Division which is
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under direct control of the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. At the border
of South Vietnam near the boundary between Thua Thien and Quang Nam
Provinces the supplies and infiltrators become the responsibility of the
72nd TR which maintains the communications-liaison route through Quang Nam
to southern Quang Tin Province. The 70th TR reportedly maintains about
17 communications-liaison stations in Laos with the first station located
near the end of the DMZ. A company of about ,100 able-bodied men is
located at each station to carry out security, communication)s,/ liaison,
and guidance of infiltrators and locally recruited porters. J It is not
known whether the supplies transported by truck down route 23 are also the
responsibility of the 70th TR. It is possible that such supplies are turn-
ed over to the 70th TR at the end of the truck route. The 71st TR was re-
ported V to control a short segment of the route between A Rum, a village
located near the end of route 922, and same point within Quang Nam Province.
It was said to have 12 stations, also with one company at each station or
a total of about 1,200 men for the 12 stations. The 72nd TR had about 2L
stations maintained by a total of 1,700 men. Thus as of mid-196- about
3,000 men were supposedly maintaining the transportation corridor through
Laos and another 1,700 or more were maintaining the route in the northern
part of South Vietnam.
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ers on the trails ca at porters are
recruited locally or are moved. from one station to another whenever needed
for 1)fl ]m)'.1.11v lama mnzrrnmr 1+a
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Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points
32. Trucks, porters, and native craft on the inland rivers are all
used to some extent, depending on the:'season and location, to bring sup-
plies to the South Vietnamese border. The staged movement by truck from
North Vietnam into Laos has been described above. Along the trails the
way stations are said to be located about one-half day's march apart.
The short distances, anywhere from 4 to 12 miles, depending on terrain and
the tactical situation, allow the porters to haul supplies to the next
station and return to their home base within one working day. The extent
to which this porter system is functioning at present and the methods
and number of men being used are not known.
portions of the trails were being upgraded into
roads and that he had seen trucks being used on portions of the route.
He had apparently observed route 922. Other infiltrators who crossed the
border in early 1965 observed pack bicycles more often then porters. The
use of bicycles would considerably reduce the number of porters needed.
The porters carry 40 to 60 lb-loads in back packs or shoulder poles while
single or dual bicycles can carry up to 500 lb-loads. Annex C lists
several additional methods used for packaging and transporting supplies.
33. Only one waterway in Laos, the Se Kong River mentioned above,
is known to be used to any extent as part of an infiltration route, al-
though the alignment of other waterways, the Se Bang Hieng, Se Pone, and
the Song Ben Hai, makes them suspect infiltration routes.
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craft on the river, and portages of difficult sections. This waterway is
navigable perennially by sampans, but its use during the dry season will
probably be reduced when the road being built parallel to it is completed,
possibly by the end of 1965. The Song Ben Hai/Rao Thanh waterway in the
DMZ forms the border between North and South Vietnam. Although infiltra-
tion across this river of 3 to 4 man teams swimming or using small craft
has been reported, infiltration of supplies across the river has not been
observed. Utilization by sampans of this waterway perennially for lateral
movement within the DMZ to interior tracks, trails, and tributary streams
providing access to South Vietnam is possible, however.
34.. Apparently the major border crossing points, as shown on the map
at Annex, consist of the trail networks east and southeast of route 922
and route 165. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the South
Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum is
interlaced with trails, many of which are probably being used. Pinpoint-
ing specific border crossing points is impossible due to lack of infor-
mation. Thick forest coverage of the roads and trails make aerial recon-
naissance of these routes difficult. Captured personnel, even the communi-
cations-liaison personnel who worked on the routes, lack knowledge of the
routes used because of the strict security system applied to the infiltra-
tion process.
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IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES
Supply Routes, Embarkation Areas, and Debarkation Areas
35. The Communists have been using seaborne infiltration to transport
men and supplies into South Vietnam since 1957. Although the number of
personnel infiltrated by sea has been relatively small, large quantities
of supplies have apparently been infiltrated by sea in past years. These
supplies are believed to have been used principally to build stockpiles
and to supply forces in the southern and coastal areas of South Vietnam,
which are more easily supplied by sea than by land.
36. Seaborne infiltration directly into South Vietnam takes place
principally from two countries - Cambodia and North Vietnam. The embarka-
tion areas in Cambodia are at the port of Kampot or on the coast between
Kampot and the border of South Vietnam. The embarkation areas in North
Vietnam are located in two general areas - in the north, near Haiphong
and Bai Chay, and in the south, along the coast between Ben Thuy and the
17th Parallel. About 15 embarkation points and 3 logistic supply bases
have been reported in North Vietnam.
37. The routes used by infiltration boats evidently vary according
to the type of mission: and the season of the year. Infiltration opera-
tions from Cambodia, which originate in the area between Kampot and the
border of South Vietnam, proceed to Phu Du, Phu Quoc, or one of the
other nearby islands, and finally to the western coast of South Vietnam.
It seems reasonable to assume that some seaborne infiltration takes
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place directly between Cambodia and the western coast, although there is
little tangible evidence to support this. Some reports state that seaborne
infiltration also is conducted by foreign ships which stop off the coast
of South Vietnam while the cargo is unloaded into lighters that transfer
it to shore. Most of the seaborne infiltration is assumed to take place
over routes from North Vietnam. Infiltration by ship from North Vietnam
reportedly has taken place in past years only from December through
August, except for emergencies, because of the rough seas usually en-
countered during the rest of the year. One informant, who participated
in several infiltration missions from North Vietnam, mentioned two routes,
a "near-shore" route, paralleling the coast at,about 3 miles offshore,
and a "distant-shore" route, ranging from 50 to 100 miles from the coast.
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Some of the ships or craft involve
in the infiltration from North Vietnam probably leave the northern areas
and stop at ports in the southern area of the country before continuing
their trip into South Vietnam. Others also may stop at Communist China's
Hainan Island on the way to the south.
38. Infiltration boats or ships are reported or suspected to have
landed, unloaded, or been seen on the coasts of 16 of the 21 coastal pro-
vinces of South Vietnam. (See map at Annex.) In addition, one other
province reportedly has parts of its :coastline, held by the Viet Cong and
could provide safe landing areas for supplies. Most of the reported or
suspected landings or sightings, however, appear to have taken place in
the :four northern provinces of South Vietnam (Quang Tri, Thua Thien,
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Quang Nam, and Quang Tin) and in the southern part of the country from
Binh Tuy PrQv.ince. (east of Saigon) along the coast to the Cambodian
border and the islands of Hon Khoai and Phu Quoc. Apparently small junks
and sampans from North Vietnam have been engaged in infiltration from
North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam, while larger
craft have been carrying supplies to the southern part of South Vietnam,
supplemented by small junks and sampans from Cambodia and Phu Quoc
island. Coastal and oceangoing freighters could offload supplies along
any part of the South Vietnamese coast, but reports indicate that most
of the sightings of these ships have taken place in the southern part of
the country, south of 10 15 N. Debarkations reportedly are made usually
at night, with boats using both "near-shore" and "distant-shore" routes
waiting offshore until landings can be made under cover of darkness.
Organizational Control and Estimated Inventory of Infiltration Ships
39. Since 1957 at least five major North Vietnamese organizations
have reportedly been closely associated with seaborne infiltration of
Viet Cong personnel and supplies into South Vietnam. These were (1) the
Unification Agency, reportedly in existence from 1956 to 1960; (2) the
Ong-Xa Group, reportedly a military organization in existence between
1959 and 1960; (3) the Research Bureau, reportedly in existence from
1961 through at least 1963; (.) the 603rd Special Battalion of the PAVN;
and (5) Group 125, believed to be subordinate to the North Vietnamese
Naval High Command. The complete absence of reports since 1963 on the
first two organizations makes it probable that they have been disbanded,
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reorganized, or merged with other infiltration organizations.
he "603rd Special Battalion" probable is still actively
engaged in infiltration activities.
this battalion as a special maritime infiltration unit of the PAVN
stationed south of the Gianh River (about 19 miles northwest of Dong Hoi),
North Vietnam.
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41. In addition to the major seaborne infiltration organizations
discussed above, initial interrogations of six Viet Cong captured on 31
May 1965 indicate the possible existence of another large infiltration
organization (640 men and 48 junks). This organization, the 103rd Transport
Battalion J, reportedly has been conducting infiltration by rotating
operation of its junks in 4 groups of 12 each.
In 1965 an additional method of infiltration has
been noted. This method consists of the Viet Cong obtaining South Vietna-
mese ships and crews on a, temporary basis by either hiring or coercing
owners and personnel. The crews then take the ships to North Vietnam,
where supplies are loaded, and the ships then return to South Vietnam.
This method apparently has been used only a few times and has been con-
fined to infiltration in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. The
organization responsible for instigating this type of operation is un-
known.
The similarity between the unit designations of the 103rd and 603rd
Battalions should be noted.
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Forms of Sea Transportation Used
42. Almost all types of ships and small craft have been used in infil-
trating supplies into South Vietnam for the Viet Cong. These vessels
include small wooden junks and sampans, steel-hulled ships, and coastal
and oceangoing freighters. Small sampans and junks have been used to
carry cargo ashore, whereas some junks and freighters have been reported
as transporting cargo to offshore locations. Some of the North Vietna-
mese junks involved are apparently faster and better armed than the boats
of the South Vietnamese Junk Fleet. An infiltration ship sunk at Vung Ro
on 16 February 1965, for example, was a 120-foot, steel-hulled ship with
an estimated cargo capacity of 100 tons, and a. cruising speed of 8 knots.
The motorized boats of the Junk Fleet have a speed of only 6 to 8 knots.
Since 10 percent to 30 percent of the 50,000 commercial craft registered
with the South Vietnamese government are off the coast on any given day,
the problems involved in detecting any planned infiltration movements are
formidable. However, in view of the greatly increased scope of patrol
coverage since early 1965 the absence of any further incidents involving
steel-hulled infiltration vessels since the Vung Ro sinking in February
suggests that the Viet Cong are now using only smaller craft which are
more easily concealed.
Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved
43. The types of military supplies entering South Vietnam by sea,
have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies.
Neither the amount of supplies infiltrated by sea, into South Vietnam
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in the past nor the amount presently being infiltrated can be quantified
with any degree of reliability on the basis of available information.
However, the fact that Group 125 apparently failed to make any infiltra-
tion attempts to South Vietnam between February and September 1965 may
indicate that a lower level of sea infiltration is taking place at present
than in past years.
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V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA
44. Although there is evidence that certain supplies for.? the
Viet Cong enter South Vietnam by land and water from Cambodia, it is
fragmentary and of varying reliability. In general, however, it appears
that supplies procured in or through Cambodia consist of materials that
can be purchased on the open market. These supplies and materials arrive
in Cambodia principally through normal trade channels on international ships
that,. unload at Gulf of Siam ports or at Phnom Penh after moving up the
Mekong River. L/ Some supplies may be infiltrated from southern Laos on
the inland waterways, roads, and trails in northeastern Cambodia,
Once within Cambodia supplies are moved into South Vietnam by the following
routes and methods: (a) by sea from Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf
of Siam and to the west coast of South Vietnam; 141 21 (b) by sampan or junk
on the inland waterways; and (c) by porters and vehicles on the motorable
roads that approach or cross the South Vietnamese border. There is also
a substantial open but illegal barter trade between South Vietnam and Cam-
bodia, especially in the Mekong delta. The general locations of the major
routes are indicated on the map at Annex. Many points along the border
between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been mentioned in reference to Viet
Cong border crossings, but Tay Ninh and An Giang 10 .have been the two
8 See Section VI, below, for a discussion of Cambodian international ship-
ping and trade.
9 This route has been described as a sea infiltration route in section IV,
above.
10 During 1964 provincial boundaries in South Vietnam were rearranged with
the result that An Giang Province no longer borders Cambodia. Chau Doc
Province is now On the Cambodian border.
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provinces most often cited. The relative importance of each area, route,
or mode cannot be determined from available information. It appears that
the Viet Cong shift back and forth from land to water transport and from
one area of entry to another as the need and tactical situation change.
45. Use of inland water transport to cross the border in the southern
and delta area seems to be much more important than it is from the north-
eastern part of Cambodia into central South Vietnam. Four inland water
routes, the Se San, the Sre Pok, and its two tributaries, provide access
from Cambodia to Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac Provinces in the central area.
These waterways can accommodate small native craft only, and, although
few reports are available to indicate the Viet Cong have used these water
routes, their importance is accentuated by the scarcity of roads serving
the area. There are six waterways providing access to the southern or
delta area, of which three serve Tay Ninh Province and two consist of
the Mekong-Bassac River complex. These southern rivers, which for the
most part are navigable for craft as large as small oceangoing steamers,
provide connections to mostpoints in the delta area.
46. Water transport on the Mekong-Bassac River complex was one of
the major means of moving supplies from Cambodia into South Vietnam until
1964. During 1963 a significant quantity of supplies, particularly ex-
plosives, was captured by South Vietnamese patrols on the rivers, but since
that year reported seizures of explosives on the rivers have virtually
ceased. This situation may mean that the Viet Cong have developed other
water transport routes or are relying more heavily on land routes. A shift
from water to land transport was revealed in 1964 in a captured document
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from the Finance and Economic Section of Chau Thanh District of Tay Ninh
Province which stated that its transport units had to use cross-country
land routes because movements by water were often stopped and searched.
Viet Cong use of water transport undoubtedly continues, however, because
some areas can be reached, only by water transport or by a combination of
land and water transport. A description of a logistic system on a river
route
IThe explosives were smuggled from Phnom Penh on a
ship to a point within 1 mile of the border. The explosives were then trans-
ferred to small junks downstream at night to about 5 miles below the border
from where other crews took over. In the first 3 months of 1963 about 3
to 5 tons of explosives were transported almost every other day in this
fashion by one or two boats. The materials were well camouflaged in sacks
under layers of sand, salt, or fruit or in false bottoms and tops of the
the Viet Cong man the boats them-
selves when certain materials such as rifles and ammunition are being
transported.
47. The land routes provide access at many points along the Cambodian
border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain
supplies as necessary. Motorable routes possibly used for this purpose
include at least 6 roads that cross the border between Quang Duc Province
and the Gulf of Siam. Evidence exists that before crossing the border
porters fan out from the roads onto the complex of trails to portage their
loads. In other cases the agents mingle with the local traffic that crosses
the border by vehicle or on foot. Four of the major land routes that enter
South Vietnam through Tay Ninh Province reportedly have been used to trans-
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 port weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. o rout es enter
the province from the north, one from the west, and one from the south. The
Viet Cong,
(have assembled as many as 300 porters
at one time to carry their supplies across the border. An Giang Province,
located on the south side of the Mekong, is another area through which land
supply routes pass.
in March 19631
Viet Cong crossed the border almost nightly.
taken to the border and there picked up by the Viet Cong.
he
supplies were
Points of entry into An Giang and Phuoc Long
Organizational Control
48. Information on organizations that control the infiltration of
supplies from Cambodia is very sparse. An example of such an organization,
however, probably is the above-mentioned Finance and Economic Section of
the Chau Thanh District of Tay Ninh Province. This section may be only
one of many such organizations along the border or it may be the principal
one that serves COSVN. .n May 1964 the
section was composed of a section chief with his deputy and 5 helpers and
3 units or cells. One unit consisted of 5 men who recruited 7 Cambodians
and 4 Vietnamese tradesmen to purchase goods in Cambodia, and 3 other men
who were only in charge of purchases of goods from local markets. Another
unit consisted of a village organized into 5 water transport units and 12
land transport units. The third was a motor boat cell. In may 1964 the
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section purchased in Cambodia about 15 tons of supplies, including many
types of food, cloth, dry cell batteries, electric wire, and medicine. In
addition the list of purchased items included about 90 animals.
Viet Cong B4ses in Cambodian Territory
4+9. While there is considerable evidence that the Viet Cong use the
Cambodian border area as a sanctuary and bivouac area for varying periods,
there is no confirmation of reports received during the past few years that
they have established permanent military bases, rest camps, training areas,
hospitals, workshops, or storage facilities. Most reports of such facili-
Seldom has the same information been obtained from two individual
of suspected Viet Cong military
installations have invariably indicated that they were long since abandoned
or were not military installations in the first place. Even though the
Viet Cong obtain supplies in Cambodia or transport them through Cambodia,
there is no evidence that large stockpiles are maintained there for any
period of time.
50. Recent reports cannot be confirmed or denied that the headquarters
of the PAVN 325th Division, elements of which are known to have infiltrated
into South Vietnam, is located in northeastern Cambodia in the area border-
ing Laos and South Vietnam. The area in question is remote, mountainous,
and sparsely inhabited only by tribesmen, and the headquarters of the 325th
Division could be in any one of the three countries at any given time. In
the past, some captured Viet Cong have stated that they had infiltrated into
South Vietnam via Cambodia so there is precedent for the use of this area
by Communist forces.
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Cambodian Government Collusion
51. There is no question that the Cambodian government has taken an
attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese situa=
tion. The Cambodian government has expressed its official goodwill
diplomatically and politically for the NFLSV, but stated that Cambodian
neutrality forbids its operational and logistic cooperation. Sihanouk
has made public statements supporting the NFLSV's claim to represent the
Vietnamese people; he sponsored the Indochinese Peoples Conference at
Phnom Penh in February; he has presented medical supplies to the victims
of American bombing in North Vietnam; and he presided at a ceremony in
which medical supplies were presented to a representative of the NFLSV.
He also participated in negotiations concerning the Cambodian/South Vietnam-
ese border with representatives of North Vietnam and the Front in December
1964, though he was disappointed in these negotiations as neither the
Front nor Hanoi was willing to give him the border guarantees he desired.
In short, Sihanouk's open political support of the NFSLV has helped the
Front in developing its international image as the "legitimate" represent-
ative of the South Vietnamese people.
52. However, there is no hard evidence that the central Cambodian
government is actively or knowingly providing logistic support to the Viet
Cong, beyond the gift of medical supplies mentioned above. There is no
conclusive evidence that Communist arms being brought in openly through
Sihanoukville are intended for other than the Cambodian armed forces al-
though it is conceivable that some may have ultimately gone to the Viet
Cong. It is also conceivable that the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce
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knowingly assisted the Viet Cong by granting licenses to Cambodian firms
to import explosive materials in excess of domestic needs for eventual
diversion to the Viet Cong. The Cambodian government did, however, seize
a shipment of potassium chlorate moving down the Mekong in September 1963
and turned the confiscated material over the royal palace for the manu-
facture of fireworks.
53. There is some evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at
lower Cambodian government and military levels. Despite the fact that
Cambodian authorities have occasionally taken well publicized actions
against Viet Cong border crossers and arrested Viet Cong personnel in
Cambodia, there are other reports of Viet Cong being permitted to take
refuge from South Vietnamese military forces in Cambodia, at times appar-
ently with the active assistance of Cambodian armed forces. There have
even been some low-level reports of Cambodian and Viet Cong troops
fighting together against South Vietnamese troops, and Viet Cong prisoners
of war in 1964 stated that the Cambodian troops attempted to cover up
their cooperation with the insurgents. Prisoners have also reported that
local Cambodian authorities have made no effort to interfere with Viet
Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia.
reported that Cambodian soldiers assisted the Viet
Cong in trucking ammunition and explosives to the border. Cambodian
villagers and even Cambodian military units in the border areas report-
edly regard the Viet Cong as protectors or allies and not invaders.
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54. In sum, it is difficult to estimate reliably the extent to which
Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active Cambodian cooper-
ation, passive "laissez-faire," or simply the inability of the Cambodian
government to.control or even patrol its frontiers. It is also possible
that some local officials may help the Viet Cong for personal profit or
out of fear of reprisal.
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VI. INITIAL SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARY HANDLERS OF EXTERNALLY PROVIDED
SUPPLIES
55. The initial sources of externally provided supplies are princi-
pally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, and
the US. The countries through which most of these supplies pass immediately
before infiltration into South Vietnam are most likely North Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South Vietnam coast from
other Bloc countries are possible.
56. Supplies that are moved via North Vietnam most likely are trans-
ported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam.
Although these materials undoubtedly were
destined for the PAVN forces, supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are
taken from PAVN storage areas. Reports are also available indicating that
military supplies have been moved from China by junk or small coastal ships
to various points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it is possible
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that war material is moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments
about 175 of the ships belonged to Bloc countries, and a considerable pro-
portion of the Free World ships calling there were chartered to Bloc coun-
some merchant ships have offloaded
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cargo into junks and other small craft before entering the port of Haiphong.
Such cargo could have been destined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam,
much of which seems to originate in, the Haiphong area.
57. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from
Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels, and princi-
pally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries
call at Sihanoukville
The total tonnage is relatively small and the bulk of
it consists of non-military supplies.
Only slightly over 1,000 tons of cargo
were delivered to Sihanoukville from the USSR and East Europe in the first
half of 1965, while or}ly three Chinese Communist ships called at the port
during the same period. One of these ships carried only commercial goods;
one carried commercial goods and material for a small ordnance plant which
China had promised to build for Cambodia; and the third carried a significant
amount of military equipment -- in partial fulfillment of China's promise
to equip about 22,000 Cambodian troops. Since 1963 there have been only
about 10 Communist military deliveries to Cambodia. The items delivered
have ranged from spare parts and ammunition to MIG aircraft, but there has
been no effort by Cambodia, Communist China, or the USSR to conceal these
deliveries, and Prince Sihanouk has provided a detailed breakdown of the
weapons supplied.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that any significant amount of this new
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equipment or ammunition has been supplied to the Viet Cong, although some
of the replaced equipment may have been turned over to the Viet Cong.
58. The weapons and ammunition that have been shipped to the Viet
Cong. through Cambodia probably were smuggled into Cambodia by sampans or
junks, or over land routes, or obtained from commercial channels in
Cambodia. Potassium chlorate, a chemical used in making matches, but
which can also be used in making explosives, is an example of a military
item which may be obtained by the Viet Cong through commercial channels
in Cambodia. Between 1961 and 1963, Cambodian imports of potassium
chlorate increased about 10 times
although there was no comparable increase in the use of matches in
Cambodia. Valid licenses for all imports of this chemical were issued
to established business firms in Cambodia.
59? In addition to explosives, other military supplies for the Viet
Cong which are being or have been imported through commercial channels
include communications equipment and medical supplies.
the Nam Phuang Import-Export Company, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was expected
to send a shipment of tactical radio equipment to the: Viet Cong in the
near future. The shipment, consisting of about 50 radio sets manufactured
in Japan, was to be made from Phnom Penh to Tay Ninh, South Vietnam. On
3 September 1965, Prince Sihanouk presented a gift of medical supplies
to a representative of the National Front for the Liberation of South
Vietnam. These supplies probably were imported from abroad by the
Cambodian government through normal commercial channels.
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BLOC-SUPPLIED AND LOCA.LLY PRODUCED WEA.PONS AND AMMUNITION
PROBABLY HELD BY THE VIET CONG MAIN FORCE UNITS
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
1. Communist China
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54
7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)
7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M44)
7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model K50
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSh) VC modified
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)
7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)
7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)
40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)
57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)
75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56
Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)
60-mm Mortar, Model 31
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82-mm Mortar
90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51
b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 50
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 53
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 56
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model L
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model API B32
7.92-mm Cartridge
12.7-mm Cartridge
40-mm Grenade, PG-2
60-mm Shell, mortar
82-mm Shell, mortar
75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun
2. USSR
a. Weapons:
7.62-mm Carbine, Model m44
7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891
7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSh 41
7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP46
23-mm Cannon
b. Ammunition:
7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P
7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32
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3. Czechoslovakia
a. Weapons:
7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B4+6
b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited.):
7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle
7.92-mm Cartridge, fv(auser
4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiel
a. Weapons and. Explosive Devices:
Skyhorse (VC Type-Bazooka)
Grenade launcher
AA. Machinegun (modified from US 50 caliber MG)
AT Parachute hand.grenad.e
Bicycle mine
Mine delay firing device
Shaped. charge (2 types)
Shaped. mine, short cone type
Hollow cone mine, non-electric
A.P mine, cylindrical type
A.P fragmentation grenades (2 types)
AT mine, cast iron fragmentation
AT mine (constructed. from British 100-mm mortar shell)
AT mine, iron case, cylindrical
AT mine, wooden, box type
Mine, turtle shaped., cement
Mine, turtle shaped., sheet metal
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Mine, betel box shaped., cement
Mine, round. volume type, sheet metal
Mine, round. mound type, cement
Mine, 81-mm mortar container
Fixed. directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-l0
Incendiary grenade, sodium
Chemical firing device
A.P mine, match box size
Antenna detonating device
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COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED
SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
DECEMBER 1964 - JUNE 1965
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Number of Trucks
Reported Moving Nu
mber
o
f Days
A
T
P
verage Num
rucks Movi
er Day /
ber of
ng
Route Number and Month
South
North Co
vere
d
by Reports
S
outh
North
Route 23 b/
December 1964 c/
185
12
5
37
2
January 1965
337
324
22
15
15
February 1965
311
172
27
12
6
March / 1965
481
658
30
16
22
April 1965
640
775
30
21
26
May
1965
340
541
24
14
23
Sub-total
.2,294
2,482
138
17
18
June
1965
0
0
5
0
0
Total
2,294
2,482
143
16
17
Route 92
February 1965
13
15
19
0.7
0.8
March
1965
11
12
21
0.5
0.6
April
1965
66
58
20
3.3
2.9
May
1965
27
35
26
1.0
1.4
1-5 June
1965
7
7
5
1.4
1.4
Sub-total
124
127
91
1.4
6-30 June
1965
0
0
17
Total
124
127
108
a/ Total number of trucks reported during the month divided by the number of
days covered by reports during the month.
c Of these trucks, 170 were reported from other points on days-when there
was no coverage in this area. Since these 170 trucks would have'had to pass
this area, they have been included in this tabulation.
d/ The direction of an additional 4 trucks was not given.
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22 September 1965
Copy No. 6
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GROUP I
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051WM V,nyb0o
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