REPORT ON STRATEGIC WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100440001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 27, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
NRO REVIEWS
COMPLETED
Report on Strategic Warning
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February 1967
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18,
Sections 793, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the reve-
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as
its use iri any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels.
Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining
25X1 A to the ALENT-KEYHOLE and Communications Intelligence
Controls. No action is to be taken on any communications intelligence
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantage to be gained,
if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature
of the source, unless such action is first approved by the appropriate
authority.
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The Honorable Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.
In accordance with President Kennedy's letter to Mr. McCone
dated 16 January 1962 and the Director's letter to the Secretary
of Defense dated 12 December 1963, your Deputy for National
Intelligence Programs Evaluation asked me, with appropriate staff
assistance, to study in depth the performance, planning, present
and foreseeable future problems of the U.S. intelligence community
in carrying out its Early Warning mission. That mission is defined
in the Charter of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)
Watch Committee (DCID 1/5 of 23 April 1965) as follows:
To provide the U.S. Intelligence Board with the earliest
possible intelligence warning of, and continuing judgment
on, /Soviet Bloc and Chinese/ intentions to engage in
aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.
In the course of my survey, I have extensively reviewed the
present capabilities of information systems and intelligence
organizations contributing to Early Warning and have attempted to
anticipate and outline future trends, problems and improvements in
warning matters which the intelligence community should expect in
the years ahead. My report is submitted herewith.
My work has been invaluably assisted by the fine cooperation
and true professional competence of a large number of dedicated
intelligence officers throughout the intelligence community, both in
the Washington area and in the field. I have had the benefit of a
number of special studies and memoranda prepared for me and many
detailed and excellent briefings on a host of subjects related to
strategic warning in the Washington area and in the field, at home
and abroad.
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I hope the Report will accomplish two purposes. The first
is to set forth for you and the other members of the U.S.
Intelligence Board my analysis of the manner in which the U.S.
warning intelligence machinery is organized and operating, the
strengths and limitations of that machinery and certain problems
confronting it. The second purpose is to present for study and
decision my estimate of the problems which the warning effort may
well face in the next years and my action recommendations and
suggestions for dealing with them.
The problems in the area of warning intelligence are not
simple. The target=-enemy hostile intent, concealed as best the
enemy can--is elusive. The multi-agency and service structure of
the intelligence community complicates the tasks of collecting
and assessing the vast flow of bits and pieces. Much of what I
recommend calls for further study in the several areas of the
warning effort. For background information for you and for those
who may participate in any such studies, I submit separately my
treatment in some depth of the various intelligence collection
resources which do or can contribute to warning (Annexes A to E)
and the various processes for extracting warning intelligence from
those sources (Annexes F to J).
The Report itself consists of background material and
conclusions required for perspective (I); analysis of indications
intelligence and its appropriate role in the intelligence community
(II); a summary of the detailed treatment in the several arnexes
of the discussion of warning sources and warning processes (III);
comment on warning costs and on the problem of delivery of the end
product to the customers--the national decision makers (IV); and,
finally, my recommendations for improvement M.
Without attempting to summarize those recommendations, I do
emphasize here the need for you and for USIB to study and take
action on the present and imminent problems of the warning effort
in various segments of the intelligence community.
Whether the recommendations and suggestions of this Report are
precisely correct in every detail is not of great concern. Of
vital interest to the United States is the task of ensuring that the
problems outlined in the Report be carefully studied and that
appropriate solutions be determined and carried out by the members
of the intelligence community. The Report may gather dust; the
problems must not.
Respectfully subj$tted,,
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Background and Conclusions
1. Strategic warning is one of the most important responsibilities
of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the U.S. Intelligence
Board. Timely warning of hostile enemy intentions will require the
best efforts of all elements in the intelligence community to deal with
its gravest crisis. It is the purpose of this Report to examine the
community's present machinery for meeting this challenge and to propose
measures to maintain and improve it for the years and crises ahead.
2. The term "warning" as used in this paper refers to strategic,
rather than tactical warning. Strategic warning is warning of enemy
preparations to attack acquired by intelligence sources and methods,
transmitted through intelligence channels, evaluated by intelligence
organizations and passed to national security authorities at the highest
level for use in determining national policies and reactions. Tactical
warning is warning of the actual approach of the enemy (or his weapons)
acquired by mechanical sensors for the most part, transmitted through
operational channels to tactical force commanders for prompt tactical
reactions and countermeasures.
3. The strategic warning system of the U.S. intelligence community
was developed during the late forties and early fifties and was strongly
conditioned by the strategic surprises at Pearl Harbor and in Korea.
Its primary focus was on the USSR and the possibility of a surprise
attack, first by Soviet Long Range Aviation and then by ICBM. Concurrently,
it was also directed against the possibility of a Soviet ground attack
in Europe, with flanking moves in the Middle East, always with the
prospect of a rapid escalation into intercontinental nuclear war in the
background. This system has never had to face the problems it was
designed to meet; throughout its existence it has dealt with peripheral
crises--the Arab-Israeli War, the Hungarian revolt, the Syrian-Turkish
crisis, the Offshore Islands, Indonesia, Laos, Berlin, Cuba and
Vietnam--looking at and past them to the posture of the USSR and China
and to signs that the Soviets or the Chinese might be preparing to
enter, exploit or expand the local confrontations.
4. As the detente with the USSR continues, questions are being
raised as to whether the likelihood of a Soviet attack on the U.S. or
its forces or allies abroad has diminished to the point where a special
warning effort against that possibility is no longer justified.
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5. We set forth here our firm and central conclusion that, so
long as the USSR possesses the means to launch a damaging assault on
the U.S., it is essential to maintain continuous surveillance over
all the elements of Soviet power which could be involved directly or
in a supporting role in that assault. We believe that it is minimum
prudence to maintain and improve as expert and as well supported a
strategic warning system as the community can develop.
a) The achievement and maintenance of a high degree of
competence in strategic warning matters is a major component
of national power; its preservation and improvement are
essential;
b) The rise of the Chinese threat requires the development
of a substantive expertise on Chinese behavior and processes
of readying for war comparable in detail and documentation to
that evolved over many years on the USSR;
c) The strategic warning mission of USIB, its Watch
Committee and the National Indications Center remains valid and
deserves support from USIB along lines suggested in this Report.
d) Intelligence information collection, processing and
analysis techniques are likely to go through major changes
under the im~act of oncoming technological developments. The
intelligence community and its strategic warning mechanism must
find ways to adapt and exploit these changes for the systematic
improvement5of the Nation's warning capability.
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Indications Intelligence
1. Indications intelligence is the term used to describe a
systematic effort to detect, trace and document enemy preparations
a) to initiate hostilities, b) to pursue courses of action involving
a risk of hostilities, or c) to move to deter or oppose an anticipated
U.S. course of action which appears to risk hostilities, and on that
basis to estimate enemy hostile or non-hostile intentions. Indications
intelligence has several basic postulates:
a) that no enemy can launch hostilities from a standing start
but must make some prior preparations, moves, deployments or force
status checks to be sure that his initial offensive strikes are of
the force and weight required and that his own defenses are
prepared to reduce the effects of U.S. counter-strikes;
b) that the process of preparing for a major war will
generate enough aberrations in enemy behavior patterns and activity
levels to permit the intelligence community to recognize a
condition of abnormality with some degree of specificity;
c) that some preparatory moves can be detected by U.S.
intelligence if we know what to look for, where to look for it
and how to recognize it;
d) that the best warning we may be able to give may have to
be based on fragmentary and inconclusive evidence and on less than
perfect proof.
2. Indications intelligence deals essentially with enemy inten-
tions, and these are ephemeral, contingent on and alterable by a great
variety of unpredictable events, actions, and interpretations. It is
extremely unlikely that direct evidence of hostile enemy intentions
will ever be available in such explicitness, accuracy and reliability
as to form the basis for U.S. counteractions. It is necessary, therefore,
to turn to an extensive, broad-based, essentially inferential process of
collecting, processing, correlating, analyzing and drawing judgments
from a great field of data of all kinds as to indications of what enemy
intentions may be. This process cannot provide certainty and absolute
truth; at best it will always be an imperfect and incomplete approxi-
mation of what the enemy's posture for and intentions to attack are at
a given time.
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3. The critical element in indications intelligence is the prompt
recognition of abnormalities in enemy behavior which might reflect a
change in enemy posture and capabilities for war. It is essential,
therefore, to develop the most accurate and complete understanding of
what constitutes normality in all aspects of enemy life which might
be affected in preparing for war. Against this baseline of normality,
abnormalities can more readily be recognized and evaluated. Isolated
abnormalities are constant occurrences; numerous and concurrent
abnormalities affecting a broad range of capabilities should prompt a
sense of concern and a general warning which can be made progressively
more specific as further evidence reveals a widening involvement of the
war-making elements of enemy power. Yet even fairly complete information
on these matters may not permit clear identification of enemy intentions.
It will always be difficult to distinguish whether the enemy intends a
preemptive attack, a ready defense against a feared attack, a bluff to
support a major international move or a deterrent to some course of
action expected from us. IL L E GIB
4. If the recognition of a concurrence of ominous abnormalities
in enemy behavior is the basis for strategic warning, it is essential
to know in advance what form those abnormalities might take. The basic
framework of warning intelligence is the Indicator List, a list of steps
which may be taken by the enemy to raise his forces from whatever level
they may be at a given time to the level of readiness necessary for
waging war. These indicators cover not only military, but also political,
economic, scientific, diplomatic, and intelligence activities which are
likely to show change as the enemy readies all his assets for their
greatest task. Success in developing warning depends on the precision
and accuracy of these indicators, the clarity of understanding of them
by the various intelligence collection source systems, and the
,sophistication and perceptiveness on the part of intelligence analysts
throughout the community in recognizing evidence--or indications--that
.these indicators or readying measures are indeed being carried out.
An improved warning capability depends on improving the speed and
sensitivity of collection sources to these indicators, in learning more
about what the enemy really must do in the readying process, and in
more promptly and accurately correlating all evidence that readying
measures or departures from norms are taking place.
5. Because of the panoramic scope of enemy activity that must
be kept under surveillance for the earliest possible detection of
abnormalities, because of the need for a great variety of expertise
and because of the gredt"volumes of information which must be dealt
with, virtually every part of the intelligence community is involved
more or less directly in warning intelligence. This diffusion requires
a centralizing mechanism to correlate and analyze all indications and
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aberrations wherever they may have been initially perceived. Within
most current intelligence organizations there are activities designated
as focal points for indications evidence and for the support of the
national warning organization, the Watch Committee of the USIB and its
staff, the National Indications Center (NIC).
6. Success in providing timely warning will depend on better and
more definitive indications information for the strongest possible
proof of enemy intentions as early as possible in the process of readying
for war. This will depend in turn on the accuracy, sophistication and'
comprehensiveness of our indicators, the sensitivity of our collection
sources in recognizing indications, the perceptiveness of analytical and
judgments elements in drawing conclusions from these indications and the
ability of top intelligence officials to convey, and of decision makers
to understand, the warning this process can produce.
7. The relationship between current and indications intelligence
is close and in many ways mutually complementary. Indications intelli-
gence is essentially a specialized way of dealing with current
intelligence, and the NIC depends heavily on the support it receives
from departmental current intelligence offices. In most crisis
situations the line between current and indications intelligence becomes
blurred as both operations focus on the same sets of facts and follow
the situation together. Differing views between the NIC analysts and
those in current intelligence offices as to what those facts mean can
give rise to problems in developing community judgments. Ways must be
found to take advantage of the specialized skills of both groups.
Indications intelligence can contribute, in addition to the shared
function of current reporting, research and knowledge in depth of
specific patterns of enemy behavior, of specific enemy requirements for
war readiness and of prior real or exercise readying processes. These
are of great value in interpreting current developments for warning
purposes and in watching for the earliest signs of hostile enemy
intentions.
8. Indications intelligence in the form of the Watch Committee-
NIC system is a means of maintaining a special alert against strategic
surprise, a minimum insurance against the possibility that current
intelligence operations might overlook or misinterpret significant
warning indications and a specialized discipline for keeping continuous
watch on the state of enemy capabilities.
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Warning Sources and Warning Processes
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1. In the course of our review of the early warning activities of
the U.S. intelligence community, detailed studies were made of all sources
of intelligence collection that could contribute to indications intelli-
gence and of all aspects of information processing, analysis, evaluation
and judgment which form a part of the warning effort.
COMINT and Warning
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than a decade and a sensitive "feel" for likely propaganda themes in a
- STATSPEpre-hostilities crisis has been developed, supported by the extensive
Guidance of Collection
22. Guidance to collectors for warning purposes exists in general
terms in PNIO #1, "Maximum prior warning of impending military attack
on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is
committed to defend", and more specifically in the official USIB General
Indicator List, last revised and approved in September 1964. The latter
is a:list of preparatory actions the enemy could take, grouped under
topical headings and arranged as precisely as possible in the chronological
order in which the actions would be likely to be carried out. Theoretically,
the List should serve as a matrix for incoming evidence (or negative
reports) and as a synoptic scenario for the warning effort.
23. The General Indicator List is essentially a statement of informa-
tion objectives, however, and requires reinterpretation in detailed
requirements for specific collection sources. There is a need for this
process to be carried out before this kind of collection becomes urgent.
Indicators, rephrased as specific collection requirements in terms
meaningful to the several collection systems, should be levied on specific
collectors and discussed with them so that collectors are aware of the
demands that will be placed on them in a crisis, and the users of infor-
mation have an idea of what information may be forthcoming when needed.
24. The General Indicator List can also serve as a unifying frame-
work for tagging evidence, for data storage, background and baseline
analysis, trend assessment and as a check-off list for enemy status
reports. On this basis the List can provide coherence and continuity
across varieties of information and ensure the examination of evidence in
terms of its potential relevance to a given part of the enemy's readying
process.
Information Selection
25. Indications information is no different from current information
serving other intelligence disciplines. A critical step in the warning
process is the recognition that a given item, while useful to current or
other intelligence analysis, may also have a special relevance to the
enemy's readying efforts. This may be accomplished by watch officers or
disseminators at the point of information receipt, by photo interpreters
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and SIGINT analysts in processing information, and by intelligence
analysts in the community's production offices. What is essential is
that ways be found to maintain an alertness by these people to
recognize a warning relevance and a willingness to see that the
information reaches the NIC as a central repository of indications.
26. Recognition procedures vary in effectiveness for the several
collection sources. They are most advanced in the SIGINT Warning
System where recognition can take-.,place at the intercept position and
where a world-wide network of uniform procedures assures that indications
information is sent promptly to the proper analysts, including the NIC.
More work is needed to develop a comparable sensitivity in the
reconnaissance field. A "warning readout team" of NPIC and NIC people
with considerable familiarity with the usual appearance of places likely
to be affected in a war readying effort would enhance the possibility
of early recognition of warning abnormalities. In the field of human
source reporting, a long-standing problem has been how to ensure that
scanners and disseminators are fully and currently aware of the concerns
and needs of indications analysts. Some upcoming developments in the
fields of electronic scanning and dissemination of reports may offer
an improved reliability, but nothing replaces a specialized reader who
is virtually a warning analyst himself in his sensitivity to warning
information.
Automatic Data Processing
27. Automatic data processing (ADP) has been discussed in
connection with warning for many years but little real effort has been
given to investigating what it can and cannot do for this purpose.
Moreover, there has been considerable uncertainty as to the proper
objectives to be sought from ADP and the scale of the effort which
should be devoted to warning needs. Current ADP techniques can
improve the handling and retrieval of indications, correlate indica-
tions by a number of sortings for pattern or trend analyses, record
events for chronologies and adapt more readily than manual systems
to increasing speeds and volumes of information transmissions such as
real-time readout would represent. The growth of the community's
ability to provide timely strategic warning will depend in an important
degree on the successful adaptation of ADP to the warning problem.
28. Probably the most effective way for the NIC to enter the ADP
is through piggy-backing on existing systems and those under development
among the intelligence agencies. Much of what NIC would need in the way
of information retrieval might be furnished by such systems as COINS
(Community On-Line Intelligence System) which will permit remote
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querying of certain files of one agency by other agencies. It might
suffice for some time to come for NIC to develop certain specialized
programs and tapes and run them on computers in CIA and DIA. These
programs might support NIC current and research needs such as
chronologies, summaries of indications, monitoring of activity levels
and, on a more sophisticated plane, model building and simulation.
In the future, when the computer file is continually up to date in
information, it will be very useful to be able to check all other
categories of indicators in the computer store for corroborating
abnormalities whenever an unusual trend or act is noticed in one such
category.
Evaluation and Analysis
29. Each of the major intelligence agencies has extensive organiza-
tions exploiting, analyzing, publishing and disseminating current intelli-
gence. Each of these organizations and other offices engaged more in
research in depth bear part of the community responsibility for providing
strategic warning and contribute in various specialized ways to the work
of the community's warning machinery--the Watch Committee and the NIC.
The relationship between these efforts and the NIC has been well set
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is described as an a vance warning evaluation center supported by all
intelligence agencies in Washington. The NIC serves as a focal point
to receive all information that might have a bearing on Soviet intentions
to initiate hostilities". The principal function of the NIC was stated
as "the evaluation and collation of warning information from a national
standpoint in support of the Watch Committee".
30. The NIC is a small interagency organization of 29 persons
drawn from CIA, NSA, Army, Navy and the Air Force. The State slot has
been left unfilled for over five years. The NIC is headed by a Director
from CIA and a Depty Director, a colonel from Air Force, the executive
agent of the organization. The Indications Staff, the day-staff
analytical element, is nine persons, supported by two in graphics, two
in security functions and three secretaries. The 24-hour Watch Alert
Group is composed of 11 men, civilian and military, who carry out the
first echelon scanning, selection and noting processes.
31. As time has passed and US-Communist confrontations have increased
in number and kind, the Watch Committee has had to cover more and more
problems to remain responsive to the USIB and policy levels. Each such
extension has widened the area the NIC must deal with in support of the
Watch Committee, As a result, NIC's coverage has necessarily become
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more superficial in certain cases and its dependence on and competition
with current intelligence offices greater. A basic dilemma confronts
the Watch Committee and the NIC: the increasingly complex problem of
enemy intentions, the shrinking warning time likely, and the massive
consequences of failure to give warning argue for full-time, single-
minded concentration on warning indications by at least one intelligence
organization. Yet war does not threaten every week, and enemy
intentions remain to be dealt with in other areas and in other contexts
than that of full-scale Soviet-US nuclear war.
32. One solution to this problem is to redefine the roles of the
NIC and departmental current intelligence offices in support of the
Watch Committee, shifting the bulk of analysis and reporting on current
developments to the current shops and focussing the NIC on the evaluation
of specific potential indications which have appeared in the period under
review. Such a division of labor would encourage the:development of a
substantive professionalism in depth in indications matters and reduce
the area of overlap between NIC and departmental current reporting
responsibilities.
33. NIC's ability to speak authoritatively on indications subjects
would be enhanced by the assignment to it of a small (3-5 man) research
component which could undertake a needed rethinking of the whole
indications system and the individual indicators now relied on for warn-
ing. This research component could generate new indicators by wringing
out all the lessons to be learned from Soviet behavior in crises, major
maneuvers and system tests; it could redefine collection requirements
and explore warning potentials in new collection systems; it could
sharpen crisis operating procedures; and it could work out a realistic
role for ADP in support of warning. Working with research organizations
in and outside the intelligence community, it could go further than
has ever been possible up to now to assemble and exploit all available
information that could shed some light on the kinds of situations the
community's warning mechanisms may have to confront.
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Judgment
34. The judgment process in the context of warning is constrained
and complicated by a number of factors. Working against time and the
unknowable future, these warning judgments are subject to uncertainty
and inexactness. Dealing with some of the most serious problems of our
times, these judgments are understandably hesitant, fearful of being
misread and inclined to cautious and sometimes oblique phrasing.
Reissued week after week, these judgments are caught between the slowness
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of most big developments and the need at shorter intervals to find some
new way to reflect the small changes taking place in situations. Based
on less than perfect information, these judgments are often stretched
,,and strained to include a variety of views and, seeking an agreeable or
unanimous construction, can end by being less candid and informative
than if a dissent were forced.
35. The judgment process for strategic warning is carried out
within the Watch Committee cycle each week. The NIC Agenda for the next
Watch Committee meeting is drawn up on Friday and serves to identify
developments, trends, reports and indications which warrant departmental
analysis and discussion at the next session. On Monday,the NIC's draft
of the next Watch Report is drawn up and is circulated Tuesday. This
draft deals with Agenda and other items as NIC analysts assess them and
is subjected to searching study by departmental current analysts. Their
comments and changes are sent in prior to the Committee meeting on
Wednesday and are incorporated in the draft Report considered at the
table. The process at the table, then, becomes essentially editorial
with substantive discussion of the pros and cons of changing the draft
text. After the meeting the revised draft is forwarded to USIB for
noting and dissemination to policy levels.
36. Throughout this course of the weekly cycle, which absorbs about
80% of NIC's efforts, the judgment process is affected by the exchange
of ideas between departmental analysts and NIC's analytical staff and
by the differences in their perspectives. The result is a document
:strongly influenced by departmental viewpoints and so can be said to
represent the view of the community. The views of NIC analysts, if
they differ significantly from those of current intelligence analysts,
are usually deleted or diluted in the course of the process. This
sometimes raises the question of the usefulness of maintaining a
substantive staff in the NIC; these analysts would have greater impact
on the Report if they spoke from the agencies from which they came.
37. It is obvious that an effective judgment process requires that
it have available to it all the information pertinent to its concerns.
NSAM 226 provides that the NIC and the Watch Committee have access to
all information and intelligence pertinent to its mission without
restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.
Implementation of this Presidential Directive is spotty and needs
reaffirmation by USIB to its member agencies from time to time. On
a different plane, NIC and the Watch Committee need negative information
regarding warning indicators as much as they need positive reports.
Any warning collection plan in the future should stress the importance
of negative reports in maintaining accurate perspective on the status
of enemy preparations.
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38. The judgment process also benefits from the inclusion of all
pertinent varieties of assessments. Although the State Department sits
at the Committee table and participates in the formulation of the Report
at that point in the process, its failure for the past five years to
assign a State representative to the NIC has deprived the NIC portion of
the judgment process of important political and diplomatic inputs. This
shortcoming needs repair at the earliest opportunity. The entire warning
process would benefit.
39. Despite the numerous changes which have taken place in the
intelligence community and in the world's confrontations of power since
the present warning machinery was set up in 1954, many aspects of the
Watch Committee's operations remain substantially unchanged. The Watch
Committee itself should be tasked to examine its well-rooted procedures
for possibilities of better relevance to today's world's situations.
We would propose as points to be considered:
a) that the Watch Committee's Charter be more narrowly
interpreted to encompass those situations in which Soviet or Chinese
activities threaten conflict with US strategic interests (this would
include Vietnam, exclude Indian-Pakistani, Arab-Israeli, Indonesian-
Malaysian and other peripheral tensions);
b) that the Committee meet at less frequent intervals--
bi-weekly or monthly, with the option for more frequent meetings
as circumstances warrant;
c) that the Committee Report address itself more to measuring
changes and directions in the situations it covers rather than to
rewriting recent current publications;
d) that the NIC's contribution address itself fundamentally
to an accounting of the indications present in those situations;
,e e) that the Committee be charged to arrive at an assessment
as to the prospects in the conflicts it is "watching".
(40. In general, these proposals are directed toward focussing the
Committee's work on real threats to US strategic interests, on actual
or potential engagements of US forces with Soviet or Chinese or other
Communist forces. The Committee's efforts would be to arrive at an
assessment, a short-term estimate, of the likelihood of fighting or
enlargement of existing conflict based on indications analyzed and
submitted by the NIC and commented on by departmental experts. In this
way the Committee's product would fill a gap between regular current
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intelligence publications and national estimates. The result would be
a versatile Committee and NIC, able to deal with longer-term trends in
situations of strategic significance and with rapidly developing crises
in responding to the needs of policy-makers and of the USIB.
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Warning Costs and Warning Customers
Costs of Warning
1. A few words on the subject of the overall costrof the warning
effort are necessary. We have not conducted a cost/effectiveness
study, but we are aware of the size of the several budgets involved
in the total effort. In some areas we have found problems; most of
these are for decision and resolution by the internal management of
the agencies concerned; on some we venture an opinion:
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b) We believe that the collectors, especially NSA, are
tasked for too many reports in the name of warning. There is
a tendency in intelligence to ask for more without attempting
to cancel earlier requests for what has become unnecessary.
This is particularly true in the case of warning information
where no one seems willing to give up what may have become
relatively unproductive efforts simply because there continues
to be a slim chance that something of value might turn up some
day. The several agencies involved in the warning effort should
take a stronger role in policing those requirements levied in
the name of warning.
c) We are unable to identify with any precision specific
collection programs or analysis efforts more or less involved
in the warning effort which could be cut in the interest of
saving money. The inevitable tendency toward departmental
duplication and the inevitable justification of these efforts
on the grounds that in-house capabilities are needed constitute
effective bars to any wholesale cost-saving reductions. The
all too human tendency to try to learn more and more about
everything and the failure to distinguish between what is
necessary and what, by contrast, would be "nice to know" compli-
cate any broad effort to improve the situation in intelligence
requirements, including those requirements connected with
strategic warning. Yet the rising costs of intelligence
collection, processing, exploitation and analysis will inevitably
force sharper and sharper scrutiny of the real value of what we
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are doing in various fields; the warning effort should be no
exception.
d) Notwithstanding the foregoing, we do not believe that
the warning effort by itself can be the subject of a valid cost/
effectiveness study. Except for limited and relatively
inexpensive activities such as the NIC, the costs of the warning
effort are inextricably tied into collection, processing and
analysis activities which produce indications intelligence as
only a portion of their total output. The proportion assessable
against early warning would be virtually impossible to determine.
Warning Customers
2. In the last analysis, the success of the warning effort will
be measured by the actions taken by national decision makers in
response to warnings given. It is of the greatest importance there-
fore that users of warning understand the capabilities and limits of
the product they-May one day receive. The decision makers need to be
reminded from time to time that the best the intelligence community
is likely to produce will be a deductive judgment based on observable
enemy preparations and that the actions taken in response to warning
will have to be taken on less than absolute proof of hostile enemy
intentions. There should be a constant dialogue between the DCI and
the customers of warning in any crisis situation so that the decision
makers are continually aware of the progress of the situation, of the
indications of successive stages in readiness, and of the degree of
probability that more specific warning will be available as time passes.
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1. We submit herewith a number of recommendations for improving
the warning capabilities of the intelligence community. We believe
that conscientious and monitored implementation of these recommendations
will do much to ensure that when and if strategic warning is required,
the community's mechanisms will be able to meet the need.
a) The USIB should reaffirm its support of the mission of
its Watch Committee and the National Indications Center and
should give favorable consideration and support to the recommen-
dations below.
b) The DCI should designate a Warning Systems Monitor to
follow up the implementation of this Report's recommendations
and to ensure that new advances in intelligence techniques are
fully exploited to improve the warning capabilities of the
intelligence community.
3. Recommendations for Warning Sources
a) A study should be undertaken under the supervision of the
Chairman of the Watch Committee to identify COMINT processing and
reporting programs whose value to the warning effort may have
diminished to where they can be stopped or merged with other
reporting series.
b) The Chairman of the Watch Committee should arrange for
the extension of sensitive source clearances to all NIC and
Watch Committee members so that full use can be made of compart-
mented materials in warning analysis and research.
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e) NPIC and DIA should initiate a series of PI studies to
measure activity levels at various installations of relevance
to warning to determine the identifiability of important changes
in activity at various times. From such studies could come the
baselines of normal appearances for each installation, against
which changes of warning significance could be quickly recognized.
f) NPIC and NIC should collaborate in producing a Recon-
naissance Warning Survey, somewhat as a counterpart to the SIGINT
Warning Survey, building on the results of e) above. Such a
study could serve to guide the initial PI readout as the SIGINT
Survey guides the intercept operator in recognizing indications.
It could also provide the authoritative vehicle for Reconnaissance
Warning Requirements.
g) As progress in the above steps is achieved, consideration
should be given to the creation of warning readout teams of PI's
and NIC analysts to scan new photography on a routine basis for
evidence of abnormalities at locations of warning interest.
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i) CIA should designate a central point of reference in
the Clandestine Servides to handle NIC needs, to relay warning
information from sensitive covert sources, to inform the Watch
Committee and the NIC of changes in warning capabilities, and
to monitor and exploit any unique warning capabilities of foreign
intelligence services.
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4. Recommendations for Warning Processes
Guidance of Collection
a) The USIB should reaffirm the status of the General Indicator
List as its basic guidance for warning information collection and
management and should enjoin organizations involved in warning
processes to use the List and its indicator designators as,the
basic framework for information reporting, indexing, dissemination,
ADP storage and retrieval and correlation.
b) The NIC should convert the USIB General Indicator List
into a specific Warning Collection Plan, translating individual
indicators into detailed requirements expressed in terms meaning-
ful to the several collection sources which might obtain pertinent
indications information. These requirements should be forwarded
to the collectors to alert them to their responsibilities in crisis
situations.
c) The NIC and the Watch Committee should take prompt steps
to develop a counterpart to the General Indicator List for the
warning problem represented by Communist China. This too should
be converted into a specific collection plan and laid on
collectors through appropriate departmental machinery.
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Information Selection
d) The Warning Systems Monitor should follow developments
in communications with reference to their capability to speed
the flow of warning information. Operations of the Criticomm
net are of particular relevance in this context and should be
closely followed.
e) The Warning Systems Monitor should maintain awareness
of developments in automatic document scanning and dissemination
techniques with a view to the benefits which they may provide in
the selection and distribution of incoming warning information.
Automatic Data Processing
f) The Chairman of the Watch Committee should coordinate
a concentrated effort to determine the requirements of the NIC
for ADP methods, explore existing techniques and systems for
adaptation of NIC needs, and develop new programs for NIC re-
search support and quick recall and review of indicator
categories for significant indications.
Evaluation and Analysis
g) The NIC should review and reinforce procedures by which
its current information needs are watched for by alert mechanisms
throughout the intelligence community. It should ensure that
2.~ changes in inteIests and needs are promptly passed to these
offices and that these offices are aware of their responsibility
to spot pertinent information for transmission to NIC.
h) The Department of State should take prompt steps to
restore its assignment of an experienced political analyst to
2 the NIC to provide analysis of the political contexts of critical
warning problems.
i) Member agencies of the Watch Committee should contribute
qualified personnel for the formation of a small research com-
ponent in the NIC to strengthen the specialized substantive
competence of the NIC in warning subjects.
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k) The Director of NIC and the Warning Systems Monitor
should review existing intelligence reporting instructions
pertinent to the warning problem to ensure that adequate
25 provision is made for negative reporting on certain key indicators
during crisis periods in order that accurate perspective can be
maintained on the enemy's intentions and progress toward combat
readiness.
1) The Watch Committee should examine the changes in its
operations proposed in paragraph 39 of Section III and recommend
to USIB the adoption of those they consider feasible. These
~-~ changes call for less frequent Committee meetings, Committee
assessments on situations it has under surveillance, and more
room for dissents in Committee conclusions.
m) The Watch Committee or the Warning Systems Monitor
should study the role of the Watch Committee and the NIC in
crisis management plans and procedures so that these mechanisms
can adjust in advance to the likely needs for quick-reaction and
prompt judgments in critical situations.
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ANNEX F - Guidance of Collection
The USIB General Indicator List
A Warning Collection Plan
Uses of the List
Other Lists
ANNEX G - Information Selection
Communications
Recognition and Dissemination
SIGINT
Photography
Human Source Reports
Dissemination Systems
ANNEX H - Automatic Data Processing
F-1
F-3
F- 4
F-4
G-1
G-1
G-2
G-2
G-3
G- 4
Some General Ideas H-1
Past Experience H-2
Present Position H-3
Some Uses of ADP for Warning Analysis H-4
ADP In NIC H-5
ANNEX IR-- Evaluation and Analysis
First-Level Exploitation I-1
Current Intelligence Operations 1-4
The National Indications Center (NIC) I-6
NIC Analysis Function 1-7
Possible Remedies 1-8
Some Other Ideas for Warning Research I-10
ANNEX J - Judgment and the Watch Committee
Recognition of Indications J-l.
Some Possible Changes in Watch Committee Procedure J-3
Crisis Management and the Watch Process J-6
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REPORT ON STRATEGIC WARNING
ANNEX A - COMINT and Warning
Page
COMINT and Soviet Forces: The Rocket Forces
A-2
Long Range Aviation
A-2
Air Defense
A-3
Submarines
A-3
Naval and Naval Aviation Forces
A-4
Ground Forces
A-4
Other Activities
A-5
COMINT Warning Problems and Prospects
A-6
ANNEX B - .FLINT and Warning
ELINT Warning Problems
B-1
ELINT Potential
B-1
SIGINT Satellites
B-2
Prospects
B-2
ANNEX C - Reconnaissance and Warning
The Present Status
C-l
Photo-Reconnaissance Characteristics
C-2
Future Photo-Satellites
C-4
Other Future Technical Prospects
C-5
Table A - Indications through Overhead Reconnaissance
ANNEX D - The Clandestine Services and Warning
The Case for the Penetration Agent
D- 1
Counter-Intelligence Operations
1)__3
Future Prospects
D-3
The Clandestine Services and the NIC
ANNEX E - Overt Human Sources and Warning
D- 4
Diplomatic Personnel
The Moscow Observers Guide
Military Liaison Missions
Defectors and Travelers
E- 1
E- 2
E- 2
H- 3
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already seen and soon to be seen again in visual photography, SLR
would provide an important real time continuity in a fast-building
crisis or in late stages of Soviet preparations and deployments.
0-20. The potential in satellite imaging reconnaissance systems
gives some ground for hope that increasing complexities in the
warning problem can be dealt with, although probably with rising costs.
One clear conclusion is inescapable: the investments in sensor and
vehicle development will require comparable investments in means of
exploitation and analysis. The technical revolution in information
collection, epitomized by the reconnaissance field, is only just
beginning to be felt. Its full impact promises to be enormous and
will be expensive, but the great volumes of information we are learning
to collect must dp,:Rlt with or d Nowhere will this problem
be sharper than which seems
inevitable at some date ine ma e hat the technical
is obvious; when
difficulties. The importance of
it comes, its effect on intelligence analysis and judgment processes
is likely to be revolutionary.
NRO
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Guidance of Collec~Lj.on.
F'?-1. The original concepts of indications intelligence generally
held that indicator lists--Checklists, as they were often called--would
serve to express the warning information needs of the intelligence
community. Indicators, descriptions of preparatory measures we could
expect the enemy to take, were grouped under substantive or topical
headings and were listed as precisely as possible in the chronological
order in which such steps probably would be taken. Theoretically, the
collector could follow the list down, indicator by indicator, and know
what to look for next. Theoretically, too, the warning analysts, stack-
ing indications up beside the indicators they pertained to, could tell
what level of readiness the enemy was reaching and could request special
collection efforts to be aimed precisely at the kinds of indicators
logically next to appear. Theoretically, the General Indicator List
would form the matrix for incoming indications (or negative reports)
and serve as a synoptic scenario for the whole warning effort at all
steps in the enemy's readying process. The List would thus unify and
regulate a wide variety of activities from collection to ultimate
judgment a_nd decision. Essentially, this concept is still valid and
practical, but for a number of reasons it has failed to be as effective
in practice as it should be in both warning collection and warning
analysis.
The USIB General Indicator List
F-2. The principal official indicator list today is the USIB
General Indicator List, last revised and approved in September 1964.
Its failure to serve effectively as a warning collection guide
certainly does not derive from its lack of status or distribution or
from absence of formal recognition of the warning problem. The General
Indicator List theoretically amplifies Priority National Intelligence
Objectives #1 and #2 which read:
t11. Maximum prior warning of impending military attack on
the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which the US is
committed to defend."
"2. Major changes in the capabilities, posture and concepts
for employment of Soviet, Chinese Communists, and Cuban strategic
military forces, with particular reference to S,)vie'.t nuclear
delivery capabilities, Soviet development of new or s: i.gn.i..ficantly
:improved offensive or defensive weapon systems, and Chinese
Communist development of nuclear weapons and related delivery
=yst~ms."
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F-3. The List is imbedded in collection guidance to the
Clandestine Services in the IPC List of the Interagency Clandestine
Collection Priorities Committee. The first item in the list reads:
`Warning of Military Attack
"The provision of strategic and tactical warning of military
attack on the US, on US forces overseas, or on any country which
the US is committed to defend is the highest priority task of the
Intelligence Community.
"Maximum warning on the basis of strategy and plans would,
of course, have to be obtained from the enemy's political and
military command structure. Less direct but nevertheless highly
important evidence can be provided by such physical manifestations
of imminent hostilities as are catalogued in the United States
Intelligence Board's General Indicator List.
"These indicators should be reported when they are observed
but the List is not intended as a basis for planning and programm-
ing clandestine collection operations since not all indicators
are amenable to that mode of collection, and not all of them are
meaningful by themselves as manifestations of the imminence of
hostilities."
F-4. An earlier and slightly modified version of the USIB Check-
list is incorporated but not identified as such in Chapter 3 of DIA's
Intelligence Collection Guide, Armed Forces (DIAM 58-5-1 of 30 April
1963 Indicators). As the Foreword states, "It (the Manual on
Indicators) is to be used not only as guidance by all DOD agencies
having intelligence collection missions, but also for coordination by
these agencies with other organizations having an early warning
collection potential". This Manual went to all the Unified and
Specified Commands, the JCS, the Service Departments (1322 copies to
Navy alone), other US intelligence agencies and some of the service
war colleges.
F-5. The General Indicator List forms the. core of the SIGINT
Warning System, and pertinent indicators from it have begin sent: to all
intercept stations having a collection potential against them.
F-6. In the reconnaissance world, the General Indicator List
affects collection and readout but more remotely, the yield from
reconnaissance being so different in. nature from other collection
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stem products. The List serves to highlight activity patterns which
might be discerned in photography in static stages separated by
considerable time. Except for working to maximize targets covered in
early orbits of a crisis or warning satellite, collection guidance in
reconnaissance terms is really readout guidance to photo-interpreters.
Work has been begun to identify baselines in certain classes of Soviet
activity as a precursor of warning readout guidance on Soviet forces.
A Warning Collection Plan
F-7. The failure of the General Indicator List as a guide to
collection, except as a statement of information objectives, lies in
the fact that such documents as those cited above have little real
effect on collection activities day by day. Real. collection action is
guided by special, short, focused requirements which clearly assign
responsibility for the satisfaction of the stated. need, along with
priorities and deadlines. This fixing of responsibility for delivery
is the key to effective guidance, and the General Indicator List cannot
do that, however august its auspices.
F-8. The translation of the general. list (which is a statement of
collection objectives and no more) into relevant specific guidance must
be a separate operation in which the information needs of indications
intelligence are re-expressed as detailed requirements, drawing on the
indicators in the List and describing their possible reflections in
terms meaningful to specific collectors or collection systems. These
requirements should be forwarded to the collectors to alert them to
their probable responsibilities in times of crisis and to give them
time to plan how to carry out such collection. Because such assign-
ments can grow dim or inappropriate with time, they should be modified
and reissued to collectors periodically.
F-9. Thoughtfully and meticulously executed, these requirements
would constitute in the aggregate a Warning Collection Flan, with the
parts to be played by each of the various collection sources clearly
dof.inrd In terms of collection targets, priorities and. sresponsibi.lities.
4ti'orkod. out, requirement by requirement, with the collectors, such a
Plan would introduce a measure of order and reduce uncertainty about
the information we might hope to receive in a pre-hostilities period.
Considerable latitude will. be needed to provide for the unforeseen,
but at least a consistent community--wide warning collecti.f'n program
will have. come into being, and the collectors wi.l.l. know r iii h More
clearly what they will be expected to do.
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U ,es of the List
F?10. For its part, the General Indicator List is still essential
to the indications intelligence process as a matrix for incoming
information or for negative reports on indicators, as a reminder of what
else may be occuring, and as a scenario of enemy preparations. Indeed,
an important remedy for some of the problems of indications intelligence
lies in more sophisticated use of the General Indicator List as a unify-
ing information plan, as a tool for tagging evidence in reporting and
data storage, and as a framework for analysis, revealing interrelation-
ships and warning implications in discrete bits of data.
F--II. More can still be done to use the List as a means for
assuring that all the potentially pertinent information on enemy
preparations is assembled at a central point, regardless of its source
or sFnsitivity, for analysis and correlation in a continuing frame of
reference which can move forward in detail with various stages in enemy
readiness. The USIB General Indicator List should be used by all
organizations connected with warning, regardless of their affiliation,
as the basic framework for information reporting, indexing, dissemination,
ADP storage and retrieval, and analysis and correlation. The general
structure of the List will probably not require much change for a number
of years; it is structurally essentially the same as the original lists
in 1948. We believe the List is sufficiently durable to serve as the
framework for warning information systems community-wide, and on this
basis it can introduce coherence and continuity into wide varieties
of sources and troublesome ambiguities of information.
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F-13. We are faced with an urgent need to apply the procedures
described in this section to develop guidance for warning collection
against Communist China. Much preliminary guidance has been given in
response to the Chinese threat in the Vietnamese situation. What is
needed. is to pull that guidance together, in a systematic way, to produce
a List of Indicators of Chinese intentions to broaden. hostilities in
Asia and then to redefine those indicators in a Chinese Warning
Collection Plan in terms that are meaningful to various collectors.
Some help can be found in the General Indicator List,'but broad
differences exist between significant Russian behavior and counterparts
for China and in the types of war that might be fought. Chinese
patterns have yet to be given the amount of sophisticated and sustained
study that has been applied to the Russian case; here is a gap that
needs to be closed soon.
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A 'NEX G
Information Selection
Communications
G-l. This Survey was concerned with communications so far as fast,
dependable communications are the lifeline of any warning system. There
are few warning communications problems that are not part of larger and
more general communications situations. For example, the communications
required for handling for warn-
ing purposes will be derived from a general grow in sys ems sophistica-
tion and capacity, not from specifically warning-oriented development.
Nevertheless, good communications systems should be continuously
monitored as part of a status check of national warning resources. New
communications developments should be kept track of for potential
contributions toward improving warning system responsiveness and
apacities to bear heavy loads in times of crisis.
2 5X1A
Recognition and Dissemination
G-3. Except for a few special efforts and except for extraordinary
collection activities responding to a crisis, the bulk of information
used by the warning effort is collected by the same sources and methods
\4hi.ch routinely supply all other intelligence. disciplines. For all
practical purposes, warning information is indistinguishable from all
other incoming intelligence information. Thus, a critically important
wioment in the warning process is the recognition that a given fragment
o?? information'-may possess potential significance to warning analysis.
G-4. This recognition occurs at several levels in the intelligence
r.:ach:i.nery. It can occur at the "first-level exploitation" level where
current- intelligence information bearing on warning matters is selected
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up the echelons. Recognition. also takes place at points further removed
from the analytical process at the levels of the report disseminators,
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collection methods. There are recognition problems peculiar to each of
these levels and systems which need to be dealt with before the volumes
of incoming information from future improved collection systems become
unmanageable.
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C-7. A major assist toward this objective would be the formation
f e Warning Readout Team of selected 'Pis and analysts from NIC. ` pis
group would read out newly arrived film for warning content as film is
b
now read by specialists for new details on ICBM's, missile-comPle:e,,
nuclear energy installations, submarines and the like. Nothing succeeds
in this area like practice, and the chances of early recognition of alert-
ing abnormalities would be greatly enhanced by routine, regular review
of current missions by such an NPIC-NIC team. At the least these men
would become intimately familiar with the usual appearances of places
where in the future indicative changes might appear. One useful product
of their studies could be a far more thorough and realistic counterpart
of the table in the Reconnaissance Annex (Annex C).
Human Source Reports
G-8. Human source reporting presents a different problem. Where
SIGINT and Reconnaissance recognition processes deal with information
of certain quite specific kinds, human reporting covers a wide range
of content and detail from sources of greatly varying knowledgeability
and reliability. Moreover, those outside current intelligence channels
who select reports for warning analysts are more remote from the warn-
ing problem than those in SIGINT and, for certain problems, in
Reconnaissance. They must spot information of less easily perceived
relevance to warning. The long-standing problem has been how to ensure
that scanners and disseminators are fully aware of the needs of warning
analysts and to relieve the analyst's natural concern and inclination
to try to scan. all the material himself. The objective of improvements
in the area of scanning and dissemination should be to increase the
precision and reliability of material identification and selection so
as to free the analyst for more productive research or reviews of recent
events for possible indications patterns.
G-9. We suggest that a trial arrangement for scanning human-source
reports be tested in. CIA in OCR's Documents Division. Scanners handling
categories of documents by type and office of origin could select
do uments according to the general subject categories of the major head-
ings of the General Indicator List and forward them to a single scanner
assigned to the warning problem full-time. The secondary screen_er would
be fully aware of all the indicators in the List, the current concerns
o.t NIC and other warning support outfits and the content of reports
already sent to NIC. On the basis of this knowledge, he could eliminate
the irrelevant, obsolete or duplicative reports and also, as an added
tirr.e-saver, route the documents to the appropriate analysts in :SIC.
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Th e fec.t of such a system would be to tap for the first time on a
-c-gular basis a whole layer of reporting up to now generally out of
reach. The product of this effort would be especially helpful when
a warning research component gets to work; it would be able to use
such data more than the current squad who tend to live by the latest
cables and teletypes.
G-10. We also suggest that a concurrent test be made of the
holdings of the Intellofax document retrieval system against indicator
topics as a means of surveying the quality of the information base
available to support the work of a warning research component. This
kind of review has never been possible in the face of the reading loads
and time pressures of the weekly Watch Committee cycle.
Dissemination Systems
G-ll. There are a number of automatic document scanning, selection
and dissemination techniques under study at various points in the
intelligence community. Several being investigated by CIA's Cable
Secretariat and by the National Military Command Center appear quite
promising. In general, the systems are aimed at dealing with the
sizeable increases expected in both message volumes and numbers of
electrical transmissions over the next few years--perhaps as much as
8 to 10%n a year. They are also experimenting with remote print-out of
the messages at the analyst's locations and with electronic storage for
t~xtended periods and retrieval by cathode ray tube display as well as
hard copy. As communications centers expand in capacity, message handl-
ing down the line to the analyst will come under heavy pressure to go
automatic too. This will be true also in the warning community, and new
dei7elopments of this nature should be monitored for benefits to warning
analysts along with others.
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-Automatic Data Processing
Some General Ideas
H-l. The determination of the proper role of automatic data
processing (ADP) in warning intelligence has always been a difficult
and uncertain thing. Some enthusiasts have visualized ADP doing
practically all the information handling, including generating
conclusions about the enemy's intentions and probable actions. Skeptics
have rejected ADP as incapable of coping with all the varieties of
report types,''sources, and reliabilities, degrees of detail, variations
in timeliness and multiplicities of content and vocabulary. All
generally agree that machine methods cannot replace the human intellect
in the analysis and judgment roles, and most acknowledge that, properly
controlled and used, machines can be effectively employed as aids to
analytical processes.
H-2. Despite a considerable history of discussion of the subject,
the intelligence community has little actual experience in the use of
ADP in roles similar to those required in warning analysis. Only a
few attempts have been made to investigate in depth and detail what ADP
can do for warning, and even these have been hampered by general
confusion as to the objectives sought and the nature of machine assistance
expected.
11-3. Current ADP techniques can add speed and accuracy to the
processing and manipulation of the increasing volumes of information
coming into the indications system. They can reduce the inefficiency
of reliance on memory and of dependence on manual data files. They can NRO
NRO adapt readily to the growth in volumes and speeds of communication and
they can cope with the problems that will be pose 25X1
25X1 They can ensure that all relevant new
information is properly tagged with indicator designations and they can
route that information in various forms to the proper analysts without.
the wasteful intervention of supporting personnel. And, most importantly,
they are flexible and versatile enough to adapt to a wide variety of
tasks and situations as the needs of the warning community alter and
grow. It is correct to say that the growth and improvement of the
community's warning capability will depend in a major way on its ability
co enlist ADP in the warning effort.
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Past Experience
Its report, "Automation and the NICi1, discussed "the theory and
techniques of indications intelligence and described a recommended data
handling system designed to improve and extend the capability of the
National Indications Center" and recommended the use of ADP-associated
techniques in three areas:
11-5. The first concerned the problem of identifying various types
of warfare and establishing for each type the most pertinent indicators
and hypotheses of action. Available information would then be weighted
according to relevance and assigned to various hypotheses. Continuous
track could be kept of all information on each hypothesis and a
determination made as to which hypothsis best fit the incoming indicators.
The conclusion that all. these methods had some potential in
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early ;va7.ring analysis was tempered by the authors' caveat that further
study would be necessary before a precise judgment of the effectiveness
of their use could be made. That conclusion is still valid today.
Present Position
H-9. All intelligence agencies have developed and are continuing
to increase the use of machine systems for processing information, most
of them for storage, manipulation and retrieval.
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Some Uses of ADP for Warning Analysis
H-12. There is no doubt that auto~at.c data pr^o,oessing techniques
can be effectively employed in warning analysis. The state of computer
technology now allows the analyst to converse in his own vernacular
with a computer at a remote location, a capability which can greatly
reduce the time required to retrieve a vital piece of information.
Display consoles are becoming familiar peripheral devices on time-sharing
computers; through them several analysts can obtain answers to their
questions immediately instead of having to pore over voluminous listings.
Display consoles also provide powerful analytical tools for data reduction
and analysis. Activity rates can be quickly converted to bar charts or
line graphs, for example, and the scales can be quickly adjusted to enable
the console operator to concentrate upon significant deviations in the
entire picture.
H-13. Some examples of specific uses of computers to assist warning
analysis follow:
a) Chronologies: Formatted records of indications information
tagged by related indicator in the General Indicator List, date of
information,' date received, geographic area co.acerned, subject and
source. The complete text of the indication could be entered in
each record or only a portion, cross referenced to the basic entry.
If the same fixed information were provided for each item of infor-
mation, chronologies could automatically be generated for source
within subject area and within source by date; by indicator within
date or in any other sequence desired by the analyst. This increased
flexibility to order the data in different ways could well provide
the imaginative analyst with new insights into the correlation of
events.
b) Summaries of Indications: These would be an automatic
byproduct of the system to produce chronologies. The criterion-for
inclusion in the Summary could be date, geographic area, or possibly
a specific tag inserted in the record after the information had been
analyzed and evaluated.
Via
c) EKG System: The continual monitoring of a large number of
data streams to identify deviations from the nodal activity level
would be greatly simplified by electronic data processing. Establish-
ment of the norms themselves would be simplified by allowing the
intelligence analyst to display the activity--say, numbers of Soviet
submarines out-of-area--over varying spans of time to determine
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whether seasonal patterns or individual +Vents such as national
holidays affect the activity level. Once the norms were
established, it would be easy to program the monit;;r!ng system
to display only those events which represented significant
aberration--i.e., "warning by exception". Furthe-.nore, the
availability in machine language of fairly complete statistics
of the activity levels of the USSR and other potential adversaries
would permit the warning analysts to apply certain methodologies
which have proven fruitful in other disciplines. Multiple
correlation, for example, could perhaps lead to an association
of indicators which is not readily apparent otherwise.
d) Simulation: A computer is essential for simulation,
model-building, or gaming unless the elements in the system are
only a dozen or fewer. Through the use of a simulation program,
the cumulative effect of all the indicators could be rapidly
computed for any postulated situation (the weights assigned to
each indicator would be assigned by the warning analysts) and the
time frame as well as the weighting system itself could be easily
changed. One major advantage of simulation is that the effect
of individual components (i.e., indications) of complex systems
(i.e., the entire strategic setting) can be isolated and evaluated.
The over-all posture of a potential adversary can be automatically
included in the consideration of the significance of any single
event which may appear to be ominous.
e) Status Checks: In the future when indications from all
sources are fed _i.nto the computer file at the same time they reach
the analyst, i.e., when the computer file is current up to the
minute, it will be a major advantage to be able, whenever an
ominous item is received, to query all other indicator files for
any corroborating abnormalities or unusual activities. This sort
of "ripple-scan" across the board would greatly increase the speed
and precision of :141C and Watch Committee reaction and evaluation.
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1T-14. NIC's entry into the APP field is overddue. It has been over
four years since the end of the but the pressures of events
and the weekly cycle of Watch Committee-NIC activities has precluded any
further systematic efforts to adapt APP techni ue, specifically try warning
needs. As noted earlier, one major bar to ,pr-ogress in this area has been
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the cancer': into about what ADP should do for warning. T is b ;t 1e
ill not be, r>>moe d until a research component has been established
,n NIC and its needs explored and understrood. The reaches wr>uld
probably be the heaviest users of ADP resources; most of the appli.;~`inns
suggested in the preceding paragraph are research tools, although also
useful in support of current analysis.
H-15. Once a research capability has been set up, a systems analyst
with intelligence experience should be assigned to work with the
researchers in determining real ADP requirements, exploring existing
techniques for adaptation to NIC needs, devising ways to use existing
systems and files and fixing the needs for computer time. When this
has been done, it will be a great deal easier to determine the extent
to which special ADP R&D projects will be needed in addition. Our
present impression is that piggy-backing on other systems will p'srobably
meet NIC needs for some time, along with some special NIC tapes to be
run on a nearby computer as needed. Again, the directions and rates
of progress of NIC research efforts will be instrumental in setting
specifications for any special warning ADP programs.
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1-7. In DIA's system, the Alert Officer Js the key to the
operation of the system since he can orchestrate a wide variety of
resources to deal with a given message or situation at any time
around the clock. This officer is more often concerned with current
intelligence matters than with warning per se, but to the degree
that the two are almost co-terminous at this level, warning analysis
can benefit from an effective quick response current intelligence
mechanism. At times when the warning aspect of current intelligence
increases with rising tensions, warning needs are placed high in the
priorities of the Alert Branch functions.
1-8. CIA: In CIA, warning functions are centered in the Office
of Current Intelligence which contains the Indico (Indications
Coordinator) Staff. This staff supports the Chairman of the Watch
Committee, selects information for NIC, procures analyses, evaluations
and viewpoints from current intelligence analysts to help NIC and the
Chairman and monitors the flow of current information made available
to it by the CIA Operations Center. It shares the first-level early-
reaction function with the Ops Center, which carries it around the
clock. The Indications Staff applies a sharp warning-oriented scan
to current information and is a valuable backup to both the NIC and
current intelligence branches.
1-9. State: In State, warning functions are indistinguishable
from usual intelligence research and production.. Except for COMINT
and Clandestine Services reports, INR has no monopoly over the
circulation of warning information in the Department; area desks and
policy makers get information from State's Ops Center at the same
time as INR, does.
I-10. NIC: In NIC, the first-level function is performed by the
24-hour watchYoffi.cers who scan incoming cables, teletypes and FBIS
and press ticker for items of potential indications value. Those they
select are typed up and reproduced in the Watch Officers Notes, an
informal compilation of indications selected by each watch which was
originally intended to be a quick briefing of NIC analysts each morning
on events during the night. This publication has gradually come to be
regarded by current military analysts in. NSA, DIA and CIA as a compre-
hensive, easily read digest of potentially significant reports. Watch
officers in NIC are assigned for fairly :Long tours of duty; they bring
to their scanning process considerable continuity and experience.
Because they are in an indications-oriented environment, their selections
a?rc sensitive and responsive to the needs and concerns of the analysts
of the day-time staff and the indicators of the General Indicator List.
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I-11, Binding these separate first-level scanning and l
LZI 1.11e
strongest guarantee we have that important information will be brought
before the right neonle and +h.+ _.f,,, , .,,.._.-_ _
o -- w aaaw ylll~ i uug,uenzs on new developments, the
enual of this inf---mnl ,, ... ,. ,
eva uatioll
functions together is a strong tradition of frequent checks, comparing
of notes and sharing of ideas among the watch offiears nn ;a?+., ;r -L-
1-12. This first-level is important. The continu?t f
,,.cll. uc aw-ru of the
Ifornation needs of warning analysts as they follow moving situations
y ese men are
usually the first to know of new events and breaks in situations. The
success of the warning affn?i .,. ., __
vll 1.11e.S'Pi
.:atches become in effect the community. During the da ' th
community through the night and over weekends is in thisy r the
__ -? group. Under
surnrise rnnrli+,n?~ a?A -P---
r
urrent Intelligence Operations
1-13. The current intelligence oneratinna of +u-
h+(-'v sift out items of warning ~i,fj+ls In general;
a way oacxstopping the
s rs t-echelon exploitation mechan .qme n nrl ---A-
1-14.
DIA: Current intelligence in DIA
2 o ices have a substantial capability to
f^,'aluate current
ve .visions for the Soviet Bloc,
ern, western and Latin American areas. Together with the Indications
u
port and
pd Indications Cente
r
fIsi ), divided into four substanti
_.r t o .r i s interwoven with DIA T s
effort in the
11
s Intelligence S
t lour knowledge. These divisions-are. the primary
for research in C7,nr,r,,,+ ,.,
--_- u =1x1 Asa ~e a variety of collection
t.i~ns to fill o-apC
the sue Lally Analytical Warning summary
4) Snvi r~i tz,.
I'tirri~tal. . in exing the items in depth; for micro-
The DAWs i .a; .
`1: comments on activities ofetheISoviet rforces land~entitieswcovered
"'=;~1? This structure permits ? d
'o the -~_? vl 1,111-5 puollcation is arranged. to
= rig jor headings in th
t 5.t`ff lrman of the JCS, the Director of the
s the Nationn7 nrt;, ; .,
+r, s~G111111(1 L.CU co a reiatIvely limited
which includes the Ch
- -- ?+?~y --a-1u uenzer, -Vie J-21
S O the
+ 't and Specified Comma d
s
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1-15. Direct DIA support to warning is also provided through
participation in the watch cycle. The Chief, Indications Division,
ISIC provides items for discussion by the DIA Watch Committee member
at the Watch meeting and amplifies them with contributions from
current analysts at the pre-Watch meeting.
1-16. For deeper research, information in depth, and technical
enlightenment, ISIC can turn to the Production Center and to DIAST,
DIA's Scientific and Technical Office which can support the warning
effort on demand with reference services and expert manpower to
augment ISIC resources during crises. Both these offices could manage
and monitor research contracts for warning purposes outside DIA.
1-18. State: In State, as has been noted earlier, no distinction
is made between current and warning analysis. The support to the
State member of the Watch Committee is drawn from the regular current
analysis and reporting of INR and deals for the most part with the
political elements and forces in the situations under current review.
The political picture is of course an indispensable ingredient in
warning analysis. Sound analysis of the political context within
which a critical warning problem is developing is essential to the
proper assessment and interpretation of the available military
indications, whose true significance must be weighed against the.
political posture of the potential. enemy. Much necessary good would
be accomplished by making this input available at the NIC level, and.
it is urgently recommended that State restore its assignment of an
analyst to the NIC Staff at once. The absence of an experienced
State man on the NIC Staff is a severe handicap to the.NIC.,
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1-19, CIA: In CIA, the warning contributions of intelligence
production offices, such as OCI, ORR and, on special problems, OSI
and FMSAC, are pulled together by the Indications Control Officer
(Indico) on the staff of the Director of Current Intelligence. Indico
serves as NIC's agent in CIA, obtaining assessments from analysts, .
arranging for staff positions on Watch Committee agenda items, chair-
ing pre-Watch meetings and maintaining contact with elements in the
Clandestine Services as they are involved in warning problems. It
provides briefings for the NIC and Watch Committee, arranges for
expert support, works out requirements on Agency collection assets
and represents the Agency in interagency discussions concerned with
warning matters. Indico performs the essential service of efficiently
bringing to bear on warning problems the full range of Agency resources
in collection, analysis and judgment.
1-20. Outside Washington: Current intelligence and indications
support to the warning effort outside Washington is provided. through
the world-wide DOD Indications System with ISIC of DIA as its center,
linking together counterpart centers in all the major commands in
the US and overseas. Each of these Centers is supported by local
NSA elements and Operations Groups and exercises a double function
of support to DIA/ISIC and to the local commander in operational
intelligence for the command mission. All these Centers are 24-hour
operations, guided and coordinated by ISIC, exchanging information
and evaluations in a continually alert world-wide warning mechanism.
The National Indications Center (NIC)
1-21. The organizations described above are involved in the
warning problem, but their main function is current intelligence.
For the National Indications Center, its main function is warning.
The NIC is described in the Charter of the Watch Committee of USIB)
25X1A DCID 1/5, as the operational and administrative staff of the Watch
Committee. I I reporting to Mr. McCone on 1 March 1962
on his review of the Watch Committee and the NIC, described the NIC
ati "an advance warning evaluation center supported by all intelligence
agencies in Washington. The NIC serves as a focal point to receive
a'1 information that might have a bearing on Soviet intentions to
initiate hostilities." The principal function of the NIC was stated
as the evaluation and collation of warning information from a
National standpoint in support of the Watch Committee"..
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I-22. The NIC is a small interagency organization of 29 persons
drawn from CIA, NSA, Army, Navy and the Air. Force. The State slot
has been left unfilled for over five years. The NIC is headed by a
Director from CIA and a Deputy Director, a colonel from Air Force,
the executive agent of the organization. The Indications Staff, the
day-staff analytical element, is nine persons, supported by two in
Graphics, two in security functions and three secretaries. The
24-hour Watch Alert Group is composed of 11 men, civilian and military,
who carry out the first echelon scanning, selection and noting
processes described earlier.
NIC Analysis Functions
1-23. The analysis function of NIC is difficult to describe in
isolation from the weekly cycle in which it moves. This cycle absorbs
more than 80% of NIC analytical energies. Most of NIC analysis
consists of attempts to determine the meaning of events in situations
under Watch Committee scrutiny and the relation of those events to
present enemy intentions and capabilities or to future enemy actions.
Its efforts are to provide rapid intelligence responses to imminent
or actual. critical developments, to recognize evidence reflecting
possible enemy intentions and to identify as early as possible
potentially ominous, trends and patterns in general enemy behavior,
whether in the context of peripheral areas of confrontation or in
internal postures of enemy forces or areas of activity involved in
the readying process,
I-24. Another kind of NIC analysis, regrettably small in proportion
to other NIC efforts and to the need for this kind of work, is its
substantive -research in depth uniquely focussed on indications problems:
the development of better indicators, determination of.new information
requirements for new collection systems or opportunities, assessments
()L changes in warning capabilities, applications of. new informational
t:erhniques to warning problems, research into enemy military doctrine,
strategic thinking, plans and innovations, post-mortems of crises and
??.-UL'nr_;, reaction patterns to update understandings of enemy
beha5?ior., and studies and reviews of evidence to establish longer-term
as background for evaluating current developments. These
unrch and analysis efforts are basic investments to improve the
"Inre capabilities of the warning system. we have. To the degree that
l? 'xeekly cycle preempts -t:heir accomplishment, the rate of growth of