AN ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1976
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2001/09/06 CIA-RDP82M0031I R00010027000172
Secret
SEMIANNUAL NSC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
National Foreign Intelligence'
Production
Volume I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE. ASSESSMENT
Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff on behalf of the:
Director of Central Intelligence for the National Security Council,
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 680797
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category-
5 58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
SEMIANNUAL NSC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
An Assessement of
National Foreign Intelligence
Production
Volume I
Executive Summary
The Assessment
Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff on behalf of the
Director of Central Intelligence for the National Security Council
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
An Assessment of
National Foreign Intelligence
Production
Table of Contents
Page
Foreword ..................................................... v
Executive Summary .......................................... 1
The Intelligence Community and Its Activities ................. 7
Findings on Intelligence Products .............................. 11
Some Systemic Problems in Satisfying User Needs .............. 17
Findings, Actions and Recommendations ....................... 29
Annex Summary ............................................. 35
Annex ................................................. Volume II
iii
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
FOREWORD
Executive Order 11905, promulgated by the President on 18 February
1976, states that the National Security Council (NSC) shall provide guidance
and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence
activities. The Executive Order further directs the NSC to conduct a
semiannual review of intelligence, including among other aspects "the needs
of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence
products ...."
This report responds to a request in June 1976 by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs that the Intelligence Community Staff
(IC Staff), in consultation with the NSC Staff, assess on a continuous basis
these user needs and the products of intelligence, and report the results of this
program for review at each semiannual NSC meeting on intelligence matters.
The report has been prepared by the IC Staff assisted by an ad hoc task
force composed of representatives from the Departments of State and
Treasury, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). It
has been developed through interviews with users and selected producers of
intelligence, including those in the Departments of State, Treasury and
Defense, the military services, the CIA, the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ERDA, Over 100 users
of intelligence in the Executive Branch were formally interviewed. They
ranged from the Vice President and the Secretary of the Treasury through
senior staff and line policy officials in relevant departments and agencies. In
preparing the report, IC Staff officers have analyzed the results of the
consumer survey and also have drawn heavily upon documentary data,
including the broad range of intelligence products over the past year or so and
the observations on intelligence performance that have been made by: the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, the Rockefeller Commission Report, the Lynn Report of
December 1975 on Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Community which led to Executive Order 11905, and independent
studies of the IC Staff, Comments by the Intelligence Community on a draft
of the report have been utilized in preparing the final report.
This report is an initial effort to provide regular evaluations of a very
broad scope. It covers a wide spectrum of political, economic, military and
technical matters of concern to users of intelligence. Yet, it is by no means
V
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
exhaustive, with many key regions and topics omitted because of time
limitations. This reports tends to concentrate on the needs of intelligence users
at the "national" level, that is, to support policymakers on issues that confront
the National Security Council, its members and their senior staffs, and top
leaders in national foreign economic policy. By contrast, much less attention is
paid to many departmental needs. For example, this report does not give
extensive attention to the vital intelligence needs of military commanders,
some of which are to be met by national intelligence resources and products.
Some, but not all, needs of agencies dealing with arms control are treated. In
subsequent evaluations the IC Staff will cover areas omitted from the first
report and analyze in greater depth issues of continuing national concern.
This report attempts to delineate the broad strengths and weaknesses of
the Community. In addition to analyzing performance on specific regions and
topics, it discusses several systemic problems of intelligence management and
performance which affect, directly or indirectly, the satisfactory response to
users' needs. These systemic problems are addressed to develop a better
understanding of reasons for identified intelligence strengths and weaknesses,
and to help generate measures for improvement. Problems addressed in this
report relate primarily to Community structure, process, and resources.
Largely untreated are questions of recruiting and training appropriate
analytical manpower.
The report is organized into two volumes. Volume I contains an
Executive Summary, The Assessment, and an Annex which summarizes
salient points from Volume II. The second volume contains a detailed review
of the timeliness and quality of intelligence products concerning various
regions and topics, organized as seven Annexes to The Assessment.
vi
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
SECRET
NOFORN
An Assessment of
National Foreign Intelligence
Production
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Findings on Intelligence Products
In the eyes of its users, the products of the Intelligence Community are
uneven, a mixture of demonstrable strengths and significant deficiencies. This
appraisal no doubt results in part from the large number of users, with diverse
interests, concerns and responsibilities. But intelligence performance can be
improved; indeed, it must be improved in many areas addressed in this
review,
In summary, this review finds:
? An increasing diversity and sophistication in the demands of an
expanding community of users.
? Inadequate Intelligence Community understanding of the needs of
various sets of users and of priorities among these needs.
? General user satisfaction with current, short-term reporting on most
topics and geographic regions, but a serious deficiency in anticipatory
analysis which alerts policy components to possible problems in the
relatively near future (one to three years).
? User desire for more multi-disciplinary analyses which integrate
political, economic, technological and military factors to provide a
broad appraisal of issues and events for developing US policies and
programs,
? User discontent with NIEs and interagency products, especially
regarding their utility, and relevance to policy issues.
? Problems in the Community's ability for early recognition of impending
crises; in integration of intelligence with information on US political
and military actions; and in the definition of responsibilities of the DCI
and other Government officials concerned with warning and crisis
information.
? User concern about what they view as unnecessary compartmentation
of many intelligence products.
1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
Systemic Problems in Satisfying User Needs
The findings on intelligence products indicate an uneven record of
performance. The causes are many, but the critical aspects appear to derive
from some systemic problems of intelligence.
1. Demands and Resources
One problem concerns the demands on intelligence as compared with the
fiscal and manpower resources available to meet those demands. The number
of intelligence users is expanding and their needs are becoming more complex
and sophisticated. Vital issues concerning international economic, political,
social and technological developments are striving for recognition on an equal
footing with more familiar national security issues. But the Community
cannot easily move to support these new concerns within fixed resources. This
is because questions regarding the traditional issues of Soviet and Chinese
military capabilities and intentions are becoming both more resistant to
collection and more complex as regards the information needed by the United
States.
2. Determining What Users Really Need
The Community too often has a poor perception of users' needs and
cannot project future needs with confidence. But most users do not articulate
their needs for intelligence particularly well and inadequately project their
future needs. Thus, intelligence managers have difficulty in setting priorities
for allocating intelligence resources. This difficulty is particularly apparent in
dealing with user needs which are not well established or which cut across
traditional intelligence topics or regions, e.g., information relating to nuclear
proliferation.
The following actions are under way or will be explored by Community
elements and the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff) to alleviate this
problem:
? More consultation with users in planning intelligence research and
production.
? User review of or participation in the development of general
intelligence planning and requirements.
? More workshops, briefings and personnel exchange programs to
familiarize users and Community personnel with one another's
problems, perspectives and constraints.
? Examination of possible ways to increase the collection, processing and
production flexibility of the Community to respond rapidly to shifts in
user needs.
? A concerted Community effort to analyze in depth the several markets
and customers it services, as an aid to better anticipation of users' needs.
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
3. Allocation of Resources to Various Aspects of the Intelligence
Process
At present, it is very difficult to relate intelligence resources to the end
uses of intelligence or to future production requirements. Current manage-
ment information systems at the Community level do not provide senior
managers with adequate understanding of the complex ways by which parts
of the intelligence process relate to one another. Community budgets and
manpower accounts are currently organized by inputs (e.g., the Consolidated
Cryptologic Program, CIA Program, General Defense Intelligence Program);
resource allocation decisions are not routinely made on the basis of their effect
on outputs (the end products used by consumers). Needed are:
? Improved data bases to relate Community funds and manpower to
intelligence products.
? Better measures of the utility of specific intelligence products, stated in
terms of users' needs.
? Analyses which explicitly relate collection, processing and production
resources to intelligence products and users' needs, to provide a better
basis for decisions by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI).
Establishing the means for better intelligence resource management on
the basis of outputs is a priority task for the Intelligence Community Staff and
other Community elements.
4. Balance of Production Effort Among Data Bases, Current
Intelligence and Analysis
Producers of intelligence tend to give priority to factual reporting on
events and issues because it is necessary for their own operations and answers
the first line demands of users for direct support. Most producers also want to
undertake deeper analyses to improve users' understanding of current
situations and future developments bearing on policy and negotiating issues.
But there are problems in moving from factual reporting to complex analyses.
More comprehensive, detailed data and the best people are needed; analysis
takes more time and closer supervision. This kind of product is in competition
with the needs of both users and producers for factual reporting. But clearly
both are needed.
In recent years it appears that the balance has tilted away from data base
and analytic support of traditional national security concerns and in favor of
current intelligence products to support new demands. For example, attention
to detailed analysis of Soviet industry has given way to more effort on
international trade. Steps which would redress this balance and permit a
larger portion of in-depth analytic products include the following:
? Reduction in the amount of finished current intelligence products,
consistent with the needs of departmental users.
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
? A reduction of self-initiated descriptive and factual memoranda, but
the maintenance and improvement of solid data bases to support
production of ad hoc analytic papers responding to the immediate
needs of uses.
? Joint user-producer procedures for establishing priorities for analytic
reporting on regions, topics and areas of particular concern to users.
? Planning Community analytic work to better dovetail with the large
amount of analytic work that takes place within the policy areas of key
Government departments and agencies.
5. The Degree of Proximity Between Policy and Intelligence
Should the coupling of users and intelligence be tight, to enhance the
relevance of intelligence to policy, or loose, to assure the objectivity of
intelligence products? Users, desire and, in many cases, encourage a close
relationship (e.g., through participation in policy review committees, study
groups, NSSMs) in the belief that it leads to more responsive intelligence
focused on priority user needs. Producers-perhaps more in CIA than in the
departmental components of the Community-are apprehensive about
mixing policy and intelligence. Intimate user-producer relationships may
suppress objectivity. Nevertheless, much of the effective intelligence support
noted in this review is the result of close contact between intelligence
personnel and policymakers.
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), following the philosophy of
his predecessors, has instructed the Community to be action-oriented and
responsive to users' needs. But he demands total objectivity in intelligence
reporting and analysis, and professional judgments on developments, without
coloration by policy considerations. Perhaps there should be a more
comprehensive policy statement on participation of intelligence producers in
policy activities, to define a responsive, yet proper, relationship. Lacking this,
users and producers should maintain professional standards of performance
and an appropriate degree of tension in their relationship to ensure the
objectivity of intelligence.
1. Actions to be Taken by the DCI
? Assure the effective functioning of mechanisms for evaluation of major
new user requests for national intelligence production, to ensure
intelligence sources and methods are required and will contribute
meaningfully to the issues involved.
? Examine the possibility of key users augmenting their own analytic
resources to reduce the volume of requests for memoranda that are not
primarily dependent on intelligence sources and methods.
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
? Work to establish through the IC Staff a base of tools and data for
assessing the interplay of resources for collection, processing and
production and their impact on the value of intelligence products.
? Direct producers of national intelligence to consider reductions in
current intelligence and event reporting, while assuring that high-
quality current intelligence support is provided as actually needed by
users. Request departmental intelligence components to do the same.
? Direct national intelligence components to produce more broad,
predictive, multi-disciplinary analyses to assess foreign developments
which could have a major impact on US interests.
? Direct the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) to be more active in
soliciting users' views in planning the production of National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other interagency papers.
2. Recommended NSC Actions
? Concur in the findings of this review and provide comments on the
principal problems and issues.
? Consider improved ways for users to communicate to the Community
their changing concerns and prospective intelligence needs.
? Express strong support of the DCI's leadership in improving the quality
and relevance of intelligence products and in determining the
organizational and management arrangements within the Community
that would enhance his authority to allocate resources toward that end.
? Endorse the continuing need for well-integrated national intelligence
during a major crisis or war. Consider measures to assure a strong role
for the DCI in providing this intelligence, while also assuring that his
role is in consonance with the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
An Assessment of
National Foreign Intelligence
Production
The Assessment
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND ITS ACTIVITIES
This report is concerned with the activities of
the Intelligence Community (called IC or the
Community hereafter) which support the pro-
duction of foreign intelligence on the capabili-
ties, intentions and activities of foreign powers,
organizations or their agents. Except for terror-
ism, it does not address counterintelligence; nor
does it address covert actions.
The Community carries out activities which
result in intelligence products in support of US
policies in the areas of national security, foreign
affairs and international economic policy. This
first chapter briefly describes the intelligence
process, the organizations involved in intelligence
and the users of intelligence.
A. The Intelligence Process
The intelligence process consists of organiza-
tions, machines, networks of overt and clandes-
tine foreign contacts, communications systems
and a body of lore and techniques, all of which
provide information about foreign powers, orga-
nizations and their agents. This process carries
out six basic activities:
? Identification of users' requirements for
intelligence.
? Collection of intelligence information by
human and machine systems.
? Processing of raw intelligence into forms
suitable for analytic exploitation.
? Analysis and Production of intelligence end
products in forms suitable for use by consum-
ers.
? Dissemination of these products to users
through cables, maps, bound reports, papers
and briefings.
? Evaluation of the timeliness and quality of
intelligence products in meeting users' needs,
with feedback to the intelligence process to
improve performance.
Intelligence products can be classified into the
following broad categories, based on the purpose
to be served by the products:
? Background information and data on foreign
countries and groups which are not directly
relatable to specific actions or programs of
the US Government. This type of informa-
tion is essential for developing other intelli-
gence products and helps establish the
context within which US policy is formulat-
e d.
? Information reports, analyses, estimates and
projections related to specific foreign actions
or programs used more directly by depart-
ments of the Government, military com-
manders and the Congress to help determine
US peacetime actions and programs.
? Alerting of US officials and military com-
manders to potential foreign military, politi-
7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
cal, economic or terrorist actions inimical to
US interests. Alerting (sometimes called
strategic warning in the military context)
differs from estimates and projections in that
it signals a probable increase in the likelihood
of hostile foreign actions in the near future.
? Warning of imminent foreign military, po-
litical, economic, or terrorist actions inimical
to US interests. Whereas alerting concerns
foreign intent which may change before
hostile action occurs, warning implies for-
eign commitment to hostile actions and
includes a much higher content of tactical
intelligence than alerting.
? Intelligence support to US military, foreign
policy and economic actions during crises or
war. During such periods tactical intelli-
gence assets provides major support to
military planning and operations, as well as
some support to national leaders. National
intelligence assets are expected also to
contribute to support of tactical operations,
while fulfilling their primary mission of
supporting the national leadership in the
broad direction of crises or wartime oper-
ations.
B. Intelligence Organizations
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), his
staffs and 11 organizations, collectively known as
the Intelligence Community, operate the foreign
intelligence process.* The Community includes
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National
Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), special DOD offices for the
collection of intelligence through reconnaissance
programs, the intelligence branches of the three
military services, and intelligence elements of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), State
Department, Treasury Department and Energy
Research and Development Administration
*RcsponsibiIities of the DCI and Community organizations are
defined by statutes, National Security Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs) and Executive Order 11905.
(ERDA). The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA),
while not part of the Community, processes and
produces cartographic information. Other organi-
zations actively involved in the foreign intelli-
gence process are the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the National Security Council
(NSC) Staff, the National Intelligence Officers
(NIOs) and the Intelligence Community Staff
(IC Staff).
The DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense and
Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs compose the Committee on
Foreign Intelligence (CFI), which reviews the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)
and budgets. The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence), who is also the Director of Defense
Intelligence, manages DOD intelligence re-
sources. The NSC Staff oversees the semiannual
NSC review of intelligence. The Deputy to the
DCI for National Intelligence and his staff of
NIOs are senior counselors to the DCI on
substantive matters of national intelligence and
are responsible for supervising the production of
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other
interagency intelligence products, except for
national current intelligence, which is a function
of the CIA. The Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community and his IC Staff provide
the primary support to the CFI, are responsible
for coordinating the requirements process and
evaluate intelligence performance. Table I shows
the involvement of these organizations in the
intelligence process.
Coordination of Community actions is effected
by a number of committees and boards. The CFI
has already been mentioned. The National
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) consists of
representatives of each Community agency and is
responsible for approving national intelligence
requirements and estimates. The DCI Commit-
tees (12 in number) are composed of representa-
tives from appropriate Community agencies and
are responsible for coordinating key Community
aspects of the collection, processing and produc-
tion of national intelligence.
8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
Table I
Foreign Intelligence Activities and Organizations
Analysis &
Dissemi-
Evaluation
ti
n
ll
C
Processing
Production
nation
& Feedback
Requirements
o
o
ec
CIA
x
x
x
x
x
x
DIA
x
x
x
x
x
x
NSA
x
x
x
x
x
x
FBI
x'
INR/State
x
x 2
x
x
x
Treasury
x
x2
x
x
ERDA
x
x 2
Military
Services 3
x
x
x
x
x
x
DMA
x
x
x
x
x
OSD
NIOs
IC Staff
The FBI collects foreign intelligence within the US when requested by authorized Intelligence Community officials.
z Representatives of State, Treasury, ERDA, Commerce and Agriculture, when stationed overseas, conduct overt collection of information. Resources in
support of these efforts are not included in the NFIP.
Includes the Air Force Office of Space Systems.
For imagery only.
Coordination of collection and processing efforts.
C. Users of Intelligence Products
The users of foreign intelligence products are
generally concerned with three broad areas of US
interests: national security, foreign policy and
international economic policy. These users in-
clude:
? The White House: The President, Vice
President, NSC Staff and the President's
economic advisors.
? Cabinet-level departments, particularly
State, Defense, Treasury and Commerce.
? The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA).
? Military commands.
? Economic bodies, such as the Economic
Policy Board, East-West Foreign Trade
Board, National Advisory Council on Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Policies,
and Council of Economic Advisors.
? Energy organizations, such as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Federal Energy Ad-
ministration and ERDA (also responsible for
developing, producing and maintaining nu-
clear warheads).
9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
? Law enforcement or protective agencies, such
as the Drug Enforcement Agency and the
Secret Service.
Congress is also increasing its use of intelli-
gence. Congressional committees request and
receive intelligence briefings and reports, primar-
ily from CIA and DOD. The CIA also provides
briefings and biographic materials to Congress-
men in preparation for overseas trips.
The Intelligence Community is itself an im-
portant consumer of intelligence. Many prod-
ucts-e.g., data bases, maps, biographic informa-
tion and analyses of specific regions, weapon
systems and political trends-are inputs to
higher levels of intelligence products. Production
to meet internal demand contributes to the data
bases, expertise and general information needed
for products which respond to external consum-
ers.
10
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
SECRET
FINDINGS ON INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
In the eyes of its users, the products of the
Intelligence Community are uneven, a mixture of
demonstrable strengths and significant deficien-
cies. This appraisal no doubt results in part from
the large number of users, with diverse interests
and concerns, and an extraordinarily broad range
of policy and operational responsibilities. But
intelligence performance can be improved; in-
deed, it must be improved in many areas
addressed in this review.
Users are most critical of what intelligence does
not do, not of what it does. In general, users see a
base of good quality, timely and relevant
products. They note fairly substantial support on
short-term, day-to-day issues and events. How-
ever, users see a serious deficiency in anticipatory
intelligence that alerts policy components to
possible problems in the relatively near future.
Users complain about the relative lack of multi-
disciplinary area analyses which integrate politi-
cal, economic, technological and military factors
to provide a broad and balanced appraisal of
issues and events for developing US policies and
programs.
Intelligence components do many traditional
types of reporting and analysis well. This is
particularly so when intelligence officers are
familiar with the issues, when user needs are
stable, and when the requirements for intelli-
gence support have had relatively high priority
over a number of years. Intelligence does less well
with new tasks and new issues, not for lack of
priority, but for lack of specific guidance from
users on what is expected and useful, and in
many cases for lack of experience, data bases,
training or appropriate emphasis within the
Community.
A. Current Intelligence
Government officials, force planners, overseas
missions and military commanders have consid-
erable requirements for intelligence on current
events and for follow-up` commentary and
analysis. In addition to reports on the occurrence
of events, they want analyses of their signifi-
cance. Closely related is the need for, data,
memoranda and summary views on short-term
developments or time-urgent issues where policy
decisions are imminent. Similarly, as important
happenings unfold, users require wrap-ups or
situation reports that are reasonably comprehen-
sive and consider peripheral actions or develop-
ments bearing on the problem. In these regards
users rate intelligence products as follows:
? Current reporting in the National Intelli-
gence Daily (NID), specialized periodicals
such as International Oil Developments, and
other current intelligence publications get
high marks as timely, clearly stated products.
? Topical reporting on most issues by the CIA,
NSA and departmental components is timely
and relevant.
? Support to the international economic activi-
ties of the Government, an expanding intelli-
gence function, is viewed by economic users
as a valuable supplement to reporting from
other sources.
? Brief analytic memoranda by the CIA or
departmental components on events or new
developments that affect user understanding
of issues are generally of value.
? Some users in State, Treasury and Defense
find that the drafting of certain current
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
intelligence reports to include highly classi-
fied or compartmented information limits
their usefulness.
? Economic users find that current reporting in
the NID often omits reference to significant
economic events.
B. Facts, Figures and Data Bases
Users have an insatiable appetite for direct
field reporting and hard data such as order of
battle information and summaries of force
capabilities, political interrelationships among
major world countries, and compilations of
economic, financial and biographic data. The
Community supplies this data to users in a
constant stream via direct field reporting from
such entities as NSA, the clandestine service of
the CIA and overseas missions, and via finished
products developed and disseminated for general
consumption or tailored to the needs of particular
users.
? The Community supplies excellent data of
this type on Soviet strategic forces and on
primary order of battle for Soviet general
purpose forces (counts of ships, divisions,
aircraft, etc.). Data on Soviet strategic forces
in support of SALT and on Warsaw Pact
forces in the NATO Guidelines Area in
support of MBFR negotiations are rated
excellent. As detailed in Annex A of Volume
II, however, the effort to support MBFR
negotiations since 1972 has drawn heavily
upon the analytic resources in the Commun-
ity. As a result, there has been limited
analysis of the qualitative force effectiveness
of Warsaw Pact forces required to support net
assessments.
? Data development and field reporting in
support of US international economic actions
and negotiations are generally given good
marks, although some economic consumers
feel that resources applied to this function are
inadequate.
? While intelligence on technology transfer,
terrorism and nuclear proliferation has made
useful contributions to US programs con-
cerned with these developments (e.g., intelli-
gence in support of licensing decisions),
intelligence in these areas definitely needs
strengthening. Not only are more compre-
hensive data bases needed, but the Commu-
nity should provide more multi-disciplinary
analyses of the impact of technology transfer
on the Soviet Union and of the political,
economic and regional factors affecting
nuclear proliferation.
? Users commend the Community for its rapid
and detailed support with all types of basic
political, economic and military data on,
most countries of the world. Economic data
on the USSR, however, tend to he aggrega-
tive and do not answer some national
security and economic users' needs for
detailed information on Soviet industry.
Military information on free world countries
continues to be weak, despite Community
efforts to increase the emphasis on this area.
C. Analytic Products
As intelligence analysts move from facts and
descriptive summaries to the more analytical and
interpretative products of intelligence, users
become more critical. Users' needs are manifold
and include comprehensive research reports on
topics or geographic areas, national estimates,
analyses of the effectiveness of military forces,
net assessments of opposing forces and specula-
tive studies of future developments. Users are
clearly not satisfied, but their reasons differ.
? The essence of the users' verdict is that
analytical and interpretive products too often
are not relevant to the problems currently
facing the users. Products should be focused
on issues, highlight developments that affect
existing US policies and interests, and antici-
pate future problems to provide insights for
US policymakers and force planners.
12
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
SECRET
? Users in all areas - national security, foreign
policy and international economics - see
the need for more multi-disciplinary area
analyses which integrate political, economic,
military and technological factors. These
analyses might relate to regional develop-
ments (e.g., the Persian Gulf or Mexico) or to
such complex issues as Warsaw Pact warmak-
ing potential or Soviet objectives and strat-
egy.
? Policymakers at every level need more
analyses of political, economic and military
trends and projections of major long term
developments bearing on US interests.
? Analyses of basic aspects of the Soviet and
East European economies (R&D, industries,
technology) are inadequate to support cur-
rent user needs in such diverse areas as SIOP
targeting, assessment of the implications of
technology transfer, and estimating the eco-
nomic burden of Soviet defense spending. In
part, this inadequacy stems from the inabil-
ity of the Community, within resources
currently devoted to economic intelligence,
to maintain data bases and expertise on the
Soviet economy while supporting the major
expanding market of users concerned with
international economics. Economic policy
officials believe that economic intelligence
requires additional analytic resources; some
have suggested that detailed economic analy-
ses of Communist countries might he con-
tracted out to properly cleared external
research organizations under the direction of
agencies within the Community.
? Users of nuclear proliferation intelligence
need multi-disciplinary analyses of the pros-
pects for increased spread of nuclear weap-
ons. These analyses should address the
political, economic and military incentives or
disincentives for specific countries to acquire
nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as
well as their technical capabilities to do so.
? Several consumers have expressed the desire
to have more analysis of those capabilities
and vulnerabilities of foreign nations which
would reveal possible areas of leverage for the
United States in various international pro-
grams and negotiations.
? National security users, especially in the
Department of Defense, are concerned with
the lack of comprehensive analyses of overall
Soviet and Warsaw Pact warmaking poten-
tial and with the inadequacies of net
assessments. There are two problems regard-
ing net assessments. The first relates to the
need for the Community to develop better
data bases and techniques for analyzing the
effectiveness of foreign military forces. The
second has to do with the role of intelligence
in net assessments. The Community performs
such assessments of foreign military balances
(e.g., Arabs and Israelis) and provides inputs
to net assessments of US-Soviet and NATO-
Warsaw Pact military balances. It is also at
times called upon by Congress and others to
compare US and Soviet forces, which may be
regarded by users as a logical rounding out of
intelligence analyses, but which also can
place the Community in the undesirable
position of evaluating US military forces and
policy.
D. National Intelligence Estimates
and Other Interagency Products
Interagency products, particularly the more
significant NIEs, are high-cost items in terms of
manpower and time. Accordingly, users' criti-
cisms are cause for concern to producers who, by
and large, still view these products as useful
compilations of facts, interpretations and judg-
ments. Estimates are an effective way to force
intelligence components regularly to review
events, reassess developments and clarify issues
on topics of importance to a wide range of users.
Users are particularly vocal on the deficiencies of
national estimates and other interagency prod-
ucts. Such reports are highly visible and try, in
13
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
one document, to meet the requirements of a
number of users having differing responsibilities
and concerns. But the flaws appear to be more
generic.
? Policymakers find many estimates "old hat,"
often untimely, and consequently unread.
They generally prefer direct support keyed to
their immediate needs as issues arise. State
Department users note, however, that Na-
tional Estimates are useful in providing
background for international meetings.
? Economic consumers find that interagency
papers dealing with economic and political
situations, while providing useful descriptive
background materials, often fail to provide
adequate intelligence relating to the more
difficult policy and negotiating issues.
? Some NSC Staff users question the value of
most National Estimates, except for those on
military topics. Economic users feel that
many of the politico-economic estimates are
internally generated for the Community;
these users seek more systematic arrange-
ments for discussing priority needs for esti-
mates.
? National security users, especially those in
DOD, criticize the conventional wisdom and
analytic bias they allege to find in National
Estimates on Soviet objectives and strategy
and the capabilities of Soviet and Warsaw
Pact forces. These users want the Community
to analyze incomplete data and project
trends through adversarial techniques and
net assessments that will provide a wider
range of estimative judgments. The Commu-
nity is beginning to respond to these de-
mands, most notably with the experimental
use of competitive teams to develop NIE
11-3/8-76, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental
Conflict Through the Mid-1980s, The utility
of this experimental technique has not yet
been determined.
? Despite attempts by the NIOs in recent years
to expose differences in view, there is still
criticism that coordinated interagency prod-
ucts too often do not provide balanced
appraisals of all factors without being waf-
fled and inconclusive. Users tend to be
suspicious of agreed statements, arguing that
serious differences of opinion are lost in the
process.
There is the danger that these complaints
reflect more a mind-set of the user than an
objective view of the analytic products. Even
when interagency products are at their objective,
relevant and perceptive best, they may get no
better than mixed reviews if their conclusions do
not suit the preconceptions of users. Nevertheless,
the complaints about relevancy and usefulness
are sufficiently widespread to be telling.
E. Warning, Crisis and Wartime
Intelligence
Crisis situations-impending or actual-pro-
vide the most stringent test of the timeliness and
quality of intelligence. Most "intelligence fail-
ures" occur when policymakers or military
commanders are surprised by hostile foreign
actions when the Community should have
provided some warning. The key question is
whether the Community's warning abilities are
improving. Post mortems have been conducted
on a number of past crises and have resulted in
improvements in organization, procedures and
communications. But effective warning depends
also upon the attitudes and alertness of intelli-
gence officers in sensing that foreign actions may
take unexpected turns, based on incomplete
information. It also depends upon the readiness
of users to receive warning in an uncertain
situation. These factors can only be judged
during the next impending crisis.
As noted, intelligence procedures, communica-
tions and facilities for warning and crisis support
to national leaders are improving. This is
reflected in favorable user comments on the
performance of the Community or its elements
14
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
during evacuation of Americans from Lebanon in
June and July 1976 and during the recent Korean
DMZ crisis. Most users also approve the concept
of a single DCI task force to produce National
Intelligence Situation Reports during a crisis. But
some major, long-standing problems limit the
value of intelligence support to national authori-
ties during warning, crisis and wartime oper-
ations. There is a need for:
? Further improvements in the Community's
ability for timely recognition of impending
crises and hostile foreign actions, to provide
better alerting and warning so that early
steps can be taken to avoid or mitigate the
crisis, as well as to increase the readiness of
US forces.
? Better integration of intelligence, diplomatic
and political plans and actions, and military
plans and operations to support all elements
of the Government concerned with warning
and crisis situations.
? Better definition of the DCI's responsibilities
in crises and wartime, which are vaguely
defined in existing legislation and executive
orders; better definition of the relation
between the crisis and wartime responsibil-
ities of the DCI and of other Government
officials (e.g., the Secretary of State, Secre-
tary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff); and
improved facilities, organizations and proce-
dures to support the DCI in carrying out his
crisis and wartime responsibilities.
15
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
SECRET
SOME SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN SATISFYING USER NEEDS
The findings on intelligence products indicate
an uneven record of performance. The causes are
many, but the critical aspects appear to derive
from some systemic problems of intelligence
which are discussed below:
? The determination of what users really need.
? The allocation of resources among various
stages of the intelligence process,
? The balance of production effort among data
bases, current intelligence and analysis.
? The degree of proximity between policy and
intelligence.
? The effect of compartmentation on product
utility.
A. Determining User Needs
1. The Problem of Priorities
Meeting the requirements of users for timely,
high quality intelligence is basically a problem of
setting and adjusting intelligence priorities
against a changing set of user needs.* Limits on
the budgets and manpower of the Community
preclude covering all user needs at the same time.
Hence, priorities must be established so that the
most important needs can be satisfied with
available resources.
The straightforward approach of setting priori-
ties by simply asking users what they need fails
on two counts - there is a multitiude of users,
with varying and sometimes conflicting demands
which exceed available intelligence resources,
* The term "priorities" is used in the sense of a set of criteria by
which the Community implictly or explicitly allocates its fiscal and
manpower resources.
and the users all too often do not understand
their own needs for intelligence very well.
The number of intelligence users is expanding
rapidly and their needs are becoming more
complex and sophisticated. World power rela-
tionships are changing and new, vital issues
concerning international economic, political, so-
cial and technological developments are striving
for recognition on an equal footing with more
traditional national security issues.
But the Community cannot easily move to
support these new concerns within fixed re-
sources, for questions regarding traditional issues
are becoming more comprehensive and sophisti-
cated, demanding increased efforts. The tradi-
tional subjects - Soviet and Chinese military
capabilities and intentions - are becoming both
more resistant to collection and more complex as
regards the information needed by the United
States. Growth in Soviet capabilities and limits
on US defense budgets make military planning
decisions more sensitive to finer details of Soviet
capabilities. The more delicate balance of world
power which now prevails leaves less margin for
ignorance or error by the United States about the
USSR. Better information is needed earlier to
provide the opportunity for the United States to
affect international developments during the
formative period, before foreign options get fixed
and countries become committed to courses of
action which run counter to US interests.
These conditions increase the importance for
the Community of accurately prioritizing the
many and varied needs of users. But the
Community too often has the wrong perception
of users' needs and cannot project future needs as
well as users can. Most users, on the other hand,
17
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
do not articulate their needs for intelligence
particularly well and inadequately project their
future needs. Even if future needs and priorities
were carefully projected, they would still be
subject to unexpected change caused by external
events which cannot be forecast far in advance.
Intelligence managers often are faced with
conflicting, high-priority demands requiring sup-
port from the same pool of resources. Some
inadequacies in intelligence products noted by
users are a result of earlier decisions to support
other policy needs. For example, the demand for
order of battle data on Soviet general purpose
forces to support MBFR negotiations has limited
broader studies of the effectiveness of Soviet
forces which are now being sought to support net
assessments. Similarly, the demand for data in
support of current economic and trade issues
eroded the Community's ability to provide basic
Soviet economic and industrial studies now
needed for SIOP targeting, technology transfer
analyses and estimates of the burden of Soviet
defense spending.
These considerations suggest that the Commu-
nity must have flexibility to shift collection,
processing, or production resources rapidly in
response to changing user needs. But the Com-
munity has only limited flexibility of this sort.
Satellites provide some capability to retarget
collection assets quickly, but not as much as is
sometimes imagined.. Many collection means
require ground-based facilities or networks of
human contacts which cannot quickly be shifted
to new locations. Linguists for processing raw
intelligence take time to train, as do area experts
who provide the finished products. New data
bases require time to develop. Thus, flexibility to
respond to rapid shifts in priorities is inherently
difficult to achieve. Moreover, what flexibility
the Community has developed in the past has
been reduced in recent years by the declining
purchasing power and manpower of the NFIP.*
2. Mechanisms for Establishing Priorities
Current mechanisms for adjusting intelligence
priorities to match user needs are complex,
imperfect and do not involve users to the extent
they should. They fall into three categories - the
formal Intelligence Community planning system,
other formal mechanisms and informal commu-
nication networks.
The Intelligence Community Planning Sys-
tem. The CFI is charged with establishing policy
priorities for collection and production of na-
tional intelligence. The DCI and NFIB provide
detailed guidance to the Community on intelli-
gence objectives, requirements and priorities
through a system of planning documents devel-
oped under the aegis of the IC Staff. This system
consists of short-range, mid-range and long-range
elements.
? The short-range element consists of the Key
Intelligence Questions (KIQs) and the DCI's
Goals and Objectives. About a dozen KIQs
will be issued for FY 1977 to focus special
collection and production attention on prior-
ity user needs. The DCI Goals and Objectives
are intended to provide broad goals for the
Community during FY 1977.
? The mid-range element is a comprehensive
set of national intelligence requirements and
priorities for the FY 1979-83 planning and
programming period. It consists of three
documents: (a) the DCI's Perspectives for
Intelligence Planning and Programming, a
review of trends and broad needs projected
for the period; (b) a new document, National
Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Prior-
ities for Planning and Programming, intend-
ed to define the highest priority national
intelligence requirements for the next five
years; and (c) a revised attachment to DCID
1/2, which assigns intelligence priorities to
regions and topics.
? The third element is a long-range study,
extending 15-20 years into the future, to
project trends and identify implications for
18
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
planning of future intelligence collection,
processing and production.
These formal planning documents are the
product of a Community coordination process
and reflect Community consensus on high
priority users' needs and broad priorities for
allocating resources. Users have not participated
directly in developing the planning documents,
so user needs are reflected only insofar as they are
understood by the Community.
Other Formal Mechanisms. Three other for-
mally established mechanisms have more direct
effects on determining users' needs and on the
detailed management of intelligence resources.
These are the NIO system, which primarily
affects production priorities; the DCI commit-
tees, which affect collection and production; and
intelligence liaison units in major user agencies,
which influence both production and collection.
The NIOs are the DCI's staff for overseeing
production of all national intelligence except for
current intelligence, which is a responsibility of
the CIA. They are responsible for supervising
production of national intelligence, assuring that
collection and production are responsive to
national needs and maintaining a dialogue with
senior users. The NIOs help the Community stay
aware of high priority user needs in a number of
key areas, but they are a small staff and are not
charged with primary responsibility for liaison in
all areas of interest to intelligence users.
The DCI Committees have evolved over the
years to handle collection, processing, production
and other problems requiring coordination
among Community organizations. Two of these,
the Commitee on Imagery Requirements and
Exploitation (COMIREX) and the SIGINT
Committee, coordinate Community manage-
ment of critical collection assets in their respec-
tive areas. Others coordinate Community pro-
duction and collection efforts in various special-
ized areas.
Intelligence units within several Government
departments serve more directly as interfaces
between departmental users and the Community
than do the other formal planning mechanisms
discussed above. Treasury has such a unit and
efforts are underway to establish an intelligence
liaison unit in the Department of Commerce.
The intelligence unit in ERDA provides liaison
with the rest of the Community, in addition to
carrying out its own production functions. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State
Department and DIA in the Department of
Defense have many responsibilities, including
liaison between users in these departments and
the rest of the Community. While such liaison is
essential for effective user-Community interface,
it does not resolve all problems of apprehending
user needs, since each departmental intelligence
unit represents a special set of customers and
cannot adjudicate Community-wide priorities.
Informal User-Community Networks. Us-
ers and Community specialists in key areas
communicate informally on users' needs and
priorities. These informal communication net-
works probably do more to tie together users,
collectors and producers than other, more formal
mechanisms, although they are not substitutes for
the formal mechanisms. Areas where such net-
works exist include strategic forces, international
economics, SALT, MBFR, China, terrorism, the
technical aspects of nuclear proliferation, special-
ties within the science and technology area, and
Soviet politics and foreign policy.
Being informal and evolutionary, these net-
works provide uneven coverage of user needs.
They are narrowly oriented to specific topics or
regions and do not provide a means for dealing
with adjustments in intelligence priorities which
cut across topical or regional lines. Moreover,
these informal networks generally provide for
communications among analysts, and do not tie
together policymakers and managers of intelli-
gence resources. Nevertheless, such networks
have considerable potential - and, in some
cases, such as international economics, are
currently quite effective.
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
3. Improved Ways to Determine User-
Needs
Intelligence managers have inadequate means
for obtaining a comprehensive view of user
needs, projecting these needs into the future and
setting priorities for allocating resources. These
means are especially inadequate for responding
to user needs which are not well established or
cut across traditional intelligence topics or
regions. In most areas of collection, processing
and production, the users are not involved with
intelligence managers in setting priorities and
making tradeoffs within limited intelligence
resources.
Some within the intelligence Community
caution against too much direct involvement of
users in setting intelligence priorities, arguing
that sometimes users do not want the Communi-
ty analyzing problems in certain areas where the
analysis may challenge the users' views on policy.
Some users are skeptical that their greater
involvement in setting priorities will materially
enhance the relevance of intelligence products.
They feel that Community managers must do
sufficient planning to anticipate users' needs
before the users realize that they are needs.
Others argue that the Community must make a
concerted effort to analyze in depth the several
markets and consumers it services, rather than
merely interview consumers or ask them to
communicate their needs more precisely.
These observations have merit, and the call for
market research by the Community on its various
types of consumers warrants pursuit. Neverthe-
less, the timeliness and quality of intelligence
production can be improved by close user-
Community interactions, provided these are
carefully devised to serve the purposes of
relevance and understanding. The following
steps, for example, are underway or will be
explored by Community elements or the IC
Staff:
? More consultation with users in planning
intelligence research and production.
? User review of or participation in the
development of intelligence planning docu-
m ents.
? More workshops, briefings and personnel
exchange programs to familiarize users and
Community personnel with one another's
problems, perspectives and constraints.
? Examination of possible ways to increase the
flexibility of the Community to respond
rapidly to shifts in user needs.
B. Allocating Resources to
Intelligence Activities
Figures 1 through 3 show FY 1972-76 trends in
the allocation of NFIP resources. Table II shows
overall trends in NFIP budgets (in current and
FY 1976 dollars) and manpower levels.*
Among the priorities and trends shown by these
data, the following are noteworthy:
* The data in Figures 1 through 3 and Table II show NFIP
resources as contained in the CIRIS (Consolidated Intelligence
Resources Information System) data base. CIRIS shows, for current
and past fiscal years, the distribution of intelligence resources in
official programs and budgets. This distribution reflects the best
judgment of intelligence managers on how their resources will be
allocated by function, subject and regions. Ground rules for these
allocations sometimes vary between programs and over time within
specific programs. Moreover, the data do not reflect the actual
allocation of resources. Nevertheless, a valid picture of de facto
priorities and trends emerges at the level of aggregation used for
Figures I through 3 and Table II.
20
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
1. The Collection-Production Balance
It is often stated that resources for collection
are out of balance with those for production and
that production should receive a larger share.
This criticism is based on the fact that production
receives only 6-7 percent of NFIP funds, the
judgment that intelligence products do not fully
satisfy user needs, and the widespread but still
subjective opinion among many users and pro-
ducers of intelligence that a relatively modest
increase in resources for production could bring
major improvements in output. Translating this
general perception into specific resource alloca-
tion recommendations for the CFI is a priority
task for the IC Staff.
The extent to which present production inad-
equacies stem from a collection-production re-
source imbalance is not clear. Intelligence collec-
tion systems must be redundant to some extent
and postured worldwide simply to be ready,
when and where information is accessible and
needed. Collection is the expensive end of the
intelligence business, is getting more so, and-
along with processing-will always far exceed the
cost of analysis and production. What is impor-
tant to note in the mix of resources is that
relatively small reallocations from collection
resources would amount to significant additions
to the production budget.
In the end, it might be found that insufficient
resources are committed to production, but hard
data for making such a judgment are not yet
available. There are several steps that should be
taken before making a determination that pro-
duction expenditures are too low. Better user-
producer interactions may allow elimination of
some products and a redistribution of existing
production resources to better satisfy user needs.
We must assess whether we are processing from
collected raw data the maximum available
information needed to fill identified intelligence
gaps. Recent concern about a shortage of
linguists to process COMINT and of photointer-
preters, for example, certainly suggests that more
resources could readily be used in processing.
New options for machine processing of raw
collected data are under continuous examination.
Thus, addressing the long-standing complaints
that intelligence collection and production or
analysis are out of balance must delve to the
heart of complex intelligence resource manage-
ment issues.
2. Better Management of
Intelligence Resources
At present it is very difficult to relate systemati-
cally the resources of intelligence to the end uses
of intelligence or to future production require-
ments. Current management information systems
at the Community level do not provide senior
Community managers with adequate under-
standing and control of the complex ways that
parts of the intelligence process relate to one
another. This is especially true of those relation-
ships which cut across organizational or budget
lines, The DCI and CFI must deal with this
23
Approved For Release 2001 /09 R IA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
problem in order to control more efficiently the
resource allocations for the NFIP.
Budgets and manpower accounts are currently
organized and displayed at the Community level
by collection programs (e.g., Consolidated Cryp-
tologic Program) or by organizations (e.g., CIA
Program and General Defense Intelligence Pro-
gram); that is to say, resources are managed in
terms of inputs to the intelligence process.
Resource decisions are not routinely made on the
basis of their effect on the outputs of the
intelligence process, which are the end products
used by consumers. The CFI's responsibility to
control resource allocation for the NFIP is limited
by the lack of adequate:
? Data bases which relate past, current and
programmed Community funds and man-
power to intelligence products.
? Measures of the utility of specific intelligence
products, in terms of user needs. It may not
be realistic, or useful, to assign numerical
values to intelligence products, but - at the
minimum - the implicit measures of prod-
uct utility used by senior Community man-
agers should be made explicit, so that
individual judgments about product utility
can be compared and debated.
? Analyses which explicitly relate collection,
processing and production resources to specif-
ic products and future requirements for
products. While these analyses would be
facilitated by the data bases discussed above,
they need not wait upon the development of
better data bases, and indeed the IC Staff
and other Community elements are proceed-
ing with output-oriented analyses in support
of the CFI.
Establishing the means for better intelligence
resource management on the basis of outputs is a
priority task for the IC Staff and all Community
elements.
C. The Distribution of Production
Resources Among Data Bases,
Current Intelligence,
and Analysis
The traditional intelligence output is solid,
descriptive reporting - the when, where, who,
what and how of facts bearing on various issues.
Every analysis calls for control over a body of
hard data that can be massaged to meet the
users' needs. Producers of intelligence tend to
give priority to this side of their responsibilities
because it is necessary for their own operations
and it answers the first line demands of users for
direct support. Most producers, however, want to
move beyond factual reporting. They want to
undertake deeper, more sharply focused analyses
of the data that will improve policymakers'
understanding of current situations and likely
future developments bearing on the principal
policy, program and negotiating issues. A vocal
body of users (and critics) also want such
analyses - context, intentions, projections, net
assessments, and appraisal of the aims and
strategies of the protagonists.
Despite this motivation, producers have their
problems in moving from factual reporting to
complex analyses. Analytic products require more
comprehensive and detailed data - usually
more difficult to collect and process - and the
best and most experienced personnel, as com-
pared with factual reporting. Moreover, analysis
takes time - lengthy gestation periods and closer
review by supervisors. This kind of intelligence
product is in competition with the needs of both
users and producers for "bread and butter"
intelligence that underwrites order of battle and
capabilities documentation, reporting on scienti-
fic and technological trends, and descriptions of
day-to-day political and economic developments.
But clearly the Community has to respond to the
needs for both descriptive reporting and analyses.
Users and producers share a responsibility for
limiting and prioritizing user demands and for
establishing the appropriate mix of factual
24
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 -CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
intelligence and near-term analysis. In recent
years it appears that the balance has tilted away
from data base and analytic support of tradition-
al national security concerns and in favor of
finished current intelligence products to support
new demands. Steps which would redress the
balance include:
? Reduction in the amount of finished current
intelligence products, consistent with the
needs of national and departmental users.
Steps have already been taken by CIA and
DIA to streamline and improve current
intelligence production.
? A reduction of self-initiated descriptive and
factual memoranda, but the maintenance
and improvement of solid data bases for
daily support production of ad hoc analytic
papers responding to the immediate needs of
users.
? Joint user-producer procedures for establish-
ing priorities for analytic reporting on re-
gions, topics and areas of particular concern
to users,
? Community recognition that a large amount
of analytic work takes place within the policy
areas of key Government departments and
agencies. These analytic activities are outside
the framework of the Intelligence Communi-
ty. Nevertheless, the Community must take
these efforts into account so they will not be
unnecessarily duplicated by intelligence
analyses. Insofar as practical, the analytic
output of departmental policy desks should
be disseminated to the Community for
background information and other uses as
appropriate.
? More attention by policy-level users to
providing the Community with important
information they acquire from their own
foreign contacts and information identifying
important policy and negotiating issues,
D. Intelligence Objectivity and the
Policy Process
Intelligence producers have mixed views about
their role in the policy affairs of the Government.
There is a cyclic history of passive and active
intelligence relations with policymaking. Recent
years have seen a swing towards closer intelli-
gence participation in some policy areas.
Good interpretive analysis often comes close to
a meshing of policy and intelligence. Users seem
to approve of drawing producers closer to policy
issues. In fact, some consumers are seeking to
bring producers more into the policy process
through participation in various policy review
committees. This is being done not to ask the
advice of intelligence producers on policy deci-
sions, but to strengthen the Community's under-
standing of the issues and its appreciation of the
factors of prime importance to policymakers.
Should the coupling of users and intelligence
producers be tight, to enhance the relevance of
intelligence to policy, or should it be loose, to
assure the objectivity of intelligence products?
Interviews with users indicate they generally
desire a close relationship in the belief that it
leads to more responsive intelligence focused on
priority consumer needs. But producers-perhaps
more in CIA than in the departmental compo-
nents of the Community-are apprehensive
about mixing policy and intelligence. By tradi-
tion, intelligence producers have favored passive
over active support of users and have been
reluctant to initiate a closer user-producer rela-
tionship. As a result, many intelligence products
have been less relevant and timely with respect to
consumers' needs than could be the case.
User criticisms of analytic products often are
couched in terms of the relevance of the products
to users. Much of the effective intelligence
support noted in this review is the result of
frequent discourse between intelligence personnel
and relatively senior policymakers. Areas where
production and policy are closest are energy,
25
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
international economics, terrorism, narcotics,
SALT, MBFR and territorial negotiations. Main-
taining objectivity in descriptive and quantita-
tive intelligence in these areas has generally not
been a serious problem. There is a danger
however, that close working relationships be-
tween intelligence analysts and departmental
staff officers or senior policymakers could result
in biased products that are structured to support
policy, as producers come to identify with the
policies they helped develop.
Other forms of bias pose problems for both
users and producers. Some users find bias in
estimates and projections. One must, however, be
guarded in treating this criticism. Charges of bias
can result from products which do not provide
the answer desired by users. Nevertheless, bias
continues to be a problem, particularly on topics
on which there is extensive uncertainty allowing
institutional leanings of various Community
components the opportunity to come to the fore.
There is a subtler form of bias which both users
and the Community must watch for - the
cultural bias of Americans, who unconsciously
view the world from a different frame of
reference than others. For example, Americans
find it difficult to take the subject of nuclear war
as seriously as the Soviets apparently do, And
Americans have different criteria for what is
rational action in the Middle East than do the
Arabs.
The DCI, following the philosophy of his
predecessors, has instructed the Community to be
action-oriented and responsive to users' needs.
But he demands total objectivity in intelligence
reporting and analysis, and professional judg-
ments on developments, without coloration by
policy considerations. Perhaps there should be a
more comprehensive policy statement on partici-
pation of intelligence producers in policy activi-
ties, to define a responsive, yet proper, relation-
ship. Lacking this, users and producers should
maintain professional standards of performance
and an appropriate degree of tension in their
relationship to ensure the objectivity of intelli-
gence.
E. Compartmentation of Intelligence
Products
Compartmentation of intelligence products is
necessary to protect specially sensitive informa-
tion and safeguard sources and methods which
are vulnerable to counteraction by adversaries.
But compartmentation also limits the uses to
which such information can be put. A balance
must be struck between these divergent but valid
concerns - a balance which ensures that users
have access to and can disseminate information
they need and at the same time protects sensitive
information, sources and methods.
In recent years, the President, DCI and
Community have taken a number of steps to
broaden dissemination of compartmented infor-
mation. The existence of US imagery satellites
and most information derived from these sources
are now availabbeg &users at the Secret level
outside of compartmented controls. I
. Detailed procedures
ave been developed or the sanitization, down-
grading and decontrol of certain classes of
SIGINT information, although the general policy
is still to keep SIGINT information under
compartmented controls.
During the past year, special studies of
compartmentation problems have been under-
taken by various Community elements and
changes recommended to improve intelligence
support to consumers. One major change current-
ly under consideration is the removal of a
substantial amount of SIGINT information from
compartmented controls. A promising new effort
is the creation of a Single System Working Group
under the DCI's Security Committee. It is
charged with developing a single system of
compartmentation to encompass the needs of all
26
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
special programs and of users as well. Consumers
still feel, however, that more should be done to
sanitize and decontrol intelligence products.
? Many users, ranging from State to Defense to
Treasury, feel that the balance between
source protection and access to information is
still tipped too far, in favor of source
protection. They continue to press for more
sanitization of intelligence products, to per-
mit wider use of intelligence information
while sources remain secure. When requested
to prepare reports on specific issues for
particular users, the CIA and departmental
intelligence components tailor their reports to
the needs of these users and can often address
the issue satisfactorily with sanitized infor-
mation. But when reports are prepared for a
large audience with diverse interests, it is
more difficult to be relevant and informative
without including sensitive details of sources
and methods.
? It should be noted that user organizations
have been slow to nominate necessary per-
sonnel for access to compartmented informa-
tion. Community officials will expeditiously
clear any persons nominated, provided they
meet personal security standards and have a
need to know.
? The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied
compartmentation problems and have rec-
ommended decompartmentation of all intel-
ligence products derived from satellites and
adjustments in the classification and com-
partmentation of the "fact of " satellite
reconnaissance, These recommendations
have been forwarded to the DCI and are
awaiting his decision. They are aimed, inter
alia, at improved intelligence support to
military commanders, who need intelligence
data at the lowest possible classification to
permit wide dissemination.
? Department of Defense users note that none
of the actions discussed above adequately
take into account the role of NATO in US
national security strategy and the need for
improved intelligence support to NATO and
its Allied commands.
27
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
FINDINGS, ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Findings
In summary, this review finds:
? An increasing diversity and sophistication in
the demands of an expanding Community of
users.
? Inadequate Community understanding of
the needs of various sets of users and of
priorities among these needs.
? General user satisfaction with current, short-
term reporting on most topics and geographic
regions, but less satisfaction with analyses
and prognoses of developing issues,
? User discontent with NIEs and interagency
products of all types. Their utility and
relevance to policy issues are questioned by
many users.
? Problems in the Community's ability for
early recognition of impending crises; in
integration of intelligence and information
on US political and military actions; and in
the definition of responsibilities of the DCI
and other Government officials concerned
with warning and crisis information.
? Long-standing problems systemic to the
intelligence process concerning the identifi-
cation of user needs; the basis for allocating
intelligence funds and manpower; the bal-
ance of production efforts among data bases,
current intelligence and analysis; the degree
of proximity between intelligence production
and the policy process; and the compartmen-
tation of intelligence products.
B. Improvements Under Way
Community components have a number of
actions in progress which should effect some
improvements, although these actions alone will
not resolve the deeper problems of intelligence
noted above.
? The NIO concept, when vigorously adhered
to by individual NIOs, provides a valuable
service. NIOs are responsible for keeping the
DCI abreast of policy issues and needs of
intelligence relevant to various areas or
topics. They are also charged with ensuring
that interagency intelligence products are
responsive to national needs.
? The Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO)
system serves somewhat the same purpose for
production of military intelligence which
comes under the authority of the Director of
DIA.
? The DCI's system of KIQs, when consciously
used as a management tool, can assure
appropriate emphasis on selected intelligence
questions. The list is revised annually and
this year is sharply reduced to focus on a
small number of intelligence questions that
require priority attention because of policy
implications or deficient intelligence per-
formance. NIOs have the lead in formulating
agreed Community collection and produc-
tion strategies to develop answers to the
KIQs.
? The NFIB and DCI Committees play a key
role in the complex process of coordinating
detailed Community collection, processing
29
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
and production activities and relating these
to users' requirements.
These mechanisms help focus intelligence on
national needs. Other actions work more directly
to support departmental needs for intelligence
production. The following represent ongoing
developments:
? The Defense Intelligence Board, in operation
within DOD for some eight months, brings
together DOD users and producers of intelli-
gence. It has initiated actions to deal with a
number of problems, including compartmen-
tation of information and the establishment
of user requirements.
? Informal networks between intelligence ana-
lysts and the user community exist in many
areas and probably are more productive
means of user-producer communications
than are purely organizational mechanisms.
These networks should be expanded and
more systematically exploited to assure effec-
tive user-Community communications,
? Within the Department of the Treasury there
is a separate office for national security
affairs in the Office of the Secretary which in
recent years has been successful in strength-
ening the interface with intelligence and in
maintaining a daily dialogue with intelli-
gence officers. This office has contributed to
increased relevance of intelligence to interna-
tional economic policy and negotiating
issues. A similar arrangement will be initiated
at the Department of Commerce and the
technique could be expanded to other
departments.
? Oft-suggested
user-producer
such topics
intelligence.
but infrequently attempted
workshops are planned for
as nuclear proliferation
C. Actions to be Taken by the DCI
There has been little need in the past to control
users' demands on intelligence
establish priorities for areas and subjects outside
of traditional national security concerns. Users'
requests for support have increased to the point,
however, where they are beginning to divert
research resources devoted to priority concerns.
Ultimately, the Community will have to deter-
mine the limits of its capabilities and develop
criteria for refusing some requests for specialized
intelligence support.
DCI Action: The DCI will assure the
effective functioning of mechanisms for
evaluation of major new user requests for
national intelligence production to ensure
that the desired information is available
primarily through intelligence sources and
methods. Where requests conflict with
recognized priorities, the DCI will empha-
size explicit adjustment of priorities, in
consultation with appropriate users.
DCI Action: The DCI will examine the
possibility of key users augmenting their
own analytic resources to reduce the
volume of requests for memoranda that are
not primarily dependent on intelligence
sources and methods.
Provision of improved intelligence support to
users may require some reallocation of intelli-
gence resources. To do so, the Community needs
better tools and methods for measuring the
potential value to users of collection, processing
or production funding changes, as well as the
consequences of manpower changes within pro-
duction components.
DCI Action: The DCI will seek, on a
priority basis during FY 1977 and 1978, to
establish through the IC Staff a compre-
hensive, accurate and flexible base of tools
and data for assessing the interplay of
resources for intelligence collection, proc-
essing and production and the impact on
the value of intelligence products. He will
work with other members of the CFI to
establish management policy which will
30
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
ensure the full participation of Communi-
ty program managers in this effort.
The Community must improve its near-term
analyses, multi-disciplinary analyses and na-
tional estimates. These improvements should be
made deliberately, so that good work and
existing relationships will not be destroyed in the
process.
DCI Action: In consideration of those
steps which can be taken within present
budgetary limits, the DCI will:
? Direct analytic components involved
in production of national intelligence
to produce a larger number of broad,
predictive analyses to assess foreign
developments that could have a major
impact on US interests.
? Direct production managers in the
national intelligence field and request
those producing departmental intelli-
gence to consider some reductions in
current intelligence and event report-
ing, while assuring that they will
continue to provide quality current
intelligence support on a timely basis
as needed by users.
? Direct the NIOs to incorporate a
broader view of possible trends and
developments into their country and
area estimates, and to develop more
effective ways of interrelating the
economic, political, military and tech-
nical aspects of issues in their major
interagency analyses.
? Direct production managers involved
with national intelligence and encour-
age production managers dealing with
departmental intelligence throughout
the Community to adopt procedures or
reorganizations to establish integra-
tive, multi-disciplinary analyses on
areas and topics of interest.
The Community must deal with users' con-
cerns for the lack of relevance and utility in
many NIEs. The NIOs have developed several
ways of outlining key issues in estimates by
discussions prior to drafting, but they rarely
solicit the direct views of users on what issues and
factors should be addressed by NIEs.
DCI Action: The DCI will direct the
NIOs to solicit users' views in planning the
production of NIEs and other interagency
papers. The NIOs could borrow from the
technique of National Security Study
Memorandums (NSSMs), in which intelli-
gence users and producers interact directly
on specific topics. Some of the more
important NSSMs demonstrated the feasi-
bility of forcing producers to perceive
policy issues more broadly and to focus
their products on specific user concerns. A
more direct and perhaps less cumbersome
approach would have the NIOs invite the
principal users of major intelligence esti-
mates to participate in drafting terms of
reference and provide background brief-
ings to the estimate drafting teams on the
principal policy questions pertaining to the
area or topic under review.
The DCI recently met with the Economic
Policy Board (EPB) to consider means of improv-
ing the interface between economic policymakers
and the Intelligence Community. A number of
constructive suggestions came out of that meet-
ing and will be included in a special EPB report.
DCI Action: The DCI will ensure that
all members of the new Cabinet concerned
with economic policymaking are briefed
on the contributions that intelligence can
make in this area and the arrangements for
doing so. He will also give early consider-
ation to the recommendations of the EPB
report.
D. Actions Recommended to the NSC
This review has not identified any issues which
are susceptible to final NSC resloution at this
31
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
time. There are, however, several areas in which
NSC guidance or support is desirable.
One area is the findings of this review and the
Community actions for improvements reflected
in the foregoing discussion,
Recommendation: The NSC principals
should concur in the findings of this review
and provide comments on the principal
problems and issues which relate to their
areas of responsibility, It would be of
particular value to have NSC members
and their senior staffs identify as specifical-
ly as possible those improvements in
intelligence products considered to be most
urgently needed.
Experience with the now disbanded NSC
Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) indicates that
formal user-producer mechanisms at a senior
level are difficult to maintain on a continuing
basis. Nevertheless, users must be more explicit
and disciplined in their expression of intelligence
needs, in order to increase the relevance and
timeliness of intelligence products. In particular,
the Community has to understand the areas of
future user concerns to bring its collection and
processing capabilities to bear on issues some
time before specific reporting and analyses are
needed.
Recommendation: The NSC should con-
sider improved ways for users to communi-
cate to the Community their changing
concerns and prospective intelligence
needs.
The intelligence products reviewed in this
study are the output of several agencies and
departments, only one of which is the direct
executive responsibility of the DCI. The DCI can
direct changes within the CIA that will improve
national intelligence in areas of unique Agency
competence and in interagency products. Ile can
directly affect the field reporting of the CIA's
clandestine service, which supplies a significant
amount of intelligence to consumers. But much
of the Community is departmentally based and
the DCI can affect the ultimate performance of
such elements primarily through positive leader-
ship and guidance in the NFIB and CFI.
Recommendation: The NSC should ex-
press its strong support of the DCI's
leadership in improving the quality and
relevance of intelligence products and in
determining the organizational and man-
agement arrangements within the Com-
munity that will best enhance his author-
ity to allocate resources toward that end.
The Community's ability to function effective-
ly in crisis and wartime situations could be
seriously affected by several long-standing prob-
lems. Improvements directed toward more timely
recognition of impending crises and more com-
plete and relevant reporting during crisis situa-
tions are now under way. However, the DCI's
role during major military crises or war has long
been in need of formal clarification, particularly
as regards his authority in respect to national
collection assets and his performance as principal
foreign intelligence advisor to the President. The
need for such clarification becomes more urgent
as major national intelligence assets, managed by
the DOD, are increasingly tasked to provide
direct support to military operations, and as the
assurance of reliable and secure communications
between national intelligence elements and the
National Command Authorities in a nuclear
conflict becomes less likely. The NSC must
eventually engage in a comprehensive examina-
tion of the role of the DCI, and of national
intelligence generally, in a major crisis or war.
But considerable study is required over the next
several months to prepare to address the wide
range of issues involved.
Recommendation: The NSC should de-
clare its endorsement of the continuing
need for well integrated national intelli-
gence during a major crisis or war. The
NSC should consider measures to assure a
strong role for the DCI in providing this
32
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
intelligence, while also assuring that this joint Chiefs of Staff and with the needs of
role is in consonance with the responsihil- other departmental intelligence users dur-
ities of the Secretary of Defense and the ing major crises or wartime.
33
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
Summary
The following summarizes the salient points of
users' views on intelligence support on geograph-
ic and topical areas (Annexes A through G in
Volume II).
A. The Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe
1. Economy, Technology, and Politics
? There is general satisfaction with the quality
and timeliness of most of the current
intelligence.
? However, there is increasing need to go
beyond current reporting and produce more
policy-oriented research, credible estimates,
factual compendia and imaginative, multi-
disciplinary analyses. There is a particularly
strong plea for in-depth, integrated politico-
economic reporting on internal matters in
Eastern Europe.
? Shortfalls exist in the Community's data
bases on and analysis of the Soviet economy.
These deficiencies affect the ability to sup-
port:
- Nuclear war planning requirements to
prolong Soviet economic recovery under
the guidance of NSDM 242.
- In-depth studies of the Soviet economy.
Deficiencies in this area weaken the
ability to provide policy-oriented analysis
on such topics as the impact of Soviet
acquisition of Western technology and its
effect on our export control policies.
- Estimates of Soviet military expenditures.
2. Military Strategy and Capabilities
? The Community provides excellent descrip-
tions of Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic.
forces and major general purpose force units
and weapons systems.
? There is equal satisfaction with support to
SALT and MBFR negotiations. But there is
concern with the treatment of dissent and
uncertainty. Annex A in Volume II of this
review notes the importance to arms negotia-
tions of disagreements concerning the range
and mission of the Backfire bomber and
uncertainty about the size of Warsaw Pact
forces.
? Users need enhanced analytical sophistica-
tion. On the basis of available data, more
intelligence products are required on such
complex, qualitative issues as:
- Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy, tactical
doctrine and concepts of operation.
- Overall Soviet and Warsaw Pact warmak-
ing potential.
- The Soviet ability to project power to
distant areas.
- Soviet and Warsaw Pact training, main-
tenance, logistics and command, control
and communications.
- National net assessments of critical US-
Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact military
balances.
? Basic user needs for general purpose forces
intelligence have been illuminated by the
user-producer debate following publication
35
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M0031I R0001 00270001-2
SECRET
of NIE 11-14-75, Warsaw Pact Forces Oppo-
site NATO.
? The ongoing competitive analysis experiment
for NIE 11-3/8-76, Soviet Forces for Inter-
continental Conflict Through the Mid-1980s,
represents a significant attempt to respond to
user criticisms of the national estimative
process regarding Soviet strategic forces.
? The Community has been less responsive to
requests for a comprehensive, up-to-date
estimate of Soviet long-range strategic objec-
tives. Such an estimate is currently in
preparation.
? Examples of especially good support include:
- Clandestine reporting on nuclear weap-
ons development programs in South
Korea and Taiwan.
- State and CIA reporting on PRC foreign
policy. 25X1 A
ommunity ettorts on the Korean mili-
tary balance and the Korean I&W
problem.
? Users' demands for newer types of sophisti-
cated intelligence products are straining the
Community's capacity to redirect scarce
analytical talent while continuing to deliver
a high volume of good analyses of the more
traditional, quantitative style which is still in
demand.
? There is general agreement that most intelli-
gence reporting and analysis has been ade-
quate, although there is some controversy as
to the adequacy of analysis on Chinese
leadership politics.
? Greater collection and analytical effort is
needed on North Korea, particularly
Pyongyang's domestic political develop-
ments, diplomatic strategies and internation-
al intentions.
? Users have a growing need for a better grasp
of Hanoi's domestic and foreign policies that
affect US interests in Southeast Asia and any
further negotiating strategies. Intelligence
resources were shifted away from Hanoi after
the fall of Saigon and the Community's
resources devoted to Southeast Asia may
have to be reassessed to satisfy these antici-
pated user requirements.
C. The Middle East
? There is general concurrence that the Com-
munity has covered three major issues in a
meaningful, timely, and 'effective manner:
issues related to peace settlement, with
emphasis on the politico-military dimensions
of the complex Arab-Israeli equation; threats
to political stability of key countries; and
activities of major oil exporters bearing on US
international economic policy decisions and
negotiations.
? Support has improved noticeably since 1973
Arab-Israeli war.
? Current problems include the need for better
dialogue between users and producers; the
excessive volume of current intelligence; and
the need for more in-depth analyses.
D. The Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and Technology
? The Community's performance on this topic
has been mixed. Current and ad hoc intelli-
gence support, especially on technical aspects
of proliferation, has been satisfactory. The
consensus is, however, that the Community
has not performed as well in providing longer
term, in-depth analyses which integrate
political, economic and military aspects with
technical factors,
36
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
? The DCI is attempting to improve matters
through user and producer meetings to (1)
better define required intelligence informa-
tion (including data bases on special nuclear
material stockpiles and trained personnel in
nuclear technology); (2) determine what can
realistically be provided; and (3) establish a
more effective Community mechanism for
integrating nuclear proliferation intelligence.
E. Support to International Economic
Actions of the US Government
? There has been good to excellent support in
terms of timeliness, quality and coverage on
international economics, particularly in cur-
rent reporting. There is, however, widespread
need for more multi-disciplinary analyses of
current politico-economic developments and
trends, particularly those drawing on classi-
fied material.
? CIA's Office of Economic Research is the
principal producer of finished economic
intelligence.
? Treasury's intelligence unit is facilitating the
user-producer dialogue. Consideration is be-
ing given to a similar liaison unit at
Commerce.
? Interest in improving economic intelligence
support has been shown by the Economic
Policy Board (Secretary Simon, Chairman)
and PFIAB.
? Periodic collection and reporting guidance
from Washington to diplomatic and consular
posts abroad has been helpful.
? Some problem areas include:
- Compartmentation of certain products
substantially restricts their dissemination
and usefulness.
- More economic content in NIEs is desir-
able.
- More intelligence support is needed to
the continuing series of meetings related
to North/South issues and the Less
Developed Countries.
There is a need to improve user-producer
interchange.
F. Warning, Crisis and Wartime
Operations
? Recent technological advances have permit-
ted improvements in communications sys-
tems and operating procedures which support
the Community's warning process and en-
hance its capability to provide better intelli-
gence to national authorities during crisis.
? Major long-standing problems include:
- Improving the Community's ability to
recognize indications of potential foreign
actions affecting US interests.
- The need for better definition of the
DCI's role and relationship with other
USG officials in warning and crisis
operations, and provisions for improved
support to the DCI in carrying out those
responsibilities.
- The need to achieve more systematic and
adequate integration of US operational
and policy information in intelligence
assessments pertaining to warning and
crisis situations.
G. Support to US Counterterrorism
Activities
? There is general satisfaction with the timeli-
ness, quality and relevance of terrorism
information provided by the Community.
The focal point for intelligence support is the
Working Group (WG) of the Cabinet Com-
mittee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT), a
policy guidance and coordination activity.
? There is a need for products that analyze
attitudes and intentions of countries and
groups most likely to perpetrate terrorism,
37
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100270001-2
SECRET
and any changes from the norm of terrorist
conduct or activities.
? There is a need for information on counter-
terrorism policies and practices of other
countries and wider dissemination of pub-
lished materials, e.g., to military commands
and various military schools.
? Specific suggestions and recommendations
include:
- Tasking of special Community studies or
other production requirements on terror-
ism should be coordinated by the
CCCT/WG.
-A computerized central file of terrorism-
related intelligence should be established.
- Collection and analysis on terrorism
should be expanded to include the
possible use by terrorists of chemical and
biological agents. This topic could be
handled by a subcommittee of the
CCCT/WG and perhaps addressed in an
"Interagency Intelligence Memoran-
dum."
38
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP82MOO31 1 R0001 00270001-2