SOVIET PARTISANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000500830069-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: August 6, 1947
• Content Type: IR

USQp., ,
MAAy Y pa pa . s comona Appro4 1e 04/03/31 CIA-RDP80-00809AO00500830069-2
WU;1{nl i717a78T DATE DISTR. 6 . A31g,tg ',
SUBJECT" Sovist Partisans 1947
NO. OF PAGES' 10
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
ONFORMAT8ON REPORT
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cbeerrationssp occasionally supplomentad by reminiecencea of other psartiaanp rorhi ch
25X1 cppearytd in the Soviet monthlies, Zaamsra (Ho. 4, 1946) and Ootobor (Not. 1-2, 3-4.
I? T H J 5 MlaINN 3 ! o r H 1
C
7. The outbreak of the war was so unonneotod to the entiro?couwtry both in its
forma and Ito tnposo that the Aruay Command and the local party and soviet
s:.vthorities were thrown into attar confusion and had* no time to, seriously plan
and organize the people for the coming atlsa behind the oneaaq?y )ines. The
panic was so great that all the local leaders thought only of escaping Wore
the Germans cameo Only in a small aaasmber of districts did the District Committees
of the party,, acting on their ore initiative, leave behind certain party members
'-- work in the rear of the enemy. These party members later established oontnate
id b"' each other, and drawing a part of the population into the worko organised
~.ighQing unita.
2. Jailarly, as number of the local offices of the EC>M?) had not had time to leave
t:~eeir agents behind. However, even agents who remained behind did not ploy any
ufetive role* but lived quietly through the ocwpa3tiou p oonziniuQ theaoaelvee : to
compiling blacklists of all persons who had in any aaasura cooperated with the
CY~Drraans. But sometimes these agents added people who arrived from the other side
o the -front and helped them to contract (,reliable patriots.e
3. Or, the whole, the appearaaiaoa in ?U9 enemy? a roar of numerous a=aaod peasant groups
d;rriag the early months of the war was a purely spontaneous phenomenon. ).Tiny of
these groups(, moreover, were. little more than simple bandit gage.. Basically(,
the groups consisted of young pennants, soldiers who escaapai into the format
m.fter their units wore ourroundodp and el,o of people who saw en opporl;tmity for
looting and -enricbment :A the prevailing chaos. Only units which wore joined by
the local intelloctuel'a,, each as couool teachers and agronomists, engaged i.n
struggle against the enemy by moano of diversionary auto, sabotage and torroriaea.
Th. r obtained arms roe the retroal.:ing army, but those arias were vary primitive
and useful only for.- 'mall-ec3lo attacks on houses where the Germans engaged in
drinking bouts,, 'nsmall storehouses and on Germst soldiers who bed accidentally
strayed from their units. All those acts were conducted by the guerrillas
on their own(, without any leadership and without coordination betroon the
e)
STATE 2
WAR 2
The present Ministry of the Interior was known as the NXVD up to Warchi, 19469
Both designations are used in this report.
IiAW
AAF
CLASSIFICATION
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various detachmamts. There were even cases when the detachments, meeting
in the foreete, open fire upon oaok other, suspecting a trap on the part
of the Germane. _
4EfEREP,GF CENTER Li B',
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A. Despite the noisy propaganda in the press, the government did not"regst&
thane patriots in the oneaWte rear as a serious forge, especially since
it had no contact with them and therefore could not direct their activi
ties. However, this spontaneous resistance movement convinced the govern-
meat that there were peoplo'on the other side of the fighting lines who
might be of considorablo value in the fight against the Germane and mho
might help in diversionary activity and in destroying enemy communications
if they were contacted and directed through trusted agents. By this time
the command decided to send a large number of loyal persona an divorsioniOts
for the demolition of those bridges and-strategic points which tha retreat-
ing army had not had time to blow up and which were now proving of great
value to the Germane ao means of communication with their distant bases.
It use also decided to use the detachments active in the roar to help these
diveraioniats in their work.
SCOUTS, *ND 'Pd8 FOEUSA`PION OF SPMXAL SQUADS
5. Toward the end of July and in August, 1941, e. call for volunteers went out
to the Comaomol youth in the. war factories and echoolo. The volunteers
were to be sent to districts under German occupalon for dynamiting and
terrorist work. Party and Comsomol cells were instructed to launch an in-.
tonsive propaganda campaign and arouse patriotism in order to attract the
largest possible number of volunteers. And their number was great indeed.
In the Dzerzhineky district alone (thero.aro 22 such districts in Jdoscov)
1100 volunteers registered in roapon?e to the call, end tho total for Moscow
exceeded 10 thousand. All the volunteers were members of t s party and the
Comsomol, between the ages of 18 and 28, with at least 7 years of elementary
school education. They regarded thin dangerous work as something interesting
and romantic, and many wore also prompted by prefoi?ance for diversionirt work
to service at the front, to which they were oubjeet in nay case in view of
their age and which seemed to them much morn dangerous.
6. An the registrants were carefully soroened by organs of the IIKVD, which
questioned each applicant about his entire flamily, hie pax ntot oeeupatione
before the revolution, the possible existence of relatives abroad, and so
forth. The answers were then checked with the Man of the NKVD, and only
one'tenth of the registrants mar accepted for secret assignmeatn, while the
root were told to await the second call.
?. The author of the prasent.report knows of only two schbola.in existence at
that time in Moscowc a school for aoouts, and a school for diversionists.
Both ware under the jurisdiction of 11M departments and were under msrtial
law. These schools were located in.the "Dynamo" Stadium, on the Loair. rad
highway, in the Pntrovak Park, which belongs to the Ministry of the Interior
and Which was closed to public sports from the first days of the star.. There
the volunteora, selected according to their political roliability, wet sub-
jectad to thorcegh medical examination. Thu physical requirements were very
high; in addition to native physical endowments, they included athletic train-
ing, anduranoe and tenacity. These requirocienta were anetwored moat/ closely by
profoseional athletes, as wolf as the students of special sport inatit~zteo and
technical behoolso Consequently, the athletes c(..nprised 25-28% of the total
number of poroonn selected for training at the schools.
8. Applicants who ped. the medical toots were given military uniforms aid ai-
eigned to dormitories and school auditoriums not up for them on the stadium
grounds. They were divided into sections and plat-one, designated an cuua
munications sections, scout platoons,'-dynamiting companies, and so forth,
according to their taake. The 300-hour training program (30 school days. of
ton hours ouch) viers devoted to the following etudioss a) topography and
orientation by the compass and natural tokens; b) radio communication; e)
explosives and their uses in diversion; d) military :Intelligence and oepionage,
and the syatem of their organisation in the roar; o) weapons and their ups;
f) cryptography and codes; g) signalling by bird-conga; h) current events and
the political character of the rear. Theme subjects were taught by. professors
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of the regular military achoola of the Ministry of the Interior and certain
specialists from the Military Acidemioe. Since in aoleeting the students
preference was given to persona with high-school or college education, the
program consisted of brief coursee in theory and subsequent emphasis on
practice.
9. Every morning all students were put through intensive physical training: run
ning, jumping, grenade-throwing, overcoming obstacles and weight-lifting. These
were followed by breakfast. Then four hours of uninterrupted theoretical
studies. ,After lunch the students engaged in practical studios in orientation
and topography, camouflage, organization of diversions and other subjects.
For this they took tripe to the country, where there were natural objectives,
and learnt their subjects by practice under the guidance of the instructors.
On their return, they were again assembled in the auditorium, where they were
given lectures in current events, taught how to select the people they could
depend on behind the German lines and how to judge the degree of their truat-
worthinesa. In the evenings they studied radio.
10. Thirty days proved insufficient for the entire program, and the term was ax-
tended by another 12 days. After they mastered their subjects, the atudento
were given a short course in parachute jumping and were dropped two or three
times from the training plans. The final examinations were hold before high-
ranking members of the EMinintry of the Interior, and the graduation ceremony
was attended by'the 2nd Secretary of the Moscow Party Organisation, Popov, who
d,ilivored a long speech which was meant to inspire the future diversionists to
self-sacrificing work for party and people...
11. The next stop was the formation of detachments. The commanders appointed to
lead them were communists of long party experience and irreproachable past,
who had distinguished themselves in their work by initiative, courage, and
loyalty to the party. Inasmuch as the basic tasks of these detachments con-
sisted of diversion and reconnaissance, it was preferred that the commander
be a person with technical training or a specialist in military-espionage re-
connaissance, according to the aims with which the detachments were being sent
to the rear. An a rule, they were also volunteers who requested the Central
Committee of the Party in Uoscow to assign them to thin type of service? After
a careful checking of their records by the NKVD, the entire material on them
was sent to the Central Committee of the Party, which finally approved each
detachment commander and assigned him to a district of operations. The politi-
cal commissars for the detachment- ware chosen from among party and Soviet
leaders who had managed to escape from the districts they directed before the
occupation and who were thoroughly familiar with the terrain of the area whore
the detachment was being sent and with the local people with whom they would
have to deal. In addition to these, the posts of commissar were given to party
workers. of the Moscow organizational apparatus who had served before the wear as
instructors, propagnndiete, lecturers, and who had wide party experience and an
unblemished past. The detachment commander and the commissar selected their
people in the school, having come to knot; them during the month and a half of
common study and choosing those who, they felt, satisfiaa the all-round require-
ments.
129 The detachments consisted of 40 to 80 people; those rare divided into a cowtauni-
cations section, a scout squad, a mine-layers' and dynamitere' squad, a sharp-
shooters' squad, and a quartermaster. The command consisted of 3 or 4 persons;
to commander,'the commissar, and the chief of staff. Thus, for in',tanoe, the
detachment under the engineer Lynkov, who became known among the partisans as
"Datya" ("Daddy") and later became famous throughout Russia and was awarded the
Order of Hero of the Soviet Ur-Lon, consisted of 54 persons; 16 radio men, 2
nurses-radio jporators, 5 scouts, 12 apacialiats-dynamitero, 1 quartermaster,
and the rest - privates. Of the latter, 12 wore professional athletes and for-
mer members of sports organizations or students* of sports schools. Each group
of this detachment formed a section or squad, which was led by a group-commander
subject to the detachment commander,
13. Practically all the detachments were transported to the German rear in September
and the beginning. of October, 1941. They wore transported by the Division of
long-range bombers T8-3, which wore also loaded with explosives, arms, radio-
apparatus, instruments, ammunition, canned roods, medical supplies, etc. Thus,
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bynkov'a detachment was transported by 7. planes with a total carrying capacity
of 20 tons,
III. IrANDING ID=AA 1 TS AND TAE TASKS
KN THEM
14. The moat suitable points for partisan activity are toreated areas where it is
both easy to hide and to net up entire41iving camp;i. The landings were there-
- made in such areas, including the Bryanak forests, the Bakhmach district,
Suzy, Zhitonir, Shepotovka. In addition, these points were situated near
strategic communication lines and important railroad junctions through which
passed a largo part of the German troop and ammunition transports, About 50%
of all. the diveraioniete were dropped in the area of the Bryanak forests, from
shore they subsequently made their way to their assigned points.
15.. that were 'the assignments act before these. detachments? Their first task was
to find in these areas the people who had been left behind by the eommnaiat
organizations for underground work, to establish liaison with thew, and with
their aid to find loyal patriots willing to launch a struggle against the Gor-
man occuparta. rebore no people had boon left by the organization,, the detach-
ment commanders were advised to contact the chairmen of the kolkhoses or village
soviets, village coamuniets, teachers, young agronomists graduated from Soviet
institutes, and kolkhon activists. However, they were to confine their contacts
only to party members. There were many such party members left in the villages,
end the Germans did not molest them up to the day of their retreat. It is true
that many communists began to ardently collaborate with the Germans, some to
aave their skins, others for political considerations; the new arrivals there
tore had to. be careful in approaching even these people, and to reveal them-
solves only after carefully checking their trustworthiness. The clieekod and se-
lected people were to, be added to the detachment and also utilized for espionage
and intelligence, As spice it was reoommandod to use young girls who studied in
the ton-year schools or worked in the district government bureaus. Only members
of the,Comsomol were to be used in this work. Their tank was to maintain friend-
ahipa y'iirith liussiane who wont into German service and with Germans themeolvesr
from whom they were to obtain information as to the plane of the local garrison
units; they were also charged with watching the roads over which passed the Ger-
man mobile units, to strike up friendships with German soldiers billeted nearby
and obtain all available information from them.
16. After the detachment augmented its ranks from among the local population and
created a network of spies and scouts. it was ready to start action. But the
first requirement was the maintenance of liaison with the front and with the
cantor of divernionist work in Moscow, which was later transformed into the
-Staff of the partisan movement. The instructions were that the center was to
be informed of all actions, all succasses and failures of the detachment and all
plans, and that no action was to be undertaken without previous approval from
the center. Moreover, all data obtained by the agents concerning troop movements
and armament wore to be immediately relayed to the staff of the front sector
where it took place.
17. Moscow generally needed info=ation on what was taking place behind the enemy
linen,. for without such knowledge it was difficult to make any strategic plans.
The commanders were also ordered to report about all the groups and detachments
active in the rear, so that the castor might be able to fill the numerous blank
spots on its maps. Such blank spots abounded up to 1943, and frequently people
sent from the center to those areas found whole armed detachments 'Which they mis-
took for groups of German provocateurs and from which they fled. For instance,
the diversioniet Zabelcv, sent to the Bakhmach district in 1942, was told that
he would find there only armed enemies, and no friends= in reality, several par-
tisan detachments wore'operating there, frequently attacking the Germans.
18. The objeotivor of diversionist activity included railroad bridges, stations,
functions, traffic bridges over rivers, arras and ammunition depots, troop bar-
racks, officers' clubs, motion picture theatres, single automobiles, eta. In
actions endangering the life of the dynamiter himself, it was recommended that
a local person be used, ao that the group sent from the center might be preserved
intact.
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19. Besides military strategic taaka, there wore also political ones. It was neeosa
ary to itetil in ; the population faith that the Red Arn4` would soon return to these
areas, that the Soviet Governeaent was still strong and capable. of wlining the oar,
Those ciao had lost this faith and entered into collaboration with, the enesq were
to be ruthlessly" punished, preferably hanged in tbQ villages as an oxemple to
others 'ebo had not yet gone into German service.
20. The final paragraph of the instructions stated that it was impossible to foresee
all conditions under which the detachments would have to work; that. new, uex-
pooted objectives uight be discovered on the spot, and that such situations
called for Initiative, courage, decision and readiness to sacrifice all for the
fatherland. Incidentally, in order to make aura of such loyalty and sacrificial
seal, each detachment was assigned 9 or 4 agents oho remained unknown even, to the
commander; those agents were instructed to quietly eliminate all who deviated
from the required standards.
21. Firsl.ly, the diversioniets were landed. And bore suddenly everything proved un-
expected and fraught with difficulty. For most of the detachments were dropped
ctthin a radius of 150-200 kilometers from their objectives. Thoso who were to
be dropped over Bakhmach found themselves near Bryanak... The landing operations
ware.conduotod?at night, when- the pilots could not correct their course by the
lei- of the land but had to make their computations blindly, by their inatmants.
As a result of the pilot's error by 2odegrees, the detachment commander Lyuoov
found ?himself '100 kaa. from hie objective, utterly alone; it took him six months
to assemble a part of his'detanhaent and set to work.
22. In addition to this initial difficulty, the entire occupied territory proved full
of surprises. There was probably no other country under German occupation which
had such chaos, treason, collaboration with the enemy, so many different trends
and groupings as existed in Russia and oapecially in the Ukraine. There were the
followers of Bonderov and of Vlassov, nationalists, Ukrainian. separatists, cossack
patriots, plain bandits, and eo on. It would require a separate report to analyse
all tho.,moveaents and trends among the Russian population In occupied areas during
the war years in order to see how absurd are the assertions of the Soviet loaders
that the country is a monolithic union of all nationalitio?. An a result of the
war, 5 republics have boon liquidated. (only 3 were mentioned in the official proms),
over 35% of the population of the other republics which had boon under occupation
had been deported to Siberia, and numberless traitors have been shot in mass exo-
entions. The prevent author, who moved westward with the army, saw with his -own'
Was the punishment noted out to the Ukrainian population by NKVD'troops. NKBD
uaiits followed the advancing front and, breaking Into each populated point, banged
the leaders and carried out mass arrests of 'all who were in'any measure involved
in collaborationist activity. In 'the winter of 1944-1945 the jails of the;Ukra ne
were bursting with prisoners, who had to be sent to Siberia on foot, without shoos,
goaded by the constant blows of rifle-butte.
2y. it was necessary to mention thoec facto in order to make clear the actual altua-
U.on in which the divorsioniste found themselves upon being dropped from td ,
'planes. Wandering in the forest in search of his comrades, division comsaf?sr.
Lynkov had. several times atuablad upon forest partisans who took his either for
a German provocateur or for an agent of the NKVD. Once he net two members of d .
detachment of "okrusahontzi" (soldiers of armies which'had been surrounded by
German troops and had scattered in the forest to escape capture). Learning that
they were former Red !Army eoldimrn, he use overjoyed and asked their help in >..._
carrying out his mission. But the soldiers' nearly killed him when they heard
that be bad just arrived from J!secow, declaring that they occupied themwnlvco ~-~
with briGandsgo and had no intention to defend the bankriaPt government.'
24. In the sane Sorest there was another detachment, whose aim ware closer to those,
of Lynkov. Thou he met them, they did not believe that he had been cent by Noncoar 1
which, in their opinion, had no time just then to think of such distant place In
the rear. To test his identity,'they asked him what was Stalin's birthplace. Bo
named a 'city in the Caucasus, but, one of the soldiers declared that Stalin teas born
in, Gorky, near Moscow. Again he was about to be shot,, but was able to escape once
more, And only when he began a search in the villages for former activists from
the party cells, did he find people who believed his documents and 'oaths. none
.:_
people helped-him to find his comrades,and'Lynkov begun to carry out his diver J '
slanary activities, He chose villages situated in a remote area adjoining the:
Forest, where no Girmano had ae?yet not foot, announced" the mobilization of all
amen of military ago, divided. than into sections and squads, and declared that 1
henceforth they would be regarded as partisan-miliaviamon called up to fight the
Germane. Soon afterwards, when the detachment incroaosd,to 200 urn,'they not to
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work. They attaacked the district center, blow up small bridges, broke into
stations and dynamited entire ammunition trains,, attacked village police eta-
tions and killed the lies "traitors" (during the occupation all police unite
consietid of Russians
25.. abet of the detachments underwent similar experiences, and they were all ov-
ganisod in the rear in the said manner. .any of the groups) failing to aeaom
ble their own-members, joined other detachments. The largest partisan unite,
under Kovpak, who was twice decorated with the Order of Hero of the Soviet
Union and later raised to the rank of Major General, absorbed the greatest num-
ber of such groups. Kovpak himself, who had organized his detaohmaub on his
own Initiative during the very first months of the tar, evinced great abilities
in organization and leadership of men and shored himself to be a cunning and
courageous,guerrilla.? Eta fame soon reached Moscow,, which began to send.,him
many people trained in special schools, as well as,ammunition and other supplies
needed in his work.
26. There large detachments were Boon given more important assignments. In 1942
Stalin himself received some commanders of. partisan detachments and not them
various tasks. Kovpak was ordered to make a raid on the right bank of the
Dnieper and there try to disorganize the, whole German rear. Others were In-
structed to semain'near the front and diraictly aid the fighting Red Army by
means of diversions hampering the transport of ammunition and men for the Car-
man Army. However, this took place In 1912, when the partisan movements was
brought under the jurisdiction of a special central staff which directed eU.
the schools and the man behind the Gown lines. But more of this later.
27. The IiKVD retained its own spy syetoa and its own divoraioniete, who formed nodo
tachaments, but acted with especial secrecy and by themselves, reporting only is
Ftoscow. It also retained Jurisdiction over the series of schools which trained
these diversionists. One of these echoole,which is of special interest, was the
school for women scouts.
IT. wowSSCOUTS.
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2d. a' age g+p
of young women, who were being sent to the enemy a rear for espionage and intelli
gene-work. A large shipment of automatic parachutes arrived at the airfield
where our unit was stationed, and soon afterwards the girls arrived by train.
After one or two training jumps from low heights, they were taken to the Qerwn
Near. They were divid,cd into small groups of 5 or 6 under tbd leadership of
experienced NKVD workers. hear. rare
recruited in July or August, ly4lp rom a . ey were all
members of the Cosnomal, came from working-class familied,and distinguished theme
melies by their discipline and loyalty to-the Soviet Government. All those se
lac ed had excellent recommendations from their party or Comeoo1 calla, and were
sdmitted toithe school for scouts after careful screening by. the NKVD and the medi-
e1 commission. There were several such schools In Moscow,, and they were housed
in the buildings of the regular high-schools, a number of which were clos4d to
their fo>amor students and plao6d at the disposal of the Yldr.Lldnietry and-Us 141MVD;
F the 73rd and the 141st"Schools in Moscow.
29... In the reconnaissance schools the. girls were put through a 3-months' course of
study; the curriculum Included German, radio and communication, codes, weapons,
(revolver and grenade) and their use, military documents and their significance,
current events. and athletic exercises. They were taught -by profostlora from the
special NKVD schools and some specialists In radio-communication from the Uilitety
Acedomy and, the Intelligence Division of the General Staff..
30. On graduating, all students gave their'solomn oath and signature to reveal nothing
of what they had been taught at the school and to faithfully perform-all tasks set
before them. To further guarantee their loyalty, hostages remained In Moscow in
the persons'of their parents and relatives. These scouts were dropped over the
districts of Rshsv, Veliki,Re Luki, Smolamrk, Kursk, Bolgorod, Khai'bbv,. eta. They
wore to work in they German officers' clubs and restaurants, and some of them were
to enter, the -Grain brothels; the latter were distinguished by.boauty and gay toe-
orenonts. They showed'little gaiety, however, after they wore landed, an on
more than hall' of
them were caught by the Germans an pe a one or en lost their courage and
were eliminated - (shot) bj, their own agents, and'only 25-30% managed to establish
contacts with Germans and obtain some. Information. As a rule, they became the
mistresses of commandants roar officers club meriagora, eta., and aotc.l through
thee. Of the oft girla `-Tay one returned; one was killed In
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the fall, one was captured-by-the Germans, one was shot by the representative v -
the NOD.: (she had been rapped by the Germans, became insane and began to "talk");
one was killed by the. Germane during the retreat, then the head at the, group was
cant.',t,, and 02ly one lived to return.
31. 049 of the girls from the same school,?nickna. d'"Salina", killed the commandant
over the entire Byeloraosia; she off his head and brought it in a sack to the
partisans. To avenge this act, the Germans shot 15,000 i habitant, of the city
of Minsk, and therefore *Balina".received no rewards or honors for a long time,
"Afterwards the Germans raised a noisy campaign concerning the Soviet policy of
sending young girls as spies into Brothels, and the policy was apparently dispon-
tinued.
V. LU1 NS ON OF THE PAATI$$AN L OVE4'N'n' IH 7 96143.
32. In the beginning of 1942, the gaps in the map of the German roar rapidly began.to
up. The parachutists sent to those areas radioed the results of teir
connaiasance which indicated that approximately 1200 guerrilla detachments were
active behind the enemy lines (this figure is taken frog the reminiscences of one
of the ecouta). This convinced the government of the necessity to seriously uti-
lize these detachments by sending then experienced and reliable people who would
assume leadership and direct their activities in the required channels. By this
time, Stalin signed an order creating a central staff of the Partisan movement.
Ldarehal Voroshilov was appointed Commander in Chief, and Ppnomarenko (leader of
the Byelorussian Communists)'r748-named Chief of Staff. They were placed in obarge
of the partisan detachments and the schools which mere training new contingonte'
of reinforoementa. All detachments which had radios and iaintainid communication
with C:aecow were given now ciphers and codes, which. were henceforth to be used is
orders from the center and in reports that the partisans were to sand daily to the
staff headquarters regarding their work. The staff also began to assign the dam
echmente various operational tasks ooordinated with the needs of the fronts... To
asbiet in the execution of these missions the staff cant the partleans ammunition,
esplosives, arms, man, clothing and food. Different detachments pooled their
energies to building landing stripe in the fields for the heavily loaded "Doyglases"
which brought supplies from Moscow and took back the wounded and the various deaf.
me>xts captured from the Germane.
33. Ite'work of the detachments was becoming more organized and effective. Their chief
objectives were railroad lines, junctions and bridges. The Bryansk railroad Junc-
tion alone was the scene of a concentration of 80 detachments organized into a
single partisan center. Each detachment, however, had a strictly defined "sphere
of influene.", in which it blew up entire transports of supplies and Gorman troops.
The Germans perfected the technique of rebuilding blasted lines, bringing the rem
Pair time dogs to B or 10 hours, but they never succeeded in organizing any effec-
tive method of fighting the dieersioniats. The latter were scattered and camou-
f1a ed in the impenetrable depths of the Bryanak forests, whence they dispatched
at night small groups of.mon to different sections of the railroad, and whoiaoo.they
could not be driven out by any "combing" of the forest. And the largor-detacbaente,
snob as Lynkova
', which than counted more than 250 persons, acted in squads of five;
which were sent far from their base for long periods, and with which infrequent con-
tact was maintained, mainly, for the purposb of supplying them with, explosives.
34. In addition to.these detachments, there appeared new groups of diversionisl;s,' or-
gauiited.by the commands of the various fronts on their own initiative. These were
either left behind in the, retreat or carried across the front lines by planes,*
float of the membare.of these groups were scouts who had undergone a ten.day train-
ing course before being sent to the roar. This course dealt. with only one subjects
military intelligence and diversion in the rear. Thus, in June 3942, in the region
of the Bryangk forests, on the "small land", 130x1.70 1cm. in area and belonging to. partlsans, there landed the group of Major Ytrobigora, who subsequently took flyer
cos and of Kovpak's legendary division. The group-was sent by the Dryansk front
for purposes of reconnaissance and diversion. The instructions read to them before
they wore sent off.. to the enemy's rear warned thee. to refrain From all contacts
with the population and mat to reveal themsdlvoa, mince the'area araraod with
traitors. This group bad its own agents, who, kept watch 2h hours a day at the ap-
proaches to railroad stations and reported to the front intelligence on all passing
transports. Not having sufficient etreagth for an attack upon the station, they
demolished all the approaches to it, croating,a tie-up, than radioed back for p1pnos,
9irshigora'8 group consisted of a company of scouts and two women radio oporaters;
in August, 1942, they all Joined Kovpak's detachment.
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35. This experjeoce was shared by other groups dropped behind the German lines by the
Russian fronts.: Only a 8sa11 percentage made their my back to their unite across
the front lines, and', ths rest joined various guerrilla detachments.
36. In the middle of the summer of 1942 LZoacow decided to vend a large detachment far
into the rear - to the right bank of the Dnieper1 shore there was relatively little.
resistance to the Gentians and where many had begun to accept the occupation and
collaborate with the onemy.
37. The Commanders of the large detachments were called to a conference in Moecoir. In
addition to the legendary Kovpak, there came Saburov - the hero of the Bryanek
forkrsts, Smelyutin -commander of a 650-man dotachmont, Duke, Pokrovsky and others.
,They were generously rewarded, showered with gifts and received by Stalin hIftelf.
Ho ancoura ed them, thanked them for their valuable help, and then began to dim-
ewe now tasks. The, large detachments were advised to continue their work in the
same spirit, expanding into districts further vest. But Xovpsk'a detachment was
ordered to make a large-scale raid on the right boundary of the Ukrainas, to cap-
teas a part of Western Ukaaino and reach the Carpathians. By thin time Kovpek's
detachment, 5000 strong, consisted of 4 subdivisions of 8 companieoeach, with
=out oquade, minors' sections, and a quartermaster corps. The first battalion
a3.so had a sapper platoon and a radio-junction.
38. In September (this large military unit started out, and'in November it made a forced
march across the Dnieper. The appearance of thin division was so sudden and effec-
tive, that the population began to talk about a break-through of the front by the
Red Army, and some people broke into panic flight. ?7horover the detachment passed,
it looted German depots and distributed the food to the population, hanged all police
and all Ukrainian. traitors, and did everything possible to win over the people -.
such was Stalin's order. It also destroyed numerous communications and functions.
The most brilliant operation was its smashing of the Sarna?Cross (a junction of
many railroads and highways connecting with Kiev, Rovno, Baranovichi, etc.); around
the city of Sarno itself, the detachment blew up all the bridges and large sections
of the ronds. Small groupie detailed by the detachment put on police armbands, broke
into villages and killed all traitors. Lamy, of the Russian mayors, appointed by the
Germane came of their own will, pleading their guilt and offering their aerv'icea;
some of them more hanged and some, thoroughly intimidated, were left in their. places.
Bat by this tine, at the beginning of 1943, the Germans had developed the policy of
using Russians. for fighting in the roar. They assembled volunteers from the prisoner-
of-war camps for cossack detachments to do garrison duty in the rear. There proved
to be & 'great number of volunteers (moat of them bitter enemies of the Soviet Govern-
sent), and they distinguished themselves by unbelievable cruelty to the partisan
who disturbed their current prosperous and free existence. The volunteers included
middle-rank officers who had graduated from -Soviet aehoola, Uoaeow workers, cossacks,
ar:td many of the various nationals who had served in the Rod Army and voluntarily
doverted`to the German aide,
39. Kovpak+e;detachment launched a fight to the death against these volunteer divisions,
but the latter were too ntnerous and fought so stubbornly that the partisans did
not succeed in destroying them and had to circle around them in order to proceed.
In addition to open fightd, the guerrillas sent to these eoesaoks girl-spies en-
listed among the local population. These girls lured then to drinking partieis,
where they were caught by the partisans. The partisans also wood other tried
methods; they stole into the enemy'a offices and headquarters, planted delayed-
action mince, and soon both the building and the people in it warn blown to bits.
In. one instance, they blow up a "Labor Bureau" which was recruiting the local work-
ing population for deportation to Germany and which was guarded by cossack units.
40. In other districts the detachment encountered new Gestapo tricks. On learning of
the advent of the partisans, the local.Gestapo and police officers dismissed all
Russian employees who had become known for 'especial cruelty in dealing with the
recalcitrant population, announcing the diomiesals as an act aimed to benefit the
population. however, the dismissed men, armed by the police, organized gangs and
b'gan to-hang and massacre all who fell into their hands. Uhen the population bu-
gan to complain against these atrocities, the German authorities said that they
would gladly help, but they had no troops for. the purpose. If the population,
they added, would take up arms against these various bandits and partisans, then
there might be some peace in their district. And the population took up arms and
opened a war on the partisans and. the bandits. Kovpak'a detachment loot many
people in thane battles until he succeeded in convincing the population of the
difference between his men and the bandits.
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41. Generally, the detachment encountered a great number of surprises, traps and pro-
vocations on the pert of the Gestapo. But despite these, the raid was successful..
The partisan.. blow up aaay bridges, destroyed many communication junctions, killed
hundreds of ermene, and disrupted-numerous telephone and telegraph lines. They
also obtained-much valuable information which was immedieteIr transmitted, over
the radio or through liaison planes, to LCoscow and the various front-line staff
headquarters. Thus, lovpak's partisans donned the plane which carried all the
-operational resumes and the p l a n s of the head4narters of Kleist's a r . These
documents were relayed to Ltossow, which found them eery valuable and generously
rewarded :the. partisans for this font.
42. 8ovpak'e raid was important in other respects as well. Ia almost all'the districts
pasted by the - detachmentthere sprang up new partisan units which began to fight
the Gernsona, The raid also restored faith-in the return of the Soviet Goverment.
The detachment subsequently proeoU,edto?the Western Ukraine and Poland, reaching
as far as Warsaw. It was reconstituted into a large military divission,?equipped
with artillery and several tanks, and maintaining a permanent contact with Woscav,
which continually supplied it with ammunition. In addition to ammunition and sup-
pl:len, iovpak'a army was given a special..reprecentative from the Central Committee
of the Party, Syromolotov, whose position was equivalent to that of a member of
the Military Soviet of the Front - the highest-ranking party commissar.
,. The other detachments, most of which remained in their native districts, also ex-
panded every year. Their functions multiplied as their membership grew, and some-
times they took part in;ragular front operations; they prepared air fields for the,
landing of large divisions of the Red Army,blockaded whole districts, and gave
direct aid to the fronts. The. smaller detachment* continued their work of diversion,
blowing up trains, and so forth.
VI.
F -UM
49. The war has yielded;a vast store of experience with regard to various forms of par-
tisan struggle, methods of organizing partisan units, and systems of preparation
and training. This experiencowas carefully and constantly studied by the Soviet
Command, and the question of possible utilization of partisan warfare in. a faftre
war Will be decided - has probably been decided already - on the basis of-thia study,
The principal question hero is the relative value of the two basic types of pear-
tiqun organisation and the possible use of both or the preference of one over the
other. One ofthese types is the partisan unit which sprang up(more or leab
spontaneously as an expression of popular resistance and was later gradually brought
under the direction of the Red Army Command. The other type is ropreeented by the
detachments which ' wore. thoroughly trained beforehand and which operated-from the .
vary first under instructions from the center. The problem involves not only the.
relative usefulness of these types of partisan detachments, but also the accompany
ins conditions and results of their activity, In this respect, the partisan units
of the former type have not proven desirable in every respect, for they created
muQh friction and. even disorders, particularly during the winding-up of their
operations.
46. To the partisans themselves the and of the u r and generally the and of their an-
tiaitiea brought many disappointments and aroused =oh discontent, An soon an, the
Rod Army entered a now district, where the partisans had hitherto been active, the
latter were immediately required to surrender their arms and either doter the' regu-
lar army or to to work in the kolkhozoe. But more than 3 years of life in the.",
forests, where they bad been ontiroly'on their own and dons practically what~
they pleased, bred in the partisans a certain independence and unruliness. the
Soviet Government, which had always fought those qualities, began to combat then
in the. partisans as well,
47. Thus, in the spring of 1944, after the liberation of: the Leningrad region, all per-
tiaane-who operated in the area behind the enemy lines were, called to a conference
in Leningrad. 'The resulting spectacle was rather curious and quite unpleasant both
to the government and the population. The city was invaded by armed tramps who had
acquired a taste for-looting, murder, and all sorts of lawlessness. They were
dreamed in the motley uniforms and costumes of aoeartod European and Soviet armies,
Having listened to the high-flown speeches of the regional leaders, they askod'what
rewards they would receive for their deeds and how they would now live. They were
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told that it wee still necessary to finish off the enem
on hi
t
y
s own
erritory and
then begin to rebuild their homeland.
48. Neither answer was very satisfactory to the partisan. Emerging into the street,
they broke into the newly- opened commercial stores in which the beat area were
gathered and;began to loot. -Firnt of all they made for the eleoholic,drinks.
After a day of drinking, they turned in the evening to robbing the civilian popu-
lation. They held up passers-by and took their coats and watches, raped woman,
transformed small roetaurento into places of= riotous orgy - Fbr two days'the entire
city wee in a state of total chaos. The residents were :Ira!; to not foot in the
streets, the police .hidin the barracks, the stores that escaped looting remained
closed. It was not until the morning of the third day that an NNKVD division,
called up-from its garrison, managed to sorb the partisans and drive them out of
the city after carefully disarming than. The ringleaderp paid for;the riot c;ith
their liver
49. Even greater and longer-lasting anarchy`wae created by the partisan in the Ukraine.
Learning trhat the returned government intended to do with thou, they. Preferred to
rermin in the forecto and continue their lawless exiatence. Up to the and of 1945,
the forests of the Ukraine swarmed frith partisan, and the?NKVD van forced to carry
on aln-oat tie- aame,atruggleagainst than as had been waged by the Germans.
50. After this experience, it is hardly likely that in a future war Moscow would again.
be willing to net up an extensive network of partisan detaiohmente out of the local
pope ation" But there is no doubt that, even in peace-tire the government will ex-
pend its system of partisan schools for the youth of the urban centers and increase
the number of especially trained diveraioniete, who remained throughout fully sub-
ordinate to their,leadera'and showed irreproachable discipline.
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