HSU CHUNG-CHIH AND THIRD FORCE ELEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R007400320011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 7, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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HIA FOR PiiiiTOON REPORT co NO,
?L...e,Y China
S!JUJECT HSU Chung-ohlh and Third Force Elements
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In early October 1950*. ESU Chung-ehih 15 ) announced that he would
assume leadership of a third force aimed at' overthrowing the Commaniet regtns.
The charter of HSU3s organization, as formulated in late November., is the fele
/owing:
rFor the purnose of opposing and reisisting Communism and saving the country
from ruin, the citizens of the Republic of China have formed a democratic group
to rehabilitate the Derublic in accordance with the Three Peonies Principles
laid down by the late Dr. SUN Yat-sen* The name of thin organization is the
Chinese National Anti-Communist and Rational Salvation Confederation.
"The Confederation is organized for the specific purpose of early eradication
of the Chinese Communist Party, which is out to sell the country short and
upset the peace of the world. The Confederation will coneentrate all its
efforts on the aims and objectives of fostering national independence and
equality, democratic forms of government, reconstruction based on a policy of
livelihood for the people, international economic cooperation, freedom of
faith and religion, and support of the UN charter for the achievement of a
true world of common weal.
?The highest executive function of the Confederation is in the Central Basic
Personnel Fetecutive Committee. A chairman shall be elected by the committee
members and shall be charged with the duty of general direction of all af-
fairs and of leadership among all members. The chairman shall namlnate mem-
bers of a standing committee, who are to assist him in the discharge of all
functions. Thn Central Basic Personnel Executive Committee shall establish
sub-committees and bureaus. A sub-committee shall be headed by a director
and shall consist of several members., one of whom shall be the directing
executive.
'The following are sub-divisions of the committee3
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CLASSIFICATION COWDENTIA
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a.
Secretariat
f.
Administrative Committee
b.
Organization end Training Committee
g.
Publicity Committee
c.
Finance Committee
h.
Planning and Reeonstruction
d.
Military Committee
Overseas Affairs Committee
e.
Foreign Relations Committee
J.
Editing end Compilation Committee
'Basic Personnel Committees shall be established in all cities, provinces, and
foreign countries. Each organization shall be set un according to the needs
and circumstances of its particular conditions, and regulations to this effect
shall be drawn up accordingly."
For immediate action, HSU has stated that his program is to cooperate with
anyone dedicated to combating the Peiping regime. This includes the National-
ist government, although the Confederation will be kept free of Nationalist
control. When the Communists have been ousted, HSU plans to retire again,
leaving the government of China to be decided by a free election. His only
suggestion for future administration is that considerable power should be
granted to the provinces, since local differences are so great in China ,that
a concentrated central government each as that of Nanking is impractical. .
4. RSU, now 64 years old, was graduated from the Tokyo Military Academy; he has
many Japanese friends and speaks the language fluently. In 1920. he was com-
missioned by SUN Yet-sen as commander in chief of Kuomintang forces in Kwange
twig (the equivalent position in Kwangsi was held by LI Teungejen) and served
until 1923, with CHIANG Kai-shek as his Chief of staff. When SUN called on
the USSR for aid in 1923, HSU took the firm anti-Communist stand he has main-
tained, ever since. This attitude led to an order from the USSR through Mikhail
Borodin for CHIANG to dispose of HSU. In 1924, when a shipment of arms arrived
in Canton on a Soviet gunboat, CHIANG forced HSU to go aboard and be trans.-,
ported to Shanghai. There he lived in exile in the International Settlement
until 1939.
5.
From 1939, when HSU went to Hong Kong to live, until 19430 his Japanese fttends
tried to give him a position in the puppet government of china (he was offered
the presidency), but he steadfastly refused. He remained in Hong Kong, where
the favor of the governor, General ISOGAI, who had been his schoolmate in
Tokyo, permitted him to engage in profitable smuggling ankoplumgpeals with
CHIEN Wei-chou (14 t...0 ), brother of CHIEN Chi-tang ( 4 cce), lest
Nationalist goveitior of Hainan. Since the war, HSU has diarided'his way of
living, given up many of his former dissipations, and returned to politics
in order to oppose the Communists.
HSU was condemned even by his supporters for his dissipation and indolence;
it was partly these factors which led to his ousting by SHIANG. He is now in
good physical condition, however, plays tennis regularly, and is working
actively on his third force plans. HSU is generally conceded to be a good
:eighter and a good leader, in smite of being poor at both organization and
administration. He is personally well-liked by nearly everyone and is re-
peated by his fellow officers. His sincerity, honesty, and reputation for
clear-cut and unambiguous statements, and his generosity and courtesy appeal
to the Chinese. Moreover, the fact that he was once CHIANG /s military supe-
rior and is one of the most senior Nationalist commanders gives him enormous
nrestige. There is even a story that in 1948 CHIANG wrote to HSU that if he
wore unable to cone with the situation, he would resign in HSUIs favor.
HSU counts on Obtaining support from a ntMber of different directions: some
aaerrillas already fighting Communism on the mainland, former Nationalist
troops now in the Communist armies, members of the Nationalist government
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who are dissatisfied with its policies, groups which formerly collaborated
with the Japanese, and Japanese military circles interested in anti-Communist
weak. Support, in varying degrees, has already been promised or hinted from
these elements. HSU also hopes to obtain assistance, particularly funds,
from the United States.
ea Among thoee who have offered active support, his immedlata circle of aides
and advisers in Hong Kong includes the following:
a, HUANG Chao-tung tg). the adviser who is drawing up HSU ss politi-
cal platform, is manager of the Wah Mei Bank in Hong Kong. He is a grad-.
uate of the University of Washington. He is also conducting negotiations
.with guerrilla and Nationalist leaders for HSU.
b. Dr. C. T,; WANG,* former Foreign Minister, has agreed to assist HSU on
foreign affairs. WANG cleans to be in contact with Indian diplomatic
sources who have informed him that the Chinese Communists and the Indians
agree in principle not to let the yellow races fight one another but to
keep them fighting the white race. WANG was educated at Yale and sereed
as Foreige Minister until his indecisive policies forced him out of office
in 1931. Although he was a fellow provincial of CHIANG Kai-shek from
Chekiang, he never received another official position, and this neglect
made WANG glad to support some non-Nationalist leader.
le et. A-
0. CHANG Fh-kuei (9p, n agreed to be responsible for military opera-
tions in KwangtUng and Kwangsi. In early October, he was in consultation
with political analysts and university professors,' including WU Tsaezdhip
(jIL .,1,),* LI Wei-chsen ( L 34 ).* and HSIEH'Chsong-psing (7.tf.'/;5
-'-)* to discuss political aspectebf the situation. Although CHANG had
ei
originally planned to support LI Twung-jen, he had becouie so dissatisfied
with lass failure to act that he went over to HSU. Later, when he was
publicly asked about his relations with HSU, CHANG denied the connection,
on the advice of his ride LI Wei-chsen.
CHANG Chan-mai (at ft 40(0arson CHANG)*, former head of the Democratic
Socialist Party, gave 115U assurance of support in late December.
e. WENG Haiechao 4.46),* influential rightist labor leader in Hong
Kong, offered HSU enereort,
es, ree
LIU Pao-chin (l A ), executive member of the Democratic Party, con-
templates haakkig Rau, althoegh the powerful branches of the party in
Canada and. the United States ordered the Hong Kong membership to establish
connections with CHLANG Kai-shek and open a liaison office in Taipei.
CHAO Ping ( le ), Hong Kong barrister and head of the Nat/0ne1 Liberal
Party, has been a friend of HSU for a long time and will give some support.
Persons designated as HSUls aides (exact capacities not stated) in Hong
Kong include:
MORT Chung-fu ( ) KUAN Sue,jen ( IC )0 secretary
TISO Ling-y6 ( )? cousin
. TSAI lime/Jong " .41)
HU Chang-won ( 0 ) WANG Jo-chou ( )*
HUNG chsien-i 4+, )(James HUANG)
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HSU's relations with the Nationalists, although he says he will work with
CHIANG and expects support from some elements, are stillanecertain. Many
an
veter Kuomintang leaders in Taiwan, such as TSOU Lu t CHO Chang
), and LI Shihachen (4- -r), support HSU and ilth CH' M1 Hanatzu
( a:4r ), abanker and HSUIs friena, took an oath in Peining in 1928 to
fig t rnmunism to the end. HSU plans to inform CHIANG Kai-shek of his activi-
tiee and to cooperate with him. CHIANG's attitude toward HSU, however, appears
slightly less frank. Three Nationalist representatives were sent to Hong Kong
in late 1950 to observe HSU and report on his plans:
HO ChIengadhan (4] ), former governor of Rune:, was in Hong Kong
in November and December 1950 with the specific task of studying third
force activities. He told HSU that the Gimo was interested in his third
force movement and Would be willing to cooperate but that CHIANG Chingakuo
would certainly oppose HSU. CHIN ChIeng had sent his regards. HSU"s
aides denied that HO had offered any money or persuasions to HSU for any
purpese and stated that no definite alignment with the Gimo was made. In
private HO confided that in spite of outward improvements in Taiwan, CHIANG
was as dictatorial as ever, a statement HSU regarded as a probable bid for
his confidence. Relations in Hong Kong were cordial, and HSU gave a dinner
in HO's honor. HO left Hong Kong to return to Taiwan by ship on 8 January
1951, promising to return as CHIANG's liaison officer to HSU.
b. TUAN Muachieh )** also visited Hong Kong during December as an
emissary from Taiwan. He told the public that Taiwan was in good condi-
tion but told HStipmivately that actually it was still in bad shape. TUAN
also tried to sound out HSU's position and intentions.'
c. LEI Chen ( ) spent some time in October trying to convince all the
third force elaFents in Hong Kong that they should give up their individual
efforts and support CHIANG. Rt interviewed HSU, among others, and told him
that CHIANG intended to start his offensive against the Communists in
Kwangtung, rather than as had been nreviouely intimated, in Chekiang. LEI
was in Hong Kong from the first to 23 October.
In early January, HSU intimated that he had learned that several democratic
(non-Communist) leaders in Peining had offered him their support unsolicited
but he did not name them. Et Jid state, however, that he expected to be
aided by defections of former Nationalist leaders and troops now under the
Communist banner, including especially the following:
a. At. least 450,000 Connanist troops in north and central China would defect
as- soon as he had established abase on the mainland in South China. He
did not define these troops or leaders but stated that they had remained
intact units not subject to direct Communist control or influence. This
estimate was reined by KUAN Suajen to two million troops, still unspecified.
b. General LIU Wen-hui( 4 Le ).*** governor of Sikang, who had accumua
lated, four million (U dol ars worth of gold bars and lost them to the
Communists when they came in. He has about 700000 troops between Szedhaan
and Sikang which he would turn against the Communists at the first eppor-
tunity.
c. FU Tsoai*** will join HSU rthen a South .China base is neallable, and other
generals in the Northwest have also expressed their willingness to defect.
d. Numerous (unnamed) former Nationalists Who defeated to the Communists be-
cause of opposition to MANG Kai-shek but would sannort any anti-Communa
ist leader except CHIANG if the occasion looked favorable.
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Through HUANG Chao-tung, HSU in ,November approached LW Te-chung hk,1 )0
an Annemese leader in Hong Kong, with the object of securing the re Pala o
the 40,000 Nationalist soldiers interned in Indochina. LIU, however, believes
that these troops, under HUANG Chieh ( ), have already sworn allegiance
to CHIANG. One of HUANG's subordinates 'in.Hong Kong had. been told by the come
wander that the troops would return to China early in 1951.
H3U2s approach to support from the United States has been indirect. One of
the third force aides, Lt. Genera/ WEN Yingehsinn who was a
fellow student of General Bradley at West Point, is in 65r esnondence with the
general and has informed him or HSUIs -plans. HSU hopes to send WEN to the
United States to present the third force operational plans in person as soon
as he has the funds necessary for the journey n WEN, however, is a blunt eole
nier and has no gift for missions or diplomaeye his earlier attempts to secure
aid for LI Tsung-jen in Washington were completely unsuccessful. HSU has in-
timated that he has other means of establishing contact wIth American author-
itieebnt has not atated them definitely. He believes, with all the other
nhinese, that whichever third force leader the United States supporte will be
successftl.
For his principal support, however, HSU counts on the backing of his Japanese
friends. He has maintained the contacts made during his student dews in Tokyo
and has always had very cordial relations with the Japanese, particular/7 with
the older military leaders, who favor a consereative program, rather than the
younger, jingoist, ultra-military grows,. Through his early friends, HSU hem
been informed that the any of approximately 100,000 Chinese trained and equipped
by the Japanese between 1941 and 1944 can be counted in the third force strength.
These units, although they were turned over to LIN Piaa after the war, the
Japanese believe can be re-defected by their former commanders. Among HSUls
Japanese backers are former Finance Minister IKEDA, General OKAMURA Yeauji,****
veteran liberal leader UGAKI, and some Japanese financiers. Their interest is
said to be commercial rather than exclusively military.
A Japanese Lt. General YAM )***** visited Hong Kong in late August
1950 to present the Jananese case to HSU. He was chief of intelligence and
special service work in Canton from 1939 to 1941 and later did similar work
in Hong Kong. TAKI, a Chinese scholar and well acquainted in south China,
was one of the Japanese annvls Chinese experts.
During,the fall, HSU indicated that he would have another Japanese visitor by
the end of 1950. He stated et the end of November that the Japanese was Lt.
General ETC Toshihiko fr ), a former division commander who had
aerved in apolitical off icduHrie; the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong. He
owns some buildings, including the former Tokyo Hotel (later the Cosmos Club)
in Pottinger Street and Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong. NTO planned to open
an office in Macao as a merchant and to enter HongKong as a commercial dealer.
At the end of December. ETC wrote HSU that he would arrive from Japan shortly
with a cargo of woolen materials and other goods valued at approximately US
$3500000, which would be sold to furnish operating expenses for HSUls campaign.
It developed at this point (HSU did not Clear up the discrepancy between this
and his earlier statement) that ETC was not a military man but a merchant who
had operated nre-war businesses in both Hong Kong and Honolulu and had. also
eublinhed the HonenneweeppilLenTere in Japanese, Chinese, and English editions.
During the war he continued the English edition in the 50?11th China nornineennest
building. ETO is connected with UGAKI and many of the elder generals and lead-
ing Japanese financiers. The cargo he was bringing was contributed by Japanese
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interested in clearing China of Communism and re-establiehing trade with
Jaean. At one time in November, however, HSU had stated that he would have
to raise HK $50,000 in connection with this goods shipment.
HSU hoped that the funds from the sale of this cargo would enable him to pur-
chase weapons and other necessary supplies and to commence guerrilla activi-
ties immediately. He planned to use part of the money to pay an organized
working staff. He etated, however, that although this financial aid from Japan
was enough to begin on, he would have to have military support from the United
etates in order to accomplish any permanent results. In addition he expected
to draw some financial aid from his war-time business partner CHEF Wei-chou.
ee, HSU is admitted even by his supporters to be less competent and less pueposee
fui than, CHIAMG, but he commands reset and liking from many leader; who feel
that CHIANG has betrayed them for his own benefit. One of his supporters
summed up the position as follows: ALM in faIrly-well informed on current
problems y but his present advisory staff is not particularly strong. He needs
al:eft:et 4eeet0 Fe is mentally alert and physically well, and he has the esteem
and rospect of his former subordinates, a useful quality in leadership of the
Chinese. His seniority to other military commanders is a great advantage, be-
cause one Chinese general would be just an good as another in leading an anti-
Communist movement eni any arbitrary selection would lead to much jealousy
from the others, whereas HSUls senior position is undisputed. He would be
preferred to SUN Li-jen, the only Chinese general really well trained in modern
warfare, because the latter is very junior in service and has little prestige.
HSU hail the temperament to take suggestions from American military evisere and
he could command the support af many Chinese groups.
19. Others, not so enthusiastic, point out that in some ways HMIs Close associae
tion with the Japanese will be a handicap to him. Horeover, he and 1.1.Teung-
Jen are actually of equal seniority in -military command. la's relations with
HSU and his group have not been stated by either side, although several pert-
sons usually considered to be aligned with LI, such as CHANG Feekuel, have
expressed interest in HSU's cause.
ee,
One of the factors which urged HSU out of his retirement was information given
him in July 1950 by a former mobordinate (unidentified), now important in the
ehinese Communist government, that the Chinese Communiste would'participato in
earge-scele activities in the ensuing winter but would suffer reverses through
them He. tntimated that HSU might take advantage of this situation. On
HSU' s own estimate, the Communists .will remain in power for three more years.
World War III will begin, he thinks, In summer 1951, and after three years both
the USSR and Communist China will be defeated and. the Kuomintang will return.
He maintains that it is the leaders of the KMT rathr than tts principlee. which
teed changing.
HSU Claims to have predicted the German attack on the USSR six months in ad-
vance and to have given the information to Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr (now Lord
Inveedhapel), at that time British ambassador in China, who forwarded it to
London. He also forecast the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and communicated
the information to an American contul. in Hong Kong in mid-1941, but ha cannot
:semi]. the American's name. On the basis of those earlier events, HSU feele
that his present analysis of the situation may be of value.
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11111104mpnt. According to several other sourcae. some of tease per..
eons nave nromieed their support to other leaders li.k
e/nstead of to HSU:
eex
CHANG Chits,mai; Sunnonter of LI Twungejen; see
&HAAG Fa-4cne5: Ham denied supporting LI Tswi-jen the Natioealint
third party- and other leaders. The general imnression as or July
1950 censored to be that he was actually supporting LI. The Comeune
lets. according to one source, were trying to bring him back to the
mainland; according to a November Communist news relent:so an the
other hand, he had been appointed guerrilla commander in South Chiia
be General MacArthur. CHANG denied both these statements.
eh,BN Chunearue Manager of (SNC during the war, an official of the
eng3 China-ye1 government; now living in Hong Kong and interested, with
oMior eepee ariciels, in contact with antie-Nationalist forces. He is
a gradeete fel Tokyo leeeriel Ureiversity.
]NG Hoi-ebao;- :.e :, ee the-era-Nationalist Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade
Union et:lune:xi,
FUER Chvengepaing: Member of the Young China Party.
Li Weiech3eng Fighly regarded by both anti-Communist and anti-National-
let groups in Hong Kong in early 1950 and affiliated with the Young
Ghtna movement
wANGg In Jule 1950 aligned with the Nationalist-sponsored thied nerty
lovement.
WAN' Jos.ohou: Reported in Arpil 1950 woeking with HSUKH rush and II Pu-
lin on Nationalist guerrilla activities.
WU Tsao-chvih: Nominal head of the Social Democratic Party. reeorteel
eupporting HSU Chungechih.
milGement, The strength of BSU9 s position is probably
tk o, alibi's report.
Inu.n,,.. The elaims of Nationalist unprort for HSU appear rather
ifian/r^ TSOU 1.p, however, Ilan been reportzll as opaosed to the increasing
,o.-for of CHIANG Ching-kuo in the Nationalist government. TUAN Mue.chieh
renained in Hong Kong after many other Nationalist officials had joined
the government in Taiwan bee:awl? he feared retribution for the defection
of the air amishieping companies to the Communists while he was Minister
of Communications.
1111111/2emmte LIU defected to the Commnniets in December 1949. His
troops were reported in March 1950 to be disaffected and. Showing anti.*
Communist tendencies. The status of VII Teo-i has been doubtful ever
since his defection to the Communists although he received the .qppoint.,
ment of Minister of Water Conservancy in the Communist government. His
return to the arti-Communist camp has been persistently rumored beet
never effected.
11111116mt. OKAMURA's name has been constantly asseciated with
Chinese-Jananese military combinations in 1949 and 1950.
25X1A MCcEnmt. A. Japanese Colonel IWASHITAwas reported in the Hong
Kong aggrglInA20? of 12 September 1950 fts visiting a retired National-
ist general in Hong Kong to discuss Sino-Japanese cooperetion. Although
not named, the general with whom he was conferring was assumed in Hong
Kong to ho HSU. A Japanese General YAZAR:Ior MAKI was mentioned in the
same article an having been expected in Hong Kong earlier but never hat"-
tn4 arrieede source, who gives the name as YAKI. states definitely that
he did come and that it was HSU he came to see.
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