USSR WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A000100010070-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: March 9, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

National
eF l 'Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79TOO912A000100010
Assessment
Center
USSR
Weekly Review
Secret
RP UWR 78-010
9 March 1978
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Moscow's Reaction to the Rhodesian Settlement . . . . 1
Moscow and the Arab World: The Diplomatic
Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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This publication is prepared by the USSR Division, Office of Regional and Political
Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the National
Foreign Assessment Center. The views presented are the personal judgments of
analysts on significant events or trends in Soviet foreign and domestic affairs.
Although the analysis centers on political matters, it discusses politically relevant
economic or strategic trends when appropriate. Differences of opinion are
'25X1A sometimes aired to present consumers with a range of analytical views. Comments
and queries Thpy ;hniflrl he directed to fha authors of the i ual
articles or to "l77
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Moscow's Reaction to the Rhodesian Settlement
The decision of Zimbabwe African People's Union
leader Joshua Nkomo--with the support of the frontline
presidents and the leaders of other important African
states--to reject the Rhodesian internal settlement
probably was well received in Moscow and Havana. Moscow
is expected to increase its military assistance and has
already launched a propaganda campaign endorsing Nkomo's
stand and denouncing the settlement. Over the longer
term, the level and character of Soviet assistance will
be primarily influenced by the degree of support accorded
Nkomo by the frontline presidents and Moscow's assessment
of Nkomo's prospects for success. Geographical constraints
and ZAPU capabilities may cause Moscow to be cautious
about the degree of its commitment, but--in the wake of
their success in Angola and Ethiopia--the Soviets are
psychologically prepared for additional involvement in
Africa. Only a very strong reaction from the West is
likely to alter that mood.
Constraints in Southern Africa
Moscow's credibility as a supporter of revolutionary
movements and its ability to transport personnel and
equipment to Third World trouble spots has been demon-
strated in Angola and Ethiopia. A major effort to increase
deliveries to ZAPU, however, presents serious problems--
some beyond Moscow's ability to control--which the Soviets
did not encounter in Angola and Ethiopia. Any major
buildup of equipment would be difficult to arrange because
ZAPU does not control any territory. Moscow can presum-
ably continue to send supplies by sea to Luanda and Dar
es Salaam, from where they can be transported overland
to ZAPU camps in Zambia and Angola. The Angolan route,
over which most of the equipment would have to be moved,
involves very difficult terrain, and the Cuban-protected
convoys will face the added hazard of passing through
rebel-held territory, which would increase the possibility
of equipment loss and Cuban casualties. An airlift to
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Lusaka would overcome these obstacles, but Zambia already
restricts the number of non-Africans it allows to work
with ZAPU and is not likely to be enthusiastic about in-
creasing their number to accommodate a major arms buildup.
President Kaunda is a major supporter of Nkomo, but
there are disadvantages for him in an expanded Soviet-
Cuban presence in Zambia.
-- He is already under heavy pressure from
his party to abandon his preoccupation
with the Rhodesian problem and turn his
attention to serious domestic economic
and social problems.
-- Kaunda himself is reluctant to allow
ZAPU to launch large-scale military
operations against Rhodesia, primarily
out of fear of Rhodesian retaliation.
Therefore, he may allow some accelera-
tion in the pace of Soviet-Cuban involve-
ment with ZAPU inside Zambia, but is un-
likely to give ZAPU all they want.
Even if the logistic barriers and political con-
straints involved in preparing ZAPU troops in Zambia can
be overcome, it will be difficult to infiltrate these
forces into Rhodesia because of the obstacles presented
by the Zambezi River and Lake Kariba, which make up the
border between the two countries. Botswana and Mozambique
offer more attractive infiltration routes, and ZAPU is
now taking some steps to exploit them. Neither govern-
ment has been as close to Nkomo as Kaunda's. Botswana
is not likely to allow the presence of Soviets and Cubans
on its territory or permit additional ZAPU camps to be
opened. For its part Mozambique might be willing to allow
a gradual buildup if it can be portrayed as a demonstra-
tion of Patriotic Front unity as opposed to direct support
for Nkomo.
In any event, the capacity of ZAPU to absorb a rapid
increase in the level of support in the short term is
questionable. Most ZAPU troops lack combat experience
and, despite Soviet-Cuban training efforts, often do
poorly in clashes with Rhodesian security forces.
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To support an expanded guerrilla war, ZAPU will need
additional weapons, instructors, and advisers as well as
air defense equipment and additional combat units--probably
Cuban--to defend its camps from Rhodesian raids. Nkomo
can count on Cuban support for a wider war, as Castro has
been trying to increase his role in the Rhodesian imbroglio
since 1976 and has the military personnel to support an
expanded effort. He is likely to be reluctant to commit
major combat units to ZAPU, however, as long as increasing
numbers of Cuban forces are needed in Ethiopia. Given
the realities of ZAPU's capabilities as a fighting force,
a large-scale, short-term buildup would be of dubious
value.
It is possible, however, that Nkomo might favor a more
conventional operation against Rhodesia instead of a
continued guerrilla war. ZAPU has the manpower, but a
credible conventional force will require extensive Soviet-
Cuban support, particularly in air defense and such so-
phisticated weapons as artillery and armor. It will take
more than a year to assemble and train such a force, and
even then it will not be a match for the Rhodesian mili-
tary.
Presumably, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans are
likely to encourage a conventional operation, particularly
as lonq as they are heavily involved in Ethiopia. Moreover,
both would weigh the possibility of South African inter-
vention to trustrate a conventional attack against Rho-
desia. South African involvement would raise the pros-
pect of a wider conflict and would increase the risks
to the Cubans, who would bear the burden of combat support.
US Reaction
US complaints are not likely to deter policymakers
in Moscow and Havana from increasing their support for
Nkomo. They resisted US pressures on Angola and Ethiopia
and gained additional credit with African militants in
the process. They probably believe that this experience
can be repeated in Rhodesia, particularly since they recog-
nize that the US will want to avoid appearing to back the
white Rhodesian minority. Moscow will monitor the US
reaction to be sure that the most important aspects of its
US relations are not seriously damaged over Rhodesia.
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Moscow is likely to conclude that the US will be reluctant
to link important bilateral issues such as SALT to Rho-
desian developments.
The logistic and political difficulties in southern
Africa and the realities of ZAPU's capabilities suggest
that support from Moscow and Havana for Nkomo will not
increase dramatically in the short term. What we are
likely to see is additional support for some level of
guerrilla activity--and possibly terrorism--inside Rho-
desia to keep attention focused on the area and give Mos-
cow the opportunity to exploit the situation for its prop-
aganda value.
The Soviet-Cuban commitment is long-term, however,
and will involve a gradual increase in the amount of
equipment sent to ZAPU and a determined effort to improve
the combat capabilities of ZAPU troops. This is likely
to involve some increase in the number of Soviet and
Cuban advisers and instructors in Africa and possibly
larger numbers of ZAPU trainees sent to the Soviet Union
and Cuba. Moscow will not commit any combat troops and
will probably limit the number of advisers it allows to
operate with combat units. As the training effort be-
gins to make an impact, the delivery of sophisticated
weapons will increase.
It will take 6 to 12 months, at a minimum, to get
ZAPU forces in shape for a serious effort against the
Rhodesian armed forces and much longer if a credible con-
ventional force is to be created.
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Moscow and the Arab World: The Diplomatic Process
The current impasse between Egypt and Israel may
be finally working to Moscow's advantage in the Middle
East. A flurry of diplomatic activity between the USSR
and several Arab states during January and February re-
vealed:
-- A willingness by the USSR and Algeria to move
toward more explicit support for each other's
positions on the Horn of Africa and Western
Sahara.
-- Increased military cooperation between the
USSR and South Yemen to enhance support for
Ethiopia.
-- Some progress in furthering Soviet-Libyan
relations.
-- A drawing together of the Soviets and Syrians
on a variety of political issues.
PLO leader Yasir Arafat's arrival in Moscow on Monday
means that the USSR has now touched base with every
member of the Arab opposition except Iraq.
The current round of diplomatic activity is remi-
niscent of Soviet summitry nearly three years ago when
Washington failed to achieve a second Sinai disengage-
ment. This led to high-level Soviet discussions with
heads of state and foreign ministers from Iraq, Egypt,
Syria, and Libya. Neither then nor now have the Soviets
used the diplomatic process to suggest a Soviet initiative
to break the impasse in the Middle East. Instead the
Soviets are demonstrating their refusal to sit idly by
during another round of US shuttle diplomacy and, unlike
the April-May 1975 period, the Soviets are now more
concerned with wooing the anti-Sadat forces than with
searching for a reconciliation with Egypt.
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Glossing Over Differences With Algeria
President Boumediene's visit to Moscow from 12-14
January was the beginning of the Soviet effort to rally
the Arab "progressives" against Egyptian President Sadat.
The Algerian President was presumably eager to visit the
USSR in the wake of French military intervention in the
Western Sahara, which helped to tip the balance against
the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. For their part the
Soviets were taking advantage of the negative reaction
to Sadat's political initiatives to strengthen their
relations with members of the Arab resistance front.
As a result, both sides were willing to paper over
their differences and, for the first time, provide high-
level political backing for each other's policies in
other areas of concern. For example, the Soviets traded
qualified support of Algerian policies in the Western
Sahara for equally qualified Algerian support of Soviet
policies in the Horn. Both the Soviets and Algerians
had hitherto avoided getting directly and publicly in-
volved in these controversies because of Moscow's un-
willingness to irritate the Moroccans and Algiers' in-
terest in not challenging other members of the Arab League.
The Soviets have endorsed Boumediene's visits to
various Arab capitals in January to mobilize opposition
to Sadat's peace initiatives as well as his willingness
to attend the Tripoli summit of hard-line Arab states
in Decemb and summit the follow-
ing month.
Algeria has recently received substantial military
assistance from the USSR, and the atmospherics of the
Boumediene visit indicated that military aid was a major
topic of discussion. The communique winding up the
visit referred to cooperation in "all fields," a euphe-
mism for military assistance.
Several weeks before the Algerian President's ar-
rival in Moscow, Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister
Ogarkov met with his Algerian counterparts and with
Boumediene in Algeria to discuss new Soviet arms ship-
ments. Soviet media reported that Ogarkov subsequently
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accompanied Boumediene on visits to air force garrisons
and military units in the Moscow area, where the Algerian
President "inspected equipment and weaponry." It is
very unusual for the tightlipped Soviets to admit openly
their Arab visitors' interest in Soviet hardware. Moscow
will presumably continue to be generous in handling Al-
gerian aid requests.
Moving Closer to South Yemen
The USSR has been the PDRY's principal source of
weapons and military training for the past 10 years,
and as a consequence of Moscow's change in allies in
the Horn of Africa, the Soviet interest in Aden has be-
come more intense. Soviet use of Aden's port and air-
port facilities has increased, and Moscow has made
greater use of overflight rights in order to expand its
the time in the discussions with Hasani was devoted to
the situation in the Horn. He conceded that the visit
was designed to promote military cooperation and indi-
cated that military aid to South Yemen would be in-
creased. He also implied that the PDRY would be granted
a moratorium on the interest on its debt to the USSR as
well as given a longer term to repay the principal.
The particularly warm remarks exchanged by Hasani
and Premier Kosygin suggest that the two sides were
also looking for ways to institutionalize their closer
relations. Both sides have denied that they were con-
sidering the signing of a treaty of friendship and co-
operation, but it is nevertheless possible that Aden
and Moscow will move toward signing a declaration of
political principles or establishing closer party ties.
Current agreements between the Soviet Communist Party
and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
could be a model for the latter; Soviet consultation
agreements with France could'be an example for the
former.
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In any case, the absence of a more formal relation-
ship has neither prevented Moscow from increasing its
activities in the PDRY nor Aden from increasing its sup-
port for the Soviet-Cuban presence in Ethiopia. The So-
viets will probably continue to press for a formal agree-
ment to deal with their use of military facilities in
Aden, but there is no evidence that such an agreement
has been signed. The South Yemenis--sensitive about
their sovereignty--have always turned aside such requests.
Dialogue of Opportunism between the USSR and Libya
The visit to Moscow by President Qadhafi's deputy,
Major Abd al-Salam Jallud was clearly intended to worry
Cairo. The Soviets view their Libyan connection both
as a means of pressuring Sadat to repair relations with
the USSR and as an alternative to limited Soviet influ-
ence on Egypt. The Libyans are pleased that their grow-
ing ties with the Soviets produce discomfiture in Cairo,
particularly in the wake of Sadat's initiatives toward
Jerusalem.
Thus the Soviets used the Jallud visit from 14-22
February to underline their continued displeasure with
the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. At a dinner for
Jallud, Kosygin denounced Sadat's approach as harmful
to Arab interests; their joint communique condemned
Egypt's "capitulatory" policy toward Israel.
The visit suggested that Jallud's heavy schedule
of talks with Kosygin and other high Soviet economic
and defense officials made some progress in furthering
Soviet-Libyan relations. The joint statement winding
up the talks expressed the mutual intention to expand
bilateral cooperation in "all areas" (an obvious refer-
ence to military assistance) and indicated that Jallud's
visit imparted "new momentum" toward consolidating
Soviet-Libyan ties. Libyan references to a "great leap
forward" and to the "principled nature of their rela-
tions" could presage a formal agreement or protocol on
consultations, similar to Soviet arrangements with
France, Canada, and the UK.
Jallud's stay in Moscow overlapped the visit by
Syrian President Asad, who was in Moscow from 20-23
February, and probably involved tripartite talks on
Libyan financing of Syrian purchases of Soviet arms.
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Syrian o icia s have denied, however, a
Jallud joined the Soviet-Syrian discussions.
Despite the ostensible success of the Jallud visit,
the Soviets have never had any illusions about the tenu-
ous nature of their popularity in Libya and are presuma-
bly aware that there is some opposition in Tripoli to
Qadhafi's increasingly close relations with the USSR.
Soviet-Libyan relations will therefore continue to ex-
pand, but only gradually and with mutual caution.
High-Level Attention for Asad
Syria has been a focal point of Soviet policy in
the Middle East in the wake of Moscow's deteriorating
relations with Egypt. During this period the Soviets
have survived a period of serious political friction
with the Syrians over Damascus' intervention against
the Palestinians in Lebanon, the possibility of closer
Syrian-Egyptian relations, and Asad's threat to deny
the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean the use of
facilities at Tartus. During Asad's previous visit to
the USSR in April 1977, Syrian media stressed Damascus'
independence in its relations with the Soviets and its
"balanced relationship" between the two superpowers.
Soviet-Syrian relations are far warmer at this
juncture. Asad received a warm welcome and appropriate
protocol during his relatively brief visit. Soviet
media noted that "joint, parallel action" had been dis-
cussed to strengthen Soviet-Syrian relations, an unusual
formulation that suggested some type of joint political
initiative. Syrian media, in a marked shift since the
last Asad visit, emphasized the Soviet role as a "stra-
tegic ally" rather than stressing Syrian independence,
which probably reflects Damascus' sense of isolation in
the Arab world since the Egyptian peace initiative began.
Finally, the reference in the Soviet-Syrian communique
to the development of Syria's. defense capability was
unusually generous.
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Several days after Asad's return from Moscow, Syrian
Army Chief of Staff Major General Hikmat Shihabi arrived
in Moscow, presumably to discuss the details of a major
new arms agreement that was negotiated by Shihabi in the
USSR in December. Syria has been seeking more advanced
Soviet weapons to help offset the growing gap in modern
weaponry between Syria and Israel, and Moscow has re-
portedly agreed to supply additional surface-to-air
missiles, an unspecified number of T-62 tanks, and a
squadron of MIG-23 fighter aircraft. The arrival of
more sophisticated military equipment could lead to an
increase in the number of Soviet advisers--who now total
about 2,200--in Syria.
In return for Soviet military assistance--which
suggests an even heavier Syrian reliance on the Soviets
in the near term--Asad was willing to support several
Soviet positions in the Middle East and Africa. Re-
treating from his implied criticism of Soviet policy on
the Horn during a dinner given in his honor, Asad agreed
to a communique that denounced "imperialist interference
in the Horn of Africa." The communique also contained
harsh language directed against the Egyptians, although
Asad's banquet remarks dealing with Sadat had been nota-
bly moderate. The communique's references to the impor-
tance of Soviet participation in a middle East settle-
ment "at all stages" as well as the emphasis on Soviet-
Arab cooperation and "coordination" of actions by all
progressive forces were also to Moscow's liking.
Soviet Tactics in the Near Term
Moscow's use of the diplomatic process in the Arab
World during the past two months strongly suggests that:
-- The USSR is clearly encouraging an anti-Sadat,
anti-US front of Arab states.
-- The Soviets and their Arab clients have decided
that it is in their interest to forget their
differences on a variety of substantive matters
in order to create an image of solidarity.
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Moscow is planning no diplomatic initiative in
the Middle East at this time, but is merely
trying to show that a lasting settlement would
be very difficult without Soviet cooperation.
The Soviets are not counting on recent Egyptian
hints about the desirability of better ties
between them to have any significant results
and are unwilling to ease their polemical
assaults against Sadat.
establish a diplomatic dialogue with the Egyptians.
Some improvement in relations with Egypt is cer-
tainly desired by the Soviets, but recent high-level
Soviet criticism of Sadat could complicate efforts to
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