POLICY, METHODS, AND DETAILS OF RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP82-00047R000400530004-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 30, 2013
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 28, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP82-00047R000400530004-4.pdf | 328.92 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000400530004-4-
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
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rfittg_.:fie4
COUNTRY USSR
DATE DISTR. Jun 1954
SUBJECT Policy, Methods, and Details of Railway
NO. OF PAGES 171
Construction
PLACE
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
ACQUIRED 50X1
DATE
SUPPLEMENT TO
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE
REPORT NO.
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DATE OF INFORMATION
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL OETENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING Of TITLE IB, SECTIONS 799
AND 794, OF THE U.S. COOS, Al AMENDED, ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CON TO OR RECEIPT SY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROM EEEEE D ST LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF TNI$ FOAM IS PROHISITEO.
SOURCE
1.
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
2. Of course, military and political factors strongly influenced the central planning
in Moscow of the routes of governmental motor roads and railways. However, it is
my feeling that the routes rd? most railways may be said to have been primarily .'
decided for economic reasons. It must be recalled, on the other hand, that industrial
factory development was primarily keyed to supporting the military potential of the
USSR and that the production of weapons came before that of food and clothing. Of
course, there were a few railways that were built purely for military reasons,
particularly in the western border areas of the USSR,.
It was my impression that there were almost no railways built\in Central Asia under
the Soviets only for military purposes. For example, the single-track, broad-gauge
railway from Tashkent to Chirchikstroi had no strategic or tactical use. .It was
built because of the electric power station and dam at Chirchikstroi., An
exception to this was one railway begun in 1939 and intended only for military use,
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
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le, it would have tactical value in aiding the development of the Turkmen
"platz d'armes". This railway was from Tedzhen to Serakhs. A dirt motor road was
first built on the route and then, I believe, a single-treck, broad-gauge
railway line was laid on it which was completed in 1940. The Soviet Ministry
of Defense built this line utilizing old railway equipment. In addition, an-
other military railway had existed from Czarist times running from Mery to
Kushka; also the Kagan-Kerki-Termez line. All this was single-track and broad-
gauge. The line to Termez was extended to Stalinabad, but the extension was
for 'economic and political reasons.
4. Going back to the Tashkent-Chirchikstroi railway, there was an "azot" galtroge.j
plant in Chirchikstroi which was designed to manufacturenitrogen from air and to
use it in fertilizer. This plant required electric power. lastigent had
sufficient electric power before the building of Chirchikstroi. The "azot" was
intended to be used for TNT in wartime. The plant was built and operated at
partial capacity in 1940. It was later intended to be used at full capacity.
Therefore, the decision for the Tashkent-Chirchikstroi railway route was reached
because of the electric power and industrial installations near Chirchikstroi.
There were no special problems in building the railway as it was a level route.
5. The Ministry of Transportation Routes (Ministerstvo Putei Saabshenii) and the
Ministry of Defense (Ministerstvo Oboroni) planned the routes. The Defense
Ministry was represented by the Chief of Military Transportation (Nachalnik
Voennikh Saabshenii) who was in charge of all military activities and offices on
all railways. For motor roads, the following organizations and individuals
cooperated: Central, Administration of Road Transportation (TSUDORTRANS -
Tsentralnaya Dorozhno Transportnoye Upravleniye); the "Nachalnik Voennikh
Saabshenii"; and the Military Construction Board (VSU - Voennoye Straitelnoye
Upravleniye) of the military district.
6. The authority in charge of building the railway from Tashkent to Chirchikstroi
(which was either 32 or 37 kms in length) was the Central Asiatic Railway
Construction Administration (SREDAZZHELDORSTROI - Sredni-Asiatski Zheleznodorozh-
noye Straitelnoye Upravleniye). Such an organization existed on every railway if
conutruction was in progress. This administration used the military labor
battalion of 600 men. The heaviest railway rails were not used on this line.
Bails were numbered one through four, number one being the heaviest. Number one
weighed 92 or 96 kgs per meter and was 10 meters in length. As I recall, the
Tashkent-Chirchibstrot line used rails not heavier than number three, since great
speed was not expec, - and heavy locomotives were not used on that line. As
indicated earlier, the line ends at Chirchikstroi. Chirchik was a small railway
station two kilometers northeast of the main Tashkent station.
7. In the construction of a main railway line, 1400 ties were used per kilometer,
La, 14 ties for each lOmeter rail, On the type of lines such as Tashkent-
Chirchikstroi, approximately 1100 or 1200 ties per kilometer were used. Number
three rail was about seven to eight meters long.
In Central Asia, there were no fully automatic
railway signals (elektrichiski avtomatichiskiya signalizataya). An older type of
System was used called "ihezlovaya systema". "Zhezel" is a baton or stick. The
system utilized signal boxes which contained several sticks. The latter were re-
moved and replaced by train engineers as the trains travelled between stations.
9. The Moscow-Taskent railway was built in 1907 as I recall--especially the section
from Orenburg (now Chkalov) to Tashkent. This was a one-track, broad-gauge line
designed .to permit 12 trains to travel each way each 24 hours. Later this became
inadequate. Therefore, in 1934 posts were erected for modern signals along 75% of
CONFIDENTIAL
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the route. However, even by 1942 no new signals had been installed and the
posts were empty. Nevertheless, the number of trains had been increased to
30 or 32. This was done by constructing small railway stations at least
every 10 kms. Previously the stations had been only every 25 or 30 kma. This
was done as only one train can travel between stations. A freight train could
coverfa station-to-station distance under the newest up In not over 12 or 13
minutes. The railway authorities also tried to equalize the speed of all trains
and as 4 result passenger trains ran slower and freight trains ran taster. 'There,
was no double-track railway in all of Central Asia, except for the 36 kill section '
from Tashkent south to Kaufmanskayagie station. This was 4OnS40.4hat:IhiYtai1way
could load and unload troops and Military supplies more quickly in event of war.
There were no signals between the railway stations.
10. The main railway .bridges constructed in Czarist times were strong enough:to
accommodate theheavier locomotives, but tot at high speeds. The tracks also
could not handle high speed trains. The Soviets did introduce heavier rails
(number one) but did not much increase the speed. The ballast used. on Central
Asian railways was of coarse sand, and also could not handle high speeds. The
average speed of trains in the USSR was 42 kms per hour. The distance between
sidings was uniform, but I do not recall the actual distance. The sidings were
.194g--120 axles, ie could accommodate 60 normal cars. The maximum, grade was
eight meters in one kilometer, le, 8/1000. I do not recall the minimum curvatUre,
but Ido know there were many exceptions to the rule in mountainous terrain. I
think that the minimum curvature was not less than 400 or 500 meters of radius
of. curve (of course, such vehicles as streetcars would have a Much smaller radius).
11. Coal was available only at the "depot station" (depovskii stantii), ie,where there
was a "turn-around" depot (oborotnoye depot). The latter were from 160 to 200
kms apart.. This section formed a "division" (?) (oborotni uchastok--turnaround
section)'. Locomotives were assigned to these "divisions" and never left their
territory. In the middle of these "divisions" there were one or two stations with
water available for locomotives. Of course, each station had water, but the loco-
motives stopped at only one, or two, or three such stations, and-the stop was, eight
minutes each time. However, from 1936 onward there were some new locomotives which
could travel for 200 kms without taking water. These were designated as the "SO"
(ergo Ordzhonlkidze). These were "condensation locomotives" (paravozi condensatori).
Repair facilities were available at each "oborotnoye depot", where current and
..,1um work vaa done (tsekuchi remont i sredni). These, installations could work
or 14 locomotives at once. However, by about 1931 in Central Asia, all
sam locomotives were changed to burning oil (mazout) instead of coal, because
oil was avails more easily from Krasnovodsk. Even military and civilian bread
ovens, were converted to burn "mazout" instead of coal from 1930 on. I do not know;
of course, what is used at present LT951g, as I believe a railroad has been built
since World War II from Karaganda, where coal is available, and then on to Mointygirg.
and to Chu. This line was scheduled to be finished in 1949. As a result, perhaps
coal is again bel-a burned since this latter railway line was constructed especially
for the purpose of transporting coal. Also in 1939, coal was found 70 kms east of
Tashkent in Angren and a railway line was built to that area in 1941-42. However,
I'do not know if the coal is good enough to burn in locomotives The Fergana
Valley also had some poor quality coal. In earlier times the railways in Central Asia
used coal from the Donbas or from Kuznetsk.
12. There were two large railway repair shops in Central Asia which provided capital
repairs foribcomotives and railway freight and passenger cars. Each was referred to
as a "parovozervagoni remontni zavod" (locomotive-railway car repair plant). One
was in Tashkeit and the other was in.Kizy1.4rvat. There were also several "vagoni
remontnii maiterskii" (railway car repair shops), which provided capital repairs for
railway freight cars only. There were eight or nine such shops in such locations
as Ktasnovodsk, Ashkhabad, Chardzhou, Kagan, Andizhan, Kokand, and Kazalinsk.
LteRAVY UJCTp: ANSA ODEMS
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000400530004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000400530004-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/04/30 : CIA-RDP82-00047R000400530004-4