CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001300070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
C p/&
COPY NO. 17
OCR NO. 3954/57
11 July 1957
NO CHANGE IN
CLASS, CHANGED T
NEXT fiEVtEW DATE.
DATA REViEV'/ER:JI 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL
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State Dept. review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Khrushchev appears to be firmly in control of Soviet
affairs, following the most sweeping top-level political
purge since the 1930's. The membership of the new party
presidium includes no leaders of sufficient stature to
oppose Khrushchev's views except possibly Marshal Zhukov.
Khrushchev seems committed to the decisions of the 20th
party congress, and the policies which were set forth at
that congress will probably be vigorously implemented.
The de-Stalinization effort and the industrial reorgani-
zation in the USSR will be pushed, as will the agricul-
tural program. The USSR's policy toward the satellites
will be designed to give them the appearance of inde-
pendent states within the bloc. Communist China has ap-
plauded the changes, expressing confidence that they "will
help unite and consolidate" the Soviet party. The major
lines of Soviet foreign policy will be directed toward
selling the idea of peaceful coexistence, and Khrushchev
may follow a more flexible foreign policy as a result of
the removal of the conservative Molotov faction. The
disarmament negotiations in London may well become a test-
ing ground for any new Soviet approaches to foreign poli-
cy problems.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SATELLITE REACTION TO THE SOVIET PURGE . . . . . . . . . Page 1
All of the East European satellite regimes have
hailed the Soviet move as a great victory for Communism
in the Soviet Union and in the world at large, but their
reaction in other respects has not been uniform. Two
parties--the Rumanian and the Polish--apparently had
been prepared for the impending changes and have re-
acted with some self-assurance. The Rumanians had been
carrying out personnel shifts of their own, coincident
with the developments in Moscow. The Poles may have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
received advance information and guidance from Mikoyan;
they had begun to step up their campaign against do-
mestic Stalinists even before the Soviet announcement.
The reaction of the other satellites has been charac-
terized by caution and uncertainty.
SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The political purge in Moscow has injected new life
into the effort initiated last spring by Yugoslavia and
the USSR to remove the tensions between them. The de-
parture of President Tito's top aides, Vice Presidents
Kardelj and Rankovic, for the USSR on 8 July suggests
that the Yugoslavs are optimistic about the prospects
for coexistence. A number of fundamental differences
remain, however, which cannot be easily removed.
REACTION IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD TO THE SOVIET
SHAKE-UP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Official opinion in Europe generally holds that the
Soviet shake-up will lead to few if any changes in Mos-
cow's policies. Both London and Paris have indicated
some concern over the apparent elimination of collective
leadership, which they believe blocked at least some
reckless maneuvering by Moscow. Some European commenta-
tors, however, have dwelt on the possibility of a peri-
od of better understanding between East and West. Re-
action in the Far East and South Asia has been generally
cautious, but some hope is seen for better East-West re-
lations.
FRANCE'S ALGERIAN POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Growing French expectations that the exploitation of
Sahara oil will ease France's energy and foreign exchange
difficulties have considerably sharpened the controversy
over Algerian policy. The right in particular is more
than ever determined to hold on to the area at all costs,
but pressure for a compromise has developed because of
the conflicting financial demands for investment in oil
development and for military operations. A period of
transition appears to have set in, and the idea of a
federal relationship giving limited autonomy to Algeri-
an regions appears to be slowly crystallizing as a basis
for a new French approach to the problem.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
THE SYRIAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page l
Diplomatic tension between Syria and Saudi Arabia
has been eased by an apology to King Saud by the Syrian
cabinet. The internal Syrian political situation re-
mains confused. Clashes along the Syrian-Israeli border
continue.
ISRAELI DEVELOPMENT OF EILAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Israel's apparent determination to establish by
use, as well as by legal argument and force, its right
to navigate the Gulf of Aqaba is illustrated by a cony
siderable expansion of Eilat, the Israeli port at the
head of the gulf. Eilat is viewed by Israeli leaders
as of major economic, olitical, and strategic importance.
EGYPTIAN ELECTION RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The 3 July election in Egypt provided some sur-
prises for the Nasr regime. While no outright oppo-
nents of the regime were elected to parliament, several
of its preferred candidates suffered defeats. In near-
ly half the constituencies, no candidate obtained the
required absolute majority and run-off elections will
be held there on 14 July.
SOVIET AID PROGRAM IN BURMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Soviet economic aid program in Burma appears
to be having a favorable impact on the Burmese govern-
ment. The work of 22 Soviet agricultural technicians
in particular seems to have pleased the Burmese, so
that their original one-year contracts have been ex-
tended through 1958 and may be further extended. Proj-
ects sponsored by these experts have been given top
priority in Prime Minister'Nu's four-year program. A
large-scale Soviet construction program in Rangoon is
under way and the much-publicized technological insti-
tute is nearing completion.
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11 July 1957
NORTH VIETNAM PRESIDENT TOURING SINO-SOVIET BLOC . . . . . Page 11
Ho Chi Minh left Hanoi on 6 July for a two-month
tour of North Korea, the East European satellites and
Yugoslavia, "to tighten the friendly relations between
Vietnam and the socialist nations." The character of
the delegation accompanying Ho suggests that no major
negotiations are envisaged but rather that the tour has
been planned principally for reasons of prestige. Ho's
willingness to leave North Vietnam for a protracted
period suggests that the regime feels a recurrence of
disorders like those of last fall is unlikely.
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Lt. Col. Sumual, deposed commander in East In-
donesia,renewed his defiance of the Djakarta govern-
ment on 7 July when he declared himself still the su-
preme military authority in the area and transferred
his headquarters from Makassar in South Celebes to
Menado in the north, where he has strong support.
There is no indication that the government plans to
attempt to use force against Sumual. Meanwhile, Su-
karno continues his attack on partisan politics, and
there appears to be growing concern within the Na-
tional Party that the Communists will win the forth-
coming provincial elections in Central and East Java.
ARGENTINE-VENEZUELAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Argentina "interrupted" diplomatic relations
with Venezuela on 7 July over the question of ex-
dictator Peron's continued asylum in Venezuela. Ar-
gentina had again charged Peron with directing Peron-
ista subversion, including plans for terrorism prior
to the 28 July constituent elections, and had de-
manded that he be ousted or interned. Venezuela had
responded to these demands by declaring Argentina's
ambassador in Caracas persona non grata for disre-
spect and by recalling top embassy officials from
Buenos Aires.
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CURRENT INT q &
Q SUMMARY WEE
A feud in the highest body
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union resulted at the end
of June in the most sweeping
top-level political purge since
the 1930's and victory for
Nikita Khrushchev, who now
appears to be firmly in control
of Soviet affairs.
The precipitating cause of
the purge apparently was a plot
to oust Khrushchev from the pre-
sidium and his job as party
first secretary. Khrushchev
turned the tables and succeeded
in deposing five of his 11 col-
leagues from full membership in
the party presidium--the effec-
tive ruling body of the USSR--
and in removing another from
candidate membership in the
presidium and the secretariat,
which is the party's principal
executive arm.
A. B. Aristov
PRESIDIUM OF THE SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ELECTED JUNE 1957
N. I. Belyayev
N. A. Bulganin
Ye. A. Furtseva
1 N. A. Mukhltdinov
N. G. Ignatov
N. S. Khrushchev
F. R. Kozlov
O. V. Kuusinen
A. I. Mikoyan
N. M. Shvernik
M. A. Suslov
K. Ye. Voroshilov
CANDIDATE MEMURS
IN ANNOUNCED ORDER OF PRECEDENCE )
IP. N. Pospelov
D. S. Korotchenko
Ya. E. Kalnberzin
A. P. Kirilenko
I A. N. Kosygin
K. T. Mazurov
V. P. Mzhavanadzel
Former members 0 New members
Promoted former candidates *Demoted from full membership
Nine new members have been
brought into the presidium to
create a body in which Khrush-
chev's authority will be over-
whelming though still short of
absolute. Thus he is now in a
position to press ahead in his
efforts to increase the growth
rates of Soviet industry and
agriculture and to promote the
idea of peaceful coexistence.
The chief purge victims--
Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich
and Shepilov--were charged with
antiparty methods in attempting
to change the composition of
the party's leading bodies, with
opposition to the policy of
peaceful coexistence and to
criticism of Stalin and with
opposing certain of the party's
economic policies.
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11 July 1957
Malenkov had suffered an
earlier defeat at Khrushchev's
hands in early 1955, primarily
over the question of investment
priorities. At that time, he
was dropped from the premiership
and publicly humiliated. The
Old Bolsheviks, Molotov and
Kaganovich, have been unable
to reconcile themselves to the
various adjustments in foreign
and domestic policy which have
taken place since Stalin's
death. It seems unlikely that
the three men had a common view
on all points of policy. Malen-
kov was probably not a "Stalin-
ist" in the sense that he in-
sisted on all of the old methods,
like Molotov and Kaganovich.
The three seem to have united
mainly because of their opposi-
tion to Khrushchev's continued
dominance in the formulation
of Soviet policy.
Shepilov evidently joined
the opposition late in the game
and for purely opportunistic
reasons. One report suggests
that, in return for his support,
he was offered Khrushchev's
post as party first secretary.
If true, this would explain de-
nunciations of him after the
purge as a contemptible second-
rater and Khrushchev's charac-
terization of him as a "double-
dealer."
Prominent among the charges
leveled at these men by the
central committee were those
dealing with their opposition
to economic policies. This
fact, plus the demotion of
Pervukhin and Saburov--two
economic specialists--from the
presidium, suggests that differ-
ences over economic policies
touched off the sequence of
events which led to the shake-
Disagreement over the
sharply reduced goals of the
1957 plan and over proposed
revisions in the Sixth Five-
Year Plan (1956-1960) probably
existed throughout the first
half of this year. What may
have made these policy differ-
ences irreconcilable was
Khrushchev's industrial re-
organization scheme. This
reorganization has either
eliminated or drastically re-
duced the scope of the govern-
mental posts held by Malenkov,
Molotov and Kaganovich, and
their probable supporters, and
the deposed group probably felt
that their only chance was to
cut Khrushchev down before the
reorganization was carried out.
Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who
was promoted to full membership
in the presidium, apparently
sided with Khrushchev in the
latter's fight against the
ousted presidium members. There
are persistent reports that
Zhukov's support was crucial to
Khrushchev's success. His new
position gives him a political
standing which no professional
Soviet military leader has ever
enjoyed before,and he is in a
better position to exert in-
fluence on policy-making.
Several reports emanating
from Moscow say that Bulganin
and Voroshilov initially voted
against Khrushchev but changed
sides when the issue was taken
to the central committee. If
these reports are true, further
changes in the presidium may be
forthcoming.
Moscow radio has announced
that Malenkov has been appointed
manager of a hydroelectric sta-
tion in East Kazakhstan and that
Molotov and Kaganovich have been
transferred to other work.
Though further action against
the "antiparty group" and its
supporters is still possible,
Khrushchev has apparently ruled
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11 July 1957
out vindictive persecutions
reminiscent of the Stalinist
period.
Implications for Domestic Policy
The question of the future
of collective leadership may not
be answered for some time.
Khrushchev, who will certainly
be more dominant that hereto-
fore, may wish to continue the
system of "collective leader-
ship," but it will be more of
a facade for one-man leadership
than at any time in the last
four years since there are no
leaders of stature left on the
presidium who are likely to
oppose his views.
One possible exception is
Zhukov. Although he has
stressed in the past that his
primary concern is military
affairs, not politics, demarca-
tion between these areas is
virtually impossible in dealing
with such matters as disarmament,
satellite security, and Soviet
industrial output.
EVOLUTION OF JUNE 1957 PRESIDIUM
NAME
OCT
1952
MAR
1953
FEB
1956
JUNE
1957
Aristov
Belyayev
Brezhnev
Bulganin
Purts eva
Ignatov
Kalnberzin
Khrushchev
Kirichenko*
Kirilenko
Korotchenko
Kosygin
Kozlov
Kuusinen
Mazurov
Mikoyan
Mukhitdinov
Mzhavanadze
Pospelov
Shvernik
Suslov
Voroshilov
Zhukov
Pervukhin
Kaganovich
Malenkov
Molotov
Saburov
Shepilov
* Elected June 1955
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The remaining mem-
bers of the previous
presidium, particularly
Mikoyan, Bulganin, and
perhaps Suslov,probably
still have some personal
influence, but it may
be limited to their
ability to persuade
Khrushchev. The new
members as individuals
are no match for Khru-
shchev and are not
likely to pose serious
restraints to his
policies. He may, how-
ever, be forced to heed
their general views and
allow himself to be per-
suaded by their opinions
since they represent the
party apparatus--the
source of his power.
Khrushchev seems
committed to decisions
of the 20th party con-
gress and genuinely
convinced that the basic
goals of the de-
Stalinization effort
and industrial reor-
ganization--to release
initiative and promote
a sense of participa-
tion at all levels of
Soviet society--are
essential for Soviet
growth and power.
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11 July 1957
The central committee
resolution and Khrushchev's
subsequent statements amount
to a demagogic platform of
promises of pie-in-the-sky to
the Soviet people. Khrushchev
summarized his optimistic
economic outlook in his 6-July
Leningrad speech, "...We want
our industry and its basis,
heavy industry, to grow and
become stronger; we want our
agriculture... to develop even
more successfully. We want the
Soviet people to have enough
meat, butter, milk and fruit.
We want our shops to be filled
with many inexpensive and pretty
fabrics and clothes--everything
that makes the life of man more
beautiful."
The "next task," he said,
is to catch up with American
per capita production in meat,
milk, and butter, an accomplish-
ment which will " . -something
stronger than any atom or hydro-
gen bomb..." in the struggle
with capitalism.
Khrushchev will have a
clearer field in implementing
his program than before, but
the regime's most pressing
problems will not arise from
any lack of vigor in execution
of the program. Rather they
will stem from difficulties in-
herent in the program itself.
Khrushchev seems convinced that
the USSR can accomplish all of
its economic objectives through
improved organization and
Socialist competition without
the necessity of making hard
decisions over the proper al-
locations of scarce materials
between the parts of the
economy. Khrushchev's goals,
however, are so ambitious that
within the next few years it
will become necessary to make
such decisions and when they
are made, heavy industry may
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well continue to be favored
despite Khrushchev's promises
to consumers.
In addition, the regime
must promote local initiative
without encouraging "localism"
and losing central control.
It must encourage intellectual
creativity without losing dis-
ciplinary control and permit-
ting questioning of the system
itself.
The appointment of Zhukov
to the presidium suggests that
there will be no reduction in
economic effort in support of
the Soviet armed forces and
that military requirements may
be given an even higher priority
than in past years.
Soviet Relations With Bloc
Soviet relations with
the satellites probably will
continue generally along the
lines developed since the 20th
party congress and will be de-
signed to give the satellites
the appearance of independent
states within the bloc. The
USSR will be faced, however,
with the same dilemma that
plagued it after the 20th
congress--how to adopt a less
domineering relationship with
the satellites without letting
resurgent nationalism fragment
the Communist camp.
Soviet-Polish relations
will in general probably be
more harmonious, although the
Soviet leaders will continue
to be concerned by the influ-
ence that the Polish "road to
socialism" will have in Eastern
Europe. Certain outstanding
problems with the Poles may
now be settled, such as Polish
economic claims against the
USSR and the Polish desire
for greater latitude in
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0
PRESIDIUM OF SECRETARIAT OF
CENTRAL COMMITTEE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
AR ISTOV
BELYAYEV
BREZHNEV
FURTSEVA
IGNATOV
KIRICHENKO
KOZLOV
KUUSINEN
MIKOYAM
SHVERNIK
SUSLOV
ZHUKOV
MUKHITDINOV
POSPELOV
KOROTCHENKO
KALNBERZIN
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
MZHAVANADZE
PERVUKHIN
I
FIRST SECRETARY
KHRUSHCHEV
SECRETARIES
ARISTOV
BELYAYEV
BREZHNEV
FURTSEVA
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SECRET
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS PRESIDIUM OF
SUPREME SOVIET
PRESIDIUM
CHAIRMAN
RULGANIN
CHAIRMAN-CEREMONIAL
HEAD OF STATE
FIRST
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
MIKOYAN
KUZMIN
14 OTHER
DEPUTY CHAIRMEN
14 01h, Officiah -I
Mih.,, Rank.
(The Chav.nn, of dh Svp.- Swin
P-tdm- :n die 15 R~pabIi ,.)
COUNCIL OF THE UNION I COUNCIL OF NATIONALITIES
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
implementing the program of
repatriating Polish citizens
in the USSR.
One of the most important
steps that the Soviet leaders
could take to help build up the
prestige of the satellites and
possibly to strengthen the
hands of the local regime
leaders would be to make a
series of trips to each of the
Eastern European countries.
Such a plan ,
seems to be in the
making with the pres-
ent trip to Prague.
Such trips could
be readily publicized
as return courtesy
visits for those made
to Moscow last fall
by the satellite
leaders who were
accorded the full
red-carpet treatment.
Khrushchev had been
reported reliably in
the past to believe
continue to conduct its economic
relations with them more and
more on a direct bilateral
basis. Some of the satellites
may be permitted even greater
freedom in direct economic
negotiations with the West.
To counter a devisive
tendency that a less rigid
policy toward the East European
countries might encourage, the
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT
BUREAU FOR RSFSR
NATIONAL MINORITY
REPRESENTATIVES
Khrushchev - Est Secretary
Khrushchev - Chairman
BALTIC AREA
Aristov
Belyayev - Deputy Chairman
Kalnberzin - Latvia
Belyayev
Aristov
Brezhnev
Ignatov
BELORUSSIA
!Lrtseva
Kozlov
Mazurov
Kuusinen
Kirilenko
Suslov
Pospelov
UKRAINE _
Pospelov
Kirichenko
Korotchenko
TRANSCAUCASIA
Mzhavanadze - Georgia
CENTRAL ASIA
CANDIDATE MEMBERS
Mukhitdinov - Uzbekistan
that the leaders of the satel-
lites must be treated as equals
by the Soviet leadership as one
way of gaining their co-operation
with and support of the USSR--
a policy known to have long
been opposed by Molotov. In
the resolution condemning
Molotov,he was specifically
charged with denying "the
advisability of establishing
personal contacts between the
Soviet leaders and the states-
men of other countries."
To give substance to its
efforts to gain satellite co-
operation, the USSR can be
expected to continue imple-
mentation of the existing pro-
gram of economic assistance to
the satellites. As a further
mark of respect for the satel-
lites, the USSR probably will
USSR has stressed to these
countries the absolute necessity
of maintaining bloc unity. That
this lesson is clearly under-
stood is indicated by the initial
satellite reaction to the purges
in the USSR--unequivocal support
for the Soviet leadership.
Khrushchev's move will
clearly receive Peiping's sup-
port. The Chinese in the past
year have consistently implied
that they would welcome the re-
moval from leading positions
of remaining exponents of
Stalin's views in the USSR and
satellites. Peiping's response
to the central committee resolu-
tion on the shake-up was a brief
message expressing confidence
that the action "will help unite
and consolidate" the Soviet
party. This message was followed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
by similar reactions from North
Korea and North Vietnam.
It appears unlikely that
the Soviet purge will be fol-
lowed by any shake-up in the
Chinese leadership. The
"rightists" bearing the brunt
of sharp attacks at the sessions
of the National People's Con-
gress now under way in Peiping
are non-Communists; no Commu-
nists have been singled out as
coconspirators.
Implications for Foreign Policy
Khrushchev and his fol-
lowers have been outspoken in
their praise of the peaceful co-
existence policies laid down at
the 20th party congress,indicat-
ing that the major lines of So-
viet foreign policy will undoubt-
edly remain unchanged. After
Khrushchev has consolidated his
power, he may undertake a more
imaginative and energetic ap-
plicationr of these policies
as a result of the removal of
the conservative Molotov faction
which appears to have inhibited
the bolder and more flexible
tactics characteristic of
Khrushchev.
One by-product of the purge
will be to aid Moscow's attempts
to restore its pre-Hungary
posture of peaceful coexistence,
particularly since the central
committee resolution blamed
Molotov specifically for oppos-
ing a number of conciliatory
steps in foreign policy. Khrush-
chev will probably try to ex-
ploit the purge of the conserva-
tive presidium members to revive
his campaign for top-level bi-
lateral meetings with free
world leaders--one of the pol-
icies Molotov was accused of op-
posing. He will also probably
push cultural and technical
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exchanges with all countries
more vigorously.
But Moscow has already
warned the West against expect-
ing a radical change in foreign
policy as a result of the purge.
Moscow radio on 6 July stated
that it is "entirely unjusti-
fied" to hope for a "certain
compromising attitude in Soviet
foreign policy, which always is
ready to meet the West halfway."
The disarmament negotiations
in London may well become a
testing ground for any new
Soviet approaches to foreign
policy problems. There is no
indication, however, that Mos-
cow intends to make any signifi-
cant move toward a compromise
with the Western position on dis-
armament. Khrushchev may choose,
however, to follow up Zorin's
8 July statement with some
spectacular move, such as a call
for a top-level meeting on dis-
armament. Such a move would
serve to emphasize Khrushchev's
charges against the "conserva-
tive" attitudes of Molotov and
his associates on foreign policy.
Perhaps more than in any
other area of foreign policy,
Molotov's removal will affect
Moscow's turbulent relations
with Yugoslavia. With the Molo-
tov faction eliminated, Khrush-
chev probably will initiate a
change through strong efforts to
improve relations with Tito,
possibly including a trip to
Belgrade. Khrushchev may well
also take measures to clamp
down on satellite criticism
of Yugoslavia and re-establish
exchanges on lower levels. (See
Part II for a fuller analysis of
Soviet-Yugoslav relations.)
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11 July 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SATELLITE REACTION TO THE SOVIET PURGE
All of the East European
satellite regimes have hailed
the Soviet purge as a great
victory for Communism in the
Soviet Union and in the world
at large, but their reaction
in other respects has not been
uniform. Two parties--the
Rumanian and the Polish--appar-
ently had been prepared for the
impending changes and have re-
acted with some self-assurance.
The Rumanians had been carrying
out personnel shifts of their
own, coincident in both time
and substance with the develop-
ments in Moscow. The Poles
may have received advance in-
formation and guidance from
Mikoyan; they had begun to step
up their campaign against do-
mestic Stalinists even before
the Soviet announcement.
The reaction in the other
satellites has been character-
ized by caution and uncertainty,
the East Germans failing even
to mention the name of their
party leader--Walter Ulbricht--
for two full days following the
official revelations. The Hun-
garian party also exhibited some
uncertainty, apparently regret-
ting some of its hard-line pro-
nouncements issued at the re-
cently concluded party confer-
ence.
Although all of the sat-
tellite parties may have to
clean house eventually, only
Rumania has responded thus far
to the Soviet purge with a
specific move of its own. After
meeting from 23 June--a day be-
fore the Soviet central commit-
tee recessed--to 3 July,"the
Rumanian central committee on 4
July announced its decision to
oust two members of the polit-
buro--losif Chisinevschi and
Miron Constantinescu--and sev-
eral days later revealed that
these men had been engaged in
"antiparty" and "factional"
activities. The expulsions ap-
parently came as a result of
a decision by party leader
Gheorghiu-Dej--presumably with
guidance from Moscow--that the
time was also ripe in Bucharest
for the elimination of the
"Stalinist" opposition.
Dej, who has been the most
consistent and vigorous advocate
of a Khrushchev-like line in
Eastern Europe, thus appears to
be a direct beneficiary of the
Khrushchev victory in Moscow.
His past emphasis on internal
economic reforms, relatively
good relations with Yugoslavia
and the West, and on party re-
organization may have been
opposed by some party figures
both at home and in Moscow, but
now appears to have received
complete vindication.
The Polish party, not un-
naturally, is enthusiastic
about the developments in the
USSR. Polish leaders privately
expressed their approval of the
Soviet purge to American offi-
cials during the 4th of July
celebrations in Warsaw, and the
American embassy has noted an
easing of the fears of forceful
Soviet intervention in Polish
affairs and of possible attempts
to restore harder line policies.
Premier Cyrankiewicz predicted
better relations among all na-
tions working for peace, and
Deputy Premier Zenon Kowak
termed the change "a good devel-
opment for everyone." Opinion
representative of the Polish
managerial class was that
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11 July 1957
contacts with the West would
now be easier.
Polish journalists, even
more enthusiastic about the
changes, published material
claiming the event to be a
"grievous below to our own na-
tive conservatives and dogma-
tists and a strong reaffirma-
tion of support for the Poloh
independent "road to socialism."
The official party newspaper,
in an editorial aimed at Polish
Stalinists, described the ousted
Soviet leaders as a faction of
dogmatists, sectarians and con-
servatives whose activity dam-
aged the Soviet party's cam-
paign against revisionism. An-
other press article has direct-
ly advised Polish conservatives
to take their warning from
events in the Soviet Union.
Future direction of Polish
party policy was illustrated by
Gomulka's actions at the Warsaw
city party conference held from
22 to 24 June. Gomulka report-
edly had learned on 22 June of
the impending developments in
the Soviet Union from Mikoyan--
in Warsaw--and his bitter at-
tack on Stalinist elements with-
in the party on 23 June was
probably the first move in a
more determined campaign direct-
ed at destroying their influ-
ence. This campaign will prin-
cipally be fought among the
lower levels of the party, over
which Gomulka does not yet have
adequate control. In time, one
or more of the several Stalin-
ists in the regime may be re-
moved and others may hasten to
align themselves with Gomulka.
East Germany
The uncertainties over a
possible shake-up within the
East German Socialist Unity
(Communist) Party (SED), im-
plicit in the first official
East German commentaries on the
Russian purges, now appear to
have been at least temporarily
dispelled. Communications media,
after failing to mention Stalin-
ist Party First Secretary Walter
Ulbricht br two days, are again
referring to him as the leader
of the SED, suggesting that he
has succeeded in making the
ideological contortions neces-
sary to remain in the Kremlin's
good graces.
Ulbricht endorsed the So-
viet party action in a speech
on 7 July at Rostock claiming
the SED had taken an "unambigu-
ous stand against the factional
attitude of Comrades Malenkov,
Molotov, and Kaganovich," and,
perhaps in warning to party
opponents, declared that "neither
cliques nor factions can be
tolerated in a revolutionary
working-class party."
Soviet leaders, however,
may not have decided as yet
what Ulbricht's ultimate fate
will be. They realize that
purging him would entail the
risk of heightening the already
serious unrest in East Germany,
since it would probably be in-
terpreted as a move toward lib-
eralization which would inevi-
tably inspire increased pressures
for even greater concessions.
On the other hand, Ulbricht's
ouster at this time would be
consistent with the Soviet purges
and might be conveniently used
in the campaign to defeat Ade-
nauer in the September West
German elections. Furthermore,
a reliable leader could be
chosen from the pragmatic econ-
omists whose basic views would
be more in harmony with present
Soviet political and economic
policies.
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11 July 1957
Hungary
The condemnatiojn of the
Stalinists in the USSR may have
come at an embarrassing time
for the Communist Party in
Hungary. The first big party
conclave since the revolution
had just concluded with the
elevation of an arch-Stalinist
--veteran theoretician Joszef
Revai--to the central committee
and with a resolution which con-
firmed the party's hard-line
political policies. Party lead-
ers speaking before the confer-
ence had even avoided the refer-
ences to the "spirit" of the
Soviet 20th party congress, an
omission they have now hastily
begun to redress.
Encouraged by developments
in the USSR, some members of
the party apparently have al-
ready opened a campaign against
Revai, and a member of the party
leadership associated with Kadar
has criticized some of Revai's
views. Factionalism within the
party may thus be stimulated
by the Soviet action, but Kadar
himself, despite his advocacy
of stringent measures to re-
store party power in Hungary,
may welcome the Soviet purge,
seeing in it further support
for his own "centrist" position.
A regime spokesman has warned
"revisionist" elements, however,
that they are not to be encour-
aged by the anti-Stalinist
attitude of the present Soviet
leadership.
Other Satellites
The three most doctrinaire
of the European satellites--
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and
Albania--have responded to the
Soviet purge in similar fashion.
All profess to see a further
spur to their efforts to tight-
en party unity at home and em-
phasize their solidarity with
the Soviet party. In addition,
the Bulgarian and Albanian
parties have intimated that
personnel changes are not con-
templated since measures to
solve factional problems have
allegedly already been taken.
This may not, however, save
Bulgarian Stalinist Vulko
Chervenkov--ostensibly demoted
only after the 20th party
congress--from a genuine decline
in rank and prestige.
The Czech leaders may now
have some cause to regret their
recent unusually strong emphasis
on a harsh political line and
their cautious approach to de-
Stalinization in general. De-
spite this hard line, discontent
among intellectuals with the
regime's rigid policies has ap-
peared openly off and on ever
since the Soviet 20th party
congress and, although scarcely
out of control, has been grow-
ing during the past several
months.
leadership.
In part because the purge
of top Czech leaders would prob-
ably stimulate additional fer-
ment, Moscow would probably
exercise considerable caution
in urging the ouster of "Stalin-
ist" figures and would presum-
ably not suggest such measures
unless some of the most doc-
trinaire, second-level Czech
leaders--such as politburo
member Kopecky and Party Secre-
tary Hendrych--could be specif-
ically identified with those
purged in the USSR. Further,
the top Czech leaders have, on
the whole, operated a success-
ful satellite and have appeared
to be Moscow's favorites ever
since the Hungarian revolution.
The visit of Bulganin and Khru-
shchev to Prague, scheduled be-
fore the Soviet central! commit-
tee meeting took place, may thus
result merely in a Soviet re-
indorsement of the top Czech
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11 July 1957
The political purge in Mos-
cow has injected new life into
the faltering effort initiated
last spring by Yugoslavia and
the USSR to remove the tensions
between them. The departure
of President Tito's top aides,
Vice Presidents Kardelj and
Rankovic,for the USSR on 8 July
suggests that the Yugoslavs
are optimistic about the pros-
pects for genuine coexistence.
Soviet policy toward Yugo-
slavia, to which Molotov is
known to have raised a number
of objections, has been charac-
terized by vacillation in recent
months, with friendly and hostile
sentiments alternating in the
press and public statements.
The removal of Molotov might
herald the end of the vacilla-
tion and the beginning of a
consistent Soviet effort to im-
prove relations with Belgrade.
A number of fundamental Soviet-
Yugoslav differences remain,how-
ever, particularly with respect
to the satellites, and these
cannot be easily resolved.
Nevertheless, with the
victory of "their man Khru-
shchev," the Yugoslav leaders
are anticipating the imple-
mentation of the Belgrade and
Moscow declarations. It is un-
likely that the Yugoslavs will
concede on any of their basic
ideological views; on the con-
trary, they probably expect the
"man who came to Belgrade" to
accept their validity. Indica-
tive of the Yugoslav optimism
in this regard is the fact that
Kardelj,long regarded as the
uncompromising designer of "the
Yugoslav road to socialism," is
going to the USSR.
Presumably Tito has in-
structed his aides to try to
secure a public reindorsement
by Khrushchev of the "independ-
ent roads to socialism" concept,
a statement that the USSR will
not attempt to impose its will
on states developing "socialism,"
and that relations between not
only the Yugoslav and Soviet
Communist Parties but all Com-
munist parties will be voluntary
and based on complete equality.
Despite their optimism
concerning future relations
with Moscow, Yugoslav leaders
have exhibited a certain amount
of caution in asserting that
not all "Stalinists" have been
eliminated from the Soviet lead-
ership. Kardelj said just prior
to his departure that their
removal will be a "long process."
Yugoslav officials be-
lieve that in the near future
certain satellite parties will
meet to remove "Stalinists."
One official emphasized his
belief that the Czech leaders
were rigid and conservative
because they were operating
from positions of weakness.
it is unlikely, however, that
the Yugoslavs will press for
the wholesale removal of sat-
ellite "Stalinists" as they did
before the Hungarian revolt,
since Belgrade now is sen-
sitive to the repercussions
that the policies of too-
liberal leaders can have on
the stability of Communist
regimes.
The Yugoslavs presumably
will try to justify to the
West the acceleration of
Soviet-Yugoslav good-will
moves by asserting that Khru-
shchev should be encouraged
to maintain policies of the
20th party congress.
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11 July 1957
Official opinion in Europe
generally holds that the Soviet
shake-up will lead to few if
any major changes in Moscow's
policies. Soviet experts in
Britain warn against the devel-
opment of a mood of relaxation
in the Western alliance, and
German Chancellor Adenauer has
stated publicly that he will
not believe any change has
taken place until it shows up
in the Soviet attitude in the
London disarmament talks. A
Foreign Ministry official in
Paris fears the Soviet leaders
may use the shake-up as a gam-
bit to bolster their claims to
peace-loving intentions, but
he sees little probability that
it will have any repercussions
in the satellites other than
in Rumania.
Some European commentators,
however, have dwelt on the pos-
sibility of a period of better
understanding between East and
West. West German Socialist
chief Erich Ollenhauer inter-
prets the change as indicating
that Moscow "wants a settlement
of certain international prob-
lems," and some officials in
the German Foreign Ministry
tend to be optimistic regarding
Soviet relations with nonbloc
countries.
Both London and Paris have
indicated some concern over the
apparent elimination of collec-
tive leadership which they be-
lieve blocked at least some
reckless maneuvering by Moscow.
The French believe Khrushchev
is particularly dangerous, and
the London Foreign Office be-
lieves Soviet foreign policy
is likely to be "more clever,
more enterprising, more elastic,
and more insidious" than ever.
The War Office, however, re-
portedly sees the possibility
of a major Soviet pull-out from
Germany, and some officials look
for a lessening of international
tension.
Reaction in the Far East
and South Asia has been generally
cautious, but some hope is seen
for better East-West relations.
Japanese official and press
opinion regards the action as
consolidating Khrushchev's
leadership and as indicating
the USSR may increase its em-
phasis on "peaceful coexistence."
Indian Prime Minister Nehru,
in a televised broadcast from
London, called the move a "be-
lated toning down of the Soviet
Union's revolutionary spirit."
The Egyptian press has re-
ceived favorably Soviet assur-
ances--which were also broad-
cast by Moscow radio in Arabic--
that the purge means no change
of policy toward the Middle
East since policy is obviously
not made by one person alone.
The Egyptians have asserted that
the purge marks the end of
Jewish influence in Kremlin
circles--they have found Jewish
connections (wives or other
relatives) for practically all
purged Soviet leaders. Mean-
while, the Israeli press is
cautiously hopeful that the
changes might eventually permit
establishment of better rela-
tions with Moscow, but Israeli
officials have eschewed public
comment.
Palmiro Togliatti and
Maurice Thorez, leaders of the
two largest nonbloc Communist
iparties,were quick to support
the purge. Togliatti stated
in the Italian party paper
L'Unita on 6 July that the move
was 11 a solutely necessary and
fully justified." He has since
admitted that some comrades were
shocked,. however, and one hard-
core Communist deputy, regarded
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11 July 1957
by the American embassy as a
reliable source, reports that
the change has caused great
confusion in the Italian party.
The central committee of
the French party has expressed
total agreement, and a Foreign
Ministry spokesman has noted
Communist leader Thorez's en-
thusiastic response despite
the fact that his party is the
most Stalinist of the Western
European Communist parties.
He believes Thorez may take
the opportunity to crush re-
visionists in the French party.
In London, the Daily Worker
editorialized o-ulyy that
the USSR was "making it clear
to all the world that there
will be no return to the wrong
methods of the past."
The Indonesian Communist
daily in Djakarta, Harian
Rakjat, accepted and defended
the shifts in the Soviet
hierarchy without specifically
commenting on the individuals
involved, in an apparent effort
to leave Indonesian Communist
leadership prepared to accept
any other internal Soviet
political developments. The
paper added that the purge was
further proof that the Soviet
government was placing world
peace above everything else.
In Japan, Communist Party First
Secretary Sanzo Nosaka publicly
regretted the "deviationist
activities" of the purgees and
said his party would intensify
its efforts to cement unity
and prevent such "deplorable
activities." Indian Communist
Party functionaries are re-
portedly confused and cynical,
however, and there is some
feeling that the party must now
interpret Marxism for itself
without leaning on the Soviet
or Peiping models.
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Growing French expecta-
tions that the exploitation
of Sahara oil will ease France's
energy and foreign exchange
difficulties have considerably
sharpened the controversy over
Algerian policy. The right in
particular is more than ever
determined to hold on to the
area at all costs, but pressure
for a compromise has developed
because of the conflicting
financial demands for invest-
ment in oil development and
for military operations. A
period of transition appears
to have set in and the idea
of a federal relationship
giving limited autonomy to
Algerian regions appears to be
slowly crystallizing as a basis
for a new French approach to
the problem.
Premier Bourges-Maunoury
has so far carried out
essentially the same Algerian
policy that the Mollet-Lacoste
team instituted 16 months ago
with an end of hostilities con-
sidered a necessary prelude to
political changes and with a
continued unwillingness to
concede independence. Never-
theless, the financial drain,
a growing war-weariness in
France and division within most
political parties are increasing
pressures for a more positive
political program, even among
supporters of pacification.
This demand is partially re-
sponsible for the new military
tactic aimed at eliminating
rebel forces in selected areas
in the hope that new local
administrations can be estab-
lished which would form the
basis for the establishment of
regional political units.
There are signs that French
policy appears to be headed
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11 July 1957
in the direction of the frag-
mentation of Algeria through
the development of French- and
Moslem-dominated regions in
the north and the separate
administration of the Algerian
Sahara under the recently
formed Saharan Ministry.
Minister Residing in Al-
geria Robert Lacoste, who now
admits that his expectation
of early pacification was un-
realistic, recently expressed
the hope that an enabling act
for Algeria would be deposited
with the National Assembly
before the summer recess, ex-
pected on 20 July, but he did
not expect debate to begin
before October. During the
recess, an attempt will be made
to obtain broad political sup-
port in the assembly for ter-
ritorial assemblies and execu-
tives in the three northern
regions of Oran, Algiers and
Constantine. According to a
press report, there would be
a parliament in Algiers co-
ordinating these regional
bodies.
At the same time France
appears to be trying to mend
its fences in other parts
of North Africa and the Middle
East, probably in the hope of
buying time as well as good
will from the Arabs for what-
ever compromise may be attempt-
ed.- The removal or reloca-
tion of French troops in Tuni-
sia and Morocco, the tempering
of France's pro-Israeli policy,
and its trade negotiations with
Egypt and use of the Suez Canal
appear to be geared to meet the
exigencies of the Algerian sit-
uation. Along with a new polit-
ical progam, Paris may con-
sider that such steps will
strengthen its hand during an
Algerian debate this fall in
the UN General Assembly.
Meanwhile, the Bourges-
Maunoury government may have
difficulty in next week's
assembly debate on a bill to
extend to metropolitan France
at least part of the wide
emergency powers it holds in
Algeria. There is also growing
criticism of Lacoste in of-
ficial circles which may lead
to a complete airing of Al-
gerian policy and a confidence
vote.
The diplomatic impasse
between Syria and Saudi Arabia
brought about by Syrian press
attacks and Defense Minister
Azm's criticism of King Saud
has apparently been resolved
by an apology to Saud by the
Syrian cabinet.
The internal political
situation in Syria continues
to be confused. Dissension
within the army has increased
following the promotion ofa
number of supporters of left-
wing G-2 Col. Sarraj over the
heads of senior officers. De-
spite the deteriorating inter-
nal situation, several cabinet
ministers have seen fit to de-
part for trips abroad. Minister
of Defense Azm, the army's
protege, and Foreign Minister
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11 July 19 57
Bitar are in Italy, while Min-
ister of Public Works Fakhir
Kayyali has flown to the
Netherlands on a quest for
*BEIRUT 4
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HAWA S Y R I A
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0 10 20 30
technicians to operate the new
refinery purchased from the
Czechs.
The most serious incident
since the Sinai hostilities oc-
cured on 9 July near Gonen,
north of Lake Huleh. A ten-hour
exchange of fire resulted in a
number of casualties on both
sides. While there is no proof
that the tension along the bor-
der is connected with internal
events in Syria, it is possible
that the incident was inspired
by the left-wing army group in
an effort to unite army elements
which have been disgruntled fol-
lowing the recent promotion of
leftist officers.
In any event, the continu-
ing absence of recognized au-
thority in the Syrian army and
government will make border in-
cidents more difficult to con-
trol. Should the Israelis
launch a retaliatory action,
however, the purposes of Syrian
leftists might be further served,
since both domestic opponents
and the Arab states would feel
obliged to rally in at least
verbal support of the Syrian
army.
Israel's apparent deter-
mination to establish by use,
as well as by legal argument
and force, its right to navi-
gate freely the Gulf of Aqaba
is illustrated by consider-
able expansion of Eilat, the
Israeli port at the head of
the gulf. Eilat is viewed
by Israeli leaders as of major
economic, political and stra-
tegic importance. Israel's
hopes for exploitation of the
Negev wastelands, as well as
trade contacts with Asia and
Africa, are involved in its
future.
The Israeli minister of
development has announced that
from last October to mid-June
imports and exports moving
through Eilat amounted to more
than 40,000 tons. This figure
compares with 6,000 tons handled
through the port from 1948 un-
til the Sinai campaign. The
ministry will invest the equiva-
lent of $700,000 in building
up Eilat's facilities during
1957 to handle the increased
volume of trade between Israel,
Africa and the Orient.
The long-range plan for con-
struction at the port envisions
an extension of Eilat's exist-
ing jetty by four and a half
miles. The new wharf will be
divided into four harbor areas
to provide separate commercial,
oil and naval ports, as well as
facilities for fishing and water
sports.
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11 July 1957
Progress is being made on
doubling the port's 400-ton
daily unloading capacity. The
eight-inch Eilat-Beersheba oil
pipeline which was completed
last spring should be capable
of transporting between 14,000
and 16,000 barrels per day. On
completion of tanks now being
built, oil storage facilities
at Eilat will reach a capacity
of 33,000 tons for crude oil
and 1,500 tons for fuel oil and
gasoline. Cargo-handling equip-
ment is being purchased and as-
sembled.
The Israeli government re-
gards as the main economic fac-
tor affecting short- and long-
range planning for Eilat the con-
struction of a railroad to con-
nect the town with the center
of the country. Present costs
of land transportation seriously
lessen the profits on trade
through the port. A more im-
mediate problem is that of ob-
taining fresh water, which, un-
less solved, may keep Eilat in
the small-town status. Popula-
tion gains have been rapid. By
the end of 1957, Eilat's popu-
lation, now around 2,000, may
be 4,000. Before the Sinai cam-
paign there were 1,200 inhabit-
ants, while in 1948 the town
consisted of a few mud huts.
The Israelis hope that
Eilat's port eventually will
make possible the development
of industries and mines. Is-
rael's mineral potential is
mostly in the south; transporta-
tion costs to Eilat normally
would be cheaper than to north-
ern ports. At present, however,
Eilat is still a project of the
future, one which seems to the
Israelis an essential part of
their vision of the country as
a bridge between the West and
Asia.
The 3 July election in Egypt
was relatively quiet, judged by
Near Eastern standards, but the
results announced on 6 July have
provided some minor surprises
for the Nasr regime. While no
outright opponents of the regime
were elected to parliament,
several of its preferred candi-
dates suffered unexpected de-
feats and others failed to se-
cure the required absolute ma-
jority The blessing of the
regime apparently was not an
adequate guarantee of popularity
with the electorate for a number
of brothers, cousins, and friends
of key figures around Nasr, de-
spite the absence of any open,
organized resistance.
Cases of violence through-
out the campaign were generally
restricted to rural areas, where
family and clan feeling ran
higher in favor of particular
candidates. A reportedly Com-
munist-inspired demonstration
against Shawqi Abdul Nasr,
brother of Gamal, occurred in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
Alexandria and an ineffectual
protest bombing by members of
the Moslem Brotherhood was made
in Cairo. However, antire-
gime feeling was manifested in
relatively few isolated in-
stances.
It is unlikely that addi-
tional "favored" candidates
will fail in the run-off elec-
tions which have been required
in a large number of cases and
which were not anticipated by
the regime when it established
an absolute majority require-
ment. Thus a new vote must be
taken on 14 July in 172 con-
stituencies, nearly half the
total. In five other constit-
uencies, the regime disqualified
all candidates before the elec-
tion. Special elections are
scheduled to be held some time
after the parliament convenes
on 22 July in order to bring
the total membership of that
body to the required 350.
The Burmese government is
reported to be so pleased with
the performance of 22 Soviet
agricultural technicians that
it is contemplating extending
their contracts through 1960.
Originally hired last November
for a one-year period, their
contracts have already been ex-
tended through November 1958.
Agricultural projects undertaken
by the Soviet technicians re-
portedly have been given top
priority in Prime Minister Nu?s
recently announced four-year
program. There is speculation
that if these projects are to
be completed by 1960, addition-
al Soviet personnel and Burmese
budgetary allocations will be
needed.
The Soviet agricultural
team is concentrating princi-
pally on the construction of
several dams which, when com-
pleted, will help irrigate large
tracts of hitherto dry land in
upper Burma. While at least one
of the projects has been judged
impracticable by American engi-
neers, the over-all program is
undoubtedly feasible and will
fill an important agricultural
need in Burma.
Probably as a result of
the favorable impression made
by the agricultural technicians,
Bumra is reportedly tempted to
accept Soviet offers to provide
technicians in the oil explora-
tion and housing fields. Burma
would use its unexpended barter
credits to pay for their serv-
ices.
The USSR is also moving
ahead with its large-scale con-
struction program in Rangoon.
Construction of the technologi-
cal institute, the most impor-
tant of these projects, is re-
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portedly well on its way to com-
pletion.
t will be an im-
pressive sight when finished.
Other projects in the program,
less important but equally showy,
are scheduled for completion
before 1963. These include a
sports center, a theater, and
a hotel. It is likely that the
average Burmese in Rangoon will
recall that the USSR built these
edifices long after he has for-
gotten that the Burmese govern-
ment must pay in full for these
"gift" projects.
Successful completion of
the agricultural and construc-
tion projects are likely to go
a long way toward making up for
Burma's disappointment with its
barter trade with the USSR. It
may also enhance the prestige
of the pro-Communist National
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 July 1957
United Front (NUF) by seeming
to bear out Khrushchev's claim
to Rangoon University students
in December 1955 that Communism
could do a better job in under-
developed countries than capi-
talism. The NUF, which won 30
percent of the vote in last
year's national elections, is
already aiming at winning the
1960 elections and is continu-
ing its energetic efforts to
build up popular support.
(Concurred in
by ORR)
NORTH VIETNAM PRESIDENT TOURING SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Ho Chi Minh left Hanoi on
6 July for a two-month tour of
North Korea, the East European
satellites and Yugoslavia. Al-
though visits to Moscow and
Peiping are not mentioned in
the Hanoi communique, Ho has
already spent two days in the
Chinese Communist capital as an
unofficial guest and will prob-
ably do the same in Moscow.
The announced reason for
the trip is "to tighten the
friendly relations between Vi-
etnam and the socialist nations,'
and contacts are to be made on
a government-to-government level.
The North Vietnamese dele-
gation, as described by Hanoi
broadcasts, consists of only
three men in addition to Ho:
Hoang Van Hoan, a politburo mem-
ber and former ambassador to
Peiping; Pham Ngo Thach, vice
minister of public health and
Ho's personal physician; and
Hoang Minh Giam, minister of
culture. Hoan has served the
party in numerous capacities.
He led the North Vietnamese
delegation to Moscow in 1950,
and at the 1954 Geneva confer-
ence was responsible for press
relations. He was recalled as
ambassador to Communist China
last April after a six-year
tour to take up new duties, as
yet unannounced.
The small size of the dele-
gation and the absence of any
financial expert suggest that
the tour has been planned prin-
cipally for reasons of prestige
rather than serious negotiations.
Hanoi probably hopes it will
serve to offset the prestige
gained by Diem in his recent
visit to the United States.
Recent commentary from
Hanoi has made no particular
distinction between Yugoslavia
and the East European satellites,
and the party press has not
commented on Tito's recent dis-
agreements with the Kremlin.
Additional signs pointing to
the existence of friendly rela-
tions between the two countries
are Ho's personal birthday mes-
sage to Tito in May and an agree-
ment reached in March for the
exchange of ambassadors.
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Ho's willingness to take
a long trip at this time sug-
gests that, contrary to some
reports, he is in fairly good
health, and is confident that
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11 July 1957
Lt. Col. Sumual, deposed
commander in East Indonesia,
renewed his defiance of the
Djakarta government on 7 July
when he declared himself still
the supreme military authority
in the area and transferred his
headquarters from Makassar in
South Celebes to Menado'in the
north, where he has strong sup-
port. Only a few days earlier,
"Governor" Manoppo of the lo-
cally created province of North
Celebes gave quasi-official
sanction to existing smuggling
when he announced that his
area was "tired of waiting"
for economic relief from Dja-
karta and would attempt to be-
come economically independent
by engaging in its own barter
trade. These actions largely
nullify intensive efforts of
Army Chief of Staff General
Nasution during the past two
months to halt disaffection and
illegal trade in the area.
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
The government may be able
to retain its control over
South Celebes and thus maintain
a small enclave in East Indo-
nesia comparable to the Medan
area in Sumatra. There is no
indication that the government
plans to use force against
Sumual. It is likely that the
government will simply continue
its refusal to recognize Sumual
with the hope that time and new
developments will provide an op-
portunity for the restoration
of Djakarta's authority in East
Indonesia. ..
Meanwhile President Sukar-
no's speech on 3 July marking
the 30th anniversary of the
National Party was a disappoint-
ment to party leaders, who had
hoped he would indicate disap-
proval of Communism and support
for the Nationalists. Instead,
Sukarno continued his attack on
partisan politics and repeated
a Disaffected provinces
[J Provinces under central go
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11 July 1957
the themes of "continuing the
revolution" and fulfilling the
concept of "guided democracy."
The Nationalists are fearful
that without Sukarno's support
they face defeat by the Commu-
nists in the forthcoming
provincial elections in East
and Central Java. Sukarno's
predominantly leftist national
council is still scheduled to
be installed on 12 July.
Argentina "interrupted"
diplomatic relations with
Venezuela on 7 July after Vene-
zuela responded to its demand
that Peron be ousted or interned
by recalling top embassy offi-
cials from Buenos Aires and by
declaring Argentina's ambassa-
dor in Caracas persona non
grata for disrespect. The
Venezuelan regime issued no
comment on Argentina's docu-
mented charges that Peron was
directing subversive activities,
including plans for terrorism
prior to the 28 July constituent
assembly elections. The "in-
terruption" may create an awk-
ward atmosphere for the inter-
American economic conference
scheduled to meet in Buenos
Aires on 15 August.
The Aramburu regime con-
siders Peronista activity the
biggest obstacle to its efforts
to hold elections and turn over
a stable country to a democrat-
ically elected government
next May
Peronistas
are being urged by their leaders
to cast blank protest ballots
in the July election for a con-
stituent assembly to revise the
constitution.
Opposition activity will
be facilitated by the govern-
ment's lifting on 28 June of
the long-lived "state of siege,"
which restricted public gather-
ings and other civil rights--
a measure considered risky but
necessary to promote free
campaigning prior to the con-
stituent assembly elections and
the general elections next
February.
Argentina reportedly be-
lieves that Venezuelan co-
operation is essential to con-
trol continued attempts at
sabotage and revolution directed
by Peron. Venezuela, however,
has been unreceptive to Argen-
tine requests, especially since
the Inter-American Meeting of
Presidents in Panama last July,
when President Perez Jimenez
felt slighted by President
Aramburu. Venezuela's security
chief Estrada told Ambassador
McIntosh in April that Peron
is still a powerful individual
and has under his control a
"tremendous organization."
Argentina sent an emissary
to Caracas in June to help pre-
sent its case against Peron;
he had intercepted letters,
recordings and written propa-
ganda which mention the clandes-
tine Peronista organization,
sabotage and opposition to the
July elections. President Perez
Jimenez refused for three weeks
to see the Argentine ambassador,
who finally saw the foreign
minister on 1 July to present a
note requesting that Peron
either be expelled or interned
under surveillance in the in-
terior. The foreign minister--
apparently interpreting the note
as an ultimatum--persuaded the
ambassador to withhold it tem-
porarily and on 5 July recalled
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11 July 1957
Venezuelan embassy officials
in Buenos Aires. The Venezue-
lan interior minister says offi-
cial steps will not be taken to
expel..Peron .
Argentina's position has
received considerable support
in South America, and the nun-
cio in Caracas reportedly has
also given Argentina his sup-
port. Argentina can point to
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restrictions on Peronista
activities taken by Brazil,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and
Chile. While these countries
may have been influenced in a
small degree by their location
as neighboring countries, they
acted after receiving Argentine
evidence and are on record
publicly that Peronista exiles
are engaging in subversive
activities.
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