CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000500120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
~G~6REF
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
cpl,eAv
COPY NO. 16
OCI NO. 5431/55
23 June 1955
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
^ LjzzC VWI Cr
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT R MEW CATS:
NO CHANGE IN CLAD 0
OiCicn
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SUMMIT CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow is continuing to insist that the status of the
European Satellites cannot be discussed, at the summit con-
ference, while it remains vague about whether the discussions
will include the German unification problem. The Soviet
Union may take the position that all-German talks and four-
power progress on broader issues, such as European security,
are necessary first.
THE ARGENTINE REVOLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . Page 2
The revolt of 16 June has left a military junta appar-
ently exercising the executive power in Argentina, although
President Peron is still referred to as chief of state.
Peron's immediate future seems to depend in part on nego-
tiations now under way between the joint military command
and rebel naval units reported still in control of the
naval base of Puerto Beigrano.
CONSEQUENCES OF
ITALIAN PREMIER'S RESIGNATION
. Page 3
The resignation of Premier Scelba on 22 June, caused
by a split in the Christian Democratic Party, presages a
long period of political instability in Italy, possibly
culminating in general elections next spring. In the mean-
time, if President Gronchi followed the customary practice
in choosing a candidate to form a new cabinet, he would
call on.a member of the faction which brought down the
government, and would probably select former premier Pella,
leader of the Christian Democratic right wing.
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Menon's Conversations: India's Krishna Menon, in conver-
sations at the UN'and in Washington, has supported
Chou En-lai's various proposals relating to Sino-
American negotiations, but has offered no evidence of
a change in Peiping's position on the basic issues.
The Chinese Communists appear to be awaiting reports
from Menon and other intermediaries in order to assess
the prospects for talks. I I . . Page 1
Soviet Invitation to Adenauer Arouses Satellite Apprehension:
The Soviet Invitation to West German chance or enauer
has received the official approval of the East European
Satellites, but it has at the same time evoked appre-
hension among them. This reaction was most pronounced,
in East Germany and Poland., the two countries most
directly concerned, with Soviet-West German relations.
. . . . . . . o . . . . . . Page 2
Polish-Soviet Relations: The Soviet Union appears to be
establishing a new basis for its relations with the
Polish Communists by admitting that errors were com-
mitted against Polish Communism during the Stalin
period. The USSR may be preparing to permit the Polish
party to adopt a policy of building Socialism in accord-
ance with local conditions and national traditions.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Soviet Overtures to Greece: Since the Soviet-Yugoslav talks,
there have been increasing indications that the USSR is
making special efforts to improve its relations with
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Soviet-Japanese Negotiations: Prospects at London talks
between Soviet and Japanese negotiators are still favor-
able for a limited settlement. This might provide for
an end to the state of war and restoration of diplomatic
relations, while the more _;ontroversial. issues would be
postponed. I I . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The UN Membership Question: Hope for an early break in the
ve-year deadlock on the UN membership question has
risen in United Nations circles since the signing of
the Austrian treaty which endorsed UN membership for
Austria. Most countries expect that unofficial talks
among the Big'Four foreign ministers at the San Francisco
commemorative session will lead to some agreement on the
membership problem. I I . . . . . . . . . Page 7
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23 June 1955
Progress Report on Soviet Agriculture: Substantial progress
has been announced by rs Party Secretary Khrushchev
toward fulfilling the Soviet planting goals this spring.
The weather has been generally favorable in the estab-
lished agricultural areas but dry in parts of the "'new
lands." Fulfillment of production goals depends on'
good weather throughout the summer in areas which are
often arid. I I . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Vietnam: The Vietnamese government is putting first priority
on reaching an agreement with the French on the status
of the French Expeditionary Corps and is apparently
unwilling to take a definite position on the question
of pre-election talks with the Viet Minh until it has
The army.is::proceedJ.ng with its
achieved this goal
.
campaign against the Boa Hao rebels. Page 9
Cambodia: An official request by the Cambodian government
for a ruling by the International Control Commission
on the US-Cambodian military aid agreement is expected
to result in a decision. within a week. At present, it.
appears likely that the commission will request the
Cambodians to provide an explanation of certain points
in the aid agreement. A flat denunciation of the agree-
ment by the commission is unlikely unless New Delhi., so
instructs its representative.' . . Page 10
New Constituent Assembly in Pakistan: The Pakistan governor
general will probably be unable to control the new
constituent assembly when it convenes on 7 July. The
resulting confusion in the government will aga n tempt
the governor general to dismiss the assembly.
10 . . . . . . . a . . . . . . Page 11
Afghan-Pakistani Dispute: There have been signs during the
past wee that Afghanistan is beginning to give in to
Pakistan in the dispute over the 30 March riots in
Kabul. The trend of events suggests that Daud no
longer has a free hand in making Afghan policy.
Israeli-Egyptian Border: The partial relaxation of tension
on the Egyptian-Israeli border noted since the begin-
ning of June has continued despite minor incidents
3
and Israeli army maneuvers. I I . . . . . rage 1
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23 June 1955
French North Africa: Paris has named Gilbert Grandval,
the. outspoken and strong-willed former chief of the
French mission to the Saar, as resident general to
a tense Morocco. Prospects are that disorders will
continue. In Algeria, troops and police reinforce-
ments have brou-g-ET terrorist activity under more
effective control. In Tunisia, opposition to National
Assembly approval of the rench-Tunisian agreement
continues. . . . . . . . . . Page 14
East Germany Feeling Pinch of Bonn's Empargo: East Germany
apparently is feeling the pinch of the selective embargo
on iron and steel products imposed by West Germany in
reprisal for the highway toll increases. As a result,
the East Germans may adopt a more conciliatory attitude
during the forthcoming negotiations on the tolls with
West German officials, but they are unlikely to deviate
from their basic policy of attempting to secure a
greater degree of recognition from Bonn. age 15
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
MOSCOW ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE INITIATIVE ON "ATOMS FOR PEACE" . Page 1
The Soviet Union's invitation to a number of scien-.
tists of non-Communist countries to attend a Soviet-
sponsored conference from 1 to 5 July on the peaceful
uses of atomic energy is the latest of several dramatic
moves the USSR has made this year in the field of atomic
energy. The scheduled conference, in addition to empha-
sizing Moscow's new liberal policy in releasing nuclear
information, apparently is designed to give greater appeal
to the Soviet disarmament proposal of 10 May and to
strengthen the USSR's position at.the four-power talks
and at the UN-sponsored conference on atoms for peace
scheduled to convene in Geneva in August.
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23 June 1955
THE COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION . . . . Page
The 1-3 June conference of the foreign ministers of
the six Coal-Steel Community countries considered the
prospects for further strengthening Western Europe through
economic union. Agreement was reached in principle on
the goal of economic union, and specific integration
objectives were established. These new objectives will
be the subject of continuing negotiations between now and
the next such conference which is scheduled to be held
not later than October.
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CORRENT 1NTE16LIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SUMMIT CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow is continuing to
insist that the status of the
European Satellites cannot be
discussed at the summit con-
ference, while it remains vague
about whether the discussions
will include the Germany uni-
fication problem. Soviet bloc
spokesmen have been contribut
ing contradictory hints on the
type of German offer the USSR
has in mind.
Moscow is obviously very
sensitive to suggestions for
discussion of the internal
structure of Satellite states,
and is trying to discredit any
concessions in this sphere as
a legitimate quid pro quo for
the withdrawal of American
troops and bases from Europe.
The USSR has not yet, however,
denounced possible discussion
of Satellite "neutralization,"
which might involve troop with-
drawal, the dissolution of al-
liances, and limits on armed
forces.
Soviet propaganda comment
on the meetings of the three
Western foreign ministers in
New York tried to prove there
were wide areas of disagreement
among them, and particularly
claimed that the United States
was opposed to discussion of
disarmament and Far Eastern
issues at Geneva.
Soviet and East German
propaganda comment on the four-
power conference has recently
begun to include references to
the German issue, but in terms
which most often imply that
German unification would not be
on the agenda but would be
facilitated if progress were
made on other measures to
lessen world tension.
A Moscow radio commentary,
which listed disarmament, Euro-
pean security, and Far Eastern
questions as "outstanding
issues," added that German uni-
ty depends to a great extent
on co-ordination of four-
power views.
A East German government
statement said that a German
settlement "would be facil-
itated by positive results
from the Geneva conference."
It added that the most impor-
tant contribution toward unifi-
cation must be made through
understanding among the Germans
themselves.
An East Berlin newspaper
warned that while the Paris
accords are in force four-
power negotiations on German
reunification "will bear no
fruit," but added that this
did not bar the German prob-
lem from the conference agenda.
It predicted that, at Geneva
the USSR would press for can-
cellation of the Paris accords
and exclusion of Germany from
military alliances as the pre-
requisite for free elections.
An East German Committee
for German Unity proposed that
representatives from both parts
of Germany work out a common
position in preparation for
the conference, including
agreement on withdrawal of
occupation troops, removal of
military bases, a peace treaty,
and membership of an alliance-
free Germany in a collective
security system.
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Soviet bloc officials
have expressed contradictory
views on the prospects for a
new Soviet unification offer
at Geneva.
Soviet officials in Mos-
cow and Berlin were said to
have impressed West German
newsmen with the USSR's unwill-
ingness to consider yielding
East Germany and its interest
in a limitation on armaments
of the two German states.
On the other hand, a TASS
representative in London asked
a West German newsman what the
German reaction would be to a
Soviet offer for free elections,
in return for some form of
neutralization. The TASS man
added free elections would prob-
ably result in a 90-percent
East German vote for the West
German government.
Although Moscow may find
it necessary from time to time
to inspire speculation that it
is preparing a serious new
unification plan, the weight
of evidence at present would
seem to indicate that it hopes
to avoid the issue during the
Geneva conference, holding that
all-German talks and four-power
progress on broader issues such
as European security are neces-
sary first.
(A roundup of information
relating to the "summit con-
ference" is contained in a
special SUMMIT CONFERENCE SUP-
PLEMENT being distributed to
recipients of this publication.)
The revolt which broke
out on 16 June has left a mili-
tary junta apparently exercis-
ing the executive power in
Argentina, although President
Peron is still referred to as
chief of state. Peron's im-
mediate future seems to de-
p end in part on negotiations
now under way between the joint
military command and rebel
naval units reported still in
control of the naval base of
Puerto Belgrano.
Minister of the army
Lucero, to whom Peron gave lav-
ish public praise for defending
the government, has emerged as
the key figure in the govern-
ment. He controls all of the
military and security forces
and on 21 June was reported
Ito e
sharing the executive power in
a junta also including the
commanding general of the in-
terior, General Emilio Forcher,
and the subsecretary of the
army, General Jose Embrione.
Both Forcher and Embrione
are highly respected within
the services by both pro- and
anti-Peron elements.
The joint military com-
mand has apparently not yet
succeeded in reaching any
agreement with the rebel naval
forces, and there is much spec-
ulation in Buenos Aires that
the chief point at issue is
Peron's future .
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Organized labor, tradi-
tionally the dominant power in
Peron's regime, has remained
generally quiescent, contrary
to its behavior in previous
crises. A few labor groups
were reported shortly after the
revolt as engaged in looting
and partly responsible for the
burning of churches, but these
were probably acting without
direction. A larger number of
workers were observed with arms
in their hands during the bomb-
ing and strafing raids, but
their many casualties, combined
with Peron's radio appeals to
remain calm, evidently dis-
couraged them from attempting
to play any prominent role.
It is clear that Peron's
power has been sharply curtailed
by the army, though he remains
at least the nominal head of
the government. A more precise
indication of the new distribu-
tion of power will appear with
the announcement of new cabinet
members.
CONSEQUENCES OF
ITALIAN PREMIER'S RESIGNATION
The resignation of Premier
Scelba on 22 June, caused by a
split in the Christian Demo-
cratic Party, presages a long
period of political instabil-
ity in Italy, possibly cul-
minating in general elections
next spring.
certainly lose the support of
the left and larger wing of his
party, which believes,as did
the late premier De Gasperi,
that such an.antireform govern-
ment would revive the waning_
fortunes of the Italian Com-
munists.
In the meantime, if Pres-
ident Gronchi followed the
customary practice in choosing
a candidate to form a new
cabinet, he would call
on a member of the fac-
tion which brought down the
government, and probably select
former premier Pella, leader
of the Christian Democratic
right wing.
If Pella should seek sup-
port from the Monarchists, on
whom he relied during his 1953
premiership, he would almost
During his previous pre-
miership, Pella apparently had
an informal understanding with
the Communists for mutual toler-
ence. It is reported that he
would not be unwilling to make
a working arrangement with
Nenni instead.
An arrangement with Nenni
would reportedly be possible
under most of the other lead-
ing candidates, who are left-
wing Christian Democrats and
believe with President Gronchi
that the Communists would be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
seriously undercut if the Nenni
Socialists could be weaned
away from them in support of
a reformist government.
These candidates are:
Budget Minister Vanoni, former
agriculture minister Segni,
and party secretary, Fanfani.
An additional candidate, whose
position on co-operating with
Nenni is unclear, is the right-
wing leader Gonella.
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The Christian Democrats
are reported to be encouraged
by their gains in the 5 June
Sicilian elections, and if a
prolonged period of unstable
cabinets results, they may
well try to push the 1958 date
for the national elections up
to 1956, in the hope of acquir-
ing a stronger popular mandate
at that t me.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Menon's Conversations
India's Krishna Menon,
in conversations at the UN
and in Washington, has supported
Chou En-lai's various proposals
relating to Sino-American nego-
tiations, but has offered no
evidence of a change in Pei-
ping's position on the basic
issues. The Chinese Communists
appear to be awaiting reports
from Menon and other intermedi-
aries in order to assess the
prospects for talks.
Menon has seconded Chou
En-lai's proposal for early
diplomatic contacts between
American and Chinese Communist
envoys in New Delhi, London
and Moscow. Both Chou and
Menon have suggested that such
contacts would reduce tensions
immediately and could lead
easily into formal negotiations.
Chou and Menon have also
argued that it is the turn of
the United States to make some
concession--in the interest
of improving the atmosphere
for talks--to balance Peiping's
gesture in releasing the four
American airmen. Both have
suggested such actions as per-
mitting relatives to visit
Americans still detained in
Communist China, encouraging
additional Chinese students
in the United States--only one
of whom is held against his
will--to go to Communist China,
inducing Taipei to evacuate
the remaining Nationalist-held
offshore islands, and relaxing
trade restrictions on Peiping.
Both Chou and Menon have
recommended that the topics
for any Sino-American talks be
defined in general terms, such
as "relaxation of tensions"
or the "general area" of For-
mosa. Chou had said in April
that the first step was to
determine whether the United
States was willing to under-
take talks, after which the
agenda could be arranged.
Neither Menon nor any
other source has provided any
evidence of a modification in
Peiping's hard line on the
basic issues. The Chinese
Communists have consistently
asserted that there is no
need for a cease-fire and that
they wish to negotiate only
about the American "occupation"
of Formosa--that is, the Ameri-
can-Nationalist defense treaty
and the presence of American
forces in and around Formosa.
Peiping has made clear
its hope of negotiating a
peaceful "liberation" of For-
mosa with the undefended
Nationalists. At the same
time, the Communists have left
themselves room to postpone
a Formosa operation indefinitely
in exchange for American con-
cessions on various political,
economic and military matters.
Menon is scheduled to have
additional talks with American
leaders in the next few weeks,
and Burmese premier U Nu is
to arrive in Washington next
week, U Nu will almost cer-
tainly want to discuss the
prospects for Sino-American
negotiations.
Menon has said that he
will report back to Chou on the
results of all his talks, and
U Nu presumably intends to do
the same. It thus seems likely
that Peiping will await receipt
of such reports, as well as the
outcome of the summit talks,
before making a decision as to
its future course of action in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the Formosa Straits. The Com-
munists may well seize any op-
portunity the Nationalists give
them, however, to pose as the
aggrieved party and to take de-
fensive action in the area.
Meanwhile, Peiping's pub-
lic and private statements have
continued to suggest that the
Soviet Invitation to Adenauer
Arouses Satellite ppre ens on
The Soviet invitation to
West German chancellor Adenauer
has received the official ap-
proval of the East European
Satellites, but it has at the
same time evoked apprehension
among their governments. This
reaction was most pronounced
in East Germany and Poland--the
two countries most directly
concerned with Soviet-West Ger-
man relations.
Communist leaders in East
Germany, apparently caught un-
awares by the invitation, seem
to fear that they may be sacri-
ficed by the USSR for the sake
of German unity. One of Bonn's
major prerequisites for reuni-
fication is the banishment from
political activity of the pres-
ent members of the East German
regime.
Some of the East German
leaders, notably Deputy Premier
Ulbricht, on the other hand,
appear to hope that a unified
Germany could retain some fea-
tures of the Communist state.
This hope has been re-
flected in East German propa-
ganda countering predictions
in the West Berlin press that
nationalized industries would
be absorbed by private business
in the event of unification.
On the contrary, according to
an East Berlin radio commentator,
Chinese Communists would wel-
come, in addition to or instead
of bilateral talks, a meeting
of five, six, ten or even more
powers to discuss a wide range
of Far Eastern issues. These
issues would be similar to
those expected to be put for-
ward by the Soviet Union in
the summit talks.
"what the workers and peas-
ants... have achieved... will
never be abandoned. On this
there can be no discussion what-
ever." Another broadcaster
stated that the German Demo-
cratic Republic "is a reality
which cannot be talked away."
In Poland, traditional
fears of German irredentism
quickly emerged in official
and press comments reiterating
the view that the Oder-Neisse
boundary is permanent and in-
violable. In commenting on
Adenauer's statement in New
York on 13 June that Germany
would recover its eastern ter-
ritories, Trybuna Ludu, the
Polish par Ty paper, pointed out
that the Warsaw treaty guar-
anteed the inviolability of
Poland's frontiers.
Czechoslovakia on 9 June
inaugurated a Czech-German
friendship week, with much of
the emphasis being placed on
West German
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
Czech Foreign Ministry
officials believe that a united
Germany can be achieved if cer-
tain security guarantees are
granted the Soviet bloc, and
anticipate that it will have a
bourgeois-conservative govern-
ment. Czechoslovakia allegedly
will welcome an easing of ten-
sions because of the vital im-
portance of mutual trade.
Little reaction beyond
mere official approval has been
noted in the Satellites farther
removed from Germany. Hungary
is reportedly planning over-
tures to Bonn to establish
diplomatic relations, and all
of the countries of the Sino-
Soviet bloc can be expected to
follow the Soviet Union's lead
in this respect.
The Soviet invitation has
probably aroused some fears of
German ascendancy among the
peoples of Eastern Europe,
especially among the inhabitants
of former German lands now part
of Poland and of the former
Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia.
In East Germany, although all
Soviet moves are regarded cyni-
cally, the people have probably
derived some hope for eventual
unification from the invita-
tion.
The official Polish Com-
munist Party paper printed
pictures on 1 May of 18 Polish
Communist leaders, some of
whom were out of favor during
the Stalinist period. This
suggests strongly that a new
'Soviet policy toward the Polish
party is evolving.
The pictures were pre-
sented in a conspicuous spot
under the heading: "Those Who
Led Us in the Struggle." The
only accompanying text was a
brief biographical description
of each leader.
A group of pictures show-
ing founders of Polish Commu-
nism included Rosa Luxemburg,
Julian Marchlewski, and Feliks
Dzierzynski, all of whom have
been accepted by the Soviet and
Polish parties as standard
heroes of Polish Communism,
although Luxemburg and March-
lewski have been accused of
deviations. Another group
showed party leaders between
the two World Wars, most of
whom were purged in Moscow in
1937 by Stalin before he dis-
solved the Polish party in the
spring of 1938. A third group
was made up of deceased wartime
and postwar leaders about whom
there is no question of an anti-
Soviet or anti-Stalinist
attitude.
Most striking was the in-
clusion of five of the inter-
war leaders, among them Adolf
Warski and Were Kostrzewa--
known to have been purged in
1937 for espionage, Trotskyism
and Bukharinism--and Julian
Leszczynski-Lenski, who was
purged for engaging in espionage
for the prewar Pilsudski govern-
ment. Publication of their
pictures with the implication
that they helped the Communists
gain control in Poland was the
first favorable mention made
by party historians since their
fall.
The cloaking of these five
leaders with party respect-
ability is an anti-Stalinist
gesture designed to appeal to
the minority "nationalist" and
"moderate" Polish party ele-
ments, who feel that they owe
their heritage primarily to
pre-Stalinist, Polish and
Western Communism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Publication of the pic-
tures, which was probably
cleared with Moscow, is another
indication that Soviet policies
toward the Satellites are
moving away from the rigidity
of the Stalinist period. It
implies that ideological mis-
takes committed by earlier
Satellite party leaders have
been pardoned.
By adopting a more lenient
and reasonable posture, the
current leaders of the Soviet
Union may hope to reduce the
anti-Soviet feeling kindled by
Soviet Overtures to Greece
Since the Soviet-Yugoslav
talks, there have been increas-
ing indications that the USSR
is making special efforts to
improve its relations with
Greece.
The Soviet leaders, when
in Belgrade, showed special
courtesies to the Greek ambassa-
dor there, and Khrushchev
stated that the success of the
talks with the Yugoslavs was
leading to closer Soviet-Greek
relations. Mikoyan, similarly,
urged an improvement of rela-
tions with Greece, and Marshal
Tito told the Greek ambassador
that the talks would improve
relations between Moscow and
Athens.
Following the Soviet-Bul-
garian communique from Sofia,
which also called for closer
Bulgarian-Greek relations, Soviet
ambassador Sergeyev in Athens
began a series of friendly of-
ficial overtures which immedi-
ately placed Soviet-Greek re-
lations on a new plane.
In a conversation with
Greek foreign minister Stephan-
opoulos, Sergeyev referred to
the "new spirit" emanating from
Stalinist dogmatism and encour-
age an attitude of real co-
operation among all elements
of the Polish party. This
presumably would improve Soviet
control over the party and
make the local regime more
stable.
The way would then be
opened for creating the appear-
ance of greater independence
for Poland and permitting the
party to adopt a policy of
building Socialism in accordance
with local conditions and
national traditions.
the Soviet-Yugoslav talks and
offered to use Soviet influence
toward a settlement of Greek
financial claims against Bul-
garia and Rumania as a contribu-
tion toward a general improve-
ment of Soviet bloc-Greek rela-
tions.
The USSR has also indicated
a willingness to make an effort
to expand trade with Greece.
On 16 June Sergeyev gave a
dinner at the Soviet embassy in
honor of Stephanopoulos--the
first time a Greek foreign
minister had been so honored
since the end of World War II.
During the dinner, the Soviet
ambassador chided the Greeks
for remaining "cold and inflex-
ible,"
Among other complaints,
Sergeyev mentioned difficulties
in getting visas for Soviet
personnel, Greece's failure to
respond to the USSR's sugges-
tion for an exchange of parlia-
mentary delegations, and the
lack of Greek efforts to im-
prove relations with the Satel-
lites.
Sergeyev again gave Stephan-
opoulos the impression that the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
USSR would mediate economic dis-
putes. He also reiterated
assurances of Soviet support on
the Cyprus issue.
Despite these Soviet blan-
dishments, Greece is not likely
to effect a rapprochement with
Moscow which would impair its
relations with the West. Ac-
cording to a recent report,
however, Stephanopoulos is
advocating in the highest
government circles the explora-
tion of all Soviet overtures for
any possible Greek advantage.
Stephanopoulos is reported
to believe that such an attitude
might lead to an improvement in
Greek-Soviet relations without
damaging Greek ties with the
West; in addition, he would use
the threat of a Greek-Soviet
rapprochement as a means of ex-
torting increased American aid
to Greece.
The American embassy in
Athens comments that Moscow
apparently wants to induce the
Soviet-Japanese Negotiations
Japanese and Soviet nego-
tiators exchanged views at a
lengthy session on 21 June and
decided to meet twice weekly
as originally planned. Despite
reports that the USSR would
make Japanese neutrality the
price of a settlement and rumors
that the Japanese might move to
halt the talks, it is probable
that both sides intend eventually
to compromise.
At the 14 June meeting, the
USSR had presented a draft
treaty generally patterned after
the amendments to the Japanese
peace treaty which the USSR
proposed at San Francisco in
1951.
hope in Greece of a favorable
resolution Of Greek financial
claims against Satellite states
as a stalking horse for establish-
ing friendlier Greek-Soviet re-
lations.
Initial Soviet successes,
the embassy believes, may lead
to the promotion of the respect-
ability of Communist-front or-
ganizations in Greece and might
ultimately weaken Greek vigilance
toward Communist subversive
activities.
The most important result
the USSR may hope to achieve
through its intensified atten-
tion to Athens is that Greece
might. ultimately be "neutralized."
As a part of a broader
European security scheme Moscow
might even plan to offer a pro-
posal for creating a Balkan bloc
that would include Yugoslavia,
Greece, at least one Satellite
and possibly Turkey.
The principal terms of the
draft treaty included: mutual
agreement on nonaggression and
noninterference in domestic af-
fairs; nonparticipation by the
Japanese in any alliance di-
rected against a power that
fought Japan in World War II;
Japanese recognition of Soviet
sovereignty over Soviet-held
former Japanese territory;
mutual relinquishment of war
damage and reparations claims;
restriction of the naval navi-
gation of the straits adjacent
to Japan to military vessels of
the nations bordering the Japan
Sea; Soviet support for Japan's
admission to the UN; and provi-
sion for cultural exchanges
and future commercial relations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENLE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
Japanese dele-
gate Matsumoto told
Soviet negotiator
Malik he was unable
to discuss the So-
viet draft as long as
the problem of Japa-
nese internees re-
mained unsettled.
Malik's reply that
normalization of re-
lations must come
first, after which
the USSR would con-
sider substantive
points, was unaccept-
able to the Japanese
and the meeting
ended.
The Japanese
Foreign Ministry
leaked the Soviet
peace terms to the
press in an effort
to educate the pub-
lic as to Moscow's
true intentions.
The press was generally
critical of the Soviet pro-
posals; Malik's assertion
that all Japanese prisoners
except war criminals had been
returned provoked public anger.
The general optimism created
by Prime Minister Hatoyama's
glib promises of easy negotia-
tions were deflated by the
harsh terms.
The repatriation issue
has long been charged with
emotion for the Japanese
people, and the government
would have public support
should the negotiations break
down on this problem.
The Foreign Ministry,
however, regards the Soviet
proposals as an opening posi-
tion, and believes a compro-
mise on repatriation will
be reached. It foresees long
and tough negotiations. Prime
Minister Hatoyama's commitment
to achieve a "diplomatic suc-
cess" will militate against
Japan holding out for a com-
plete settlement on all issues.
The Soviet proposals on
nonaggression, nonparticipa-
tion in alliances and re-
strictions on naval naviga-
tion indicate Soviet efforts
to obtain Japan's neutraliza-
tion.
The prospects still
appear favorable for a
limited settlement, possibly
embodying an end of the
state of war, restoration of
diplomatic relations, and
the postponement of the
more controversial issues.
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3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
The UN Membership Question
Hope for an early break
in the five-year deadlock on
the UN membership question has
risen in United Nations cir-
cles since the sigping.on 15, May
of the Austrian state treaty,
which endorsed UN membership
for Austria. Most countries
expect that unofficial talks
among the Big Four foreign min-
isters at the current San Fran-
cisco commemorative session will
lead to some agreement on the
membership problem.
Twenty-one applications
for UN membership are pending
before the Security Council.
The USSR has vetoed the
admission of 14 states--Austria,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya,
Nepal, Portugal and Vietnam.
. The Western majority in the
Security Council has blocked
the admission of the seven
Soviet-sponsored candidates--
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Mongolia, North Korea, North
'Vietnam, and Rumania.
The desire among the appli-
cants as well as other UN mem-
bers to break this deadlock has
led to increased pressure on the
Western powers to accept some
form of a "package" proposal.
The "package" plan has been the
USSR's stock answer to the mem-
bership problem.
Belaunde, the Peruvian
chairman of the UN Committee
of Good Offices on the Admis-
sion of New Members, on 10
May suggested to Ambassador
Lodge a new compromise plan.
Under this plan, the Security
Council would vote on each mem-
bership application separately,
but the voting would be pre-
ceded by a gentlemen's agree-
ment among the Big Four on which
countries were to be admitted.
Belaunde told Lodge on 1
June that Soviet UN delegate
Sobolev had twice indicated
interest in a "concrete" pro-
posal on membership.
However, according to press
reports from San Francisco,
Molotov on 22 June countered
Belaunde's approach with another
package involving admission of
the "peace treaty states,"
Austria, Finland, Italy, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania.
Uneasiness among the ap-.
plicants over which countries
might be admitted to the UN has
already resulted in diplomatic
representations. The Italian
UN observer told Ambassador
Lodge on 18 May that he believed
it would create a very bad im-
pression in Italy if Austria
were admitted and Italy were note
The Spanish UN observer
told Ambassador Wadsworth on 16
June that his government would
be "gravely embarrassed" if
Austria and Italy were admitted
without Spain.
British foreign secretary
Macmillan has indicated his in-
terest in discussing membership
on a "philosophical" basis and
in exploring the possibility of
a Security Council meeting on
Austria's application after the
San Francisco session.
time.
If the USSR continues to
hold out for a package deal,
an early Security Council meet-
ing would be futile, since the
Western powers are firmly op-
posed to such a deal at this
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WhSit:RN (. S. S. R.
ESTABLISHED AND NEW WHEAT
PROD!JCING AREAS
Progress Report on
Soviet Agriculture
Party first secretary
Khrushchev told a recent con-
ference of Baltic agricultural
workers that 49,000,000 acres
had been sown this spring in
the "new lands" of western
Siberia and Kazakhstan, and
that corn planting was 2,000,-
000 acres over the target
of 40,000,000 acres. The total
sown area of collective and
state farms was reported to
have been increased 52,500,000
acres over last year.
These achievements repre-
sent substantial progress to-
ward the "new lands" goal of
50,000,000 acres under culti-
vation this year and 70,000,000
to 75,000,000 by 1956, and to-
ward the corn acreage goal of
not less than 70,000,000 acres
by 1960.
The fall and winter pre-
cipitation in most of the USSR
was relatively favorable.
Spring rainfall in the "new
lands" area of Siberia and
Kazakhstan, however, has.been
less than in 1954. American
embassy officers returning from
an important edge of the "new
lands" area in northwest Kazakh-
stan and Chkalov Oblast, re-
port "dry,hot,dusty weather
conditions" there, and say they
heard comment suggesting that
grain was "burning up."
As of early June, moisture
in the European USSR was gener-
ally adequate for agriculture,
indicating no repetition of the
drought that plagued the
Ukraine and Volga area in the
summer of 1954.
Good weather throughout
the summer, however, is even
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
more important this year
in most areas of the USSR
than in previous years. A
higher proportion of the
total wheat crop is to be
grown on the "new land," where
it passes through its criti-
cal stages of development
at a later date than in the
established wheat regions.
The acreage in corn, which
requires substantial rainfall
and warm weather in late sum-
mer, has been increased al-
most fourfold over 1954.
(Prepared by ORR)
The Vietnamese government
is putting first priority on
reaching a new military agree-
ment with the French and is
apparently unwilling to take
a definite position on the
question of pre-election talks
with the Viet Minh until it has
achieved this goal. The army,
meanwhile, is proceeding with
its campaign against the Hoa
Hao rebels.
other foreign diplomatic
chiefs, while the French are
equally insistent that he be
designated "ambassador-in-
residence at Saigon" and carry
over-all responsibilities for
Laos and Cambodia. Until this
matter is settled, the French
say that under no circumstances
can they reach a new military
agreement with Diem's govern-
ment.
Diem's special envoy in.
Paris is asking the French to
agree in principle to the with-
drawal of the Expeditionary
Corps with certain elements
to be retained temporarily
at specified points. The
Vietnamese envisage elimination
of the French High Command
structure and establishment by
the French of separate head-
quarters for the units pro-
visionally retained. These
units would maintain liaison
with the Vietnamese high command.
The French believe they
could soon reach agreement in
principle on a new military
relationship but discussions
have been held up by a disagree-
ment on the title and respon-
sibility to be given Henri
Hoppenot, chosen as France's
senior representative in Sai-
gon.
The Vietnamese insist that
he be designated simply ambas-
sador, in the same manner as
Paris, however, remains
primarily concerned over the
question of consultations with
the Viet Minh on all-Vietnam
elections for which, as a
Geneva signatory, it is re-
sponsible until the responsi-
bility can be passed to the
Vietnamese. The latter:.fully
realize that the approach of
the 20 July deadline set at
Geneva gives them a useful
bargaining lever in the mili-
tary negotiations.
The farthest that Diem has
gone on the question of enter-
ing into electoral consultations
with the Viet Minh is to state
that his cabinet did "not ex-
clude the possibility of some
form of consultation not later
than 20 July." He insists, how-
ever, that "consultations" do
not necessarily require the two
sides to sit down at the same
table; they could, he says,
take place by written communi-
cation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In an aide-memoire handed
the British, India has proposed
that the two-cochairmen at,Gene-
va (Eden and Molotov) request,
the South Vietnam government and
the Viet Minh to start consulta-
tions and offer the services of
the three delegates on the In-
ternational Control Commission
to assist the parties. Diem, who
distrusts the commission,would
scarcely accept any assistance
from that quarter and in order
to counter the Indian proposal,
Britain will press Diem himself
to take the initiative in making
specific proposals. The British
will offer to convey such pro-
posals to the USSR for trans-
mittal to the Viet Minh.
The Viet Minh, according to
Hanoi broadcasts, continues to
put great emphasis on the neces-
sity to hold a consultative con-
ference "exactly on 20 July." A
broadcast of 18 June noted the
approval that the, Viet Minh's
willingness to consult had won
in the USSR and Communist China
and expressed surprise that France,
"which is directly entrusted with
the responsibility of executing
the Geneva agreements,, has not
An official request by
the Cambodian government folr .:.
a ruling by the International
Control Commission on the US-
Cambodian military aid agree-
ment is expected to result in
a decision within a week.
At present, it appears likely
that the commission will re-
quest the Cambodians to provide
an explanation of certain
points in the aid agreement. A
flat denunciation of the agree-
ment by the commission is un-
likely unless New Delhi in. the
meantime instructs its represent-
atives to that effect.
yet expressed a clear attitude"
on the consultations.
This broadcast also noted
that "the activities of South
Vietnam have not so far asserted
a formal and clear attitude."
The Communists continue to
assert or imply that the United
States is. making every effort
to prevent elections from being
held.
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese
army is gradually eliminating
the Hoa Hao rebels and claims
that between 14 and 18 July,
250 of Ba Cut's troops were
killed and that an equal num-
ber went over to the government
or were taken prisoner. General
Soai's forces, originally es-
timated at 7,500, are believed to
have been reduced to less than
half that figure.
General Minh appears to have
abandoned the rebels' cause and.
has departed from the. Hoa Hao
area. He turned up in Cambodia
apparently en route back to France.
Binh Kuyen remnants,, southeast of
Saigon, are scattered and. refuse
to be drawn into combat.
The Indian and Polish
representatives on the commission
informally concluded on 11 June,
over Canadian protests, that
certain passages of the aid
agreement were incompatible with
Cambodia's commitments at Geneva.
The Indian chairman appears
receptive to the Canadian view,
.however-, that at most'a simple-
request for a Cambodian inter-
pretive statement be made. He
would probably view this as a
reasonable compromise between
the alternatives of labeling
the agreement a violation of
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} 5}
CURRENT I1tTELLIGEZACE 'EEKLY SUMMARY
Cambodia's commitments at
Geneva and giving it the
commission's approval.
According to the chairman,
however, urgent efforts are be-
ing made to obtain a final de-
cision from Nehru on what the
Indian position should be.
A possible indication of Nehru's
reply is the hostile attitude
displayed toward the aid agree-
ment by Krishna Menon in in-
formal Washington talks re-
cently.
Cambodian officials have
assured the American embassy
that their government has
no thought of going back on
the military aid agreement.
They assert that, should the
International Commission
condemn the agreement, the
government would hold a
referendum on the issue, and
the anticipated popular demand
for American aid would be con-
sidered as overriding any
objections by the International
Commission.
New Constituent Assembly
In a istan
According to the final
election returns, Pakistan's
governor general will not con-
trol the new constituent as-
sembly which convenes on 7 July.
In West Pakistan, the regu-
lar Moslem League organization,
which supported the governor
general in the 21 June elections,
won all of the nine Moslem seats
from the Northwest Frontier
Province, Sind, and Karachi.
The league, however, lost five
of the Punjab's 20 Moslem seats
to opposition leaders and
independents.
The governor general can
probably count on the loyalty
of Dr. Khan Sahib, running
independently in Baluchistan.
However, he may not control
the two non-Moslem seats from
Sind and the Punjab. Thus the
governor general can be fairly
sure of only 25 of West Paki-
stan's 40 seats.
holds one of the 12 seats won
by the Awami League. Fazul
Huq's United Front opposition
got 16 seats and is expected
to control the nine Hindu
places. Two independents have
also secured seats in East
Pakistan.
The governor general's 25
West Pakistani seats will be
insufficient to offset these
opposition groups, especially
if the five opposition and
independent victors from the
Punjab join the East Pakistanis.
His power in the assembly will
be further weakened if, as has
been feared, Prime Minister
Mohammad Ali and two of the
West Pakistan Moslem Leaguers
also form an alliance with the
United Front.
The 13 East Pakistan Awami
League seats will be dominated
by Suhrawardy and leftist
leader Maulana Bashani.
In East Pakistan, Prime
Minister Mohammad All has
captured the only Moslem League
seat for the province. Central
Law Minister H. S. Suhrawardy,
to date the governor general's
chief supporter in East Pakistan,
While the governor general
may get support from Suhrawardy
and occasionally from some of
the others, establishment of a
lasting coalition is unlikely.
Suhrawardy may also attempt
to organize around himself a
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third force, occasionally
opposing both the prime minister
and the governor general.
The governor general's sup-
port from East' Pakistsn will.prob-
ably therefore be ineffective
in countering co-operation, be-
tween-dissident West Pakistanis
and the East Pakistani opposition.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
One of the first items
of business when the assembly
convenes will be the election
of eight more members to
represent the states and
tribal area in West Pakistan.
The struggle between the
governor general and his op-
position may be joined at
once on this issue.
C H I N A
.:,
Ile
] A M
-AND
4TH,/ PUNJAB
21
Y C f 20 Moslems
,u ~u.lem
/
1 1
p
1 )
K A S H M I R
\ 'NITS
nernLi~// EAST PAKISTAN I
IQ IJ I AS. MAIN MAP
INDIA
58
Red figures indicate the number of
delegates to be elected.
0
Pakistan Elections
0 100 200 300 M,Ies
0 100 200 300 K000e1ere
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Green figures indicate the number of
delegates to be subsequently chosen
by the Constituent Assembly.
Tribal Territories
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
During pre-election maneu-
verings, the governor general's
cabinet associates repeatedly
expressed doubts as to the fu-
ture of the assembly. The gov-
ernor general retains power to
prorogue it. If he is unable
to push through his proposals
for a constitution or is faced
by a serious political challenge
from the prime minister, he is
Afghan-Pakistani Dispute
There have been signs dur-
ing the past week that Afghan-
istan is beginning to give in
to Pakistan in the dispute over
the 30 March riots in Kabul.
These signs include Afghan-
istan's acceptance of Pakistan's
demand that a cabinet minister
attend the flag-raising cere-
mony in Kabul previously agreed
on. Afghan king Zahir Shah
also intervened with Saudi
Arabian mediator Musaid on 19
June to soften earlier demands
by Prime Minister Daud for re-
opening of the Pakistani con-
sulates at Jalalabad and
Kandahar immediately after the
flag-raising.
Now the initiative lies
with Pakistan, which has to de-
cide whether to accept the
king's request that Pakistani
consulates be opened two or
three weeks after the flag-
Israeli-Egyptian Border
The partial relaxation of
tension on the Egyptian-Israeli
border noted since the begin-
ning of June has continued de-
spite minor incidents and
Israeli army maneuvers.
likely to exercise this power
again.
October.
In view of the Pakistani
high court's recent decisions
that the governor general's
powers are more limited than he
had previously assumed, however,
Pakistani opinion would be less
inclined to accept another
arbitrary act than it was last
raising ceremony, by which time
the Afghan government would
undertake to halt anti-Pakistan
religious propaganda.
Pakistan is likely to ac-
cept the request with its own
proviso that the consulates
will be closed again if anti-
Pakistan propaganda is resumed.
This would once again face
Afghanistan with a basic deci-
sion, since it probably recog-
nizes that Pakistan's aim would
be to bring an end to the Push-
toonistan agitation as well as
to the current Afghan charges
of Koran-burning in Pakistan.
Settlement of the dispute
on these terms would be a de-
feat for Afghan prime minister
Daud. The trend of events,
however, suggests that Daud no
longer has a free hand in making
Afghan policy.
It is clear now that "high-
level" talks between Israel
and Egypt will not take place,
but the ground has been pre-
pared for lower-level meetings
to work out methods for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
Preventing new major incidents
along the border.
While Tel Aviv has lamented
the failure of the "high-level"
project, it has become less ag-
gressive on both the military
and diplomatic fronts.
The chairman of the
Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice
Commission reports that Israeli
forces have quietly moved back
their positions to points one
to five kilometers from the
Gaza demarcation line.
On the diplomatic side,
Israeli prime minister Sharett
appears to have been alarmed by
an erroneous report that a UN
Security Council meeting-had
been called as a result of
"rumors" about Israeli troop
movements in the area.
French North Africa
Tension and terrorism in
French Morocco continue at a
high level. Paris has named
Gilbert Grandval, a Gaullist
sympathizer and chief of its
diplomatic mission to the Saar,
to replace Francis Lacoste as
resident general as a first
step toward solving the
Moroccan problem.
Police investigation of
the 11 June murder of newspaper
publisher Jacques Lemaigre-
Dubreuil has thus far resulted
only in the arrest of a former
French police inspector. In-
vestigation of counterterrorist
activity by French settlers
has not been productive in the
past.
The troop and police rein-
forcements dispatched to
Algeria have brought terrorist
activity under more effective
control. Governor General
Both Sharett and the di-
rector general of the Foreign
Ministry gave American officials
categorical assurances that
Israel plans no aggressive
action, and Defense Minister
Ben-Gurion is officially re-
ported to have even denied the
existence of maneuvers near the
Gaza strip.
Although tension may
heighten momentarily following
minor local incidents, like the
seizure of an Egyptian jeep by
Israeli border settlers on 14
June or the blowing up of a
section of Israel's water pipe-
line to the Negev on 19 June,
the current relaxation appears
likely to continue at least
until after the lower-level
Egyptian-Israeli talks are
held.
Soustelle's plans for closer
political integration with
France and for a comprehensive
economic development program
are reported to have been ap-
proved in principle in Paris.
The return to Tunisia on
13 June of General R me-Bruneau,
president of the reactionary
French settlers' organization,
Presence Francaise, probably
will result in increased activi-
ty aimed at blocking National
Assembly approval of the French,
Tunisian agreement.
Meanwhile, Habib Bour-
ghiba, president of the fore-
most nationalist organization,
the Neo-Destour, is presumably
consolidating his support.
Following the assembly action,
he probably will'continue to
press for further concessions
to nationalist aspirations.
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23 June 1955
East-Germany
Fee ng Pinch of Bonn's Embargo
East Germany apparently is
feeling the pinch of the selec-
tive embargo on iron and steel
products imposed by West Germany
in reprisal for the highway toll
increases. As a result it may
adopt a more conciliatory at-
titude during forthcoming ne-
gotiations on the tolls with
West German officials. There
will be no deviation, however,
from the basic East German
policy of attempting to secure
a greater degree of recognition
from Bonn.
In the opinion of the chief
of the American mission in
Berlin, East Germany is in ur-
gent need of steel imports from
the West and might agree to
further reductions in highway
tolls in order to secure such
imports. This may explain in
part its willingness to review
the question of tolls.
The first secretary of the
Socialist Unity (Communist)
Party declared in his 2 June re-
port to the party central com-
mittee that shortages of iron
and steel would curtail expan-
sion of the machine building in-
dustry. He blamed the shortages
on limited quantities available
for export in the Soviet bloc.
The East German author-
ities, moreover, have not car-
ried out their earlier threats
to curtail deliveries of brown
coal briquettes to West Berlin.
Instead they have offered ad-
ditional quantities of bri-
quettes in exchange for larger
amounts of iron, steel, coke,
and hard coal.
East German officials have
also expressed a desire to
discuss present and future
levels of interzonal trade with
officials of the West German
Economic Ministry. Bypassing
the. Interzonal Trade Committee,
however, would raise again the
question of recognition of
East Germany. The West Ger-
mans probably would refuse
to enter into negotiations
under conditions which would
imply recognition of the East
German regime.
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23 June 1955
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
MOSCOW ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE INITIATIVE ON "ATOMS FOR PEACE"
The Soviet Union's invi-
tation to a number of scien-
tists of non-Communist coun-
tries to attend a Soviet-
sponsored conference on the
peaceful uses of atomic energy
from 1 to 5 July is the latest
of several dramatic moves the
'USSR has made this year in the
field of atomic energy. Invi-
tations were extended to the
science academies of France,
Great Britain and Denmark,
reportedly to an unidentified
group in Italy, and to indi-
vidual scientists of high
repute in the United States
and Japan.
The scheduled conference,
in addition to emphasizing
Moscow's new liberal policy in
releasing nuclear information,
apparently is designed to give
greater appeal to the Soviet
disarmament proposal of 10 May
and to strengthen the USSR's
position at the four-power
talks and at the UN-sponsored
conference on atoms for peace
scheduled to convene in Geneva
in August.
The first signs of liber-
alized Soviet policy on releas-
ing nuclear information were
two announcements made in mid-
January.
The USSR promised to re-
port to the UN conference in
August on the knowledge it had
gained from operating its
atomic-driven power plant. It
also offered to furnish fis-
sionable material and sci-
entific aid to five bloc
states for the purpose of
developing nuclear energy for
"peaceful uses." The latter
offer was accompanied by the
statement that consideration
was being given to expanding
it to include "other countries."
Soviet propaganda media,
during this period, stepped
up output on nuclear matters
to both home and foreign audi-
ences. Propaganda for internal
consumption discussed at great
length the potentialities of
nuclear energy for "peaceful
uses," but avoided fear-provok-
ing themes.
The next dramatic move came
on 10 May at the disarmament
talks in London, when Soviet
delegate Gromyko presented a
new proposal for general dis-
armament containing the great-
est concessions to the West on
this problem since the end of
World War II. Moscow, simul-
taneously, denounced the West
for alleged attempts to sabo-
tage the talks and sought to
take the credit for preventing
a complete breakdown of the
negotiations.
By early June, the USSR
had submitted a number of ab-
stracts to the preparatory
committee planning the UN-
sponsored conference on atoms
for peace. American scientists
who studied the abstracts were
impressed by the fact that the
USSR had released a large
amount of hitherto classified
information.
There are increasing in-
dications that Moscow is ac-
tually carrying out its offer
to assist five bloc states as
it promised in January.
the USSR had given
the Chinese Communists scien-
tific and technical aid which
would eventually enable them
to produce nuclear weapons,
but added that it had not given
them either the bomb itself or
the facilities for its manu-
facture.
Radio Moscow announced on
14 June that the Soviet Union
was carrying out its offer to
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Bulgaria and Hungary by deliver-
ing equipment for experimental
atomic piles and accelerators
of fundamental particles. .
Soviet specialists were being
sent to help assemble the
equipment, free scientific
advice and technical documenta-
tion were being provided, and
preparations were being made to
supply the "necessary amount"
of fissionable and. other ma-
terial for research.
As for non-Communist
states, Prime Minister Nehru, is
reported by the press to have'
visited it Soviet "Atomic
plant" this week, and it is
probable that he will be of-
fered some form of assistance
in developing the Indian atomic
energy program.
The USSR's sudden move
to hold its own conference
reflects a continuing appreci-
ation of the popular appeal the
atoms-for-peace plan has evoked.
The conference apparently is
aimed at countering the effect
of the UN-sponsored conference
on President Eisenhower's
atoms-for-peace plan, and at
influencing the opinions of
leading men in the field who
would either attend the Au-
gust conference or who might
have contact with those who
do attend.
A two-week tour planned
for the scientists--at least
in case of the French--prob-
ably will include a visit to
the Soviet atomic-driven power
plant and other nuclear
research installations.
In this way the USSR may
want to put itself in a posi-
tion of offering "proof" at
the August conference that it
is the only state actually
using atomic energy for peace-
ful purposes. It would then
try to contrast its own accom-
plishments with the American
atomic artillery piece and sub-
marine, and the "demonstrator"
reactor the United States
intends to display at the
conference.
Probably the most impor-
tant impression the USSR hopes
to convey by its activity in
the atomic field is that it
has caught up with the West in
all phases of nuclear develop-
ment; that it speaks from a
position of confidence and
strength and can therefore
afford to release some of its
previously classified materials.
The most important result
the Soviet leaders probably
hope to achieve is to persuade
the West to accept the Soviet
disarmament proposal of 10 May
as the only workable formula
for disarmament. This proposal,
which has not yet been negoti-
ated, undoubtedly will be used
at San Francisco, at the four-
power meeting, and at the Au-
gust conference as one of the
foremost of the recent Soviet
"innovations" for peace.
There is -little reason to
doubt that the Soviet leaders
fully appreciate the destruc-
tive power of nuclear explo-
sions as well as the effects
of radioactive fall-out.
Although the Soviet lead-
ers would undoubtedly like to
avoid the heavy expenditures
required for the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, there is lit-
tle likelihood that they will
cease to expand their program
until they are assured that
they can have relative secu-
city without it. Should the
USSR achieve even a partial
agreement on disarmament with
the West, however, it might be
willing to curtail production
of weapons and concentrate on
developing nuclear energy for
purposes described as "peaceful"
but which would have military
potentialities at least in
research.
In the long run Moscow
probably hopes, through
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negotiations and psychological
warfare, to make it politically
impossible for the United
States to use nuclear weapons
except in retaliation to such
an attack oy the USSR.
The new Soviet disarma-
ment proposal is more flexible
than any previous one and Mos-
cow may, as the proposal im-
plies, intend to make actual
concessions in the way of set-
ting up a "control mechanism."
There are no indications, how-
ever, that the USSR is yet
ready to submit to a far-reaching
system of controls as advocated
by the West, which would in-
clude free access by interna-
tional inspection teams to any
area and installation inside
the Soviet Union.
(Concurred in by OSI)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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THE COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The long-term prospects
for the further political and
economic integration of West-
ern Europe were, on the whole,
improved by the conference of
foreign ministers of the six
European Coal-Steel Community
countries* in Messina, Sicily,
from 1 to 3 June.
*France, Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands.
Agreement was reached in
principle on the goal of eco-
nomic union, and specific inte-
gration objectives were es-
tablished. These new objectives
will be the subject of continu-
ing negotiations between now
and the next conference which
is scheduled to be held not
later than October.
The difficulties facing
the advocates of European
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
integration were also brought
out at the Messina conference.
The sessions were marked
by disagreements on how best
to proceed toward a common
market, West German reservation
with respect to supranational
controls, and warnings from
French foreign minister Pinay
that there is not at present
a parliamentary majority in
France for "European union."
Nevertheless, the confer-
ence results and the general
satisfaction expressed with
them by officials of the par-
ticipating countries suggest
that the steps taken thus far
toward integration are of such
political and economic impor-
tance that they are not likely
to be undone. There appears
to be a wide measure of agree-
ment with the American view
that the long-term welfare,
strength, and security of the
Atlantic community may well
depend on the success of the
"European idea."
The CSC's Economic Importance
The immediate impetus for
the Messina meeting was pro-
vided by the progress of the
supranational Coal-Steel Com-
munity (CSC) in exercising the
sovereign powers accorded it
by the Schuman Plan treaty,
the impact of the CSC's oper-
ations on the "unpooled" sectors
of the various national econo-
mies, and the need for de-
cisions about the community's
future.
There is concrete evidence
that the gradual elimination
of trade barriers in the two
years since the common market
was established. has contributed
to substantial gains in pro-
duction, trade, efficiency,
and market stability in the
coal and steel industries. CSC
countries in 1954 produced
43,800,000 tons of steel, a1+-
most 5 percent more than the
record production in 1952
before establishment of the
common market. Production in
1955 is exceeding last year's
all-time records and is ex-
pected to reach 50,000,000 tons.
By comparison, in 1954 the USSR
produced 41,000,000 tons and
the United Kingdom 19,000,000
tons.
Coal production in the CSC
area last year also set a post-
war record, and productivity
in the mines has steadily in-
creased in every CSC country
except the Netherlands.
These production increases
have been accompanied by a
spectacular rise in intra-
community trade. In the past
two years, trade among the CSC
2500
o Monthlyaverage J FM AMJJASON DJFMAMJJASONDJFM
1952 1953 1954 1955
0 200
TRADE IN IRON AND STEEL
BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES
1DD ll-l 11 I-I1.1llll-1 if
Monthi average JFMAMJJASONDJFMA MJJAS ONDJF
1952 1953 1954 1955
COAL TRADE
BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES
15001 ! I I I I I I U I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I L i i
Monthlyaverage J FM AMJJ AS 0NDJFMAM JJ A SON D J F
1952 1953 1954 1955
23JUNE 1955 50613-2
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countries has risen 25 percent
in iron ore, 30 percent in coal,
100 percent in steel, and over
300 percent in scrap.
One fifth of the total
exchange of goods and services
among the CSC countries is
accounted for by products under
the CSC's jurisdiction. The
movement of these goods consti-
tutes one half of the internal
and international freight traf-
fic in the CSC countries and
results in 40 percent of the
total freight receipts.
The CSC has only limited
powers over transportation,
but has already eliminated dis-
crimination in freight rates
based on the nationality of
the shipper and has begun the
gradual institution of inter-
national through-freight rates
on coal and steel. These and
other planned actions are ex-
pected to have a considerable
effect on transport policies
and national budgets.
The CSC's anticartel pro-
gram, its efforts to promote
international mobility of work-
ers, its experimental housing
program, and its efforts to
equalize working conditions
are further examples of com-
munity activities which,
although still on a limited
scale, are having effects
ranging far beyond the coal
and steel industries.
The CSC's Political Significance
The Community's High
Authority has established it-
self as an effective collegial
executive, primarily "European"
in character; its staff of
over six hundred regards it-
self as an international civil
service.
The broad outlines of the
High Authority's policies are
believed to be secure, despite
the replacement of its presi-
dent, Jean Monnet, by former
French premier Rene Mayer, who
lacks Monnet's strength of
conviction.
The Council of Ministers,
intended as the guardian of
national interests, has proved
an effective forum for their
reconciliation.
Further experience with
the CSC Court has quieted
earlier fears that it would
eventually acquire a dominant
position in the community. In
recent decisions the court has
confined itself to interpreting
the treaty--a self-restraint
which will be particularly im-
portant as the High Authority's
anticartel program is more
vigorously pursued.
The Common Assembly, with
few powers under the treaty,
includes the outstanding mem-
bers of the various national
parliaments of the CSC coun-
tries and clearly regards it-
self as the custodian of
"Europe" and its democratic
character. Its Christian,
Liberal, and Socialist fac-
tions vote across national
lines.
At its most recent session
from 10-14 May, the assembly
went beyond its legal powers
and took the initiative in es-
tablishing a committee to draw
up proposals for extending both
the scope of the common market
and the assembly's powers in
its development. A similar
initiative in the assembly in
1952 resulted in the drafting
of a constitution for a Euro-
pean Political Community.
TheCSC's Role in Integration
The Coal-Steel Community
has thus fulfilled, in many
respects, the expectations of
its founders. Had it been fol-
lowed by the other projects
which they envisaged--the
European Defense Community and
the European Political Commu-
nity--Europe would have been
deeply committed to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1955
principles for which the CSC
uniquely stands.
(With EDC dead and EPC dor-
mant, the CSC has become the
only concrete manifestation of
the "grand plan" which had
foreseen:
(1) the establishment of
federal institutions exercis-
ing powers permanently dele-
gated to them by the national
states;
(2) the progressive multi-
plicatioai of economic activ-
ities pe?farmed by these insti-
tutions,
(3) the eventual creation
of a United States of Europe
limited, in all probability,
to the present six members of
the CSC ("Little Europe"); and
(4) the reconciliation of
F ance and Germany without the
emergence of a French-German
combine which would dominate
the smaller states.
"Little Europe's" moss
ardent advocates still believe
that these objectives are at-
tainable. As they believed
that the CSC was a "first step"
toward union, many of them
maintain that at minimum it is
now a toe hold, to be consoli-
dated and expanded.
Most of them are aware
that, by itself, the CSC offers
BENS-
Sea LUX
ETRFy, _ _( RWEST
MA
-YGEERMANY
n ---
Europe
May, 1949
23 JUNE 1955
0
E
E
C
Organization for
European Economic
Cooperation
April, 1948
PORTUGAL`
European and Atlantic
Integration Groupings
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
insufficient leverage for a
further rapid advancement to-
ward "Europe"; they believe
that the six national govern-
ments must be persistently. urged
to take the concrete, if grad-
ual, steps which the achieve-
ment of this goal requires.
The Western European Union
The differences which de-
veloped even among the "Euro-
peans" during and after the EDC
crisis over the specific steps
to be taken by the six govern-
ments suggest the obstacles
which this program still faces.
What appears to be the
most notable advance toward
European union since the
defeat of EDC has been the
launching of the Western Euro-
pean Union.
By mid-July, the WEU insti-
tutions--the Council, Assembly,
Arms Control Agency, and the
Standing Armaments Committee--
are expected to be in full
operation. However, few if
any of the most ardent "Euro-
peans" see the WEU institutions
as a vehicle for further Euro-
pean integration.
The French had urged a
"dose of supranationality" in
the new organization, but this
has thus far been restricted
to the surrender of the veto
in the WEU Council on some
matters. There is little pros-
pect that French efforts to
"supranationalize" arms pro-
duction will be successful.
Moreover, there is a gen-
eral conviction among most of
the WEU powers that, in con-
trast with the CSC, whose func-
tions are permanent and contin-
uing, WEU has already performed
its principle function by bring-
ing West Germany into NATO, and
that in any case, WEU should
not duplicate the activities
of NATO.
Many "Europeans" fear that
WEU, which has a broader terri-
torial basis than the six-
member CSC and no supranational
institutions, will sap public
enthusiasm for "Little Europe"
which, they believe, provides
the' only real opportunity for
early progress toward*federa-
tion.
CSC Relations with OEEC and GATT
Many Western Europeans have
had misgivings that the spe-
cific economic approaches of
the CSC are incompatible with
larger economic objectives of
the Organization for European
Economic Co-operation and the
General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.
There has been a deterior-
ation in relations between the
CSC and these organizations in
recent months, and it is quite
clear that in several respects
the CSC cuts directly across
the activities of both of these
organizations.
Among CSC members, for
example, there has been in-
creasing doubt that the pro-
gressive pooling, slice by
slice, of economic activity is
the most direct route to a
common market.
These critics argue that
the best way to establish a
common market is to remove
tariff barriers in general--
thus avoiding the distortions
which arise in other sectors
and the "intolerable" inter-
vention with free enterprise
which they feel the CSC
approach entails.
Since the "general" ap-
proach, however, also recog-
nizes the need for protection
of specific industries, read-
aptation funds, and anticartel
measures, it basically differs
from the CSC approach only in
that it is far more ambitious.
More serious criticism of
th? CSC approach derives from
the feeling in some quarters
that the territorial base of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WESTERN EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC INTEGRATION
AREAS
` ATLANTIC
COMMUNITY
GREATER
EUROPE
ORGANIZATIONS
NATO
OEEC
CE
VETO
UNLIMITED
WEU
VETO
LIMITED
CSC
DEGREE
VETO
UNLIMITED
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES
MILITARY
POLITICAL
the Community of Six is too
small to be economically ad-
vantageous. These quarters
argue that the 17-country
Organization for European Eco-
nomic Co-operation (OEEC),
with a more flexible approach,
promises more beneficial results.
Noting the Advantages of
a European market over national
markets, they see even greater
advantages in a world market.
The route to this, they state,
is not to concentrate on cus-
toms unions in Europe, with the
.protection against outside com-
petition which this may involve,
but to pursue steadfastly the
goal of free world trade and
currency convertibility.
That this, too, is no short
route is suggested by the zesults
of the 10-12 June meeting of the
OEEC Council. The European Pay-
ments Union was given a new if
temporary lease on life, and
definitive arrangements for con-
vertibility failed to materialize.
LITTLE EUR
PLUS U K
VETO
MINIMIZED
MILITARY-
ECONOMIC
ITTLE EUROP
Integration Prospects
In their efforts at Mes-
sina to bridge these cross-
currents, the CSC foreign min-
isters were able to agree only
that the time has come to take
new steps toward the "construc-
tion of Europe."
The most clear-cut plan
which emerged from the CSC con-
ference at Messina was the
agreement on the need for a
"common institution" in the
field of atomic energy, sup-
ported by member contributions
and given extensive powers to
'supervise the sharing"of tech-
nicians, basic materials, and
research results.
This and the other pro-
posals for better co-ordina-
tion of air transport, the de-
velopment in common of trans-
portation and energy policies,
the standardization of trans-
port equipment, and the pro-
motion of trade in industrial
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gas and electric power may well
portend a continuation of the
sector-by-sector approach to
further integration.
Belgian foreign minister
Spaak reportedly regards atomic
energy as "the master-key to
integration," and a member of
his delegation has expressed
the view that after a full sur-
vey of the possibilities, the
six countries will eventually
decide to build further on the
base already established by
the CSC.
The foreign ministers also
recognized at Messina, however,
that the basic objective is the
gradual establishment of a com-
mon market, free from tariff
barriers and quantitative re-
strictions on trade.
It was agreed that the com-
mittee of experts established
to draft treaties to carry out
the less ambitious projects
will also study the problems
this will involve--including
the drafting of a timetable for
the formation of the customs
union, the establishment of an
industry readaptation fund, the
necessary safeguards to protect
specific industries, and the
institutional instruments
required.
So far as country atti-
tudes toward further integra-
tion steps in the immediate
future are concerned, the 1-3
June conference was largely
indecisive.
The three Benelux countries
and Italy were reportedly dis-
appointed by the refusal of the
West German delegation to push
the French to a formal commit-
ment in favor of supranational
institutions.
West Germany's alleged
"coolness toward Europe" seems,
however, to have been more
apparent than real. A spokes-
man for the Bonn Foreign Minis-
try and for Chancellor Adenauer
told American officials on 14
June that his government has
decided "emphatically" to push
all practical integration
measures as a matter of "urgent
necessity."
According to the spokesman,
the government believes that
further steps are imperative
if the existing arrangements
which tie West Germany closely
to the West are to survive a
depression or the growth of
German nationalism.
At his press conference on
7 June, French foreign minister
Pinay asserted that "at Messina
we understood that one cannot
play 'double or nothing' with
the construction of Europe."
It is unlikely that France
can soon make decisions on the
European question, but the ex-
pected emergence from the com-
mittee of experts this summer
of specific proposals should
help clarify the integration
issue in the forthcoming French
elections.
CONFIDENTIAL
se"MPM
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000500120001-5
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 12 of 12
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