CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000500110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

{ Approved-, r Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-0 7A000500110001-6
tOt4FLDENTIAL
5E2R?fi
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 16
OCR NO. 5240/55
16 June 1955
DOCUME"lT rvo.
NfJ Gti4NOZ tP4v4ASS?
[1 DEGLASSt~iED SO
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nEVtEWER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE SOVIET DELEGATION
AT SAN FRANCISCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , . . . . Page 1
The Soviet delegation to the United Nations commem-
orative session at San Francisco is a lower-level group
than attended the Berlin and Geneva conferences last year.
The inclusion of two prominent Far East specialists suggests
that the USSR may intend to make a proposal involving the
SUMMIT CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS . . . , . . .
. Page 1
The TASS statement of 13 June on the four-power talks
indicate that the USSR's agenda proposals at Geneva will
include disarmament and European security and that the
Russians may also raise Far Eastern issues--probably for
consideration at a subsequent five-power conference.
Moscow apparently desires to avoid the German unification
issue. F7 I
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet-Japanese Negotiations: Chief Japanese negotiator
Matsumoto In London has stated that the talks with
the USSR have made "great progress in a friendly
atmosphere." However, at the 14 June session,the
USSR reportedly rejected many of the key Japanese
demands. . , , , , , . , , . . Page 1
Present British Position on Formosa Question: A recent
British Foreign ice policy paper on Formosa
recommends Peiping's eventual accession to China's
present seat in the UN through some sort of "package
deal." As part of this deal, Formosa would gain
seat of s own independently of Peiping.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Formosa Straits: Chinese Communist military activity in
evicinity of the offshore islands remains at a low
level,but there are continuing indications of Commu-
nist logistical preparations in the area. 3
. ? . . . . . . . . . . . . o . . . . . . Page 3
Yugoslav Policy in the Balkans: Since the Soviet visit to
Belgrade, ere have been various reports that a meeting
of high-level Yugoslavs and Bulgarians, possibly the
heads of state, is to take place. Such a meeting would
revive the question of Yugoslavia's postwar pretensions
to hegemony in the Balkans. F_ I . . . . Page 4
East Germany on the Anniversary of the June Uprising: On
the anniversary of the 17 June 1953 uprising, e
popular mood in East Germany is one of irritation and
opposition to the regime. F_ I . . . . . Page 6
Recent Assessments of Top Soviet Leaders: The Soviet dele-
gation to Belgrade,. rus c ev in particular, made a
uniformly bad impression on the Yugoslavs and on
Western representatives. The diplomatic lapses com-
mitted in Belgrade and the personal shortcomings of
the Soviet leaders are not, however, an indication
e e . e s ? e e ? e ? ? ? w ? o ? ? ? ? Page 6
USSR Plans to Enter International Air Shows: Preparations
for ov e r Force Day-and Soviet acceptance of a
bid to attend the Geneva International Air Show demon-
strate an apparent eagerness on the part of the Soviet
Union to display its progress in aircraft development.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Soviet Parliamentary Exchange Program: The USSR has had
some success in carrying out a parliamentary exchange
program proposed in a declaration of the Supreme Soviet
last February. Several Western governments have
accepted invitations; Sweden and India have sent dele-
gations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
South Vietnam: The government's campaign against the
remaining Hoa Hao rebels and remnants of the Binh
Xuyen continues as an antiguerrilla operation; an
offensive against Ba Cut's 3,300-man force may be
imminent. Diem, meanwhile, has announced his will-
ingness to engage in talks with the Viet Minh
regarding elections,but he reportedly will insist
that only a future national assembly could commit
the government to participate in country-wide
elections. F_ I . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
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Cambodia and Laos: The International Control Commission
in Cambodia has decided that the recently concluded
American-Cambodian military aid agreement is in
conflict with the Geneva agreement. In Laos,
national elections have been postponed from August
to December. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Af han-P
an spu e is deadlocked. I I. Page 3.1
Elections for Constituent Assembly in Pakistan: Political
maneuvering and factionalism in Pakistan over the new
constituent assembly to be elected on 21 June is
weakening the power of the government and makes the
assembly development as a stable governing body
unlikely. If this latest attempt at achieving consti-
tutional government fails, the governor general and
his supporters would robably reinstitute oligarchic
rule. F__ l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Iranian Prime Minister May Be Replaced: The ineffectual
Iran an government of Prime Minister Ala appears to
be drifting and its lack of direction has created a
growing feeling among Iranian politicians that Ala
may be replaced in the near future. Page 13
Israeli-Egyptian Border: Prospects have dimmed for high-
level talks between Egypt and Israel with reference
to the Gaza strip. Israel is continuing military
activities in the area, presumably seeking by a
demonstration of strength to impress Egypt and the
West with the necessity of high-level talks. age 14
French North Africa: The deterioration of conditions in
Morocco was mar ed. by the assassination in Casablanca
on ITT Tune of Jacques Lemaigre-Dubrueil, a prominent
exponent of a liberal French policy for Morocco. In
Algeria, the military campaign to reduce guerrilla
. . . . . . . . Page 15
French Senatorial Elections: The elections on 19 June to
replace one half o the French upper house will not
affect the Faure government's status and are expected
to leave unchanged the present conservative align-
ment. As in the April cantonal elections, some
Communist-Socialist co-operation is likely, despite
the vigorous rebuffs of Communist overtures b the
Socialist Party leadership. F__ I . . . . Page 15
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE ODER-NEISSE ISSUE ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE. Page 1
Statements by high East German and. Polish officials
during recent weeks indicate that attempts are being made
to avoid any appearance of friction over the Oder-Neisse
frontier on the eve of the summit meeting.. The Soviet
Union apparently prefers not to discuss at this time the ques-
tion of revising the Oder-Neisse line in favor of Germany.
The USSR might play this trump card later when this ight
have a major effect on Germany's orientation. 0
AMERICAN-SOUTH KOREAN TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The American-South Korean economic talks scheduled
to begin in Washington about 20 June are likely to be
protracted and acrimonious. President Rhee probably will
revive his long-time economic grievances, and will use
the opportunity to bid for a major share of Asian aid,
an enlarged military establishment, a stop to the alleged
American "build-up" of Japan, and an end to neutral nations'
activity in Korea.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS BESET BY AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS . . Page 8
The Chinese Communists are faced with new agricul-
tural setbacks which will probably delay their industrial
development and military modernization programs. To counter
this danger and to maintain exports of foodstuffs, the
Peiping regime has been tightening control over food
consumption in both rural and urban areas. Some open unrest
has reportedly resulted from these measureg.
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SOVIET LEADERS TIGHTEN IDEOLOGICAL REINS . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Since the Writers' Congress of December 1954, Soviet
leaders have required greater conformity with the party
position in ideological controversies, and have increas-
ingly relied on doctrine to enforce discipline and inspire
confidence. The more militant ideological line is remi-
niscent of the line pursued by Andrei Zhdanov from 1946
to 1948. The present leaders have also reinstated some
of the men attacked by Zhdanov as imitators of the West
and have argued for increased study of Western methods.
The regime apparently does not wish to return at this
time to the Stalin pattern of tyranny in ideology,
enforced by purge and terror.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE SOVIET DELEGATION
AT SAN FRANCISCO
The Soviet delegation to
the United Nations commemora-
tive session at San Francisco
is a lower-level group than
attended the Berlin and Geneva
conferences last year. The
purely cermonial, nonsub -
stantive nature of the confer-
ence probably influenced the
composition of the delegation.
The inclusion of N. T.
Fedorenko and B. M. Volkov in
the group suggests that the
USSR may intend to make a for-
eign.. policy move involving
the Far East. Fedorenko,
second-ranking member of the
delegation, is a deputy minis-
ter of foreign affairs and
the former head of the Far
East Division. Volkov is the
deputy head of the Southeast
Asia Division.
Molotov may choose the
forum at San Francisco to press
for an ultimate great-power
meeting which would include
Communist China.
The Soviet delegation un-
doubtedly will reiterate the
USSR's demand for full UN
membership for Peiping including
the Security'Council seat now
occupied by the Nationalist
On 13 June TASS issued a
statement supplementing the So-
viet note agreeing to a Geneva
conference on 18 July. The
statement contained a list of
urgent international problems
Chinese. The Soviet repre-
sentatives will also have an
opportunity to negotiate with
various Asian and Middle Eastern
states which participated in the
Bandung conference.
The Chinese Communists, on
their part, have suggested in
their propaganda that Peiping
would welcome an international
conference--of five, six, ten
or even more powers--to "relax
tensions" in the Far East.
Peiping has made unofficially a
number of proposals for the Far
East, similar to those expected
from the USSR in the "summit
conference."
Peiping has indicated a
desire to define. Far Eastern
issues as including the banning
of weapons of mass destruction,
liquidation of SEATO and all
other Western miliary pacts,
withdrawal of foreign forces and
disestablishment of foreign
bases, normalization of rela-
tions between all Asian govern-
ments, universal membership in
the UN.and "restoration of
China's rightful place" in that
body, and the development of
trade and an end to economic
restrictions and subversive
activities.
that might be considered as So-
viet agenda proposals: reduction
of armaments and prohibition of
atomic weapons, a European col-
lective security system, Asian
and Far East peace and security,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and Communist China's Frights"
in the UN.
This list of-possible
topics is similar to other re-
cent Soviet statements,. and
like them, is noteworthy for
the exclusion of German unifi-
cation.
The TASS statement also
repeated previous assertions
that the problems of Eastern
European countries and the
activities of international
Communism had been raised by
the United States in an attempt
to divert attention from the
urgent problems listed above.
Moscow is making clear its
categorical.refusa.1 to permit
discussion of these two sub-
jects at a conference.
Ambassador Bohlen believes
that the Soviet leaders are
seriously concerned about the
burdens and consequences of an
all-out arms race. He thinks
there may now be a more serious
basis for discussion of dis-
armament than has existed in the
past, although he doubts that
Moscow is prepared to accept the
controls and inspection neces-
sary for a disarmament plan to
work.
The European security plan
expected to be put forth by the
USSR will probably be accom
panied by some of the elements
of Malik's 10' May proposal for
elimination of foreign bases
and the evacuation of troops
from foreign countries, partic-
ularly Germany.
The i1SSR may propose that
Far Eastern quetions be dis-
cussed at a later conference,,
to be attended by representatives
of the Big Four and Communist
China, and perhaps'by other
countries.
The exclusion of German
unification from lists of press-
ing issues adds to the evi-
dence that Moscow wants to
postpone discussion of that
question and perhaps transfer
it to an East-West German con-
ference table. The invitation
t6 West German chancellor
Adenauer pointed in the same
direction,
Soviet officials, however,
have been dronnine hints to
apparently intended to create
the impression that the USSR is
ready to abandon East Germany
and agree to German unification.
Deputy Foreign Minister
Semenov said that West Germany
should be able to dominate a
united Germany if it follows a
policy of peace. Another So-
viet official contradicted East
German party leader Ulbricht's
statement that a united Germany
could not overlook the achieve-
ments in the eastern zone,
saying that no one could foresee
the results' of all-German elec-
tions.
American officials in
Frankfurt see the possibility
that the Communist extremists
in East Germany may be. in dis-
favor with Moscow, and that the
Kremlin might seek to reduce
the unpopularity of the regime
by promoting a popular front
policy. It is at least apparent
that Moscow has been treating
its East German puppets publicly
in a'cavalier fashion and that
they are uncertain'of Soviet
intentions.
The unpopularity of the
East German regime seriously
reduces the USSR's flexibility
on the German issue-and provides
a strong motivation for trying
to avoid discussion of the unity
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issue at Geneva. American
officials in Frankfurt consider.
it very likely that Moscow
estimates a Soviet troop with-
drawal from Germany would lead
to the collapse of the regime,
and that it therefore would
propose withdrawal of foreign
troops only because of confi-
dence that the West would reject
0
(A roundup of information
relating to the "summit con-
ference" is contained in a
special SUMMIT CONFERENCE SUP-
PLEMENT being distributed to
recipients of this publication.)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet-Japanese Negotiations
At the first substantive
meeting on 7 June between the
Japanese and Soviet negotiators
in London, the Japanese proposed
that outstanding issues be set-
tled prior to the establishment
of diplomatic relations.
The Japanese advanced the
following topics for discussion:
the repatriation of Japanese
held by the USSR, territorial
rights over the Habomai and
Shikotan Islands, the status
of the Kurils and South Sakhalin,
fishing rights, and Japan's ad-
mission to the United Nations.
Matsumoto also made it
clear that the negotiations
must not affect Japan's obli-
gations. under the San Francisco
treaty and the United States
security treaty.
On 14 June, according to
press reports from Japan, the
Soviet negotiators responded
to Japan's proposals by out-
lining Moscow's position for
concluding a peace treaty. Ac-
cording to these reports, Soviet
delegate Malik took the position
that the repatriation of Jap-
anese in USSR territory had
already been settled, and that
war criminals would be re-
turned on completion of their
terms; that Shikotan and the
Habomai Islands were part of
the Kurils and Moscow did not
intend to return theta to Japan;
and that the USSR demands the
right of free navigation for its
warships in the straits ad-
jacent to Japan.
The Soviet position, in
the opinion of the Japanese
press, indicated that the USSR
will use the Soviet-sponsored
amendments to the San Francisco
peace treaty as the basis for
the London begotiations.
The Soviet treaty amend-
ments, Which would have a major
effect on Japan's present in=
ternational obligations, called
for a limitation on Japanese
rearmament, withdrawal of all
foreign troops, barred Japan
from entering any coalitions or
military alliandes, directed
against participants in World
War II, and barred atomic and
nuclear weapons.. In addition,
the Soviet amendments required
Japan to recognize Soviet sov-
ereignty over South Sakhalin
and the Kurils and Chinese Com-
munist hegemony over Manchuria
and Formosa.
These implied demands would
strike at Japan's security treaty
with the United States, and ac-
cording to the announced position
of the Japanese government, would
be unacceptable to Japan.
The Soviet stand probably
is an initial bargaining position,
designed to counter Japan's
original proposals which repre-
sented maximum demands.
The negotiations are still
in the initial stage, and the
fact that the negotiators agreed
not to meet again for a week
further confirms that their posi-
tions are relatively far apart.
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16 June l95~
Present British Position
~n a Question
From a recent revision of
the Foreign Office policy paper
on Formosa and from the atti-
tude adopted toward Krishna
Menon's mediation efforts, it
is evident that Britain con-
siders its appropriate role in
the Formosa dispute to be still
that of honest broker among the
principal parties.
London seems to think that
any change in the present sit-
uation is most likely to be for
the worse; its apparent policy
therefore continues to be that
of encouraging inaction.
Foreign Secretary Macmillan
has encouraged India's chief
UN delegate Krishna Menon~in
his effort to secure a '"relax-
ation of tensions" in the For-
mosa area. The Foreign Office
has informed the American em-
bassy in London that it be-
lieves Menon, whom Macmillan
has characterized as "Nehru's
Harry Hopkins," to be a genu-
ine "force for peace" and to be
a spokesman for a large sector
of Asian opinion.
London, however, evidently
does not believe Menon has re-
ceived any real concession from
Peiping, or that Menon himself
has any very clear proposal for
possible negotiations between
Peiping and Washington.
The Foreign Office thinks
that formal negotiations should
be avoided for the indefinite
future, since neither side
appears prepared to retreat
substantially from its present
position. In the Foreign Of-
fice view, Peiping would at
present be satisfied with noth-
ing less than the elimination
of Western power and influence
in East Asia.
The British believe that
Chinese Nationalist evacuation
of the offshore islands remains
the . key. factor in obtaining an
indefinite de facto cease-fire.
They hope that evacuation can
be arranged soon, during the
present "temporary lull."
Over the long term, the
Foreign Office's revised policy
paper recommends a "China-For-
mosa" solution rather than a
"two-China" solution, and in-
dicates willingness to support
Peiping's eventual accession
to China's present seat in the
UN. Britain would wish For-
mosa to gain a seat of its own
independently of Peiping, per-
haps through some sort of
"package deal."
In general, London offi-
cials consider that Formosa's
future independence depends on
whether it can become politi-
cally and economically "viable."
London has shown some interest
in the suggestion that during
his lifetime, Chiang should be
supported as Formosan head of
state by the UN or other inter-
national guarantors of the pro-
posed cease-fire.
Both the Chinese Communists
and the Chinese Nationalists
have repeatedly denounced com-
promise proposals of this type.
The Nationalists can be ex-
pected to remain bitterly op-
posed to any further weakening
of their international position,
but the Peiping regime might
well modify its present line
to accommodate to the-British
view.
Peiping could see such
British proposals as an op-
portunity to make early po-
litical and economic gains,
with a prospect of eventuall
annexing Formosa.
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16 June 1955
Formosa Straits
Chinese Communist military
activity in the vicinity of the
offshore islands remains at a
low level, but there are continu-
ing indications of Communist.lo-
gistical preparations .in the.
area.
EAST CHINA (incl. FORMOSA)
Available Airfield (jet)
Available Airfield (cony.)
Airfield Site
Primary Road -.---- Selected Railroad
Secondary Road -. - -. Proposed Railroad
Naut. ? 5o '2' --Miles
UNDER CONSTRUCTION
}
hingyan
Lgngchi W.
K WANGTIrNG A
CANTON R1 Chenghai
Airfield construction along
the East China coast has gone a
the runway of Nantai
airfield at Foochow has been com-
pleted
Chinese Communist
propaganda has intro-
duced no new lines in
the past week. Pei-
ping's comment on For-
mosa has asserted that
there is a growing
campaign in the United
States for a.negotia-
ted settlement of
Chinese issues.
NINGPO
Peiping broadcast
on 10 June an inter-
view of 2 June in
which Chou En-tai had
restated the Chinese
Communist position for
Indonesian newsmen.
the Chinese Commu-
a cease-f'ire,_,and that
Chou reiterated
that Peiping wished
to negotiate only
the issue of Ameri-
can "occupation"
of Formosa, that
there is no need for
nists will employ peaceful
means against Formosa "in-
sofar as it is possible."
Chou explicitly endorsed
the "good offices" of interested
parties--which he had solicited.
at Bandung--yin attempting to ar-
range'.Sino-American talks. Brit-
ain, India., Indonesia and Burma
are already involved and Chou is
expected to encourage others
to take part.
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Yugoslav Policy in the Balkans
Since the Soviet visit to
Belgrade, there have been vari-
ous reports that a meeting of
high-level Yugoslavs and Bul-
garians, possibly the heads of
state, is to take place.
These reports are sup-
ported by Orbit propaganda on
the Soviet-Yugoslav communique,
a statement. by a Yugoslav of-
ficial that he expected Yugo-
slav-Bulgarian relations to be
the first to improve in the
wake of the Soviet visit, and
an official Yugoslav report
that the USSR had raised the
question of Bulgaria's admis-
sion into the Balkan pact.
Such a meeting would
bring Yugoslavia's postwar
pretensions to hegemony in the
Balkans back into the lime-
light.
The Yugoslavs hailed the
treaty of alliance with Bul-
garia, signed in August 1947,
as the first formal step to-
ward federation. Although the
Bulgarians never carried
through with their supposed
willingness to cede Pirin Mace-
donia, they did allow Yugo-
slavia to establish its own
schools in that region.
Following the break in
1948, all such arrangements
were discontinued and little
has been heard about a federa-
tion and a greater Macedonia
since the end of the Greek
civil war in 1949. Yugoslavia's
alliance with Greece and Turkey
has somewhat limited Belgrade's
freedom of action, particularly
since Greece holds a part (Aegpan
Macedonia) of what has tradi-
tionally been considered "Mace-
donia."
While the subject has
been almost completely buried
since the Tito-Cominform break
in June 1948, a Balkan federa-
tion was one of Tito's prin-
cipal objectives after World
War II.
As early as November 1944,
Yugoslav vice president Kardelj
proposed in Sofia that the
Bulgarian Communist Party ap-
prove a plan to cede Pirin
(Bulgarian) Macedonia to the
Yugoslav Macedonian Republic
and that Bulgaria itself be-
come the seventh republic in
a South Slav federation along
with the six Yugoslav repub-
lics.
Bulgarian and Soviet lead-
ers favored the concept of a
federation, but the Bulgarians
feared possible subordination
to Tito, and countered with a
proposal that the two coun-
tries form a union with power
equally' distributed.
Because of the Balkan
pact and the changed European
situation, Belgrade probably
has no desire to revive pub-
licly any proposals for a Bal-
kan federation similar to what
it envisioned before the break,
but it may have more immediate
thoughts about the possibilities
of enlarging the Balkan pact
to include Bulgaria and pos-
sibly Albania.
Actually, all three pact
nations generally agreed that
the clause in the pact allow-
ing for the accession of other
countries in the future could
apply to the present Soviet
Satellites. In fact both
Yugoslavia and Greece originally
hoped the pact would eventually
be expanded into an associa-
tion of Balkan states.
Yugoslavia is undoubtedly
more optimistic about the pros-
pects for freedom in Bulgaria
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 195.5
than are Greece and
Turkey, and it might
consider high-level
talks with Sofia
useful as a means of
determining whether:
the USSR is willing
to allow the Satel-
lites real freedom.
Belgrade's view is
probably colored by
a wish to have Bul-
garia in the pact so
that Yugoslavia's
independent status
and socialist theo-
ries could serve to
weaken Sofia's ties
to Moscow.
The Yugoslavs
would present Bul-
garian participation
in the pact to the
West as a realistic
way of fathoming So-
viet intentions to-
ward the Satellites,
which Belgrade has
long said would be
the key test of basic
change in Soviet
policy.
At present there
are no signs that
the Soviet Union
would be willing to grant Bul-
garia the necessary freedom to
make it acceptable as a member
of the Balkan pact. Neverthe-
lesp,discussions may be held
regarding Bulgaria's role in
any future Balkan arrangements.
There-has been a rumor
that Bulgaria might again be
willing to consider the cession
of Pirin Macedonia to Yugoslavia.
Such a specific proposal seems
improbable at this time. Even
if it were,made, the Yugoslavs
U M A N I A
BUCHAREST *
PIRIN MACEDONIA
APPROXIMATE OF
MODERN MACEDONIA
would probably be highly sus-
picious of Orbit motives and
unlikely to accept the con-
ditions which would almost in-
evitably surround any such
maneuver.
It seems more probable
that the Bulgarians might be
willing to grant a number of
concessions in respect to Pirin
Macedonia, short of outright
cession of territory, such as
the establishment of cultural
centers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
East Germany on the Anniversary
0 the June uprising
On the anniversary of the
uprising of 17 June 1953, oppo-
sition to the regime is wide-
spread in East Germany but there
is little active resistance.
The popular mood is one. of
irritation.
Food shortages, increased
work norms, and the prospect of
obligatory service in the armed
forces have given rise to work
stoppages and illegal meetings
in widely separated industrial
establishments this spring.
Repeated East German denuncia-
tions of the "Western espio-
nage centers" in West Berlin,
current spy trials and harass-
ing measures have increased
tension in the Berlin area.
Recent international devel-
opments have probably raised
hope among the East Germans con-
cerning the prospects for unity
and the withdrawal of the Rus-
sians. Any such optimism, how-
ever, will probably be tempered
by their memory of the failure
of the Berlin conference in the
spring of 1954.
An indication of the tem-
per of the populace is the -in-
crease in the flow of male refu-
gees of military age to the West
from 139 during the last week of
1954 to 975 in the week ending
9 June. An open demonstration
against military service oc
Recent Assessments
Top Soviet Leaders
The Soviet delegation to
Belgrade made a uniformly bad
impression on the Yugoslav of-
ficials and on Western represent-
atives-on the scene. Yugoslav
officials were reported contemp-
tuous of the Soviet leaders fol-
lowing the visit.
curred in March at Greifswald
University.
The unrest among railroad
workers cause.d,by the sudden
introduction of a new work
schedule in April apparently
has continued.
The regime is stepping up
security precautions and cur-
tailing contacts between East
Germans and the West. It is
avoiding measures which might
provoke the population, and has
been exceedingly cautious in
putting into effect the higher
work norms announced by First
Secretary Walter Ulbricht on
15 April.
Although shortages of
essential foods, particularly
fats, continue, the appearance
of vegetables and grains from
the 1955 crops in the next six
weeks may alleviate the situation.
Despite the population's
unrest this spring, another up-
rising'by East German workers
similar to that of June 1953 is
unlikely. The regime's repres-
sive measures at that time are
still fresh in the memory of
East Germans, who also are
acutely aware that Soviet ar-
mies, numbering 400,000, are in
a position to crush any insur-
rectionary moves as they did
two years ago.
The British embassy in
Belgrade reported that the
Yugoslavs had a strong feel-
ing that the Soviet delegation
was composed of "uncouth second-
raters," and that Tito stood
head and shoulders above any of
the Soviet representatives.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
The Yugoslavs were also said
to be dismayed by the con-
tinued inflexibility and
Stalinist cast of Soviet think-
ing.
believe that neither Khrush-
chev nor Bulganin displayed
qualities of leadership in
Belgrade.
Soviet visit caused the
Yugoslavs to realize how much
they had grown in intellectual
stature and broad-mindedness
since the 1948 break and how
deep the gulf had become be-
tween the two parties in
their thinking, knowledge of
the world,and manners.
Khrushchev, he said,
looked like one of those
" hornyhanded . miners who
receives a gold watch from
his pals and boss following
30 years of toil, while
Bulganin looked like a petty
bureaucrat of tsarist days.
These men, he said, "are
not the heirs of Stalin,
they are the legacy."
Ambassador Bohlen has
commented, following at-
tendance at the Soviet re-
ception for Nehru, that the
more the top Soviet leaders
are seen, the less impres-
sive they become. Bohlen
feels that, with the ex-
ception of Malenkov, who
gives the impression of
,superior quality even in
eclipse, and Molotov, who
perhaps because of his ex-
perience gives the impres-
sion of greater dignity and
capability, there is not
one of the present presid-
ium members vo appears
to have outst,ding per-
sonal qualitj..,~;:.: or abilities.
The unfavorable reaction
produced by the Soviet leaders
in Belgrade was probably due
partly to the uninhibited,
headlong style in which Khrush-
chev pl.yed his new role. It
provided a sharp contrast to
the calculated reserve of -
Stalin, who kept himself from
close scrutiny.
Khrushchev undoubtedly
displayed diplomatic inepti-
tude at Belgrade, but this
quality is not likely to cause
his decline,. His position will
probably be ' little?affected by
the Belgrade performance.
It would be equally unsafe
to conclude that, since individ-
ua.l . Soviet leaders may lack pol-
ish'and do not always fit'the
Western picture of skillful lead-
ership, Soviet policy is in in-
competent hands.
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USSR Plans to Enter
International Air --'Shows
The Soviet Union has seemed
in the past two months to be
seeking greater international
publicity for its achievements
in aircraft design.
Recent developments have
included: continuation of
fly-bys in Moscow following
cancellation of the May Day.
fly-by, preparations for the
annual Soviet Air Force Day
-air show in Moscow, Soviet
acceptance of a bid to this
year's International Air Show
at Geneva, and an announcement
of the USSR's intention to
participate in the 1956 Canadian
International Air Show.
Soviet officials in Bern
have accepted an Invitation to
the International Air Show
scheduled for 24 June-17 July
at Geneva. The secretary of the
Soviet legation earlier indica-
ted that the USSR might send
MIG jet fighters. He questioned
suitability of the Geneva air-
port for Soviet jet bombers, and
stated that, if unable to land,
the bombers might overfly the
field.
The Soviet ambassador to
Canada, D. S. Chuvakhin, on 21
May declined an invitation to
this year's Canadian Internation-
Soviet Parliamentary
xc ange rogram
The USSR has had some suc-
cess in carrying out the parlia-
mentary exchange program pro-
posed in a declaration of the
Supreme Soviet last February.
Several Western governments have
accepted invitations; Sweden and
India have sent delegations.
No Western leader has yet
been invited to address the
Supreme Soviet, however, in
al Air Show in Toronto but
stated that the USSR would par-
ticipate in next year's show.
The Soviet intention to partici-
pate in 1956 was reiterated by
the leader of a delegation of
Soviet engineers attending the,
Toronto Trade Fair.
The Moscow fly-bys of 5
and 7 May following cancella-
tion of the May Day air show may
also reflect a Soviet desire to
show off new aircraft. Prepara-
tions have already begunfor the
annual. Air Force Day air show,
apparently scheduled for 19 June.
E
The Soviet engineers in
Toronto delcared that this year's
show will include "models more
advanced than those seen before"
which "will make American air-
power look obsolete." They in-
dicated that the 'show would in-
clude aircraft not observed in
the Moscow fly-bys of April
and May.
However, only one new type,
a large helicopter resembling
the American H-16, was noted in
the practice fly-bys on 7 and 13
June which included jet medium
and heavy bombers plus the two
new fighter types previously ob-
past Soviet practice.
served. Some aircraft prototypes
may participate in the Moscow
demonstration, in accordance with
spite of inclusion in the decla-.,
ration of a reference to exchange
of ".speeches made by parlia-
mentary delegations-of one
country in. the parliament of.
the other."
Belgium, France, West ,
Germany, Yugoslavia, Norway,
and Iceland have promised .
to send delegations to Mos-
cow.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
No affirmative reaction has
been reported from the other
countries which were invited.
The leader of the 12-man
Indian parliamentary delega-
tion which toured the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia said on
his return to New Delhi on 13
June that "the desire of the
USSR for peace seems genuine
and sincere."
The USSR probably hoped
when it set up this program
that members of the Supreme
Soviet could give just this
impression to members of
other parliaments, under-
cover of friendly discussion
of common legislative prob-
lems. This may have appeared
to be a more direct means
than the usual appeal to
"peace-loving people" to bring
pressure on Western govern-
ments against co-operating
with American foreign policies.
The government's campaign
against the remaining Hoa Hao
rebels and remnants of the
Binh Xuyen continues as an an-
tiguerrilla operation; an of-
fensive against Ba Cut's 3,300-
man force may be imminent.
Diem, meanwhile, has an-
nounced his willingness to en-
gage in talks with the Viet
Minh regarding elections, but
he reportedly will insist that
only a future national assembly
could commit the government to
participate in country-wide
elections.
Ba Cut and General Soai
have been declared outlaws and
their property ordered seized.
The government hopes that con-
tinued military pressure will
induce most of the Hoa Hao
troops to turn themselves in.
Four understrength battalions
of General Soai have reportedly
already done so.
Should the army press an
attack on Ba Cut's men, as is re-
ported likely, Ba Cut may move
his troops into Cambodia where
they would create problems for
the Cambodian security forces.
The Hoa Hao rebels, however,
could not long maintain them-
selves as a unit in a hostile
.countryside.
According to one report,
some 200 Viet Minh officers and
noncoms have joined Binh Xuyen
remnants southeast of Saigon.
A Viet Minh-Binh Xuyen tie-up
would make the government's
security operations more diffi-
cult but there are not believed
to be any large number of Viet
Minh personnel in or near the
area to which the Binh Xuyen
has retreated.
Meanwhile, Diem has an-
nounced his willingness to en-
ter into talks with the Viet
Minh on the subject of elections.
In entering such talks, Diem's
motive would be to undercut
Viet Minh charges of Geneva
violations.
A government spokesman
has said that South Vietnam
would not commit itself to par-
ticipate in elections without
elaborate guarantees of free
voting and the results of any
preliminary discussions would
have to be submitted for ap-
proval to a future national
assembly.
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Diem's under secretary of
state, Nguyen Huu Chau, left
Saigon for Paris on 8 June.
the hoped to reach an
agreement in principle with
the French on.the status of
French Union forces in Vietnam
within 10 days. If the French
demur, Chau said, the Vietnam-
ese contemplate publishing a
note they recently handed the
French.
Diem has insisted that a
new status for the French Ex-
peditionary Corps must be ne-
gotiated before Vietnamese
policy on all-Vietnam elec-
tions can be defined. If this
is achieved, Diem believes the
next step is to get
explicit assurances
from France and Brit-
ain as well as the
United States that
they will give full
support to the Viet-
namese.
Chau will re-
portedly try to get
French views on this
subject while in
Paris and may go to
London before he re-
turns.
In a Hanoi broadcast of
14 July, Viet Minh vice pre-
mier Pham Van Dong was quoted
as citing the holding of a con-
sultative conference to pre-
pare for the elections as "the
most important problem in sight
for the whole Vietnamese
people."
The vice premier insisted
the conference must open "ex-
actly on 20 July as provided
by the Geneva agreement."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
Cambodia and Laos
The International Control
Commission in Cambodia has de-
termined, by a two-to-one vote,
that the recently concluded
American-Cambodian military aid
agreement is in conflict with
the Geneva agreement.
In general terms, the
Indian and Polish members of
the commission have interpreted
certain passages in the bilat-
eral agreement as implying a
military alliance aligning
Cambodia with the Western bloc.
The commission plans
further discussions to establish
more clearly these alleged con-
traventions of the Geneva terms
and to decide on a course of
action.
The Canadian member, who
has argued strongly in the mi-
nority, plans to insist that
nothing more is required than
an interpretive statement from
the Cambodian government. Other
possible steps, for which the
Polish delegate is expected to
argue strongly, are a protest
to the Cambodian government and
a formal report of violation to
the Geneva powers, or a request
for formal amendment of the mili-
tary aid agreement.
han-Pakistani Dispute
Ithe Afghan-Pakistani dis-
pute is deadlocked.
Afghanistan refuses to ac-
cede to Pakistan's demand that
the Afghan foreign minister be
present at the flag-raising cere-
mony in Kabul--presumably to
The Indian chairman as
usual holds the key to the com-
mission's final decision.
The Cambodian government,
particularly sensitive to foreign
criticism, can be expected to
view any protest from the com-
mission as another instance of
unwarranted meddling in its in-
ternal affairs.
In Laos, the assembly and
the royal council voted almost
unanimously to postpone the na-
tional elections, previously
scheduled for August, to 25 De-
cember.
This postponement provides
both the royal government and
the Pathet Lao with additional
time in which to prepare for the
elections, and the advantages
to either side appear in this
respect about equal. However,
there will also be additional
time for Premier Katay, en-
couraged by the International
Control Commission, to pursue
negotiations for a political
settlement with the Pathet Lao--
negotiations which are unlikely
to prove conclusive except
through dangerous compromise on
the part of the royal government.
signify the government's re-
sponsibility for the 30 March
riots.
Pakistan refuses the Afghan
request to reopen its consulates
in Kandahar and Jalalabad im-
mediately after the flag-raising,
claiming that this matter is
beyond the scope of the media-
tion efforts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
At the moment, neither
side seems prepared to compro-
mise.
Politically, as well as
economically, Pakistan is in
the stronger position. Ka.ra.chi!
seems unlikely to make concess!.-
sions which might be interpreted
as weakness and which might en-
courage Kabul to retain Prime
Minister Daud and to continue
Pushtoonistan propaganda.
Afghanistan suffers short-
ages of some critical commodi-
ties. The American Morrison-
Knudsen construction company
reports that it may have to
terminate operations in south-
ern Afghanistan because it has
received no supplies through
Pakistan for several weeks.
Afghan army conscripts in Kabul
are restless, and have engaged
in unruly acts. They have been
issued no weapons and rumors
continue that they may be de-
mobilized.
Though there is some ten-
uous evidence that Afghanistan
is receiving needed supplies
Elections for Constituent
Assembly in Pakistan
Intense political maneuver-
ing in Pakistan over the new
constituent assembly to be
elected on 21 June is weakening
the position of the government.
Although Governor General Ghu-
lam Mohammad may be able to
control the new assembly, fac-
tionalism at both national and
provincial levels makes un-
likely its development as a
stable governing body.
Breakdown of this latest
attempt to achieve constitu-
tional government would probably
cause the governor general and
from the USSR, it is unlikely
that Moscow can effectively
counter Pakistan's unofficial
blockade within a short space
of time.
Should Saudi Arabia an-
nounce the failure of its medi-
ation efforts, Turkey, Iraq,
Egypt, and Iran may step in, and
seek a solution. The majority
of these countries would be in-
clined to put more pressure on
Afghanistan than on Pakistan.
The Afghan government.ap-
parently does not yet feel the
necessity of giving in. It may
do so in the near future, if
popular opposition is aroused
by economic shortages, layoffs
of personnel, and the restive-
ness of military conscripts.
Even if the situation re-
mains stalemated, however, the
Afghan government may be.suf-
ficiently cowed by recent events
to act cautiously both in its re-
lationship with the USSR and in
renewing the Pushtoonistan cam-
paign.
his immediate supporters to
reinstitute oligarchic rule.
Prime Minister Mohammad
All, in order to ensure his own
election to the 80-man assembly,
has formed an alliance with
Fazul Huq, dominant political
power in East Pakistan. The
Huq-Ali group is expected to
control about 30 of the 40
seats allotted to East Pakistan.
As a member of the assembly
with East Pakistani support,
the prime minister might feel
less dependent on the governor
general than he has in recent
months.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
Of the 40 West Pakistani
seats, 30 are to be elected
from the Punjab, Sind, and the
Northwest Frontier Province.
These 30 seats will probably
be under the governor general's
control. The other 10 seats
which represent minor states
and territories are to be
elected by the assembly itself
after it convenes.: These and
10 East Pakistani seats, re-
ported in the hands of leftist
Awami League leader Maulana
Bashani, are a potential bal-
ance of power in the assembly.
Absence in Europe of Gov-
ernor General Ghulam Mohammad
and H. S. Suhrawardy, his
political ally, is undoubtedly
handicapping the governor gener-
al's supporters. Ghulam Mo-
hammad is the only political
Iranian Prime Minister
May Be Replaced
The ineffectual Iranian
government of Prime Minister
Ala, which came into power on
7 April, appears to be drifting.
The government has made almost
no progress in implementing its
much-touted reform programs
and its lack of direction has
created a growing feeling among
Iranian politicians that Ala
may be replaced in the near
future.
The prime minister, who is
loyal and subservient to the
Shah, returned on 12 June after
two months' absence for medical
treatment and convalescence.
Ala's protracted absence from
Iran gave wide currency to
reports that he intended to re-
sign. His return and his
formal denial of the rumors are
not likely to change the picture.
There is growing opposi-
tion to the government and the
figure in Pakistan with suf-
ficient acumen and authority
to resolve another crisis.
Interior Minister Iskander
Mirza, staunchest supporter of
the governor general, has ex-
pressed his concern over the
situation by stating that when
the assembly convenes, the gov-
ernment is going to be in "a
hell of a mess."
Although an open clash
may not come immediately, the
Huq-Ali group and the governor
general's supporters in the as-
sembly may be so evenly matched
as to make effective government
impossible. In this case, the
governor general may resolve
the situation by using his
emergency powers again.
Shah in the Majlis and the vot-
ing there is becoming progres-
sively less favorable on govern-
ment-sponsored bills.
An antigovernment coali-
tion reportedly will soon be
formed including Majlis deputies
and senators, dissident army
factions, remnants of the Na-
tional Resistance Movement, and
discharged government employees.
American charge Rountree
says the cabinet ministers re-
maining in Tehran are trying to
carry out their responsibilities,
but even they are getting dis-
couraged.
Majlis deputy Jehangir
Tafazoli allegedly advised
the Shah recently to dis-
solve the Majlis on the_grounds
that it was obstructing his so-
cial program. The Shah later
said he would not hesitate to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
do so if the Majlis refused to
co-operate.
The Majlis represents for
the most part the landlords,
and these, with the army, have
traditionally been the monarch's
only firm support.
The progressive elements,
comprising for the most part
the National Resistance Move-
ment, bitterly oppose the Shah
and his government. The Re-
sistance Movement itself is
disunited because of a struggle
between the xenophobic extrem-
ists and the moderates who are
seeking to reorient the movement
toward the West. The Shah's
policies have tended to weaken
these moderates.
American officials in
.Tehran see no indication that
the Shah has altered his in-
tention to retain most of the
responsibility for the di-
rection of the government,and
they expect continued weak-
ness in the government and
increasing political difficul-
ties.
A prediction made in
April that the Shah's mis-
rule would last only three
months probably represents
a consensus, of the Mai l is .
A former official of the
Zahedi government also stated
that "the Shah is heading
for real trouble."
Israeli-Egyptian Border
Prospects for high-level
talks between Egypt and Israel an
conditions along the border of the..
Gaza strip have dimmed, but the
atmosphere is somewhat less tense.
Israel is continuing mili-
tary activities in the area,pre-
sumably seeking by a demonstration
of strength to impress Egypt and
the West with the necessity of
high-level talks.
Cairo's note to the United
Nations on 10 June accepted, the
proposal for talks, but restrict
ed the agenda to the four points
suggested by General Burns, the
United Nations truce supervi-
sor,and to Prime Minister Nasr'e
suggestion for some kind of
"no man's land" in the area.
Cairo has also made it clear
that it will not appoint a gener-
al officer to represent it in
the talks, as requested by the
Israelis. Nor is Nasr willing
to give a written asurance that
his representative, Colonel
Gohar, will have power to com-
mit the Egyptian government.
These developments have
led Israeli prime minister
Sharett to conclude that the
project has "fizzled out."
Activity on the diploma-
tic level is likely to con-
tinue, however, for the im-
mediate future. Ambassador
Lawson in Tel Aviv feels that
the apparent improvement in
Cairo's control over its bor-
der forces will, if maintained,
make it more difficult for
Israeli "activists" to justi-
fy the necessity of large-
scale military action.
Lawson believes that
a quiet border is to the
interest of the major Israeli
coalition parties during the
present election campaign,
scheduled to end 26 July.
The absence of incidents
would help the parties a-
gainst any extremist charges
that the government is
unable to defend Israel's
border "pioneers" against
the Arabs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The steadily deteriorating
situation in Morocco was high-
lighted by the assassination in
Casablanca on 11 June of Jacques
Lemaigre-Dubrueil.
French officials in Rabat
and Paris have promised a
thorough and speedy investi-
gation of Lemaigre-Dubrueil's
death.
The authorities in Morocco
reportedly will attempt to
break the four-week-old shop-
keepers' strike by forcibly
opening the shops. The limited
strike, called on 19 May by the
nationalists at the end of
French Senatorial Elections
The elections on 19 June
to replace one half of the
French upper house, the Council
of the Republic, will not af-
fect the Faure government's
status and are expected to
leave unchanged the present
conservative, alignment. As in
April cantonal elections, some
Communist-Socialist co-operation
is likely, despite the vigorous
rebuffs of Communist overtures
by the Socialist Party leader-
ship.
One half of the 320-member
council is renewable every three
years, and this year senators
will be elected in the metropoli-
tan departments running alpha-
betically from Ain to Mayenne.
These elections are not a
reliable index of public senti-
ment, however, because of the
Ramadan, the Moslem month of
fasting, was extended indefinite-
ly following the expulsion of
67 shopkeepers from Casablanca.
Since the expulsion, the
tension has become acute and
has spread to all major Moroccan
cities. The American consul
general in Rabat believes that
the nationalists are testing
their control over the popula-
tion and that mass violence ap-
pears imminent.
In Algeria, the military
campaign to reduce guerrilla
activities continues. Only
minor incidents have occurred
in Tunisia since the signing on
3 June of the French-Tunisian
conventions granting limited
home-rule to Tunisia.
indirect method of election and
the disproportionately large
rural representation in the
electoral colleges. The con-
servative tradition is also
likely to militate against any
increase in left-of-center
representation.
Few of the most heavily
populated and industrialized
departments will elect senators
this year. Thirty-nine of the
58 Socialist seats and three
of the 16 Communist seats are
up for renewal.
The breakup of De Gaulle's
Rally of the French People ap-
parent in the April cantonal
elections will not be fully
reflected on 19 June, since
only 23 of the 53 seats held
by the Gaullists are at stake.
Moreover, many senators orig-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
iginally elected as Gaullists
are assured of re-election
under other party labels.
The council has regained
some of the prestige of the
pre-World War II Senate, and,
for the first time since the
war, many assembly deputies
are candidates for seats in
the upper house.
By-elections to replace
deputies who win seats in the
council will be held in the
fall. This will permit ex-
premier Mendes-France to test
the success thus far of his
efforts to form a new majority
in the National Assembly.
There is the remote
possibility that the dominant
parties in the Faure coalition
may use the need for by-elect-
tions as an excuse to hold
general elections in.the fall
rather than wait'.until June
1956.. This would be aimed at
forestalling a build-up of
Mendes-France's forces.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE ODER-NEISSE ISSUE ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Statements by high East
German and Polish officials
during recent weeks indicate
that attempts are being made to
avoid any appearance of
friction over the Oder-Neisse
frontier on the eve of the sum-
mit meeting. The USSR appar-
ently prefers not to discuss
the question now and has no im-
mediate intention of reversing
its consistent position that
the frontier is permanent,
Eventual revision of the
frontier in favor of Germany is
Moscow's trump card, which it
can play most effectively in
future direct dealings with the
Germans. No offer to revise the
frontier is likely until it
could be expected to have a
major effect on Germany's orien-
tation.
Walter Ulbricht, first sec-
retary of the Socialist Unity
Party, warned on 1
June that anyone who
raises the issue in
connection with ne-
gotiations on Germany
"only proves that he
is looking for a pre-
text to prevent re-
unification."
In Poland, high-
level spokesmen have
laid unusual stress
in recent weeks on
the definitive char-
acter of Poland's
possession of its
western territories. 3~'?
Premier Cyrankiewicz
made this point in
his address on 11 May
to the Warsaw con-
Terence which set up
the Soviet-Satellite
joint command. He
underscored the role
of the common frontier
Poland with East Germany.
Moreover, the Warsaw pact
signed on 14 May pledged all
signatories to take the meas-
ures necessary to "guarantee
the integrity of their frontiers
and territories."
These statements are prob-
ably designed to clarify the
official Communist position in
the face of recurrent speculation
in Poland and both parts of Ger-
many that adjustment of the
Oder-Neisse line had been the
subject of discussion and prob-
ably disagreement between East
Germany and Poland in recent
negotiations.
Developments Since World War II
The USSR has consistently
recognized the permanence of the
Oder-Neisse frontier, as marked
out by Stalin himself on the eve
of the Yalta conference.
POSTWAR POLAND - PREWAR POLAND
Former German territories and former Free City of Danzig
now under Polish administration
Former Polish territory annexed by the USSR
0 100 200
as a link "uniting" 14161 16 JUNE 1955 MILES
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16 June 1955
The Soviet position fur-
nished the basis for the East
German.-Polish treaty signed 6
June 1950 recognizing the Oder-
Neisse line as final and the
agreement of 6 July 1950 pro-
viding for demarcation of the
frontier.
Soviet and Polish spokes-
men have argued that concessions
made by the Western leaders at
Yalta and Potsdam constitute de
facto acceptance of the Oder-
Neisse settlement.
Polish authorities moved
into the "Regained Territories"
in the wake of the Soviet armies.
They immediately took advantage
of the authorization in the
'Yalta and Potsdam agreements
to deport Germans and con-
currently instituted a drive
to attract Polish settlers into
the borderlands.
Approximately 6,500,000
Germans. were deported or left
the territories under their own
volition.
They were replaced during
the first five years after the
war by approximately 5,000,000
Poles, including some 1,500,000
emigrants from territories an-
nexed by the Soviet Union.
The present population of
the regained provinces is pre-
dominantly Polish. There are
approximately 125,000 ethnic
Germans in the area.
The acquisition of-the
"Regained Territories" increased
Poland's industrial and agri-
cultural production potential
significantly. The possession
of the Oder River waterway with
its key port of Szczecin (Stet-
tin), added to Gdansk (Danzig)
and the existing Polish port
of Gdynia, vastly augmented
the country's foreign trade
facilities.
Balanced against these
gains, the seizure of the former
German territories saddled Po-
land with a permanent source
of friction with Germany. The
Germans have never reconciled
themselves to the loss of 22
percent of prewar German ter-
ritory--26 percent of prewar
Germany's agricultural land--
and the displacement of Germans
from historically German ter-
ritory. There has been re-
current evidence that many East
German party members have also
questioned the wisdom of the
settlement.
East German and Polish
leaders have sought to play
down latent friction by repeated
statements lauding. the "fra-
ternal" relations of the two
countries. Co-operation,
nevertheless, remains somewhat
limited.
The usual inter-Satellite
agreements calling for economic,
technical and cultural co-
operation have been signed. East
Germany reportedly has been as-
signed dock space at Sczcecin
and plans to make large invest-
ments to develop facilities in
the port. A special agreement
was signed last autumn under
which Polish and East German
barges would be used interchange-
ably on the canal systems of the
two countries.
The two countries
are committed to mutual assist-
ance by the Warsaw pact.
Prospects for the Future
The Poles have frequently
shown signs of believing that
the USSR would one day find it
expedient to return all or part
of the territory to Germany.
They have hesitated to
move into the western borderlands
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for fear their farms would one
day revert to Germans. More
recently,
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the prestige of Polish United
Workers Party leaders who have
praised their Soviet allies for
assistance in "regaining"
these territories.
Polish officials
and journalists visiting East
Germany have displayed a "cer-
tain mistrust" of the permanence
of the settlement.
Under certain conditions
Soviet leaders might revive
Western suggestions made at
the 1947 Moscow conference, that
agricultural areas in the Pol-
ish western borderlands be re-
turned to Germany. Such a lim-
ited offer, however, would not
have much impact.
Western Germans in par-
ticular would probably be
skeptical of any offer which
did not include substantial
portions of the Upper Silesian
industrial area. The USSR
might, nevertheless, take this
course at some future date in
order to achieve some specific
important goal in Germany.
A Soviet move to return
substantial portions of the
"Regained Territories'tto Ger-
many would awaken violent anti-
Soviet sentiments among the
Poles and deal-a severe blow to
Such a change in Poland
would have repercussions in
Czechoslovakia, where a similar
latent fear has existed that the
Soviet Union would eventually
sacrifice the Czechs in order
to gain advantages from the
Germans.
For these reasons, the
Soviet Union probably will not
raise the Oder-Neisse question
at the Big Four conference.
If the issue arises, the
USSR is likely to fall back on
the bilateral agreement signed
by the Polish and the East Ger-
man governments in 1950, and
may revive Molotov's argument
at the 1947 Moscow conference
that these territories belong
to Poland by right and not in
compensation for the lost East-
ern territories. The USSR
presumably would also contend
that the Western allies, by
assenting to the transfer of
populatfons,agreed de facto to
the present frontiers.
F 71
AMERICAN-SOUTH KOREAN TALKS
The American-South Korean
economic talks scheduled to
begin in Washington about 20
June are'likely to be pro-
tracted and acrimonious.
President Rhee probably
will not only revive his long-
time economic grievances, but
will use the opportunity to
bid for a major share of Asian
aid, an increased military
establishment, a stop to the
alleged American "build-up"
of Japan, and an end to neutral
nations' activity in Korea.
The preparations being
made, by Rhee suggest that he
will. not readily retreat. In
order to prepare both domestic
and foreign opinion, he is re-
newing. his familiar tactics,
attacking the United States
and Japan in his controlled
press, organizing "spontaneous"
demonstrations, and falsely
attributing "promises" to
American officials. He is re-
ported to have instructed his
diplomatic missions in Wash-
ington, New York and Tokyo to
"promulgate widely" his ob-
jectives.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June '1955
Economic issues, such as
the adoption of a realistic
exchange rate, adequate pric-
ing of imported aid goods,
budgetary and tax reforms, and
the proper use of Korea's own
foreign exchange, may con-
stitute the crux of the talks.
According to American aid
officials, failure of South
Korea to co-operate on these
issues cost Seoul revenue
equivalent to its entire budg-
et deficit--the primary
cause of inflation.
.The perennial exchange
rate controversy will be.one
of the most difficult issues to
settle. Rhee maintains a
theory, which has become an
obsession with him, that
changes in the exchange rate
cause inflation, rather than
reflect it. He has already
attempted to fix his position
by publicly implying that the
United States has agreed to a
permanent rate effective 1
July.
Rhee told Ambassador
Lacy on 7 June that he wanted
a fixed rate for six months,
believing that this period
would permit him to prove that
a fixed rate would reduce in-
flationary pressures. He
probably contemplates extreme
measures, if necessary, to
prove his point.
He also said that the
actualrate was not important,
so long as it is permanent.
ou Korea w
seek a rate of 300 or 350 hwan
per dollar, against a realis-
tic rate of about 600 to 1.
South Korea will probably be
reluctant to value the hwan
below that of the Japanese yen,
currently 360 to 1.
Even if a realistic rate
could be agreed on, the con-
tinuing inflation would make
such a pegged rate pro-
gressively more costly for the
United States. Aid goods
would be underpriced, thus
minimizing their counter-
inflationary effect, black
markets would be stimulated,
and favorites would get wind-
fall profits.
South Korea reportedly
will also press for unilateral
control of 60 percent of the
hwan counterpart funds, which
are now under joint American-
South Korean administration.
This would permit diversion
of the funds to finance un-
economical projects, designed
for prestige purposes, which
have been blocked:in the past
by American administrators.
Such funds also would be use-
ful to Rhee's Liberal Party
in the 1956 presidential
elections.
South Korea considers
questions of currency stabili.
zation inseparable from the
general question of the level
of American military and eco-
nomic aid.
Reports indicate that
Rhee plans to demand a mini-
mum economic-military aid
program of $900,000,000 for
fiscal 1956--of which at
least $350,000,000 would be
economic aid. This total
represents an increase of
$200,000,000 over the 1955
program.
Rhee is already charging,
through the controlled South
Korean press, that his mili-
tary establishment is inade-
quato,and he will probably
demand that the United States
increase South Korea's mili-
tary strength. This demand
would ignore the peacetime
manpower problem of main-
taining even the present
650,000-man army, which
necessitates a 10-year term
of service for all eligible
males.
Rhee's military demands
reflect a genuine concern
over the Communist armed
threat as well as his primary
objective of unifying Korea,
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which he believes can be done
only by military force. By
maintaining the largest non-
Communist army in the world
except for the United States,
Rhee would be in a position to
exploit any opportunity to
achieve this objective. It
would also enable him to keep
the United States' stake in
Korea high and aid him in his
attempts to exert a dispro-
portionate influence on Far
Eastern affairs.
The negotiations give
promise of being a repetition
.of last summer's talks, when
Rhee delayed implementation of
the aid program for four months
while repeatedly misrepresent-
ing and abusing American motives
and intentions.
If he follows his usual
negotiating techniques, the
following can be expected:
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(1) having no legitimate
bargaining position, he will
stir up as many issues as
possible, and then bargain a-
gainst a promise of good be-
havior;
(2) he will revive all his
old demands, ignoring whatever
has previously been granted to
him to "settle" those demands;
(3) he will remain ada-
mant in hopes American im-
patience will lead to con-
cessions; and
(4) he will toss in new
demands whenever agreement
has apparently been reached.
He can also be expected,
as was the case last year, to
ignore or circumvent any pro-
visions of a final agreement
which are distasteful to him.
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CHINESE COMMUNISTS BESET BY AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS
The Chinese Communists are
faced with new agricultural set-
backs which threaten their in-
dustrial development and mili-
tary modernization programs.
To counter these threats and to
maintain exports of foodstuffs,
the Peiping regime has been
tightening controls over food
consumption in both rural and
urban areas. Some open unrest
has reportedly resulted from
these measures.
The production outlook for
the early crops being harvested
this month in most of China is
poor, but the harvest will re-
lieve somewhat the starvation
in certain localities and the
general food shortage.
The crops sown last winter,
which are about to be harvested,
normally constitute about 30
percent of China's annual food
output. They have been hit by
a series of disasters--planting
problems as a result of un-
drained land, other afteref-
fects of last summer's disas-
trous floods, a severe winter,
and drought this spring which
has affected all of China ex-
cept Manchuria and the Yangtze
valley.
The Chinese Communist press
has already conceded that in
the North'China plains, a major
wheat-producing area, there
have been losses to the wheat
crop as a result of the drought.
The drought in the South China
province of Kwangtung is said
by Communist sources to have
been the severest in 90-odd
years. The food situation there
is expected to remain critical
until after the late summer
rice harvests. Meanwhile,
thousands of refugees and desti-
tute farmers are reported flee-
ing to Macao and Hong Kong.
No mitigation of agricul-
tural taxes in kind or of quotas
for peasants' forced sales,
both of which are set on the
basis of norms, has as yet
been announced.
To combat the general
scarcity, the government, which
controls the distribution of
most of the country's food,
has been reducing allocations
to both rural and urban markets
late this spring, in an inten-
sification of the austerity
campaign.
Rationing in cities, first
adopted on a wide scale last
year, has been extended to
more items in more areas in
recent months. Recent. urban
austerity measures appear de-
signed to reduce the food ra-
tions of population groups less
favored by the regime.
Another action taken this
spring by the government to
deal with agricultural problems
has been the strengthening of
the party cadres, the real rulers
of rural China. This effort to
increase party control over the
peasants probably indicates
that the 1955 fall harvests will
be followed by stricter procure-
ment policies and a renewed
drive to develop agricultural
producer co-operatives, an
elementary form of collective.
To control food riots in
the starvation areas and deal
with other manifestations of
hostility, the regime has ap-
parently strengthened security
forces in the countryside.
Because of 1954's disastrous
floods in the Yangtze valley,
China's "rice-bowl" area, this
year's exports of rice to Cey-
lon--planned at about 300,000
tons--have come from Canton,
despite the critical food situa-
tion in South China. Rice ex-
ports from South China to Macao
were stepped up in late 1954 and
resumed to Hong Kong in early
1954 after an interval of several
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
years. Some 10,000 tons have
also been shipped to the Viet
Minh from Canton this year.
Moreover, Peiping continues to
ship rice to the USSR.
Peiping has contracted to
buy from Burma this year
300,000 tons of rice, which
will offset part of the Chi-
nese rice exports.
COMMUNIST CHINA
Agricultural Problems
16 JUNE 1955
Major agricultural area
Area of the 1954 flood
The Chinese Communists
have often announced their
determination to export food-
stuffs to pay for industrial
imports. They are expected to
try to maintain net exports at
the level of previous years.
Peiping has announced
a 1955 food target calling for
an increase of 6 percent over
Severe drought
I KWANOTUNCO
Refugees fleeing !
to Hong Kong / Cantono
e'F
and Macao. ?h
,I' \ 0C:: ? HONG KONG aix.)
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last year's production. This
goal may not be reached unless
the fall harvests are larger
than normal.
As happened in all other
years since the,Communists came
to power in 1949, food produc-
tion on a. grain equivalent basis
again may fail to reach the
average output of the prewar
years from 1931 to 1937.
These failures, reminis-
cent of the difficulties ex-
perienced in the USSR. during
the early years of Soviet eco-
nomic development, appear to
have been a principal factor
behind the acceleration of so-
cialization and state controls
and the adoption of increasingly
harsh austerity policies in the
past two years.
The peasant hostility
aroused by the regime's actions
is regarded by some observers
as constituting a major poten-
tial source of instability--
unless, of course, the regime
chooses to moderate its policies
at the expense of the current
rate of industrial and military
development. There are no indi-
cations, however, that the re-
gime is inclined toward such
a major shift in its planning.
Recent official statements
indicate that Peiping recognizes
the rise in food output during
the first two Five-Year Plans
(1953-62) will be limited be-
cause of the low priority as-
signed to allocation of invest-
ment resources to agriculture.
Peiping obviously abandoned
hopes, expressed early in the
first Five-Year Plan, for an
increase of as much as 70 per-
cent in food output by 1962.
Actually, during the first
two Five-Year Plans (1953-62)
the rise in food output will
probably not exceed 9 o1 10
percent and may be much less.
Estimated population growth
during this period will almost
certainly keep pace with the
rise in food production.
After that it will be
impossible to maintain an equi-
libriutd without substantial
inputs of fertilizer.
The two principal means
ofachieving agricultural in-
creases in China--the applica-
tion of chemical fertilizer
and the opening up of new land
with mechanized, equipment--will
not be attempted on a large
scale until the third Five-
Year Plan of 1963-1967, accord-
ing to a report of last March
by the minister, of agriculture
to the State Council.
It is estimated that the
supply of chemical fertilizer
will rise from about 500,000
tons in 1953 to only 1,000,000
tons in 1960. At least 10,000,-
000 to 15,000,000 tons are
needed to achieve significant
crop increases.
A modest plan to expand
acreage during the next five
to seven years was recently
announced. The plan envisages
the addition of only 6 percent
to Communist China's present
cultivated acreage.
Meanwhile, Peiping plans
to concentrate on expansion of
irrigation and water conserva-
tion works as its main effort
to raise food output, and mod-
est increases can be expected
from this program.
In view of these unfavor-
able long-range prospects, the
'rising needs of the regime for
foodstuffs are to be met by an
accelerated drive to increase
control over agricultural out-
put.
These unfavorable agricul-
tural prospects, the drive to-
ward socialized farming, and
other harsh rural policies have
led some observers to conclude
that during the first two Five-
Year Plans (1953-62) Communist
China may witness a peasant re-
action similar to that of the
peasants in the USSR during its
first Five-Year Plan. Neither
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 June 1955
this possibility nor that of
a more open peasant revolt ap-
pears to worry the Communist
regime which has already de-
veloped effective security
controls in the countryside.
Unless such a serious re-
action occurred, agricultural
failures would probably have
no great effect on Peiping's
military plans.
The worst food situation
in the regime's history occurred
in early 1950. At that time,
however, Communist China was
prepared to invade Formosa,
and later in the year the
Chinese Communists intervened
in Korea. The food situation
remained poor, although slowly
recovering, in 1951 and early
1952 when Peiping committed
and supplied some 700,000
Chinese Communist troops in
the Korean war.
Prepared by ORR)
SOVIET LEADERS TIGHTEN IDEOLOGICAL REINS
The Soviet leaders apparent-
ly are trying to re-establish
a militant ideological line.
A drift toward less rigid
party control on ideological
matters, noticeable since the
death of Stalin, was halted at
the Congress of Soviet Writers
in December 1954.
The line now being intro-
duced is similar in many re-
spects to that followed by the
fiery Communist Party activist,
the late Andrei Zhdanov, in the
1946-1948 period.
Zhadanov, as the ranking
party secretary after Stalin,
was instrumental in developing
a rigid pattern of party con-
trol over all spheres of crea-
tive activity in the early post-
war years. In 1947, he forced
G.F. Alexandrov out of his
position as director of agita-
tion and propaganda for "tooth-
less vegetarianism with regard
to enemy philosophers." Alex-
androv's successor was Mikhail
Suslov, who acquired much of
Zhdanov's ideological authority
after the latter's death.
During this period, ideo-
logical "deviations" led to
the intimidation of any in-
dependent criticism and often
to the liquidation of the
guilty party.
In the period of rela-
tively diffused authority
after Stalin's death, however,
Considerable discussion began
to emerge on ideological and
particularly literary ques-
tions.
Malenkov's occasional
willingness to disregard doc-
trine in order to accommodate
popular desires--for consumers'
goods in particular--was ac-
companied in late 1953 and early
1954 by growing demands for
"sincerity" in writing and more
consideration of purely literary
values in criticism. In February
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1954, at the high point of
freer literary discussion, G.F.
Alexandrov was appointed minis-
ter of culture, thereby return-
ing to prominence a personal
and ideological rival of the
more rigid Suslov.
In June 1954, Suslov and
the other ideologists of the
central committee opened the
attack on the more liberal
attitude by approving an editor-
ial in Rommunist which cited the
"great and-major I significance"
of resolutions on the arts a-
dopted by the central committee
from 1946 to 1948. This call
for greater party control was
followed by specific attacks
on "the cult of sincerity" and
the works of authors who had
reflected a relatively independ-
ent critical outlook in their
writings.
The proponents of more
creative freedom were surpris-
ingly unsubdued,however, and
some high-level support for
their position may have been a
factor in postponing the Writ-
ers' Congress from autumn to
late December 1954. A clear
resolution of the controversy
was evidently required in order
that the congress--only the
second in the history of the
USSR--would not become a demon-
stration of ideological division.
The list of speakers and
the tone of speeches at the
congress indicated that the
debate had already been resolved
in favor of stricter party dis-
cipline along Zhdanov lines.
The report on the activi-
ties of the Writers' Union was
largely a catalogue of ideolog-
ical tendencies to be avoided;
and the formal message from the
central committee pointedly
urged writers "not to remain
passive from the political
point of view."
Michael Sholokhov, the
only writer to argue seriously
for greater creative freedom
and scope for the artist, was
rebuked by the chairman, who
spoke of his "party duty" to
denounce "the un-party-like
attitude" of Sholokhov.
The resigned tone of
Alexandorv's speech at the con-
gress and his subsequent dis-
missal as minister of culture
confirmed the rise of firmer
party control in literature.
The emphasis on ideologi-
cal conformity moved into wider
fields in January. Kommunist,
under the title "The Sta egy
and Tactics of Leninism," printed
a militant statement of classi-
cal revolutionary doctrine. An
unusual feature of the article
was an accompanying note which
explained that this text would
"clear up the question of what
the strategy and tactics. of
Leninism are." The article
referred to the Communist Party
as "the shock brigade of the
world revolutionary workers'
movement," and Mao Tse-tung was
quoted to reaffirm that "who-
ever tries to fight the Com-
munists must be prepared to be
ground to dust."
Other publications in Janu-
ary denounced those who "oscil--
lated from one side to the other
with the help of pretexts" and
"wreckers on one side and bun-
glers on the other" who had in-
fected the party with "their
filth of theory and practice."
Resolution of the more
fundamental issue apparently
had to await the discrediting
of Malenkov in early February.
Molotov, in his speech to
the Supreme Soviet the day after
Malenkov's demotion, condemned
the "weak-nerved and weak-kneed"
in the USSR, saying that not
"world civilization" but only
the "decaying social system of
which bloodthirsty imperialism
is the core" would perish in
any new world war. Thus, he
rejected Malenkov's statement
of March 1954 that a new atomic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
war would mean "the destruction
of world civilization."
The speech was the most
Stalinist in several years.
Like the decision to stress
heavy industry over consumers'
goods and to increase military
expenditures, this development
was a clear indication that the
government was determined to
react with firmness to the rati-
fication of the Paris agreements
and the growling strength in the
West.
Molotov's speech was fol-
lowed by the deletion of all
"defeatist" references to "the
destruction of world civiliza-
tion" from the domestic press
and radio, although they still
appeared in international propa-
ganda.
This attitude of forced
optimism in the party drew
much of its inspiration direct-
ly from the period of Zhdanov's
dominance.
Citing a Cominform declara-
tion of September 1947 that
"the main danger today for the
working class lies in under-
estimating its own forces and
overestimating the forces in the
imperialist camp," Kommunist
declared, "This was correct in
1947. It is all the more cor-
rect in 1955."
The importance of this re-
newed party discipline in
ideology has been emphasized in
all recent party publications.
Nevertheless, a full
return to Stalinism does not
appear to be intended.
A number of men known to
have identified themselves with
the policies of Malenkov have
recently been elevated in
authority, indicating the un-
willingness or inability of the
apostles of the firmer policy
to revive the Stalinist pattern
of purges .
There has been no renewal
of interference with scientific
research on ideological grounds
as in the Lysenko controversy
some years ago. Khrushchev, in
fact, has warned that Soviet
scientists must not ignore
Western science "under the guise
of the struggle against cosmo-
politanism."
Denunciation of writers
has not yet led to their dis-
appearance. A number of writers
discredited in the 1946-47 peri-
od have reappeared. The at-
titude has been that writers
should create enthusiasm for new
achievement above and beyond
routine conformity.
This position is exempli-
fied by Alexander Korneichuk,
one of the official summarizers
of the 'Writers' Congress, and a
man who may well be the closest
of all major Soviet writers to
Khrushchev. The Moscow opening
of Korneichuk's play, The
Wings, was attended on-M Febru-
aryby Khrushchev and other
Soviet leaders. Khrushchev re-
portedly made a point of applaud-
ing the portions of the play
criticizing Beria and his methods--
apparently anxious to indicate
that greater party control over
literature would not mean a re-
turn to terror of the Stalin
type.
Khrushchev appears to favor
a return to Zhdanovism without
terror. Concerned not only with
steeling conviction among the
faithful, Khrushchev wishes to
secure positive approval for dif-
ficult new undertakings such as
the new lands program. Having re-
jected Malenkov's primary reliance
on consumer incentives, Khrush-
chev seeks to use "the lively
study of theory" to inspire
confidence and stimulate popu-
lar enthusiasm. "Scholasti-
cism" and "routinism" have be-
come the accepted terms of re-
proach for those who do not
find ideology a "stimulus" for
increased accomplishment.
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.. _ ~_. _ ..._
CONFIDENTIAL
Apparently Khrushchev and
the ideologists of the central
committee want to get the best
of both worlds: the stability
and confidence of renewed party
control and ideological firm-
ness, along with the practical
benefits of learning from the
West and allowing for creative
initiative from below on tech-
bical matters.
Whether the present leader-
ship will eventually return to
the capricious terror and crude
ideological intimidation of
Stalin's day, or whether in-
stead there will be a more and
more realistic accommodation to
actual conditions and popular
desires, will largely be de-
termined by the success of the
present policy.
oNF DFNTIAL
ySs+
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