CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000500100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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$ONFIDENTIAL
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(C11 URRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 16
OCI NO. 5108/55
9 June 1955
11
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REV1ENiER:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED
FBI & DOS review(s) completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
SE
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 June 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MOLOVOT'S PREPARATIONS
FOR SAN FRANCISCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Soviet foreign minister Molotov may be planning to
hold preliminary discussions at the San Francisco UN ses-
sion of some of the issues to be taken up at the "summit
conference."
POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES
IN THE SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Recent Soviet moves, particularly Moscow's public
acceptance of Yugoslav Communism and the agreement to
withdraw troops from Austria, have raised considerable
speculation both among the Satellite populations and
among Western observers over the possibility of immi-
nent changes in Soviet-Satellite relations.
SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Following the 7 June meeting between the Japanese
and Soviet negotiators in London, chief Japanese negoti-
ator Matsumoto hinted that an important development was
responsible for the postponement of the next meeting
until 14 June. According to the Japanese UN delegate in
New York, however, Soviet negotiator Malik made clear that
the Soviet Union was in no hurry to conclude the negotia-
tions.
SOVIET INVITATION TO ADENAUER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
By inviting Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow, the
USSR hopes to persuade West Germans that fruitful negotia-
tions on unification are possible. Domestic political
necessities impelled Bonn to accept.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Summit Conference Developments. The Belgrade talks have
provided some clues as to 'the priority the USSR may
give to agenda items and the stand it will take on
Germany at the "summit conference." Soviet officials
have been hinting to Norwegian officials that a.
neutral belt might involve neutralization of some of
the Satellites. . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet-Yugoslav Talks. The Yugoslavs have treated the
ov e - ugos a.v declaration primarily as an impor-
tant statement of international policy and not of
ideology. The conference seems to have reinforced
the Yugoslavs' belief that Soviet policy, both in-
ternal and foreign, is undergoing a. slow but real
change under Stalin's successors.
Khrushchev's Primacy Evident at Belgrade: It became clear
and to the Satellites that Secretary Khrushchev is the
most influential leader of the Soviet hierarchy.
Khrushchev's primacy over Bulga.nin., may cause diffi-
culties at the Big Four talks planned for next month,
since Khrushchev, not being the head of the government,
is not expected to attend. I . . . . .
ur ng the visit o e Soviet e ega.tion to Belgrade
Satellite Reactions to Belgrade Talks: The reversal in
Soviet policy toward T os ess an a, month after
the USSR agreed to withdraw from Austria., ha.s raised
hopes among the Satellite populations for a. loosen-
ing of Communist controls. There are indications
that Khrushchev's visit is causing increased confu-
sion and uneasiness in the Eastern European Commu-
nist parties, particularly in Hungary.
Effect of Belgrade Talks on Western Communist Parties:
The ovie ugos a.v conversations produced. n al
confusion in the Communist Party of Italy
and a dramatic denunciation of Khrushchev's explana-
tion for the break by the head of the "pro-Cominform"
Communist Party of Trieste. The French Communist
Party, a participant in the 1948 Cominform decision
to condemn Tito, has not yet taken a public position
on the Belgrade discussions. I. . . . .
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9 June 195
Berlin Truck Toll Problem Remains Unresolved: The prob-
em of the exorbitant truck tolls imposed by East
Germany was little closer to solution after a
second meeting of transport experts of East and
West Germany on 4 June. Not only did the negotia-
tors fail to reach a, decision on this problem, but
the East Germans introduced a demand that the prob-
lem of freight confiscations be discussed by the
transport ministerse . . . . . . . . Page 6
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South Vietnam: Besides the problem of defeating the
rebellious Hoa Hao forces, the most pressing problem
facing the Diem government is the question of
consultations in July with the Viet Minh to discuss
the 1956 all-Vietnam elections provided for at Geneva.
Diem argues that his government is not bound by the
Geneva agreements as it was not a signatory to them.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Cambodia: In recent weeks, a marked. deterioration has
been noted in Cambodia's internal security situation.
Small roving outlaw bands, reinforced by military
deserters, are terrorizing provinces north and west
of Phnom Penh. Provincial officials have proved lax
in meeting the security problem, and the government
itself has only lately acknowledged the threat.
I ? o e e . e e
Page 10
Nehru.'s Visit to the USSR: Indian prime minister Nehru's
good-will visit to the USSR and the Satellites is
complementary to his visit to Peiping last October.
Soviet efforts to play on Nehru's susceptibility to
flattery will probably succeed, but not to the extent of
causing any change in India's polio
I s . . e . . . . e e
. Page 11
Afghan-Pakistani Situation: The basic issues between
Pakistan and Afghanistan remain unresolved. Meanwhile,
Saudi Arabian efforts at mediation have apparently
led to agreement for a hoisting of the Pakistani
flag in Kabul. A five-nation commission is to investi-
gate the attack on the Afghan consulate in Peshawar.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Syria.: The forthcoming visit to the United States of
Syrian foreign minister Kha.lid a.1 Azm is likely to
delay further negotiation of the E' ptian-Saudi Arabian-
Syria.n defense pact. . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Israel-Egyptian Border Tension: Tension between Israel
and Egypt in the Gaza area has not been eased despite
efforts of UN truce chief General Burns and representa-
tions in Tel Aviv and Cairo by American, British and
French diplomats, . . . . . . . . Page 13
French North Africa.: The situation remains tense in Algeria.
and Morocco. early 10,000 French army reserves have
been called to active duty in Algeria., where more tha.n
100,000 troops are now assigned but where guerrilla. am-
bushes continue unabated. The upsurge of terrorism which
occurred in Morocco in late May at the end of Ramadan has
not lessened. . . . . . O . . . . . . Page 14
French Military Withdrawals Weaken NATO Defense: Fra.nce's de-
termination to preserve its position in North Africa ha.s
resulted in a weakening of French participation in NATO.
0 ? . O 0 ? ? ? . . . . . ? . ? 0 ? ? ? Page 15
USSR Trying to Encourage Neutralism in Italy: Communist com-
mentary suggests a. Moscow hopes to interest Italy in
neutralism and is attempting to arouse opposition to the
possible transfer of American troops from Austria. to
Italy. . ? . . . . . ? . . e . . . . . . Page 16
Sicilian Election Results: The outcome of the Sicilian re-
g ona. a ec ons on June has increased the prospects for
early changes in the Italian cabinet. Premier Scelba is
expected to announce a. cabinet reshuffle or even his resig-
nation during the parliamentary debate scheduled to begin
on 14 June. Any new government would probabl be built on
an a.11-Christia.n Democratic Union cabinet. Page 16
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SIGNATURE CAMPAIGN OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL . . . . . Page 1
The world-wide signature campaign to ba.n nuclear
weapons sponsored by the Communist-dominated World Peace
Council (WPC) is to culminate in a. World Peace Congress
scheduled to begin in Helsinki on 22 June. Although the
current "Vienna. Appeal" ha.s attracted more adherents tha.n
its 1950 predecessor, the "Stockholm Appea.l," the drive
is not meeting with the same enthusiasm. Soviet foreign
policy changes have confused the campaign.
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PEIPING'S EFFORT TO WIN OVERSEAS CHINESE MAKING HEADWAY . Page 4
The Chinese Communist regime is continuing an inten-
sive and many-sided campaign to extend its influence
among the Overseas Chinese, particularly the youth. The
campaign has achieved considerable success and will con-
tinue to do so as Peiping gains further, prestige.
AUSTRIA AND THE DANUBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Once the new Austrian state treaty has been ratified,
renewed efforts can be expected on the part of Austria. to
regain its prewar position a.s the major shipping power
along the entire Danube River. The Austrians have had
some success in this direction since 1953, a.nd success
in further efforts would of necessity involve closer
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MOLOTOV'S PREPARATIONS
FOR SAN FRANCISCO
Soviet foreign minister
Molotov may be planning to hold
a preliminary discussion at the
San Francisco UN session of
some of the items to be taken
up at the "summit conference."
Although the USSR has said
that the agenda for the top-
level talks should be left open,
the Soviet leaders, especially
Premier Bulganin, who has not
previously participated in
great-power discussions, may
want to plan the scope of the
conference and discuss some
substantive issues at San
Francisco.
There have been a number
of indications that Molotov,
supported by an entourage of
45 persons, plans to use the
San Francisco session to make
some important foreign policy
moves.
The Soviet press has quoted
an article in the French press
which stated that the meetings
POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES
IN THE SATELLITES
Recent Soviet moves, par-
ticularly Moscow's public ac-
ceptance of Yugoslav Communism
and the agreement to withdraw
Soviet troops from Austria, have
raised considerable speculation
both among the Satellite popu-
at San Francisco could help to
dispel misunderstandings that
have arisen over the summit
talks.
The Soviet delegation is
unlikely to pass up this
opportunity to reiterate at
San Francisco that full member-
ship of Communist China in the
UN is necessary for realistic
approaches to world problems.
Molotov may make an outright
demand for Communist China's
participation at some stage in
the great-power talks.
In view of the Austrian
treaty and the current talks
with the Japanese, the USSR
may be willing to take a new
approach to the problem of UN
membership in general. Molotov
might propose universal member-
ship in the UN, including ad-
mission of Communist China and
consideration of its claims to
Security Council membership.
lations and among Western ob-
servers over the possibility of
imminent changes in Soviet-
Satellite relations.
There are a number of steps
the USSR can take to create the
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appearance of granting in-
creased independence to the
Satellites without actually
weakening its control. For
instance, the Cominform, long
a symbol of Soviet domination
of the Satellites, could be
abolished without cost to the
USSR.
Such actions would proba-
bly be designed to support
Moscow's rapidly expanding
diplomatic offensive against
expected Western attempts to
make Soviet domination of the
Satellites a subject for nego-
tiation at the forthcoming
four-power conference. Both
the USSR and the Satellites
have displayed extreme sen-
sitivity on this subject.
These moves would also be
intended to weaken the West's
position on such questions as
American bases in Western
Europe, the rearmament of West
Germany and its inclusion in
NATO.
Moscow may attempt to use
the political and military
mechanisms set up at the War-
saw conference to give the
appearance of greater Satellite
sovereignty. With the coming
into effect of the Warsaw
treaty, Soviet troops stationed
at "joint armed forces" in
SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Following the 7 June meet-
ing between the Japanese and
Soviet negotiators in London,
Japanese chief negotiator
Matsumoto hinted that an impor-
tant development had caused the
postponement of the next meet-
ing until 14 June.
Eastern Europe can no longer be
called occupying forces. The
terms of the treaty can be used
to offset Western objections
that the Satellites are not
independent.
Indeed, the whole Warsaw
organization is expendable, and
the USSR may offer during the
forthcoming negotiations to
abolish it and to withdraw Soviet
troops from Hungary and Rumania
in return for the disbanding of
NATO and the withdrawal of
American troops from Western
Europe.
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Moscow may be planning to pro-
pose an independent Balkan bloc
in which some Satellites would
participate after withdrawal
from the Eastern European De-
fense Command in return for the
withdrawal of Greece and Turkey
from NATO.
in the West.
Since the prospects of
Western acceptance of any such
proposals are extremely dim,
the USSR would probably con-
sider that such moves could
serve without risk to counter
Western proposals and to
strengthen neutralist sentiment
According to the Japanese
UN delegate in New York, how-
ever, Soviet negotiator Malik
made clear that the Soviet Union
was in no hurry to conclude the
negotiations. Malik suggested
that normalization of relations
would lead to the settlement of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
other problems; the Japanese
representative replied that
the settlement of problems
might assist in normalizing
relations.
During the past week,
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
publicly rejected neutralism
on the Austrian pattern as
irrelevant because of Japan's
independent status.
Shigemitsu, in statements
to the Diet, unequivocally de-
clared that Japan would not
agree to abrogate the security
treaty and defense arrangements
with the United States in re-
turn for Soviet concessions.
He stated that separation from
the United States would destroy
Japan's political and economic
position.
Prime Minister Hatoyama
has taken the same general posi-
tion as his foreign minister
and has also affirmed his
determination not to permit
negotiations with the USSR to
damage Japan's ties with the
free world.
Shigemitsu does not be-
lieve the Soviet representatives
will use the territorial issue
for bargaining or that they
will return the Kurils or South-
ern Sakhalin. If they do, he
assumes that Japanese neutrality
will be the price of the con-
cession. Consequently Shige-
mitsu feels that if the present
talks cannot settle basic issues,
Moscow will propose a trade
agreement and the exchange of
trade representatives as a
first step toward normal re-
lations.
A possible clue to the
Communist position may have been
revealed in a Communist Chinese
propaganda broadcast on 6 June
which characterized as unreason-
able the Japanese demand for the
settlement of outstanding issues
prior to any consideration of
diplomatic relations. The broad-
cast declared such demands were
purposely imposed by outsiders
to undermine the talks between
Japan and the USSR.
The Japanese government
faces a difficult situation at
home if the talks are prolonged.
Optimistic statements by the
Hatoyama government concerning
the London talks have led the
Japanese people to expect a
quick and favorable agreement.
They are unprepared for the pro-
longed negotiations which will
probably be necessary. Con-
servative circles, including
elements of Hatoyama's Democratic
Party, are apprehensive about
the resultant popular suscepti-
bility to Soviet propaganda.
If the talks fail, the USSR
can claim that Japan's security
ties and military bases arrange-
ments with the United States pre-
clude Soviet concessions, such
as the return of Soviet-occupied
territory.
By inviting Chancellor
Adenauer on 7 June to visit
Moscow, the USSR hopes to per-
suade West Germans that fruitful
negotiations on German unifica-
tion are possible. Domestic
political necessities impelled
Bonn to accept the invitation
conditionally on 8 June.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In accepting, Bonn stated
that it would like to consult
its Western allies. The Germans
later are likely to raise ques-
tions as to the timing of the
meeting in relations to the
"summit conference," and the
desirability of a prepared
agenda.
Moscow may hope to fan
West German interest in neu-
trality by presenting a new
and more attractive unification
plan.
Even if the Moscow visit is
limited to establishing diplo-
matic and economic relations,
the USSR would expect that West
Germans would see this as an
indication of progress toward
eventual talks on unification.
The Soviet invitation specifi-
cally states that normalization
of relations would help solve
outstanding problems relating
to the whole of Germany and thus
contribute to the solution of
the unification problem.
Two considerations are prob-
ably paramount in Adenauer's
thinking: first, the political
necessity of taking every op-
portunity to discuss German
unification- and second, the
equally great necessity, in
Adenauer's view, of retaining
the confidence of the West in
his ability to withstand Soviet
blandishments.
Probably one important
factor in Adenauer's acceptance
is that the trip to Moscow will
clearly prove the opposition
Social Democrats to have been
in error when they believed
Moscow's propaganda that rati-
fication of the Paris treaties
would preclude further, negotia-
tions on Germany. Possibly
Adenauer, in the hope of further
"educating" his opposition, will
want to take some Social Demo-
crats, including party chairman
Ollenhauer, along with him.
Adenauer and nearly all
German leaders have been in
favor of resuming diplomatic
relations with the Soviet bloc
and establishing normal trade
relations as well. These sec-
tions of the Soviet note there-
fore accord squarely with West
German desires.
Adenauer, however, has not
wanted to participate in forth-
coming four-power meetings on
Germany because he realized that
Moscow would then demand the in-
clusion of an East German con-
tingent. A meeting in Moscow
will give him an opportunity to
talk directly with Soviet leaders
unembarrassed by the presence of
East Germans.
All West Germans are united
on the necessity for free elec-
tions as a prelude to unifica-
tion; they are, however, divided
on the necessity of remaining in
NATO. The Social Democrats, while
disavowing neutralism, contend
that NATO membership should be
surrendered in favor of a general
alliance and nonaggression pact.
Adenauer has consistently
hammered away at the theme that
neutrality for a unified Germany,
endorsed by Moscow, would be
catastrophic.
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Summit Conference Developments
Ambassador Bohlen believes
that the order in which topics
were mentioned in the Soviet-
Yugoslav declaration of 2 June
may contain some hint of which
subjects will be given priority
by the USSR at the four-power
meeting.
The declaration said that
new efforts to reach agreement
on armaments reduction, the
abolition of atomic weapons, a
European collective security
system, and the peaceful use of
atomic energy would create an
atmosphere which would make
possible a solution of the Ger-
man and Formosan questions.
Premier Bulganin in his
speech before the Warsaw con-
ference on 11 May, however,
suggested several other meas-
ures necessary to create the
international confidence which
he said was a prerequisite to
a practical solution of the dis-
armament problem.
These included a Far East
settlement, troop withdrawal
from Germany, liquidation of
foreign military bases, lifting
of trade discrimination, and an
end to cold war propaganda.
reasonable to suppose some
countries in the present Soviet
bloc would have to be neutral-
ized as part of a European
neutral belt plan.
The Norwegian Foreign Min-
istry interpreted this as a
hint that Moscow might offer
to neutralize Poland and Czech-
oslovakia, in return for major
Western concessions, presumably
including the neutralization
of a united Germany. Norwegian
officials also recognized this
as an obvious lure to Norway
and Denmark to join a neutral
belt.
The term "neutralization,"
as applied to the Satellites,
could cover a variety of mean-
ings. Moscow has already said
it would disband its military
bloc if an all-European securi-
ty organization were set up
and it might offer to withdraw
troops and military advisers
from a least some of the Sat-
ellites in return for substan-
tial Western concessions. So-
viet propaganda has objected
vigorously, however, to the
idea that the legitimacy of the
Satellite regimes might be dis-
cussed at the four-power con-
ference.
Moscow apparently does not
have any rigid and consistent
priority list for the topics to
be discussed by the heads of
government. During the Vienna
talks in mid-May, Molotov men-
tioned European security, dis-
armament, the atomic question,
and a five-power conference as
appropriate subjects for the
heads of state to discuss.
Soviet officials have ex-
pressed "personal" opinions to
members of several Norwegian
embassies that it would be only
Yugoslav deputy foreign
minister Prica told the Western
ambassadors that the USSR did
not mention the possibility of
German neutralization during
the Belgrade talks. The Yugo-
slavs have the impression that
the USSR does not expect German
unification in the near future
and realizes the impossiblity
of neutralization.
This follows earlier Yugo-
slav impressions from the talks.
Prica also said. that the
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Yugoslavs had the impression
that Moscow expects real agree-
ment on disarmament will take
a long time to attain and be-
lieves that no country accepts
full control over armaments.
D
Soviet-Yugoslav Talks
In contrast to Khrushchev's
efforts to emphasize the ideo-
logical aspects of the Soviet-
Yugoslav declaration of 2 Jung,
the Yugoslavs have been treat-
ing it as an important state-
ment of international policy,
bringing the Soviet Union
closer in line with long-standing
Yugoslav views.
Yugoslav officials have
not, however, denied that the
part of the joint communique
referring to "co-operation among
the social organizations of the
two countries" and "exchange of
socialist experiences" could
cover the possibility of rela-
tionships between Communist
parties.
The Belgrade press has em-
phasized that such exchange of
socialist experiences conforms
to long-standing Yugoslav policy
illustrated by relations with
Western Socialist parties.
The Yugoslav government
has been at particular pains to
continent on Western interpreta-
tions of the Yugoslav stand.
The official government news-
paper Politika, for example,
stated t at Yugoslav recogni-
tion of Chinese Communist
rights to Formosa depended on
the peaceful exercise of these,
rights. It also emphasized
that the Yugoslavs oppose both
continued division of Germany
and neutralization of a united
Germany.
(A roundup of information
relating to the "summit con-
ference" is contained in a
special SUMMIT CONFERENCE SUP.-
PLEMENT being distributed to
recipients of this publication.)
Politika stressed that the
commun qsupported the gen-
eral idea of European security,
not "some already existing plan
for European security."
Moscow's Pravda, however,
capitalized the word "Treaty"
in referring to a European
security system, apparently in
order to imply that the declara-
tion was endorsing the Molotov
security plan. The Yugoslavs
had previously reported that
during the talks the Soviet
delegation sought specific sup-
port for the Molotov plan.
There have been conflicting
reports as to the effect of the
meeting on the Yugoslav belief
that the Soviet Union is ac-
tually changing its approach to
both internal and international
problems.
In the official Yugoslav
briefing for the three Western
ambassadors, Yugoslav under
secretary of foreign affairs
Prica emphasized the continued
Yugoslav judgment that the
Soviet leaders really want peace
and realize that war would be a
dreadful disaster. He also
stated that the Yugoslav gov-
ernment is sure that the present
Soviet leaders recognize the
stupidity of much of the Stalin
policy and that changes are
coming to the USSR.
Vice President Kardelj
specifically told the British
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ambassador during the conference
that he was convinced Moscow
wanted peace and would even-
tually make concessions to
that end. Vilfan, Tito's sec-
retary, reportedly stated fol-
lowing the meeting that he
thought there was a possibility
that fundamental changes were
occurring in the Soviet Union.
On the other hand,Ambas-
sador Riddleberger has re-
ceived reports from good
sources that Tito himself was
disillusioned about the real
Khrushchev's Primacy
Evident at Belgrade
The behavior of Party
Secretary Khrushchev during
the visit of the Soviet dele-
gation to Belgrade and to the
Satellites is the clearest
public demonstration that he
is the most influential leader
of the Soviet hierarchy. This
represents a departure from
past efforts to suggest that
at least the four or five sen-
ior presidium members are equals.
Both Premier Bulganin and
presidium member Mikoyan, well
known for their commanding per-
sonalities, were consistently
relegated to positions of sec-
ondary importance during the
trip. The fact that Bulganin,
not Khrushchev, signed the
declaration of agreement with
Tito was probably a concession
to Yugoslav insistence that the
agreements reached were strictly
governmental and not political.
Soviet attitude and that he was
less convinced that Moscow's
intentions are peaceful.
Tito was reportedly
shocked by frank statements
about the continuation of the
Stalinist line inside the USSR
and by Soviet boasting that
World War I brought Communism
to Russia, World War II to
China and Eastern Europe, and
World War III would see it
spread throughout the world.
a
Any embarrassment to the
Soviet Union resulting from the
delegation's visit to Yugosla-
via would not necessarily re-
flect on Khrushchev's power
position, since important dip-
lomatic maneuvers probably re-
flect a general consensus or
agreement within the party pre-
sidium.
The fact that Khrushchev
plays a more important role
than Bulganin may cause dif-
ficulties at'the Big Four talks
planned for next month, since
Khrushchev, not being the head
of state, is not expected to
attend. Bulganin, as chairman
of the Council of Ministers and
a power in his own right, will
be able to present the Soviet
viewpoint effectively, but may
have less authority than Khru-
shchev in meeting problems
that arise on the spot.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Satellite Reactions
To Belgrade e Talks
The reversal in Soviet
policy toward Tito, less than
a month after the USSR agreed
to withdraw from Austria, has
raised hopes among the Satel-
lite populations for a loosen-
ing of Communist controls in
Eastern Europe.
The Satellite regimes,
maintaining an outward calm,
have officially acclaimed the
Soviet-Yugoslav declaration
as a contribution to peace
and have promised to take steps
to reach similar accords with
Yugoslavia. There are indica-
tions, however, that Khru-
shchev's visit is causing in-
creased confusion and uneasi-
ness in the Communist parties,
particularly in Hungary.
According to the American
legation in Bucharest, Soviet
prestige has suffered "consider-
ably" and rumors are widespread
that Rumania will be liberated
during 1955.
The American legation in
Budapest reports that not even
the sharply increased police
terrorist tactics which have
appeared in Hungary during the
past several weeks have dampened
the mood of "high optimism"
which has gripped the Hungarian
people since the signing of the
Austrian treaty.
While no reports of specif-
ic reaction have yet been re-
ceived from the other Satel-
lites, a sense of excitement
and hope is probably general
throughout Eastern Europe.
The Soviet delegation's
stopover in Sofia and Bucharest
an its way back to Moscow may
have been intended at least in
part to reassure Satellite
leaders that the Soviet about-
face on Tito will not affect
the USSR's support for these
Satellite regimes.
Extensive speculation is
reported from-Hungary about
the possible ouster of first
secretary Rakosi and other
"orthodox" Communist leaders
as part of a Soviet attempt
to appease Tito. Rakosi played
a leading role in the 1948
ejection of Tito from the
Cominform.
Such speculation will prob-
ably contribute to further hes-
itation among party members to
give active support to Rakosi,
whose party strength has al-
ready suffered as a result of
his conflict with ex-premier
Nagy.
The public reconciliation
with Tito and recognition of
the Yugoslav "form of develop-
ment of Socialism" will prob-
ably encourage nationalism both
among the Satellite populations
and within the Communist parties.
It is likely to make even more
difficult the efforts of the
Satellite regimes to gain mass
support for their policies.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 June 1955
Effect of Belgrade Talks
n Wes ern ommunis arties
The Soviet-Yugoslav con-
versations produced initial con-
fusion in the Communist Party
of Italy and a dramatic denun-
ciation of Khrushchev's explana-
tion for the break by Vittorio
Vidali, head of the "pro-Comin-
form" Communist Party of Trieste.
Vidali, in an editorial in
The Trieste Communist newspaper
on 30 May, said that Trieste
Communists were enormously sur-
prised and shaken by Khrush-
chev's attempt to place the
blame on Beria, Abakumov and
others for the Cominform de-
cision.
Now he may be preparing to
fall into line. He said in an
interview in Unita that he ex-
pected a "compleTe clarification"
of Khrushchev's remarks "would
undoubtedly be reached in the
near future."
The French Communist Party,
a participant in the 1948 Comin-
form decision to condemn Tito,
has not yet taken a public posi-
tion on the Belgrade discussions.
The USSR's public acknowl-
edgment of the rights of individ-
ual nations to find their own
appropriate paths to socialism
suggests that foreign Communist
parties may be given an inde-
pendence of action in domestic
politics whereby they could
represent themselves as truly
national political parties not
subservient to Moscow. Such
tactics conceivably could make
them politically more formidable.
There has been speculation
that the Cominform,, which has
become a. symbol for Soviet sub-
version, would be abolished.
International Communist
activity may be an agenda topic
for the "summit conference" this
summer, and the USSR might find
it advantageous to make a gesture
that could be construed as abol-
ishing the international Com-
munist subversive apparatus.
Such a move would be in line with
the acknowledgment of error in
the recognition of independence
in achieving socialism.
The Cominform, which is
largely a propaganda organ, in-
cludes the French and Italian
parties as the only non-Satellite
members. Its publication, For a
Lasting Peace, For a People ssDDe-
mocracy. has been use u .in -
trans-mitting the party line to Com-
munist parties throughout the
world.
This function could be per-
formed by the numerous other Com-
munist publications or possibly
through covert channels, and thus
the USSR would sacrifice little
by the abolition of the Comin-
form. It might hope by this
move to disarm suspicion of So-
viet subversive activities in
the-non-Communist world, as it
did in dissolving the Comintern
in 1943, even though the two
organizations are dissimilar in
function and importance.
The Soviet Union might
hope that the abandonment of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 June 1955
Cominform, and the portrayal of
foreign Communist parties as
national parties, would be a
persuasive reply to the charge
that it uses foreign Communist
parties in fostering a new type
of imperialism.
Nehru, according to Indian
newspaper accounts, will ask
that the Cominform be dissolved
"to prove Russia's sincerity of
noninterference in other coun-
tries' affairs."
Berlin Truck Toll Problem
Remains Unresolved
The problem of the exor-
bitant tolls imposed by East
Germany on West German truck
traffic into Berlin was little
closer to solution after a
second meeting of transport
experts of the two countries
on 4 June.
West Germany's efforts to
solve the problem in discus-
sions at a technical level pro-
duced no decision, and the East
Germans continued to press for
additional recognition by de-
manding that the problem of
freight confiscations be dis-
cussed by?~the transport minis-
ters.
gesture toward recognition im-
plicit in the West German dele-
gation's journey to the East
German ministry to conduct the
discussions.
The suggestion that Bonn's
transport minister should con-
tact his East German counter-
part to settle the confisca-
tion problem is a further in-
dication of the purpose behind
the current harassing measures.
The degree to which Communist
pressures will be relaxed will
probably be closely related to
the amount of recognition
granted by the West Germans to
East Germany.
The East Germans, who de-
clined Bonn's offer of a joint
technical study of the toll
problem, instead informed the
head of the West German dele-
gation of their unilateral de-
cision to reduce the tolls by
20 percent of the total. The
reduction is very small on
truck traffic, however, and
benefits mainly drivers of
passenger cars.
The East German negotia-
tors hinted that the Autobahn
tolls might be further reduced
if needed spare parts for old
trucks and railroad cars were
made available for sale to
East Germany.
This 20-percent reduction
apparently was doled out by the
East Germans in return for the
While there has been no
official West German reaction
to these developments, it is
possible that Bonn may now be
more willing to impose firmer
economic countermeasures to
combat the Communist pressure
tactics. At the same time,
the West Germans will call for
further efforts of the Western
powers to intervene with Soviet
authorities.
Meanwhile, scrap shipments
on the Autobahn and canal
routes continued to be inter-
fered with to the same extent
as before, with confiscations
of truck and barge cargoes as
well as heavy fines being
imposed.
The East German govern-
ment also announced on 4 June
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 June 1955
that restrictions were being
imposed on travel between West
and East Germany to prevent the
spread of a West German typhoid
epidemic.
While there is no question
of the seriousness of the
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epidemic, the East German move
was probably motivated more by
political and security than
health considerations. As yet,
the precise nature of the re-
strictions has not been revealed.
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South Vietnam
The Vietnamese army's
heavy superiority in weapons
and manpower give it a decided
edge in its campaign against
the Hoa Hao rebels. The army,
which has 24,000 troops in
position for the campaign, is
apparently moving cautiously,
but appears to have success-
fully isolated the 7,500 troops
of General Soai from any sup-
port that might be provided by
Ba Cut, the other rebellious
Hoa Hao leader.
Besides this problem, the
most pressing question facing
Diem's government is that of
talks in July with the VietMinh
on the 1956 all-Vietnam elec-
tions envisioned at Geneva.
The final declaration at Geneva
specified that consultations on
the July 1956 elections for
unification will take place
"between competent authorities
of the two zones after 20 July
1955."
As the Geneva signatory,
the French are responsible for
carrying out the Geneva terms
on the non-Communist side. Their
legal experts interpret the
declaration to mean that talks
between the two sides should
take place;on 20 July, not just
at some time thereafter.
The French have suggested
that the Western powers propose
either that the Geneva conter-
ence presidents (Eden and Molo-
tov) make an approach to the
two Vietnams or that the Inter-
national Control Commission do
so.
The Diem government, mean-
while, is apparently planning
to use two arguments as a basis
for backing away from any talks
with the Viet Minh, at least in
July.
The main argument is that
the Vietnamese government was
not a signatory of the Geneva
agreement and is thus not bound
by its terms. Another argument,
or stall, is that only a popu-
larly elected assembly--which
will not exist before fall--can
deal with such vital matters.
In addition, Diem is link-
ing the subject of elections to
the status of the French Expedi-
tionary Corps. He maintains it
is essential that Vietnamese
sovereignty be complete and un-
questioned before his govern-
ment makes any declaration on
all-Vietnam elections.
When such a declaration is
made, he wants to dissociate his
government completely from the
Geneva accords. He regards this
as a necessary step to prevent
the International Control Com-
mission, which he distrusts,
from taking over the election
arrangements.
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Diem's point will scarcely
impress the Indian chairman of
the Control Commission, who said
on 31 May, "If the French had
the authority and it has passed
to the Vietnamese, the latter
are responsible; but we do not
know how much has passed to the
Vietnamese." As to whether the
Vietnamese "automatically in-
herit" the responsibility of a
Geneva signatory, the Indian
chairman said that was a legal
question that would be studied
when it arose.
The Canadians on the com-
mission take the position that
it has no role regarding elec-
tions until both sides have
agreed on all details. The
Indians, with the support of the
Poles, however, will almost
certainly seek an active role
for the commission.
In recent weeks a marked
deterioration has been noted
in Cambodia's internal security
situation.
Small, roving
outlaw bands rein-
forced by military
deserters are
terrorizing prov-
inces north and
west of Phnom Penh.
Provincial officials
have proved lax in
meeting the security
problem and the
government itself has
only lately acknowl-
edged the threat.
after forays. Favored targets
are the numerous local buses,
and many villagers have been
kidnaped for ransom.
The government
has had to warn
foreign representa-
tives in the capital
to avoid "unpleasant
surprises" by re-
stricting their
travel on certain
routes leading north-
westward.
The bandits, for
the most part out-
laws who until the.
Geneva truce operated
under the guise of
nationalists, follow
guerrilla-like
tactics. They move
by night in small
groups and withdraw
and regroup quickly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
9 June
Potential sources of rein-
forcements for these bandit
groups include not only peas-
ants, whom the brigands are able
to recruit or'impress, but also
dissatisfied regular army and
auxiliary troops.
Many soldiers reportedly
have already gone over to the
outlaws following an increase in
the amount of personal "squeeze"
exacted from their pay by their
officers. Those auxiliaries
who since the Geneva cease-
fire rallied from dissident
ranks and were allowed a semi-
autonomous status in the armed
forces are discontented with
their pay scale, which is con-
siderably lower than that of
the royal army.
Provincial troops have
been less than energetic in
meeting this security threat
and their capability of doing
so is questionable. The central
government has likewise been
lax in reinforcing these in-
Nehru's Visit to the USSR
Indian prime minister
Nehru's good-will visit to
the USSR and the Satellites
is complementary to his visit
to Peiping in October. Soviet
efforts to play on Nehru's
susceptibility to flattery
will probably succeed, but
not to the extent of causing any
change in India's foreign
policy.
Having gone to Peiping,
Nehru undoubtedly felt he
should accede to long-standing
invitations from the Soviet
Un ion "
The enormous ovation
given to Nehru on his arrival
in Moscow--much greater than
the reception he received in
Peiping--was undoubtedly in-
tended to play upon Nehru's
well-known susceptibility to
flattery. It is very likely
that Nehru will be pleased by
this demonstration of his im-
portance in the world.
secure areas with regular
troops, who might achieve more
success. The tactics of the
outlaws, and the cover afforded
them by the terrain, makes
their apprehension difficult
in any case.
The government has ap-
pointed two high-ranking offi-
cials to overhaul the machinery
of internal defense. Phnom
Penh officials are not unaware
of the fact that banditry, al-
though now conducted with no
political objectives, could
develop into an important po-
A carefully planned tour
may impress Nehru with Soviet
strength and the accomplish-
ments of a socialist economy.
Since he has long considered
the USSR a technologically
advanced European nation,
however, he is probably pre-
pared for what he will be
shown. This was not true in
the case of Communist China,
in which Nehru is much more
deeply interested and with
which he recognizes a cultural
kinship.
Nehru has for some years
recognized the Soviet Union's
aggressive intentions and its
hold over Indian Communists.
However, he knows less and
cares less about international
problems involving the USSR
and its Satellites than he does
about the Chinese and such
questions as Formosa. He is
not vitally concerned with
trade, a focal point of Soviet
and Satellite inte t in India.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Afghan-Pakistani Situation
The basic issues between
Pakistan and Afghanistan re-
main unresolved, Saudi Arabian
efforts at mediation have ap-
parently led to agreement for
a hoisting of the
Pakistani flag in
Kabul. A five-
nation commission
is to investigate
the attack on the
Afghan consulate in
Peshawar. Continued
Pakistani economic
pressure on Afghan-
istan has apparently
inspired widespread
efforts by Afghan-
istan to strengthen
its bargaining po-
sition.
Information
from the Pakistani
embassy in Kabul sug-
gests that Pakistan
is not now insisting
on the presence of
central government
representatives at
the Kabul flag-rais-
ing ceremony.
In an apparent
effort to build its
bargaining position,
Afghanistan has begun
talks with Iran over
use of the Gulf of
Oman port of Chahbar
as an outlet to the
sea, instead of Karachi. Kabul
has also announced a new agree-
ment to construct, with Soviet
assistance, a new port of entry
at Qizil Qalu on the Afghan
side of the Oxus River.
There is no necessary
connection between these
developments and the Afghan
economic mission currently in
Moscow.
Whether Afghanistan will
~._ Railroad (selected)
All-weather road
O Proposed new port
cease its efforts to establish
new patterns of trade if cur-
rent mediation efforts are suc-
cessful is not yet clear. Nei-
ther is there any indication
that Pakistani pressure for the
removal of Prime Minister Daud
will end with the raising of
the Pakistani flag in Kabul.
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Syria
The forthcoming visit to
the United States of Syrian
foreign minister Khalid al Azm
is likely to delay further ne-
gotiation of the Egyptian-Saudi
Arabian-Syrian defense pact.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Azm plans to leave on
12 June. to attend the meeting
of the United Nations in San
Francisco. Speculation in the
area generally is that he will
not sign Cairo's pact before
his departure,
The ostensible cause of
delay is disagreement over the
size of the Egyptian-Saudi
contribution to Syria's defense
costs. The real obstacle is,
however, Azm's unwillingness to
-take any step which he thinks
might throw the country into
turmoil and thereby jeopardize
his chances of winning the
presidency of Syria this fall.
With the pact unsigned,
and.Azm out of the country,
political activity in Syria is
likely to slacken just as it
did when Azm attended the
Bandung conference.
Israeli-Egyptian Border Tension
Tension between Israel and
Egypt in the Gaza area has not
been eased despite peace ef-
forts of UN truce chief General
Burns and representations in
Tel Aviv and Cairo by American,
British and French diplomats.
Neither Israel nor Egypt has
to date accepted either govern-
ment's conditions for negotia-
tions, but both appear to be
making some effort to exercise
restraint in the area.
Sentiment is reported grow-
ing in Israel, however, that
the Gaza strip should be taken
by force. Egypt has already
received assurances of military
However, covert plotting
by the leftist Arab Socialist-
Resurrectionist Party, which
has been pressing Azm to sign
the pact, will probably continue.
Conservative politicians, who
favor closer links with Iraq
and the West rather than Egypt
and Saudi Arabia, likewise may
continue jockeying against one
another as well as against Azm
and the Resurrectionist Party,
Azm's return from San
Francisco may signal the re-
opening of his campaign for the
presidency. The foreign minister
probably hopes to gain consider-
able domestic prestige from his
tripyin the course of which he
will make stops at Paris and
London. Anti-Western sentiment
in Syria is still so strong,
however, that Azm may have to
rely heavily on the Resurrec-
tionist Part for support.
aid from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon
and Syria in repelling any
Israeli aggression.
Tel Aviv continues to de-
mand high-level direct talks
with Cairo officials and has
requested American pressure on
Egypt to control its troops
along the border. At the same
time, Israel still rejects pro-
posals for further discussions
within the Mixed Armistice Com-
mission and maintains its de-
sire for security guarantees
from the United States.
In view of the 26 July elec-
tions, the Mapai party, now in
control of the government,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 June 1955
apparently feels that unless it
follows a maximum "tough" border
policy, it may lose votes to
the extremist opposition polit-
ical. parties. Protection of
border settlers and the country's
security are likely to be main
issues in the campaign.
Egyptian prime minister
Nasr, harassed by his own inter-
nal problems, has suggested that
if Israel would agree to his
proposal for a neutral zone
along the demarcation line, he
might be willing to have a meet-
ing on a level of military
chiefs of staff. However, he
has made clear that Egypt can-
not meet on a higher level.
French North Africa
The situation remains tense
in Algeria and Morocco. Nearly
10,000 French army reserves have
been called to active duty in
Algeria, where more than 100,000
troops are now assigned but whee
guerrilla ambushes continue un-
abated.
The upsurge of terrorism
which occurred in Morocco at
the end of Ramadan--the month
of fasting--in late May has
not lessened. Tension is so
high in Casablanca that European
residents are reported to fear
being massacred.
In Tunisia, no disorders
disrupted the homecoming cele-
brations for Habib Bourghiba,
president of the moderate na-
tionalist Neo-Destour party,
who returned on 1 June after
The government-controlled
Egyptian press has warned that
an Israeli attempt to occupy the
Gaza strip would renew the war.
Despite the somewhat
ambiguous impressions left by
Israeli spokesmen, Tel Aviv
will probably not initiate a war
against Egypt at this time.
Frontier clashes and large-scale
retaliatory raids are likely to
continue. Israel's economic
dependence on public and pri-
vate American aid and possible
concern over its ability to
withstand a united attack by
the Arab states are likely to
counter the domestic pressure
for trying to drive the Egyptian
forces out of the Gaza strip.
more than three years' enforced
exile.
Bourghiba immediately de-
clared that the conventions,
signed in Paris on 3 June, were
only the initial step toward
full independence. His insist-
ence on collaboration with the
French, at least initially,
probably will reduce somewhat
the haggling over interpretation
of the conventions. The French
government expects they will be
ratified by the National Assem-
bly in July.
Radio Cairo and Radio Da-
mascus beamed at North Africa
continue agitation against the
Tunisian agreement, and the
rumblings of extreme nationalist
disapproval as well as French
settler opposition raise the
possibility of more trouble.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
French Military Withdrawals
Weaken NATO Defense
France's determination to
preserve its position in North
Africa has resulted in a weak-
ening of French participation
in NATO.
Recent heavy withdrawals
of NATO-committed contingents
for use in North Africa, in-
cluding an estimated fifth of
the French M-day contribution,
have led Supreme Allied Com-
mander Gruenther to warn that
"some positive action" is re-
quired by the French govern-
ment to restore its combat
forces on the Continent and to
reconstitute the French mo-
bilization base.
French combat effective-
ness in Europe had Already
been compromised by the pre-
cipitate institution early this
year of a long-range forces
reorganization plan. to convert
existing large NATO-committed
divisions into "light" units.
The reorganization was begun
where SHAPE was most reluctant
to see it--among....divisions in
Germany-and eastern France.
One of the "reorganized" M-day
divisions is now being moved
to North Africa..
Although the two M-day
divisions whose effectiveness
was reduced by 1954 withdrawals
of men and equipment now have
been replenished by conscripts,
personnel withdrawn from other
units have never been fully re-
placed because of "budgetary
and financial" reasons.
Hope that an accelerated
repatriation of the French
regulars in Indochina could at
least fill the newly created
M-day gaps for General Gruenther
is waning. Increased indica-
tions are that many repatriates
will be used in North Africa.
The French redeployment
has been reported to the North
Atlantic Council, which has re-
quested the opinion of its mili-
tary authorities on the effects
of the French move.
Faure's flat public an-
nouncement that his government
would not permit anything to
stand in the way of restoring
order in Algeria throws open
the basic question of the degree
to which France is actually
willing to subordinate national
interests to NATO. _F We-`:in-
creased doubt-as;te fhe French
position by re ai'king privately
to General - Gruenther on 4 June
that France had probably made a
mistake in assigning too large
a proportion of its forces to
NATO.
As long as unrest continues
in North Africa, there is little
possibility that the French
government can be induced to re-
build an effective force for
NATO in Europe. Because of their
hopes for an East-West detente
aroused by the assurance of big-
four talks, the French probably
will try to avoid any serious
reconsideration of their present
military DOlicies.j
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
USSR Trying to Encourage
Soviet commentaries
argue that the threat of Ameri-
can.troops is rising just at
the-time when the Austrian set-
tlement has changed Italy's
situation and has convinced
many Italians that their country
should become independent of
the American-dominated military
bloc.
Soviet and Italian Com-
munist propaganda in recent
weeks has been attempting to
arouse Italian opposition to
the possible transfer of Ameri-
can troops now in Austria to
northern Italy. Moscow has
warned that this would increase
the dangers to which Italy is
already vulnerable as a result
of its involvement in NATO.
Not only is Moscow seri-
ously interested in trying to
prevent having American troops
based in Italy, but it probably
considers that the Austrian
settlement has created a more
favorable climate for neutral-
ism in Italy.
Sicilian Election Results
The outcome of the Sicilian
regional elections on 5 June
has increased the prospects
for early changes in the Italian
cabinet--possibly to an all-
Christian Democratic minority
government. Premier Scelba
is expected to announce a cabi-
net reshuffle or even his res-
ignation during the parlia-
mentary debate scheduled to
begin on 14 June on a rightist-
sponsored motion of no confi-
dence in the governments
The Communists and Nenni
Socialists again won 30 seats
in the 90-member Sicilian as-
sembly, indicating that, what-
ever the success of the Scelba
government's anti-Communist
campaign in Italy's industrial
north, it has not significantly
cut into the polling power of
the extreme left in Sicily.
The Communists are re-
ported to have lost 15,000
votes as compared with their
As an open manifestation
of Soviet interest in Italy,
Molotov appeared at the Italian
national day celebration at
the Italian embassy in Moscow
on 2 June, the first such ap-
pearance by the Soviet foreign
minister since before the war.
Sicilian support in the national
elections two years ago--pos-
sibly in part a result of the
reported confusion in the party
over the USSR's approaches to
Tito, The Nenni Socialists,
however, picked up 55,000 votes
over their 1953 figure.
The Christian Democrats
increased their representation
in the regional assembly from
30 to 37 seats, but made these
gains mainly at the expense
of the smaller center parties
which are their allies in the
national coalition government.
These results will probably
intensify the pressure in
Christian Democratic circles
for replacement of the Scelba
coalition with a one-party
cabinet.
The formation of an all-
Christian Democratic national
government would require new
agreements between the party's
minority right-wing "Concen-
tration" faction and the
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reformist "Democratic Initia-
tive" majority group. Both
factions have reservations
about Scelba and presumably
would like to see him replaced.
Furthermore, the party's inter-
nal differences might be
smoothed over somewhat by a
redistribution of the key cabi-
net posts now held by the minor
coalition parties.
The most likely candidates
to replace Scelba are Christian
Democratic Party secretary
Amintore Fanfani and Budget
Minister Ezio Vanoni, both of
the party's left wing. Other
possibilities are "Concentra-
tion." leaders former premier
Giuseppe Pella and former
party secretary Guido Gonella.
Party president Adone Zoli
might be a compromise choice.
The Christian Democrats
do not have a majority in
parliament, and the formation
of a one-party cabinet would
probably not be attempted with-
out a working arrangement with
one or more other parties,
probably either the Monarch-
ists or the Nenni Socialists.
In any case, the decisions
reached on the composition of
the cabinet will be made mainly
on the basis of domestic issues,
and it is unlikely that Italy
will depart radically from its
ro-Western foreign policy.
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9 June 1955
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SIGNATURE CAMPAIGN OF
The world-wide signature
campaign to ban nuclear weap-
ons, sponsored by the Commu-
nist-dominated World Peace
Council (WPC), is to culminate-
in a World Peace Congress
scheduled to begin in Helsinki
on 22 June.
Although the current
'?Vienna Appeal" has attracted
more adherents than its 1950
predecessor, the "Stockholm
Appeal," there is considerable
evidence that the WPC is having
a difficult time reaching its
goal of one billion signatures.
Outside the Sino-Soviet bloc,
the drive has progressed very
slowly, and even the USSR has
not pushed the campaign within
its own borders with its
customary vigor.
The modification of the
Soviet line on the consequences
of nuclear warfare, set forth
in Molotov's speech on 8 Feb-
ruary,probably was responsible
for a divergence in line and
some confusion that has
appeared since the signature
campaign began in January.
The Vienna Appeal warns
that the use of atomic weapons
would result in a war of exter-
mination, and demands the
"destruction of stockpiles of
atomic weapons, wherever they
may be, and an immediate end
to their manufacture."
This wording goes further
than the Stockholm Appeal,
which demanded only that such'
weapons not be used for
"intimidation and mass murder."
The World Peace Council
is the major front organiza-
tion for soliciting support
for Soviet policy objectives.
Operating without overt
affiliation with any Communist
THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL
party or the Soviet government,
the WPC masks its goals behind
a facade of generally approved
social iiieas. Its current pro-
gram of collecting signatures
in a mass campaign is part of
the effort to maintain the
organizational network of the
peace movement intact through
constant activity.
There is no indication
to date that the coming con-
gress will be any more suc-
cessful than the "Congress of
the Peoples for Peace" held in
Vienna in December 1952, when
attendance fell short of Com-
munist expectations. The Com-
munists claim that some 3,000
"peace partisans" from 61
countries will attend.
The "World Assembly of
Representatives of Forces for
Peace" was planned last fall
to take place in May. Without
any prior warning, the WPC
secretariat issued a statement
on 27 April postponing the
congress until 22 June, at the
request of various "important
organizations and prominent
individuals" who were to attend.
It seems probable that
the congress was postponed
because (1) the international
atmosphere had changed con-
siderably since the scheduling
of the meeting and events were
unfolding too rapidly for the
propaganda of the peace move-
ment to keep pace, and (2) the
reception of the Vienna Appeal
as of April was so far below
expectation that an extension
of time was necessary.
Total signatures for the
appeal had far from reached the
goal of one billion when the
communique postponing the
conference was issued. If all
Communist claims are taken at
face value, 400,000,000
signatures had been obtained
in Communist China and only
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
about half that many in all
the rest of the world.
Divergence in Communist Line
One of the difficulties
in obtaining signatures may
have been the divergence be-
tween the WPC and Soviet lines
in atomic warfare.
Frederic Joliot-Curie,
chairman of the WPC, had to
modify his stand on the possi-
bilities of atom destruction
of "all life on our planet"
to bring it closer to the So-
viet position, expressed by
Molotov in February, that only
capitalism and not civiliza-
tion would be destroyed by a
nuclear war.
The East German party
central committee issued a
directive in March stating
that the signing of the appeal
did not constitute an endorse-
ment of all the aims of the
WPC or Joliot-Curie's early
statements.
Maurice Thorez in March
corrected a Communist editor
for exaggerating the threat
of nuclear war and recommended
"for our party activists"
Molotov's reply to "those who
talk about the wiping out of
world civilization."
There has been a sporadic
but definite tendency among
some Communist editors to
change the emphasis of WPC
pronouncements, apparently in
order to avoid contradicting
the Molotov line.
Moscow radio, Neues
Deutschland, and the Bir tish
rontmagazine, Soviet Weekly,
eliminated completely the
first three lines of the
Vienna Appeal which referred
to "war of extermination" and
by doing so left the emphasis
on the effectiveness of mass
initiative for "peace."
The absence of progress
reports from the 40 countries
outside the Sino-Soviet bloc
where signatures are being
collected, suggests that the
drive has. not come up to
expectations in these countries.
The secretary general of
the Italian Communist Party,
Palmiro Togliatti, published
an article in the Cominform
journal in May stating that
the work in exposing atomic
danger is suffering and the
collection of signatures is
falling far short of the need
because of the people's
attitude "that whatever our
course, developments will in
the long run take their course."
Signatures in non-Commu-
nist countries are being
collected by house-to-house
canvasses as well as by mass
recruitment in industrial
plants and public areas.
Adherence is encouraged
by a variety of methods. In
Finland, Communist sympathizers
"vie with each other" for the
prizes awarded to those col-
lecting the most signatures.
Autographed pictures of national
party leaders are presented to
those most successful in India.
In central and southern
Africa, fingerprints are sub-
stituted for signatures.
In the United States, one
source reports that telegrams
and letters, rather than
signatures on the petitions,
are being solicited.
According to FBI reports,
Communist Party leaders in
California were to launch a
state-wide petition demanding
the abolition of atomic weapons.
These petitions are reportedly
similar to but not identical
to those now being circulated
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by the WPC. Fruits of the
effort in the United States
are to be presented at the
tenth anniversary session of
the United Nations to be held
in June in San Francisco.
The appeal has made more
headway than expected in the
trade unions in Sweden because
it was signed by the vice
president of the Swedish Con-
federation of Trade Unions,
who is usually strongly anti-
Communist. There the sponsor-
ship and purpose of the campaign
have not been publicized and
thus many of those signing
were unaware of the political
implications.
Italian propagandists
used May Day celebrations to
keynote the struggle against
atomic war preparations.
Their campaign was accented by
allocating specific times for
concentration, with 17 April
set as "Youth for Peace Day"
and 17-25 April--"Week of
struggle for peace and for the
successful collection of signa-
tures."
The Drive in the Soviet Bloc
In those Satellites where
the drive has been completed--
Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, East-Germany--the
figures reported by the Com-
munist press represent in most
cases about 80 percent of the
population.
In contrast to its usual
leading role in such matters,
Moscow seems to have been
reluctant to push the WPC
signature drive in the USSR.
The campaign opened in
the Soviet Union on 1 April,
some 10 weeks after the text
of the appeal was issued and
after collection was well
under way in the Satellites.
To date, no specific results
have been publicized. It was
merely announced at the recent
5th All-Union Peace Conference
that "scores of millions" of
signatures have been collected
in the Soviet Union.
Soviet radio propaganda
on the appeal constituted only
10 percent of the total internal
and external broadcasting time
during the period of greatest
emphasis in the first week in
April and has now practically
dropped out of Moscow's
broadcasts.
This modest Soviet invest-
ment of effort in the WPC
campaign, which of course was
scheduled some six months ago,
may reflect the development in
recent months of new departures
in Soviet foreign policy and
propaganda. The strong emphasis
Molotov and other Soviet leaders
have recently placed on Com-
munist ability,tb-survive an
atomic war has inevitably
tended to undercut WPC descrip-
tions of the horrors of atomic
devastation.
The USSR has also been
turning the focus of world
attention to direct Big Four
negotiations as the main arena
in which the Communist "stuggle
for peace" is being waged. The
WPC effort has thus tended to
be pushed out of the limelight.
Finally, the USSR in its
omnibus "peace" proposals of
10 May put the problem of
banning nuclear warfare and
destroying existing nuclear
weapons in the framework of a
general disarmament plan con-
siderably more realistic and
subject to more serious ne-
gotiations than the WPC demands.
As a result of these
developments, the WPC signature
campaign is not now so directly
geared to Soviet policy as when
it was planned.
The WPC effort will prob-
ably continue, but is unlikely
to recover fully from the con-
fusion and apathy of its early
stages this year.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PEIPING'S EFFORT TO WIN OVERSEAS CHINESE MAKING HEADWAY
The 10,000,000 or 12,000,-
000 Overseas Chinese residing
in Southeast Asia are an ele-
ment of great political and
economic importance throughout
the area. Ever since the
Peiping regime seized power on
the China mainland, it has
sought, with considerable suc-
cess, to win the allegiance of
these Chinese.
The Chinese communities
in Southeast Asia constitute
approximately six percent of
the region's population. As
a result of their industry
and initiative, they are the
most powerful economic group
in almost every Southeast
Asian country.
For generations, the Over-
seas Chinese have resisted
assimilation, regarded China
as the "homeland," and pas-
sively accepted whatever re-
gime happened to be in power
in China. These factors have
been intensified by the legal
and extralegal harassment
they have experienced at the
hands of local governments
throughout Southeast Asia.
An initially favorable
reaction to the Communist re-
gime was set back somewhat by
the brutalities of Communist
"reforms," and Peiping's 1952-
53 extortion campaign which
touched practically every Chi-
nese in Southeast Asia. A
continuing obstacle for Peiping
has been the preoccupation of
the Chinese with their busi-
ness interests and their desire
to avoid open political com-
mitments.
Peiping's Tactics
An article in Peiping's
constitution states, "the
Chinese Peoples Republic pro-
tects the interests of Over-
seas Chinese." There is an
Overseas Chinese Affairs Com-
mission, a government agency
charged with implementing this
provision. Thirty seats in
the National Peoples Congress
are reserved for overseas
representatives, of which some
20 are allotted to Southeast
Asian countries.
The Overseas Chinese are
bombarded by intensive propa-
ganda. The present "peoples"
regime is pictured as repre-
senting China in its best
tradition, genuinely solici-
tous of the welfare of the
Overseas Chinese. The propa-
ganda also stresses the "wave
of the future" theme by con-
sistently asserting that Com-
munist China and the Soviet
Orbit are indivisible and
that their strength is in-
vincible.
Peiping has been particu-
larly interested in influenc-
ing young people. It not only
appeals to youthful patriotism,
but offers such tangible in-
ducements as free tuition and
a promise of a good job for
those who return to the main-
land to pursue their education.
Inexpensive Communist
textbooks are readily avail-
able to Chinese schools through-
out Southeast Asia, and pro-
Communist teachers have been
employed in increasing numbers,
The Communists have also taken
considerable pains to organize
all sorts of athletic, hobby
and discussion groups for Over-
seas Chinese youths.
Front organizations and
well-advertised relief proj-
ects have been organized--
through diplomatic posts--to
aid Chinese victims of dis-
asters. The several branches
of the Bank of China in South-
east Asia finance various
Communist programs and advance
low-interest loans to individ-
uals and organizations. They
also subsidize newspapers and
finance good-will missions to
China.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Local Chinese Communists
resort to sterner measures, in-
cluding assassination, to dis-
courage opposition.
In the interest of secur-
ing badly needed foreign ex-
change, Peiping is encouraging
Overseas Chinese to remit money
to China. Relatives of Over-
seas Chinese are now apparently
receiving preferential treatment
and Peiping claims that remit-
The most striking is the
large number of students go-
ing to China. It is estimated
that by 1953, well over 10,000
students had traveled to China
from Southeast Asia to pursue
their education.
The flow has not only
been maintained but probably
increased. Approximately ten
percent of the present enroll-
ment of Chinese Communist
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Chinese (Negligible)
CAMBODIA SARAWAN
Pop. 3,000,000 Pop 550,000
Chinese150,00D C 145.000
tances are reaching the ad-
dressees in record time. A
number of investment companies
have also been established to
which Chinese abroad are asked
to send money in order to en-
hance China's economic devel-
opment.
Results of the Campaign
There are a number of in-
dications that Communist ef-
forts to influence Overseas
Chinese have been effective.
SECRET
BRUNEI Pop. 5b,00D Chinese 10,0D0
N. BORNEO pp
Chin 3055
The bar graph is divided horizontally into u,55 proportionate to the total
vnpwarpn of the boanmes and areas named. Divmiom within three unio
show the percentage of the population that is Chinese.
The Chinese population throughout the area iii concentrated mostly in the
large cities, the most lmporoant of which era accented on the map by large
colored doN,
All figures are approsimate.
C Chines, Nationalist Embassy
0 Chinese Communist Embassy
Chinese Communist Consulate
Bang of China Branch
secondary schools is reported
to consist of overseas students.
In fact, recent reports suggest
that the movement is placing a
heavy strain on accommodations
and that Communist authorities
now feel they can be more selec-
tive.
In Southeast Asia, itself,
the Communists have gained con-
trol of large numbers of Chi-
nese schools, exert strong in-
fluence in Chinese labor unions,
trade associations and secret
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
societies, and have at least
the tacit support of most of
the local Chinese press.
In such countries as Burma
and Indonesia, which are anxious
to maintain friendly relations
with Peiping, the climate is
particularly favorable for the
Chinese Communists' activities
and they are conducted quite
openly. The enthusiastic re-
ception accorded Chou En-lai
on his way to the Bandung con-
ference by the Chinese in these
countries is indicative of their
attitude.
The recent riots in Singa-
pore were a demonstration of
the Communists' ability to ex-
tend their influence among
Overseas Chinese under adverse
circumstances. Although forced
to operate clandestinely, the
Communists were in control of
the Chinese unions and students
involved and were successful in
winning extensive concessions
from the government and employ-
ers, which had a devastating
effect on the morale of anti-
Communist Chinese.
Appeal to Southeast Asians
While maintaining its ef-
forts to influence Overseas
Chinese, Peiping has sought--
particularly since its espousal
of "coexistence"--to placate the
fears and suspicions of South-
east Asians. To this end, both
Chou and the chairman of the
Overseas Chinese Affairs Com-
mission have publicly exhorted
Chinese not to become involved
in the politics of their coun-
try of domicile.
After months of negotia-
tions, Communist China and
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Indonesia concluded a treaty
in late April dealing with the
thorny problem of dual nation-
ality held by Overseas Chinese.
According to the treaty,
the Chinese in Indonesia must
choose either Indonesian or
Chinese Communist citizenship
within two years of the treaty's
ratification. A possible loop-
hole which the Communists can
exploit is a provision that
Chinese choosing Indonesian
citizenship who subsequently
leave Indonesia to reside else-
where automatically lose such
citizenship if they regain
Chinese Communist citizenship.
The Indonesian government
professes to be well-Pleased
with the treaty, and Peiping
is holding it up as a model to
other countries in Southeast
Asia.
There are indications,
however, that many Overseas
Chinese are seriously disturbed.
They realize that implementation
of such a treaty will force them
off the fence and that they will
henceforth be liable to stricter
controls, regardless of their
choice.
Moreover, the treaty pro-
vides that the Chinese can
choose only Chinese Communist
or Indonesian citizenship. This
will be an effective impediment
to any open manifestation of
pro-Formosa sentiment. It will
become increasingly difficult
for the Overseas Chinese to
serve two masters--the rulers of
China to whom they instinctively
look for protection and the rul-
ers of their country of resi-
dence where they make their liv-
ing.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AUSTRIA AND THE DANUBE
Once the new Austrian state
treaty has been ratified, re-
newed efforts can be expected
on the part of Austria to regain
its prewar position as the ma-
jor shipping power along the
entire Danube River. The Aus-
trians have had some success
in this direction since 1953,
and success in further efforts
would of necessity involve
closer ties with the Soviet bloc.
Background
Prior to 1948, navigation
on the entire Danube was regu-
lated by the Danube Commission,
which derived from the 1921
Paris Statute on Danube Naviga-
tion. In addition to the ri-
parian countries, France, Brit-
ain, and the United States were
members.
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The
conclusion of a similar bilat-
eral agreement with the USSR
would open the entire length
of the river to Austrian ship-
ping.
On 23 May Soviet ambassa-
dor Ilychev in Vienna invited
the Austrians to join the East-
ern Danube Commission. After
consulting Western representa-
tives, Foreign Minister Figl
replied that the West was un-
alterably opposed to such a
move and that he did not feel
the period prior to complete
ratification of the new state
treaty would be a proper time
for this step. Ilychev then
indicated that the invitation
would be re-extended after
Austria had its full independ-
ence.
Postwar disputes between
the Western powers and the USSR
over freedom of navigation cul-
minated in late 1948 in the for-
mation of the Eastern Danube
Commission. This was based on
the Belgrade Convention.for
Navigation on the Danube, which
had been signed in the spring
of 1948 by the USSR and the new
Communist Satellite governments
concerned. The commission con-
tinued to function even after
the Tito-Cominform break.
The Western powers have
consistently refused to recog-
nize the authority of the East-
ern Danube Commission and have
operated instead a separate
regulatory body, whose de facto
authority is limited to the
part of the river above Linz.
Although the Soviet bloc made
provisions to include Austria
in an observer status in the
Eastern Danube commission,
Vienna has refrained from par-
ticipating.
In the past two years,
Austria has negotiated separate
navigation agreements-with
Czechoslovakia,?Hungary,'Rumania,
Up to now the Austrian
government has feared that asso-
ciation with the Belgrade con-
vention would give the USSR
another means of exerting pres-
sure and influence on Austria
and would earn the displeasure
of the Western powers. Vienna
has also felt that even with-
out such association, the bi-
lateral navigation agreements
with the Satellites would lead
.to increased trade and economic
benefits.
Benefits of Joining
The Orbit omm ss on
Full membership in the
Eastern Danube Commission would
give the Austrians certain ad-
vantages.
The bilateral navigational
agreements which Austria has
with all the other riparian
states except the USSR are sub-
ject to denunciation each year
on three months' notice. Adher-
ence to the Belgrade Convention
would put'these navigational
rights on a more permanent ba-
sis.
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Moreover, Austrians gen-
erally believe that policies af-
fecting Danube affairs should
be determined by the riparian
countries only, and in the past
there has been some resentment
of American, British, and
French participation in the de-
termination of these policies.
Many Austrians feel that the
Belgrade convention could guar-
antee freedom of navigation on
the river no less effectively
than the Paris statute of 1921.
After Austria has full
sovereignty, Moscow may make
Vienna's signature of the Bel-
grade convention a condition
for an Austrian-Soviet bilat-
eral navigation agreement. In
any case, Austrian shipping
will continue to be excluded
from traveling the full length
of the Danube until Soviet ap-
proval is given.
The Austrian government
has been under pressure from
a small group of businessmen
and government officials who
see no harm in participating
in the Eastern Danube Commis-
sion. An observer status,
they felt, would at least keep
Austria informed on the activi-
ties of the commission. The
Austrian observer might also
be in a position to present
Western views, even though his
influence might be small.
West Germany has also
pressed Austria to join the
Eastern Danube Commission.
When Austria and Hungary
were negotiating their bilat-
eral agreement in 1952 and
early 1953, West German water-
way authorities reportedly
urged their Austrian counter-
parts to seek participation
in the commission in the ex-
pectation that it would ensure
greater utilization of the
German fleet on the upper Dan-
ube and eventually lead to
German inclusion on the com-
mission. With support from
Austria and Yugoslavia, the
West Germans hoped to open
the way to German shipping
through reciprocal agreements
Commercial Navigation in the Danube Basin
~
MAXIMUM TONNAGE OF 11MOERCIAL VESSELS
G E R A N Y ~1'?r
~-,
P 0 L A N
/
1.
D ?\
The maximum tonnage of FULLY LOADED river craft
indicated on the map by proportional bands
and by the bold f'qures.
`\
f~~/~~
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/ 2.
1000-ton river craft
loaded to 6111 capacity
can
~?
~
1J PRAGUE _
j
~
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,
i
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nav
gate on the Danube to Regensburg, G-nnany.
125
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L MILE! """" C.-fission Countries
LE!
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S
!Ip 10 10 210
j NELNEIM
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200
EILOMETEF9