CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000300160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 13, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI NO. 8847
COR1FIoENt1A
13 August 1954
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
DAT : MR v EnF-Td
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLASS.
FiECLASSIFILD
.
CLASS. CH CHANtJG~GE
~p TO: TS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
V M"
ell I'm
SE2RET
25X1
25X1
I 25X1
STATE review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SUMMA Y OF CONTENTS
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
0
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS EXPECTED TO Page 6
LIMIT MENDES-FRANCE'S ECONOMIC REFORM. . . . . . .
The economic program for which Mendes-France re-
ceived decree powers on 10 August is a watered-down
version of pre-investiture proposals. The momentum
created by his dynamism may arouse wide support for
the program, but political maneuvering and economic
factors will probably combine to dilute further his
attack on the basic weaknesses of the French economy.
VIET MINH CONTRAVENES INDOCHINA CEASE-FIRE . . . . . . . Page 8
Recent Viet Minh military and political activi-
ties throughout Indochina contravene those portions
of the cease-fire agreement pertaining to free move-
ment of troops and persons, foreign military aid, and
withdrawal of forces from Cambodia.
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE GREEK-TURKISH-YUGOSLAV
MILITARY ALLIANCE. . . o o e . . . . . . . . Page 10
Conclusion of the Balkan military alliance sig-
nificantly strengthens East Mediterranean defenses,
but many political and military problems remain to
be solved.
INDONESIA BROADENING ITS TIES WITH ORBIT . . . . . . . . Page 12
Indonesia during the past year has taken a num-
ber of steps to broaden its ties with the Soviet bloc
and, while maintaining that its position is essenti-
ally neutral, has become increasingly critical of the
West.
CASTILLO ARMAS REGIME IN GUATEMALA WINS FIRST
Page 14
Although the Castillo Armas regime successfully
reasserted its authority after the 2-3 August fight-
ing in Guatemala City, the regular army still holds
the ultimate political power in Guatem
AM Wk 9 -P AV
13 Aug 54
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
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INDIAN SOCIALIST PARTY DETERIORATING AS A
POLITICAL FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Praja Socialist Party, which is still the
strongest threat to Congress Party control of India,
has during the past year adopted a visionary, long-
range program antipathetic to formalized political
activity and has failed to develop an organization
in depth. By the time of the next national elec-
tions in 1956, therefore, it may have become an in-
effective political force.
. Page 17
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THE SOVIET WORLD
Communist efforts to isolate the United States and to
win new positions of strength in neutral zones last week
included various peaceful gestures and promises of future
benefits for those who would walk without the Americans.
Moscow announced that three Soviet trade officials were
on their way to Tokyo to negotiate with Japanese business
representatives for sale of Soviet coal, lumber and man-
ganese. A Chinese Communist trade mission was also en route
to Tokyo, and a Chinese trade official in Peiping informed
a member of the Japanese Diet mission that his government
was interested in finding a solution to the fishery problems
in the East China Sea. The president of the Chinese Red
Cross hinted that Peiping would consider the release of
Japanese war criminals. Underscoring the purpose of these
overtures, the chairman of the China Peace Committee told a
Japanese Diet delegation on 3 August that the main obstacle
to normalizing Sino-Japanese relations was Tokyo's adherence
to American policies regarding Communist China and Formosa.
The Soviet government has shown concern over American
activity in the Near East. Recent Soviet propaganda has
criticized the settlement of the Iranian and Egyptian dis-
putes and emphasized the danger that these countries may join
an American-dominated military bloc. Pravda on 9 August is-
sued another warning to Iran not to joina Middle East mili-
tary bloc, and referred pointedly to the text of the 1927
Soviet-Iranian treaties prohibiting either country from join-
ing an alliance directed at the other.
The Soviet press on 8 August abandoned the equivocal
attitude it has maintained toward the Egyptian government
since its formation, with a strong attack on the Anglo-
Egyptian treaty as guaranteeing neither Egypt's territorial
integrity nor sovereignty. It warned that the treaty "can
mean indirect, if not direct, participation of Egypt in the
Turkish-Pakistani pact," which it described as a threat to
peace in Asia.
The Eastern European Satellites are endeavoring to
utilize their acceptance of the American flood relief offer
as evidence of their sincere desire to reduce international
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tensions. The East German press and radio is portraying its
acceptance of President Eisenhower's "generous offer" as an
expression of East Germany's "policy of furthering...inter-
national understanding." The East German government may
also see an opportunity to enhance its sovereignty through
the negotiations on the relief offer.
The Hungarian government has accepted the American re-
lief offer specifying that it desired cash rather than food
and clothing. This follows Hungary's acceptance of a Dutch
offer of aid if it was in the form of currency. Czechoslo-
vakia has not yet answered but it will probably accept.
Rumania, which suffered only slight damage, politely declined
the American relief offer.
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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS EXPECTED TO LIMIT
MENDES-FRANCE'S ECONOMIC REFORM
Mendes-France's current economic program, for which he
received decree powers from the National Assembly on 10 August,
is a watered-down version of pre-investiture proposals. The
modifications were necessitated by the diversity of views a-
mong his parliamentary supporters and various economic fac-'
tors.
A treasury crisis and balance-of-payments difficulties
are anticipated in the fall, and he may be forced to use his
decree powers in such a way as to increase parliamentary oppo-
sition and lessen his chances for revitalizing the economy.
The build-up of the French economy has long been the basic
remedy in Mendes-France's over-all prescription for solidifying
France's world position. In his investiture bid of June 1953,
he indicated he would make a drastic attack on the causes of
economic maladjustment, which include high-cost production and
distribution, fostered by extensive government protection of
special interests such as the sugar beet and wine producers.
These have combined to keep prices high and real wages low and
have largely negated the effects of American aid.
The premier's economic program calls for a "rigorous"
financial policy to permit production expansion. Finance Minis-
ter Faure, long close to Mendes-France, had already incorporated
many. of the latter's basic ideas in the 18-month program insti-
tuted under Laniel in 1953. He has, moreover, convinced the
premier that too rapid an acceleration of this program might up-
set current progress. Both see the need for eventual elimina-
tion of marginal enterprises, particularly in agriculture; but
their aim of full employment requires a cautious approach to
the problem.
In June,'the Faure program was already well on the way to
its goal of a 10-percent increase in production and purchasing
power by the spring of 1955. Industrial production had hit
new highs with the consumers' goods industries leading the way;
unemployment was down and decreasing; and steady purchasing
power had improved confidence in the economy. The Treasury's
Stabilization Fund was near $400,000,000 at the end of June,
foreshadowing a period during which the government could easily
meet its obligations.
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The growing prospect of a budgetary crisis at the end
of the year, however, would in any case have necessitated
early recourse to a more stringent financial policy. As
early as-June, over $571,000,000 had been added to the antici-
pated 1954 budget deficit by extraordinary outlays for in-
creased subsidies to farmers, a civil service wage boost, and
unforeseen military expenditures in Indochina. By the end
of the year, total uncovered treasury obligations may reach
$2.5 billion. Moreover, the drop in American financial aid
anticipated from the suspension of hostilities in Indochina
will make more urgent the need to cut expenses and increase
revenue.
The government has already taken steps to counter the be-
lief that peace in Indochina will obviate tighter financial
policies, and is attempting to convince the United States that
aid for Indochina must continue to be channeled through Paris.
Although $248,000,000 is expected to be shunted from the mili-
tary budget to the investment program, an austerity program to
offset the feared cutback in dollar support seems imminent.
At the end of July, public fears that a curtailed dollar
supply would force devaluation caused a 20-franc rise in the
black-market dollar rate and a comparable upswing in the price
of gold. French financial circles are convinced that eventual
devaluation is necessary for convertibility. This drop in the
franc rate after six months of stability, however, may force
the premier to devalue before he has solidified his political
position and generated enough financial confidence to ensure
the maximum advantages from such a step.
Major opposition will develop within the premier's present
parliamentary support if he uses the decree powers to tighten
tax administration, limit social benefits, or channel invest-
ment funds in such a way as to eliminate the marginal producer.
His plans for an expansion of housing construction as a key ele-
ment of his program will increase his support on, the left, but
the Socialists are sure to insist on maintaining present levels
of social benefits.
Moreover, a large part of the premier's own party, the Radi-
cal Socialists, will oppose restrictions on small businessmen,
and agricultural interests will fight any early reduction in sub-
sidies, Many business groups which would have feared to oppose
an austerity program in 1945 now feel secure enough to fight moves
to consolidate enterprises and eliminate uneconomic production.
They can probably find parliamentary allies among opponents of
other Mendes-France policies--on North Africa, for example, or
on EDC. Nevertheless, the momentum created by Mendes-France's
dynamism may arouse wide support for his program.
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Recent Viet Minh military and political activities
throughout Indochina contravene those portions of the cease-
fire agreement pertaining to free movement of troops and
persons, foreign military aid, and withdrawal of forces from
Cambodia.
In Tonkin, the Viet Minh has attempted on a wide scale to
demoralize Vietnamese troops, encourage desertion, and otherwise
interfere with the regrouping of a large Vietnamese force south
of the demarcation line. A tactic used in several instances has
been to assemble shouting and stone-throwing mobs of women and
children in the oath of troop convoys. According to one report,
the Viet Minh kidnaped the families of Vietnamese soldiers to
force them to aeserL. The cease-fire agreement (Article 15)
provides that neither side shall take any action which might
hamper troop withdrawals and transfers.
The Viet Minh is also trying to prevent the mass exodus
of Vietnamese civilians to the south. Attempts in this field
have included a letter-writing campaign in which civilians in
Viet Minh-held areas have strongly urged relatives in the delta
not to choose evacuation. Stronger measures were used at Dong
Hoi, a populous French-held area just north of the truce line.
There, the Viet Minh drove local villagers into the hills in
order to prevent them from choosing evacuation.
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The French believe
the Communists intend to utilize the period before the arrival
of the inspection teams to achieve a maximum build-up of Viet
Minh materiel strength. Even after the teams arrive, they
are not expected to be adequate to maintain an effective check
on the border.
Vietnamese Communist forces in Cambodia apparently are
withdrawing to Vietnam, but are reported to have been replaced'
in large part by Viet Minh troops recruited from among the
large Cambodian population in Viet Minh-controlled areas of
south Vietnam. This is a type of violation the Cambodian
government specifically foresaw when it required that the
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provision for withdrawal of foreign troops (Article 4) be
extended to cover "Cambodians, not natives of Cambodia."
A tactic employed by the Viet Minh in south Vietnam, while
not clearly a truce violation, illustrates the speed and
audacity with which Viet Minh propagandists have begun to
exploit every weakness of the free zone. There, demonstrations
have been organized calling for the repatriation of French
troops. Vietnamese police breaking up such demonstrations
are thus put in the unpopular position of appearing to favor
retention of-the French.
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PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE
GREEK-TURKISH-YUGOSLAV MILITARY ALLIANCE
Formal signing of the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military al-
liance on 9 August culminates more than two years of intermit-
tent political and military conferences. It is a step toward
closer tripartite relations based on the.Trea.y of Friendship
and Collaboration signed at Ankara on 28 February,; 1953. and is
a significant step in strengthening Balkan defenses.
The three key articles of the treaty of alliance include
Article 2 which specifies that aggression against one of the
contracting parties shall be considered aggression against all
and that the three signatories shall take "immediately all meas-
ures, including the use of armed force, which they shall deem
necessary for efficacious defense." Article 5 provides for im-
mediate mutual consultation to determine necessary measures in
addition to those of Article 2. -Article 6 concerns Yugoslavia's
obligations to aid Greece and Turkey in the event of their in-
volvement in conflict as a result of NATO commitments. it pro-
vides for consultation by the signing powers on measures to be
taken "to meet the situation that would have been created in
their area." The.alliance will come into force on the day the
last ratification instrument is deposited in Athens.
Progress is also being made in tripartite political plan-
ning. A permanent secretariat was established in November 1953.
The new treaty establishes in addition a "permanent council,"
composed of the foreign ministers and special invitees, which
will meet twice annually and in emergencies. A representative
"consultative assembly," with advisory powers only, is also
being organized to promote tripartite co-operation.
Mutual awareness of insecurity in a vulnerable area appar-
ently prompted unusually quick action on the alliance. Last-
minute delays resulted largely from Greek and Turkish desire to
make sure that NATO obligations were in no way contravened by
the phrasing of the new treaty.
Conclusion of the alliance, however, does not eliminate all
tripartite problems. Traditional suspicion, resentment and the
struggle for area leadership periodically strain tripartite re-
lations.
One of the chief problems will be co-ordination of politi-
cal decisions governing the use of forces. The exact relation-
ship of the new military alliance to NATO has yet to be defined.
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Although the proposed alliance was unofficially approved by the
North Atlantic Council, the Scandinavian representatives reserved
the right to raise subsequent objections. Greek and Turkish
forces are now committed both to NATO and to the Balkan alliance.
On the other hand, Yugoslav forces are not committed to aid the
North Atlantic community as firmly as some NATO powers would de-
sire. Yugoslavia insists it is not interested in joining NATO,
though it has admitted publicly that no war in Europe can be iso-
lated, and has expressed willingness to co-ordinate military
plans and forces with the West.
Peripheral problems of immediate concern are the Trieste
issue and Greece's interest in promoting union with Cyprus, where
there is a Turkish minority.
The extent to which these problems may cause estrangement
will depend largely upon the external pressure of a common threat
to Balkan security, the internal. stability of the three principal
powers, and particularly the manner in which-the individual mem-
ber countries come to view the alliance. Currently, Athens is
particularly interested in the alliance because it joins Greek
and Yugoslav efforts in developing defense in depth. Ankara re-
gards it as a great diplomatic triumph for Turkish leadership in
welding a strong link for Western defense. Belgrade views it as
a means of getting under the NATO defense umbrella without extend-
ing its commitments beyond the Balkans and without political ties
to NATO.
The military alliance, like its forerunner the tripartite
Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration, provides for the
adherence of other nations, primarily in the hope that Italy will
eventually join. Rome's adherence may be achieved when the Trieste
dispute is settled and an improvement in Yugoslav-Italian relations
results. There is general agreement among present signatories of
the pact that eventual Italian adherence would strengthen the
Balkan defense position.
Nevertheless, the tripartite Balkan alliance, basically a
regional development, strengthens Western defenses as a link in
a chain which now extends from Norway to the western border of
Iran.
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Indonesia claims that it has continued its neutral foreign
policy during the past year, but in practice it has taken steps
to broaden its ties with the Soviet bloc and has become more
critical of the West. The change is attributable both to
Communist influence on the present government and to a revised
estimate on the part of government leaders of the West's future
role in Asia.
The National Party, which heads the government, has long
argued that an exact interpretation of Indonesia's "independent"
foreign policy demands balanced relations with both the West
and the Soviet bloc. Immediately after it came to power in
August 1953, with the support of the Communists in parliament,
it set about acting on its interpretation. Within two months,
Indonesia's first ambassador to Peiping had departed for his
post. In April, Indonesia opened an embassy in Moscow, a
development long delayed by anti-Communist elements in former
governments. The Soviet ambassador, a fairly high-ranking
official in the Foreign Ministry, is reportedly scheduled to
arrive before November. Approximately ten members of his staff
are already in Djakarta.
The entrance of Communists and fellow travelers into Indo-
nesia has been far less restricted by the Ali government than
by previous cabinets. Similarly, more Indonesians are traveling
to Orbit countries. Particularly since the establishment of the
Indonesian embassy in Moscow have Indonesian delegations from
various organizations and government ministries accepted invi-
tations to the USSR for tours of one to three weeks.
Commercial relations with the Soviet bloc have been expanded,
and although they have as yet little economic importance, the
National and Communist parties find them useful for political
purposes. They argue that by seeking out Orbit markets the
government is taking steps to limit the United States' power
"to manipulate" prices of Indonesian products. Indonesia signed
trade agreements with Communist China in July and with Rumania
in early August and, during the past year, renewed its annual
trade agreements with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. An
unofficial trade delegation from East Germany is now in Djakarta
and the Central Indonesian Economic Council, a semiofficial
organization, reportedly plans to set up a commercial agency
for East Europe with headquarters in Prague.
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A shipment of rubber, believed
to be
destined for
Communist
China, is about to leave Djakarta.
The shipment would
constitute
Indonesia's first violation of the UN-sponsored embargo, although
the shipping orders are so written as to evade official respons-
ibility for the rubber's destination.
Indonesia's gradual withdrawal from close association with
the West has been highlighted in its relations with the Nether-
lands during the past year. In July, the last members of the
Netherlands military mission departed. Indonesian authorities
admit that political factors make it inadvisable to obtain re-
placements from other sources, despite the serious deficiencies
in the training of the armed forces. Indonesia and the Nether-
lands agreed at The Hague in August to abrogate the Netherlands-
Indonesian Union and related agreements on military, cultural
and foreign affairs. The Communists have demanded that the
Indonesian government make further demands that would adversely
affect the extensive Dutch investments in Indonesia.
The question of Dutch control over West New Guinea looms as
a significant issue which may carry Indonesia still further away
from the West. Communist propaganda has consistently supported
Indonesian claims to the area, and recently has given the issue
increased attention. President Sukarno told the American
ambassador in June and again in July that if the United States
delays too long in settling such problems as New Guinea in
accordance with Asian wishes, Soviet propaganda may win out
among the Indonesian people. Sukarno's remark has the ring of
political blackmail, at a time when Indonesia is threatening
to take the issue to the United Nations.
Prime Minister Ali observed, after Chou's talks with Nehru
in late June, that the "balance of power in the world seems to
be shifting to new positions." Indonesia has refused to consider
membership in a Southeast Asian defense organization. It has
suggested instead a political-economic alliance of African and
Asian countries and is reported to be considering a nonaggression
pact with Communist China.
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CASTILLO ARMAS REGIME IN GUATEMALA W;NS FIRST CRUCIAL TEST
Although the Castillo Armas regime successfully reasserted
its authority after the 2-3 August fighting in Guatemala City
between a rebellious army garrison and an encampment of Castillo's
irregular "Army of Liberation," the regular army still holds the
ultimate political power in Guatemala. It will continue to be
a potential threat to the regime until bitterness engendered
in the June revolution has been neutralized,
The outbreak 'Highlighted the need for Castillo to replace
unreliable officers and build up a personal following in the
regular forces. Known leaders of the uprising have been arrested
and Castillo is believed to be in a position to weed out other
unreliable elements. Thus far, he has retained the backing of
Colonel Elfego Monzon, representative of the regular army on
the three-man junta.
Castillo has reneged on his forced promise of 2 August to
disband the "Liberation" forces, however, and this "army" of an
estimated 600 men now encamped near the Honduran border may
prove a source of serious friction between him and the regular
army. The "Army of Liberation" is believed to have aircraft
ready for use against the regular forces in the event of a
further outbreak.
Castillo has great popular appeal in the capital, but his
backing is unorganized and could dissipate quickly. The success
of the Castillo regime?s efforts to secure the support of
politically important labor and the key "intellectual" strata
will depend on its ability to eliminate certain Communist
practices without repudiating the social and economic advances
made since the popular revolution of 1944. Some important
segments of labor are already being subjected to reprisals from
management for their activities under Arbenz, and this could cost
the government whatever labor support it now has. In view of
the close ties between the Castillo regime ane Washington in the
minds of many Latin Americans, any widespread identification of
it as "reactionary" would be adverse to United States interests.
On 4 August, Castillo told Ambassador Peurifoy he was seriously
considering calling elections for a constituent assembly "in a
month or so." He felt that his present popularity would assure
the election of a friendly body which would ratify acts of the
junta and elect him provisional president.
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INDIAN SOCIALIST PARTY DETERIORATING AS A POLITICAL FORCE
The Praja Socialist Party, which is still the strongest
threat to Congress Party control of India, has during the past
year adopted a visionary, long-range program antipathetic to for-
malized political activity and has failed to develop an organiza-
tion in depth. By the time of the next national elections in
1956, therefore, it may have become an ineffective political force.
In the national elections of 1951-52, the Socialist Party won
10.5 percent of the votes cast, as opposed to the Congress Party's
44.9 percent. Since then, the Socialists have been strengthened
by mergers with the Peasants, Workers, and Peoples Party in 1952
and with the Forward Bloc (Subhasist) Party in 1953. They now
hold the balance of power in the coalition government of Andhra
state. The Socialists also head a minority government in
Travancore-Cochin, though they are dependent on Congress support.
They have made small gains in by-elections throughout the country,
probably winning the allegiance of disillusioned voters who favored
the Communists in 1951-52. These developments suggest that Social-
ist strength might grow in the near future.
There have been several developments in the past year which
point to a contrary view, however. In late 1953, the Socialists
adopted an impractical, long-range program aimed at greater au-
tonomy for local governments, decentralization of industry, and
creation of a'nonparty mass movement of a Gandhian type which
would concentrate on village self-government and economic improve-
ment. The purpose of the plan is to effect the moral regeneration
of India, with inspiration springing from the village level.
This program was foreshadowed as early as June 1953, when Jai
Prakash Narain, India's foremost Socialist, emphasized the nonpar-
tisan nature of the land reform movement in which he was partici-
pating. It was formulated by the time the Socialist Party con-
vened in late December 1953. The plan apparently grew out of
Narain's feeling that strong moral leadership could never develop
within a government or party structure because government and
party thinking usually aim at benefiting the organization rather
than the people. On this sentiment, Narain seems to have grafted
Vinoba Bhave's ideas of universality and self-sacrifice as applied
to his "bhoodan yagna" or land reform movement.
This development is a partial answer to the controversy cur-
rent in India as to whether Narain, who is afflicted with dia-
betes and has kept himself in the background for two years, has
abandoned politics or whether he expects to re-enter the political
arena at a later date. In a sense, the whole Socialist Party has
abandoned politics, probably at least until 1956.
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Both Narain and Asoka Mehta, India's number-two Socialist,
have made it clear in conversations and writings that their pro-
gram envisages the almost complete breakdown of centralized
authority in India and practically complete village autonomy.
It aims at the development of cottage industries rather than
heavy industry. Inspiration for the whole scheme is to come
from the peasants themselves.
AL
Despite a body of thinking that this new Gandhian type of
movement will capture popular imagination, both Narain and Mehta
have admitted the visionary nature of the plan and their doubts
as to how a movement can grow without organization or centralized
leadership. Mehta further admitted in May 1954 that the program
was not aimed at the elections of 1956-57, since most Socialist
leaders are too young to command public respect and since there
is no hope of winning elections while Nehru is alive. Moreover,
the Congress Party actually undercut the Socialist move early
in 1f;54 by recognizing the possible threat of a new Gandhian move-
ment and by itself adopting the principles of village self-help
and the promotion of cottage industries as the foundation of its
next Five-Year Plan.
The leaders of the Praja Socialist Party are of such vari-
able character, furthermore, and are engaged in such diverse
activities that they can hardly give effective direction to their
program. Narain has formally dedicated his life to the land re-
form movement. Mehta was elected to parliament in mid-May lt?54
and presumably now has less time than before to direct party
operations.. The prestige of Acharya Kripalani, another leader
who seceded from the Congress Party in 1951, is declining, and
Rain Manohar Lohia, the Socialists' only rabble rouser, inspires
little popular confidence.
Finally, the party itself has not yet developed either the
organization or the leadership in depth necessary to take over
administration of state and national governments.
With no immediate goal toward which to work, and with their
leadership engaged in diverse activities, therefore, it seems
a~.uiost impossible for the Socialists to constitute a formidable
c'.Zal.lenge to the dominant Congress Party by 1956.
CO TIAL
13 Aug 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Page 18
Approved For Release 2004/06/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A000300160001-3