INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 137
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1965
• Content Type: MF

SECRET
30 June 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CIA Imagery Analysis Division, NPIC
SUBJECT: Inspector General's Report
1. Attached is the Inspector General's Report and
a numerical listing of the recommendations contained
in the report accompanied by the name of the division
or divisions responsible for commenting on each recom-
mendation.
2. Will you please furnish me by 9 July 1965
your written comments on each of the recommendations
indicated as well as any general comments you might have
on specific parts, or the whole of the study, or any
other recommendations that you feel are of interest to
you.
Assista?rprpministration NPIC
Attachments: (2)
IG Report
List of Recommendations
`?????????????
GROUP 1
EXCluind from aqto70!:-
declassification
se 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
BEST COPY
? Available
THROUGHOUT
FOLDER
6/24/98
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
-/ TOP SFCPT
IDEALIST/MINA/
1)e. If;5 5
Ivir./4/10RAS-1` TM FOR: 1)eputy rdrector of Central h telligence
Inspector Coeval's 'survey of the National
,Thotograpiiic Interpretation Center
I. :iubmitted herewith is a report covering the inspection
of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (D:ric), non.
Also attached for your signature is a memorandun. 1:o the Deputy
Director for Intelligence requesting 'nis response within sixty
days to the recommendations contained in the report.
2. The last Inspector General's Survey of NPIC was made
in 1962. I am impressed at how remarkably little elange there
has been in the operating problems IN:PIC faces. Most of the con-
clusions we reached three years ago are still valid today. I am
also impressed by the accomplishments of NPIC sirce 1962 in
coping with its steadily and rapidly rising workload. While its
personnel strength was a little better than doubling, film inputs
to it were increasing some fourteen-fold.
25X1A
3. The requirements of the intelligence coirn unity for
photographic intelligence have always exceeded the production
capacities of )PIC, and probably always will. Similarly, the
capability to collect new photography has expanded at a faster
rate than NP/C's production capacity, and the scheduling of
individual satellite missions has been made without regard for
availability of photo interpretation manpower. We saw a deve-
loning need three years ago to establish a Committee on Exploita-
tilm at the USIB level, and it is now time to create such a mechanism.
4. Although there has been a revolutionary expansion of
the photographic collection capability, the techniques for inter-
preting photography have evolved much more slowly. Little
attention has been given to the need for compatibility between
collection systezr s design and exploitation techniques. NPIC has
been and, as things now stand, will continue to be faced with having
to resort to extensive manual operations in its analysis of photography.
Approved For Release 2002/00,/,97914-1781T00990R000100
140001-7
25X1A
Approved For Release 29910841p!iiIA;RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
IDEALIST/LOROliA,
?
5. NPIC has compiled a forecast of personnel and
financial resources required over the next five years to cope
with the increasing volume and improving ground resolution
of film expected to be delivered to it for interpretation. The
forecast is based on NPIC's past experience factors in handling
present film formats and on professional judgments of the
impact of improved systems whose design parameters are
known. NPIC sees a need by 1970 for a personnel strength
25X1A &Innis/larking' and an annual program cost in excess of
25X1A In terms of NPIC's experience to date, these
figures may well be conservative. The forecast addresses it-
self only to the impact of major new systems that can be expected
to operate within the next five years and the design specifications
of which are known. The state of the art of sensor systems
desitin is moving rapidly toward search and surveillance capabilities
25X1D
As these systems come into
operation, the dimensions of the exploitation problem will
radically change.
6. We devoted particular attention to the technological
aspects of photo interpretation. It appears to us that the break-
through needed to materially cut the human-hours spent in photo
interpretation, if break-through is in fact possible, will be found
in vastly improving the integration of collection systems design
with photo interpretation techniques. Because this is a highly
technical field, there would be much to be gained from a cross-
disciplinary examination of photo interpretation technology and
procedures by a panel of competent consultants. I have had con-
versations with the Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
toward this end and have furnished him with a list of individuals
whom we have identified as being particularly well qualified to
participate. The Director has already signed a letter to the
Chairman of his Scientific Advisory Board requesting that such
a panel be formed.
7. If the panel of consultants is unable to arrive at
workable recommendations for substantially reducing man-hour
Approved For Release
?,1*
25X1A
25X11A
- a - 140694-65/1
25X1
TOP S.:7.r.T 25X1
R14)1121;:qTA?RDIP81T00990R000100440130 it4v, A
CONTROL SJTr-
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
T7P
per foot of furl factors within the near future through farther
automating of photo interpretation techniques. then I see no
alternative to being prepared to begin rapidly expanding the
Agency's allocation of personnel ar', financial resources to
Approved
'Earrnan
Inspector General
25X1A
- 3 - 40694-65/125X1A
For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TCP
SUET
List of Recommendations
Recommendation Action
1 Office of the Director
2 Office of the Director
3 TID and PDS
4 IPD, TID & PDS
5 PDS
6 P&DS and SS
7 PDS
8 Office of the Director
9 SS
10 SS TID, IPD, PDS and 1DV' g
11 ice of the Director
12 f's 164.
13 SS
14 SS and TID
15
16
17
18 ?""
19
20
21
Office of the Director
ice of the Director
F.',,
PAG
d SS pa Ito
PSD, Records Management Officer
P. "3
SECRET
7.: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
?
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
IDEC:T/LZaNA/
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF rl-ti;
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC IN TEit TATION CENTER
June 1965
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
CoPY2-3f
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07wr piA-tripp81Toow
lgool4000tit"DLE VIA
iu CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY.
ir!!!eT r ? ,
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TrP StCPF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Evolution of the Role of Photography in Intelligence
Collection and Analysis
25X1A
Page
1
Comparison of the NPIC Workload With That of Three
Years Ago 5
NPIC's Accomplishments to Date 9
Projection of the NPIC Workload Over the Next Five Years 13
Organization and Procedures for Photo Interpretation 19
The Imbalances Among Collection Capability, NPIC's
Exploitation Capacity, and the Requirements of
NPIC's Customers 29
Integrated Systems Design in Photographic Reconnaissance 40
The Status of Automation at NPIC 51
Equipment, Stereo Viewing, and Research and Development 72
Hand-Held Photography 86
Management 91
Security Controls on Photographic Intelligence 114
The Long-Range Outlook 115
Tab A - Extracts From 1962 Inspector General's Survey
of NPIC
Tab B - Computer-Supported Equipment at NPIC
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP !MIT
40694-65
25X1A
1A
25X1A
25X1A
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TO? SWIFT
25X1A
LN TR ODUC TION
Most of the conclusions reached as a result of our Survey
of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in 1962
are still valid. (See extracts at Tab A). The intervening years
have brought remarkably little change in the operating problems
NPIC faces. Three years ago NPIC was jammed into the Steuart
Building, a converted garage, and was using inadequate and anti-
quated processing equipment; it then had an on-duty strength of
against an authorised strength of
the recently reconstructedj
Today it is housed in 25X1A
which was functionally 25X1A
designed for photo-interpretation purposes. It has an on-duty
strength of nagainst an authorized strength of
Thus, 25X1A
personnel strength over the last three years has more than doubled.
Why then should NPIC still be operating under the same sort of
near-desperate work pressures? The answer is to be found in the
film inputs to NPIC. While personnel strength was a little better
than doubling, film inputs were increasing some fourteen-fold.
Our survey uncovered essentially the same set of problen-is we
treated then and our conclusions today differ only in degree from
those of three years ago.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : 510-FWIT00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
VIP SECRET N'?
177:-1
25X1A
EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF PHOTOGRAPHY IN INTELL/GENCE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSId
1. The three years since the last Inspector General's
survey of NPIC have seen peacetime reconnaissance of denied
areas by photography firmly established as a major instrument of
national intelligence collection. A substantial portion of U.S.
knowledge of Soviet and Communist Chinese weaponry, hardware
development and testing, military programming, military inter-
vention abroad, and economic activity was initially obtained from
overhead photography, and much of it is still unobtainable in like
quantity or quality from any other sensor or h.urnan collection
capability.
2. Human intentions and activities in developmental labora-
tories within denied areas are only indirectly accessible, if at all,
to sensor collection systems. On the other hand, sensor systems
(such as COIViINT, ELINT, photography.
) today
provide the only partially assured access to the visible manifestations
of the results of plans and development in areas protected by efficient
security and police systems. Sensor collection systems and human
source collection systems are clearly complementary in intelligence
collection; however, it is our view that photography is now established
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 ktA-RDP81T00990R000100140
25X1 D
25X1 D
- TOP SECRET
IDEAL - 2:-AA
au tne Lean contrioutor to Iliat1011*4. intelligence estimates on tne
military postures of the Soviet Union and of Communist China.
3. Sensor systems, with photographic collection and
exploitation as a prime example, have been caught in a dynamic
and sophisticated post-war technological revolution. Major systems
innovations, including high- and low-level aircraft and satellite
systems, are occurring at the rate of at least one every three to
five years. For example, the KII-4 system appeared in 1960, the
Although we have witnessed and are witnessing a revolutionary
expansion of the photographic collection capability, the techniques
for discovering the intelligence contained in photography have evolved
much more slowly.
4. United States photographic systems development is
currently, and very belatedly, entering the era of integrated systems
design. The key principle, now increasingly appreciated, is that no
element of the collection device may be varied without significant
impact on many other elements of the total collection/exploitation
design concept. All three current U.S. operating systems, the U..2
25X1A and the 1CH-4
25X1A
meet only partially and inadequately
the technical exploitation requirements of NPIC. Despite certain
design deficiencies in the U.S. photographic reconnaissance
effort of the first ten years, the effort has achieved a significant
- 3 -
25X1A
4:1694-406X1 A
S
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
?/' TOP SECRET
.1DEALIST/CORONA/
25X1A
capability to conduct repetitive search and identification of activity
in denied areas and is now moving rapidly into an era of continuing
surveillance and analysis of change in known targets.
5. Concepts within the U.S. intelligence community for the
complete exploitation of photography and for integrated a.nalysis of
all other sources of information, by photo interpreters, intelligence
analysts, and estimators are at an early stage of evolution. Some
current trends include:
a. An intensification of area specialisation to match
initial functional specialisation.. e.g. in guided missiles,
in nuclear weapons and installations, or in electronics.
b. An expanding effort to improve data processing
and retrieval systems, utilising all-source information,
and serving both photo interpreters and intelligence analysts.
6. In the last analysis, photo interpretation deals in Judgments,
not in facts, particularly given today's state of the art in controlling
ground resolution in high-altitude photography. Photo interpretation
is a human skill that can be supported by but not replaced by auto-
mation. The key to continuing and improving effectiveness in the
exploitation of photography is free communication between the photo
interpreter, the analyst, and the consultant, with each acquiring
greater competence in the others skills.
25X1A 25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-111:11581T00990R000100140001-7
? ? ?
40694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
? TOP grci
25X1A
COMPARISON OF THE NPIC WORKLOAD WITH THAT
OF THREE YFARS AGO
I. A valid comparison of today's workload in NPIC with
that of any prior year requires that many variables must be taken
into account. An indication of the tremendous increase can be
obtained from comparing such factors as number of aircraft and
satellite missions flown, linear feet of film delivered, square
miles of the earth's surface imaged on photography, or the number
of COMOR targets designated for coverage. None of these criteria,
however, take into account what can be seen on the film and can be
described and measured accurately. The more the photo inter-
preter can see on the film, the more time he must spend in searching
out fine detail. As a corollary, the more details the photo inter-
preter can observe, the more numerous and more complex are the
requirements levied on him.
2. The time required to interpret photography varies with
the volume of film delivered, the number et targets covered, and image
quality. Image quality is affected by such factors as the resolving
capability of the camera system, the film, and the film processing
and viewing equipment, and by cloud cover, obliquity. haze, snow,
darkness, sun angle, contrast, vehicle altitude. etc.
25X1A
- 5 - 40694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7 25X1A
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VI
-
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
1:)ersonne1
co
if\
CY\
P5X1A H
\C)
0\
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
40694-65
TOP SECRET
TCP SECIVT
11AALI3T/C:.21
25X1A
3. A Photo Nk orking T.anel,, under the technical direction of
Or. .!=iidney Drell of Stanford University, spent some three months
laut year studying problems of image quality. The 1-ane1ls principal
conclusion was that much work is yet to be done in getting accurate,
quantitative n?essures of image quality. although precise measure-
ment of image quality is not yet possible, there are certain yardsticks
that may be used in arriving at a gross estimate of how quality has
improved over recent years.
a. When what we now know as the KH-4 system first
became operational in 1960 it delivered phbtography with
a ground resolution of perhaps 100 feet. By 1962 it was
delivering photography with 25-foot resolution and occa-
sional frames on which it improved to perhaps 10-15 feet.
Now the KH-4 system is quite regularly delivering resolu-
tion on the order of 10-15 feet.
TUP SUR
25X1D
25)6A
140694-65 25X1A
25X1A
IDLE VIA
?
?
TOP ST"IFT ?
25X1A
4. Vastly improved image quality has been paralleled by a
geometric expansion in number of missions flown, in film footage
delivered, and in COMOR targets covered. The graph reproduced
on the opposite page compares the various ways of gauging workload
for each of the years 1958, 1961, and 1964. The scale is relative
and is arrived at by adjusting all elements to a common norm in
1961. The same information is conveyed statistically in the chart
25X1D
that follows.
S. Although none of these statistics taken singly is an
accurate measure of workload, taken in the aggregate and combined
with dramatically improved image quality they add up to an explosive
expansion of the workload over a very short time. We can further
illustrate this statistical presentation in these three observations:
a. NPICes film holdings at the end of 1964 were almost
25X1A
double what they were at the beginning of that year.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : C14RIEW81T00990R000100140001-7 40694-65
nD prrr.","
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
b. Aircraft missions flown in 1964 approximately
equalled the total of all missions flown from 1956
through 1963.
c. Eleven KH-4 missions in 1964 approxixnately
equalled in film footage the product of all 30 satellite
missions flown from 1960 through 1963.
6. We include a curve on the graph showing personnel
growth, primarily because this is a good place to make the com-
parison. We will speak to the subject of staffing later in the report;
however, it is pertinent to observe here that it is evident that
personnel growth is badly out of step with the expansion of the
workload.
25X1A
10694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-kl5P81T00990R000100140001-7 25X1A
TCP "CRET HAN.=
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
V":17
. ,
NPIC'. ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE
25X1A
1. NPIC has been remarkably successful in building and
In maintaining an establishment capable of a continuous, high
quality performance. This conclusion is supported both by our
own observations during the course of the survey and by the
comments of those outside NPIC whom we interviewed. The
criticisms we heard were niggling and almost invariably were
preceded by a qualifying comment to the effect that "NPIC is
doing a whale of a good job." Officers in the Foreign Technology
Division of the Air Force Systems Command and in the Strategic
Air Command, both of which we visited, were high in their praise
of the timeliness and the quality of NPIC's readout of photography.
2. NPIC has scanned every foot of film delivered to it.
and examined some of it in great depth, to discover new targets and
to report changes in those already identified. However, much of
the film in the NPIC library has not been exhaustively exploited.
Installations sometimes must be reported as unidentifiable as to
function simply because there is not time to pore over the film and
compare an installation with other similar objects on other photo-
graphy, which might lead to identification. Much could be done in
the field of area studies of industry. mining. transportation.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : Cl4-EDP81T00990R000100140001-71-140694-65
TUP
25X2
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP Sm.?.
agriculture, and the like, but the necessary photo interpreter
ivanpower is lacking. It is also true that NPIC occasionally rt irises
something that comes back to haunt it. The failure to discover the
SAM sites
which may have contributed to the loss of
mission CO25C last January is an example. There have
been other instances in which targets were not discovered at first
opportunity either at NPIC or other photographic interpretation
centers.
3. We are not inclined to be at all critical of NPIC's occa-
sional failures to discover something that is there to be seen. Per-
fection in photo interpretation is unattainable. The viewing instrument
is the human eye, supported by various mechanical optical devices,
and the hurran is fallible. We spent days watching photo interpreters
at work and several hours ourselves at light tables looking at film
through various magnifying viewers. We are mpressed with the
skill of experienced photo interpreters in picking out objects of
intelligence interest from thousands of feet of flin of highly variable
image quality. An excellent example was the finding of the SAM site
near Hanoi, only a small portion of which was peeking out from under
heavy cloud cover.
4. We are InIpressed with the TDli of NPIC's Tnanasternent.
By and large, it is a forward-looking group--proud of its past 25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/01 IVIA-RDP81T00990R00010014000
T-n errinrT
40694-65
S
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R0001001400\1-7
TP suRrH
MAO/CORONA
25X1A
accomplishments, aware of areas in which improvement might be
made in the present organisation, and planning realistically for
what it must do to cope with the problems of the future. It is a
flexible organisation?one that is constantly undergoing change.
It has been careful, for the most part, to avoid committing itself
to policies, programs, or techniques that would impair its flexibility.
The graph reproduced opposite page 7 demonstrates that NPIC's
workload has increased several times as rapidly as personnel
strength. The fact that NPIC has been able to keep up with this
disproportionate increase is a tribute to its managerial pkill in
devising more effective organisational approaches to photo inter-
pretation and in finding ways to do mechanically many of the tasks
that once had to be done by hand--as well as a tribute to the
motivation, devotion, and stamina of all of its employees.
5. NPIC has an excellent recor4 of finding solutions to
problems that are its to solve. Unhappily, most of the major
impediments to an even more effective NPIC performance are
beyond its control or influence. It is these latter problems, the
ones that are outside NPIC's sphere of authority, to which the bulk
of this report is addressed.
6. A major share of the credit for NPIC's success goes
to its Director. He is an unusual combination of dynamic leader
25X1'
- 11 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100t410694-65
waat.44
T^? SrCRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
IDEMIST/CONNA1
25X1A
and technologist recognized as eminent in his field. He is highly
esteemed within his own organization and is respected by those
outside it. He has shown great skill in exercising functional
control of an organization over which he has incomplete administrative
control.
25X1A
- 12 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET RANDLE VIA
25X1A
140694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP S.r:CIET .-
11;:a!STAIIREA,
PROJECTION OF THE NPIC WORKLOAD
OVER THE NEXT FNE YEARS
25X1A
1. In 1963 the Director, NPIC, initiated a computer-based
work measurement program. The program provides for detailed
inputs to a computer on manpower utilization and production
efforts of the Center and permits manipulation of these data to
meet the needs of NPIC management. The system furnishes NPIC
management with an accurate measure of the man-hour costs for
more than 150 activities carried out by the Center and in time should
be highly useful in indicating the ratios of input and cost of each
service to all others measured. Statistics alone cannot indicate
an optimum mix for the resources to be invested; this mix is in
the final analysis a matter for management decision.
2. If we take any exception to NPIC's five-year projection
it is to the use of the currently valid ratio between support and
photo interpretation needs over the five-year apan. The statistical
base from which support man-hours are projected was compiled
from work records of support components some of which are sorely
understaffed. As these support components approach authorized
strength and more man-hours become available, we believe that
the ratio between support and photo interpretation will drop and
- 13 ?
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TCP S!!IFT kANDLE VIA
CONTROL SYSTEAdiontswan
IDEAIIST/CZRGNA
TOP SECRI.TI
25X1 A
the required increase in support personnel will be somewhat less
than now envisioned by NPIC. However depending on future deve-
lopments in both the technical and requirements areas the ?'PIC
projection may well be conservative rather than inflated.
3. The documents of the Committee on Overhead Recon-
naissance (COMOR)/USIS that we have studied reveal that KH-4
missions are to be launched at the rate of ten per year, plus two
additional missions primarily for mapping purposes. These docu-
ments discuss the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) capability
25X1 D
4. We find no evidence of concern in the COMOR/USIB
documents that photo interpretation resources would be adequate
before determining the frequency of KH-4
Taking NPIC experience factors over the last year, we calculate
25X1 D
that the Center has enough photo interpreter regular time manpower
- 14 - 25X1A 40694-65
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: 960401971009 0R03M61.0001-71-1ANC.)LE VIA I
25X1D
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
IDEALIST/COROM
TOP SECRET
devoted to the national effort to coulplete the immediate exploitation
(first and second phase readout) of ten KH-4 missions
No regular time,
however, would then remain for work on detailed projects, which
during calendar year 1964 occupied about one-third of the photo
Interpreter time devoted to the national effort.
5. NPIC must continue to work detailed projects because
25X1A
2
X1
the immediate exploitation is done rapidly and yields much
densed reporting, and it is likely, in our judgment, that the
con-
proportion
of time devoted to detailed projects must be increased.
25X1
25X1D
anticipate
NPIC must
a growing demand from its customers for more detailed
interpreta-
tion. Thus, NPIC appears destined
to face a workload expanding
at
a faster rate than its peraonnel resources,z?
pe U no new
collection
25X1D
siLgemas were
nection that
to be introduced. It
is pertinent to note in
this con.
25X1D
25X1D
A single U-Z mission over the
USSR during the period 19564960 averaged
SO targets and 150.000
square nautical miles of coverage.
25X 1A
6. New systems are just over the horison, howwver, and
the outlook for NPIC is grim. Officers in the DD/S&T have been
?I
Approved For Release 2002/0g/0/75: tIA-RDP8,1T00990FilfAi11ti140F 40694-6525X
TOP SECR
HANDLE IP
A
25X1A
40694-65
S
25X1D
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRIT---1
IDEAUST/CSONA
discussing with NPIC a concept for designing a SUPER CORONA
which could become operational within 12 to 18 months
The SUPER CORONA
would be a modified KH-4 system delivering in four missiors
the equivalent of the 1964 film yield from eleven KH-4 missions.
Since four missions of 20 days' duration each would not provide
the continuity of coverage of denied areas generally required by
the U.S. intelligence community, it is very possible that laaost
missions and a substantial new increase in NPIC workload q,22.411
be forthcoxningfromn
25X1A
25X1
25X1D
Approved For Release 2002/08/0,7 16IA-RDP81T00990R0001001400
01-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET -
IDEALIST/CORONA/
8. The DD/ESAT is also working on the design of a search
system as an eventual replacement for the KH-4.
9. NPIC has compiled a forecast of personnel and
financial resources required over the next five years to cope
with the increasing volume and improving ground resolution of
film expected to be delivered to it for interpretation. The
forecast is based on NPIC experience factors in handling present
film formats and on professional judgments of the impact of
improved systems whose design parameters are known. NIC
and an 25X1
sees a need by 1970 for a personnel strength of
annual program cost of 25X1A
10. In terms of NPIC's experience to date. these Lijit....ires
may well be conservative. These estimates concern only the
impact of major new collection systems that can be expected to
operate within the next five years and the design specifications of
which are known. The state of the art of sensor system design for
operation against denied areas is moving rapidly toward search and
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7 25X1A
- 17 - 40694-43
25X1A
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP-SECA
IDEALISIINRONA
25X1A
surveillance capabilities that could afford continuous manned
observation, selective use of multi-sensor capabilities, and
electronic delivery of data from collection vehicles on command.
As these systems come into operation, the dimensions of the
exploitation problem will radically change.
Approved For Release 2002/1?/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100
40001-
694-65 25X1A
?
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP crepr7
25X1A
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES FOR PHOTO INTERPRETATION
1. NSCID No. 8, effective 18 January 1961, specifies that a
National Photographic Interpretation Center shall be provided as a
service of common concern by the Director of Central Intelligence
In consultation with the interested members of the USD3. Among
the other key points of the directive are these:
a. No complete separation of interest is possible
or desirable in photographic intelligence activities.
b. Departments and agencies represented on the U.S.
Intelligence Board shall continue to be individually
responsible for photographic interpretation . in support
of departmental or agency responsibilities
c. The Director of NPIC shall be designated by the
Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with
the interested USIB members and with the concurrence
of the Secretary of Defense.
d. The Intelligence Board departments and agencies
engaged in photographic intelligence production shall
Jointly provide appropriate personnel and other support
for the Center, as agreed by them with the Director of
Central Intelligence. Such supporting personnel shall be
functionally under the direction of the Director. NP/C.
for Joint activities, but shall remain administratively
responsible to their parent organisations.
e. The administration of NPIC in time of war shall
be transferred to the Secretary of Defense.
f. The NPIC shall engage in or sponsor, as appro-
priate. the development of specialised equipment for the
intelligence exploitation of photography, and shall provide
Information about such specialised equipment to interested 25X1A
- 19 694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990RatIAM40001-
PP SP.:PET
HANDLE VIA
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
MEM
N \TION \l, 1110TOGR \NW: INTERPRI, IXIION CENrITIZ
CIA/NPIC
DETACHMENT
DIA/NPIC
DETACHMENT
I
11114 EC1111{
I )Il'( DM FA :FOR
TI I)II{ EC:1'111i
ASST FOR
ADMINISTRATION
ASST FOR
OPERATIONS
ASST FOR
PHOTO ANALYSIS
ASST FOR
PLANS & DEVELOPMENT
MANAGEMENT
SERVICES STAFF
SUPPORT STAFF
OPERATIONS STAFF
PHOTO ANALYSIS GROUP
PLANS &
DEVELOPMENT STAFF
TECHNICAL
INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION
PUBLICATIONS
DIVISION
A. ? roved For Relea
INFORMATION
PROCESSING
DIVISION
?I'Altl? I
COLLATERAL
SUPPORT
DIVISION
PRODUCTION
SERVICES
DIVISION
Approved For Release 2002/08/91p: RIOLIIDP81T00990R000100140001-7
INALISTAMIA/
elements of the intelligence community for their
possible use or further adaptation.
g. In discharging its responsibilities, the NPIC
shall consult, as appropriate, with individual depart-
ments, agencies and committees of the U.S. Intelligence
Board. The intelligence chief of each department or
agency represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board shall
coordinate photographic intelligence activities within
his parent organisation with the National Photographic
Interpretation Center.
2. At the time NPIC was established as a national Center,
the DCI elected to continue its subordination within the Directorate
for Intelligence where it had existed since 1956 as Project HTAUTOMAT.
In the DDI it appears on the organisational chart at the office level,
equivalent to the Offices of Central Reference, Current Intelligence,
Research and Reports. etc.
3. The internal organisational chart of NPIC is reproduced
on the opposite page. Some explanation of the chart is in order
because it does not reveal the functional aligrurents among the
various components.
a. The Photo Analysis Group (P.A.G.) under the
Assistant for Photo Analysis is the designation of the
component engaged in the national effort, the fulfillment
of national photo interpretation requirements, which
include the immediate exploitation of all film delivered
to NPIC.
25X1A 25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : ClARDP81T00990R000100140I01 - 20 -
TOP SECR 1HANDLE VIA
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07lft-VP81T00990R000100140001-7
IDEALISTACIDA
25X1A
b. Photo interpretation in response to departmental
requirements is carried out by separate CIA and DIA
Detachments.
c. The Assistants for Administration, for Operations.
and for Plans and Development function in support of the
Director, NPIC. in carrying out his responsibilities for
the management of the Center.
d. The five support divisions named in the lower row
of boxes work directly in support of the photo interpretation
effort, both the national effort and the departmental efforts.
It should be noted that NSCID No. 8 specifies that support
to departmental efforts shall be furnished only to the
extent that such departmental support does not degrade
support of the national effort.
4. The sequence of steps followed and the products generated
in the exploitation of photography at NPIC are outlined in very con-
densed form below. Illustrative data cited relate to the processing
of satellite photography, but are applicable in the main to aircraft
missions as well.
5. Photo interpretation as performed by NPIC falls into
two categories: a) immediate readout of photography as received
- Z 1 -
25X1A
25X1A
40694.65
Approved For Release 2002/08LQZ pP81T009901/gppR140001-7
lilt' SUM HANDLE VIA
PRAIIST CA A
Alkr
25X1D
prove or e ease 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TT?
JULlL. 1/
fron reconnaissance missions, and b) detailed readout of all
photograph,/ available in the NPIC film library covering a
specific target of national interest. The immediate readout
operation is tasked with a) identification and analysis of signifi-
cant change in COMOR selected priority targets and with h) search
of the photography and reporting of new targets. Detailed
analysis is concerned with the exhaustive study of particular
targets to appreciate their operating systerrs and their strategic
or tactical implications.
Preparations for Readout
6. The selection of targets and the designation of the
25X1A
1J0
priority sequence in which they are to be covered is the respo.n- A Deo M
Powiek %or% ?
sibility of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR)
under USIB. COMOR representatives working with the represen-
tatives of the National Reconnaissance Office (NR0), DoD..begin
- 22 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R0001
40694-65
01-7
25X1A
25X1D Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP Srf,'"FT
IDEAUST/r '1' PI I
In in ediate Exploitation
rriefing Boards - Vrior to its receipt of the pboto-
graptiy, i\:"1:-IC selects froi, anon g he rrost in portarxt targets
or which coverage is anticipated a list of from 25 to 75 items
for whic'i it schedules the preparation of enlarged, annotated
prints, or ?)riefing boards. Briefing board teams check these
targets i-omediately upon receipt of the filn and, where cloud
conditions and quality permit, extract the images for expedite
processing. The sets of briefing boards are customarily pro-
duced during the first 24 hours and utilized in briefing the senior
officials of the U. Government. Many sets of prints and view-
graphs for projection are subsequently generated and disseminated
arror.g participating U.S. organization.s.
9. First Phase Report - The initial investigation of
Incoming photography is concentrated on analysis of the status of
known targets bearing COMOR priority designations. As of the
second week of June 1965 there were 284 K11-4
active, COMOR priority targets. The Photo Analysis Group (PAG)
at ?PIC rnanages the readout operation and generates first phase
reports known variously as OAK, IPIR (Immediate Photographic
- Za.t. -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :-CJA7RDP.81,T0.099 R000100140?00
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
0694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
r?-?
25X1A
Interpretation- Report), or .IT.11/..4 (ituatior -5ummary), depending
on the type of n:issior. The results of each day of OAK readout
are disse1.7)inated by cable and by separate published installment
to the cleared TKI-{ audience throughout the world. COMOR targets
covered during the OAK are heavily concentrated on advanced
weapons and military information. hence PAG assigns the OAK
readout to teams of interpreters varying from
n number
25X1A
who are specialized in the various categories of missiles, nuclear
weapons, electronics, and order of battle including air, land, and
sea aspects. Significant new or "bonus" targets are, reported if
discovered but there is no concerted search for such items in
first phase readout.
10. Second Phase Report - Upon completion of the OAK,
the 'FAG n,anagetrent launches a detailed search of the mission
photography to identify new targets and determine significant
change in known targets. Published reporting of the second phase
readout is identified as the Mission Coverage Index (MCI). The
total NPIC target file including COMOR targets now numbers some
19,000 items. The given mission nay provide information on as
many as 3,000 of these targets.'Second phase reporting is assigned
by FAG to teams of photo interpreters who are primarily area
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :CIZ6RDP81T00990R00010014000
25X1A
40694.65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
r
TCP S7,7r
i
rather than weapons specialists and the size of the tean, effort
again may range fron, 40 to RO personnel. Unlike the OAK
which is usually completed in one to five days, the MCI requires
up to three or four weeks of readout varying with the quality of
the photography obtained.
25X1A
25X1D
--
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : -RDP81T009 R000100140001
,
- .4
40694 -21X1A
25X1
25X1
4069,4-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
< TOP Sr.flET -
MEAZ1ji,:,ROTti 25X1
25X1
Detailed Exploitation
13. Stimulated to a substantial degree by the flow of new
in/on:ration on targets contained in-the 0.AK ;rid MCI reporting,
the intelligence community levies a continuing flow of requests on
- 27
.fiipswned For Releas410120/07 : CIA-E1
?
1T00 0Ftopql0o140c01-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
-.- TOP srcRlh
for the thorough interpretation of all photog,raphy pertinent
to targets of special interest. These projects for detailed
analysis are breaking dowi today into a variety of specialized
analytical programs which 14:av !-.)e stir rf--,arized as follows:
a. Military Order of Battle (MILOB), Traffic
Analysis, Strategic Hamlet Reports* and SAM SEARCH -
The projects devoted to these reports were based on
great numbers of individual installations. They result
in separate, short, tightly formatted reports for each
installation. The SAM search requirement called for
a repeat search of photography of China to lessen the
chance of one having been nissed.
b. Other Detailed Reports - These reports require
a detailed interpretation of a single target, a complex
of targets, or a series of a relatively few closely related
targets. There is considerable variation both in the length
of reports and in the amount of work required to prepare
them.
c. Post-Mission .;upport - Conduct evaluations of
photographic collection system performance and products,
prepare product assessments, and provide data to assist
in system appraisal and improvernent.?
Approved rorlielease,2002/08/07 : CIA-RDR8,11-,0,0990130001Q91400'
4
25X1A
ILLEGIB
"T
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :/FLItRIDP81T
0099e
R000100140001-7
THE IMBALANCE", AMONG COLLF,CTION CAPABILITY,
NPIC'e;FXt OIT "LION CAPACITY, AND THF REQUIREMENTS
OF CU'4TOMFRS
1. There is a serious in balance between collection and
exploitation capabilities. Historically, recor:mendations on the
scheduling of photographic reconnaissance missions have originated
in the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), a con -
mittee of UAB. We are inforn ed that the two CIA members are
consistently outvoted by the DoD majority.
25X1A
2. V e have reviewed COMORALSIB documents over the
past several n-onths. V e find considerable attention being given
to scheduling on the basis of availability of launch vehicles,
phasing of the launch readiness cycle, and the over-riding military
requiren ents. We find no evidence, however, of consideration
being given to photo interpretation capability. The nearest thing to
it was a COMOR proposal that a mission not be launched until targets
could be selected on the basis of readout of the last previous mission.
This proposal was rejected by the NRO on the grounds that orbit
selection had to be 'lade too early in the readying cycle to permit
change based on previous mission results.
- 29 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIAZFE)FS8P1 t
,
25X1A
( I
25X1A 25X1A
40694-65
0001001?40001-7 HANDLE \PIA
TFOL, 71 ON
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : 017.V-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
3. These points illustrate the ,_extent to which collection
scheciulinc; and exploitation capability are out of phase:
inputs to.1.\ PIC in 1964 were twice those of 1963 while its pIr-
sonnel rekaources were increasing by only three per ce.nt. and
NPIC WaS overloaded in 1963; the USIB decisio to ch ten
KH-4 n ibSi0.17,3(121.1ku_t_w_o prinArily for mapping)
appears to have beers made with
no re ard to ihoto inter reter n an
? ?
er availabilit ; in a
recent instance scheduling has resulted in the delivery of film
to the tastman Kodak processing center from two satellite
missions on the same airplane.
4. Related to the need for a better match between col-
lection and exploitation capabilities is the need for closer and
earlier coordination between collection equipment design and the
nroblerns of photo exploitation. In recent years insufficient
attention has been given to the problems of photo interpretation
in designing collection systems.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : Oli(-RIr8TT00.990R000100140001-71
- 30 -
#' .;? 'H Ni)
25X1A
25X1
25X1D
25X1
25X1A
4069igkifilfik
? ? ?
5. Not only is NPIC' s production capacity out of balance
with the collection capability, but it finds itself in a perpetual,.
struggle to keep up with the needs of its customers for photo
irtelligence. NPIC has a "can-do" philosophy which unfortunately
cc.2,12.1re e of a facility with nearly unlit ited capacity
for doing alit ost anything asked of it. The backlog of detailed
projects and the delays in con pletIng then are excessive, parti-
cularly during periods of heavy fur inputs. In our interviews
with consumers at Headquarters, we often encountered the
con:ment that many more requirements could be levied on NPIC,
but they were withheld sintply because NPIC hadn't the manpower
to devote to them. On the other hand, senior management at
NPIC held that they should be the ones to decide whether TOPIC had
? t
the capability to fulfill a requiren-ent, not the potential originator.
There is .validity both positions; however, we are inclined to
agree that there is little point in submitting a new requirement
25X1A
when final reports on already .accepted requirements are long-overdue.
(I. *Part of the delay in completing ,detailed projects results'.
Iron, the fact that the photo interpreter working on a photo tnalysis
of a particular target is repeatedly interrupted ,by the demands
of x22.1;2c s . The immediate exploitation of new film
takes precedence over detailed work. A good example is Project
- 31 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81700990R0001001401 .
25X1A
40694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP Sr
No. 11499-4 concerned with a dozer or so seer! iegl y related
eniclentified installations t.t.,at are referre.c1 to as -ensitive
.iperational Coewlexes. It is apperent that the i.estallations
are of consici,.,..rable significance, but their' precise function has
no yet been discovered. The photo interpreter assigned to the
i"reject is a TTJA civilian employee working in the ;)hotsa Analysis
Group (the ,:,,roup that works on national requirer,ents). He
began his analysis or 2 ljay 1964. Through 25 tpri1 1965, he
was able to work on the project, at least part time, on 109 of the
214 days he was present for duty during the period. He had to set
the project aside at least 30 times. one of the interruptions
resulted frore his having to wait for mensuration or graphics
support; sonle resulted Iron: his being diverted to tasks of
higher priority. The project was still ircornplete as of 25 April.
For whatever reason interrupted, discontinuity_of effort is a
serious handicap, and it is a major factor in causing project backlog.
7. .{jr.other is a tendency by analysts to request that a
0.0
going project be updated photographyby.........c. of the
target acquired since the project was initiated. At the rate at which
currert reissicrnS are being flown it is almost impossible to com-
plete a lengthy project without establishing a cut-off point beyond
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 d&-RDP81T00990R0001001400I
1-7
25X1
25X1Ai
-094-0X1A
TOP Surn
15:ALIST/r)13:;,,
25X1A
which new acquisitions are to he disregarded. The analyst. of course.
is anxioes that the photo ieterpretaticrn report he receives be based
upon the latest available data, end he is inclined to add hit-and-
piece requests to his original requirement. An example is
Project C P15-64, a study made of dual HEN HOUSE radar sites
in the ..oviet Union by a senior photo interpreter in the CIA
departn ental detachment. He received the original requirement
on 7 May 1964. He completed it approximately one year later.
"While the study was in process, the photo interpreter received
six follow-up requirements, which in his judgment called for
yapipplkiiONOINIW
analysis that was implicit in the original requirement. The
requirements screening mechanisms both at Headquarters and
within NPIC failed to recognisse the redundancy of the later
requirements.
Diacontinuity of effort and piecemeal additions to the
requirement are inevitable when a single photo interpreter is
assigned to work on a project that will require a great many man-
;lours for its completion. NPIC uses the team or task force
concept in working the immediate exploitation of the new film.
At one time the Center made extensive use of the task force
technique is..., working detailed projects. With the creation of a
ate 20 2
- 33 -
004 25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP !r"IrT
Jointly staffed national effort, the task force approach to detailed
projects has all but,disappeared, and we think there. is much to
2 -
be gained by reinstituting it.
9. Discontinuity of effort and additions to requirements
before the photo analysis is con pleted are serious hindrances
to orderly production scheduling, but the real problem is that
there is simply more work to be scheduled than there are hands
available to dolt. If relief is to be found, and it must be, some
hard decisions must be made, and they are decisions to which
the intelligence community as a whole must agree. Our recom-
mendations appear at the end of this section.
10. The first step that should be taken is to cut down on
the time devotee to Ssziptkc o tatim cnx of new y.
During the 1964 calendar year, 46.6 per cent of the total photo
interpreter time available for work on national requirements was
devoted to the immediate exploitation (first and second phase)
of new photography. Immediate exploitation-accounted for 60.5
per cent of the overtime worked on the national effort. The intel-
ligence community has become accuetorred to an exploitation cycle
and a reporting sequence and formats that originated in the early
days of 1.1-2 photography. The procedures were appropriate when
A provedk ,Por Release 2002/08/07 ?
Approved For Release 2002/08/ft7p:CDP81T00990R000100140001-7
film footage and number of targets imaged were low; they have
become intolerable as film footage delivered and targets covered
have increased hundreds-fold in the era of satellite photography.
11. V e recommended three years ago that the Mission
Coverage Index (the report of the second phase scaiming operation)
be converted from a sort of encyclopedic summary to a pure
index. The recommendation was not acted upon because NPIC
could not get its acceptance by the customers. NPIC has recently
proposed to the community that it concur in a revision of NPIC's
immediate exploitation cycle to include modifications in both
first and second phase readout and reporting procedures. The
proposed revision may not be bold enough to afford .substantial
relief over the long run, but it may be bolder than the community
will tolerate. Early indications are that the community will accept
it in Its present rpodeSt form only with some reluctance.,.
12; Sorbet additional relief could be found in-immediate
exploitation by a more precise definition of targets required to be
read out immediately. The priority targets designated by COMOR
are perhaps adequate for collection guidance, but they are blade-
for the purpose of selecting targets for immediate reporting
by NPIC. A select list should be established of targets of current
35 25X1
4(494- 525X1
Approved For Releqse 2002/08/a7: clp,-RDP81TO
44: OROaalta 140, t ? -e
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 Clie-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TnPr-
IDEAUSTI/C:i' :
and indicatic?.s intelligence interest. primarily those that repre-
sent a strategic offensive or defensive threat to the United States,
ard Ts.PIC confine its first phase readout to these targets.
13. The procedures for levying requirements on NPIC
and for r:PIC's accepting then i stand in need of close and con:
ti2._v_uing_ati.e.utliwee. Requirements processing, both at Headquarters
and at 1\T-1C. is essentially a staff function, and traditionally
staff elen ents are given responsibilities that exceed their
authorities. These are our principal conclusions regarding the
requirements process:
a. There is reed for a ptrorerzer management hand
in oalsk_iplat* g and approving requirements to be levied
on NPIC.
b. There is need for a stronzer managen-lent hand
within Npic on the acceptance of requirements that call
for a commitment of resources not commensurate with
the value to be gained from the product.
c. The criteria for distinguishing between national
and departmental requirements are vague and are sus-
ceptible to n anipulation by the requestors.
d. NPIC's Advisory Committee of USIB agency
representatives, which recon nerds approval of national
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: 8ARDP81T00990R0001001400
OP -
25X1A
25X1
40694 _62,5X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Ti?
trr
projects and their priority of performance, exercises
little effective influence in its area of responsibility.
e. The needs of analysts for photo intelligence
will always exceed NPIc's production capacity?and by
a very large n argin.
14. The imbalances among collection capability, NPIC's
production capacity, and the requirements for photo intelligence
are not new. We found and reported precisely the same thing
?
three years ago. We then saw developing need for some formal
mechanism to assist in bringing collection, exploitation, and
requirements into closer harmony, but because satellite systems
were in an early stage of development, the extent of the disparity
was not then evident. It now is. EPIC cannot demand that design
details of planned collection systems be divulged to it while systems
are in development. Much of its knowledge of oncoming systems
is acquired through informal and unofficial liaison with acquaintances
in government and in industry. We think it is time to elevate the
problems of exploitation to consideration at the USIB level com-
mensurate with the attention given to collection scheduling. Our
recommendations for reducing the imbalances among collection,
exploitation, and requirements are drastic, but we are convinced
- 37 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Jr T ?
rtr.1
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SCR
lOr!'.17/?.- ?
that a rigorous approach is called for. The proposal to create
a USIB Standing Committee on "ploitation is consistent with
precedent established in DCM No. 6/1 setting up a SIGINT
Committee. We envision the role of the Committee on Exploita-
tion, as regards sensor reconnaissance, as being essentially
similar to that of the SIGINT Committee as regards signals
intelligence.
It is recommended that: No. 1
The Deputy Director for Intelligence:
a. Prepare and submit through the CIA member
of USIB a proposal for the establishment of a USIB
Committee on Exploitation (COMEX) whose function
would be to ensure a better correlation among col-
lection capability. NPIC's production capacity, and
the requirements for photo intelligence.
b.' Recommend to the Chairman of the Committee
on Exploitation that the Committee give immediate
attention to the task of establishing a priority list of
first phase readout requirements to be levied on NPIC
for accomplishment.
It is recommended that: No. 2
The Director, NPIC:
a. Abolish NPIC's Advisory Committee.
b. Establish the policy that any photo inter-
pretation requirement whose fulfillment would call
for an estimated commitment of NPIC man-hours
in excess of a prescribed maximum be referred to
- 38 ?
Approved For Release 200.2/08/07 : CIA-RDP81,T00990R000100140001-
g ?Itta 4
25X1A
40694-65
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
the US/B Committee on Exploitation for approval:
that the Director, NPIC. prescribe this maximum;
that the maximum be flexible; and that it be revised
periodically to reflect current and anticipated NPIC
workl oad s .
c. Submit to the Chairman of the UIB Committee
or r'xploitation quarterly reports detailing NPIC's
existing workload, including backlogged detailed
projects, and estimating NPIC's capability to take on
added work during the next quarter.
d. Reinstitute the practice of assigning detailed
projects to specially created task forces whenever the
project is of such magnitude as to require approval
by the USIE Committee on Exploitation.
e. If the proposed revision of the exploitation
cycle fails to gain acceptance refer the proposal to
the Committee on Exploitation for resolution by the
USIB.
- 39 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R0001001400 1-7
2,5X1A
4069445
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Top srcriT
TED MS DL 1G1
IN F.T-r(.)-I CX7/R A / II IC,' R. C( )1?11 A I ; ,A .C;E:
25X1,k;
1. of th, principal co3ic11y3ions of the iiresent,as of
tc 1)E)2,i;;Lpect1on of P" IC has beer: that the exploitation or
photo-interpretation function requires full and equal representation
at the 7lanning table in the desicr,n of photographic reconnaissance,
syster s? Stated otherwise, optimum performance of photogrtithic
recol.iiaissance requires that the design, development, operation,
and adaptation of collection vehicles (aircraft and earth satellites),
cameras, filr, and the utilization of computers in their many
supporting roles, be managed with great care for their effect
on the exploitation of the photographic product by NPIC.
2. This conclusion was steadily reinforced for the inspectors
in their many discussions with NPIC photogrammetrists and
computer programmers, who are coping daily with substitute
solutions of their data reduction and Mensuration problems due
to the failures of the systems designers to take their needs into
account. While the record on cooperation between collectors
and exploiters of photography is neither purely black nor purely
white, (see paragraph 3 below), it nevertheless strongly reflects
compartmentation, unilateral management actions, and a lack
of adequate appreciation of the fundamental requirements of
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07-: t9ATRDP81T00990R0001.0014000 -7 045-
$ T
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP Str-1
rms-r;-?
phote interpretation on the part of Systevos designers and systems
operators.
3. lhe route to cooperation between collectors and
ewploiters up to the present time has been via comolittee action.
N,'IC has participated in and provided good leadership of
'erforziiance Evaluation ream ( 'Er) post mortems of each
reconnaissance mission. _nese teams composed of IsC3IC and
cal::era ti.ariufacturer representatives have regularly reviewed
J-2 and satellite missions to analyze malfunctions in equipment,
and any degradations appearing in the photography. Such evaluation
has stimulated corrective action in satelliteicamera performance
after the given system has become operational. Similarly in the
case of satellite systems, the National Reconnaissance Office
(NO) has maintained since 1960 a Configuration Control Board
(CCB) and a sub-committee designated originally as the Systems
Engineering and Technical Development Committee, now known
as the !yetems Engineering Committee (EEC). NPIC has had
regular representation on the SEC committee but its activities
have become irregular in the past year and there has been no
meeting since January 1965. It is credited by Ni3IC with having
done useful work in securing systems modifications that better
satisfy N,'IG needs but, again, after the given system has become
- 41 -
P?ro ;OR e ease.2402/08
P 811700
' ' ?
.1 II
25X1A
406944,
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
IDEAtigicnor /
operational. As to the Configuration Control Board, NPIC has
not had representation on this Board until early in 1965. The
COB is particularly concerned with review and approval of
contracts involving system adaptation as well as development.
In summary, while much of the work of these three committees
has been useful to Nr'IC, continuity of effort and/or represent-
ation have frocri NPIC's point of view been unsatisfactory;
committee input to the design of new systems has to NAC's
present knowledge been very limited; and the NIC contribution
has not been based on close working relationships between its
specialists and those in the design laboratories and manufacturing
plants of contractors.
4. The case for representation of exploitation require-
ments in collection systems design rests on the fact that the
determinants of photographic image quality, image suitability
for measurement, and of the geographic coverage of each mission,
and photograph, are derivatives of design decision and must be
measured if at all during the actual operation of the collection
vehicle and its cameras or other sensor gear. As discussed,
for example, in the section of the inspection report dealing with
automation, the dominant approach in accommodating these
e.xploitatioh needs in present-day operating systems, the U-2,
Approvedf4pr. Release 2002/08/07.;
25)(1
7RDP81T0098APOOQ 0 140G
25X1 D
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
the KH-4,
stET
has been one of retrofit or the
addition of performance observing and recording devices
after the given systew has been ?laced in operation. rhere
are two critical limitations on design by the retrofit route.
fhe first is that in satellite reconnaissance missions only the
photography is recovered while the collection platform and
cameras are permanently lost. Hence the performance of a
new or modified component introduced during a particular
mission is extremely difficult to analyze with requisite scientific
precision. The second limitation on retrofit is that the weight
and power economies of satellite vehicles are so stringent that
many changes in configuration which are feasible and desirable
in themselves are ruled out by their probable reductions of the
performance capability of the entire system.
5. Thus the rationale for integrated systems development
effort on the part of collectors and exploiters of photography may
be stated in highly generalized terms as follows:
a. The purpose of photographic reconnaissance is
the collection and extraction of intelligence information
from images on film.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :-C4A-RDP81f 00.990R00010014D0
2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
-'TOP SECRET
IDEALIST/CORONA/
b. "t)hotograinmetry. &fined as the science of
obtaining reliable measurements of objects from their
,.)hotographic images, or, \nor, broadly, as the
technical support of photo interpretation. is now
absolutely critical to the effective interpretation of
very high-altitude photography of modern strategic
weapons, equipment, and the installations for their
production, testing, and deployment.
c. t)recise measurement of the location, attitude,
and mechanical performance of the vehicle/camera
system at each point of exposure of film is fundamental
to photogramrnetry.
d. The performance characteristics of present-day
high altitude, high speed vehicle* (particularly satellites)
preclude change of route to cover dispersed targets at
optimum camera angles, hence a high proportion of the
targets within the range of the given system camera will
be covered from widely varying angles.
e. The frame and Strip cameras employed today
yield a very narrow swath of ground coverage in vertical
perspective simplifying photogramrnetric analysis.
- 44 -
25X1A
40694-65
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP S[CR
IDEALIST/U,:ZIA
Correspondingly, they yield a high proportion of the area
of each photograph in which ground coverage is at oblique
angles which introduce distortior and require the IT ost
soplisticatecl techniques of photogrammetric analysis.
Hence, it follows, that exploitation of oblique photography
accounts for a substantial portion of NM's work, that
it yields a high proportion of the intelligence information
now being obtained froni photography, and that the relative
efficiency with which it is performed can increase most
significantly the economic performance of photographic
reconnaissance.
6. The inspectors accumulated considerable evidence
of failure on the part of systems designers and operators to take
exploitation problems into account. These failures run the gamut
from faulty design of performance measuring devices, omissions
of equipment, lack of investigation of significant problems, in-
adequate communication, to inadequate management arrangements.
a. Recording of time in binary language in data blocs
spaced at close intervals in KI-1-4
film i. highly
essential to ?PIC mission plotting computation. The
design of the time-recording data bloc does not incorporate 25X1A
- 45 -
C
e
- r
40694 a5XlA
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
T":' r`eR T
I
25X1D
25X1D
an error 'detection routine. I-A-Tor detection is 'thoroughly
understood in thy computer world and well within the state
of the art in tor s of prov;iding'for it in satellite camera
QC sign. N :)ersonnel are tinawaiie Of error detection
:irovisions
In 25X1,
331 of the above cases the OrhiSS11011 is atirost certainly
attributable to simple failure in communication.
c. rhe development of a mathematical model of the
camera (how the camera operates) by NTCprogrammer/
mathematicians is a basic step in the programming of the
col'n?puter to support mensuration. _Me models for the
cameras have been developed after the
systetils became operational. There is no arranger4ient
,46 -
oVed voq/p7
449+45 2X1A
25X1D
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA?RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP sr MET
1BEALIST/CCUJA
for NPIC. at the present time, to produce the mathematical
The prevailing pattern
may be seen to be one in which 14PIC begins interpretation
of photography from new systems before it is prepared
to employ the computer in support of the photogrammetric
analysis.
d. The Report of the Photo Working Panel on the
C/M System (CORONA/M camera.) summarized the work
of a Committee under Dr. Sidney Drell (see paragraph 3.
page 6) which investigated a number of problems relating
to image quality in the CORONA (K1-1-4) system during
1963 and early 1964. Their conclusions included the
following:
25X1D
"...Rather we have emphasised the fact that
at this rather late date there still remains the need
to construct an objective and quantitative measure of
image quality that is both reliable and operationally
practical. Although promising techniques were
discussed and measurements were made toward
filling this need, much continuing work is required.."
"In addition we have very strongly emphasized
the urgency of a measurement program in order to
identify sensitive parameters of the C/M system and.
orbital environment which limit the present performance
level. Such a measurement program, as well as
timely, systematic performance analyses are needed
to close the loop back to the system designers who
- 47 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : Clfttpril
25Xl'A
40694.6,5
25X1A
e ? ? OR000100 40 q
1A
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
have thus ,far received extremely limited feedback
On the performance of individual components.
sympathizing with the priority of
:T;aintaining an orierational schedule we recommend
that an increased number of research and develop-
mental tests be included in the Ci'M program. The
,Jotential value to be gained for this as well as other
satelVte reconnaissance programs is very high.
II
Among the problems cited by the Drell Committee were
film fogging due to corona discharge (glow from static
discharge), the presence of uncontrolled light leaks,
shifts in camera focus due to uncontrolled changes in
thermal environment, effects on the camera of vibration
caused by the firing of control rockets, and the effects
of varying atmospheric conditions on image formation.
!iorne fifteen months following the publication of the Drell
t;orrirnittee Report, the inspectors found no evidence in
I?I,"IC of follow-up action on the above problems.
C. Development and operation of satellite reconnaissance
systems are conducted in a security control system
and with separate compartmentation for individu.al,projects,
which are rigidly separated from the security
system for photographic exploitation (TA.LENT-KEYHOLE).
kew NIC specialists in photogrammetry and computer
- 48 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R0001001
25X1A
0694765 25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Tip Sur,
IDEALIST/CUA
programming acquire the necessary operational
clearances during the early stages of design and
development 01 new systems.
f. The present-day compartmentation of the manage-
. Ment of systems development, systems operation, and
photographic exploitation accounts for a noticeable
unevenness of organizational arrangements and procedures
essential to coordinated effort, e.g. the partially effective
working arrangements of the Space Engineering and Control
Configuration Committees noted in paragraph 3 above,
and the absence of arrangements for continuing working-
level contact between NPIC. specialists and design engineers
in the laboratories and manufacturing plants engaged in
the development of new systems. There is no provision
for the designation and accreditation of NIC systems
teams to work with their opposites in industry, in the
NRO/Don, nor in the DDISAL r of CIA. There is no
plahning and programming mechanism which establishes
and executes projects and employs PER T-type controls
to ensure that all decisions are effectively scheduled
arid coordinated. There is no reporting c-nechanism by
- 49
roved For Release 20.40/07t,CISIR
,
ad'
001-7
25X1A
40694-65,25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SfC1
25X1A
n cans of which projects undertaken and results obtained
are mad known throughout the photo-reconnaissance
community. To promote maximum integration of
collection and exploitation effort in photo reconnaissance:
It is recommended that: No.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence:
a. In collaboration with the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology, prepare a proposal, for the
DCI to submit to the Director. NRO, for an integrated
systems design program in photo reconnaissance; and
b. Include, as an essential element of the program.
a provision for the establithroent for each reconnaissance
system in existence or under development, an NOIC
design team (composed of photogrammetrists and computer
prograrraner? as well as representatives of the NIC
Plans and Development Staff) to work on a continuing basis
with, and have direct access to. design specialists in Nit0
and in contracting manufacturing firms.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7:
25X1 D
Approved For Release 2002/08/07f1R4-ffp81T00990R000100140001-7
IMili:;1/COriMe
THE STATUS OF AUTOMATION AT NPIC
1. Automatic Data Processing (ADP) concepts and
equipment have been employed at N PIC from the beginning of
the national photo-interpretation activity in 1956. They are
being employed today on an increasingly ambitious and effective
scale. NPIC's computer program has experienced continuing
growing pains in acquiring and retaining qualified staff, in
developing workable systems and machine instruction programs,
i.e. software, and in imposing disciplined operation of equipment.
While significant problems continue to exist in all of these areas,
the remedial measures underway and the present general posture
of the computer center--the Information Processing Division--
are much improved. The difficulties encountered in the NPIC
ADP operations are by no means unique among computer centers
throughout the country, and, in addition, at NPIC they have
included extremely rapid growth of workload, the pioneering of
new methods of analytical photogrammetry by use of mensuration
equipment on-line to the computer, and the perennial challenge
of programming mensuration for the photography from U-2, KH-4
systems despite the fact that these systems were not
designed to meet NPIC.;'s exploitation needs.
- 51 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : ciA-Fire81T00990R00.01001,
??TOP ? t
ft'
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R00010014
Tr? SECRET".
I:Zan/COMA,
2. It was readily apparent to the inspection team
throughout this survey that automation plays an indispensable
role in photographic reconnaissance. Cam era-bearing satellite.
vehicles could not be operated without the computer and, N 'IC,
similarly, could not establish r.,easurements of ground areas
and of ground objects of acceptable accuracy in the absence of
computer processed data from collection vehicles and cameras.
this is not to say that N7'IC cannot perfortri gross mensuration
in the absence of a properly designed, fully automated systern
for collection and exploitation of photography and other sensor
inputs. It is doing so today employing a hodge-podge of data
inputs some of which are acquired by sophisticated applications
of the computer, some by laborious manual readouts of mensuration
data recorded in the film, and some Of which are introduced as:
3. Ehe thrust of developments in *ie n.ensuration field
will be fateful for N 'IC, and this subject is discussed further in
subsequent paragraphs. Meanwhile, there is a second equally
important area of employn-lent of the computer at NPIC, namely,
the storage and retrieval of textual and graphic information
Approve For Release 2002/08/07 ...Gi&-13DP81T00909X01021.0014000
' 4
25X1D
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SCR
IDEUVCORONA
25X1A
on targets. Here NPIC has already achieved a high degree of
control of the written reports of photo interpreters in reading
out targets from the ten year input of phistographic reconnaissance.
New concepts are taking shape at the present time for employing
the coniputer to retrieve and present target information on remote
cathode ray tube (CR T ) displays located in the photo interpreter's
working area. This approach gives excellent promise of enhanein
the interpreter's capability to perform search and target analyst
in photography, to correlate target information acquired throu
and to write, edit, publish and disseminate newly acquired target
information by fully automated procedures. The perfecting of
such display and reporting systems is certain then to open the way
to more meaningful and more timely communication between the
photo interpreter, and intelligence analysts, estimators, and
command authorities.
4. vve have discussed elsewhere in this survey the trend
in national reconnaissance of denied areas towards the relatively
early use (5 - 10 years) of manned collection vehicles, continuously
on site,
delivering images or
signals on a real time basis on command, and producing a flow
of information digitalized for computer processing and prompt
-53-aGyA _
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81i00890KuouTuu1400
4
25X1D
25)(1.A
40694 .,65'
t,
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7 25X1A
VIPrrr
delivery to the photo interpreter. One conclusion seemed
Inescapable in our efforts to analyse the role of the computer in.
photographic Interpretation. This is that the computer is essential
but in a supporting role. It cannot displace human, trained
inspection and analysis of every square millimeter of photography.
The computer is being employed with increasing success to enha!tce
the interpreter's comprehension through sophisticated methods 01
Image control and presentation but human search and analysis of
the end product remains fundamental to the entire reconnaissance
Organisation and Activities of the
Information Processing Division (IPD)
equally between professional systems: analysts and proigraramel* -
on the one hand, and key. punch (data input) and equipment operitiorL
on the other. The Division's photogranunetry prograMs are
accomplished on a UNIVAC 490 computer and its information
processing programs are based on an IBM 1401 computer. An -
Eastman Kodak Minicard system is also employed for document
and for selected photo-image storage and retrieval.
'yr srin
Approved For Release 2002/68r/07 CFA-
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP MP "--;
1160/C2F3:1,
25X1A
6. Under the impact of the recent heavy acqUisition of
25X1D new targets
NPIC has clearly outgrown
its IBM 1401 equipment. It is now undertaking, therefore, to
streamline its target information files and to transfer their
control to the UNIVAC 490. Lffort is also underway titranafer
the information handling activities now on Minicard to the 490
which will leave Minicard as a document/graphics storage and
reproduction system. we stated in our 1962 survey and see no
reason to modify the 1962 conclusions from the present investi-
gation that Minicard is a remarkably high cost system employing
outmoded concepts. Its high quality optics probably justify its
use as a graphics copying device, but otherwise we consider
that its indexing and document storage features would be better
performed employing other modern systems.
7. As noted subsequently, NPIC is now placing a variety
of first generation mensuration equipment (see paragraph 15
below) on line to the 490 computer. The data storage require-
ments that such equipment is placing on the 490 plus the
arrangements being worked out to acquire mensuration data
in machihe language by data link from satellite operations
centers are now bringing into question the capability of the 490
to accommodate its growing workload.
NPIC has therefore
- 55 -
AvFlp: ?26.,,2:M/07 :?-aiAtRop. ? ? e 4113.' 6o01-00144000_
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP trt1
IDEAUST/C'014,4
Launched an investigation of its needs and of the desirability
of installing more powerful equipment. possibly the UNIVAC
4V4, within the next 12 to IS months.
Computer Support of Mensuration
N'IC's charter for the exploitation of photography
on behalf of national level programs requires among other duties
that it determine and publish precise measurements of ground
area coverage for eadh 'reconnaissance mission and for each
frame or strip of photbgraphy acquired. Following determination
of ground coverage, NIC is further responsible for acquiring,
processing, and utilizing all data necessary for accurate
determination of width, length, height, orientation or azimuth,
and ground location, of targets imaged in photography.
.'hose are the basic N?IC missions in analytical
photogrammetry. 11:-.)IC's capability to perform these missions
with maximum speed and efficiency and with maximum economy
in manpower/coniputer resources is a function of the provisions
within the, collection vehicle and the camera systems to obtain,
record, andeprovide to human and computer processors all
rtiaent aa concerning the total system environment during
The analysis of dimension in photographic images
not yet perfectly understood and mach additional theoretical
- 56
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP Frr/1T
IDIAILT/CO23:11,
?5)c:1A
investigation and testing remains to be undertaken. Nevertheless,
the list of variables in high altitude reconnaissance that are
understood, can be recorded and do enhance the accuracy of
mensuration is growing steadily. .`ry?ong these variables are
speed, altitude, and known locations of the vehicle. e.g. over
targets, that contribute to the ,Jrecise determination of its
track; also, the vehicle's pitch, roll, and yaw which permit
determination of attitude, the angle of the camera lens at the
time of film exposure, and derivation of the ground area covered.
Measurement of time is critical to both location and attitdde
determinations. More is being learned dailrabout the effects
of temperature, vibration, pressure, humidity, movements in
air masses, and both satellite and camera mechanics as each
and every one of them affects the quality of information captured
in photography.
10. It appeared to the inspectors that collection system
design is moving haltingly and must move far more aggressively
in the future to equip collection vehicles with instruments to
record and return continuous observations of environmental
change significant for mensuration. Three methods of data
delivery are available and need to be employed in an integrated
- 57 -
Tat rn
Approved For Release 209?./98/-uAr.:C.
10694
HANDLE vt
T I001s143,00*cliz
Approved For Release .2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SP:Rrr
IDEALIST/Cs;',,
design concept. rhese klre (I) data delivery by telktletry, (2)
data recording on tape aboard tht.:: veniele, and (3) cecorcting oi
such itaior.,:ation in data blocks ri the filn, at4,!ac-.h ti?e of
e.,x.posure. All car,-..era systems aboard the vehicle inctuding
those specifically designed to assisL in orientation and eLensuration
inust be inte.grated in the data recording program. All dati;ii,ust'
be digitalized for cornouter tIrocessiag with mininial human
intervention except for quality control.
.`
the above suggests in broad terms the present state
of the art and the cloniinant trends in the evolution toward better
photogrammetry based on maximum automation, then actual
realization of this capability at Ne1C; lies some distance in the
future. And the remedy as we see it, and have noted at many
points in this survey, lies largely beyond IsleIC's control. The
essential requirement is that each collection system be designed
or modified with fullest consideratioa given to the data reduction
and ri,ensuration respirements of icnc.
12. Of the three high altitude operation systems in use
today, the U-2 aircraft and cameras were developed in advance
of present-day concepts of mensuration. Re-engineering of the
total U-2 system to achieve highly accurate location and attitude
data now appears iregractical due to the aircraft's design
Approved For Release 2002/0$10g8 CIA-RDP81,T0'
25)(1A
001?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP supn
IDEAL TJQr
- 4
and its clear vulnerability to
and probably to defending aircraft. excellent ground resolutiOn-
three -achieved by the U-2 canioras has perrnitted acceptable
mensuration by older, less sophisticated methods.
13. rile second system, the KH-4 satellite and cameras,
has now acquired over 8 o me six years of evolution a fairly
sophisticated capability to support photogrammetry through
telemetry, through the operation of eix supporting cameras that
record track, horizon and stellar data to determine location and,
attitude, and through recording of time in data blocs in the film
from the main cameras. Unfortunately much of this data must
be processed manually, the data bloc does not incorporate an
automatic check on accuracy, and the KH-4 operations management
continues to alter the e i...sulteLris0 providing mensuration data from
time to time without advance notice to NPIC's technical and computer
personnel. rhe Information Processing Division at N?Ictipmpleted
at the end of 1964 a family of UN! VAC 490 programs that cover
all aspects of photogrammetric analysis of -KH-4 photography.
This accomplishment is highly significant and praiseworthy chiefly
in its educational effects in charting a path for future systems.
On the other hand, because the KH-4 raw data is in many formats
25X1A
4069445 ??..z? 1
pANCLE, 'VI
81-1013?41R1600,10,
4 4:, ? F
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
IBE7/COgag
It is recommended that: No. 5
The Director. NP/C, give priority attention
to assessing the skills needed to fully meet NPIC's
MAD obligations to the intelligence community,
and to seeking revision of the grade structure of
the Plans and Development 6taff as necessary to
attract personnel with the skills needed.
11. There are certain decided deficiencies in the manage-
ment of the NPIC development program, most of which stem
directly from a shortage of personnel. These are the more
significant:
a. Contract n onitoring has been reduced from
a 30-day to a 60-day cycle. This is clearly detri-
mental from both substantive and financial points of
view, as long distance telephone conversations are
increasingly substituted for personal meetings.
b. Contracts are let in spurts and tend to bunch
up in the last quarter of the fiscal year in the rush to
obligate available funds. Despite a better attempt in
FY 1965 to spread contracting more evenly over the
year. only 42 per cent of the roughly
available for NPIC RAD activities had been committed
by 23 March 1965.
- 80 -
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A I,
40694-65 25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140401-7
ANDLE VIA
!.?
- ? , .
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP ?CRT
IDEALIST/CAI
25X1A
c. The massing of new contracts toward the end
of the fiscal year places NPIC's Technical Development
Committee in an untenable position. It can give the
proposals rubber-stamp endorsements and thus make
sure no R&D money is lost through failure to obligate
it, or it can exan.ine the proposals with care and risk
being responsible for the loss of unobligated R&D funds
when its review extends beyond the end of the fiscal year.
Bunched contracting also puts a strain on the Procurement
Division of the Office of Logistics, and could result in
otherwise avoidable frictions in the relationships between
the two offices. The Deputy Director for Support has
directed the Director of Logistics to discuss this problem
with the Director, NPIC, in order to arrive at a workable
solution.
l
d. NPIC is far too casual in the matter of establishinga
technical specifications in its contracts. All too often the
sequence appears to be for NPIC to ask a prospective
bidder to come up with a technical proposal, and this
proposal becomes, in effect, the technical specifications
for the contract.
25X1A
- -
40694-685X1A
Fil
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990WMOpit40001ANDLE VIA
TIP SECR
TP r:rr
Approved For Release 2002/O8ETFL 990R000100142
411
1A
e. Test and evaluation of equipment submitted for
acceptance is on a catch-as-catch-can basis, with deve-
lop' ental and bread-board models receiving first priori
and with many new production items left prin.arily to the
?
users for evaluation.
f. A regular equipment maintenance program has
only recently been instituted. A study leading to the estab-
lishing of a schedule and standards for continuing main-
tenance is being made under contract. Two employees of
the Development Branch are assigned full time to main-
tenance work, but the effort, while an improvement. is
understaffed and in our view should be established as a
separate branch.
12. Improvement in the general area of contract management
depends to a large extent on the availability of additional personnel,
although we see distinct evidence of the new chief and deputy chief
moving to achieve better order in the management of the Staff even
now. Early action should be initiated to improve technical specifica-
tions in contracts. Spare parts and technical manuals should not be
overlooked when they are needed. We also believe that NPIC could
profit from the favorable experience of the Technical Services
- 82 -
25X1A
40694-65 25X1i,k
HANDLE
; VIA
P.'? 7,7,7,r,
CONTROL
Approved For Release 2002/0810 SYSTEM Ot243X1A4P 0990R000100140001-7
4,4*
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TCP
IDEALIST/CORGNAI
Division of the DD/P in establishing test and evaluation completely
apart from research and development, since those involved in
development rnay lack the objectivity essential to unbiased evaluation.
It is recommended that:
The Director, NPIC:
No. 6
a. Begin now to build an improved capability to
write technical contract specifications in house; and that
contracts routinely specify spare parts and technical
manuals when appropriate.
b. Divorce test and evaluation from the Plans
and Development Staff and establish it as a unit imme-
diately subordinate to the Executive Director, NPIC.
c. Remove the responsibility for equipment main-
tenance from the Development Branch of the Plans and
Development Staff and establish it as a separate branch
in the Plans and Development Staff with sufficient T/0
positions to fulfill the maintenance function adequately.
13. While, in terms of currently available personnel. the
R&D funds allotted to NPIC exceed the Staff's ability to manage
them, we are convinced that the amount of money devoted to R&D
in NPIC has been and continues to be insufficient. R&D budgetting
consists of asking for what you think you need and of gettini what-
ever is left from total allotted funds after current operating
expenses are met. NSCID No. 8 gives NPIC the responsibility for
developing photo interpretation equipment for the entire community.
Since NPIC is operating in a developmental arena where in many
- 83 -
Approved For, Release 2002/08/07 :T9itk
25X 1 k
40694-65 25X1
HQ-oo99oliskinouctuftelE VIA
4 -
?
0 -
by .11
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :Teig-Mig81T00990R000100140001-7
IDEAUST/CNNA,
cases needs can be met only by extending the frontiers of the
state of the art, and since the bulk of the development activity
must be conducted by the Center for the entire community.
NPIC's needs for R&D funds will continue to expand and probably
at an even faster rate than over recent years. We state again,
however, that allotment of additional_ funds must be preceded by
the recruitment of additional qualified personnel. The Center
must not be put in a position of having to allow contractors to
serve as their own monitors in the use of Agency funds.
It is recommended that: No. 7
The Director. NPIC, press with senior Agency
management the imperativeness of a stable and
expanding RAD budget, and, having done so estab-
lish and enforce within NPIC a budgetting and staffing
philosophy that assigns a much higher priority to the
requirements for research and development than has
been possible in the past.
14. Although NPIC, by NSC Directive, is given responsi-
bility for research and development, we believe that N 'IC has
interpreted its authority too narrowly. It has not encouraged other
members of the intelligence community to participate sufficiently
in the area of joint development. The joint procurement meetings
have in the past been not much more than fashion shows of NPIC-
produced equipment. The other participants were welcome to put
25X1A
25X1A
- 84 40694-65 25X1A
TIP !rCRET HANDLE IPA
A ?Q10CATRP- SYS
pproved For Releage 2002/dWIF/aNE40901 14O-
,w w.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
in their orders for already-developed equipment, but have had
little voice in the original designs. In saying this, we are not
minintizing the real savings that have accrued to the Government
as a whole through lowering unit costs as a result of larger
production runs. We also recognise that the large nun ber of
participants with varying levels of clearances restricted discus-
sions to the lowest individual clearance level.
15. We endorse the initiative of the new Chief of the
Plans and Development Staff, and his deputy, in proposing the
establishment of a Committee for Photographic Fquipment and
the assignment of a full-time Executive Secretary. The proposal
envisages Committee participation by NPIC. CIA, NRO, DIA,
Army. Navy, and Air Force. All participants are to have all
of the necessary operational and product clearances, since without
them the usefulness of the committee will be severely limited.
?
- 85 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81TD0990R00010014:
rV -
25X1A
25X1i?k
40694-65 25X1
25X1B
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SURET
IMISTAZZA,
HAND-HELD PHOTOGRAPHY
I. The severest criticisms we heard of NPIC in our
interviews at Headquarters concerned APIC's supposed
deficiencies in the exploitation of hand-held or ground
photography. The criticisms appeared to arise from a single
but major NPIC error in measurement of an ICBM displayed
for the first time in the 7 November 1964 Moscow parade.
The Central Intelligence Bulletin of 9 November described the
ICBM as being about 90 feet long. The comparable DIA
publication for the same date gave it a total length of about
75.5 feet. The DIA figure turned out to be the correct one. and
CIA was considerably embarrassed.
2. rile inquired into this incident rather extensively to
discover whether it was illustrative of a weakness in the NPIC
capability. We conclude that the error did not result from a
lack of skill on the parr of the NPIC mensurators. The DIA
correct figure was based on
25X1A
25X1B
- 86 -
25X1
40694-65 25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/0861 ik iRDpgiT00990R000looiLtuds* V 1 A
.C9-MtP17
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP StCRFT
IDEALIST/CORM
a. The calibration of the camera?its focal
Length, lens aberrations, and other characteristics.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07V: tw,
40694-65 i8K1A
HANDLE VAI
TO0990R00010016149Mg SY Taw ONL.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : cJA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
'UP
IDEALIST/GORDO
b. The film.
c. The range from the camera to the object.
d. The obliquity of the object to the camera axis.
e. The film printing process (cropping or enlarging).
In the final analysis, the best way of determining the size of
the object to be measured is to compare it with another object
in the photograph whose size is known. we reached this con-
clusion from our conversations in NPIC, and it was reinforced
in the interviews we held at the Foreign Technology Division.
5. NPIC has personnel who understand the geometry of
measuring ground photography and are extremely skillful at it.
We believe though that the whole field of ground photography
is neglected and is poorly coordinated. NP/C itself has been
oriented primarily toward exploitation of the photography from
overhead reconnaissance. We see evidence of and strongly
endorse a movement by NPIC to reassert itself in the field of
ground photography. It has recently published a manual on
ground photography for community-wide use. It is initiating
an in-house course on ground photography to be taught under
contract by a recognized authority on photogrammetry. This
year NPIC was able to insert itself into the Air Force analytical
effort
- 88 -
It sent a
Approved For Release 2002/08/07p:?Ift-W81300990R0001001401/51$09LE
ID iiplIf+DA
2 5X1 A
25X1A
40694.65X1A
VIA
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 ? CIA;RUP81T00990R000100140001-7
T
6. It would appear that there was once better community
coordination on ground photography than now .ixists. In 1954
and 1955, the ;;IA officer who is now Director of Nr'IC took
the lead in establishing a Joint Norking Group on Intelligence
Ground Photography. He chaired the group. For several years
it met every six to eight weeks and was an excellent mechanism
for exchanging information on a variety of subjects having to
do with photographic intelligence, primarily in the field of
research arid development. rhe Joint Chiefs of Staff were so
impressed with the effectiveness of the Group that they asked
permission to charter it as a subcommittee of the JCS
Photographic and Survey Section. rhe committee continued
active until about 1963. the establishing of the _Defense Intelli-
gence Agency resulted in the break-up of many of the existing
- 89 -
TP C
Approved For Release 2002/08/0 :
25X1A
10694-65 2255Xx1 IAA
HANDLE VIA
CONTP: !. _ oN
00990R000100140001-7
X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP SECRET -
10EALIST/CNA/
groupings of intelligence representatives, and the ground
photography group was one that virtually collapsed. It has viVt
been dormant since at least 1963. e think that substantial
worth could be gained from reactivating it.
It is recommended that: No. 8
The Director, NPIC. take the lead in reestablishing
the Joint Working Group on Intelligence Ground Photog-
raphy as a mechanism for coordinating community efforts
in ground photography and for the exchange of information
in related fields.
- 90 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/077:CCI2A
'11
0990R00010014
25X1A
C
25X1A
40694-695X1A
NfLE VIA
NTRQ
1A
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
IDEA1IST/CER:11A1 25X1A*
MAN AGE ME N T
Functional Management
1. Under the terms of ?SCID T o . 8 Intelligence Board
departments and agencies are to provide personnel for the Center
jointly, and these personnel are to be under the functional direction
of the Director, NPIC, but remain adn inistratively responsible
to their parent organizations. Such an arrangement inevitably
poses difficult problems of management:
a. Its Director wears two hats: one as Director of
the national Center and the other as the DD/I's assistant
director for photo interpretation. Although he does not
carry the latter title, he is that in effect, because the
CIA departmental photo interpretation effort is under his
control.
b. The Director. NPIC, is given functional direction
of personnel provided jointly from DoD and CIA for a
common program but DoD personnel remain under the
administrative control of DoD,
c. Certain of the key chief and deputy chief manage-
ment positions are divided between CIA and DoD. For example,
-91-
rip s!CRET
Approved For Release 2002:411603if,4411RDP8 T
25X1A
40694-65 25X1A
HANDLE VIA
tONTI3wpt, SYSTEM ONLi
,0100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :#1:AgIt7,91? 1T00990R000100140001-7
IDEAL
the Director is a CIA officer and his deputy is provided by
Dot); the Assistant for Photo Analysis (the group responsible
for fulfilling national photo interpretation requirements) is
military and his deputy is CIA; the Assistant for Plans and
Development (R&D) is military and his deputy is CIA; the
Assistant for Operations is from CIA and his deputy is
military. DoD officers in senior managerial positions.
whether as chief or as deputy, have limitations on their
usefulness: there are certain aspects of the relationships
between NPIC and CIA components that can be supervised
or monitored only by CIA employees.
2. This bifurcated managerial structure, extending from the
very top down to section level in some cases and at least partially
responsive to pressures from both CIA and Dot), forces the Director,
NPIC, into a posture of directing by negotiation. That it works as
well as it does, and it does work well, attests to the skill of the
Acee, Director, NPIC, as a negotiator. Unhappily, direction by negotiation
often results in decision by cornpron ise, and arriving at acceptable
compromise is one of the long-standing concerns of NPIC management.
3. The managerial philosophy of the Director, NPIC,
revolves around the "Mr. Outside - Mr. Inside" concept. He keeps
- 92 -
Tre
. Approved For Release 2002/08/07;f,
25X1A
25X1
1-140694?6525X1
RANDLE VIA
AMJA1001mestL SY
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/97,: C.IA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
IDEA .
birnaelf thorovighly itdorroisd on what ging on in the Censer Ma
reserves major policy decisions to himself; but he and his military
deputy concern themselves largely with briefings, coordination, and
negotiation outside the Center. Day-to-day functional control at
the Center and supervision of administrative relationships between
NPIC and its CIA superstructure is vested in the Executive Director.
NPIC, a CIA career employee.
4. NPIC makes effective use of the committee approach to
airing common Center problems. Its Production Board and its
Technical Developme-t Committee are mechanisms for getting
senior supervisors together to discuss Center-wide problems and
to seek solutions that take all variables into account. We endorse
the concept.
5. Communications within NPIC are good, both laterally
and vertically, with the possible exception of a barrier that is
beginning to appear between computer programmers and those they
serve. Communications between photo interpreters and CIA Head-
quarters analysts are good in general but vary with the individuals
concerned--primarily with the Headquarters analysts. There is no
monopoly in the capacity at analysts, consultants, or photo inter-
preters to arrive at the insights that adequately explain ground
25X1 A
- 93 -
40694-652 5X1 A
HANDLE VIA
Approved For Release 2002/00/cf s g , - e P81T002RFM0106?40691-7SYS
IPLAiLliv)::,;;;
Approved For Release 2002/08fR7 sellviRDP81T00990R000100140001-7
10EALIST/CU3A
25X1A
patterns observed. All intelligence specialists concerned with
photographic evidence require orientation in its use. An photo-
graphy requires multiple. independent examinations as the only
partially effective insurance against oversight or incorrect inter-
pretation. We see need for a program for orienting analysts on
the uses of photography and in the ways in which NPIC operates,
particularly those analysts who are early in their careers. The
Office of Training offers a course that is pertinent, but it needs
sharper focus on NPIC itself. We are informed that the course
has not been scheduled in over a year because of lack of candidates.
It is recommended that:
The Deputy Director for Intelligence:
No. 9
a. Direct the Director, NPIC. in collaboration
with the Office of Training, to develop basic orienta-
tion and refresher courses in the uses of photography
in intelligence analysis; and
b. Inaugurate a program within the intelligence
directorate which would require all cleared analysts
to receive such training on a scheduled basis and
encourage the participation of cleared intelligence
officers from other directorates.
Career Management
:Staffing
6. NPIC has been chronically under strength virtually since
Approved
94
25X1A
40694-65 25X1A
For Release 2002/08/07r pytlitppeo -1-9.9)fig00100F4J 59r SY
-
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TCP !r(ET
Its inception?both in the sense of having fewer people on board
than it was authorised, and in the sense of having fewer people
than was really necessary to meet its responsibilities. Only
twice in the last five years has on-board strength approximated
authorized strength, and then only n ornentarily?once just before
an authorized increase in 1962 and again in 1964 when ceiling
strength was frozen at on-duty strength.
7. Today, ?PIC is under strength on photo interpreters,
and in some specialties (computer programmers and photogran?
metrists, for example) the present shortage is critical. Several
factors contribute to NPIC's failure to reach authorized strength:
a. Freezing ceiling strength at on-duty strength
has cut the pipeline and filling it again is a time-consuming
process. This happened in 1964 when for about one-third
of a year NPIC's ceiling strength, the number of people
it was actually permitted to hire, was frozen at the level
of those already on board. This meant that all the candidates
who were in various stages of recruitment processing had
to be dropped. They went on to other jobs. When the cut
was restored NPIC had to start from scratch to build up
the pipeline again. /t is only now recovering from this Wow.
2,X1A
- 95 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :
25X1A
406945X1A
RANDLE VIA
R6001601T6WIFIC
SYSTEM .0
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : ClAiffilDP81"100990R000100140001-7
25X1A
b. NPIC's grade structure is not con petitive in certain
scarce labor markets. For example, there are fewer than
a dozen PhD photograrnmetrists in the country, all have
well paying jobs, and some are not clearable for sensitive
intelligence work. We found the Chief of NPIC's Technical
Intelligence Division trying to induce one of these specialists
to transfer to NPIC but the best he could oiler was less than [A:5
the $19,000 per year the man was already being paid.
c. College graduates with specialties in high demand
(mathematicians in particular) are unwilling to wait out
our security clearance delay. The problem is even more
severe in the case of experienced computer programmers.
Those who come into the labor market are snapped up
immediately. Over the last year not a single one of the
experienced computer programmers that NPIC put into
recruitment processing actually entered on duty. They took
other jobs before security approval was granted.
d. NPIC's specifications for photo interpreter trainees
are too !la__rrowl based. NPIC is advertising for photo inter-
preter trainees with degrees in geology, geography, or
forestry. These happen to be fields in which the supply
- 96 -
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CA-RD 00990R000100
10ELLitT
eiftv
25X1A
0694_65 25X1A
VIA
OC
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TP Sr",T
25X1A
exceeds the demand. The earth sciences are somewhat
related to photo interpretation, but we think much less directly
than NPIC holds. It is the view of the Foreign Technology
Division of the Air Force Systems Command, which runs
a sizeable photo interpreter shop, that there is no relation
whatsoever between the earth sciences and photo interpreta-
tion; a liberal arts major is just as likely to become as good
a photo interpreter as is a forester. It is true that photo
interpreters are often concerned with earth features and
things that are done to them (mining, crops, etc.), but more
often they are concerned with objects that have been built
on the earth. Per this aspect of interpretation, we believe
that NPIC should be hiring more specialists in engineering,
construction, architecture, transportation, electronics,
communications, and the like. We were struck by the fact
that all of the photo interpreter shops we saw were airriorit
exclusively staffed with males. The Foreign Technology
"Ya
Division uses women in a sort of pre-screening of the photo-
graphy. CIA has one female photo interpreter. Male
dominance may be explained in part from the fact that
recruitment is Concentrated on ex-military types who did
- 97 -
" r r
Approved or Release 200g/01007 : CIA*-RD15f
* -? O. 4
TO0990
40694-65 25X1A
25X1A
HANDLE VIA
'CONTROL SYS
Q001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
12..""
7 '
25X1A
photo interpretation in the service and on fields of specialisa-
tion that are highly male-dominated. It is our feeling, however,
that the exclusion of females is deliberate, and that it is a
short-sighted policy.
e. NPIC has not pursued its recruitment program as
aggressively and as imaginatively as it might have done.
Success has varied among the divisions and is proportional
to the degree of effort exerted. NPIC had the Agency efi
recruiters in for a day of briefings while our survey was
in progress. This is a good first step. There is now need
for an aggressive and centrally-directed follow-up.
It is recommended that:
The Director, NPIC:
61A"'
a. Seek authorization from the Director of Personnel
to establish certain positions in NPIC under the Scientific
Pay Schedule, including reserve appointments if appro-
priate. in order to attract experienced, highly qualified
personnel, particularly for work in the Technical Intel-
ligence and Information Processing Divisions and in the
Plans and Development Staff.
b. Request the Director of Personnel to expedite
approval of NPIC's proposal for establishing certain photo-
gram rnetrist positions under the OSS pay schedule Ii special
pay category for scientists and engineer17.
c. Initiate a concerted recruitment drive patterned
after that of the Office of Scientific Intelligence to fill
existing vacancies in the NPIC T/O. The recruitment
- 98 -
25X1A
40694-65
25X1A RANDLE ViA
Approved For Release 200/1013/a7cit s I -RDP81T00990ROOQUDIOltangs
, ?
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/0Tr:peti9pl?P81T00990R00010014000-7
,X1A
effort should be monitored by the Executive Director.
NPIC, and weekly progress reports. by Division, should
be submitted to him. The effort should combine a
dragnet approach largely involving Agency recruiters and
a rifling approach directly involving several senior isielIC
officers.
d. Direct that the search for photo-interpreter
trainees be broadened to include fields other than the
earth sciences and that the search not be limited, wittingly
or unwittingly, to males.
Overtime
8. Overtime in is excessive by any standard and the
situation is chronic. It is not at all unusual to find employees
recording overtime patterns of one or two twelve-hour days per
week and seven-day work weeks for weeks in succession. A few
employees record occasional seventy to eighty-hour work weeks.
)f NPIC's approximately
per year budget is for the payment of overtime.
9. NPIC, along with other Agency components, has been
under continuing pressure to reduce its overtime costs. Because
NPIC could not control the input of film and the resulting require-
ments it had little control over the amount of overtime that had to
be worked. Its response to pressures to reduce overtime costs
has been to decree that certain categories of personnel shall not
be paid for overtime directed and worked. There are five overtime
25X1A
- 99 -
25X1A
25X1A
RANDLE VIA
Approved For Release 2002/08/07Y talliall'IT00990R000100-469pipny
itk,- ?
kfr
f`
,
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/ffp:14-,71DP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
classifications among personnel assigned to the national photo
Interpreter effort:
a. Military personnel are paid no overtime.
b. DIA civilians are paid for all overtime, regardless
of grade or position.
c. CIA employees in supervisory positions are paid
no overtime.
d. CIA employees, grade GS-11 and above, not in
supervisory positions, must contribute the first eight
hours of overtime worked. This is in accordance with
e. CIA employees, grade GS-10 and below, are
paid for all overtime.
A considerable portion of the overtime results from the policy of
beginning first phase readout on the day following the filmes
arrival, of continuing the readout through a weekend, and of pro-
ducing massive quantities of briefing aids to support readout
reporting. We wish that we could in good conscience recommend
that NPIC be put on a straight five-day work week, and that over-
time in excess of 16 hours per pay period not be directed, but we
cannot. We do think, however, that the Director, NPIC, should
- 100 -
25X1A
Approved For RelesbeRn2/08i9p757qA P81T00i9rA6610.4414M
t.
25X1A
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
T9Prc
.T
25X1A
employ the 16 hour per pay period level of overtime as an optimum.
Strenuous efforts should be made to see that all staff in a given
component work that amount before any are authorised to exceed
it for lengthy periods of time. Inevitably, the advantages of
utilising the most competent and experienced personnel dictates
that they carry much of the overtime work burden, even though
that burden (a 60 to 70 hour work week) far exceeds any reasonable
regard for fatigue and family stress and carries with it a high
risk of overlooking critical photo intelligence and of turning out
a poorer quality product. Continuing overtime patterns of this
unreasonable nature, in our judgment, indicate a failure in the
Imtire Agency chain of command to take appropriate remedial
action. However. NPIC appears doomed, at least for the fore-
seeable future, to ? continuation of its present excessive overtime
load. It is now time to begin paying for the service we dernaEll
10. We have considered the feasibility of having NPIC
positions designated as production positions, virtually across the
board. Such position designation carries with it authorisation
to pay full overtime. However NPIC has already tried this
approach and failed to get acceptance.
- 101 -
tr"
Approved For Release 2002/08/vt.:.01
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
1T0gAlA HANDLE WA
PA6b010t11:400011:7sy
?
Approved For Release 2002/0f97s i,,c1t-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
It is recommended that:
25X1A
No. 11
The Deputy Director for Intelligence seek approval
for payment of all overtime directed and worked by CIA
employees assigned to NPIC, without regard to grade
or position
subject only to the statutory limitations.
4
Career Advancement
11. We note that NPIC gave no Quality Step Increases during
the last year, which is appreciably at variance from custom else-
where in the Agency. The explanation is found in the fact that
promotion in NPIC is, or at least has been, fairly rapid in corn-
parison with most other Agency components.
Because of available
head-room, the individual who might have warranted a Quality
Step Increase has been given a grade promotion instead.
12. In a component such as NPIC where many of the
functions are largely technical in nature, there is need for oppor-
tunity for the individual to advance either through the managerial
or through the technical channel. The concept of advancement
through either the managerial or the technical line is poorly deve-
loped in NPIC. The top non-supervisory positions for photo inter-
preters are GS-14's, which nay be high enough for the skills
required; however, the positions for the most part are filled by
interpreters who have failed at or shown little potential for
- 102 -
5X1A
40694-65
25X1A WAND1T00990R000109ggt;,s
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TCP STMET
management. We have no recommendation on this point, because
the concept is one that must evolve slowly. We think that NPIC
needs a better thought out program for advancement of outstanding
personnel along technical lines.
Fitness Reports
13. The 1963 distribution of NPIC fitness report ratings
was comparable to the Agency-wide distribution pattern. Some
employees complained to us that their 1964 fitness reports gave
them a poorer rating than they had received in 1963 and that the
poorer rating was defended to them on the grounds that NPIC was
adjusting its rating scale to accord more with Agency standards.
Although senior NPIC management denied that there was a program
to shift the scale, we reviewed some fitness reports on which such
a statement appeared. In fact, in 1964 the distribution curve
shifted strongly toward the "proficient" rating, with "adequate" and
"strong" being correspondingly decreased.
14. We have one major criticism of fitness report procedures
in NPIC. All CIA photo interpreters are carried on the Tb O of
the CIA departmental detachment (PID), even though approximately
half of them are detailed to serve in the group that handles national
requirements (PAG). Thus, the person occupying the T/0 position
- 103 -
25X1A
Approved ;For Release 2002/08/0r o1A2
,
_it-
25X1A
40694-65
25X1A HANDLE VIA
TO0990R00010a641Wit7svs,
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECR
IDEAUST/CORONA
of branch chief in the CIA departrr ental detachment might actually
be working in the national group. To accommodate to this
situation in which supervisors are not actually working with those
who appear subordinate to them in the T/0. the CIA departmental
detachment has devised a formal and quite complicated mechanism
for grading each employee on a 17-point evaluation sheet. This
evaluation sheet is completed12.11111_aulez.....arvis . The branch
chief then presents it to the detachment's career panel. The
final evaluation represents the consensus of a committee, not the
Cviews of the immediate supervisor. This is just plain imprope
It confuses fitness reporting with competitive evaluation ratin
.......0111111?10.0111.0.
for pp.aLs!!..2fabLofft_i_on
It is recommended that:
25 X lA
The Director, NPIC, direct that fitness reports
be written by the immediate superviaor; that the
role of the PM Career Panel be confined to an
ex post facto review; and that uniformity in
ratings be attained by educating supervisors in
proper fitness reporting.
Training \VP
nr1'
15. NPIC has made substantial progress since the survey\()
of three years ago in establishing an in-house training program.
The program is still suffering from growing pains and is under-
staffed. We urged then that NPIC establish a course for orienting
25X1A
- 104 -
Approved For Release AMU.
25X1A
40694-65
RANDLE VIA
T00990R000100d4RW1 SY
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TP FCAT 25X1A
new personnel on the organization and functions of NPIC. NPIC
concurred in the recommendation. They have not gone far enough,
however. One of the commonest complaints we heard from new
employees concerned the length of time it took to learn who
does what, where does he sit, and how do I go about getting
what I need. '
It is recommended that: No. 13
The Director, expand the internal orienta-
tion coarse materially, perhaps to a full week in length.
16. Nc3IC's experience to date demonstrates that many
persons trained in the skills it seeks are already earning more
than NPIC can afford to pay. In fact, the colleges do not train
in some of the skills. Photogrammetry is an example of a field
in which the number of graduates annually is substantially less
than the number of vacancies in government and industry. The
best school of photogrammetry is in Holland. NPIC is making
arrangements to send one of its better mathematicians the re
for a year of post-graduate study. This is only a beginning.
NPIC must be prepared to expand materially its embryonic
skills development program and will have to do mach of it
through Agency-financed external training. Consideration
might be given to developing a cooperative program with certain 25X1A
,((
- 105 -
Approved For Release 2002/o8/63/P,:;c4FAF
25X1A
25X1A
40694..65
HANDLE VIA
T00990R00010%4W sy
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TIP 'C.-AU
25X1A
oi the universities under which we would finance a portion of an
outstanding undergraduate's education in exchange for a corr mitment
irom him to work for us.
It is recommended that: No. 14
The Director, N L'IC, initiate a phased program
for training personnel in skills that are not now on
the cearket at prices NIC can afford to ?ay; and that
he give consideration to developing a cooperative program
at th undergraduate level.
17. N has never succeeded in having one of its
candidates nominated for attendance at the National or rvice
war Colleges or at the Harvard Advanced Management :lrograe,.
e know of no other component in CIA that is am deeply and as
continuously involved with the military in working on joint
problems. Certainly, many of its senior officers are of the
caliber that can well represent the Agency. The Agency is
missing a good bet in repeatedly ignoring N PIC', candidates
for nomination, perhape through ignorance of NPIC itself.
It is recommended that:
No. 15
The Deputy Director for Intelligence request the
Chairman of the Training Selection Board to give due
consideration to the nature of NICs responsibilities,
its extensive involvement with the military, and its
contribution to the total national intelligence effort, in
the selection of nominees for the senior war colleges.
- 106 e
25X1A ?
Approved For Release 2002/M07,: CIA
-RDP81T
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
HANDLE VI
CONTROL SY
0990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECRET
IDEALIST/CORONA,
Rotation
18. As mentioned earlier, all CIA photo interpreters in
NIC appear on the Table of Organization of the CIA departmental
detachment known as the Photographic Intelligence Division
(CIA/ PID). National requirements are worked on in the Photo-
graphic Analysis Group (AO), which by agreement is to be
staffed by equal contributions of photo interpreters from CIA
and from DIA. DIA elected to meet some 60 per cent of its
commitment by permanent assignment of civilian photo interpreters
to t"AG. CIA chose to meet its by rotation of photolnterpreters
between CIA/ PID and PAG.
19. The Director of the Defense Intelligencq Agency
protested to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. in
?
writing in December 1964, that rotation of CIA photo interpreters
,
was degrading the national effort. The then Deputy" &rector of
Central Intelligence replied that rotation was necesiary in the
interests of career development. rit e endorse the concept of
rotation of photo interpreters for reasons of career development
and to relieve monotony, but we are not in accord with the way
it is carried out.
20. An orderly, long-range rotation scheme is impossible
without stable organisational structures, with clearly defined
25X1A
?
????.:
Am!.
25X1A
e 200
? 107 -
rr.CR
25X1A
40694-65
25X1A. RANDLE VIA
SY ?
4$4.44r4'1:11; C011-7
4.`
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SCR
HOUST/CORORA
.25X1A tk?
positions to be filled, between which to rotate. Such is not the
case in the ?ID/ PAG set-ups. CIA/DID has a formal T/O;
PAG has an informal manning chart. Because there is not a
position-to-position rotation and because all CIA photo interpreters,
wherever assigned, occupy positions on the CIA/ PLO T/O. CIA
winds up with it. own photo interpretation detachment being run
by acting supervisors. For example. the Chief of tho CIA/ PID
Atornic/Biologial/ Chemical Branch is actually working as Chief
of the Nuclear Branch in PAO. The Deputy Chief of the CIA/PID/
ABC Branch is assigned as Acting Branch Chief. The?nwriber
three man in the branch. a 4-14, in a non-supervisori 410
?
well down in the-]r:io ranks has been e/evitsd to the p011itiO'n of
Acting Deputy Branch Chief. Each of the four CIA/ PID branches
is being run by an acting chief and acting deputy chief.;:,
21. The result of this musical chairs approach-01411ing
supervisory positions is that, while rotation may be a /Reid way
v/4.-
e
position. is Chief of the indestrial Branch in ?AG. A; OS-12 from/ 0
of developing photo interpreter skill, it is creating havoc in
management. An individual may be a supervisor one year and
not the next. An orderly development of managerial skill and
progression up through the managerial ranks is out of the question
25X1A
- 108
rOved For:Rpiease 2002/G
25X1A T-140694-65
-RDP81T00(01400100106914-7viA
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R00010014000 -7
TOP SECR
IDEALIST/CORONA 25)(1A,
It is recommended that: No. 16
The Director. NPIC, establish a formal T/O,
separate from that of CIA/PID. to accommodate CIA
personnel assigned to PAG for duty; that responsiu
bility for personnel administration of CIA employees
assigned to PAG be transferred from Chief. CIA /PID,
to the senior CIA officer in PAG.
ZZ. As of 9 March 1965, there were
photo 25X1A
25X1A interpreters on duty in NPIC. f them were *aligned
25X1A to the departmental effort in CIA/ were assigned
IA'Ai74(
to the national effort in PAG. CIA,. commitmelt was for
25X1A photo interpreters to be assigned to the national effort. DIA
had not yet met its commitment but had come much closer
than CIA. .CIA is ..mon to censure for having Jailed to meet kAr
this commitment, even ff doing so would significantly degrade
the CIA departmental capability.
It is recommended that: No. 17
The Director. NPIC, transfer from CIA/PID
to PAG enough photo interpreters to fill and keep
filled the CIA commitment to the national effort,
even at the expense of a short term degradation of
the CIA departmental effort.
23. DIA, by assigning photo interpreters to PAG
permanently, ensures that the bulk of its personnel will be,
experienced in the procedures followed in PAG. CIA, on the
other hand, has been and will be forced to detail personnel who
25X1A
- 109 - 25X1A 40694.65
ApiprovectTpr lease22Wak8/04 : CIA-RDP8AT0099, 00000100111QQpik7E
TOP SECRET
VIA
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81TQ0990R000100140001-7
TOP S!CR
IDEALIST/CORONA
25X1A
must learn PAO procedures virtually from scratch and this will
be repeated again and again as new photo interpreters are
recruited by CIA and rotated between the two components. In
its early rotational staffing of its commitment to .-)AG. CIA/PID
has assigned to PAG photo interpreters who had been on board
in NPIC only a few weeks. Even though this would dilute the
CIA departmental effort, we think it improper for CIA to assign
a photo interpreter to the national effort who has not had at least
a y?__Itz.._d....s.co.cperie in photo interpretation. By NSCID Direction,
if for no other reason, if one of the efforts must be degraded, the
departmental should suffer.
It is recommended that:
The Director. NPIC, establish and enforce as
long-term policy the concept that CIA photo interpreters
assigned to the national effort will have at least one
year's experience in CIA/PID before transfer to PAG.
24. There is need for a much greater formalization of
the rotation system if it is to continee and is to succeed. We
think NPIC would do well to adopt something similar to the
DD/P's Field Reassignment Cuestionnaire mechanism, a flexible
system for allowing the employee a voice in his reassignment
but reserving final decision to management. Th. cycle is begun
- 110 -
25X1
Approved For Release zuuz/A
u8/MP:
4111AUST
25X1A
25X1A
40694-6
HANDLE VIA
T00990R0001019q451304-PY
Approved For Release 2002/08/13j' :!64AliRDP81T00990R000100140001-7
IDEAUST/L..Y 1 I 25X1A
long before the .employee is due for rotation. It allows for
orderly management planning which the present NPI
rotational system does not.
? ..Y1A
It is recommended that:
The Director. NPIC. establish a system for
managing rotation between CIA/PID and PAO along
the lines of the Field Reassignment Questionnaire
mechanism of the Clandestine Services.
ZS. Son;te of the CIA photo interpreters assigned to
Tia
PAG assert that DIA runs the national effort. There is some
validity to the charge. Its chief has always been a military
officer. At the division and branch levels the chief and deputy
chief positions are divided between CIA and DIA and t,he split
is about equal. At the team or section level, however, there is
a clear DIA predominance.
positions are occupied by DIA civilians. The chart on the
opposite page illustrates why: 69.1 per cent at the CIA photo
interpreters assigned to PAG are in grades 08-10 and lower;
only 1.6 per cent of the DIA civilians carry a grade lower than
GS-11.
26. Many MA interpreter* assigned to the Scientific
and Technical Diirigli011 of PAG do not "work the MCI." The
111
25X1A
40694.65 25X
o!R09:0194944
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
r
MCI. or Mission Coverage Index is the common way of referring
to the second phase aspect of immediate exploitation in which
the entire film is scanned for new targets and to detect change
in targets not read out in the first phase ")AJC exercise. The
MCI is a grueling, monotonous exercise that is widely disliked
by photo interpreters. There is need for it to be more evenly
shared than it now is. The Chief of PAG should adopt a policy '
of rotation of all his photo interpreters into and out of the MCI ,
Ii
exercise, without regard to grade, experience or personal
preference.
It is recommended that: No. 20
The Director. NPIC, direct the Chief. PAG, to
establish a policy of rotation of photo interpreters within
PAG Jo-adder, equitable sharing of first and second
phase scheming assignments and that this policy apply
equally to CIA and to DIA photo interpreters.
Records Management
27. NPICIs records hOldings, largely in its film library,
are the second Largest in the Agency (second only to the Office
of Central Refer'ehce), and they nearly doubted during calendar
year 1964. NPIC has been slow to come to gripe with the problem
of records management. NPIC now has an experienced records
management offier assigned full time, but:he-did not come on
'
provecrfor Frose2faVitkomf ?
25X1A
25X1A
k
,
25X1A
10694-63 '
;
r
0R0004001 If
A$ ?
a'a
a*P47,:?,4g14.
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SECR
10EAUSTA.X1
25X1A
board until April of this year while our survey was in progress.
He is still trying to get a measure of the magnitude of his task,
and it is too early for him to reach any judgments on how NPIC
should go about coping with an unwieldy and rapidly growing
accumulation of film. We seriously doubt that there is real
need for NPIC to retain on file every frame of photography
ever delivered to it. As NPIC's program for building a library
of film chips (small pieces cat from roll film on which the
target of interest is imaged) gathers speed, NPIC should be
able to begin selective discarding of roll film that has lain
dormant for years.
It is recommended that:
The Director, NPIC, initiate a phased program of
reducing roll film holdings by discarding film that is
repeatedly duplicated by more recent coverage and which
is revealed by NPIC film control records to be not of
continuing latelligence interest.
25X1A
- 113 - 25X1A 40694-65
? Approved For ReleasZ52603608107 :.qc-AIRDP81T00990R000100140001-7
(AI
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
rP SEC
I 25X1A
SECURITY CONTROLS ON PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
During the Course of our inquiries particularly among
Headquarters analysts. we encountered seine very persuasive
arguments in favor of expanding the use permitted of ititelligence
from photography acquired by overhead reconnaissancii. We note
that the conclusions of the Quadripartite Conference *china.
published on 21 *ay 1965. had this to say on the subject of corn-
partmentation:
"The interplay and cross-checking between SIGINT
and photography is of the greatest importance; some
relaxation of the stringent security controls on
overhead photography would facilitate use of this
material as guidance for the collection efforts1 and
in addition would benefit research and analysis."
As we explored the ramifications of any decision to enlarge the
community of TALENT-KEYHOLE clearances or to elevate the
Central Intelligence Bulletin and similar publications to the
TALENT-KEYHOLE level, we soon discovered that the problem
was of such magnitude as to exceed the scope of & survey of NPIC.
I therefore deferred any consideration of this subject at this time,
but will propose it as a matter for separate study at a later date.
- 114
25)(1/Pep 7t,r.RiT -
Approved FOY:Release 2002/%407i,t,;;CJA-RDP8
25X1A
40694-65 25X1A
HANDLE IPA
11-00 OR0001 I 071TeRV:
7
pproved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
T'P
THE LONG-RANGE OUTLOOK
25X,1 A
25X1D
1.
future problems
reasonably
beyond the
We have dealt thus far in the report largely with the
of NPIC whose dimensions are known or are
predictable. NPIC's S-year forecast does not look
25X1D
What about the
next ten-year period? What might NPIC's posture
be fifteen years
25X1D
from now? The success of the
program in real-time 25X1A
delivery of ;II otographs of the moon suggests that a like capability
is entirely feasible for earth satellite reconnaissance vehicles,
and that such a system might become operational not too many
years hence. The early successes in the GEMINI program are
leading to a capability to operate manned photographic reconnais-
sance satellites.
Integrated multi-sensor systems are
already here. The Navy's Integrated Operational Intelligence
System is the beginning. The Strategic Air Command is building
25X1A a
processing facility at Beale Air force Base to
- 115 -
25X1D
25X1A
40694-63 25X1A
TOP SECRET - HANDLE VIA
A CONTROL rv"'
Approved For Rel?A 7002/08/07 : CI4-RDP81T00990R0001001000.1-7
ONLY
,4;', ??
?
CIA-RDP
Approved For Release 20034FIii,,: ClArDP811-00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
handle the outputs- of the multi-sensor packages to be carried in
the RS-7l.
2. We are unable to give even the grossest estimate of
what the impact on NPIC might be if these potential collection
capabilities should be realized. It is not unreasonable to suppose
that exploitation of photography might become as big a business as
exploitation of SIOINT. We would prefer not to contemplate a day
when NPIC might be an enterprise of a magnitude on the order of
the National Security Agency, but it seems to us that that is pre-
cisely where the rapidly burgeoning capability to take photographs
is leading us.
3. Historically, the intelligence community, and the
military departments in particular, has tended to collect faster
than it could digest. One of the more frequent observations made
to us by analysts was to the effect that they were already "up to
their ears" in photography. The Inspector General's survey of the
handling of information during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis found
the analytical effort flooded with paper. The volume reaching our
Cuban experts was too large for them even to read, let alone analyse
effectively. Whatever solution is eventually found for exploiting
increased film inputs to NPIC will only increase the inputs to analysts
and it is likely that analysis will be the area next needing attention.
- 116 -
Approved For Release 26(40(eifitCii
25X1A
I 140694-65 25X1A
8112600/4000100f4MP;z
HANDLE VIA
SYSTEM ONLY
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
!?.'rT
25X1A
4. To date, photography is our best, and in many instances
our only, source of information on denied areas that is visually
interpretable. Since it represents new acquisition of information
not otherwise available, it is inevitably looked upon as being of
current intelligence significance. Much of it is, but much of it is
not, and the intelligence community has been slow to separate one
from the other. Over the next fifteen ye/irk and perhaps even
within five, we would hope to see a shift in emphasis from the
current intelligence aspect of photography to one of increasing
attention to research.
5. We devoted particular attention to the technological
aspects of photo intezpretation.. We see areas in which NPIC
might be able, through automatic data processing applications, to
do certain things it is not now doing. Taking on these new tasks,
even though computer support was extensively employed, would add
to NPIC's personnel requirements. Some of the very sophisticated
gear that NPIC is planning or already has under development, which
is discussed in the sections on Equipment and Research and Deve-
lopment and on Automatic Data Processing, will help the photo
interpreter turn out a higher quality product; some will reduce the
amount of time now spent in manual operations; but none that we
- 117 -
lr
25X16:C. f_
oved E?tRelease 2002/08/0 ; CIA-RDP81170
25X1A
40694-65
25X1A
HANL.77
?DR000101411 ?
M
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
T-7
25X1A
know of will give the break-through needed to materially cut the
hurnan-hours spent in photo interpretation. It may be that the
limited scientific and technical competence of the inspection team
prevented its members from discovering areas in which major
advanced might be made through computer or other technological
applications. For this reason I believe there would be much to be
gained from a cross-disciplinary examination of photo interpretation
technology and procedures by a panel of competent consultants.
I have had conversations with the Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence toward this end and have furnished him with a list of
individuals whom we have identified as being particularly well
qualified to participate. The Director has already signed a letter
to the Chairman of his Scientific Advisory Board requesting that
such a panel be formed. I believe it would be appropriate for the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize the Director, NPIC,
to make this Inspector General report of survey available to the
panel.
6. I think we would be rernis? in failing to project our
thinking beyond the possible accomplishments of the panel of con-
sultants. if the panel is unable to recommend any workable tech-
nological innovations that would provide substantial relief from
25X1A
:Approved For Releasee20O
111".
- 118 .:
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
14ANDLE VIA
1-004.90,R000100141!t
,2.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1
25X1A
25X1A
?
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Tr'7, "77
the workload problems NPIC faces. and we reject any thought of
cutting back the collection program. then I see no alternative to
the Agency preparing to meet the predicted NPIC requirements
for an expanding work force and operating budget. I doubt that
estimated needs for over
people and annual funds in excess
of lby 1970 can be met out of resources allotted to the
Agency. It may be necessary to seek relief by referring the
matter to higher authority.
7. A work force oln7plus cannot be fitted into the
present NPIC quarters. NPIC moved into
1963 after it had been renovated at a cost of about
The building can house perhaps
near'
in January
ople and there are already
in it (CIA. DIA, and Army). About 40,000 square feet
of the building is occupied by the
that, if the
could accommodate perhaps
cost perhaps
NPIC estimates
could be persuaded to move, the space
]NPIC employees. Renovation would
8. One final observation: even if the panel of consultants
were to come up with realistic suggestions for making sweeping
reductions in manual operations in NPIC that would result in a
substantial savings in manpower, it seems likely that load-time
- 119 -
c25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1
40694-65
25X1A
T" !"DrT
HANDLE VIA
Approved For Relea,se,2002/ IA- DP81T
t .71 gdit900.1001"/"
sy
25X1 A
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
needed for development of equipment, writing of con puter programs.
etc., would be long. The savings to be made might not be realised
in time to meet the predictable workloads of the near future. and
NPIC's needs are immediate.
- 120 -
-
Approved For Release 2002/08/0/ C A
25X1A
25X1A
40694-65
HAND, I--
TO096d600140001_7
VIA
-1-EVI ONLY
Approved For Release 2002/08/07: CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
TOP SEVrt7
IDEAUST/CORONA 25X1A
EXTRACTS FROM 1962 INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF NPIC
"The Center has been caught almost continuously in a
substantial crisis in balancing its photographic exploitation
capability with collection programs on the one hand and with the
intelligence estimating process on the other hand. The reasons
for this situation include the following:
a. A collection technology and programming evolving
to a coneiderable degree independently and more
rapidly than the exploitation system has kept pace
with it.
b. The rapid evolution of photo interpretation in the
intelligence process raising new problems in the
coordination of information from many sources. e.g..
ELINT, COM/NT. and in stabilising the roles of
photo interpreters and substantive analysts in an
extremely fast-moving field of intelligence analysis.
"We are convinced that responsibility for the matters we
criticise must be generously shared outside the Center. By and
large. NPIC has coped very commendably with a number of
imponderables.
"Estimating eke rate of expansion of collection capability
is the key to the whole problem of exploitation planning. Miscalcu-
lation could mean steady repetition of present day crises.
"At no time does the technical planner get involved in
general planning problems, as for instance how much exploitation
manpower is required in scheduling 20 as against 15 missions in a
given period of time.
"Dollar-wise the cost of Wording immediate relief to NPIC
is remarkably small in relation to the investment in the IDEALIST
and CORONA collection mechanisms and insignificant in relation
to the decisions on military expenditures which may be affected by
the product of photo interpretation.
"Our recommendations throughout the survey look to. . .
clarification of the role of the DD/I in overseeing the CIA contribution
25X1A
25X1A
TOP SECRET --
Approved For Release 200/10AUP7'CCCIA;
RDP8'
694-65
25X1A
T00990R000100140664114?LE VIA
0:
"V,
Approved For Release 2002/08/017,i GIA-RpP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
to NPIC and more direct communication between NPIC and the
senior command of the Agency on the practical problems of
balancing the exploitation capability ragainst collection capabilitz?/.
"Refocus of NPIC management prerogatives may require
in the long run . . . establishment of a formal relationship
between NPIC and USIB in the form of a Committee on Photo-
graphic Exploitation and change in the CIA command arrangement
for NPIC which now runs via the DD/I to the Director of Central
Intelligence. . . No recommendations are offered on these
matters at the present time. The Inspector General believes that
they require close and continuing attention from the senior con,mand
of CIA over the corning months.
"Establishment of a USIB Committee on Photographic
Exploitation might. . . focus inter-agency attention more properly
on long-range issues of programming and policy concerning which
the present NPIC committees have been ineffective. Each member
organization would, of course, remain free to negotiate its interest
directly with the NPIC management at any time.
"No combination of co-equal USIB organisations should
expect to participate by vote in the day-to-day direction of the
Center. On the other hand. the USIB ought to be served by a com-
mittee closely informed on NPIC operations, continuously evaluating
the product of its efforts, and resolving issues of policy through
consultation with the Director. NPIC. Such a committee might
well follow the pattern of COMOR in settling issues of priority
among requirements. . A working ground under a USIB Com-
mittee on Photographic Exploitation, closely aligned with the
specialized committees such as GMAIC. JAEIC and SIC, might
examine and recommend solutions to conflicts in priority between
competing organizations or between broad categories of require-
ments, e.g.. guided missiles vs. nuclear energy. Unresolved
issues might be referred via the Director, NPIC, to the DD/I
and where appropriate to the USIB.
"NPIC has obvious and basic ties to the intelligence pro-
cesses within the DD/I as well as to the photographic collection
system now under the DD/R /now the DD/S&T/. It appeared to the
inspectors, however, that the DD/I's supervision of NPIC as a
co-equal of the other DD/I components in matters of budget and
25X1A
.2.D0694-65
25X1A
T., r-pm
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 :RDP8'11-00361001::1
01000NTRoil. s
vlyA
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
727
IDEAUST/CORONA4-1 25X1A
*tailing nag Lemma on occasion in the past to suppress the community
implications of these decisions. No other component of the DD/I
has experienced anything like the variety of community level co-
ordination and programming issues experienced by NPIC. Thus,
in NPIC's present state of imbalance, it does not make sense to
require the administrative staff to go through a new recalculation
of possible 5, 10 or IS per cent cuts because all other components
of the DD/I must do so. A good case can be made for elevating
the NPIC position in CIA to a level where it can negotiate as an
equal of the other CIA directorates for staff and funds. Until the
new DD/I can establish his own views on this subject, we would
leave NPIC subordinate to the DD/I. However, we believe that
the current problems facing NPIC call for special consideration
quite different from that accorded other DD/I components.
"Delays in the build-up of NPIC resources appear particu-
larly unrealistic against the demands now placed on the NPIC staff.
The entire staff at the Center has repeatedly demonstrated its
ability and willingness to meet emergency situations through
twelve-hour shifts, al-night work and sacrifice of weekends.
But a schedule of two or three KEYHOLE readouts month after
month from June forward spells totally unreasonable fatigue,
dangerous eye-strain, disruption of family life, and the risk of
increased error in photo interpretation.
"The present system for handling requirements for detailed
readouts calls for the Center to accept virtually any requirement
of a genuinely national interest which has not already been ade-
quately answered by NPIC or some other member of the PI
community. The rapidly growing backlog of high priority require-
ments is not considered an acceptable criterion for their rejection
or the postponement of their acceptance. This attitude is governed
by the philosophy that it is better to give the requester something,
possibly a comparatively small slice of his requirement, than
nothing at all. It is also argued that rejecting requirements might
completely cut off the flow.
"The coming two years will be a period when rigid adherence
to Agency recruitment policies will handicap efforts to flesh out
NPIC's expanding T/0. Current competition for college graduates
who have majored in mathematics is intense on the part of both
government and business. Agency efforts to sign up mathematicians
25X1A
- 3 -
F
25X1A ?140694-65
a
VIP SEMT -
HANDLE VIA
Approved For Release 2002COOLO7/MAIRDP81T009MM01910014MITEPL SY
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
25X1A
for NPIC'. Technical Intelligence Division to work on mensuration
or on computer programming have been slow. Efforts to attract
qualified individuals would be enhanced if they could be offered
the scientific or top step of an appropriate grade.
"There are fields of potential recruitment other than the
male college graduate which it is hoped will not be overlooked.
The one female PI in the CIA Detachment and those in the Air
Force Detachment are professionally respected.
"The individual.-whether he is a PI, an editor, or a
mensurator?must frequently put aside the project at hand when
another of higher priority is received. When he returned to the
first project. the PI or the mensurator virtually has to start
from the beginning in order to orient himself properly. On a
project involving several days or weeks of work, it is quite possible
for the PI to be interrupted several times.
"The Director. NPIC, while assigned responsibility for
functional direction of the Center, was obviously placed under
pressure to direct by diplomacy.
"In many cases a year's lead time is scarcely enough to
develop processing equipment for a new collection system. A
single major change in the latter can bring an entire processing
system to a halt. ? ? . Future collection systems and schedules
must be analysed for their impact on NPIC photo interpretation,
laboratory and computer equipment, and on NPIC manpower at
the earliest date possible to insure NPIC time to adjust b its
own long lead-time problems."
25)1k
25X1A
25X1A
F140694.65
Tab A
Approved For Release 2002408/0P: EV-i=inP81T00990R0001001409011)4 VIA
CONTROL SY
25X1 Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/08/07 : CIA-RDP81T00990R000100140001-7