VIETNAM: LEAKS FROM ANONYMOUS OFFICIAL SOURCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000500160037-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: October 19, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-
Approved For Release 20ii4erClA9RDP7
Indeed, who are these official but Uri aliment at ann moon ? ... a, _
V#* i#'I . IJL' LA 1'AWa.L Il l" i- - ---. ,.1.C44V11 1 WUULU! r?uteen efforts have been made to start ~
;' MODS OFFICIAL SOURCE - +. like to know in order to estimate the' these discusalona, with th.. %.i_ .,r do
to rsist, if
stories attributed to unnamed "U.S. offs : inquire as to the Nation's policies' re- persist, persist we-must,
tinue until
ci I' h ve bee a earin i 4-1,
a
a n
n e
r d
t
s
pp 5
h anu desolation have LOU to the same
p ess, J. spewing Vietnam. Are these officials In; Ba
to the effect that the war in Vietnam the White House? Are they in the Do- conference table where others could now Join
t
-does not necessarily nave to was in a ?:? fense Department? . The State Depart-1. a a much smaller cost ? ?
. negotiated settlement. The unnamed ment? IA? Or are they scattered: 2
..officials want to be sure, apparently, throughout the executive branch? '1- it. ?
that the public understands that there is the head of a department who .advances , I have spoken many times of our objoc-
gives in victnain. ro has the Government
an alternative to negotiations. What this
these officials suggest, as the alternative new concept of Vietnamese policy? of south Vietnam.' Hanoi has sot forth its'
. Or, is it a chairwarmer at a southeast; own proposals. We are ready to discuss
amounts to a total military solution, with :'Asia desk somewhere or a guard ? at the their proposals and our proposals and any
the Vietcong being driven into a state front door of the Pentagon or the State,' Proposals of any Government whose people
of nonexistence. Department? may be affected, for we fear the meeting,.!
This thesis is valid as a basis for col Whoever they may be, one thing is Cer- r room no more than we fear the battlefield.-,
loge discussion. It is' valid as a subject 1 tain about these unnamed official sources.' And in this pursuit we welcome, and we ask `
for consideration in the classified They are most irr ibl ! for. the concern and the assistance of any
es
pons a sources, in nation and all nations.
recesses of the Executive branch of the a situation in which the utmost of re-
Government. ? ?
It Is not valid, however, sponsibility is vital and I use thew d
r
o
a
as a "leak" from anonymous official 1 vital, rarely and most advisedly. Here, And if the United Nations and its officials
sources, leaving the strong impression we have almost 150,000 men in Vietnam; i or any one of its 114 members can by deed
that the policy of seeking negotiations is the number is going up steadily and the or word, private Initiative or public action,
all but abandoned and we are about to end is not yet in sight. The President I. bring us nearer an honorable peace, then
adopt a new one. Indeed, one newspaper has made it clear, not once but a dozen 1 they will have the support and gratitude of
carried a bann r headli +11 b
e lie
of
on a asts o times, that he seeks an end to the Viet- the United states of America.
this leak: "U.S. Now Sees Vietnam Vic- .I namese conflict through negotiations, l?, ' ' ' '
torn by Force of Arms_ The imm?eatinn ., ?a __ __ ___
lelb L!y ULMB scary 1s wear: it is tnat theare In the interest of this Nation and of ? I've directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to'.
doctrine of "unconditional negotiations" all concerned. That is his policy; that ' New York today and to present Immediately,
is about to be replaced by the doctrine i is U.S, official policy-period. to Secretary General U Thant a letter from
of unconditional triumph as official me requesting that all the resources and the,
policy. unconditional that u accurate or not, In these circumstances, for an un- energy and the Immense prestige of the.
is beside the named official source to engage in an L United Nations be employed to find ways to
point. Whether it is a- Idle discussion-if that is what it was-. -halt aggression and to bring peace In Viet- .
practical possibility Is beside the point
- of an alternative policy of triumph by ,nam?
The point Is. that official United States attrition, is, to say the least, a breach of ' ' ' ?
policy on Vietnam, as enunciated time trust. With the President In the h i s
and again by the President, is and re- 1 tal it is, indeed, an inexcusable breach of But we Insist and we will always insist that .'
mains one of seeking an honorable nero-'.i trush_ the neonie of South Vietnam shalt have the
....+u o.tJ tv Vucuu u1LU11y111UUS Diu- destiny in free elections in the South or
possible. The President's policy-and it dials: You are appointed officials of this :, throughout all Vietnam under International-
is the only official policy of this Govern-'y Government. Your function Is -not to j supervision. and they shall not have any ? 1
jment-is not to prove the theoretical , speculate to the press on the President's Government Imposed upon them by force
' possibility that a war of attrition without policy. Much less is it your function to and terror so long as we can prevent it,
negotiation can end in a triumph in, 1; advance publicly alternatives to his poll-
10
or 15 years
5
Gi
?
,
,
.
es, even under the anonymous cloak of
The point is, too, that it is not college -"ofllcial sources." Your function is to I just said, I hope that every member,'(
students or professors without responsi- ? advise the President and carry out, In of the United Nations that has any idea or
bility for official policy who are advanc- good faith, foreign policies which he any plan, any program, any suggestion, that,,
th
'
a
constitutional ,
? ? ? } ?
litical leaders out of office and without processes. Any other course
arti
-"
, p
cu
i z
? - official responsibilities; it Is not the Rep- larly in the critical Vietnamese situation, And as 'l have said so many times. It anyone:,
resentatives or Senators, who have inde-' Is an invitation to a lengthening of the l questions ou' good faith and will ask us to
pendent constitutional responsibilities, casualty lists, to the most serious difii- J meet them to try to reason this matter out, "
who are discussing this alternative poi culties and division at home and to dis. they will find ub at the appointed place, the
icy. Rather_ it is anonymous "rT fi nf_
except official responsibilities in these ' That ought to be understood with
t a
ou
-
matters, it is U.S. officials who are not! the saying.by every appointed official of A. I have made very clear in my ran Fran.
privileged to speak on Polley outside of the Government. The recent rash of 1'cisco speech my hope that the secretary-
the walls of the Executive branch except:.. anonymous official speculation on Viet- !General under his wise leadership would ex-mig as they express the official policy of the nam, however, makes it clear that it
db h a goiuevery f thsi llmatt
UnitedStates a
n
tI
i
tl lead
t
n
w
d
er
s e
unc
a
e
ee
t
o
y te Presi-, -
n mp
s to be said. ; the Secretary General this morning which
dent and under his direction, and with' Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- Ambassador Goldberg will deliver later to
his approval. For them to speak other. sent to have printed in the RECORD, nine the day, I reiterate my hopes and my desires
wise, even anonymously,, is to imply, experpts from the President's statement and I urge upon him that he-if he agrees_
strongly that the,President of the United to the press on July 28, 1965, articles and that he undertake new efforts in this direo-
States so thinks. editorials on this subject. 1 tton.
Now, it is true that 'these official There being no objection, the material ! Ambassador Goldberg understands the
t ekeo talking
sources were at pains to make it clear' was ordered to be Printed in the RECORD, t challenge. to spent ti the
;'that they support the President's policy!' as follows: . about the pantlal and the possibilities, our of seeking an end to the Vietnamese con- thave.
t 1 ! hopes and our dreams, hel
thawe will ill have an able e advocate and d a!
.:
flict by negotiations, even as they ad Second, once the Communists know, as we l: searching negotiator who, I would hope,
vance an alternative approach of a solo- know, that a violent solution is Impossible, could someday find success.
tion by,attrltion. Well, if they are sup "then a peaceful solution is inevitabld. We - ? ? ? ? ? ?
porting the President's policy, why do, are ''may now, as we have always been, to e.
they insist upon remaining. unnamed?:? move from the battlefield to the conference'' A.
We have stated time and time again
Why, then do they hesitate to attach tablhave stated f'that we would negotiate with any Govern.
-their names to that which they are die-. publicly and many times, moat, any time, any place. The Vietcong
again and again' America's willingness to b8": -would have no difficulty in being' represent-
Cussing with the press? 4 gta_ naoondltional discussions with any tier.4 ed slid having their views
presented if Hanoi
COAUQUQd
 for a moment decides that she wants to cease In Greece, the officials pointed out, the It assumes also that American. power-
aggression, and I would not t ink that' Would C vista simply were worn down and lanes criascrossin the country and bombs-
be an inaurmoA#DffO l hAraKcleaseov6Hff tfO ?i*rite1 -FtOPq 4-OVIWRO 8Gd 6 ~D3lYa-AAiding places-can make
think that could be worked out. ? plication was that the Communist-led forces ; a country almost as big as Missouri an In-'
-- - in South Vietnam might be worn down possible place to operate.
(F'roin the St. Louis (Mo.) . Post-Dispatch,' eventually and caused to retreat Into North On the political 'aide, it assumes that the '
Oct. 17,10661 Vietnam government of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the:.
Some spectacular successes have changed with the Soviet Union. Russian-built mis-.
the official atmosphere from the pessimism slles, which are concentrated around the.
In its simplest terms, the now strategy, many troops as seemed necessary. ever-larger conflict could well be sni Issue in
calla for the use of large amounts of Ameri- Bombers attacking the north have kept 'the ~ ionAouM elections ail year.. r ~q
can men and guns to win a military victory clear of the Hanoi area, where there would
In the south. i be a chance of direct military confrontation -
a now strategy In Vietnam are emerging as Reborn is said to have explained that this, Johnson would find It embarrassing to go to I
the Influx of massive American military . meant saturation bombing of Hanoi and the country seeking reelection In 1068 with
strength begins to take effect. sending into South Vietnam five times as, a stalemated war still on his hands and the
STRATEGY CnANCR rN VWrNAMBELIEr GROW- President Johnson has by no means bought, chief of the Vietnamese air force, repro-.,
rNG TIrAT LAnos-SCALE U.S. ErroaT MA! 'the entire hard line. He has not accepted', cents a new breed of leaders, able at last to
SUCCEED SOON the formula attributed to the new Director Inspire the people with a revolutionary spirit',
(By Richard Dudman) of the Centrn Intelligence Age.ucy, William' that will unify them In the fight.
F. Raborn, Jr.-'a ottcrdam policy in the. Finally, this analysis assumes that
favor- north and a Dominican policy in the south."' able results will come very soon President t?
of 6 months ago, when the American effort North Vietnamese capital, have shot dow
faced imminent military defeat, to a growing five American planes in the last 4. months.
conviction that the back of the insurgency The American troop buildup has reached
can' bo broken in the foreseeable future, ; 145,000 and is oxpeoted to roach 200,000
possibly within months. eventually. Some military leaders speak of
Even the failures have helped promote the' a million-man American force, but others
-emerging strategy. The lesson many plan- scoff at that figure. American troops in the
ners drew this week, when 2,000 Vietcong Korean war numbered about 260,000.
`
slipped out of a trap sprung by combined A measure of the buildup is the weekly
American and South Vietnamese forces, was: casualty figure. in Vietnam last m wce~s werel
it alone. is better kept when the Americans go American casualties. rose to 806 hostile:
The it deaths, 300 nonhoetilo deaths, 4,260 wounded'
Tsuccesses have strengthened the post-
tion of the so-called war hawks-those who; In action, 76 misting in action, and 21 de-11
never had much use for "special warfare" tained by the enemy.
and counterinsurgency techniques, who'? . Strategists generally avoid the term "vlc-
wanted to bomb North Vietnam or oven tort' although in recent weeks that Is Clearly
China years ago, who have regretted Presi what some of them have had in mind.
dent Lyndon D: Johnson's offers to negotiate, They base their present optimism on the
and who believe that peace talks now would apparent ability of the increased manpower
lead to a neutralist South Vietnam instead and firepower to defeat the Vietcong any
of the anti-Communist bastion they sue as a ? time the Reds stand still for a fight in regi-
possibility. mental or division strength. The war had
been going in the direction of big-unit on-
The "relatively benign policy of counterin- ! gagements, and the South Vietnamese Army
i aurgency" must be put aside for the time a was in serious trouble until bolstered by
!'being, in the words of a policy paper being American combat troops.
circulated at high levels in. the adminlr:- The Immediate task, therefore, Is to pound
tration. and kill and harry the Vietcong's main force
l
woman y an r can or er causes ar, are won or lost, that they never and in a
more resentment against the United States, draw. A ceasefire would mean that the Viet.
than does the destruction of an entire vii-1 eobg would promptly lose all the gray areas,
lags. the territory where it can operate but can-
Less In hoard, too, about a negotiated set- not make a permanent stand The reason
contends that the rape of a single Vietnamese
A, 1 He reasons that guerrilla wore invariably
b f
As reliance on armed force increases,
ess . until it gives up or, more likely, breaks .up
is heard about the winning of the hearts and into small guerrilla bands to continue the,
minds of the population. fighting without affording a good target.
officials no longer are reluctant to talk; Once the Vietcong have been forced to
about American use of napalm, tear gas, and'' return to guerrilla warfare, It Is thought
crop-destroying aerial sprays. Six months here, the Insurgency will be close to defeat.,
ago, if they were discussed at all It was to, The shift will meant breaking up elaborate
emphasize how little they were being used, supply -lines for weapons and supplies, going
Despite efforts to avoid injuring civilians back to using homemade or captured Ameri-
in the fight against the Vietcong, women. can arms, and, worst of all, admitting to the
and children and old men are inevitably; Vietcong rank-and-file that there will not be'
among the victims of a war fought increas- a quick victory after all.
ingly with heavy bombs and artillery. - The strategy paper mentioned earlier says'
A new defense .of this strategy Is being that there, are three possible outcomes from
heard in Washington. Critics are being as- .. the American point of view-defeat, a stele-
sured that surveys of civilian populations'. mate, or victory. It says that a stalemate
subjected to air attacks show that they, would be the hardest to achieve. The impli-
'blamo the war in general for their suffering cation is that victory should be the goal.
,rather than the particular nation that is One policymaker who holds that view
doing the bombing. . makes the further point that victory is
One student of civilian behavior, arguing possible once the United States has forced
in support of the enlarged war in Vietnam? the Vietcong to return to guerrilla warfare
tlement. When the outlook was black, the he says, is that the Vietnamese Army would
administration was nagging potential go .use a ceasefire to clean out any guerrillas'
botweefis in Communist and'noutralist coun-; remaining in such areas.
tries to try to persuade North Vietnam to. Those who see the new strategy in these.
come to the conference table. terms contend that progress cannot be meas-:
Now that the military situation appears ured merely in enemy casualties.- They call .
brighter, officials are emphasizing that ne- an operation a success even if it results In''
gotiation with the Communists Is not the,. few Vietcong bodies, because the* objective
only likely solution. Is not so much to kill the enemy as to harass
Officials pointed out this week that the., him and prove to him that his war is un
problem could also be solved by an unan-- profitable.
pounced slowing down of North Vietnamese They insist also that the bombing of North`
assistanco and Vietcong activity in'tho south., Vietnam is hurting the Hanoi regime serl-j;
The outcome thus need not follow the pat ously and must be continued with no letup. -'
torn of the Indochina 'war or the Algerian. This analysis rests on some broad assump.::
revolution, with their formal peace talks: tions
which may or may not stand u
,
p.
R '616b between the insurgents and the French. In It assumes that the Vietcong lack the re-
cT
stead, it could follow the examples of Greece' sillenc
t
t
- '
,
y
o re
urn to guerrilla warfare and go,'
and the Philippines after World War II,',. on effectively with the kind of fighting that`
when both nations successfully resisted Com took the British 10 years to ? suppress In.', -
munist-led Insurgencies. . - .. ? u.l-...
Approved For Release 2004101/16': CIA-RDP75-00149R0005001`60037-3 .