CLOUDY INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000500100003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 30, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

SITAT
l" ` ~' -- = %~l 1'br Release 2004/02%16MIAl? P75-001
Cloudy Intelligence
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CLARK MacGRECOR
OF MINNESOTA
IN THE HbUSE OF REPREtitv?'fiSfVL~S
Tuesday, April 30, 1963
gx'+~ may ' efn ers of Congress, of the
,press, and a large segment of the generet
public have often questioned the discre-
pencies between various11~ures and:
claims mado'by`"the aaministration and.
certain Members of Congress in regard,
to the- Cut~sit~iatLn. The most re-
an xa ese differences i::
whether tile Russians are actually with-
drawing troops from Cuba or are merely
rotating them, -bringing in-new men as,
they take out some 'already there. Per-
haps the following `editgrlal from the
April York Times give last
29::1 631
perts that Premier Khrushchev would never
risk installing. Russian missiles in Cuba ap-
pears to have influenced most of the Intelli-
gence judgments that reached the President
in that period. The awakening led to a con-
centration on missiles only, that caused us
to downgrade the signiflcanco of, the small
Soviet force that had been sent to Cuba.
Today, the basic differences between the
President and his critics concern the size of
this force, and whether It is being reduced.
Both Mr senator KEATING are
getting, te r nrma on'fikrm- the same
sour eg---Gov nment intelligence agencies.
But;' 3~e~au ti'fi~C has become a partisan
issue, it, is x,ot'easy for the top level estimates
that te1C~ the President to remain com-
pletely objective. The menwho provide these
judgments are appointees of the President's
own administration. Given the present cen
tralizatigl} of intelligence activities, it is
esp i 11kE rd for minorit views, which'
mignF~1 to'ixfgIt X11 the top.
This problem will n ` by the
appointment oqf }a;_K, -91 _, >?d to replace
Dr. James R. Kil arc, ohSirlliah-of the board
of directors of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, as chairman of the Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. The board was
established as a result of a recommendation
of the Hoover Commission in 1956 to monitor
continuously .G A., axid ,.,4lSe> --,Intelligence
activities,
Mr. Clifford has a brilliant mind, but, as a
long-time troubleshooter for the Democratic
Party, he is inextricably associated with.
partisan politics. He replaces a skilled and.
Objective scientist-aduii_nistrator. The selec-
ti on is at best unfortunate. It is bound to
give the impression that our intelligence
activities will now be monitored-not by a
chairman who is an expert in the field-but
i!1' ' fen President Ken-
nedy and. Senator KEATINC.about how many
Soviet troops in Cuba could reflect a serious
weakness in the elaborate apparatus the
Nation maintains for collecting and evaluat-
ing the data on `which policy must be built.
The problem is not new to this administra-
tion., 'nor did it originate with the Cuban
cri is. But when intelligence becomes, as it
has become today, the very cornerstone of
policy, an almost superhuman objectivity is
required on the part of our intelligence
chiefs to avoid estimates and evaluations
tailored to policy. - Intelligence, if it is to be
worth anything, must be. completely non-
partisan.
A Senate subcommittee, which has been
quietly investigating the Cuban crisis, has
already found considerable evidence that the
intelligence estimates of last summer and
fall were keyed to the "it can't happen here"
atmosphere, then prevalent in Washington.
The belief of all the Nation's top Soviet ex-
Approved For Release 2004/02/10 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500100003-6