(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000500090002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 25, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500090002-9
S 5774 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE April 25, 1967
1943'x. American actions in Vietnam,
however well intentioned, do not square
with the image of America that the world
has traditionally admired.
In November of 1965, I visited a civil-
ian casualty hospital in Danang near
the site of one of our largest airbases
in Vietnam. The poorly equipped wards
were jammed with terribly burned, bro-
ken and torn men, women and chil-
dren, innocent victims of our bombs,
napalm and artillery. They lay silent-
ly-two persons on each cot-their'
pained eyes following me as I walked
from bed to bed. I wondered that day,
.u: I cto now, if thin; ercat Nation of ours
zl:,s the rirsht to make so costly a deci-
sion on behalf of another people who
have a;: easy suffered so grievously.
Ninth. Our course in Vietnam does not
square with the conscience of the judg-
ment of many thoughtful Americans.
But as the tempo of the battle increases
and the martial spirit rises, the dissenter
will need to draw deeply on his courage.
Our official spokesmen have demon-
strated a growing resentment toward the
doubter and the dissenter. The impres-
sion is being created that while freedom
of conscience and expression are desir-
able theoretical principles, they are too
dangerous to practice in wartime. Even
when the claims of top level officials
prove to be groundless or contradictory,
the presure is on to accept the next pro-
nouncement without question. To chal-
lenge the soundness of our policy judg-
ments is more and more being equated
with "letting down the boys in Vietnam"
or g;v:nt; aid to Hanoi. It is almost -as
though we are fighting so intently to
secure freedom in Vietnam that we are
willing to sacrifice it in America. It is
still a regrettable truism that truth is
the first casualty in wartime. Yet, it is in
tames of national crisis and conflict that
America most urgently needs men who
will speak out with maximum candor.
For my own part, I reject the assump-
tions that lie behind our involvement,
and I regret each new step toward a deep-
er involvement. Before we take those
fateful additional steps that may lead to
s recommend now as I have
ir. ~',~ ,...:.. but with a new urgency and
n, that we:
:,;, t;;:? L.,mbin;r:, north and south,
trch anti de:": ,,y oire;give sweeps,
i couhnc our nmlli iry uc:ion to hold-
:,rratic n.s on the ;;round. Bombing
ti.. north has failed to halt or seriously
clt~`, the aow of troops to the south and
in fret, have prompted a much
lt`t' w.:: cirort by Hanoi. Secretary
tic\:una:'u himself told a Senate com-
uultec:
I don't h...'ve that the bombing ... has
:41;uitlc.,ntly ,educed (nor would reduce) the
actual flow of men and material to the
South.
In the south, our bombs have killed
or maimed countless numbers of innocent.
people and alienated others whose sup-
port we covet. A defensive holding ac-
tion in the south as advocated by Gen-
erals Gavin and Ridgway could be pur-
sued while determined efforts are being
made to negotiate a ceasefire. It is the
bombing of North Vietnam that presents
the greatest obstacle to a settlement and
STAT
greatest danger of involving Russia or Such internal disputes should be
China in the war. fought out by the competing groups with-
We should clearly state our willingness out outside interference, or be referred
to negotiate directly with the Vietcong to the Unu ?'d Nations. We have no ob-
with some recognition that they will play ligation to play policeman for the world
a significant role in any provisional gov- and especially in Asia, which is so sensi-
ernment resulting from a ceasefire and tive to heavy-handed interference by
a negotiated settlement. even well-meaning white men.
We should use what influence we have Third, unpopular, corrupt regimes of
to encourage a more broadly based civil- the kind we have been allied with in Sai-
Jan government in Saigon-a government gon do not deserve to be saved by the
willing to start discussions with the blood of American boys. Local govern-
other side looking toward arrangements ments that have done a good job usually
to end the war. have the confidence of the local citizens.
We should advocate an international They ordinarily do not have a guerrilla
presence to police a, ceasefire, supervise problem and when they do, their own
elections, provide an umbrella for the people are loyal enough to the Govern-
resettlement of Vietnamese concerned ment to take care of the guerrillas in-
about their safety, and arrange for the., stead of depending on us to do that for
withdrawal of all outside forces and the" them.
conversion of military bases to peace-
time uses.
The path to sanity and peace in south-
east Asia will not be easy. The ways to
a larger war is enticing and simple.
But before we make that choice, let us
recalls the words of Virgil:
Easy is the descent to Hell; night and day
the gates stand open; but to reclimb the
slope and escape to the outer air, this indeed
is a task.
But if we can accomplish that task,
we should use the Vietnam experience as
a guide to future policy. The enormous
destruction of life and property in Viet-
nam, both American and' Vietnamese,
will have served no useful purpose unless
we learn well the lessons that this tragic
conflict can teach us. Those lessons, I
believe, include the following:
First, conflicts of this kind have his-
torical dimensions which are essentially
political,"economic, and psychological;
they do not respond readily to military
force from the outside. Surely, the mili-
tary might of the United States can sub-
due little Vietnam, south and north.
But is this what the struggle is all
about? I think not. We are confronted
in Vietnam with an indigenous guerrilla
force that has enjoyed the sympathy or
the complicity of much of the local peas-
santry. The ineffective and unpopular
remiges of Saigon have not earned the
confidence of their subjects. Urgent
priorities, of which land reform is prob-
ably the most important, have been ig-
nored. Thus, the destruction of the
military power of the guerrillas and of
North Vietnam leaves fundamental po-
litical and economic problems still fes-
tering to set the stage for future conflict
or continued tyranny and injustice.
Second, in the future the United States
should avoid committing its power to in-
ternal struggles of this kind. The factors
involved are so complex and confusing
that it is beyond the capacity of an out-
side nation to know which group de-
serves support and which opposition. In
spite of the administration's strenuous
efforts to picture the situation as a war
of aggression from the north, it is essen-
tially a civil conflict among various
groups of Vietnamese. The Vietcong
control is strongest in the delta country
of the south a thousand miles from
North Vietnam and that control is exer-
cised by indigenous forces who enjoy the
cooperation of the local peasantry..
Even if one assumes that we are faced
with a battle for power between Ho Chi
Minh of the north and Marshal Ky of
the south, there is no clear issue here
of black and white or tyranny and free-
dom. Ho is a Communist tyrant, but
does Marshal Ky with his admiration
for Adolf Hitler represents the kind of
ideals and morality that American men
should die for?
I have never regretted my service as
a bomber pilot in World War II when
we stopped the madmen Hitler. Mus-
solini, and Tojo. But I do not believe
that Vietnam is that kind of testing
ground of freedom and free world se-
curity. It is a confusing civil conflict
with no real certainty as to the issues
at stake. I do not want to see my son
or other boys die in that kind of doubt-
ful struggle.
Fourth, those who believe that Ameri-
can military power has an iiportant role
to play in the Pacific should return to
the once-accepted doctrine of our best
generals that we should avoid commit-
ting American soldiers to the jungles of
Asia. Our power in the Pacific is in
naval and air strength as a deterrent
against aggression. Local governments
must deal with their own guerrilla prob-
lems.
Fifth, Congress must never again sur-
render its power under our constitu-
tional system by permitting an ill-ad-
vised, undeclared war of this kind. Our
involvement in South Vietnam came
about through a series of moves by the
executive branch-each one seemingly
restrained and yet each one setting the
stage for a deeper commitment. The
complex of administration moves in-
volving the State Department, the CIA,
the Pentagon, AID, and various private
interests-all of these have played a
greater role than has Congress. Con-
gress cannot be very proud-of its function
in the dreary history of this steadily wid-
ening war. That function has been very
largely one of acquiescence in little-un-
derstood administration efforts. The
surveillance, the debate, and the dissent
since 1965, while courageous and admir-
able, came too late in the day to head
off the unwise course charted by our
policymakers.
For the future, Members of Congress
and the administration will do well to
heed the admonition of Edmund Burke, a
distinguished legislator of an earlier
day:
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500090002-9