PROPOSED RECOGNITION OF THE VIETCONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000500080024-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 23, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ST 4T
Approved For Releas~2064f1 3` c - DP75-001491000500080024-6
PROPOSED RECOGNITION OF THE,
VIETCONG
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, there has
been much talk in recent days, in this
body and out of it, about recognizing the
Vietcong and offering it participation in
the Government of South Vietnam. But
this Is not what the North Vietnamese,
the masters of the National Liberation
Front in the South, are after. They In-
sist, as the Washington Post points out
'in its lea($ editorial today, on recogni-
tion of the NLF as the sole representa-
tive of the people of South Vietnam.
And this, as the Post says, is tantamount
to insisting upon unconditional sur-
render by the United States and the
South Vietnamese.
It is a surrender that would abandon
American commitments now and imperil
American ability, in the future, to continue
any effective resistance to Communist ag-
gression on the Asian mainland-
. The Post continued. Its point was em-
phasized by a second offering, written
from Bangkok by Joseph Alsop. This
column clearly points up the present
danger to Thailand, the next target in
the Communist drive to capture all of
southeast Asia. Preparations for the
attempted takeover, Alsop writes, are
"undoubted, well established facts."
And, he adds:
There -can be no doubt that the shock of
an American retreat and surrender In Viet-
nam would open the door wide for this at-
tempted Communist takeover.
I ask unanimous consent that both the
lead editorial from today's Washington
Post and Mr. Alsop's column be printed
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
and article were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
SPEAKING or SURRENDER
It is being widely argued by those who
oppose the Government's policies In South
Vietnam that we are making the surrender
of North Vietnam a condition to negotia-
tions. What the United States Is asking of
North Vietnam is the cessation of the ag-
gression against South Vietnam-and that
does not require any loss of territory, sur-
render of forces, or impairment of sover-
eignty-When North Vietnam insists that the
United States recognize the National Libera-
tion Front as the sole representative of the
people of South Vietnam, however, it itself
is asking for a surrender-an unconditional
surrender by the United States and the South
Vietnamese. On January 24, Ho Chi Minh
sent to 14 Communist countries and other
Interested parties, the letter explicitly mak-
Ing this condition. He said:
"It the United States really wants peace,
it must recognize the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam [the political arm
of the Vietcong) as the sole genuine repre
sentative of the people of south Vietnam
and engage in negotiations with It.-
It 1s remarkable that this language has
not been recognized by everyone as the equiv-
alent of a surrender ultimatum, The NLF.
from tee- beglaneig; has been only an arm
of North Vietnam. As an Australian Govern- as admitting that an American retreat and
ment study pointed out last summer: "The _surrender in Vietnam would have an "un-
National Liberation Front for the liberation lortunate" effect.
of South Vietnam was established as the "Unfortunate" is a pretty mild word for
Instrumentality of the Communist Party of the reality. The Chinese Communist For.
Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party, itself the gov- eign Minister, Chen Yi, has quite openly'
erning party of North Vietnam." New Zea- described Thailand as "next" on the agenda
land's white paper on Veetnam pointed out: after Vietnam to at least one Western visitor
"The Vietcong military and political appara- in Peiping. And the preparations for an aa-
tus In South Vietnam is an extension of'1rn j Sault on Thailand's Independence are quite
elaborate military and political structure in plain for anyone to see.
North Vietnam." It concludes that "North In order to grasp the nature of these'
Vietnam has committed aggression against ' preparations, It is first of all necessary to
the Republic of Vietnam under the guise of grasp the basic facts of Thailand's geography.
a 'war of national liberation'." . Briefly, the mountainous northeastern part
It cannot be denied that the NLF, directed- of the country and the southern provinces on
from Hanoi, has been able to get numbers the Malay Peninsula are both fairly inac-
of South Vietnamese to join the Vietcong. cessible from the center, and both regions
But it is an organization conceived In Hanoi, ;have non-Thai populations.
as an arm of the North Vietnamese Com- ` The northeast, with Its Lao and Vietnam-
munist Party, and as an instrument of the ese Inhabitants, and the extreme south, with
NorthVietnam state. Were the United States Its Malays, have therefore been selected as
to agree to recognize the NLF as the "sole" ' the prime targets by the Communist plan-
representative of South Vietnam, it would ners In Peiping and Hanoi. In the southern
,be tantamount to recognizing the Govern- provinces, a base was provided by the Com-
ment of North Vietnam as the "sole" repre- ? munist guerrillas who fled Into the That
sentative of South Vietnam. That, obvi- jungles after the failure of the assault on
ously, would be a total surrender. Malaya. In the northeast, the Vietnamese
One could look at such a capitulation in who fled to Thailand during the French war
two ways. Those who say we have no stake ' also offered useful human raw material.
in Asia and should never have intervened A good deal has already been published
In South Vietnam, still would have to ac- about this Communist effort In Thailand.
knowledge that we did Intervene and that ' But its coldly calculated character has never
we made clear commitments of our power been well conveyed. In the southern prov-
by congressional enactment, by treaty and inces, for instance, secret jungle camps were
by the declaration of authorized officials. organized, where recruits from the villages
Capitulation of this kind would betray those were Intensively trained by the refugees from
commitments. the Malayan war.
Those who admit we have a stake in Asia Many sco'ea of recruits from the north-
and an Interest in containing communism eastern provinces were also conveyed In se-
there would have to acknowledge the in- cret into the parts of Laos controlled by the ;
finite calamity of (in practical effect) sur- North Vietnamese Army (from which solemn
rendering in the field a force of 700,000 men treaty obligations of course required the ,
willing to fight on our side in the continuing North Vietnamese troops to be totally with-
struggle against aggression in Asia. And drawn 4 years ago). A hundred or so of
that would be but the beginning of our the most important agents were even taken
losses. Many others now willing to fight by sea to Hong Kong, and thence into Chi- s
with us, in the face of our withdrawal in na, for advanced training.
South Vietnam, surely would make their In this manner, quite serious though still
accommodation with the forces of aggres- limited guerrilla movements have by now
sion on the Asian mainland. been organized in both the target areas. The I
The administration has been reproached ' ruthless terrorism that Is such a charac-
for not mobilizing in Asia the sort of an in- teristic feature of "liberation" movements, 1
ternatlonal concert of powers we formed to,, has begun on a considerable scale. In short,;
contain Communist aggression in Europe. the pattern is clear, down to the last de-
We ought to have more allies and more con- tail.
trlbutions from the allies we have. But we As of now, it is not an especially alarming
may be sure that whatever international pattern, since the That Government has or-
help
we now have, we would have less help', ganized energetic countermeasures. But let
and fewer allies from now on, In containing the United States take the advice of George
Communist aggression in Asia, if we with. Kennan and his friends. Let the Vietnam-
drew from South Vietnam under conditions ese war end In a retreat and a surrender.
amounting to a surrender. Then anyone with the smallest knowledge of
The power that is demanding a "surren- Asian affairs can foresee that the effect in
der" In South Vietnam Is North Vietnam,, Thailand will be quite dramatically "un-
when it asks that we recognize the NLF as' fortunate."
the "sole" representative of the South Viet- ' To be sure, Senator FuLERICHT's antiad-
namese people. It is a surrender that would ministration witnesses do not seem to have
abandon American commitments now and included many persons with any knowledge
Imperil American ability, In the future, to whatever of Asia. If one may judge from
continue any effective resistance to Corn- 'this distance, a good specimen witness was
f can be no doubt that the shock of an Amer-'
loan retreat and surrender In Vietnam would
open the door wide for this attempted Oom' e
monist takeover..
monist-aggression on the Asian mainland. Prof. Hann Morgenthau, whose errors of basic
historical fact, concerning southeast Asia
MATTER OF FACT: ON A THEME FROM KE'NNAN have been so crude and glaring that his pose
(By Joseph Alsop) as an expert is in the nature of a comic
BANCKos.-Nearly 10 years ago, George F. turn.
Kennan, working at fever heat, dashed off Yet the double standard that now pre-
the first draft of a famouspolicy paper. On valls is still a bit bewildering. Think, for
the basis of the arguments therein set forth, Instance, of the outcry that would be heard
President Truman made his magnificently from people of Morgenthau'e stamp, if the
courageous Korean decision, and a long chain CL& were discovered to be attempting in
reaction of Asian disasters was thus averted, North Korea, or even in North Vietnam, any-
albeit at heavy cost. (thing comparable to what the Chinese and
If one can trust the transmitted versions 'North Vietnamese Communists are quite
of Kennan's recent Senate, testimony, be has openly attempting here In Thailand.
by now forgotten just about all the argil- Even more bewildering, one must add, is
meats he assembled for presentation at the the total carelessness of consequences and
Korea meetings at Blair House. But with le- the flat refusal to face unpleasant facts.
gard to this eoudtry he Is at least'guoted For these preparations for an'attempted take-
un-
L,':. :. :.. ......: ??::::.. twell-established rfacts 4-4
doubted
Approved For Release 2004/02/10: CIA-RDP75-ft~S'fS'~lti'l~'?$!1'd2`4`-l~'`*"~'