MANAGERIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE NRO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72R00410R000100130002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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Managerial Arrangements of the NRO
The NRO agreement of 11 August,1965 was intended to resolve
a number of issues which had arisen over' a period of years and had been
the cause of deep, and at times bitter, contention between CIA and elements
of the Defense Department, particularly the'Air Force. Two basic questions
were at the seat of these disputes.
a. Should CIA continue to have a more or less independent
capacity to overfly denied areas with manned aircraft?
b. Should CIA continue to maintain independent facilities
for the design and development of new satellite reconnaissance vehicles?
The first question, whether CIA should continue to operate manned
reconnaissance aircraft, has been pretty well resolved in the inegative. CIA
does continue to operate a limited number of U-2 aircraft. Presumably
it will continue to use these aircraft for the foreseeable future in areas
such as the Middle. East, Africa and Latin America. With the liquidation
of OXCART, however, CIA has lost the capacity to overfly territory
which is defended with sophisticated weapons and strategic reconnaissance
of this kind of denied area will hereafter be the responsibility of the Air Force.
The second question, whether CIA should continue as an active,
independent participant in the design, development and production of space
. NRO review(s)'completed.
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reconnaissance systems was answered in the affirmative. Existing arrange-
ments in the NRO, however, are not calculated to ensure either the best
possible individual contribution from CIA to the National Reconnaissance
Program or the most efficient over-all administration and supervision of
the program as a whole.
The Director, NRO now supervises a number of programs for which
the Air Force (SAFSP), CIA (DDS&T) and, to a comparatively minor degree,
the Navy are respectively responsible. The Air Force component of the NRO
has total system responsibility I number of SIGINT 25X1
satellite programs, both operational and in a state of development. ThNRO
Air Force is also working on. certain research projects, including vulner-
ability studies, and possible answers to the need for a quick readout system.
CIA, #~ao has the
responsibility for the payload integration of the CORONA program. It is
responsible for the development
field, its most important concern at the moment is with the design for an
objectives.
There are two serious deficiencies in these arrangements. One is
that in a number of situabis allocations of managerial responsibility as
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between CIA and the Air Force are more apparent than real. T.LiJI.-
e CIA is given responsibility for developing
25X1 el I R
25X1
NRO
The Air Force therefore has juris
diction over the design and production phasing of re -entry vehicles, stellar
NRO
i the Air Force has the responsibility for putting
which is CIA's 25X1
NRO
responsibility, must fit into this total complex. So far arrangements for
total systems integration and development have proved awkward and unsatis
factory.
is a continuing illustration of the dilemma which has
plagued attempts to resolve organizational arrangements in the NRO since
the decision in 1959 to authorize CIA to proceed with development of the
first CORONA system. Certain aspects of satellite operations necessarily
have to be the responsibility of the Air Force. These certainly include
control of launching facilities, recovery of payloads, etc. It is also
responsibility. Given thowsb?~f these Air Force responsibilities, the
generally conceded that procurement of boosters should be an Air Force
a satellite system necessarily has to be somewhat artificially determined.
extent of CIA participation, if any, in the' development and integration of
During the course of the negotiations leading up to the present NRO agree-
ment, CIA's record of leadership in the design and development of recon-
naissance vehicles (including the original U-2, improved versions of the
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U-2, the OXCART, the original CORONA system, the various improved
25X1 CORONA systems, Iwas generally conceded.
All agreed that competition between various agencies contributing to the
development of new systems in the NRP was desirable; that it was impor-
tant to keep alive and exploit the expertise which had developed in CIA and
that CIA should continue to contribute to the development of new and improved
systems. The only question was how this could best be. done within the over-
all framework of a nationally directed and integrated reconnaissance
program.
A strong effort was made to define the CIA contribution in terms of
responsibility for design and development of a payload. This would have
given CIA the authority to oversee contractors who produce a camera system
and other contractors who design space,vehicles into which the camera will
fit. This entire package could then be given to the Air Force whose responsi-
bility it would be to see that it was properly fitted on to a missile and fired
into space. The present arrangement, under which CIA's contribution is
limited to the production and delivery of the camera, is awkward and does
not preserve to CIA sufficient flexibility and scope to'ensure efficient
development of the payload. Moreover,. it obscures and confuses responsi-
bility for integration of the system as a whole. As far as can be determined,
neither the Air Force nor the NRO itself have succeeded in picking up
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this responsibility or in exercising satisfactory over-all systems inte-
gration supervision. The arrangement therefore is, neither efficient from
the over-all view nor satisfactory from the point of view of assuring CIA
adequate participation in the. development of the system.
A second serious deficiency in existing organizational arrangements
is the lack of some adequate mechanism for allocating and monitoring research
activity performed respectively by CIA and the Air Force. The NRO agree-
ment specifically, provides that a .basic objective of the agreement is to
promote a vigorous research effort and that funds "shall be adequate to
ensure that a vigorous research and exploratory development effort is
achieved and maintained by the Department of Defense and CIA to design
and construct new sensors to meet intelligence requirements aimed at the
acquisition of intelligence data. This effort shall be carried out by both
CIA and DoD." In fact, however, the total amount of research money
allocated to CIA over the past three years has been
as opposed to allocated to the Air Force.
Apart from what seems to be an inequitable distribution of
funds, there is some feeling that research activities. are carried out on
what is in fact a somewhat non-competitive basis. There has been some
reason to believe that contractors employed by CIA to work on particular
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v:y Er ...`.:ri/r
concepts (electrical optical imagery, for, instance) almost inevitably
receive instructions from the Air Force for studies in identical areas.
Given the influence of the Air Force with most major contractors, the
effect of such instructions of course, is to pre-empt development of the
concept by the Air Force. The truth of these allegations is a &e
difficult. to determine. The fact of the matter, however; is that existing
procedures for ay monitoring research plans and commitments of
the various contributors to the NRP are not satisfactory and should be
strengthened and improved.
To summarize, what seems to be required is a better way of allocating
25X1 'responsibilities. In situations such as he extent and limitations
of CIA's responsibilities should be more clearly determined than they are
under existing arrangements. CIA should have the authority not only to
see that a camera is designed -- it should also have the authority to develop
the equipment which is immediately related to the camera and necessary
to permit it to function efficiently in space. 'This would appear to include
the necessary spacecraft and re-entry vehicles. Over-all systems responsi-
bility for the integration of the entire system should then be .fixed with
greater clarity and be more efficiently implemented than it is today.
As regards research, a stronger mechanism is needed in the NRO_
to approve proposals for particular projects, ensure' desirable competition,
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eliminate pure redundancy and ensure against highjacking methods on the
part of participating organizations in the NRP. , These objectives require
some realignment of the NRO staff and working procedures.
Another aspect of the National Reconnaissance Program requires
clarification. The NRO agreement provides that "The NRP is a single
program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the Govern-
ment under a strong national leadership, for the development, management,
control and operation of all projects, both current and long range for the
collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained
through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations."
(Underscoring supplied.) Despite this injunction to include all resources
25X1
engaged in overhead reconnaissance in the NRP, neither the
SR-71 program are treated as coming within the jurisdiction of the NRO.
In the absence of compelling reasons justifying their exclusion they should
hereafter be incorporated in the inventory and subject to the normal review
procedures of the NRO. This matter should be the subject of discussion in
the Executive Committee of the NRO.
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