(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000200220055-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 55
• Content Type: NOTES

StatApDproved n-p or elease 1
R19 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200220055-2
Ouest.ion 19. Does the Administration believe we have the
men. and the equipnment to handle another ground war on the r1lain1-
land of Asia without: the use of tactical nuclear weapons) If
Answer. Whether or not the United States could "handle"
another ground war on the mainland of Asia without the use of
tactical nuclear weapons would depend very much on precisely
what~ coat i_ngcncy we were faciing. In certain emergencies it
would clearly he appropriate for the United States to mobilize
additional forces in order to broaden the character of the
options available to us, For certain situations--certain types
cif agg,:c$sion--nuclear weapons would not.
seem to have any iel.c-
vance whatever. One cannot, however, completely exclude the
ronni.bi_l _'tty of other : it_u3 tjQns in Which tactical nuclear
weapons might at some point have to be used. There does not
seem to l,e any general statement about this wide. and complex
Yongc of contingencies which weu:ld by helpful. or rosponsi.ve to
the Committee's uc,t:ion, in fact, there are weighty argumonts
against any definition or discussion by the Administration of
just 4111ich mi.i.i tary options it would select or prefer to meat
particular conti.ngenci.es,
Contingency planning of course., carriers out .rout:ill (A y
by the t)c!ik r6 3i @a opftela@ 2t 102~(48t: 611AC DFt,7bM8336Mbo720022Ot56-dirt
so, on what do we base this estimate given the presents deploy-
ment and commitment of our forces?
 SECRET
into operation mechanically if one or another event occurs.
Rather they are clcwsignod to clarify tthr character of the
choices which would, then have to be m:adde, on the basis of
political as well as military factors, and in the light of
a host of specific circummmstance:s.
Our juc1gcnent, implicit: in what has been said above, that
another war on the Asian mainland would not necessa'trily require
the use of tactical nuclear weapons, is based on. our intelli-
gence estimates on the capabilities of likely opponents and
the possibility of our being faced with one. or another type of
attack as compared with the forces available to our: selves and
our allies to meet: att;acl.;s. IL is relevant to note that the
ITS has more forces deployed today in the Pacific area not
cczinI:i1??; those in V'let:--Nim than it did in 1963.
11nestion 20. If t.re do riot: intend to use tactical nuclear
wear>ons in any ground war in should we not star L promptly
to take steps to ~: educe our conmmitments in other parts of the
1-7 0 'L (I'?
Answer. As indicated abovve, tal:et.tz~_r, this government
tlc~uld or would not find it necessary to use noel ear weapons
in a ground war: in Korea would depend on the specific circum-
stance:!s and chtractc:ristics of any act:ack, and on the c'egr,ee
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 Approved For Release 2004/02/09 : CIA-RDP70B0033$R000200220055-2
I I,CRET
of 'military success iL rni.4ht meet. The Armed Forces of t:he
Rcpubl.,ic O.C Korea, like the US divisions stationed at their
side, are wolf. trained, hi,tlhl.y i otivated, cael.J. equipped vlith
conventional arms, and capable of giving a good account: of
themselves against any aggressor. Under cortai.n conditions,
those forces in Korea might have to be reinfozc:ccl with troops
noV7 stationed elsewhere or mobilivecl to rneet: the emergency, or
oven supported by nuclear weapons, but such hypothetical
rventu~l i a.es cto not appear persuasive arguments 'or modifying
the militaty deployments and the, political commitments which we
have undor:taken to'meet actual, cul rent: probIcnis and to protect
in other areas.
Approved For Release 2004/02/09 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200220055-2