(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000200220040-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 40
• Content Type: MISC

.Question 1.
A complete description of the intelligence collection
plans which included the use of the Pueblo and other vessels.
When was this plan approved?
Who participated in the decision?.
Did the missions differ from area to area.
Beginning in 1961, the Navy fitted our several large
State Department review completed
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Government who is aware of the day-to-day operations of such
The name of the highest official in the United States
ships as the Pueblo.
.of activity, including vessels such as the Maddox which acquired
How many.United States vessels are now capable of this type
such a capability in short order?
quarters. The objective was to expand on a promising program
would be responsive to the collection requirements.offleet head-
efforts were useful, and early in 1965 a, proposal was made to
develop a number of smaller intelligence collectors (AGERs) which
specialized functions of electronic and communications intel-
ligence. (There are now six of these TRS.) The results of these
auxiliary ships called Technical Research Ships (TRS) for the
heavily committed combat vessels which the fleet had been using:;
while freeing for their primary functions the expensive and
these AGERs.
actively pursued in a number. of areas, a relatively, low prior
Although these intelligence collection efforts had been
ity had been for some years assigned to North Korea. As indicated
in the response below_to Question 4, the USS Banner, the first
had not concentrated on North Korean activity. Beginning in
of the AGERs, had pased by North Korea on several occasions but
late 1966, however., the attitude of the Pyongyang regime became
steadily more belligerent. The threatening language long used
by the North Koreans grew even more threatening. On October 5,
1966 the North Korean President,.Kim I1 Sung, called for a step-
up in the "revolutionary movement" in South Korea by means of
"properly combining violent and nonviolent: struggles, legal,
and illegal struggles ..."
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all this bellicosity, we did not conclude that Pyongyang intended
Korean military and subversive activities across the Military
Demarcation Line (MDL) increased at an alarming rate. Despite
And, as detailed below in the response to Question-U, North
weapons were arriving in North Korea in substantial volume.
military expenditures. Our intelligence indicated new Soviet
In April 1967, Pyongyang announced sharply increased
gaps in our intelligence picture of military developments and
and we felt it our duty to remedy, where we could, the serious
resources north of the MDL. The collection of electronic Intel
ligence on North Korea was therefore given.a higher priority in
the fall.of 1967; and in late 1967., the Pueblo was assigned
The "approval cycle" for the Pueblo mission of January 1967
is detailed below in the response to Question 4. The operation
plan for this mission was developed by Commander-in-Chief Paci
.fic Fleet. The Committee's questions about which individual
officials participated in the development of the operations plan
and-in the approval cycle and which officials are aware of day-
to-day operations of this type were discussed in the covering
letter transmitting these answers.
The precise missions assigned to a particular ship depend
on the electronic environment of the areas where it is to
operate and the requirements of the Intelligence Community in
that region. These variations are, however, technical in char-
acter and in a general sense the missions do not differ from one
area to another.
ligence by installing the appropriate receivers'and antennas
Any naval ship, including one as small as a sea-going
tugboat, can be made capable of collecting communications intel-
aboard and assigning a qualified detachment to operate the
equipment.
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 Question 2..
.Why is it necessary to send a ship so close to the territorial
waters of another state in order to collect intelligence information?
Answer
Radio and radar transmissions in the UHF and VHF ranges do not
signals can be heard and collection.can be accomplished.
when they are 12-15 miles from land and that to.require them to main-
tain 20 miles, 25 miles, or any larger stand-off distance would sub-
stantially degrade the effectiveness of their operations.:
Ships provide a good platform for such collection because they
are stable and can linger in their areas of operation where wanted
many transmissions tend to be directional because of antenna config-
uration and can be collected. only in a small area. Experience has
shown that our ships are operating about on the fringes in many respects
conform to the curvature of the earth and collection must be accomplished
within range of the transmitter. Such "line-of-sight" transmission is
directly comparable to reception of television. In addition, some
transmissions in the regular HF ranges (which conforn to the earth's.
curvature) are so low in power that close-in collection is required;
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What agency or agencies have operational responsibility for the
Pueblo? Does the Navy determine--the ship's track? Does the National
Security Agency have overall responsibility for the Pueblo? What is
C.I.A.'s role?
The USS Pueblo was under the operational control of the Commander
n Chief Pacific (CINCPAC).
The Navy determined the areas in which the ship was to operate,
but the captain of the ship had the responsibility-for concentrating
his efforts in the most useful of these areas. The operation areas of
the Pueblo's mission (Ichthyic I) were defined by Commander in Chief
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) as follows: western boundary was 13 NM
from land mass/off shore islands; eastern boundary was 60 NM seaward
of western boundary. Northern and southern boundaries of the three
subdivisions of the general operating area were: Pluto 42-00 N, 41-00
N; Venus 41-00 N, 40-00.N; Mars 40-00 N, 39-00 N. The track of the
Pueblo within this general operating area can only be determined when
its personnel and log are recovered.
I The National Security Agency did not have overall responsibility
for the Pueblo. The Central Intelligence Agency had no responsibility
for the Pueblo but^did utilize the intelligence. collected.
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SECRET
Question 4.
Was the Pueblo the first such intelligence ship to ;o into waters
off North Korea? If not, what were the dates and missi, ns of its pre-
decessors? What individual or individuals made the decision to send
the Pueblo into waters off Korea? When was that decision made? Were
you as Secretary of State, aware of the timing of the mission?
Answer
The USS Banner, while on intelligence gathering missions similar
to that of the Pueblo, passed through the international.waters off the
North Korean coast en route elsewhere. These transits occurred on 14-16
March 1966,'5-7 February 1967, and 15-16 May 1967. The Pueblo mission
of January 1968 was the first such mission to operate for an extended
period off North Korea.
The approval cycle for the Pueblo mission was as follows:
On 17 December 1967, CINCPACFLT'submitted the proposal for
the Pueblo operation.
On 23 December 1967, CINCPAC requested JCS approval.
On 26 December 1967, the Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule
for January 1968 (which included the Pueblo proposal) was submitted to
the'Washington agencies having responsibility in these matters.
On 29 December 1967, the JCS, the Department of State, and
the other agencies concerned approved the Monthly Reconnaissance
Schedule.
On 2 January 1968, the JCS ntoified CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT.
notified COMNAVFOR Japan that the operation was approved.
On 5 January 1968, COMNAVFOR Japan issued sailing orders to
the USS Pueblo.
the Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule on behalf of the Secretary to
'gather with other appropriate officers of this Department were aware
The designated representative of the Secretary of State who approved
of the schedule of the USS Pueblo.
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instructions. The Committee wishes to have these as well.
the copy. of a communication sent to the Pueblo provided by Assistant
Secretary Macomber contains reference to our additional messages or
communication concerning the Pueblo contains reference to prior, messages
and instructions, the Committee wishes. to have such messages. For example,
The Committee would like to have copies of all operational instruc-
tions and mission concepts relating to the Pueblo. If any cable or other
Answer
The Pueblo's Sailing Orders are attached as Enclosure 1.
The four references cited in the Sailing Orders comprise over 900
with the Dept. of Defense what arrangement might be made to meet any needs
cov