PROPOSED ADDITION TO BRIEFING FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80B01676R000400090026-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 1, 2003
Sequence Number: 
26
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 24, 1964
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80B01676R000400090026-3.pdf194.08 KB
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Approved Foif lease 2*VO81O5' PIq 2DP80BO16 000400090026-3 !)i AFT 24 July 1954 SUBJECT: Proposed Addition to Briefing for the North Atlantic Council 1. As I am sure you know from recent press re- ports, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has said on several occasions that the United States also has a satellite reconnaissance program. Premier Khrushchev is correct about this. Satellite photographic reconnaissance is one of our valuable intelligence collection tools. le have been successful for several years in utilizing satellite photography, along with other intelligence collection activities, to provide us with information essential to the security of the United States and its allies. As you are aware, in the Soviet Union State secrecy is both a military resource and an historic policy. Because of this secrecy, the Free World is dependent upon intelligence resources to redress the disparity, and we have found satellite photography a useful addition to our other resources in this effort. 2. Satellite photographic reconnaissance, how ever, has a number of problems related to it and it ~'~' J YS_ Z'3// Approved For Release 2003/08/05 CJRDP80B01676R000400090026- Approved For lease 2003/000 OB0167Qb00400090026-3 has certain inherent shortcomings. In addition to being extremely expensive in materials and money, such a system is necessarily highly sophisticated in equip- went and technique, and it is difficult to maintain a regularly scheduled program. Moreover, as our astro- nauts have observed during their earth orbits, the earth is at all times shrouded by largo areas of cloud cover. This, added to the fact that through overhead photography one can identify a building but cannot determine what work is going on within it, constitute important limitations on satellite photography as an intelligence collection means. 3. Nevertheless, as I have said we regard this collection device as presently useful; we are confident that as its development proceeds over the next several years it will become increasingly valuable. Moreover, we consider it to be a legal and Justifiable activity which violates no national sovereign territory. In support of this position, the United States has con- tended, in the United Nations and elsewhere, that outer space should be reserved for peaceful programs, that outer space is free and open for exploration by all states, and that we do not consider the use of photo- graphic satellites to he illegal or aggressive. Approved For Release 2003/08/05 CIA-~DP80BO1676R000400090026-3 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400090026-3 Dear Tommy: 28 July 1964 As I told you on the phone Friday, it seemed to me that the proposed statement to the North Atlantic Council concerning our satellite photography went really further than It should in suggesting the extent to which satellite photography makes an input to our intelligence inventory and, in addition, would be a valuable means of policing disarmament agreements. It is this latter point which concerns me particularly and I think you will agree with me that the difficulty we have encountered in Cuba in disproving rumors and gossip and "proving the negative" is an indicator of the difficulties encountered in depending upon aerial photography as a total verification of resource. Attached is a suggestion for a brief and more con- densed statement which might be used with NAC. It may be that you will wish to expand this statement somewhat in order to meat the needs you feel to important. However, I would avoid the impression that satellite reconnaissance, good as it is, is in any way a substitute for on-site inspection. ,'Sincerely, /11/ John John A. .M cCone Director Attachr>ment: Proposed Addition to Briefing for the North Atlantic Council, 24 Jul 64 #1 Original w/att - Addressee #2(1)- DCI Chrono w/att . #31 - DCI State File w/att #41 - ER w/o #51.- IR. Jack Smith w/att TS #188563 Copy - / ; Z Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400090026-3 TOP SECRET NO DP8QB91676R000400090026 FR 676ROO0400090026-3 downgraded UNGLASSMED SECRET when filledbg f to CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 28!aB4 ATTENTION: This form will oe piacea ,.m -Y w u or classified Top Secret within the ,CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter Is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns. proved For FORM 26 2C USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 9.60 DESTROYED Signature) OFFICE DATE elease 2003/08/05 : C A-RDP80B01