AIDE DETAILS U.S. MISGIVINGS ON ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000600050021-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 14, 1978
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600050021-
14 September 1978
off,
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Aide Detans U. s.
THE WASHINGTON POST
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-18
Covert Military Operations?.Were,-Mounted in 1975 Despite. the `Longest of Odds'
By . Jim Hoagland
Wasbtnston?Pwt staff wrlisr,"z:.
One of Henry A. Kissingerrs. princi-
pal aides during the Aniola crisis of
1975 reports in a-forthioming. maga-
z1he article that the'Tord a,dministra-'
tion mounted- covert.. military opera-
tions in Angola' despite a- strong con-
viction by -they officials most -directly
involved that :, the., effort would faill
*Ad I ultimately' -damage-American--i
erests abroad:,'
Providing` the-.first. public account
Vby a high-level insider of the. policy
tattle- over Angola,. Nathaniel Davis
writes in the- fall , issue of', the guar.
Z#erly journal Foreign Affairs that Kis-
.iinnger and President Ford seemed to
relieve during both the final weeks of
Vietnam and the Angola, crisis "that it
,was better to roll. the dice against the
-
4s a diplomatic-political problem. that
"3u tensee-policg"debate;.Davis=portrays`
?,.'; Kissinger "saw Angola: as part`-of
-the U.S.-Soviet relationship; ? and not
as an African problem," argues`Davis,?.
:gho served aeassistant secretary of
;-state for African affairs' under Kis-
singer from March to July 1975, when
e- secretly resigned because. of his
2ifferences with Kissinger and Ford.
Asked fore comment,-. Kissinger said
.tat he was- "astonished that a serving
nbassador would publish such a one-
;sided and distorted view of events. and,
the State-Department -has cleared
Bch a piece; -it is not-: conducive to
-nonpartisan forei_gh policy .' . ;
Quoting-from two highly. classified
-qnemos' that he prepared during the.
`3ongest of odds than, to abandon the
competition against-our great' adver-
._ n
?-of Zaire s Shaba Province surface
onflicts of Ethiopia and Somalia and
d
,quest--appears only-a few-months af?
fer the same kind of policy battle over
Approved
Although - partial% accounts :, of . the
1975 Angola policy'struggle and Davis'
resignation were eventually-leaked to
.reporters,,Davis himself had'sougbt,to
keep .them- secret until; now; His ac-
count entitled a"Memoir," is his. first
effort:.to explain publicly, the painful
dilemmahe felt. the. Angola cris}s.rep-;
resented for him. W.
It is aft account filled. with strong.
suggestions- of manipulation of the bu
reaucracy and the-press not only to
preserve secrecy but also to improve
the chances -for getting presidential
acceptance of covert operations..
Davis` draws a number of parallels
betweenn. the - dangers of covert in-
volvement in Angola and Initial U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.: He. states
that. Kissinger seemed to, share fully
those perceptions, but eventually ov-
errode them to go more deeply into
Angola
"I believe- the secretary is right in
his conviction-if I understand his
views-that if we go in, we must go in
quickly, massively and decisively
enouglt to avoid the. tempting, grad-
ual, mutual escalation that character-
ized Vietnam during the 1965-67 pe-
riod," Davis wrote in a memorandum
on July 12,1975..' . . If we are to have
a test of- strength-with the Soviets, we
should: -=find - a?; ?. mom-advantageous -
place: `+:
Davis- wrote.'-the memorandum to
head, off- . a: Central.. Intelligence
Agency covert. operations proposal for,
Angola-ordered: up by the administra?.
tion in- April. He -urged Kissinger and
Ford inatead'to adopt the "diplomatic
option" developed at the same time by
a high-level interagency task force on
Angola,. which suggested that the ad-
ministration work with Portugal and a i
few key African countries to reduce
the flow of arms to the three warring
black nationalist factions.
The task-force included senior rep-
resentatives from the CIA, Defense
Department, National Security Coun-
cil and. other agencies involved in Af-
rican policy: Davis writes that the
task force--"in its great majority" fa-
vored the diplomatic option and op-
posed the covert intervention., which
"would commit: -U.S. resources and
prestige in. a situation the outcome of.
which was' in 'doubt ' and 'over which R
we could at best exercise limited in-
fluence.!' . -. . '
But the task: force diplomatic..rec-
ommendation''-was_ rewritten on in-
structions from. the- National Security
Council staff 'ta -give- equal- weight to-.
two other options, a? complete hands-?.
off policy 'or - military?intervention; ac-.
cording to a report of the House Se- G
lect Committee ..on Intelligence that.1
was published ? in February 1976 and?'
which Davis quotes. with evident ap-
proval.
Davis suggests he was also bureau!
cratically outflanked at the crucial:
July 14- meeting of Kissinger's highly
secret "Forty Committee," a high-level,
review body for covert actions. Davis;
asked to be present at the meeting to-
argue his case, but he notes that he
"was not invited" to the meeting. It
ended with an order for further study
of the covert operation plan.
Within a week, Ford had approved a
$6 million guns-and-cash operation for
the Angolan forces of Holden Roberto'
and Jonas Savimbi, according to the
House Intelligence Committee report
A month later, the figure had gradu-
ally escalated to $14 million,, and
reached $32 million before the Senate
legislated an end to the covert. sup-
.port on Dec. 19.
- Davis, who has served at lower level
posts since his break with Kissinger,
is currently state department adviser
at the Naval War College. He de-
scribes his opposition. entirely on
pragmatic grounds.- He suggests at.
several points that he did not disagree-
with Kissinger's concern' over Russian
moves in Africa and he sidesteps the
question of his own. views on the prim .
ciple of covert action im, such situa
tions..
In the July memo- he submitted to
Kissinger through Undersecretary- of
State Joseph J. Sisco, Davis argued
that the- CIA proposal "grossly 'under.
estimates the 'risks of disclosure
abroad" because of the operation's
high visibility. The CIA had- Instead
stressed the danger of leaks inWash-
ington and the need to restrict infor?1
mation to Congress, Davis notes.
The Russians; Davis argued, would
quickly know of theAmerican. support
,for. the ' Roberto and; Savimbi forces
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000600050021-8
and could easily increase' their sup.
plies to their client, the, Popular
Movement for the Liberation of An-
gola. He described the Roberto and
Savimbi forces as having serious mili-
tary weak points, and noted that Sa-
vimbi was reported to- be ' receiving.
South African assistance, a link that
would cause problems with African
opinion.
In a section that gives a broader
scope to the CIA proposal than has
p. eviously been officially confirmed,
the July 12 memo noted that "the CIA
paper envisages covert CIA-organized!
military training, organization, orien?
tation and, leadership,'.' along the lines
of CIA activities "in the Vietnam hign-
lands and elsewhere in East Asia."
Davis. resigned Immediately after
Ford approved the, covet optloa;'-and
was offered a job as ambassador to
Switzerland. He paints- the period
that. followed his resignation as a
difficult, time of feeling that he could
not talk about his resignation without
disclosing the covert. operation.
The article discloses that Davis and
Kissinger aide Lawrence S. Eaglebur?
ger deliberately scheduled Davis to be
on vacation on July 28 when the Sen-
ate Foreign: Relations African sub-
committee began hearings at which
.Davis should have testified. When
The Washington Post discovered the)
resignation a month later, Davis ac-
quiesced in what he now calls' "a
cover story" that he had quit because
of the frustration of "working against
too many psychological obstacles"
from African and congressional oppo-
sition.
The secret Angola operation first
came to public notice on Sept. 25 in a
New York Times report that reported
including
that both "East and West,"
the United States, were pouring mil-l
.lions of dollars covertly into Portugal
and Angola. Davis writes that he is
still ' puzzled why that particular re-
.port "had so little impact in the
United States," but suggests that it
was=because the story's. sources put
the main emphasis on the political ac-
tivity in Portugal rather than the{
s military operation in Angola and b
cause` it "emphasized Soviet- action
in support of the leftists in Angola."
Staff. researcher Jane Freunder,',c
tributed'to-this report..:
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