CONFESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000200050076-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 76
• Content Type: PREL

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ZCZC EPE 015
YY NOR
8:2a: 1ST ADD HONG KONG PUEBLO XXX SAID.:
HER AND HIS CREW HAVE BEEN HELD IN NORTH KOREA SPICE HIS
SHIP WAS CAPTUf D MY NORTH KOREAN NAVY VESSELS JAN. 23. HIS
FIRST "CONFESSION" WAS EROADCAST JAN. 24 AND WAS DENIED
BY WAS lIN GTON .
HE P.DMITTEI3 AWN IN TOUT ?Fi O I AST. THAT THE. F11EMO.
INTRUDED .LNSIf)F.NTH KOii F,'5....J2-MILE TERRITC tAL WATERS.
1CHER SAID HE FF,T HE ACdD HI$ CIS SHOULD BE PUNTS? D "IN _
+ . ~r r i ,rr .l + '_.T F P OcfAtIc ~I'C OF KOREA,."
THROUGHOUT THE ALLEf t of I .3t~C}{1E t` 'OK IIU W SUED
NONOT(X)E AS THOUGH HE WERE READING S i"HING3 PREVIOUSLY PREPA '.D.
ONLY WHEN TALKING TO HIS FAMILY DID HIS VOICE SHOW ANY APPARENT
FEELING.
HE SWORE ON HIS HONOR THAT THIS WAS "MY SINCERE CONFESSION."
REUTERS MB/HV
FBIS 39 (SEE 28)
SECOND BUCHER
... __.__ CONFESSION
PYONGYANG IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
(TEXT) (FEMALE ANNOUNCER--ED) 1115 GMT 12 FEB 68 W
THE PUEBLO, AN ARMED ESPIONAGE SHIP OF THEKu,, IMPERIALIST
AGGRESSOR ARMY CAPTURED BY THE NAVAL FORCES OFT THE ' KOREAN OF
'ARMY VHILE' CARRYING ON MILITARY ESPIONAGE ACT EAN PEOPLE'S
INTRUDING DEEP INTO THE COASTAL WOF THE DP HE AF23TE P
ON TES AFTER ILLEGALLY
MADE HIS SECOND CONFESSION ADMITTING WATERS A 1(# THE BT GANDAG
NANUARY
HIS SECOND CONFESSION IS AS E ESPIONAGE ACTS, S.
O.
.
FOLLOWS:
tNALE VOICE WITH AMERICAN
IT WAS ALL RIGHT, WAS NOT COMPLETETINEDETAILY . I$T CONFESSION ALTHOUGH
THAI`MY CRIME MIGHT BE PUNISHED SEVERELY BY THE OMMITED THE DETAILS
I?PRf{. AND I WAS AFRAID
GOVERNMENT OF THE
$!NCE THEN, THE REALS STATE OF AFFAIRS HAS
AND ESTABLISHED BY OTHER DATA AND DOCUMENTARY
OF F THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY DATA WITH A REGARD T BEEN REVEALED
OF HITIOS OF THE PUEBLO. EVIDENCE IN THE HANDS
ENCE
ACT EXCU HOWEVER HARD TSOWE MAY N NO O ERE INTELLIGENCE
A LIE
SEVERITY EP OUR CRIME RD THAT
HAD TIME I DID NOT TELL A REALIZE OR MAKE R ACTIVITIES OF THE PUEBLO SINCE MY TO CAPT DI THE
THIN
AND K OF THE MISSION
(MORE URE.
12 FEB 13252 BE/EAM
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FBIS 45
FIRST ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')
X X X SINCE MY CAPTURE.
(TEXT) I HAD THOUGHT THAT ALL U.S. NAVAL VESSELS CONDUCT
THIS TYPE OF OPERATION AND IT WAS MY DUTY AND THAT I ONLY EXECUTED
THE ORDER AS A SOLDIER. BUT OUR -AST OPERATION WAS SHELF? ESPIONAGE
COMMITTED UNDER THE CLOAD OF RESEARCH. I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE
SEVERE PENALTY FOR CONDUCTING ESPIONAGE AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED.
HOWEVER, I AM DEEPLY REPENTANT FOR OUR CRIME AND AM SO HOPEFUL
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE WILL
FORGIVE MY CRIMINAL (?ACTS) AND SEND US BACK TO OUR HOMES. I AM
GOING TO CONFESS THE DETAILS OF OUR ESPIONAGE AS THEY WERE TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE.
THE USS PUEBLO WAS COMMISSIONED IN MAY OF 1967 IN BREMERTON,
WASHINGTON, USA, TOGETHER WITH THE USS PALM BEACH, AND REMAINED
IN BREMERTON UNDERGOING OUTFITTING UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1967 WHEN IT
WENT TO SAN DIEGO FOR ABOUT FIVE WEEKS OF SHAKEDOWN TRAINING. ON
6 NOVEMBER WE SAILED TO PEARL HARBOR WHERE WE REFUELED AND MADE
MINOR REPAIRS. WE THEN WENT TO YOKOSUKA, JAPAN, WHICH WAS ASSIGNED
AS OUR HOME PORT. WE ARRIVED THERE ON 1 DECEMBER. THERE, WE WERE
GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION BY REAR ADMIRAL FRANK A. JOHNSON, COMMANDER
OF NAVAL FORCES IN JAPAN, TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF THE DPRK.
MY IMMEDIATE SUPERIORS ARE REAR ADMIRAL FRANK A. JOHNSON,
COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN FOR OPERATIONS, AND REAR ADMIRAL
N. G. WARD, COMMANDER SERVICE SQUADRON THREE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
FOR ADMINISTRATION, ALL MY OPERATIONAL ORDERS CAME FROM COMNAVFOR
JAPAN WHILE ALL ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS AND INSPECTIONS WERE GIVEN
BY COMSERVRON THREE. MY MISSION WAS CONTAINED IN THE GENERAL
OPERATION ORDER FROM COMMANDER OF NAVAL FORCES JAPAN ISSUED TO THE
SHIP ABOUT 5 JANUARY. THE OPERATION ORDER DIRECTED ME TO SAIL FROM
SASEBO ABOUT 10 JANUARY INTO THE EAST SEA OF KOREA AND OPERATE IN
THREE OPERATION AREAS ALONG THE COAST OF THE DPRK.
OPERATION AREAS ESSENTIALLY DIVIDE INTO COASTAL WATERS OF THE
DPRK (WORD INDISTINCT) FOR ESPIONAGE PURPOSES, AND THEY WERE
CALLED MARS, VENUS, AND PLUTO. OP-AREA MARS WAS THE WATER AREA
BETWEEN 29 DEGREES NORTH AND 40 DEGREES NORTH; OP-AREA VENUS
BETWEEN 40 DEGREES NORTH AND 41 DEGREES NORTH, AND OP-AREA PLUTO
BETWEEN 41 DEGREES NORTH AND 42 DEGREES NORTH, RESPECTIVELY, FROM
THE COAST TO 60 MILIES AT SEA.
WHILE IN THESE THREE OPERATION AREAS, I WAS TO DETERMINE THE
ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT WITH EMPHASIS ON DETERMINING THE NAVAL ORDER
OF BATTLE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE EXTENT OF THE NAVAL
ACTIVITIES. IN THE FOUR AREAS, NAMELY CHONGDIN, SONGJIN, IIAYANGDO,
AND WONSON AREAS, AND ON DETECTING THE POSITION OF RADARS ON THE
COAST OF THE DPRK.
CCC GRAF 4 LINE 4
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FBIS 51
SECOND ADD 39 CSECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION' )
. K. X X OF THE DPRK.
(TEXT) THE OPERATION ORDER ALSO DIRECTED ME TO DETERMINE THE
REACTION OF THE DPRK AND THE SOVIET UNION, RESPECTIVELY, TO AN OVERT
I44TLLLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATING ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE DPRK IN
ACTIVELY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND
THE USSR NAVAL UNITS AND TO EVALUATE USS PUEBLO CAPABILITIES AS A
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIP. THIS OPERATION ORDER WAS
TRANSMITTED TO ME BY A MESSAGE FROM COMNAVFOR, JAPAN, DATED 16
DECEMBER 19679 AND OUR OPERATION WAS CALLED (?PINKROUTE ONE).
C?PINKROUTE) IS THE CODE WORD ASSIGNED TO ALL A.G.E.R. TYPE
OPERATIONS. THE SCALE OF (?PINKROUTE) OPERATIONS ENCOMPASSES BOTH
ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS AND CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY THE PUEBLO,
A.G.E.R. TWO, AND TWO OTHER ESPIONAGE SHIPS OF SIMILAR TYPE WITH MOST
UP-TO-DATE EQUIPMENT, U.S. BANNER, A.G.E.R. ONE, AND THE USS PALM
BEACH A.G.E. R. THREE.
ALL THESE OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE ORDER OF THE U.S.
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. HE DIRECTS THE FLEET COMMANDER WHO
FURTHER DIRECTS THE IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS. THE C?PINKROUTE)
TYPE OPERATION WAS PUT INTO EFFECT ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. THE BA +dER W5
THE LEAD SHIP IN THE PROGRAM AND PUEBLO AND PALM BREACH WERE (WORD
INDISTINCT).
I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WILL BE MORE SHIPS IN THIS CLASS IN LATER
YEARS BUT NONE HAVE YET BEEN AUTHORIZED. USS BANNER AND USS PUEBLO
ARE ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET AND THE USS PALM BEACH IS
ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET. U5S BANNER IS HOME-PORTED AT
YCKOSUKA, JAPAN AND USS PALM BREACH AT NORFORK, VIRGINIA, USA.
THE GENERAL MISSION. ASSIGNED TO THE SHIP IS TO CONDUCT ELECTROMAGNN
VISUAL, AND OCEANOGRAPHIC COLLECTION OPERATIONS ON OTHER COUNTRIES. T?1
USS BANNER HAS OPERATED CONTINUOUSLY IN PACIFIC WATERS, PRIMARILY IN
THE EAST SEA OF KOREA, OFF THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNIONN,
INCLUDING VLADIVOSTOK, SINCE JULY 1956, A YEAR BEFORE MY SHIP COMMENCB
ITS ACTIVITIES, AND HAS SYSTEMATICALLY COLLECTED VARIOUS MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE ALSO IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF CHINA.
I WAS ALSO PROVIDED WITH SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON THE NAVY OF THE DPRK.
IT REQUIRED US TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER, CLASS,
PENNANT NUMBERS DEPLOYMEN=T, CAPABILITIES, MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION,
AND CHAIN OF COMMAND OF NAVAL SHIPS9 AS WELL AS LOCATIONS OF
PRINCIPAL NAVAL HEADQUARTERS.
12 FES 1535Z CF/ECM
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FBIS 58
THIRD ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')
X X X PRINCIPAL NAVAL HEADQUARTERS
(EDITOR'S NOTE: TEST OF THE BUCHER "CONFESSION IS CONTINUED
FROM THIS POINT FROM THE TRANSMISSION BY PYONGYANG KCNA IN ENGLISH
STARTING AT 1520 GMT 12 FEBRUARY 1968)
(TEXT) THE REQUIREMENTS ALSO PROVIDED FOR COLLECTION OF DETAILED
INFORMATION ON NAVAL BASES, NAVAL PATROLS OF SHIPS AND NAVAL
MANEUVERS.
WE WERE ALSO GIVEN "SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMEdTS"
FOR DETECTING COMMUNICATIONS AND OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WHICH ASKED US TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE
LOCATION OF "COP" STATIONS, THE TYPE AND CAPABILITIES OF ALL RADAR
AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, THE QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING OF
COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL, INTERACTION BETWEEN THE "COP" SYSTEM
AND CONTROL DEFENSE FORCES, ETC.
WE WERE ALSO PROVIDED WITH THE "SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
REQUIREMENT" FOR DETERMINING THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE SUBMARINE
FORCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. IT SHOWED THE NUMBERS OF
SUBMARINES OF THE NAVAL FORCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY ALREADY
KNOWN TO US AND GAVE GENERAL INFORMATION ON THEIR MOVEMENTS.
WE WERE TOLD THAT POSSIBLY THE SUBMARINES WERE KEPT AT MAYANGDO
AREA AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO CONFIRM THIS BY SIGHTING. WE
WERE TOLD TO TRY TO GET THE NUMBER OF ANY NAVAL SHIP AND TO PHOTOGRAPH
IT IF POSSIBLE.
I WAS PERSONALLY ORDERED TO CHECK THE FLIGHTS OF U.S. SATELLITES
IF I COULD SPOT THEM AND WAS PROVIDED WITH A CHART SHOWING THE
PATHS OF U.S. SATELLITES. WE WERE PROVIDED WITH ANOTHER CHART WHICH
SHOWED THE LOCATIONS OF KNOWN RADARS WHICH WERE LOCATED IN THE
COASTAL AREAS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. WE
WERE TOLD TO INTERCEPT AND REAFFIRM THESE RADARS AND TO RECORD ANY
NEW RADARS ACCURATELY WHEN DETECTED. REAR ADMIRAL JOHNSON, COMMANDER
NAVAL FORCES JAPAN, SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH KNOWN ABOUT EXACT
DETAILS ALTHOUGH THE RADARS HAD BEEN ASCERTAINED BY THE AIR FORCE,
AND ASKED ME TO OBTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION SINCE THIS LAST OPERATION
WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE VICINITY OF THE COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
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FBIS 60
FOURTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER'"CONFESSION')
X X X-REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
11 HERE WERE GOING, UNLESS HE A13SOLU1 LLY HA
~ D
T . -'` ""11) IJO C;~~ ~' WORKEn Or-' THE PEP.,
~'~NESE TECHNIC
IV ro-11,
(TEXT) WE WERE TOLD TO TAKE OCEANIC SOUNDING FOR SUBMARINE
OPERATIONS AND OTHER SEA MEASUREMENTS WHENEVER WE COULD DO SO.
WE WERE TOLD TO RECORD ALL RADAR SIGNALS SO THEY COULD LATER BE
ANALYZED BY OTHERS WHO SPECIALIZE IN THIS WORK.
I WAS TOLD TO KEEP A NARRATIVE OF EVERY IMPORTANT THING THAT
OCCURRED DURING THE OPERATION. WE WERE TOLD TO RECORD OUR POSITION
AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE AND TO REMAIN UNDETECTED IF POSSIBLE. IF
OUR SHIP WAS HARASSED I WAS TO SEND A MESSAGE TO COMNAVFOR JAPAN.
WE WERE ALSO TOLD TO KEEP A FILE OF ALL IMFORMATION AND THE
UNDEVELOPED FILMS ON BOARD AND TURN THEM IN WHEN WE RETURNED TO
YOKOSUKA. I WAS TO PERFORM THE OPERATION IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA BY 27 JANUARY AND TO
PROCEED TO THE TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO CONDUCT FURTHER MEASUREMENTS OF
THE SEA AND THEN TO PROCEED TO SASEBO BY 9 FEBRUARY.
ON RECEIVING THE OPERATION MISSION, I SET ABOUT PREPARING FOR ACTIO
I TOLD LT MURPHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TO INSURE THAT EVERYONE
HAD ALL NECESSARY PAPERS FOR ONE MONTH AT SEA. I TOLD HIM TO
INSURE THAT THE ENTIRE CREW WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE SHIP'S
ORGANIZATION AND THAT EVERYONE HAD PRACTICE IN FIRE FIGHTING,
FLOODING CONTROL AND OTHER MEMERGENCY MATTERS. I TOLD HIM TO
INSURE THAT HE HAD ALL THE INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS ON FILE AT
COMNAVFOR JAPAN CONCERNING THE NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE KOREAN
PEOPLE'S ARMY. HE WAS ALSO TO SEE THAT THE OCEANOGRAPHERS HAD
ASSISTANCE WHEN THEY CAME ABOARD.
LT HARRIS, RESEARCH OFFICER, HAD UNDER HIM A SPECIAL DETACHMENT
OF 30 PERSONS. I TOLD HIM TO INSURE THAT HIS DETACHMENT HAD ALL
TRAINING REQUIRED TO DETERMINE ALL THE RADARS ACCURATELY AND
RECORD ALL THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNALS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
MY RELATION WITH THE RESEARCH OFFICER WAS NOT THE SAME AS WITH
OTHER OFFICERS OF THE SHIP. HE WAS NOT ASSIGNED AS A SHIP'S
OFFICER, BUT WAS THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE SPECIAL NAVAL
SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT AND SO WAS ONLY UNDER MY COMMAND AS FAR AS
THE SHIP WAS CONCERNED. HIS FUNCTIONS WERE TO COMMAND HIS DETACHMENT
AND TO SEARCH AND RECORD ALL ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNALS OF THE
DEMOCRATIC. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
I TOED LT J.V. SCHUMACHER, OPERATIONS OFFICER, TO PREPARE ALL
HIS RECOGNITION CODES AND TO BE SURE THEY WERE CORRECT, TO SEE
THAT WE HAD PROPER "IFF" CODES FOR USE DURING THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY I INSTRUCTED 'HIM ALSO TO SEE THAT ALL THE
PEOPLE WERE TRAINED IN THE USE OF THE WEAPONS WE CARRIED. TOWARD
THE END OF LAST DECEMBER SENIOR OCEANOGRAPHER DUNNIE RICHARD TUCK
AND HIS ASSISTANT HARRY IREDALE WERE SENT TO US BY THE U.S. NAVAL
OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE FOR OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN THE WATERS
ALONG THE EAST COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
HE SELECTED AND SHOWED ME 20 STATIONS FOR HIS SURVEY DURING THE
TRIP, MOST OF WHICH WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE CHONGJIN, MAYANGDO,
SONGJIN, AND WONSAN AREAS AND THE FAR EAST AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION-
PRIOR TO EMBARKATION, I TOLD MY OFFICERS TO PREPARE THEIR
DEPARTMENTS AND TO INSURE THAT WE HAD THE PROPER CHARTS FOR
NAVIGATION. I ALSO TOLD MY OFFICERS TO BE SURE THAT NO ONE CNEt:
TO KJOW
'
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FBIS 61
FIFTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION`)
X X X U.S.-JAPAN TREATY.
(TEXT) THE USS PUEBLO LEFT SASEBO ON 7 JANUARY 1968 AND SAILED
NORTHWARD THROUGH TSUSHIMA STRAIT.
WE PROCEEDED ABOUT 30-40 MILES OFF THE COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON A NORTHERLY COURSE TO OP-AREA PLUTO,
ACCORDING TO OUR PLAN, SO THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE SPOTTED IF POSSIBLE
UNTIL WE HAD FINALLY ACCOMPLISHED OUR MISSION.
WHEN WE PROCEEDED SOUTHWARD, HOWEVER, WE NAVIGATED ABOUT 13
MILES OFF THE COAST AND INTRUDED DEEP INTO THE COASTAL WATERS
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT A NUMBER OF POINTS
OF INTEREST AND CONDUCTED INTENSIVE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.
THE MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST GIVEN TO US BY COMNAVFOR JAPAN WERE
CHOGJIN, SONGJIN, MAYANGDO AND WONSAN, AND THE VAR EASTERN AREA
OF THE SOVIET UNION AS MENTIONED ABOVE. AT THESE AREAS WE WERE
TO TAKE INTEREST PRIMARILY IN THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE PORTS,
PARTICULARLY NAVAL ACTIVITY.
IN THAT REGARD WE WERE TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE NAVAL
AND THE ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE. WE WERE, FIRST OF ALL, TO OBSERVE
THE NUMBER ON ANY NAVAL SHIP IF POSSIBLE, AND WHEN CLOSE ENOUGH WE
WERE TO PHOTOGRAPH IT.
I PLANNED TO STAY ABOUT TWO DAYS, RESPECTIVELY, OFF THE FAR
EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHONGJIN AND IN THE SONGJIN
JAYANGDO AND WONSAN AREAS AND SPEND THE REST OF THE TIME IN AN ,
AREA OF SPECIAL INTEREST, IF ANY.
OP-AREA PLUTO INCLUDED CHONGJIN, OUR PORT OF INTEREST, AND
WAS THOUGHT TO CONTAIN A MINIMUM OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. THE MAIN
PURPOSE FOR ESPIONAGE IN CHONGJIN AREA WAS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT
OF THE NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TO DETERMINE
WHAT ELECTRONIC RADAR CONTACTS THERE WERE IN THE AREA.
ON THE NIGHT OF 15 JANUARY WE REACHED TO SONGJIN AREA, AND,
AFTER SAILING NORTHWARD AS FAR AS THE VICINITY OF THE FAR EASTERN
AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE RETURNED TO THE CHONGJIN AREA ON THE
MORNING OF THE 16TH.
THIS WAS THE FIRST PORT AREA WHERE WE WERE TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE
AND I GAVE AN INSTRUCTION TO ALL OFFICERS TELLING THEM HOW I
WANTED THEM TO KEEP THEIR REPORTS. NAMELY, IN ALL AREAS, BEGINNING
WITH CHONGJIN THEY WERE TO KEEP A LOG OF ALL THEIR CONTACTS,
DESCRIBING EVERYTHING THEY SAW IN DETAIL. IF THE CONTACT WAS A
MERCHANT SHIP, IT WAS TO BE IDENTIFIED FROM THE IDENTIFICATION
PUBLICATIONS WE CARRIED ON BOARD.
I TOLD THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK TO PHOTGRAPH ALL SHIPS IF
POSSIBLE AND IF NOT, TO AT LEAST TRY.TO IDENTIFY THE SHIP'S RADAR,
OTHER ANTENNAS AND ITS ARMAMENT AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE SHIP. I TOLD THEM ALSO TO REPORT ALL AIRCRAFT AND TO
RECORD THEM; THEY WERE ALSO REQUIRED TO NOTE THE PUEBLO'S POSITION
EVERY 20 MINUTES.
WHENEVER RESEARCH REPORTED A RADAR, THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK
WERE TO ASCERTAIN THE BEARING AND THE TYPE, RECORD IT AND REPORT
IT TO ME.
WHILE IN THE CHONGJIN AREA WHER
E WE STAYED UNTIL EVENING OF 17
JANUARY, WE HAD ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS.
OUR ELECTRONIC DETECTOR MEASURES THE FREQUENCY OF THE TRANSMITTED
PULSE OF THE TARGET RADAR AND IDENTIFIES IT AS WHICHEVER TYPE IT IS,
OF ALL THE RADARS INTERCEPTED THERE IN CHONGJIN, NONE WERE OF
A TYPE UNKNOWN TO U$. IN THIS AREA WE HAD FOUR v166AL CON:ACTS,'
BUT THEY WERE NOT NEAR ENOUGH TO BE IDENTIFIED OR PHOTOGRArnED.
THE OCEANOGRAPHERS HAD THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE.
ON THE NIGHT OF 17 JANUARY WE LEFT THE CHONGJIN AREA FOR THE
AREA OF SONGJIN, AND WE INTERCEPTED A PARTICULARLY POWERFUL AND
INTERESTING ELECTRONIC WAVE OF
F ORANGDAN AND MUSUDAN. BUT WE
COULD NOT MAKE OUT WHAT IT WAS, AND I ORDERED THE SHIP TO APPROACH
THE COAST. WE APPROACHED UP TO A POINT (41 DEGR E j
NORTH; 130 DE b_,~h
ll~b`rtf;crA-pQFj7.(LG 3@
j O
0 AS3' TO
IDENT~', ' j INT OF INTEREST IN THE SECOND O-
r
VENUJS, WAS THE NAVAL AND ELCTRONIC A(TIVt /' AREA,
ARMY TN THE Vr( rvrrv 11V Ti,t" e.,,,,. TY OF THE KC)Ft1;11N r'(:nn~ F ?r
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FBIS 65
SIXTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')
X X X IN THIS AREA.
(TEXT) THE MAIN PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE AREA OF SONGJIN
WAS TWOFOLD: FIRST TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITY OF
THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IN THIS AREA AND SECOND TO ASCERTAIN
THE ELECTRONIC ACTIFITY, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE RADARS. WE
WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED.IN ANY NEW TYPES OF RADAR TO BE
FOUND IN THIS AREA.
I PLANNED TO PROCEED TO THE VICINITY OF THE PORT OF SONGJIN AND
LAY TO, HOPING TO SEE SOME NAVAL ACTIVITY OR TO INTERCEPT SOME NEW
RADARS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. I ALSO HOPED TO BE ABLE TO
PHOTOGRAPH SOME NAVAL SHIPS. SO I MADE THE OFFICER OF THE DECK
RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR REPORTING ALL ACTIVITY ACCURATELY AND KEEPING
ME INFORMED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR POSITION.
IN THE SONGJIN AREA WE INTERCEPTED A NEW RADAR, NOT BEFORE KNOWN.
IT WAS A RADAR DESIGNATED AS.CROSSLOT, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS FOR EARLY
AIR WARNING. BUT I WAS NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM THE LOCATION OF THIS
RADAR DUE TO ITS INFREQUENT OPERATION AND THE FACT THAT MY DIRECTION
FINDING EQUIPMENT WAS UNRELIABLE. SO WE ENTERED AS FAR AS THE POINT
(40 DEGREES, 28.1 MINUTES NORTH; 129 DEGREES, 36.7
MINUTES EAST), 10.75 MILES FROM NAN DO, EAST OF SONGJIN, AND A POINT.
(40 DEGREES, 27.3 MINUTES NORTH; 129 DEGREES, 30 MINUTES EAST), 11.3
MILES FROM THE ISLAND IN AN EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN THE RADAR.
IN ADDITION, WE INTERCEPTED ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS IN THE
SONGJIN AREA. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT 30 RADAR SIGNALS DOES NOT
MEAN 30 DIFFERENT RADARS. SAME RADARS MAY HAVE BEEN ENTERCEPTED
SEVERAL TIMES AND THEN REDESIGNATED BY US WHEN THEY WERE SHUT OFF AND
THEN TURNED ON AGAIN. WE INTERCEPTED THREE VISUAL CONTACTS AND
CONDUCTED THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE. I DEPARTED THE AREA OF
SONGJIN ON 19 JANUARY FOR OP-AREA MARS.
OP-AREA MARS CONTAINED TWO OF THE FOUR MAIN PORTS TO BE SURVEYED--
BOTH MAYANGDO AND WONSAN.
THE PURPOSE OF SURVEILLANCE AT THESE TWO PORTS WAS PRIMARILY
TWOFOLD. FIRST WE WERE TO ATTENT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE
NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AT THE TWO PORTS
AND SECONDLY TO SAMPLE THE ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT WITH EMPHASIS ON
FIXING THE POSITIONS OF RADARS DETECTED.
I HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE STAFF OF COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN
THAT IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY
KEPT THEIR W-CLASS SUBMARINES AT MAYANGDO AND THAT WE SHOULD
ATTEMPT TO SEE THEM AND RECORD THEIR NUMBER AND PHOTOGRAPH THEM
IF POSSIBLE.
I PLANNED TO SPEND ABOUT TWO DAYS IN THE VICINITY OF EACH
UAYANGDO AND WONSAN AND TO CONCENTRATE MY EFFORTS ON WHICHEVER
AREA HAD THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF- NAVAL ACTIVITY. I ORGANIZED
WATCH SECTIONS UNDER THE OFFICER OF THE DECK TO RECORD EVERYTHING
ENCOUNTERED.
IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO ANY ACTIVITY IT WAS
TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED.
ALL RADARS THAT WERE INTERCEPTED WERE TO BE REPORTED TO THE
OFFICER OF THE DECK AND HE WAS ORDERED TO REPORT THEM TO ME AND
TO RECORD THEM. WE PLANNED TO-FIX THE POSITION OF ANY NEW RADAR
THAT WE INTERCEPTED.
I CHOSE THE AREA THAT WE WOULD OPERATE IN EACH DAY. MY USUAL PLAN
WAS TO GO TO AN AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT TO BE DETECTED AND
THEN TO LAY TO THERE, HOPING FOR SOME ACTIVITY,
WE ARRIVED IN THE MAYANGDO AREA 20 JANUARY. WE SPENT ALL THE
DAY OF THE 20TH THERE AND SAY SOME FISHING BOATS AND SOt:E OTHER
UNIDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL SHttPS.. ON THE EVENING OF THE 20TH ABOUT
30 MINUTES AFTER SUNDOWN WE SAY ? SUBr?ARINE CHASER WHOSE LAST
WAS THOUGHT TO BE 6.
E PASSED US A 'T RAE :!r O1 OO YARDS AND WE &J 'E
"10TOGRAPH HrM ZXN.: ?
,so 2004/06/14 CIA-RDP70BOO338'RO!U0200050076-8
 LAY ^TO,- HOPING TO SEE SOME NAVAL ACTIVITY OR TO INTERCEPT SMt NLU
RADARS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. I ALSO HOPED TO BE ABLE TO
PHOTOGRAPH Eo1 Ugior RldNge 2804/D6r4NDEC&4AD@Flb9@&y3> QO ~ NG
RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR REPORTING ALL ACTIVITY ACCU At
ME INFORMED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR POSITION.
IN THE SONGJIN AREA WE INTERCEPTED A NEW RADAR, NOT BEFORE KNOWN.
IT WAS A RADAR DESIGNATED AS CROSSLOT, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS FOR EARLY
AIR WARNING. BUT I WAS NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM THE LOCATION OF THIS
RADAR DUE TO ITS INFREQUENT OPERATION AND THE FACT THAT MY DIRECTION
FINDING EQUIPMENT WAS UNRELIABLE. SO WE ENTERED AS FAR AS THE POINT
(40 DEGREES, 28.1 MINUTES NORTH; 129 DEGREES, 36.7
MINUTES EAST), 10.75 MILES FROM NAN DO, EAST OF SONGJIN, AND A_POINT
(40 DEGREES, 27.3 MINUTES NORTH; 129 DEGREES, 30 MINUTES EAST), 11.3
MILES FROM THE ISLAND IN AN EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN THE RADAR.
IN ADDITION, WE INTERCEPTED ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS IN THE
SONGJIN AREA. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT 30 RADAR SIGNALS DOES NOT
MEAN 30 DIFFERENT RADARS. SAME RADARS MAY HAVE BEEN ENTERCEPTED
SEVERAL TIMES AND THEN REDESIGNATED BY US WHEN THEY WERE SHUT OFF AND
THEN TURNED ON AGAIN. WE INTERCEPTED THREE VISUAL CONTACTS AND
CONDUCTED THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE. I DEPARTED THE AREA OF
SONGJIN ON 19 JANUARY FOR OP-AREA MARS.
OP-AREA MARS CONTAINED TWO OF THE FOUR MAIN PORTS TO BE SURVEYED--
BOTH MAYANGDO AND WONSAN.
THE PURPOSE OF SURVEILLANCE AT THESE TWO PORTS WAS PRIMARILY
TWOFOLD. FIRST WE WERE TO ATTEMT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE
NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AT THE TWO PORTS
AND SECONDLY TO SAMPLE THE ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT WITH EMPHASIS ON
FIXING THE POSITIONS OF RADARS DETECTED.
I HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE STAFF OF COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN
THAT IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY
KEPT THEIR W-CLASS SUBMARINES AT MAYANGDO AND THAT WE SHOULD
ATTEMPT TO SEE THEM AND RECORD THEIR NUMBER AND PHOTOGRAPH THEM
IF POSSIBLE.
I PLANNED TO SPEND ABOUT TWO DAYS IN THE VICINITY OF EACH
MAYANGDO AND WONSAN AND TO CONCENTRATE MY EFFORTS ON WHICHEVER
AREA HAD THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF-NAVAL ACTIVITY. I ORGANIZED
WATCH SECTIONS UNDER THE OFFICER OF THE DECK TO RECORD EVERYTHING
ENCOUNTERED.
IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO ANY ACTIVITY IT WAS
TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED.
ALL RADARS THAT WERE INTERCEPTED WERE TO BE REPORTED TO THE
OFFICER OF THE DECK AND HE WAS ORDERED TO REPORT THEM TO ME AND
TO RECORD THEM. WE PLANNED TO-FIX THE POSITION OF ANY NEW RADAR
THAT WE INTERCEPTED.
I CHOSE THE AREA THAT WE WOULD OPERATE IN EACH DAY. MY USUAL PLAN
WAS TO GO TO AN AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT TO BE DETECTED AND
THEN TO LAY TO THERE, HOPING FOR SOME ACTIVITY.
WE ARRIVED IN THE MAYANGDO AREA 20 JANUARY. WE SPENT ALL THE
DAY OF THE 20TH THERE AND SAY SOME FISHING BOATS AND SOME OTHER
UNIDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL SHIPS. ON THE EVENING OF THE 20TH ABOUT
30 MINUTES AFTER SUNDOWN WE SAY A SUBMARINE CHASER WHOSE LAST NUMBER
WAS THOUGHT TO BE 6.
HE PASSED US AT RANGE OF ABOUT 1,000 YARDS AND WE WERE UNABLE
TO PHOTOGRAPH HIM SINCE IT WAS-TOO DARK.
WE DID INTERCEPT ABOUT 40 RADAR SIGNALS IN THE MAYANGDO AREA,
NONE OF WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO BE A SUBMARINE RADAR.
IN AN EFFORT TO OBSERVE SUBMARINES WHICH WE SUSPECTED TO BE
STATIONED AT MAYANGDO, WE WENT UP TO A POINT (39 DEGREES, 48.9
MINUTES NORTH; 128 DEGREES, O1.9..MINUTES EAST),
ABOUT 8.2 MILES FROM (ANOSOMGAP) ON THE NIGHT OF 21 JANUARY.
HOWEVER, WE COULD NOT SPOT ANY SUBMARINE.
NOT HAVING HAD ANY SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE MAYANGDO AREA
I DECIDED TO PROCEED TO THE WONSAN AREA THAT NIGHT.
I REMEEMBERED THAT THERE WERE MORE NAVAL CRAFT AND SHIPS OF THE
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY STATIONED IN THE WONSAN AREA SO I WAS
HOPEFUL THAT WE WOULD HAVE SOME SUCCESS IN THAT AREA.
(MORE,
Approved For elease.2Q04/06/14 ? CIA-RDP OO338RQ00200050076-8
 .Appr_oyed__Eo .Release2O04IA 44 CIA-RDP79BOO 38RO'00200050076-8
SEVENTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')
X X X IN THAT AREA.
(TEXT) I AGAIN CHOSE A PLACE TO GO TO IN THE AREA WE WERE
TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNED TO LAY TO IN THAT AREA AND
WATCH CLOSELY.
WE LEFT THE MAYANGDO AREA ON THE NIGHT OF 21ST OF JANUARY,
ARRIVING AT THE WONSAN AREA ON THE MORNING OF THE 22D.
THAT DAY WE SAY TWO VESSELS THAT I THOUGHT MIGHT BE FISHING
SHIPS. THEY INITIALLY PASSED US AT A RANGE OF ABOUT 1,000 YARDS
AND THEN RETURNED AND CIRCLED AROUND US SLOWLY.
I HAD PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN OF THEM AND DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD
REPORT THE PUEBLO, SO I CONSIDERED MYSELF DETECTED AND I SENT
MY FIRST MESSAGE TO COMNAVFOR JAPAN AND REPORTED TO HIM THAT
WE HAD BEEN DETECTED AND HAD SEEN A SUBMARINE CHASER IN THE MAYANGDO
AREA.
THAT NIGHT I MOVED OUT TO SEA A LITTLE INTENDING TO MOVE IN
CLOSER IN THE MORNPNG.
I HAD DECIDED THAT IF WE DID NOT HAVE ANY SUCCESS IN THE WONSAN
AREA BY THE NIGHT OF THE 23D, I WOULD GO BACK UP THE COAST TO
SONGJIN AND THEN TRAVEL BACK DOWN.
ON THE MORNING OF THE 23D I FOUND THAT WE HAD DRIFTED ABOUT
25 MILES OUT TO SEA AND I MOVED BACK IN.
SINCE THERE WERE ONLY FOUR MORE DAYS REMAINING IN THE OPERATION
I DECIDED TO APPROACH CLOSER IN TO SEE IF I COULD SEE EVEN ONE NAVAL
SHIP SO THAT THE OPERATION WOULD NOT BE A LOSS FROM MY POINT OF VIEW.
MEANSHILE, I BECAME QUITE BOLDER BECAUSE MY SHIP HAD NEVER
BEEN WATCHED OR HARASSED BY ANY NAVAL CRAFT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S
ARMY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD OF MY MISSION.
SO I GOT TO A POINT (39 DEGREES, 174 MINUTES NORTH; 127 DEGREES,
46.9 MINUTES EAST) QUITE CLOSE TO LAND, THAT IS, 7.6 MILES FROM
YO DO. TO MY MIND, IT WAS THE DEEPEST INTRUSION I HAD EVER MADE
INTO THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
DURING OUR LAST MISSION.
THE FACTS OF THE DEEP INTRUSIONS BY THE PUEBLO INTO THE WATERS
.OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARE PRECISELY SHOWN
ON THE POSITION LOG AND NAVIGATIONAL PLOT WHICH WERE KEPT BY THE
ASSISTANTS OF LT MURPHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND NAVIGATOR, WHO
PERSONALLY DETERMINED THE POSITION OF THE SHIP EACH TIME AND RECORDED
IT AS IT STOOD. '.*
THE REMAINDER OF THE CAPTURE WAS REFERRED TO IN MY PREVIOUS
CONFESSION.
EVERY DAY I RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM COMNAVFOR JAPAN THAT WERE OF
OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE OPERATION.
WE INTERCEPTED ABOUT 130 RADARS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING THIS OPERATION.
THE RESEARCH OFFICER'S REPORTS TO ME WERE CONFINED TO THE RADAR
CONTACTS THAT WE MADE AND HIS EVALUATION OF THEM.
THE RADARS WE INTERCEPTED WERE OF SEVERAL KINDS, TO WIT,
EARLY AIR WARNING, FIRE CONTROL, NAVIGATION, LONG RANGE SURFACE
SEARCH AND LONG RANGE AIR SEARCH.
WE HAD ABOUT 19 VISUAL CONTACTS WITH OTHER VESSELS EXCEPT FOR
THE DAY OF OUR CAPTURE.
WE KEP ALL THE TOP SECRET ESPIONAGE INFORMATION IN THE FILE OF
THE SHIP TO REPORT THEM AFTER THE OPERATION.
WE MADE OCEANOGRAPHIC MEASUREMENTS IN ALL AREAS, WHOSE CHIEF
PURPOSE WAS TO RESEARCH THE SEA BASIN THAT WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT
THE OPERATION MOVEMENTS OF SUBMARINES, DESTROYERS AND OTHER NAVAL
VESSELS.
COLLEef gL @~1 e e5 N1"I C8 `'A ION TO
THEY WERE ORDERED TO THE PUEBLO JUST PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE ON AN
OPERATION. THE TYPES OF INFORMATION THEY C01.1.ECT ARE T HF1 P
 kj" Ll;' A i J1f. %In i rib...+c, .. 41.?.....
ARRIVING AT THE WONSAN AREA ON THE iORNING OF THE 22D.
THAT DAY tWpgflYeet&8r ft ?52OP44/1114 TWR4W7lQWflj3lWQWH@5Q076-8
SHIPS. THEY INITIALLY PASSED US AT A RANGE OF ABOUT 1,000 YARDS
AND THEN RETURNED AND CIRCLED AROUND US SLOWLY.
I HAD PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN OF THEM AND DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD
REPORT THE PUEBLO, SO I CONSIDERED MYSELF DETECTED AND I SENT
ti MY FIRST MESSAGE TO COMNAVFOR JAPAN AND REPORTED TO HIM THAT
WE HAD BEEN DETECTED AND HAD SEEN A SUBMARINE CHASER IN THE MAYANGDO
AREA.
THAT NIGHT I MOVED OUT TO SEA A LITTLE INTENDING TO MOVE IN
CLOSER IN THE MORNING.
I HAD DECIDED THAT IF WE DID NOT HAVE ANY SUCCESS IN THE WONSAN
AREA BY THE NIGHT OF THE 23D, I WOULD GO BACK UP THE COAST TO
SONGJIN AND THEN TRAVEL BACK DOWN.
ON THE MORNING OF THE 23D I FOUND THAT WE HAD DRIFTED ABOUT
25 MILES OUT TO SEA AND I MOVED BACK IN.
SINCE THERE WERE ONLY FOUR MORE DAYS REMAINING IN THE OPERATION
I DECIDED TO APPROACH CLOSER IN TO SEE IF I COULD SEE EVEN ONE NAVAL
SHIP SO THAT THE OPERATION WOULD NOT BE A LOSS FROM MY POINT OF VIEW.
NEANSHILE, I BECAME QUITE BOLDER BECAUSE MY SHIP HAD NEVER
.. BEEN WATCHED OR HARASSED BY ANY NAVAL CRAFT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S
ARMY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD OF MY MISSION.
SO I GOT TO A POINT (39 DEGREES, 174 MINUTES NORTH; 127 DEGREES,
46.9 MINUTES EAST) QUITE CLOSE TO LAND, THAT IS9 7.6 MILES FROM
YO DO. TO MY MIND, IT WAS THE DEEPEST INTRUSION I HAD EVER MADE
INTO THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
DURING OUR LAST MISSION.
THE FACTS OF THE DEEP INTRUSIONS BY THE PUEBLO INTO THE WATERS
.OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARE PRECISELY SHOWN
ON THE POSITION LOG AND NAVIGATIONAL PLOT WHICH WERE KEPT BY THE
ASSISTANTS OF LT MURPHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND NAVIGATOR, WHO
PERSONALLY DETERMINED THE POSITION OF THE SHIP EACH TIME AND RECORDED
IT AS IT STOOD.
THE REMAINDER OF THE CAPTURE WAS REFERRED TO IN MY PREVIOUS
CONFESSION.
EVERY DAY I RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM COMNAVFOR JAPAN THAT WERE OF
` OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE OPERATION.
. WE INT'ERCEPTED ABOUT 130 RADARS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING THIS OPERATION.
THE RESEARCH OFFICER'S REPORTS TO ME WERE CONFINED TO THE RADAR
CONTACTS THAT WE MADE AND HIS EVALUATION OF THEM.
THE RADARS WE INTERCEPTED WERE OF SEVERAL KINDS, TO WIT,
EARLY AIR WARNING, FIRE CONTROL, NAVIGATION, LONG RANGE SURFACE
SEARCH AND LONG RANGE AIR SEARCH.
WE HAD ABOUT 19 VISUAL CONTACTS WITH OTHER VESSELS EXCEPT FOR
THE DAY OF OUR CAPTURE.
WE KEP ALL THE TOP SECRET ESPIONAGE INFORMATION IN THE FILE OF
THE SHIP TO REPORT THEM AFTER THE OPERATION.
WE MADE OCEANOGRAPHIC MEASUREMENTS IN ALL AREAS, WHOSE CHIEF
PURPOSE WAS TO RESEARCH THE SEA BASIN THAT WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT
THE OPERATION MOVEMENTS OF SUBMARINES, DESTROYERS AND OTHER NAVAL
VESSELS.
THE TWO OCEANEOGRAPHERS ON BOARD THE PUEBLO HAD THE MISSION TO
COLLECT TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SEA.
THEY WERE ORDERED TO THE PUEBLO JUST PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE ON AN
OPERATION. THE TYPES OF INFORMATION THEY COLLECT ARE USED TO HELP
FORECAST SEA CONDITIONS IN YEARS TO COME AND ARE USEFUL TO ALL
TYPES OF U.S. NAVY SHIPS IN THEIR OPERATIONS, BUT THEY WERE NOT
CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND I WAS FREE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR
NOT TO TAKE SAMPLES ON ANY GIVEN DAY OR PLACE.
HOWEVER, IF THERE WAS NO OTHER ACTIVITY I WOULD HAVE THE
OCEANOGRAPHERS TAKE DAILY MEASUREMENTS.
12 FEB 1845Z CF/EAM
Approved Fo*,Release-2004/06/14. CIA=RDP OBOO338RQD0200050076-8
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP70B00338R000200050076-8
FBIS 67
EIGHTH AND LAST ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')
X X X TAKE,DAILY MEASUREMENTS.
(TEXT) THE TWO OCEANOGRAPHERS WERE RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR
ACTIVITIES ON THE SHIP BUT THEIR REPORT WAS MADE TO THE NAVAL
OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE AS WELL AS THE SAMPLES THEY TOOK FROM THE WATER.
THEIR WORK ON BOARD WAS SECONDARY TO THE MISSION OF INTELLIGENCE
AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED OF GREAT IMPORTANCE BY ME. HOWEVER, I THINK
IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR CONCEALING THE ESPIONAGE PURPOSE OF.THE PUEBLO.
THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATION CONDUCTED BY PUEBLO WOULD
EFFECT U.S. NAVY OPERATIONS AS FOLLOWS.
IF IT WERE NOTED THAT THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WAS
LARGER THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED OR THAT THEY HAD EQUIPMENT THAT WAS
NOT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED, THEN THE U.S. NAVY OFFICIALS WOULD, IN
PREPARATION FOR WAR, DECIDE TO POSSIBLY MOVE SOME MORE SHIPS
INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN OR THEY MAY DECIDE TO BUILD OTHER FF-,UIPMENT
TO OFFSET ANY NEW EQUIPMENT OF THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY.
THESE OPERATIONS, AS WAS THE ONE CONDUCTED BY THE PUEBLO, ARE
CONDUCTED FOR MANY PURPOSES. THEY ARE PRIMARILY DEISGNED TO ADD TO
THE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE U.S. NAVY HAS ABOUT ANY
GIVEN COUNTRY. THE INFORMATION DESIRED IS ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE NAVAL
FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND IS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE EVENT OF
HOSTILITIES WITH THAT COUNTRY.
IF THE OPERATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL AND ACCURATELY REPORTED, THE
NAVY WOULD HAVE MUCH VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NAVAL FORCES
AND ABOUT THE ELECTRONICS OF THE COUNTRY THAT THE OPERATIONS ARE
CARRIED OUT IN.
t ;ERVATION
THE MOST IN IS EEXERCISES9ITHEMPORMANEUVERABTANT
THETNAVVYTBE N E Om H
FOR EXAMPLE, DURING ONE BANNER OPERATION THEY WERE ABLE TO WATCH
AN ENTIRE SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISE THAT LASTED FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS.
THE INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING THAT OPERATION IS CONSIDERED
VERY VALUABLE BY THE U.S. NAVY OFFICIALS.
THE U.S. NAVY EXPECTS THAT THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL
ONLY SOMETIMES, BUT CONSIDERS THAT THE POSSIBLE GAIN IS WORTH THE
EFFORT.
AFTER HIS LAST OPERATION, THE PUEBLO WAS TO OPERATE IN THE
VICINITY OF VLADIVOSTOK OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM ABOUT 20 FEBRUARY
TO 10 MARCH AND THEN TO BE ALONG THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA.
THE BANNER, SISTER SHIP OF THE PUEBLO, WAS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT
AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF BLADIVOSTOK DURING THE MONTH OF
LATER JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY. THEIR NEXT OPERATION IN MARCH
WAS TO BE IN THE SAME AREA AS WE WERE ON THIS OPERATION, IN
THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
I UNDERSTAND THAT OPERATION IN THE WATERS OF CHINA WAS
SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT STAGE.
THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OR AIR
OF OTHER COUNTRIES IS ESPIONAGE, AND A WANTON VIOLATION OF THEIR
SOVEREIGNTY. I CONSIDER THAT IT IS A DESPICABLE CRIME AND MUST BE
STOPPED.
WITH THE LAPSE OF TIME SINCE MY CAPTURE I REALIZED MORE DEEPLY
AND REPENT THE GRAVITY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT I COMMITTED.
IT WAS A HOSTILE ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE.
NOW I FULLY REALIZE WHY THE KOREAN PEOPLE HATE US AND HOW ANGRY THEY
MUST FEEL.
HOWEVER, WE ENTREAT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE COMMITTED
SUCH
CRIME AS SOLDIERS IN THE EXECUTION OF'ORDERS OF OUR SUPERIORS AND
NOT OF OUR OWN ACCORD, AND FORGIVE US LENIENTLY.
NOW I HAVE BEEN GIVEN GOOD WHOLESOME FOOD, FINE CLOTHES TO WEAR,
A WARM ROOM AND A CLEAN BED.
SINCE MY CAPTURE, I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GRIPPED UUBHY~~ YEARNING FOR
MY DEAR p dVQTHERE
M A RKA Kp~ f2
, 0IS MY 04/06/14WIFE : CIA-RDP70B0LL0338ROt00200050D76l8 TWO SONS,
AFT-
1Y HOr,E T(11-1'1 snN P,~
 'IL'ALJ Site w-- - -
NORTHWARD THROUGH TSUSHIMA STRAIT.
11
WE PROCEED D0 AeBdOU1r 3Ve pelILES601 IHk:R~04ST00 TF(EODE~ ATI
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON A NORTHERLY COURSE TO OP-AREA PLUTO,
ACCORDING TO OUR FLAN, SO THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE SPOTTED IF POSSIBLE
UNTIL WE HAD FINALLY ACCOMPLISHED OUR MISSION.
WHEN WE PROCEEDED SOUTHWARD, HOWEVER, WE NAVIGATED ABOUT 13
MILES OFF THE COAST AND INTRUDED DEEP INTO THE COASTAL WATERS
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT A NUMBER OF POINTS
OF INTEREST AND CONDUCTED INTENSIVE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.
THE MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST GIVEN TO US BY COt1NAVFOR JAPAN WERE
CHOGJIN, SONGJIN, MAYANGDO AND WONSAN, AND THE VAR EASTERN AREA
OF THE SOVIET UNION AS MENTIONED ABOVE. AT THESE AREAS WE WERE
TO TAKE INTEREST PRIMARILY IN THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE PORTS,
PARTICULARLY NAVAL ACTIVITY.
IN THAT REGARD WE WERE TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE NAVAL
AND THE ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE. WE WERE, FIRST OF ALL, TO OBSERVE
THE NUMBER ON ANY NAVAL SHIP IF POSSIBLE, AND WHEN CLOSE ENOUGH WE
WERE TO PHOTOGRAPH IT.
I PLANNED TO STAY ABOUT TWO DAYS, RESPECTIVELY, OFF THE FAR
EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHONGJIN AND IN THE SONGJIN,
JAYANGDO AND WONSAN AREAS AND SPEND THE REST OF THE TIME IN AN
AREA OF SPECIAL INTEREST, IF ANY.
OP-AREA PLUTO INCLUDED CHONGJIN, OUR PORT OF INTEREST, AND
WAS THOUGHT TO CONTAIN A MINIMUM 05 NAVAL ACTIFITY. THE MAIN
PURPOSE FOR ESPIONAGE IN CHONGJIN AREA WAS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT
OF THE NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TO DETERMINE
WHAT ELECTRONIC RADAR CONTACTS THERE WERE IN THE AREA.
ON THE NIGHT OF 15 JANUARY WE REACHED TO SONGJIN AREA, AND,
AFTER SAILING NORTHWARD AS FAR AS THE VICINITY OF THE FAR EASTERN
AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION9 WE RETURNED TO THE CHONGJIN AREA ON THE
MORNING OF THE 16TH.
THIS WAS THE FIRST PORT AREA WHERE WE WERE TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE
AND I GAVE AN INSTRUCTION TO ALL OFFICERS TELLING THEM HOW I
WANTED THEM TO KEEP THEIR REPORTS. NAMELY, IN ALL AREAS, BEGINNING
WITH CHONGJIN THEY WERE TO KEEP A LOG OF ALL THEIR CONTACTS,
DESCRIBING EVERYTHING THEY SAW IN DETAIL. IF THE CONTACT WAS A
MERCHANT SHIP, IT WAS TO BE IDENTIFIED FROM THE IDENTIFICATION
PUBLICATIONS WE CARRIED ON BOARD.
I TOLD THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK TO PHOT3RAPH ALL SHIPS IF
POSSIBLE AND IF NOT, TO AT LEAST TRY.TO IDENTIFY THE SHIP'S RADAR,
OTHER ANTENNAS AND ITS ARMAMENT AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE SHIP. I TOLD THEM ALSO TO REPORT ALL AIRCRAFT AND TO
RECORD THEM; THEY WERE ALSO REQUIRED TO NOTE THE PUEBLO'S POSITION
EVERY 20 MINUTES.
WHENEVER RESEARCH REPORTED A RADAR, THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK
WERE TO ASCERTAIN THE BEARING AND THE TYPE, RECORD IT AND REPORT
IT TO ME.
WHILE IN THE CHONGJIN AREA WHERE WE STAYED UNTIL EVENING OF 17
JANUARY, WE HAD ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS.
OUR ELECTRONIC DETECTOR MEASURES THE FREQUENCY OF THE TRANSMITTED
PULSE OF THE TARGET RADAR
ND
A
IDENTIFIES IT AS WHICHEVER TYPE IT IS.
OF ALL THE RADARS INTERCEPTED THERE IN CHONGJIV, NONE WERE OF
A TYPE UNKNOWN TO US. IN THIS AREA WE HAD FOUR V16UAL CONTACTS,
BUT THEY WERE NOT NEAR ENOUGH TO BE IDENTIFIED OR PHOTOGRArnED.
THE OCEANOGRAPHERS HAD THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE.
ON THE NIGHT OF 17 JANUARY WE LEFT THE CHONGJIN AREA FOR THE
AREA OF SONGJIN, AND WE INTERCEPTED A PARTICULARLY POWERFUL AND
INTERESTING ELECTRONIC WAVE OFF ORA
NGDAN AND MUSUDAN. BUT WE
COULD NOT MAKE OUT WHAT IT WAS, AND I ORDERED THE SHIP TO APPROACH
THE COAST. WE APPROACHED UP TO
CJORTH; 130 DEGREES, 03 MINUTES EAST) NI ( 41 2 DEGREES, 25 MINUTES
IDENTIFY IT. THE MAIN POI ' I E.S FRO'~? TtiE COAST TO r..rr
UT OF INTEREST I
N THE SECOND OP-AREA,
VENUS, WAS THE NAVAL AND ELCTRONIC ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S
ARMY IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT OF SONGJIN. VERY LITTLE GUIDANCE
WAS PROVIDED TO ME IN THIS AREA. I HAD READ THAT. THERE WAS ONLY
MINIMAL NAVAL FORCES IN THIS AREA.
(MORE)
12 FEB 1750Z CF/EAM
r-7
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP70BOO338R000200050076-8
 J U(' 1' ~jl..l AN S NEW EQU1f'I'JLU U 'It UAVY UP `1 IlL. xulluLEi'll 7'3 L' fJH E Y Fires n
THESE OP'kRR ,orpeIWAse' 0lZ4/Off'J4COINA MPPOSIYOJU ORIUg O#BF8
CONDUCTED FOR MANY PURPOSES. THEY ARE PRIMARILY DEISGNED TO ADD TO
THE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE U.S. NAVY HAS ABOUT ANY
GIVEN COUNTRY. THE INFORMATION DESIRED IS ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE NAVAL,
FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND IS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE EVENT OF
HOSTILITIES WITH THAT COUNTRY.
IF THE OPERATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL AND ACCURATELY REPORTED, THE
NAVY WOULD HAVE MUCH VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NAVAL FORCES
AND ABOUT THE ELECTRONICS OF THE COUNTRY THAT THE OPERATIONS ARE
CARRIED OUT IN.
THE MOST IMPORTANT POSSIBLE GAIN IS TO DETERM ~IE~A(H~ +ERVATION
AVY BE II
-' `~O EXERCISES, THE MANEUVERABILITY OF THE N
DH
E
A
R
Y
E
E
DAYS
FOR EXAMPLE, DURING ONE BANE
THRE
OR
TWO
LASTED FOR
AN ENTIRE SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISTHAT
GFFIAIAOPERATION IS CONSIDERED
THE INFORMATION N COLLECTED DURING
VERY VALUABLE
THE .S. NAVY EXPECTS THAT THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL
ONLY SO, s
EFFORT.
AFTER HIS LAST OPERATION, THE PUEBLO WAS TO OPERATE IN THE
VICINITY OF VLADIVOSTOK OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM ABOUT 20 FEBRUARY
TO 10 MARCH AND THEN TO BE ALONG THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA.
THE BANNER, SISTER SHIP OF THE PUEBLO, WAS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT
AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF BLADIVOSTOK DURING THE MONTH OF
LATER JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY. THEIR NEXT OPERATION IN MARCH
WAS TO BE IN THE SAME AREA AS WE WERE ON THIS OPERATION, IN
THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
I UNDERSTAND THAT OPERATION IN THE WATERS OF CHINA WAS
SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT STAGE.
THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OR AIR
OF OTHER COUNTRIES IS ESPIONAGE, AND A WANTON VIOLATION OF THEIR
SOVEREIGNTY. I CONSIDER THAT IT IS A DESPICABLE CRIME AND MUST BE
STOPPED.
WITH THE LAPSE OF TIME SINCE MY CAPTURE I REALIZED MORE DEEPLY
AND REPENT THE GRAVITY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT I COMMITTED.
IT WAS A HOSTILE ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE.
NOW I FULLY REALIZE WHY THE KOREAN PEOPLE HATE US AND HOW ANGRY THEY
MUST FEEL.
HOWEVER, WE ENTREAT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE COMMITTED SUCH
CRIME AS SOLDIERS IN THE EXECUTION OF ORDERS OF OUR SUPERIORS AND
NOT OF OUR OWN ACCORD, AND FORGIVE US LENIENTLY.
NOW I HAVE BEEN GIVEN GOOD WHOLESOME FOOD, FINE CLOTHES TO WEAR,
A WARM ROOM AND A CLEAN BED.
SINCE MY CAPTURE, I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GRIPPED BY YEARNING FOR
MY DEAR FAMILY. THERE IS MY WIFE ROSE DOLORES BUCHER WITH TWO SONS,
MARK, AGE 15, AND MICHAEL, AGE 13, IN MY HOME TOWN, SAN DIEGO.
I WOULD LIKE TO TELL THEM THAT I AM SAFE AND HEALTHY AND THEY SOULD
NOT WORRY TOO MUCH. I WANT TO TELL THEM I LOVE THEM VERY DEARLY.
I THINK THAT IF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS
MERCIFUL TO US WHO DESERVE PUNISHMENT, WE WILL BE SENT HOME AND WE
WILL BE TOGETHER AND IN LOVE FOREVER, NEVER AGAIN TO PART.
IF I AM PERMITTED TO RETURN HOME, I WILL WORK FOR THE BROTHERHOOD
OF ALL MEN FOR THE REST OF MY LIFE. IF I AM ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME
I WILL IMMEDIATELY EXPLAIN THE MORAL WRONG OF THIS TYPE OF OPERATION
AND WILL DO ALL I CAN TO HAVE THEM STOPPED PERMANENTLY.
THIS IS MY WISH. WE HAVE DONE A GREAT WRONG AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA. HOWEVER, I WISH WE MAY BE FORGIVEN GENEROUSLY AND ALLOWED
TO GO HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS MY SINCERE CONFESSION. I SWEAR IT ON MY
HONOR.
12 FEB 190OZ CF/EAM