PLOT AND COUNTER-PLOT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230084-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 84
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For
elease 2004/05/05 :,CIA-RDP69Br 369R290100230084-8
Plot and Counter-Plot
What - -lappened 'in the Congo
by Keith Kyle
Moise Tshombe, the former prime minister of the
Congo, was hijacked over the Mediterranean on June
30, the very day he had chosen for an operation for.
the overthrow of his political enemy, Congolese Presi-
dent Joseph-Desire Mobutu. A large sum in cash-
around $zao,ooo - was found afterwards in Palma,
Majorca, in the hotel room of Francis Bodenan, the
Frenchman the Algerians say carried 'out the kidnap
operation.
Last year, Tshombe returned to voluntary exile in
Europe, following the seizure of power by Mobutu in
November 1965. Tshombe was not in immediate dan-
rmal
hi
d
p
s no
was
ger of, arrest, but to withdraw abroa
response to a political setback. It brought him closer were to get $42,000 each. Much of the p anning o
to his',source of finance, the enormous bank account this operation was cclone"a Rhodesian capital. Salis-.
an ad-
E
t
b
h
'
in pacifying great tracts o 1- e c y
and northeast where left-wing simba rebels were at was in Kinshasa at the time, was tipped off; he rushed
large. At the same time, however, the Mobutu regime. back to his headquarters in Kisangani and cancelled
was making a sharp political tack to the left. This did the operation. These fresh instructions did not reach
not loosen Mobutu's close diplomatic links with the Watsa, in the far northeast, in time to prevent a col-
United States, Formosa and Israel, but did involve him 'umn of Katangese and mercenaries from marching on
in a sharp confrontation with the major Belgian fi- Kisangani. The discontent of the Katangese troops was
nancial interests in the Congo, including the. celebrated a factor the plotters had taken into account but which
Union Miniere which ran the copper mines in Katanga. was difficult to contain now that the plot had to be
The Belgians did not hesitate to spread the word that - unwound. The assassination of the unpopular Con-
"communist" influences were coming into the, ascen- golese Army commander at Kisangani, which was to
dant, and so Tshombe's backers thought conditions be the signal to start the mutiny, took place as planned
despite Denard's efforts.
KEITH KYL a 11 w of th Institute of Politics at In the end the mutiny was put down peacefully-
i e9JtVU. - ~ 9o`~Q rrr ~ dP69 QQ~, 9[~?QAl1bQQ2 9i8i~h o was able to cover his
M A
! M a9c
he built up in Switzerland during his period as "Chief
of State" of secessionist Katanga. It also brought him
in touch with the major European financial interests
which saw in him a much more sympathetic ruler of
the Congo than Mobutu was rapidly turning out to be.
Tshombe's villa in Madrid had numerous visitors.
They included double agents, plausible rogues who
would propose elaborate schemes, get a substantial ad-
vance from the famous Swiss bank account, then sell
the information for another sizable sum to the Con-
golese government.
Last July a serious attempt was made by white mer-
cenaries in collusion with Ian Smith's regime in Rho-
desia to bring off a coup against Mobutu. Mercenary
commandos, still employed by the Congolese govern-
ment now headed by Mobutu, were actively engaged
11
it f t ountr in the at
were ripe for the overthrow of the Mobutu regime.
This was to be undertaken by the mercenary forces
already in the Eastern Congo, with their African allies
the former Katangese gendarmes who had been been
incorporated into the Congolese National Army (the
ANC) at the end of secession.
Colonel Bob Denard, the leading French mercenary,
would seize Kisangani (the former Stanleyville); a Bel-
gian, Major Jean Schramme, would take Bukavu. In
addition and simultaneously, 70 men would land at
the main airports of Lubumbashi (Elisabethville) and
Kinshasa (Leopoldville) and capture them with the
of supporters already in those cities. The 'leaders
hel
urope
op
s
om
e
bury, where two of Ts
visers, Professor Rene Clemens and Mario Spandre,
who had both been expelled from the Congo, the mo-
ment Tshombe had been dismissed from the premier-
ship, had taken up residence.
It was, however, at the Rhodesian end that the con-
spiracy began to fall apart. There was a feud between
two of the top English-speaking mercenaries. One of-
ficer considered the scheme for seizing the Lubumbashi
airport was inviting disaster, because it involved land-
ing 70 unarmed men, out of uniform, from a civilian
plane and having them subsequently supplied with
weapons. Because of these dissensions - and just pos-
sibly because one or two mercenaries had a qualm of
conscience about turning on Mobutu while they were
still receiving his pay - the conspiracy was disclosed
. to the Congolese government. Colonel Denard, who
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.r1
tracks sufficiently for the Congolese government to de-
cide to give him the benefit of the doubt and continue
to employ him. But the experience convinced Mobutu
he must get rid of at least the English-speaking (mainly
Rhodesian and South African) mercenaries as soon as
possible. This also fitted in with his broader political
strategy. He had continued to employ the mercenaries
because he needed them for the destruction of the
simba rebellion and for securing the main frontier
posts with Uganda and the Sudan. But the next stage
was to enlist the willing help of neighboring countries
in sealing off the frontiers from the communist arms
traffic which was sustaining the rebels, and this could
be done only if the Congolese government impressed
Africa as a whole as a genuine nationalist regime.
Backed by the CIA
Mobutu himself has been strongly backed by the
Americans, especially the CIA's top Congo e pert;'
awrence ev m, ever since .7g6oA He had to prove
'Fie 'wa`not 'a'westeM-stooge. The noisier his quarrel
with the Belgians, the more successfully he would be
purging himself of this reputation. The other heads of
state in Africa were sufficiently impressed by his per-
formance to accept his invitation to stage the September
1967 session of the OAU (Organization of African
Unity) annual "summit" at the Congolese capital of
Kinshasa. President Mobutu made up his mind that by
the time these other African leaders arrived as his
guests, he would have cleared the ledger of the Congo's
embarrassments. The Katangese copper mines would C The colonel was stopped at Kinshasa on his way
be firmly in the Congo's own hands. The country's TTack__ and closely interrogated, but was finally allowed
security would be guaranteed. The white mercenaries
would have disappeared. And Mobutu determined that
another account also would be closed in time for the.
September deadline.: that of Moise Tshombe.
While Tshombe plotted away in his Madrl vj I,
regu ar y the the utu regime on tale t, the
"Congolese government wassecii g to use against
him some of his own medicine. The State Department
has officially denied Tshombe's allegation before the
Algerian Supreme Court that the CIA actually laid on
the kidnap plot on Mobutu's behalf. It may well not
have done so, since an able and energetic man like'
Bernardin Mungul-Kiaka, then the Congolese resident
minister of state in Brussels, would have been perfectly
capable of making the necessary contacts on his own
account. The'informal American position is that Presi-
dent Mobutu confessed responsibility to the Americans
year. Since Tshombe was living in Madrid he was in-
vited, through the Spanish government, either to at-
tend trial in person, or send a representative to present
his defense. The invitation was ignored. Tshombe was
condemned to death. Arrangements were secretly made
to ensure that the sentence be executed in Kinshasa.
It was originally intended that Tshombe be produced
in Kinshasa on June 8. He would be kidnapped and
brought through Algiers but there would be no pub-
licity until his arrival in the Congolese capital. A num-
. ber of agents had been commissioned for the task so
that if one scheme failed another could be attempted.
Mungul-Kiaka, who had just been. appointed secretary-
general of President Mobutu's brand-new political
party the MPR, was in Algiers in the last days of May
to prepare the ground. Only three top Algerians knew
of the plot: President Boumedienne, the Minister of
Justice and the Chef de Surete. Apparently the Con-
golese were satisfied that these three would forward
the "package" to Kinshasa without publicity or delay.
The first deadline passed because the first version of
the plot misfired. The next intention was to unveil
Tshombe in Kinshasa on June 30, Congo's Independ-
ence Day. In fact it was not until that day that he
was seized, over the Mediterranean.
Tshombe's own plotting had by now reached a
fairly advanced stage. According to General Mobutu's
subsequent statement, Colonel Denard had been to
see Tshombe in February, at Madrid. Denard took elab-
orate steps to conceal the visit, but Mobutu claims to
have received news of it (presumably through the
back to Kisangani.
Probably at this point Mobutu decided to abandon
a scheme he had hitherto approved. This was that the
large, remote but highly fertile areas in the far east
which were hardest to keep pacified were to be settled
and administered by carefully selected Europeans who
would have a reserve military obligation in case of
further trouble from the left-wing rebels. The pilot
scheme had been launched by the Belgian ex-planter,
Major Jean Schramme, in the Punia/Lobutu area.. No
doubt reluctantly, since Denard and Schramme seemed
to offer the most effective answer to the danger from
the left, Mobutu concluded that they themselves con-
stituted an unacceptable security risk from the right.
They too would have to go.
Meanwhile Tshombe had become persuaded that
Madrid was not a secure place for him. Some of his
contacts refused to meet him there for fear of the
immediately after the hijacking of Tshombe. CIA and, ironically enough, recommended Majorca.
Last March the Congolese government put Tshombe shombe appears to have put out the contract for
on trial (in absentia) before a military tribunal, along- overthrowing Mobutu . to competitive tender. There
side Katangese officers and one civilian held directly were at least two plans, one of them predominantly
rA tC ledoF -eRAbRi i Qt4 9VA?he }Az P69B ,t8M?r1j Q { &4+$ Rhodesian/South Af-
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SEPTEMBER 16, -1967
rican. The former' concentrated on reestablishing a Whichever was true, there can be no doubt about the
base for Tshombe in Katanga, the latter on a sharp, toughness of Algerian bargaining in the event. When
quick operation, using 300 men operating in ? small Mungul-Kiaka was sent to collect the prize, he found
commandos, to take Kinshasa in one blow. that every time he raised the matter the price was in-
Tshombe had been to Majorca more than once, to creased. In the end Algeria -insisted not only on a com=
meet those who were putting up schemes, to debate plete diplomatic and military breach between the
the details, to call for progress on preliminary arrange- Congo and Israel, but also on a total realignment of
ments, to play one entrepreneur off against another. the Congo's international posture in the UN and else-
Francis Bodenan, the French ex-convict, appears to have where, and a general amnesty of left-wing politicians
been in the thick of all this plotting. He was certainly like Gbenye, Gizenga, Mulele and Soumialot and the
an agent of the Congolese government. What is not thousands of simba guerrillas who took refuge in coup-
clear is whether his involvement with Tshombe's tries bordering on the Congo.
schemes was a cover or whether he himself did not One need hardly elaborate on the effect which a
decide until the very last moment which side he was combination of such a left-wing amnesty and the execu-
going to serve.' It is only possible to obtain a one- tion of Moise Tshombe would have on American public
sided account of the transactions on the critical day, 'opinion. The Johnson Administration would be unable
June 30, at Palma, because the other parties are in- . to give further support, to the Mobutu regime. A breach
carcerated in Algeria. with the Israelis would also be no merely symbolic
In the morning, apparently, Tshombe indicated loss: it was in Israel that General Mobutu himself
clearly that he was going to accept the scheme for a passed out as a paratrooper while he was Chief of Staff
direct attack on Kinshasa. Denard and Schramme would of the Congolese National Army, and, both in Israel
simultaneously take over Kisangani and Bukavu. While and the Congo, Israeli instructors have been more ef-
the white commandos would be enough to dispose of fective than those of any other nation in training Con-
Mobutu and his leading supporters and secure the key golese officers and troops. It is indeed on his Israeli-
points in the capital, Katangese troops would need to trained paracommandos that Mobutu depends.
be flown in to provide a sufficient garrison for the city. What the Algerian demands amounted to was that
There was some discussion about terms, the date for the Congolese president should create an unbridgeable
the operation and the deposit of cash in advance. gulf between himself and his two most reliable friends,
Tshombe promised to complete these transactions that the United States and Israel. Mobutu was prepared to
evening on his return. He did not return. ' make some symbolic gestures at the UN as payment
Tshombe was kidnapped in midair and arrived, a on account - he publicly repudiated his UN ambassador
prisoner, in Algiers. The event, if not the date, would for having voted the wrong way on one of the mo-
have been no surprise to President Bournedienne. But tions on the Arab-Israeli war that was before the Gen-
the circumstances were quite different from those which eral Assembly, and later the Congo appeared in un-
had been anticipated. In between there had occurred the usual company for one or two such votes. But he was
traumatic experience for the whole Arab world of the not prepared to go further, all the less so in that, five
crushing six days' defeat at the hands of Israel. The days after Tshombe's seizure, the mercenaries in the
Arab states - and particularly Algeria which was mov- Congo struck in Kisangani and Bukavu more or less
ing to take over the nationalist leadership from Egypt according to their part in the plans which Tshombe
- were casting around for any diplomatic weapon with had been considering. In this emergency, President
which to compensate for their military catastrophe. Mobutu appealed for support from the United States.
Moreover, the original scheme had provided for This came swiftly in the form of a US Strike Command
Tshombe's secret transfer through Algiers to Kinshasa. unit of three C13os. It was hardly the moment to
What had not been foreseen was that the British co- choose to offend the Americans.
pilot would be able to get out radio messages stating
what was happening and confirming that Tshombe A .Nice Quiet Execution
was on board. It was therefore no longer possible to
keep Tshombe's presence in Algiers a secret. Americans have long been divided into two camps
It is possible that President Boumedienne had on the Congo, some believing that only a regime in
planned all along, ever since first hearing about the which Tshombe takes part can bring stability, while
matter from Mungul-Kiaka, to exact a high political others are prepared to go all the way with the "Binza
price from President Mobutu for forwarding his pris- group" (General Mobutu, Justin Bomboko, Victor
oner. It is equally possible that he had intended to Nendaka). The US Embassy at Kinshasa, while no
cooperate fully with the plot but that the absence of doubt forwarding Mobutu private advice not to exe-
secrecy combined with the excitable atmosphere cre- ' cute Tshombe, did not give the impression of being
ated byphpe edJG. or a war ma~gOt ij~ gs$i~,l~A-Rlr ' 3g'~l dtTZ > Bas rejected. The
A rovess .Ea lease Lu
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THE. NEW REPUBLIC
arrest had caused sufficient confusion among the anti-
Mobutu, pro-Tshombe plotters - for example, about
who can obtain access to that Swiss bank account - to
prevent anything untoward happening in Kinshasa
this month. But it would have been unwise to count
. on it. Mobutu and his backers, including the State De-
partment and the CIA, were having a worrying time.
Nigeria's Civil War
Tshombe's own tribe in Katanga.
The tone, however, changed perceptibly, as it was Racial antagonisms afflict the whole southern half of
'borne in upon the State Department how serious were Africa, sections of which are peeling like an onion,
the political requirements being laid down by the Al- tribe from tribe.
gerians. In effect, Mobutu was being told that since he Thus Biafra - formerly Eastern Nigeria - seized in-
was asking for this favor as between one "revolutionary dependence May 30, after a year of partly chosen,
African" and another, let him start behaving as if he partly imposed isolation and on July 7, the self-pro-
really was a "revolutionary African." Mobutu did not claimed Republic of Biafra was invaded by the Ni-
take kindly to this treatment. While on the one hand gerian army.
slapping down. anyone like the unfortunate Tanzanian Nigeria is principally big on people - 6 2..5 million
ambassador, who delivered a plea for Tshombe's life, of them, increasing by nearly i.5 million yearly. One
Mobutu made his reaction to political blackmail abun- black African in four is a Nigerian. Now Nigeria is
dantly clear. In an exclusive interview with (of all in the midst of a savage civil war with overtones of
people) the Agence France Presse, he managed at one , genocide.
and the same time to denounce "international high fi- At the mention of disassembling large political units,
nance" for its interference in the Congo, and to praise bells seem to go off in the American mind. After all,
the United States to the skies for having been the one America's own example shows that former colonies
disinterested force in the Congo ever since ig60. Soon can successfully amalgamate. But idealizing on this one
afterwards, he made the entire diplomatic corps in Kin-. example is reaching for a law within the core of an
shasa turn out to see him invested with the Order of exception. The 13 American colonies were monolingual
the Auspicious Clouds, by the foreign minister of the and monoreligious; more important, they had just
Republic of China on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek. And been united by the adversity and idealism of war against
Mobutu appeared for this ceremony wearing his Is- a common enemy.
raeli paratroopers' wings prominently on his uniform. - The achievement of Turkish, British, French, Portu-
But President Mobutu's main concern was still with guese and Belgian colonial rules was to systematize
the rapidly approaching September deadline. On Sep- z,ooo African principalities and 5,000 languages into a
tember x4, the seventh anniversary of his first coup, mere 50 countries and half a dozen language groups.
when he blocked Patrice Lumumba's struggle to retain To expect that these artificial entities will all survive
power, Mobutu was scheduled to receive his distin- the withdrawal of colonial force is unreasonable - nor,
guished OAU guests in an entirely new suburb of Kin- apparently, is any reason ever produced why anything
shasa which had been specially built to accommodate,. morethan economic integration is required.
them. Less than'i5o miles away is the border with To paraphrase de Gaulle, the goal should now be
Portuguese Angola, from which any desperate attempt, I'Afrique des patries.Scandinavia, Benelux and even
by mercenaries to disrupt the conference would be' EEC work because they are economic, not political,
most likely to come. For weeks and months, wherever confederations. Africa has tried its hand at unifying
ex-Congolese mercenaries gathered together - in Brus- sovereignties: limping federations exist between Eng-
sels, in London's Earl's Court, in Salisbury, Johannes- lish and French Cameroons, between Tanganyika and
burg and presumably amongst Schramme's force in Zanzibar and between British Somaliland and Italian
Bukavu - fantasies were woven about the theme of a Somalia: of these, only the latter has a reasonable
dashing assault on the "OAU precinct" just as the chance of survival - because it is monotribal. Mali
conference was assembling. Perhaps equally damaging grouped first four, then three, then two countries, then
to Mobutu, politically, would be an attack, even of a only one. Guinea-Ghana Union never progressed be-
less ambitious kind, just before the conference was yond the stage of a communique. The ambitious pan-
due to start, causing heads of state hastily Co cancel Africanisms of colonial governors - Nigeria, the
Americans' main anxiety seemed to be that there should
not be a public execution (as there had been of
Tshombe's immediate successor as prime minister,
Evariste Kimba) and, since Mobutu's own sampling
of Congolese public opinion had convinced him that
this would be counter-productive, they were fairly con-
fident of carrying their point. But a nice quiet execu-
tion in private immediately after Tshombe's delivery
from Algiers would not cause much of a stir and would
be regretted by few except for some sections of
"1{eree~w as1 some reason ~E 2040. 1/0t5 Ts bRPP6b S36~S b Op 8 O0 ELL WARREN HowE